The Threat of Transnational Organized Crime to U.S. National Security: A Policy Analysis Using a Center of Gravity Framework.
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Topical Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Threat of Transnational Organized Crime to U.S. National Security: A Policy Analysis Using a Center of Gravity Framework.
Author: CDR Thomas S. Carlson, United States Navy
Thesis: Protecting the "friendly" center of gravity while attacking the criminal or "enemy" center of gravity is a balanced and comprehensive means of combating transnational organized crime, and U.S. policy is deficient in that respect.
Discussion: Transnational organized crime (TOC) constitutes a threat to world order by feeding the forces that drive instability. The infiltration of TOC into the fiber of the nation-state has infected the rule of law and displaced democratic interests with those based on greed, corruption and violence. The impact of transnational crime includes increased violence, taxes and social decay that threatens the prosperity, security and quality of life of U.S. citizens at home and abroad. The center of gravity of a Transnational criminal organization (TCO) is its net profit, and the center of gravity of the nation-state is governability. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 42 on international organized crime is directed at both the enemy and friendly centers of gravity, and establishes a policy framework that focuses on five critical areas: mone1y laundering, trade with "front companies", international assistance programs, legislation, and international cooperation. However, the transnational nature of international organized crime precludes any one nation from combating it, and the greatest challenge for the U.S. is enlarging the presence of legitimate governance in states like Russia and Colombia to close law enforcement gaps and eliminate criminal safe havens. The elements of international assistance and cooperation that are pivotal in achieving a global response to TOC within the center of gravity context are: political development, legal support, military-police assistance, intelligence sharing, nuclear control, and international anti-crime standards. The United Nations must evolve from a reactionary posture towards one of deterrence and prevention to serve as a "global catalyst" for international action against TOC. This requires reorganization and international consensus, which is particularly sensitive because nations are not likely to sacrifice individual sovereignty for the greater good of collective law enforcement.
Conclusions/Recommendations: PDD 42 is a good start towards achieving a global response to TOC, but the U.S. needs to follow it up with detailed policy. Subsequent policy should include a comprehensive engagement of Colombia that addresses the social, economic, political, and cultural dynamics in order to achieve an endstate that is consistent with U.S. and Colombian needs. The U.S. should encourage international commitment by seeking worldwide support for the UN Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan. Helping nations help themselves is the most effective way to achieve an international standard of law enforcement that can compete with the transnational criminal threat.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 1
The Nature of Transnational Organized Crime 4
General 4
Russian 8
Colombia 14
Centers of Gravity (COG) and Critical Vulnerabilities (CVs) 17
Friendly COG and CVs 19
Enemy COG and CVs 22
U.S. Policy: A Global Response 25
Political Development 25
Legal Support and Military-Police Assistance 33
Intelligence Sharing 37
Nuclear Control 45
Establishing International Anti-Crime Norms 46
Conclusion 51
Bibliography 56
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Introduction
The 1996 U.S. National Security Strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement" states:
International organized crime jeopardizes the global trend toward peace and freedom, undermines fragile new democracies, saps the strength from developing countries and threatens our efforts to build a safer, more prosperous world...[It] poses a direct threat to U.S. interests, particularly in light of the potential for the theft and smuggling by organized criminals of nuclear material [in the FSU]...[1]
The overall theme of the NSS as it relates to transnational crime is that the U.S. is inextricably linked to maintaining world order, and transnational crime constitutes a threat to world order by feeding the forces that drive instability. The term "transnational" is more appropriate than "global" or "international" because it implies the decreased significance of sovereign borders, and agility to transcend the jurisdiction of nation-states.[2] Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) indirectly upset the international distribution of power through arms sales, nuclear trafficking, and undermining the stability of governments. They are not bound by any agreements among nations that recognize sanctions or counter-proliferation control regimes, even though they rival the power and influence of some states.[3]
Domestic prosperity is tightly related to the global economy, and money laundering and other financial schemes perpetrated by transnational criminals on a large scale undermines the security of world financial markets.[4] Additionally, the increasing criminal control of parallel, illegal economies in the Third World spurns inflation and decreases legitimate business opportunities. The infiltration of transnational organized crime (TOC) into the fiber of the nation-state has infected the rule of law and displaced democratic interests with those based on greed, corruption and violence.[5] In the former Soviet Union crime and corruption have undermined the credibility of the new governments and the democratic reform process, resulting in growing support for a more authoritarian political environment.[6] The impact of transnational crime on the U.S. includes increased violence, taxes and social decay that threatens the prosperity, security and quality of life of U.S. citizens at home and abroad.[7] Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 42 on international organized crime supplements earlier initiatives on narcotics control and terrorism, and establishes a policy framework for combating this national security threat by focusing on five critical areas: money laundering, trade with "front companies," international assistance programs, legislation, and international cooperation.[8]
This paper will investigate the nature of TOC and then dissect the problem by using a center of gravity framework to analyze the effectiveness of U.S. policy on TOC.
The center of gravity is a military concept defined as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. It is the point against which all energies should be directed."[9] Protecting the "friendly" center of gravity while attacking the criminal or "enemy" center of gravity is a balanced and comprehensive approach towards combating this national security threat.
To fully appreciate the "friendly" and "enemy" centers of gravity, which will be developed later in this paper, one must understand the nature of TOC. Russian organized crime and Colombian drug cartels serve as good examples in the study of U.S. policy against TOC because they represent two of the largest criminal threats to U.S. national security while providing two different regional perspectives.
The Nature of Transnational Organized Crime
General
Historically, the U.S. develops a National Security Strategy to deal with global threats, employing all elements of national power to deter a particular situation from reaching a threshold of national interest that requires decisive, offensive action. TOC is an insidious threat; it has gradually established a foundation of power and influence that not only rivals the power of some states, but is protected by their national sovereignty. Understanding the nature of the international system and the problems that many nations face today is critical towards understanding the nature of TOC and analyzing the effectiveness of U.S. policy designed to combat it.
The Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War in 1648 resulted in the growth of policies of balance of power, and the nation-state emerged as the primary unit for international relations. To preserve independence of action and sovereignty, as well as contribute to alliances to maintain the balance of power in Europe, governments evolved into more competent entities, capable of creating wealth and domestic prosperity, raising large standing armies, and controlling and defending their growing populations.[10] Maintaining control over the internal population and territory required the nation-state have a monopoly of power and influence . Today, many nations face challenges that undermine that monopoly of power and control.[11]
As with any national security threat, it is imperative to understand the enemy and the terrain in order to make the proper policy choices. This is difficult in the case of TOC because the enemy runs the gamut in sizes, activities, methods, and organization. Additionally, many social, political and technological trends have collectively expanded the horizons of transnational crime, and its ability to challenge the nation-state economically, legally and ethically.[12] The terrain is the international arena, where governments are limited in their ability to maneuver against TCOs by the jurisdictional limits of sovereign borders. Conversely, TCOs are not bound by the same rules and are much less restrained in achieving their criminal goals.
The growth of transnational criminal activity is proportional to the growth of legitimate international business activity.[13] Expanding international markets through free trade is a sign of progress and growth for a nation-state, and an integral part of this process is facilitating the movement of people, money and goods in and out of a country. Legitimate economic activity seeks to maximize profits within the constraints of international and local laws, and the nation-state seeks to establish advantageous trade relationships. The ultimate goal of the collective economic undertakings of the nation-state is prosperity within its sovereign borders and the potential for influence abroad.[14] TOC also has goals of profit and influence, but it is an illegal activity motivated by greed and unconstrained by sovereign borders or laws. As such, the illicit activity may form a parallel and rival economy that moves across sovereign borders with ease, sapping the state's economic resources without any obligation or allegiance to the national economy.[15]
Increased global prosperity is accompanied by unprecedented criminal opportunities. TOC benefits from the expansion of global trade and the increased economic interdependence of the world. The technological revolution that facilitates the international flow of goods, people and data has increased both legitimate and criminal enterprises. The "global village" minimizes the significance of borders to proliferate economic opportunities that maximize profits, and TOC can select the most lucrative markets based on this international mobility. Legitimate international business may seek to establish production facilities in countries where labor is cheap, while TOC may seek out countries where inadequate control measures facilitate creating and nurturing a demand for illegal activity.[16]
Strategic alliances among TCOs make use of indigenous criminal expertise as a means to gain access to new markets, while distributing or minimizing the risk in the quest for more profit. For example, in order to expand their cocaine trade into Western Europe, the Colombian drug cartels relied on the Italian Mafia to use their well-established heroin distribution networks and familiarity with the local conditions. The Italian Mafia was in a much better position to "prep the battlefield" through corruption and coercion than were the Colombians. In return, the Italian Mafia used the Colombian drug cartel channels to revitalize their heroin trade in the U.S. Strategic alliances appear to be the extent of any transnational criminal conspiracy among the various criminal organizations worldwide. Links between the drug cartels and other criminal organizations are becoming more common because of the vast profit potential associated with the drug trade. This includes terrorist groups faced with the loss of state sponsorship and in need of alternative sources of financial support. Also, the need for specialized services such as money laundering has spawned alliances with Russian organized crime groups because of their control of national banking and the lax or non-existent banking regulations in Russia.[17]
Strategic alliances complicate matters for governments because it enhances the TCO's ability to circumvent law enforcement. Alliances are based on international cooperative criminal strategies that exploit jurisdictional vulnerabilities from state to state. Reactive law enforcement actions are anticipated and minimized through proactive planning. International law enforcement is weak because of jurisdictional limitations and lack of cooperative efforts.[18]
TCOs are highly sophisticated network structures that are designed to maintain organizational integrity that can withstand disruptions by law enforcement with minimal impact. These international networks can quickly adapt to local law enforcement efforts by shifting operations and exploiting the lack of international law enforcement cooperation. These complex criminal networks are guided by long term global strategies that thrive in the absence of a well-coordinated international response.[19]
Russia
Russian organized crime existed in the former Soviet Union primarily to profit from consumer demands that the centralized and inefficient system failed to provide. They embezzled raw materials and ran illegal factories that were exempt from Soviet control. Corrupted officials profited from their acquiescence materially through bribery, and politically through the inflated performance of the economy.[20] The Communist party itself functioned similar to a criminal organization, as they manipulated the distribution of state resources outside normal channels for bribes, controlled key economic posts, and purged any "naysayers" through selective law enforcement.[21] Organized crime was "allowed" to exist in the Soviet Union on a limited basis. Now the Russian government has little choice.
