The Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations in the Post-Cold War Era
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Topical Issues
Author - Major Chih-ping Cheng
The Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations in the Post-Cold War Era
foreword
Toward the end of 1989 east European and Soviet communist blocs disintegrated in succession. This prompted a shift in the East-West confrontation as American and Soviet leaders met on the island of Malta to pronounce the end of the cold war. The world then entering a post-cold war period, the advent of which unavoidably would have enormous impact on the evolution of relations between mainland China and Taiwan. Basically, cross-strait relations cannot evolve beyond the context of international society. Such relations will proceed parallel to the changing world event. All the variables in the post-cold war era could have immediate effect upon relations between the two sides of Taiwan Straits.
Nonetheless, seen in another perspective cross-strait relations are so unique they may not be entirely linked to happenings in the world sense. In this dependent from the world community. Therefore, even when nations of the world are in the post-cold aspects remain confrontational, at times rejection each other as the atmosphere of cold war lingers.
Current relations across Taiwan strait seem to be caught in a dilemma of the two parties trying to unite while struggling. Both sides want to be friendly yet neither trusts the other in a state of suspicion and anxiety. Communist China's policy toward Taiwan has consistently been designed from a strategic viewpoint. Taiwan should do likewise elevating cross-strait relations to the strategic level for disposition. Accordingly , we will assess such post-cold war relations and strategic views and hope to come up with some proposals for future development of cross-strait relations.
Post-Cold War Characteristics
Post-cold war period differs entirely from the years when the two superpowers were at loggerheads. The following is an analysis on several points:
1. Bipolar confrontation to multipolar competition:
During the cold war years, the fundamental structure of international political powers saw confrontation of two major camps led by the United States and the USSR. The bipolar confrontational era ended with the collapse of East Europe and Soviet communist regimes.
The breakup of the Soviet empire left Russia in an untenable position, no longer able to play the role of a superpower. Its economy on the verge of collapse, Russia must seek cooperation and support from the west. For its counterpart, the United States with economic recession at home and influenced by domestic opinions are incapable and unwilling to play "World cop" alone. On the other hand, Germany, Japan and Europe are rising in strength. The international power structure is moving toward the direction of multipolarization.
2. Economic and trade relations has become the axis of international politics:
The dissolution of communist states and their economic distress rendered meaningless ideological or military contests. How to get out of the economic plight is the main theme for these countries . East-west economic cooperation is now the name of the game. The watershed between capitalism and communism hinges on whether economic development will succeed. Economic and trade relations become one of the most important ingredients governing relations between nations. The strength of economy and trade is a crucial indicator in measuring the power of a nation.
3. Revival of rational civilization:
The history of mankind is one that records the process toward rational civilization. In the 20th century the mainstream of rational civilization is liberty, democracy and human rights. The failure of communism once again proves that any systems or lifestyle in contradiction to human nature and the evolvement of history will eventually be swept away by the tides of time. The experiences of East Europe and the Soviet Union made very clear that communist governments must switch to market economy and democratic rule, or be inexorably dragged to the fate of demise.
4. Negotiation instead of squaring off:
As ideologies gradually converge in post-cold war era and the need arises for economic development, East-West cooperation has grown to be a salient feature. Collaboration between the United States and Russia and integration of East Europe with Western European nations help in the course of world peace. Resolving disputes through international negotiations and collective consultations is the modus operandi to address post-cold war issues.
5. The trend of regional alignment:
Formation of a European community following the integration of Europe in 1992 has generated momentous repercussions in global politics and economy. The European community is now a collective force to be reckoned with in world politics, it is also exerting tremendous influence on other nations economically. Economic blocs and collective negotiations is the vogue in the post-cold war years . The United States with Canada and Mexico formed the North America Free Trade Area and joined Asian-Pacific nations in pushing Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum , using these mechanisms to counter any possible economic inroads from the European Community . Regional alignment of economic bodies is very much in evidence these days.
6. Nationalism growing apace:
In the years of the cold war, issues involving nationalism were more or less suppressed by governments or kept in low profile. With communist totalitarianism going under, the long pent-up sentiments of nationalism have burst forth. Even in democratic countries, as societies open up, nationalism is being used as a tool to campaign for political power. The upshots are civil wars in Yugoslavia, ethnic problems in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States . The United State, Canada and Great Britain also face controversies of racial conflict.