The fall of the Soviet Union provided a unique environment for a rapid and diversified expansion of Russian organized crime. The order that previously prevailed in the centralized society disintegrated with "the wall", and these fragile, transitioning states did not inherit the most basic legal, judicial and legislative measures to control organized crime within a less centralized and more democratic system of government. A host of social and economic challenges divert scarce funds and undermine the ability of the state to exercise the authority it once had.[22]
The rule of law is seriously lacking in Russia. Without the appropriate control infrastructure, criminal activity has been able to infest businesses and markets, not only contributing to the bleeding of the domestic economy, but having adverse international implications as well.[23] The decentralized infrastructure is insufficient to control the new challenges faced in a free and open society attempting to privatize the economy. The police forces retained the stigma earned during the previous harsh regimes, and the result was large manning shortfalls.[24] Laws have yet to be developed to cover money laundering, fraud, and organized crime. It was a free-for-all that allowed criminals unimpeded access at all levels.[25]
In Russia today, there are over 5,000 gangs, .....300 mob bosses, and 150 illegal organizations with international connections. Approximately 40,000 Russian business and industrial enterprises are controlled by organized crime. Their combined output is higher than the GNP of many members [states] of the U.N.[26]
Russian organized crime and the Russian government have evolved into a highly symbiotic relationship, and currently one cannot exist without the other. Russian organized crime is playing an important role in the redistribution of wealth during the transition from socialism to capitalism by providing a large part of the capital required for the privatization of the legitimate economy. Accordingly, the legitimate economy is becoming highly dependent on the Russian Mafia.[27] Organized crime has evolved from merely exploiting the economy, to practically owning and controlling it.[28] Profits often end up in foreign banks outside Russia, which undermines reinvestment and sustainable economic growth. Foreign businesses face unfair competition among the many criminal "front" companies, and are often subjected to extortion and violence which deters investment.[29]
The Russian Mafia does provide security in an otherwise insecure environment. This includes protecting businesses from "disorganized crime", as well as the enforcement of business transactions which the law and government fail to do. The "cost of doing business" results in the avoidance of state taxes to pay for the security that the Mafia provides, and the state does not.[30]
The mobility of Russian organized crime and its expansion into the international arena is largely due to the porosity of borders in Europe and the former Soviet Union. These porous borders facilitate both licit and illicit trade, and allow criminal groups more freedom to maneuver as they loot the Russian economy and expand into the international arena.[31] Customs inspections are tedious events that can slow down regular commerce and erode honest profits. Therefore, trade agreements that ease the flow of goods are an automatic enhancement for TOC.[32] As Europe continues to strive for a single market, free trade will continue to override border controls, and make interdiction an overwhelming task.
The massive profits enjoyed by TOC provide the basis to challenge government authority. Organized crime relies on violence and bribery in support of illegal and legal business interests. As a result, the Russian legal infrastructure is simultaneously overwhelmed and weakened.[33] Corruption was alive and well during the Soviet period, and is now an integral part of the Russian criminal process. The Russian legal system has inherited insufficient control measures for corruption because private property did not exist in the Soviet Union, and therefore "conflicts of interest" were non-existent as well. Russian organized crime has financed elections of government officials, and has even functioned as the government indirectly in the form of services and employment that are in dire need yet short supply.[34] Everything has a price in Russia. Manipulating interest rates, registering a bank, or issuing export licenses are all easily accomplished with a bribe.
Money laundering is one of the most daunting aspects of TOC. International confidence in the Russian banking system is low due to its infiltration by criminal organizations and corruption of banking officials. The banking industry in Russia is tailor-made through corruption, violence, and lack of regulations to launder illicit profits, as well as commit large scale fraud. In Russia, 46 senior bankers were assassinated in 1993 alone as a form of "business leverage" to maintain the criminal-friendly relationship. The Russian media estimates the cost to the Russian taxpayer at over 350 million dollars so far in bank fraud. As a result, foreign investment is further deterred and the economy continues to falter.[35]
The development of the international financial system has made it much more difficult to track or control the flow of money. Modern money is an immense, high-tech network that includes all the banks of the world, yet it is grossly under-regulated. Money can be moved electronically on a global scale with speed and ease, facilitating the concealment of the criminal source by blending in with the legitimate money. The opportunities for money laundering grow, while the means to monitor or control it fall behind. It is estimated that 85 billion dollars per year are laundered in financial markets. The porosity of borders and inconsistent control measures at the national level provide criminals increased access to the international financial network to launder and legitimize their illicit profits. Even if a particular country had adequate control measures in place, money laundering only takes a few minutes, but it may engage law enforcement agencies for months or years to investigate and prosecute the case.[36] The financial agility of the TCO originates from the diversity and inconsistency of national laws, as well as the dire need for foreign capital by developing nations. This need will often loosen controls to facilitate the influx of money.[37]
The conditions are ripe for illicit drug production and trafficking in the former Soviet Union. Poor economies and lack of counternarcotics efforts provide the impetus to exploit the large profit potential traditionally associated with drug trafficking. The retail price for cocaine in Russia is over double that of the U.S. and the demand has soared. This is not a direct threat to the U.S., but it is having a direct impact on Russian society. The problems caused by widespread drug use will only complicate the reform process in Russia by putting additional burdens on the government to deal with the crime and social decay associated with drugs.[38]
In the former Soviet Union, a poor economy, eroded safeguards, rampant corruption, and the international connectivity of Russian organized crime combine to create the potential for the theft and smuggling of nuclear materials. There is evidence that Russian crime syndicates have already attempted to smuggle nuclear materials out of the former Soviet Union. As in most illicit markets, that which is clearly known by the authorities is only the tip of the iceberg. If the U.S. can only interdict a fraction of the illegal narcotics coming into this country, it is reasonable to assume that only a fraction of the nuclear material that can be smuggled out of Russia will be interdicted.[39]
In summary, Russian organized crime is a tumor on the democratic reform process and thus a threat to U.S. national security. The criminal influence stunts economic growth that is vital for democratic institutions to flourish. Corruption, violence, and lack of civil/business law deters foreign investment, and the flow of capital out of the country exceeds internal reinvestment for now. The banking industry undermines overall financial stability and is a "black hole" for money laundering worldwide. Societal decay is enhanced by a growing illegal narcotics trade. Democracy and regional stability are at risk in Russia, and organized crime is sapping the ability of the government to reverse the trend. In addition, organized crime has the capability to exploit lax Russian nuclear security and accountability, and thereby smuggle nuclear material abroad.