Effect of Strategic Environments on cross-Strait Relation:
1. Diminishing significance of "Red China card" :
The end of the cold war ushered in an era of cooperation between USA and Russia. The use of Red China card by western nations, the United States in particular , to check the Soviet Union is not valid any more. To the contrary , western nations regarded communist China's nuclear test explosion in June 1994 and its uninterrupted effort to expand armament as a potential threat to their security . Strategically speaking , the China card has already lost its appeal . The United States and its western allies may now want to ask: who is their new imaginary adversary ? After the Soviet Union is gone , whence the possible source of security threat to them ? Judging by western nations' changing attitude on situations across the Taiwan straits ,the answer should be very obvious.
2. "Taiwan card " gaining importance:
The crumbling framework of bipolar standoff in post-cold war era enabled Taiwan to have greater room in which to maneuver in terms of international activity. Instead of relying on the United States for subsistence , Taiwan is now more independent to exercise its diplomacy. Additionally, the growing importance of trade has elevated the status of Taiwan for its economic clout. Consequently, Taiwan was able to improve or upgrade bilateral ties with nations of the world. A case in point is the recent revision of policy by the United States permitting Taiwan's "Coordinating Council for North American Affairs" to be renamed "Taipei Economic and cultural Representative Office" and allowing visits by President Lee to Cornell University.
3. Cross - strait interflow and negotiations:
The improvement of relations across the straits can be traced to the late 1970s. In order to attract world attention to their relatively pragmatic policies after the death of Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communists on January 1, 1979 released a "message to Taiwan compatriots" It proposed " peaceful unification" and " direct postal service, navigation and commerce. " Temporarily they dropped shelling Kinmen and Matsu island. It was united front strategy on Taiwan to coincide with Beijing's setting up diplomatic ties with Washington. The overture did not bring about substantive exchanges across the strait.
Cross-strait relations turned a new leaf when Taiwan gave the green light for its citizens to visit their relatives on the mainland as of November 2,1987. In September 1990 a " National Unification Committee" was established at the Presidential Mansion. January 1991 saw the promulgation of " National Unification Guidelines" specifying three stages for reuniting the mainland with Taiwan . The three stages are : short term (exchange and mutually benefiting ),middle term (mutual trust and cooperation ) and long term (consultation and reunification). During the stage of exchange for mutual benefit, Taiwan actively pushed for interflow in academic, culture , science and technology, sports, economic trade and press. Official statistics showed that , ending June 1993,4,600,000 travelers from Taiwan headed for the mainland, cross- strait trade (via third country )topped US$25.6 billion, over 10,000 Taiwanese businesses invested in the mainland totaling upwards of US$6.4 billion, 64 million letters were mailed both ways. Cross strait exchanges are getting more frequent with each passing day.
Because of numerous problems arising from such exchanges needed to be resolved, from April 27-29 , 1993 top leaders of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and mainland's Association for Relation Across Taiwan Straits (ARATS) held meeting in Singapore. It was the first such meeting by a civic body with government authorization in more than 40 years between Taiwan and the mainland. Similar meetings were subsequently held in Beijing and Taipei, indicating that cross-strait exchanges and talks were being systemized and normalized.
4. Regional economization in trade relations:
Economy is the driving force behind development and breakthrough of cross-strait relations Deng Xiaoping's mainland China has undoubtedly " put economy in command " . Taiwan is well-known for its booming economy, with trade as the key to its success on which its subsistence relies. Taiwan needs the mainland market, as well as the raw material and cheap labors available there. Conversely, mainland requires Taiwan's capital , technology and expertise. Economic trade has thus become the backbone in bilateral relations, from which derive a variety of links.
Emerging from these growing trade relations is the possibility for Taiwan, coastal mainland and HongKong to forge a regional economic zone. Many scholars and practitioners began studying the feasibility of a "Greater China Economic Sphere "Economic trade relations between Taiwan and the mainland could well formulate into a regional economic body. Viewing the trend of Asian Pacific development, both Taiwan and mainland are indispensable components in the region's economic entity, as exemplified in their being integrated in the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. The strengthening of trade relations and interaction in regional economic organization are conducive to fostering a consensus on " mutual reliance " and improving understanding and trust of each other .