Colombia
Governments susceptible to exploitation by criminal groups can also be found in democracies such as Colombia, where authority has been eroded by corruption and violence.[40] Drug trafficking poses a threat to Colombia's democracy, but the threat that it poses internationally is almost as great. For example, 80 percent of the cocaine and 30 percent of the heroin introduced into the U.S. is from Colombian drug cartels. This costs the U.S. taxpayers over 70 billion dollars annually to foot the bill for the full array of legal, judicial and social costs in response.[41]
Colombia has the longest running insurgency in Latin America, which provides fertile ground for the drug cartels to maintain their home base. As in Russia, violence plays an important role in maintaining freedom of action for the cartel, and Colombia maintains the highest murder rate in the world. The ongoing insurgency is sustained by the drug cartels as they employ guerrilla groups in the drug business as guards, growers, and traffickers. For the Colombian government, counterinsurgency efforts are a matter of national security and have a higher priority than counterdrug efforts. The mere existence of a guerrilla force undermines the government's ability to provide security within its sovereign borders, and challenges the state's monopoly of power and influence. The Colombian government spends millions of dollars annually to battle the insurgency which further erodes the credibility of the government, and makes it even more susceptible to the will of the drug cartels.[42]
The influence of drugs on regional economics and politics has strengthened the position of the cartels and undermines support of the "war on drugs." The illegal drug trade has injected money into a region wrought with poverty and unemployment. At the bottom of the ladder is the drug farmer that earns much more growing coca that he can growing other crops. At all levels, illicit wages are greater that licit ones. Political support for the cartels is garnered through corruption and violence, but it is also a result of protecting national sovereignty, and protecting the collective interests of the farmer whose livelihood depends on the drug crops. Many Colombians consider the drug problem to be a U.S. "demand" issue, and do not view the "war on drugs" with the same fervor as the U.S. The 1991 Colombian constitutional amendment blocking the extradition of Colombian drug traffickers to the U.S. was a result of these sovereignty concerns, as well as corruption and narcoterrorism.[43] Extradition would not be an issue for the U.S. if Colombia had a judicial system capable of handling cases effectively on its own.
The economy of scale of the drug trade and the broad array of transit routes provides the drug cartels with the agility that has so far precluded interdiction efforts from weakening the trade. The easing of border controls as a result of the expansion of free trade has increased this mobility, and the ability to own a diverse array of legitimate businesses provides cover and concealment for the illicit cargo. Colombian drug exporters utilize the least restrictive transshipment routes to increase the potential for their product to reach the retail market. Canada and Mexico are transit arteries for the drug trade, and the North American Free Trade Agreement has enhanced the flow of both licit and illicit cargo into the U.S. by lowering trade restrictions.[44] For example, of the 8 million cargo containers that enter the U.S. every year, only 13 filled with cocaine are needed to meet the annual demand in America.[45]
Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities
The center of gravity of a TCO is its net profit, and the center of gravity of the nation-state is governability, or the ability to govern and effectively control the activities within its borders. Governability equates to stability and an immunity to TOC. Focusing U.S. policy on protecting the "friendly" center of gravity, while attacking the center of gravity of a TCO through its critical vulnerabilities, will have the greatest chance for success. Figures (1) and (2) break down each center of gravity by its component parts. As stated in the introduction, the center of gravity is a military concept defined as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. It is the point against which all energies should be directed."[46] Critical capabilities are the essential activities enabling the center of gravity to function as such. Critical requirements are "essential conditions, resources and means for critical capabilities to be fully operative."[47] Critical vulnerabilities are critical requirements that are susceptible to attack, and will also have a damaging impact on the corresponding critical capabilities, which subsequently weaken the center of gravity.[48]
PDD 42 targets both enemy and friendly centers of gravity. Combating money laundering, enhancing U.S. legislation, and barring trade with "front companies" aim at the enemy center of gravity through its critical capabilities and critical requirements. Increasing the level of international assistance and seeking greater international
cooperation aim at the friendly center of gravity by strengthening resistance to TOC.
Friendly Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities
Governability comes in different forms ranging from a despotism to a liberal democracy. A central goal of the U.S. National Security Strategy is to promote democracy abroad, which implies that "legitimate governance" is the preferred strain of governability. Legitimate governance equates to democratic governability.
Legitimate governance is defined as governance that derives its just powers from the governed and generates a viable political competence that can and will manage, coordinate, and sustain security, and political, economic, and social development.[49]
A country with legitimate governance has the built-in ability to handle change and conflict in a manner that is morally and ideologically acceptable to the U.S. A strategy solely aimed at the center of gravity of TOC will not be effective without protecting the center of gravity of the nations that serve as a sanctuary for the TCO. The importance of strong governance is a timeless concept as indicated by the following quote from Sun Tzu:
Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means they make their governments invincible.[50]
The friendly center of gravity, or governability, can be broken down into three critical capabilities (figure 1): the military-police capability, economic capability, and political competence. Critical requirements that support these critical capabilities include: legal and judicial infrastructures (rule of law); discipline and training of the military-police; free, fair and frequent selection of leaders; popular participation in and acceptance of the political process; norms of fairness and equity (anti-corruption laws); political, economic, and social development; and, regime acceptance by social institutions (businesses, unions, religious organizations, etc.).[51] All weak critical requirements can be considered critical vulnerabilities because they can be exploited by the TCO. For example, a lack of discipline and training within the security forces makes them susceptible to corruption, and reduces the risk for criminal activity. Lack of economic development facilitates the manipulation of financial and business organizations by the TCO.
Transnational organized crime contributes to and thrives on the recent and growing trend of ungovernability that is undermining the ability of many states to carry out their traditional functions. Ungovernability is defined as "the declining ability of governments worldwide, but particularly in the Third World, to govern and carry out the many and various responsibilities of managing a modern state in an increasingly complex environment."[52] Ungovernability is characterized by a decline in the rule of law, stagnating economies, and deteriorating infrastructures. The result has been an increasing burden on the international community to take action in support of "failed" states, such as Somalia and Rwanda, when the situation reaches the appropriate moral, legal, humanitarian, and/or security threshold.[53]
Weak states wrought by ungovernability, such as the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (FSU), provide a sanctuary, or safe haven, for criminal organizations that benefit from the inability of the state to control the environment. These apolitical criminal organizations do not want to replace the government, but rather benefit from its weakness. The effects are serious and long-term.[54] Criminal organizations can also gain a foothold in seemingly stable nations, such as Colombia, and expand their influence like a virus to ultimately challenge state authority. TOC is an ungovernability multiplier, and bolstering the governability of fragile states is just as important as attacking crime itself in order to address the threat holistically.[55]
The most essential critical capability for legitimate governability is political competence. Without political competence, the government cannot provide that "balance among political freedom, economic and social development, and physical security that results in peace, stability, and well-being for the populations of a given society."[56] Political competence can be considered a multiplier for the other governability factors. Accordingly, as political competence approaches zero, so does everything else.[57] Building economic potential without political competence provides the opportunity for economic benefits to be exploited by the political elite or criminal organizations.
The Russian Mafia or Colombian cartels would certainly not benefit from the collapse of the nation that serves as their sanctuary, but they only need to bring it part of the way. There are many other factors such as war, natural disasters, or insurgencies, that can turn a weak country into a "failed" state. Reactions to crises that result from ungovernability and failed states are usually short-term, expensive military solutions that may result in U.S. casualties, and only quell the symptoms of a problem.[58] Bolstering legitimate governance is a means of reinforcing governability of threatened, failing regimes before they become "failed" states.[59] This proactive, long-term approach fits within the current NSS of enlarging the web of democracy in the world, and can be a deliberate, well planned strategy that makes the most of low-cost diplomatic and non-military resources.
Enemy Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities
Figure 2 shows the center of gravity of a TCO broken down by some of its critical capabilities and critical requirements. Critical capabilities include money laundering, drug production, trafficking, and smuggling. Critical requirements include "front" companies, corruption, precursor chemicals, drug crops, strategic alliances, border porosity, inadequate law and enforcement, and demand for the illicit products. A single critical requirement such as corruption may be common to more than one critical capability. PDD 42 focuses on two critical requirements ("front" companies and inadequate law enforcement) in an attempt to erode the money laundering capability of the drug cartels. This limited unilateral action may have limited success, but will not significantly degrade the money laundering capability of the drug cartels. If many nations could take the same action simultaneously against the critical requirements of the drug trade, those critical requirements would in fact be critical vulnerabilities, and a significant effect could be registered on the net profit of TOC. Unfortunately, TOC in Russia and Colombia do not have critical vulnerabilities that can be effectively attacked by the host nation or the U.S. This is primarily due to the weakness of the friendly center of gravity. Considering all the efforts to counter the drug supply side (crop eradication, extradition, interdiction, military support, economic pressure, seizure of property/assests), and the demand side (stiffer penalties, drug testing, education, rehabilitation, use of the media), drugs remain available at a relatively stable price.[60] The traditional approach of "going for the money" would be valid if "the money" had critical vulnerabilities that could be exploited.
Deriving a "common purpose" in the international arena amidst jurisdiction and sovereignty concerns is a major hurdle for policy makers, and using too much leverage can be counterproductive. International assistance must take into account the cultural, economic and political setting, as well as the interagency prejudices within our own system. Governability in the form of legitimate governance is the common ground for the targeted nation and the U.S. beauracracy. The economic foundation of TOC in Russia and Colombia is strong, and bolstering the governability of a state to be less vulnerable to TOC is an easier task than asking a state to destroy part of its economic livelihood.[61]
The U.S. has a very invulnerable center of gravity, but has not been successful at attacking the enemy center of gravity through its critical vulnerabilities. The problems are national sovereignty and access to the enemy's critical vulnerabilities. Enlarging the presence of legitimate governance will increase the collective degree of access to the enemy's critical vulnerabilities. In war, successful maneuver entails decisively attacking the enemy's center of gravity through its critical vulnerabilities.[62] It requires battlespace dominance to prevent the enemy from maneuvering to protect and maintain its critical requirements. Today, TOC controls a preponderance of the battlespace. By bolstering legitimate governance in both Russia and Colombia, the battlespace will be shaped in a way that allows enemy critical vulnerabilities to be engaged and defeated.
U.S. Policy: A Global Response
PDD 42 supplements previous PDDs directed at the illegal drug trade, terrorism, and nuclear safety/security in order to focus on the transnational nature of international organized crime. The five specific actions within PDD 42 (combating money laundering, no trade with drug cartel "front" companies, legislation, international assistance, and international cooperation) are part of a larger theme of "global response" in order to eliminate the sanctuaries or "home bases" of TOC. PDD 42 reflects policy goals instead of comprehensive policy.[63] It is long on "ends" and short on "means". It "implies" vice "specifies" policy. The money laundering, front companies, and legislative aspects of PDD 42 reflect U.S. unilateral actions, but the most important parts of PDD 42 lie in the areas of international assistance and international cooperation. Though not specifically listed in PDD 42, the following elements of international assistance and cooperation are pivotal in order to achieve a global response to TOC within the center of gravity context: political development, legal support, intelligence sharing, military-police assistance, nuclear control, and international anti-crime standards.
Political Development
Political development describes the process of strengthening a country's legitimate governance or governability so that they are more capable of defending themselves against TOC. It leads to the critical capability of political competence. U.S. aid to Colombia has been a proactive, long term effort consistent with some aspects of this "legitimate governance" strategy, but lacking in others. The U.S. policy has focused more on attacking the drug cartel center of gravity than protecting the center of gravity of the Colombian government. The U.S. government's international drug control program focuses on the first three stages of the five-stage grower-to-user chain, which are: (1) cultivation, (2) processing, (3) transit, (4) wholesale distribution, and (5) retail sale. The U.S. considers attacking the source of the problem to be the most cost effective method of combating the drug trade.[64] Unfortunately, that simplifies the internal social, political, and economic factors in countries like Colombia.
The relationship between the Colombian insurgents and the drug crop farmers creates a dilemma for the Colombian government by pitting counterinsurgency and counterdrug strategies against each other. A direct attack on the very source of the drug trade is an effective counterdrug strategy, but it ignores the socio-economic conditions that cause the farmers to resort to drug crops in the first place.[65] Growing drug crops has much greater profit potential than legitimate crops, and the peasant farmer does not have to rely on a modern infrastructure that is not there anyway. Getting drug crops to the buyer is a fairly simple process, whereas getting legitimate products from the rural areas to urban markets is a much tougher proposition. When insurgents protect the peasant farmers from U.S. backed Colombia eradication efforts, it helps garner peasant support for their cause.[66]
U.S. equates drug crop eradication results with political will, and in response to increased levels of corruption and perceived lack of political will in the "drug war" Colombia recently failed to recertify for the second year in a row for U.S. foreign aid in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The certification process applies to major narcotics producing and transit countries and evaluates compliance with the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illegal Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. As a result, Colombia will lose all U.S. assistance with the exception of humanitarian and counternarcotics money. A number of trade and economic sanctions are also possible.[67]
The certification process conflicts with the need to maintain consistent support for Colombia's governability. U.S. aid has focused on military-police capabilities while virtually ignoring the economic capabilities and political competence. Abandoning Colombia through decertification will only make the government more susceptible to corruption and cartel influence. As a result of decertification, Colombia is now considering reducing its level of cooperation with the U.S. counterdrug strategy, particularly in the area of drug crop eradication,[68] in order to pursue a higher priority counterinsurgency strategy that stresses drug crop substitution over eradication. Corruption will always be present as long as the drug trade flourishes, and attempting to penalize the entire government will undermine past progress. A more suitable option is to better tailor U.S. aid by targeting the private community and crop substitution programs to maintain ongoing economic development and growth that demands political competence, sustains governmental legitimacy, and counterbalances the integration of the drug trade into the legitimate economy.[69] Building a stronger, more governable society that has the moral fiber and resolve to help itself also avoids the appearance of direct involvement in the affairs of a Third World country.
Bolstering economic capability in the rural areas could facilitate an effective crop substitution program, which would also erode the economic base of the insurgency. The average Colombian considers the ongoing insurgency a far greater problem than the drug trade. Part of fighting the insurgency is removing the rebel economic base without invigorating their cause by sacrificing the support of the peasant farmer. Lack of economic development in the rural areas provides little or no alternative to growing drug crops. An effective crop substitution program implies education, technology, transportation infrastructures, and protection. One plan proposed by the Colombian government has some potential. It calls for $300 million in subsidies and technical assistance for crop substitution. Unfortunately, they are planning to get half the money from the international community.[70] This may be a problem in light of Samper's loss of credibility due to his corruption scandal and U.S. decertification. Additionally, a crop substitution program must include basic security for the farmers who will undoubtedly receive life-threatening pressure from the insurgents to continue growing drug crops.
Building governability and legitimacy in Colombia can be applied directly against the strategic alliance between the Colombian insurgents and the cocaine cartels. A "legitimacy" strategy strives to increase the participation in and acceptance of the political process. As rebel ideology wanes in the shadow of the commercialism and greed of the drug trade, the insurgents are more likely to extend their influence through a political party rather than terrorist acts.[71] However, they will be less likely to participate in a system that is not competent. Acceptance of the political system as fair and effective must occur before the rebels attempt to resolve their political issues peacefully. One of the pillars of President Samper's counterinsurgency strategy is rural spending to lessen resentment of the government, and expand democracy and government control of the rural areas. This will put the government in a much greater position to deal with the drug cartels.[72]
Governmental legitimacy is a much more critical issue in the former Soviet Union, where Russian organized crime competes directly with the development of governability. U.S. policy toward the FSU is based on maintaining stability in the region by promoting democracy, economic reform and integrating the FSU into the international community. It is a particularly daunting task because when the highly centralized communist system collapsed, these countries instantly became faltering states that were highly susceptible to infiltration by the forces of instability, such as organized crime. U.S. assistance to Russia for this transition is funded by the Freedom Support Act and based on the following objectives: threat reduction (regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and fissile material), economic growth (open, competitive markets), and building democratic institutions and civil society.[73]
U.S. policy and assistance to Russia is rooted in the promotion of legitimate governance; however, Russian reforms and U.S. assistance have been in direct competition with forces that oppose increased governability, particularly Russian organized crime. During the initial transition towards democracy, Russia provided an open playing field for criminal elements which became firmly implanted into the new political and economic system. As a result, U.S. efforts have been attrited by these factors yet continue to make progress. Governability in Russia is fragile but surviving for now, and this U.S. strategy may well establish a framework to build governance in other faltering states.
A society with an economic "stake" in the future is important towards building governability in Russia because it will result in a popular demand for a politically competent system that will support and protect that economic relationship. As a result of U.S. assistance, two thirds of the Russian economy is privatized, inflation is falling gradually, and the deficit is decreasing. Production in the private sector is rising, which contributed to a healthy trade surplus.[74] The basis of U.S. assistance is to create economic self-reliance and sustainability, and it is primarily in the form of technical assistance. Technical assistance cannot be misappropriated by the host government, and it can be tailored to best meet strategic ends. One third of the U.S. aid goes to the Russian government for economic reforms, and two thirds goes to people and programs in the private sector.[75]
The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) has fostered academic exchanges and professional training programs in the U.S. for over 20,000 FSU participants since 1993, and is up to 20 ongoing links between the FSU and U.S. universities. This is forging relationships with leaders and future leaders, as well a providing a foundation of knowledge and experience in business, markets, media, government, law enforcement, and other areas in support of governability.[76]
Russia has the political will to build governability, but without a strong political system to manage the long term effort to maintain it, all other reforms are doomed. The first step is strengthening the two-party system in Russia to enhance democratic development and serves as a check-and-balance on political reform. Under the auspices of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Democratic Institute and the National Republican Institute for International Affairs are working with various parties within Russia and the NIS to strengthen the institution of opposing parties, and provide technical assistance in the conduct of elections. A common theme of this aid is fighting corruption. Multi-party systems are more likely to publicize corruption, especially if it involves the opposing party, and elections are a good medium for purging corruption. For reasons of pride and the fact that corruption is endemic, Russia has not requested direct assistance for fighting corruption. However, the U.S. indirectly addresses the issue by promoting integrity, professionalism, and an intolerance of corruption in all training provided.[77] Another vital element in the promotion of democratic institutions and civil society is the presence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and an independent media. NGOs such as environmental groups, human rights groups and trade unions expand that common stake in society, and create a collective conscience for order, fairness, and a sustainable environment.[78]
The media is a "pillar of democracy" and is essential to keeping the public informed, but is not functioning that way in Russia. Few are independent and most respond to the highest bidder (in the form of money or threats), and represent interest groups that include the government and the Russian crime organizations. USAID, USIA, and NGOs have provided tailored support, but they cannot compete with the influence of powerful local interest groups. An independent media in Russia is not on the visible horizon until "political competence" builds and government officials put the public interest above their own.[79]
Instilling governability and legitimacy in a regime is not a stop-gap measure, but rather a long-term effort that must constantly evolve to exploit successes and reevaluate failures. Accordingly, the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Assistance to the NIS oversees the total effort of 32 federal agencies running 130 programs to maintain continuity and applicability of assistance to the FSU. This single focal point ensures unity of effort, especially when the strategy must respond to match a very dynamic situation.[80] One of the biggest dynamics to deal with is the amount of U.S. resources available. The FSA budget went from 2.5 billion dollars in 1994, to 850 million in '95, and 647 million in '96. To partially compensate for this, U.S. assistance has improved in efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally, as U.S. assistance experiences successes, the resultant economic activity spawns organizations that can share in the cost of a program. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the European Union are also coming on line to provide funding, but the U.S. is taking the lead for strategic planning to ensure that the efforts remain consistent with the overall objectives.[81] U.S. assistance to Russian is a proving ground for supporting governability, and provides a framework for other efforts that the U.S. may undertake to save failing states before they become failed states.