5. Nationalism via-a-vis cross-strait relations:
The rising tide of nationalism in various countries after the cold war and the ongoing democratization in the Republic of China are spawning an indigenous variety of nationalist sentiments in Taiwan. Although the envisioned " Taiwan nationalism " has yet to be finalized in concrete form , already evident is that it is developing in several different trats. The first kind is more radical, whose advocates deny Taiwanese as Chinese, politically tilted to Taiwan independence to completely sever ties with the mainland. Only a small minority in Taiwan go for this line of thought . The second type is for American model . Despite the fact that people in Taiwan and mainland use the same language and are of the same stock, they see the two sides differ in many ways after being ruled separately for several scores of years. Following America's break from British rule, Taiwan should establish itself as a new and independent nation . The majority of members of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DDP) embrace this idea. The overwhelming majority of people in Taiwan espouse the third kind of view, that Taiwanese are Chinese and that Taiwan's history, culture even its future cannot be divorced from the mainland . For this reason, Taiwan should maintain close and friendly relations with the mainland, maintain status quo politically and put off for the time being the issue of reunification or independence. Clamors for Taiwan independence, either they grow stronger or subside, will have a crucial effect on cross-strait relations.
Despite the divergence of views held by Taiwanese people, to pursue national dignity for the 21 million population in Taiwan remains a common desire, a common ground for the so-called Taiwan nationalism . By contrast, the Chinese Communists have little to feel concern about with regard to nationalism in handling cross-strait relations. But we must keep one thing in mind, that some hardliners "great China nationalists" in Beijing may lose patience worrying about the increasing demand for Taiwan independence and call for resolving the Taiwan problem by force without further delay. These are factors that might cast a shadow over cross-strait relations.
Strategic Overview of Cross-Strait Relations
In developing mutual relations, mainland China and Taiwan each follow their own strategic designs. They face different strategic outlooks with points of advantage and disadvantage.
Communist China's strategic goal at the current stage is " peace unification" . CCP General Secretary Giang Zemin in his report at the 14th Party Congress outlined his Taiwan policy in part as : Steadfastly abiding by the formula of " peaceful unification, one nation two systems" to bring about reunification of the fatherland. Similar contents appeared in Premier Li Peng's government work report to the first session of the 8th National People's Congress on March 15,1993. this goes to show " peaceful unification" as the fundamental strategic goal of Red China's Taiwan policy with " one nation two systems" as the principal strategic means. That "one nation two systems" should be put forth was mainly designed to fulfill the following strategic missions: (1) Make Taiwan's economic development and technology complement mainland's economy to accelerate the four modernizations. (2) The " one nation two systems " pitch is for domestic consumption to suit the principle of " peaceful coexistence. " In this connection, Beijing hopes to convert Taiwan in the direction of socialism under conditions of " one nation two systems. " (3) Sensitive issues like sovereignty and territory will give way to " one nation two systems" and be shelved.
Under the overall strategic concept of " one nation two systems, "Communist China's tactics would include: (1) Three communications (commerce, navigation, postal service )and four exchanges (academic, culture, sports, science and technology ). (2) Strengthen civilian associations across the straits to force open the official channel. (3) Relentless effort to isolate Taiwan internationally, despite improved cross-strait relations. Beijing regards cross-strait exchanges as domestic affair but will not budge an inch on sovereignty of China in relation to Taiwan's foreign diplomacy . Attempts by Taiwan to join the United Nations, its request for the UN to set up a special committee to study the issue of ROC representation have all been blocked at the UN General Affairs Committee by Communist China. (4) By using Taiwan's capital and technology to help boost economy in mainland, Beijing is counting on the eventuality when Taiwan will find itself helplessly dependent on mainland China in economy. That situation will be to Beijing's advantage as Taipei could then be compelled to make political concessions. (5) Taking advantage of cross-strait exchanges, Chinese Communists have been wooing people of various strata from Taiwan to cultivate them as Red China's spokesmen in diverse societies of Taiwan . At a Mainland Work Conference n June 1994, Director General Ying Tsung-wen of ROC's National Security Bureau presented his views as the aforesaid. (6) The threat of force remains. Very good at double-face tactics, Chinese Communists are more than willing to facilitate cross-strait exchanges, but do their level best to block Taiwan's maneuver in the international arena . They harp on "peaceful unification" as premises for relations between the two shores, yet they do not rule out using force against Taiwan if it should move toward independence. (7) They undertake various types of talks to keep contact with Taiwan, so as to defeat the" three no" policy, a long-standing taboo in ROC. Meanwhile, they deem all talks as political negotiations ,make a lot of hullabaloo to create a strategic condition favorable to them.