Legal Support and Military-Police Assistance
As discussed earlier, the political competence that results from political development is the enabler for other governability factors such as the rule of law and the military-police capabilities.[82] The capability of a nation's security forces is not only a critical requirement for governability, it is the foundation for effective international law enforcement because transnational crime seeks the path of weakest law enforcement capability.[83] A weak law enforcement capability equates to a friendly critical vulnerability that can be exploited by the TCO. Cooperation and parity between U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies is essential to tighten the net of international enforcement. U.S. law enforcement has had a tremendous influence on the evolution of law enforcement worldwide. The U.S. had extended its law enforcement reach by improving the way other countries do business. The success of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) internationally, particularly in Europe, is attributed to the "Americanization" of foreign drug enforcement.[84]
The sustainability of reforms and strengthening of governability is particularly dependent on democratic institutions and a civil society, and a major prerequisite is the rule of law. Business law is emerging in Russia as a means to control the expanding private economy. Currently, enforcement of business law is largely conducted by the Russian Mafia, which for now is a better alternative than halting business activity altogether. Criminal law has also made great strides. Technical assistance at the judge, lawyer and jury level resulted in an increase in jury trials, and legal standard operating procedures have been documented in a published guide to sustain progress made to date. Russia is moving toward a more severe criminal code, and the budget for law enforcement is 2 percent of the GDP, which is almost twice what the U.S. spends.[85]
PDD 42 continues to build on the foundation of programs already underway to help other nations combat TOC.[86] The training academy established in Budapest, Hungary supports law enforcement agencies in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union; FBI Legal Attaché Offices number 23 around the world and support the international aspects of FBI cases; and, the FBI regularly sends agents abroad to assist foreign law enforcement agencies with investigations, conduct training, and provide technical assistance.[87] Additionally, the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Office of International Criminal Justice coordinates multi-agency international training courses covering many aspects of TOC. The U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has an international training program to proliferate knowledge on money laundering and conducts training on enforcement techniques.[88] These steps appear minuscule in view of the challenge of international law enforcement, but continued progress in this area will compliment the comprehensive overall U.S. strategy. Trends are important and U.S. law enforcement has experienced steadily increasing success since the 1960's against transnational criminals.
Improving the military-police capability does not imply that the Colombians are not technically proficient, but they do lack sufficient civilian control over the military which is actively employed in both a counterinsurgency and counterdrug role. The army exercises autonomy with official acquiescence from the government. President Samper has contributed to army autonomy by declaring "red zones" in high risk areas which allows the army to assume greater powers at the expense of human and civil rights.[89] A main criteria for success in this counterinsurgency campaign is to win the allegiance of the individual peasant, the building block of insurgency.[90] The only way to truly support the U.S. counterdrug strategy without inspiring social upheaval is to first address the root causes of the insurgency. Currently, the rural population fears the army as much as they fear the rebels. Economic reforms must be accompanied by a benevolent presence to show good faith. The government must protect the populace and provide a sense of security. Without that, the rural peasants will take the path of least resistance, which is growing drug crops under the protective wing of the insurgents.
The Colombian government must also control the many paramilitary groups operating throughout the country. "[There are] 400 criminal paramilitary armies now operating in more than 50 percent of the nation."[91] Until the Colombian government can control the widespread pro-state, paramilitary violence, as well as improve the military's human rights record, there is little chance that any rebel group will scale back their anti-state terrorist tactics. Right-wing death squads are the extreme manifestation of a self-help mentality that exists in Colombian society towards "unacceptable behavior". The lessor included result has been "social cleansing" of society's undesirables nationwide. The general discomfort with the poor and disaffected, combined with a corrupt security apparatus has facilitated both indiscriminate and organized violence to control and confine what the establishment considers a threat from the left.[92] Anyone sympathetic to the plight of the less fortunate or supporting basic civil/human rights risks being labeled a subversive, which includes teachers, health workers, union activists.[93] Terror on the part of the Colombian army and the paramilitaries has fueled the insurgency by proliferating the very conditions that inspire the rebel cause, and support the need to grow drug crops.
One of the biggest challenges for the Samper Administration is to maintain the moral high ground in the midst of increasingly ruthless terror on the part of the rebels and drug cartels. The means to that end is the official denouncement of paramilitaries, and cracking open a closed and compartmented military justice system that has allowed human rights abuses to go unpunished. Samper has signed the Second Geneva Protocol and ordered the military and police to comply with it. This international convention "bans the torture of prisoners, the taking of hostages, the recruitment of children, and attacks on civilians...[the President] has also opened human rights offices in all major military and police garrisons."[94] International pressure may be required to help Colombia achieve conditions for peace so that they can concentrate fully on the drug cartels. Through decertification, the U.S. has sacrificed influence in a region that urgently needs its help.
Intelligence Sharing
The role of U.S. intelligence agencies in support of U.S. law enforcement is much more important now that TOC has been elevated to a national security threat, but not without significant potential problems associated with this new relationship. Accordingly, greater cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies is required to extend the operational reach of law enforcement worldwide. For the U.S. to effectively participate in intelligence sharing worldwide to improve the effectiveness of multi-lateral law enforcement, it must first optimize its own unilateral capability.
PDD 42 stresses the need to improve coordination among agencies to achieve increased effectiveness and synergy, but does not mention this important new relationship between national intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The mission of U.S. intelligence agencies is to collect foreign intelligence for policy makers. Their interests are long-term and continuing.[95] Collection systems, particularly human sources, are developed slowly and carefully, and are valuable long-term assets that require protection. This is not always compatible with the disclosures necessary in the criminal justice system, which may compromise sensitive sources and methods.[96]
The National Security Act of 1947 provided a clear separation between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence collection in order to preserve the jurisdiction of the FBI, as well as preserve the citizens' constitutional rights by preventing the CIA from spying on U.S. citizens, or even be accused of the possibility. Any further modification to the FBI/CIA relationship requires an Executive Order similar to the one in 1981 that tasked the FBI and CIA to cooperate on intelligence matters related to terrorism. As a result, the DCI Counterterrorism Center and Counter-narcotics Center were eventually formed and the FBI/CIA have a mutually supportive relationship on terrorism and counterdrug strategies. A major source of conflict was and still is the possibility of compromising CIA methods and sources during criminal trials.[97]
The FBI and the CIA are attempting to coordinate their efforts against TOC, but without strong unity of effort task-organized at the NSC level, it remains a "gentleman's agreement" without any tasking authority. The U.S. would never go to war without unity of effort, and neither should it combat a national security threat without it.[98] In 1994, the Counter-narcotics Center was expanded to include a broader range of international criminal activity, and the DCI Crime and Narcotics Center that resulted focuses on international organized crime and has the basic structure and networks for unity of effort.[99] Whatever relationship results between the DCI and the FBI, it should not compromise the way that the DCI does business. The capabilities of the national intelligence agencies to serve policy makers far exceeds the requirements of the FBI.[100] Similarly, any new relationships should not compromise the way the FBI does business domestically.
When dealing with a national security threat, the objective is neutralizing the threat. When dealing with a law enforcement threat, the objective is prosecution. The U.S. policy makers have a choice when dealing with TOC. Neutralizing a particular threat may not require apprehension, standard rules of evidence, and prosecution. It may be easier to feed information to other countries and allow their end-game to deal with the threat. Of course, this is limited by the legal and judicial systems of the various countries. In Colombia for example, corruption has undermined the rule of law resulting in watered down justice. However, U.S. intelligence products help identify coca and poppy locations to assist the Colombian government in their drug crop eradication efforts.