As regards the Chinese communist strategic situations, they enjoy superiority in the following: (1) With vast expanse of land area, rich resources and a large populations, China is a big country having great potential of development. It has diplomatic ties with 159 countries. (2) Red China has 3 million men in the military force, 9,200 tanks, 5,830 fighter planes as compared to Taiwan's 440,000 plus, 539 tanks and 516 planes; not to mention the numerous submarines and nuclear weapons in Beijing's possession. In terms of armament, China is vastly superior over Taiwan . (3) Mainland China is a market attractive to the whole world, more so to Taiwanese of the same Chinese race and culture. Taiwan's investment in mainland exceeded those of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and Indochina Peninsula countries combined. Economically, Taiwan is increasingly dependent on mainland. This enables Beijing to exert influence on its trade relations with Taiwan, even extending to the domain of political affairs.
However, mainland China also has the following weaknesses: (1) Still a poor and backward economy, its national income counting government subsidies is only US$1,680 versus Taiwan's US$12,500. Minus the subsidy for the people the figure is down to US$490, only one-20th of Taiwan's . Meanwhile, in 1993 Taiwan posted an external trade volume amounting to US$161 billion against mainland China's Us$196 billion. A tiny small country like Taiwan lacking natural resources showed its economic muscle by chalking up an annual trade figure almost equal to that of the colossal mainland. (2)Politically unstable, China relies on paramount leader Deng Xiaoping to maintain a semblance of political stability. Deng is in his doddering age, once he is gone it is anybody's guess whether a power struggle would lead to internal turmoil. Additionally, more than 40 years of communist rule has incurred the wrath of many. Malcontents and dissidents constantly agitate for the right to freedom and democracy. The June 4 Tiananmen incident has demonstrated that when there is opportunity prodemocracy activists, particularly intellectuals, could rally and trigger another democracy uprising in the mainland. last but not the least, the military and some of the conservatives long unsatisfied with the policy of Deng, may be waiting for the wings to act after his demise. Aside from these elements, runaway inflation in economy and the unemployed population often on the move could also create social disturbances.
(3) The Chinese Communists are notorious for human rights violations. Bad human rights record is taking the edge out of their diplomatic advantage and the main reason for their conflicts with western nations in international diplomacy. The much less than desired track record in human rights not only has affected dealings with western countries, it is also a worrisome factor in political stability at home.
Now a look at the strategic situation Taiwan is in. Its strategic objectives are still aimed at reunification, as evident in the "National Reunification Guidelines" approved by authorities. The strategic approach during the era of Chiang Ching-kuo stressed "reunify China with the Three Principles of the People." The incumbent President Lee Teng-hui tends to emphasize reunifying China with peace, freedom and democracy. Whichever it is going to be the Three Principles or otherwise, Taiwan clearly wants to bring about a " peaceful transformation" in mainland China.
Steered by the strategic idea of "peaceful transformation, "Taiwan encourages various types of interflow across the straits, hoping that through civilian exchanges more people on the mainland would come to realize the meaning of liberty and democracy, to recognize factors behind the Taiwan experience of success, to identify with the system and lifestyle of Taiwan to lay the groundwork of consensus for the reunification of China.
Besides encouraging interchanges on unofficial level , Taiwan's mainland policy basically calls for forging a peace and steady relationship between the two shores through contacts, exchanges or even bilateral negotiations . Although not opposed to developing close links in economic trade, for security considerations Taiwan would not want to be overly reliant upon the mainland. On the diplomatic front, it attempts to circumvent Beijing's interdiction by applying "dual recognition" in the hope of getting a fair treatment in the world community.
Taiwan is strategically superior in the following (1) Economic strength in terms of per capita income surpasses the mainland by far, total trade volume is almost equal to Communist China with foreign exchange reserves ranking second largest in the world. All these give a comfortable edge to Taiwan in competing with Beijing. (2) Democratic politics in Taiwan, though still some way to go before maturing, are doing quite well as opposed to the mainland. Democratization in Taiwan has won the support of people at home and contributed to improved images of Taiwan which cannot fail to gain international approval. (3)Notwithstatnding Taiwan is in an untenable position on the diplomatic front, the "Taiwan card" is like a blue-chip in the stock market that has a bright prospect over the long term. Seen in this light, it is an irreversible trend that Taiwan will gradually gain access to and be accepted in the international society.