A prime example of the threat having priority over prosecution is the smuggling of nuclear materials. Interdiction, tracking the origins of the material, and identifying the customer is far more critical than prosecuting the smuggler who is most likely far removed from the complex criminal network that spawned the conspiracy. Overcoming secrecy of sources and methods becomes less important as the threat increases. Finding imaginative and effective ways to neutralize the threat in the face of international gridlock is a much more important issue.
The Commission of the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community clearly recognized the different missions and cultures of the FBI and national intelligence agencies and made several recommendations that should be included in the framework for U.S. policy on TOC to improve unity of effort and intelligence sharing. Key recommendations include:
-Establishment of a Global Crime Committee at the NSC level to focus and harmonize efforts among the various agencies.
-Designation of the Attorney General as the focal point for law enforcement strategy, and facilitating coordination with the intelligence community.
-Development of improved procedures for the sharing of information between law enforcement and intelligence communities.
-Development of improved procedures for overseas law enforcement activities.[101]
As the leading U.S. law enforcement agency, the FBI should be the focal point and repository for all intelligence related to TOC. TOC covers many different activities, and a centralized fusion of all information is necessary to fully analyze the various criminal organizations and develop coherent strategy.[102] When the U.S. stands up a Joint Task Force for military operations, it formulates prioritized intelligence requirements and "pulls" information from all sources to meet those requirements. No other agency understands crime better than the FBI. Their validated approach identifies the criminal hierarchy or network that corresponds to the center of gravity model, and exploits critical vulnerabilities. It is proactive vice reactive.[103] The only thing missing is a formal relationship with the national intelligence agencies that establishes a network that can effectively tap into their respective capabilities, particularly HUMINT and SIGINT. Another Executive Order is required to establish binding relationships for consistent unity of effort over the long term.
The FBI also needs to adjust its "endgame" of prosecution for the sake of national security. That would open up other opportunities such as covert action. Covert action is a means of influence that protects intelligence sources and methods through plausible deniability. Covert action in support of a well-designed policy can be a "trump card" against TOC.[104] If appropriate, it enhances the credibility of the host nation government if they choose to claim credit for any operational successes. Covert actions include: providing law enforcement expertise (witness protection programs); destroying the criminal financial credit; publicizing their "secrets" (bank accounts, identity and location of key leaders, corrupt officials, etc.); and, spreading disinformation to cause internal strife and damage reputations and business. These methods can prove very effective but are highly dependent on good intelligence.[105] "Proving" any of the aforementioned items in a court of law would be too sensitive and compromise methods and sources.[106]
The FBI and DEA are already working through U.S. country teams world-wide to extend their law enforcement reach. Unfortunately, their efforts are not being deconflicted or synergized with the DCI to ensure similar efforts are not duplicated, or worse, compromised. Having oversight at the NSC level would certainly be a possible fix for this. Additionally, it is quite possible that the FBI and DEA could extend the operational reach for the CIA in areas beyond just TOC. The CIA has a "spying" stigma attached, and as a result cannot be present in some places that welcome U.S. law enforcement agencies. These agencies have the potential to compliment each other far more than they are, and unity of effort is the only way to maximize our intelligence collection potential as a nation.[107]
Access to relevant information is just as critical for foreign law enforcement agencies. U.S. unilateral improvements in information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement agencies will result in more meaningful cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies, but more importantly, will provide better access to shared information that can enhance efforts beyond U.S. jurisdiction.
The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) based in Lyon, France facilitates information sharing among participant nations through a common law enforcement communications network.[108] Its constitution reads in part:
[Ensuring and promoting] the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in different countries, and in the spirit of the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights'.[109]
Interpol lacks enforcement powers but it facilitates cooperation among its members. Overall effectiveness is based on the voluntary input of member states, which is limited by the criminal perspectives and commitments of the respective states. One state's criminal may be another state's economic pillar.[110] Interpol is leveraging FBI expertise on criminal organizations to develop a common information-sharing format to better profile TCOs, thereby facilitating information and evidence collection and dissemination among the member states.[111] Additionally, Interpol is welcome in places where the U.S. is not and its global membership provides the potential for increased intelligence reach.[112] Unfortunately, a major hurdle to overcome is the mutual fear of compromise. Many times the most useful information is also the most sensitive, and protecting that information implies that it is less likely to be shared.
Improving the effectiveness of international law enforcement is facilitated when U.S. foreign policy is compatible with law enforcement goals.[113] U.S. policy makers need to break down barriers and encourage the foreign political will necessary to combat TOC. U.S. policy makers have access to all elements of national power to provide the leverage necessary in order for "cops" to be effective. A failure of this process is the fact that no law enforcement strings were attached to the North American Free Trade Agreement, even though the increased free flow of licit goods will certainly have an impact on law enforcement efforts to curb the concurrent flow of illicit goods.[114] Foreign policy with regard to the FSU includes law enforcement as an integral part of the holistic approach.
The European Union (EU) has a unique opportunity to integrate law enforcement with free trade. Eurpol, the European equivalent to Interpol, is established in name only until the EU can agree on how much civil liberty they are willing to sacrifice in the form of collective law enforcement and judicial cooperation in order to reap the full benefits of a single European market.[115] The "Maastricht Treaty on European Union" which was formally signed by the members of the European Community on 7 February 1992, includes a "third pillar" on security that has been hailed by police forces throughout the EU as an efficient response to serious transnational criminal activity. However, member states have not fully embraced the third pillar because of fears that it lacks sufficient democratic controls to ensure that the enhanced security is not at the expense of civil liberty.[116] The international cooperation that the U.S. advocates in PDD 42 starts at the regional level, and we should aggressively support a strong and effective Eurpol.
Nuclear Control
[There is a] clear and present danger that the essential ingredients of nuclear bombs could fall into the hands of radical states or terrorist groups.[117]
A major incentive for building governmental legitimacy in Russia is the threat of nuclear smuggling. DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program that is part of the Freedom Support Act in support of Russian reform has provided equipment and technical training for the last four years to increase the security and accountability of nuclear weapons and fissile material.[118] Much progress has been made, but much remains to be done. The sustainability of all progress in this area is dependent on a politically competent system that can manage the many factors, such as unemployed nuclear technicians and military guard force, that caused "cracks" in the reliability of nuclear security and accountability.[119]
The demand for fissile material is sufficient to make nuclear smuggling a very profitable venture for the TCO. The equipment, design information, and technical expertise to construct a nuclear bomb is readily available. What most rogue states need is only a small amount of Highly Enriched Uranium or Plutonium to finish the process.[120] Russian organized crime has the access and influence to smuggle nuclear material like any other commodity, but so far the associated risks have exceeded the profit potential.[121] The range of possible international repercussions from the malevolent employment of a nuclear bomb makes the smuggling of nuclear material a bad business decision, even if the profit potential is astronomical. There is more to fear from smaller, less sophisticated groups that do not maintain the long-term outlook of a major TCO.
Similar to the "legitimacy" approach of reinforcing governability, the focus of U.S. efforts in the CTR program is to make Russian nuclear material invulnerable to exploitation. The cost of this program pales in comparison to the cost of nuclear proliferation in terms of defenses and consequence management. The U.S. spends $800 million per year on nuclear protection, control and accountability, and the CTR program is funded at $100 million per year.[122] Integral to the overall program is the reliance on the other aspects of reform to sustain the improved nuclear control and accountability infrastructure that will result from the CTR program. This includes political development, law enforcement training, and economic self-reliance.
Establishing International Anti-Crime Standards
International cooperation equates to extended operational reach of law enforcement. As discussed earlier, the center of gravity of TOC is "the money", and U.S. policy supports ongoing multilateral efforts to combat money laundering, but it is primarily focused on unilateral action to bring the "most egregious overseas sanctuaries" for money laundering into compliance with international standards. This includes the threat of unilateral sanctions while encouraging other states to do the same.[123] Sanctions are not a long-term solution. The internal effects of sanctions can result in a much different endstate than desired by the U.S. which may pose a moral dilemma, and unilateral sanctions are easy for the target nation to circumvent.[124] This focused effort without sufficient progress on a global scale can result in more control gaps for exploitation by the financially agile TCOs. The policy of barring trade with front companies of the drug cartels, and eventually other TCOs, may reduce the investment options for the TCOs to legitimize their illicit profits, but also requires multilateral cooperation to be effective.