Nonetheless, Taiwan has some unenviable disadvantages as well: (1) Internal wrangling over the issue whether to seek reunification or opt for independence is generating a dissension on the home front. Consequently, in dealing with external affairs a unanimous stand is not possible, as reflected in talks with the mainland and in the bid to joint the United Nations. (2) Diplomatic isolation remains a matter of much concern for Taiwan despite efforts in recent years to rejoin the world community through pragmatic diplomacy. Beijing is doing everything possible to restrain or block Taipei's maneuver on the international stage. (3) Although an economic power in its own right, Taiwan's dependence on the mainland in this respect is increasing steadily. According to official statistics, the degree of reliance for trade with the mainland was 0.25% in 1979, soaring to 5.36% in 1993. On the other side of the coin, mainland's reliance on Taiwan in trade registered 0.27% in 1997, up to 4.44% in 1993, the latest figure lower than that of Taiwan. The growing dependence on the mainland subjects Taiwan to greater influence from the other side. (4) In military power Taiwan lags far Behind the Mainland. It expects to take delivery of 150 F-16's on order from the United States and 60 Mirage_2000's from France in 1996, at which time Beijing may lose air superiority. However, Taiwan still needs to beef up its overall armed strength so as to defend itself against possible invasion from across the strait. All in all, we can summarize cross-strait relations by their specific characteristics thusly:
1. Stop war with peace, secure peace with war:
Exchanges, contacts and economic cooperations across the strait work to the benefit of both sides, they must be conducted in an environment of peace and stability. Keeping "peace" to prevent the outbreak of war is mutually profitable in terms of developing economy and carrying on constructions.
But there is an element of "war" in cross-strait relations. Here we must redefine the manning of "war" relative to such relations. Rather than a war using conventional military force, it is a battle waged in the forms of trade, dialogue and diplomacy aimed at winning over the opponent to "secure peace with war" or even "bring the other guy to heel."Both sides continue to build up their military might preparing for war, a small scale armament competition has been going on for sometime. Even now and then the Chinese Communists make the assertion they will not" abandon the use of force against Taiwan. "Cross-strait relations are interspersed with elements of "peace" and "war."
2. Diplomatic contest and economic cooperation:
Economically the two sides complement one another in a cooperation to their mutual benefit, so much so that they depend on each other for profits. On diplomacy they are locked in a struggle, a king of "zero-sum game" vying for living space to the other's disadvantage. The recent see-saw battle over Taiwan's United Nations bid and President Lee's visit to the U.S. clearly reflects the incompatibility of the two shores on the diplomatic issue.
3. One China with two political entities:
In reality both sides insist there is only one China. But this China has divided into two political realities, one known as the Republic of China, the other called the People's Republic of China. Over the past 40 years neither has exercised rule over people in the other side's territory. It remains a ticklish problem in cross-strait relations on how to address in a more pragmatic approach the existing status quo for ultimately integrating and unifying the two political entities.
4. Identical objectives with different means:
Both sides agree China should be reunified, only they differ on how to go about it. Taiwan is for a China reunified under the principles of freedom, democracy and equal distribution of wealth. Mainland wants "one nation two systems" to let socialism and the three principles of the people coexist , with the Chinese Communists running the central government and Taiwan regarded as a local administration. It calls for continued communications between the two sides to hammer out an accord on the eventuality of reunification.
Problems of Cross-Strait Relations and Prospects
People cannot but feel deeply impressed with the development of cross-strait relations in nearly 7 years since Taiwan threw open the door for its residents to go visit their relatives in mainland China. During the past seven years, we notice such relations still in an awkward state of "unite" and "struggle." The ongoing relations may seem gratifying, there are problems galore. They include:
1. The international status of ROC on Taiwan:
Under the "one China" principle both sides agree to , the mainland deems this one China as People's Republic of China. According to traditional international law, a nation can only have one representation which is inseparable. On this basis the Chinese Communists cannot possibly allow Taiwan to retain the status as an international legal person, much less to enjoy equal status as PRC internationally . In other word, as the Chinese Communists see it, Taiwan is nothing but a province of PRC which can have room in international activities only with the consent of PRC.
Holding different views, Taiwan regards the "one China" as a reference to the Republic of China founded since 1912, having jurisdictions over the whole China. The reality is that China has split into two parts and been administered separately for more than four decades. Mainland is part of China just as Taiwan is part of China. In another word, Taiwan considers "one China "the goal both sides are pursuing, reunification of China. A China divided remains a fact at the current stage. Foreign Minister Frederick Chien has put forward his theory of "separate sovereignty" which practically means both Taiwan and mainland from the integral parts of whole China. But ROC as an independent country does possess adequate conditions to represent its 21 million population in the world community and is entitled to full international legitimacy. Therefore, ROC will never stop making efforts to rejoin the international society enjoying the rights of a sovereign state it fully deserves.
If the two sides cannot come to a common ground on the sovereignty issue, if no compromises can be reached on the international standing of Taiwan, we will see every year a repeat of incidents like Beijing's opposition to Lee Teng_hui's participation the Hiroshima Asian games and barring Taiwan from joining the UN. Whenever such incidents happened, the goodwill and trust between the two sides would be impaired. The more pressure on Taiwan from Beijing, the greater reaction from Taiwanese against the Chinese Communists. It can only offer more excuses for advocates of Taiwan independence to clamor for their cause, thereby alienation cross-strait relations and making the goal of reunification even harder to achieve.
2. International factors in cross-strait relations:
In the instances of nations divided after the war, Vietnam was unified by the use of force as North Vietnam annexed South Vietnam. Reunification of Germany through peaceful means was made possible with the full support of USSR, USA, United Kingdom and France. Whether world nations will endorse reunification of China is still an unanswered question. Should international attitude agree with what the United States has said, unification must be settled by Chinese of both sides through peaceful means, the future of cross-strait relations will be determined by the Chinese themselves. But if major powers in the world are not very eager to see a reunified China, such relations could face an uncertain future.
3. Divergence and confrontation of nationalism:
As previously mentioned, a type of indigenous nationalism is being quietly developed in Taiwan. More or less influenced by the so-called "localization" policy, these nationalist sentiments stress "Taiwanese consciousness" and "Taiwanese dignity." If Beijing continues its high-handed treatment of Taiwan with "big China chauvinism," the upshot could be pitting Taiwan nationalism against Bid Brother China. Should that kind of scenario materialize, Communist China would have to worry not only about the Taiwan independence advocates, but also those who go for maintaining the status quo , who are lukewarm about reunification yet strongly pro-Taiwan nationalism.
Despite problems lurking cross-strait relations, the Chinese are known for their patience and wisdom and we believe both sides should address these problems in the following directions with sustained efforts:
1. Blending to bring about unification:
The world history has many different modes of reunification . In some cases there is the use of force, in others the pattern of union or commonwealth is followed. Still there is reunification through blending or fusion. This means for the people of two shores to blend with one another through contacts and exchanges which would in time gradually produce a willingness and common recognition, so that when political and economic conditions are ripe reunification will come about naturally. this is what we aspire to attain hopefully without resorting to the use of force.
In political science there is the so-called Spill-Over theory, a reference to reaching agreement on civic, non-political affairs to cultivate mutual goodwill and trust before moving onto official, political negotiations . The experience so accumulated will help in the attainment of reunification. This is exactly what the two side should do in a show of faith and good-will to nurture a trust between them. Try every means possible to reach agreements in talks about matters on hand. The process will eventually prove instrumental to hammering out accord at official and political negotiations in the future.
Additionally , responsible persons of civil bodies handling cross-strait relations on both sides should use caution in their public statements affecting bilateral ties, so as not to ruin the good relationship achieved so far through hard work. A case in point is Tang Shubei, vice president of mainland China's Association for relations Across the Strait (ARATS). At a Chinese community meeting in San Francisco in September, 1994, Tang criticized Lee Teng-hui's National Reunification Guidelines as a pretext to engage in Taiwan independence. He flatly rejected Taiwan's bids to rejoin the UN, set up ties with the US, or conduct vacation diplomacy. These harsh words bordering on threats can only draw strong repercussions from Taiwan and have negative effect on cross-strait cooperations in economy and trade are mutually rewarding to the Chinese on both sides. They should put aside ideological differences and devote all efforts in developing such links. By pressing ahead economic cooperation in a well planned manner, there will be a good chance for Taiwan, Hong Kong and coastal provinces of the mainland to be integrated in a "symbiosis of economic fat," before gradually moving toward political unity through economic convergence.