The most important aspect of U.S. policy in PDD 42 is the support of an "international declaration" to promote international unity of effort. The transnational nature of global crime precludes any one nation from combating it, and the U.S. supports the employment of the United Nations as a "global catalyst" to promote the harmonization of control regimes against TOC.[125] Currently, an international declaration against TOC already exists in the form of the United Nations Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan[126] which has already enhanced threat awareness internationally. Reliable information on the structure and dynamics of TOC is necessary for action tailored to meet needs at the national level. This Global Action Plan will also serve as a central clearing house for model legislation, training manuals and practical technical assistance.[127] PDD 42 directs the drafting of legislation to enhance U.S. efforts in the fight against TOC. The Global Action Plan recognizes the importance of all national legislation in the fight, particularly in aligning the legislation to facilitate cooperation between countries. Basic measures include laws prohibiting participation in a criminal organization, corruption, and money laundering. Future efforts include the development of legislative models, but legislative models are meaningless without the technical expertise to achieve practical results that compliment overall international strategies. Providing centralized and balanced technical assistance will strengthen the ability of states to interact and harmonize efforts to even the playing field against TOC.[128]
The Global Action Plan emphasizes the need to adopt a general concept of TOC on which to base the multitude of responses at the various national levels. This involves the accumulation of both theoretical and operational knowledge to assist states in understanding the full nature of the threat within their own political, economic, and cultural context, as well as participate in regional and international strategies. The U.S., particularly the FBI, could provide invaluable assistance in developing this general concept of TOC.[129]
The potential utility of the Global Action Plan is dependent on the commitment of nations, and successful implementation is the first step towards establishing a convention similar to the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Trafficking and Narcotics, Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.[130] A convention is an international instrument that focuses attention of a problem, standardizes and obligates responses, and facilitates systematic assistance in the rule of law.[131] The U.S. was instrumental in the 1988 Convention, and can be equally effective in promoting the declaration on TOC.
Nowhere is the international playing field more uneven than in the area of money laundering, but the U.S. is leading from the front through the establishment of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). FinCEN proliferates an anti-money laundering network by establishing organizations known as financial information units (FIUs). FIUs facilitate the flow of information to track suspicious transactions, and enhance international cooperation. FinCEN has been actively promoting this program and continues to expand the number of FIUs worldwide.[132]
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and Financial Information Exchange Agreements (FIEAs) are methods of guaranteeing cooperation in international law enforcement, but the number of treaties and agreements in force is far from adequate.[133] They streamline investigations because responses to queries are mandatory, and connectivity with the host nation is often whittled down to a single point of contact. These arrangements are not possible without overcoming political resistance at the highest level.
The international anti-money laundering organization framework needs to be strengthened through "hard law" and the requisite resourcing to match the capabilities of TOC. Unfortunately, multi-lateral frameworks must find the lowest common denominator of cooperation, but they are the only method to eliminate the control gaps so easily exploited by TOC.[134] Initial steps toward developing multi-lateral "hard law" is the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of the seven leading industrialized democracies (G-7) to combat money laundering, which has set standards that governments are encouraged to achieve. At a more operational level, Interpol has been facilitating multilateral cooperation by providing specific technical assistance, in include model legislation on money laundering.[135]
Regionally, the Council of Europe's draft convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime is a revolutionary step in multilateral cooperation and the development of an international control regime, particularly because many drafters were from outside of Europe (including the U.S.). The Caribbean governments are showing increased support for strategies to combat money laundering, but the risk of undermining the benefits of their international financial sectors has not resulted in substantial progress. U.S. unilateral efforts to achieve conformity can provide additional leverage when local special interests preclude full cooperation by a particular country.[136]
Conclusion
PDD 42 is a good start towards achieving a global response to TOC, but it does not provide the necessary means to achieve the desired endstate. The U.S. must develop more comprehensive policy. Meanwhile, U.S. unilateral actions in PDD 42 are necessary to maintain constant pressure, and inflict a cost on TOC in whatever way possible. U.S. unilateral actions also provide leadership to forge the way for more multilateral actions. However, without an international response to close the many enforcement gaps, the agile TCO will continue to prosper and threaten the stability and well-being of nation-states. The transnational nature of global crime precludes any one nation from combating it, and U.S. statesmen must exercise "strategic entrepreneurship"[137] to inspire the requisite political will abroad.
To tighten the enforcement net requires strengthening the governability of nation-states at risk, particularly those that serve as sanctuaries for TCOs. Influencing the internal affairs of a sovereign nation to bolster governability is a great challenge, but it is vital towards helping nations like Russia and Colombia become less vulnerable to exploitation by TOC. Helping nations help themselves is the most effective way to achieve an international standard of law enforcement that can compete with the transnational criminal threat. The three pillars of building governability are political competence, economic capability, and military-police capability. Until these critical capabilities can be protected by expanding governability, the center of gravity of TOC will not be vulnerable to attack. The "Catch-22" is that the very conditions that support increased global connectivity and prosperity also provide a fertile medium for TOC, which is like a virus that will never be fully eradicated without risking damage to its host. Liberal democracies like the U.S. are generally opposed to sacrificing the various citizens' rights for the greater good of reducing crime. Establishing a strong foundation of governability will provide a long-term immunity to TOC before it reaches epidemic proportions.
Building governability in Colombia requires a comprehensive engagement that addresses the social, economic, political, and cultural dynamics in order to achieve an endstate that is consistent with U.S. and Colombian needs. Supporting an environment that supports a peaceful end to the longest running insurgency in Latin America can also eliminate the conditions that make that nation a sanctuary for the drug cartels. The decertification of Colombia reveals the incompatibility of the U.S. counterdrug strategy with Colombia's counterinsurgency strategy. A less attractive and more protracted approach towards attacking the cocaine industry is helping Colombia achieve a political solution to its insurgency through rural development, and removing the insurgent economic base through drug crop substitution. By decertifying Colombia, the U.S. has lost important influence in a region that urgently needs its help. By helping Colombia build political competence, the U.S will make other specific counterdrug goals much more achievable.
U.S. support for Russian governability is not perfect, but it is establishing a foundation that is not likely to be reversed. It is far too idealistic to think that Russian reform will lead to a liberal democracy like the U.S., but it has established political competence that is capable of sustaining the other aspects of governability, such as privatization and nuclear security. Over the long-term, Russian reform will enhance immunity against the forces of instability, and Russia will cease to be a sanctuary for TOC. The interagency unity of effort at work for Russian reform under the Freedom Support Act is impressive and should be replicated to build governability in Colombia.
The United Nations (UN) must evolve from a reactionary posture towards one of deterrence and prevention.[138] It can and should serve as a "global catalyst" for international action against TOC. This requires reorganization and international consensus, which is particularly sensitive because nations are not likely to sacrifice individual sovereignty for the greater good of collective law enforcement. The U.S. must take the lead to promote international unity of effort. The first step towards this end is attaining worldwide support for the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan. The U.S. should encourage this international commitment to focus attention on the problem and pave the way for more practical applications, such as an international convention to standardize and obligate national responses to TOC.
The fears that inspired the safeguards to prevent the CIA from spying on U.S. citizens continue today and for good cause. The fear of sacrificing civil liberties for more effective law enforcement is a major obstacle for a global response to TOC. The formal relationship that defines how the CIA and FBI will task-organize against TOC, and the fate of the Maastricht "third pillar" for intelligence sharing in the EU will be a significant measure of effectiveness for the future of international intelligence sharing. An important measure towards closing the law enforcement gaps available to TOC is disseminating precise criminal intelligence. Increased global connectivity decreases the significance of borders as a control mechanism. International law enforcement will need to develop a more surgical capability to interdict an agile foe like TOC. Intelligence is the foundation of precise law enforcement, and ensuring that intelligence sharing does not erode the tenets of the society it is trying to protect is a great challenge. The U.S. is in a position to meet that challenge and set an example for international intelligence sharing. The first step is to implement the recommendations of the Brown/Rudman Commission through an Executive Order that clearly defines the relationship between the CIA and the FBI for TOC, and strengthens the FBI's international law enforcement capacity. One of the greatest hurdles for international intelligence sharing is the lack of mutual trust, or fear of compromise, which will continue to plague intelligence sharing even after a solid international infrastructure is in place.
The future is bleak for the Third World and strategic entrepreneurship serves as an investment in the future world order. Building governability now will not only address the immediate concerns of growing TOC, but it will also prepare nation-states to deal with other complex trends such as population growth and environmental degradation that will complicate the attainment of stability.[139] A politically competent nation-state is less likely to resort to authoritarian or military solutions to quell internal strife. The U.S. strategy of promoting democracy and human rights is rhetorical and insufficient. Promoting governability through strategic entrepreneurship is a "nuts and bolts" strategy of engagement that shares a similar endstate, but is more achievable by focusing on the concrete building blocks of legitimacy. However, it requires a long-term political and fiscal commitment to link the ends and means. The containment of Soviet world domination was such a commitment, but many times the result was "artificial" stability. Promoting governability will result in "real" stability.
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[1]U.S. National Security Council, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," National Security Strategy, February 1996, 25.
[2]Peter A. Lupsha, "Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation-State," Transnational Organized Crime 2, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 21.