3. Truce on diplomatic front:
Scuffles on the diplomatic arena not only hamper the progress of cross-strait relations, they are also a waste of resources. Through consultations, both sides should attempt to seek a formula mutually acceptable on the international orientation of Taiwan. Beijing must not ignore the fact that the Republic of China has effectively ruled Taiwan for more than 40 years and is in possession of all conditions to qualify for a legitimate entity in the world community. Communist China's conceding to Taiwan having its own space of maneuvering on the world stage will help in realizing reunification, while on the other hand preclude any international interference from meddling in problems that concern the Chinese only.
4. Setting up a civilian "China Unification Research Committee":
Political restraint still keeps government agencies from undertaking objective planning and research on the subject of reunification . I would propose scholars on both sides to establish a research committee for the reunification of China empowered to do long term study and preparatory programming relative to major policies involving the sovereignty issue, Taiwan's international standing, economic cooperation, post-reunification systems, etc. Such open and candid studies by scholars hopefully could produce adequate suggestions on policies governing a wide range of affairs across the strait.
Conclusion
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Giang Zemin's eight-point policy toward Taiwan announced on January 30, 1995 drew a response from President Lee Teng-hui as he made a six-item proposition on normalizing cross-strait relations on April 8 at the National Reunification Council . Having pored through both statements, we could summarize the gist of their views as below:
1. Both espouse reunification and the principle of one China, yet obviously with different interpretation of "one China."
2. Both agree Chinese culture should be the foundation of peaceful reunification. Taiwan is also for further strengthening the exchange and cooperation in the cultural aspect.
3. Both sides call for stepping up exchange and cooperation in economy and trade. Taiwan , additionally , pledges to help fellow Chinese, willing to assist the mainland in developing agriculture for economic prosperity, in response to Giang Zemin's promise "Chinese will not fight against Chinese."
4. Leaders of both sides should meet, the mainland hoping for such meeting to take place on Chinese soil (Mainland or Taiwan) while Taiwan wants this to happen on the occasion of an international meeting .
5. For peaceful reunification, both sides wish to start negotiations on "terminating the state of hostility. "The mainland leaves the name, venue and form of such talks negotiable. Taiwan hopes Beijing would first renounce the use of force against Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu before starting talks. Red China will not comply, because it is concerned about interference by a foreign power and Taiwan's moving toward independence.
6. Lee's six items also cover the issue of Hong Kong and Macao designed to have a say on that matter and win the support of compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao.
Comparison of contents between Giang's eight points and Lee's six items further reflects cross-strait relations as in state of "unite and struggle." The two sides have some common grounds as well as confrontations. For cross-strait relations to move toward "more commongrounds than differences, more to communicate more frequently and to work together more closely. A meeting between leaders of both sides, in particular, is the key to a breakthrough. Perhaps the two sides could manage to meet at an international conference held in HongKong. That might be acceptable to both sides and might contribute in no small measure toward the realization of a peace reunification.
"The 21st century is a century of the Chinese" this is what we have heard so often of late. As the 20th century is drawing to a close, we see Taiwan, Hong Kong, Mainland and even Singapore prosper with booming economy that we cannot help feeling full of confidence ad expectations.
Whether the 21st century will really become a century of the Chinese depends on three things: (1) Can economic growth in mainland China be sustained so as to gradually bring about a rule of democracy? (2) Can the Chinese Chinese Communists exercise their wisdom in handling cross-strait relations with a farsighted, magnanimous approach, so that China can be reunited by peaceful means under the principles of freedom, democracy and equal distribution of wealth? (3) Can Taiwan extricate itself from the quandary of wrangling over the issue of reunification or independence, so that on the premises of "one China" and "peaceful reunification" relations across the straits can develop steadily? When the above said problems are satisfactorily resolved, with Chinese people in Taiwan, Hong Kong, mainland and even Singapore working hand in hand, the dream will come true that the Chinese will dominate the 21st century.
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