[3]William J. Olsen, "A New World, A New Challenge," Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success, eds. Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olsen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 8.
[4]National Security Strategy, i-ii.
[5]Louise I. Shelly, "Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State?," Journal Of International Affairs 48, no. 2 (Winter 1995): 468-469, 470-471.
[6]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and its Interests Abroad, Hearings, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 22 February 1996, S. Hrg. 104-510, 113.
[7]Shelly, 471.
[8]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 31 January 1996, Congressional Information Service, fiche no. H461-46, 1996, 109-111. Summary sheet on the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-42) on International Organized Crime.
[9]Carl Von Clausewitz, Carl Von Clausewitz: On War, eds. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595-596.
[10]R.R Palmer and Joel G. Colton, "The Establishment of West-European Leadership," A History of the Modern World, 6th ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), 158-159; and William J. Olsen, "The New World Disorder: Governability and Development," Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting a New World Disorder, ed. Max G. Manwaring (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 3.
[11]Lupsha, 29.
[12]Michael Elliot, "Transnational Maffia," Newsweek, 13 December 1993, 1-2.
[13]Shelly, 465.
[14]William McLucas, Director of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, "Global Financial Systems Under Assault: Countering the $500 Billion Conspiracy," Transnational Organized Crime: The New Empire of Evil, eds. Frank J. Ciluffo and Lennea P. Raine (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 16.
[15]Roy Godson and William J. Olson, "International Organized Crime," Society 32, no. 2 (January/February 1995):19,22,25.
[16]Shelly, 466-465; and Elliot, 3.
[17]United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Implementation of the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan (NPD/GAP), paragraphs 27-28; and Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organizations: Strategic Alliances," The Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 61-62, 66-68.
[18]Williams, 70.
[19]United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Implementation of the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan (NPD/GAP), 5th session (21-31 May 1996), Official Record, E/CN.15/1996/2, paragraphs 34-36. NPD/GAP adopted by the World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, held at Naples, Italy, from 21 to 23 Nov 94.; and Godson and Olson, 23.
[20]Shelly, 481-482; and Claire Sterling, Crime Without Frontiers (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 33, 79-80.
[21]James Leitzel, Clifford Gaddy, and Michael Alexeev, "Mafiosi and Matrioshki: Organized Crime and Russian Reform," Brookings Review (Winter 1995): 27.
[22]Shelly, 481-482; and, United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Implementation of the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan (NPD/GAP),, paragraphs 12-13. NPD/GAP adopted by the World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, held at Naples, Italy, from 21 to 23 Nov 94.
[23]Dr. Ariel Cohen, testimony before U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 31 January 1996, Congressional Information Service, fiche no. H461-46, 1996, 75.
[24]Sterling, 43.
[25]Shelly, 484.
[26]Dr. Ariel Cohen, testimony before U.S. Congress, 68.
[27]Shelly, 481-482; and, Lupsha, 32.
[28]Sterling, 85.
[29]Dr. Ariel Cohen, testimony before U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 31 January 1996, Congressional Information Service, fiche no. H461-46, 1996, 75-76.
[30]Leitzel, Gaddy, and Alexeev, 28-29.
[31]Shelly, 466.
[32]H. Richard Friman, "Just Passing Through: Transit States and the Dynamics of Illicit Transshipment," Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 68-69.
[33]Godson and Olson, 21, 25.
[34]Shelly, 484; and Dr. Ariel Cohen, testimony before U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 31 January 1996, Congressional Information Service, fiche no. H461-46, 1996, 71,73.
[35]Shelly, 482; and Dr. Ariel Cohen, testimony before U.S. Congress, 46, 69, 76.
[36]United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Implementation of the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan (NPD/GAP), paragraph 15,39; and Joel Kurtzman, The Death of Money (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 11-12; and, Jack Blum, Partner, Lobel, Novins and Flug, "Global Financial Systems Under Assault: Countering the $500 Billion Conspiracy," Transnational Organized Crime: The New Empire of Evil, eds. Frank J. Ciluffo and Lennea P. Raine (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994) 23-24.
[37]Shelly, 470.
[38]Graham H. Turbiville Jr., "Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia: A New Colombia," Military Review 72, no. 12 (December 1992): 61, 63; and Rensselaer W. Lee III, "Drugs in Communist States and Former Communist States," Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 199, 200, 201, 204.
[39]Tim Zimmerman and Alan Cooperman, "The Russian Connection," U.S. News & World Report, 23 October 1995, 56-67; and Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, "The Real Threat of Nuclear Smuggling," Scientific American, January 1996, 41.
[40]Shelly, 474.
[41]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Corruption and Drugs in Colombia: Democracy at Risk, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1996, S. Prt. 104-47, v,vii.
[42]Ibid., 10-11; and Anthony James Joes, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 6.
[43]John McCullough Martin and Anne T. Romano, Multinational Crime: Terrorism, Espionage,Drugs and Arms Trafficking (Newbury Park: Sage Books, 1992), 135.
[44]Friman, 65-67.
[45]United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Implementation of the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan (NPD/GAP), paragraph 66.
[46]Carl Von Clausewitz, Carl Von Clausewitz: On War, eds. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595-596.
[47]Dr. Joe Strange, "Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language," Marine Corps University Perspectives On Warfighting, no. 4 (Quantico, VA: Command and Staff College Foundation, 1996), 43.
[48]Ibid.
[49]Max G. Manwaring and Ambassador Edwin G. Corr, "Confronting the New World Disorder: Legitimate Governance Theory of Engagement," Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success, eds. Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olsen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 32.
[50]Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 88.
[51]Manwaring and Corr, 40-42.
[52]Robert H. Dorff, "Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability, Parameters 26, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 23.
[53]William J. Olsen, "The New World Disorder: Governability and Development," Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting a New World Disorder, ed. Max G. Manwaring (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 8-10; and William J. Olsen, "A New World, A New Challenge," Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success, eds. Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olsen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 6.
[54]William J. Olsen, "A New World, A New Challenge," Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success, eds. Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olsen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 6-7.
[55]Ibid., 5-6.
[56]Manwaring and Corr, 44.
[57]Ibid., 40.
[58]Ibid., 45.
[59]Ibid., 36.
[60]Frank Pearce and Michael Woodiwiss, Transnational Crime Connections: Dynamics and Control (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 37-38, 61.
[61]Martin and Romano, xii, 93, 96, 136.
[62]Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, March 1989), 60-61.
[63]Roy Godson , Professor of Government, Georgetown University, President, National Strategy Information Center, telephone interview by author, 8 Feb. 1997.
[64]U.S. Department of State (DOS), Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1996, Washington, DC: Dept. of State Publication 10324, 1996, 4.
[65]Mary Beth Sheridan, "Colombians Vow To Eradicate Cocaine, Heroin Sources," 7 Jan 1995, Knight-Ridder/Tribune News Service, p0107K9079.
[66]T. David Mason and Christopher Campany, "Guerrillas, Drugs and Peasants: The Rational Peasant and the War on Drugs in Peru," Terrorism and Political Violence 7, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 140.
[67]DOS International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1996, xii, xxv-xxvi; and U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Corruption and Drugs in Colombia: Democracy at Risk, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 1996, S. Prt. 104-47, 1-2.
[68]Douglas Farah, "Colombia Threatens Reprisals," Washington Post, 2 March 1997, Sec. A24; and Douglas Farah, "Colombia Suspends Anti-Drug Crop Effort,"Washington Post, 6 March 1997, Sec. A23.
[69]Ethan Avram Nadelman, Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of United States Criminal Law Enforcement, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 311; and Max G. Manwaring and Courtney E. Prisk, "The Umbrella of Legitimacy, "Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting a New World Disorder, ed. Max G. Manwaring (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 86; and, Department of State, Overseas Security Advisory Council., Tenth anniversary meeting., The Emerging Security Environment: A Case for Government-Private SectorCooperation (Washington, D.C.: Dept of State, Nov 95), 5-6.
[70]"Coca Clashes," Economist,17 August 1996, 36.
[71] Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 98; and, Graham H. Turbiville, "The Implications of the Organized Crime Phenomenon for U.S. National Security," Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success, eds. Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olsen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 226.
[72] James Brooke, "Colombia's Rebels Grow Rich From Banditry," New York Times. 2 July 1995, Sec. A1.
[73]Richard Morningstar, Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the Newly Independent Sates, U.S. Department of State, testimony before U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union: U.S. Policy and Assistance, Hearings, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 14 Nov, 15 December 1995, Congressional Information Service, fiche no. H461-33, 1996, 5.
[74]Dr. Anders Aslund, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, testimony before U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union: U.S. Policy and Assistance, 136, 133.
[75]Ambassador-designate James F. Collins, Senior Coordinator, Office of Ambassador at Large for the Newly Independent States, U.S. Department of State, testimony before U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union: U.S. Policy and Assistance, 23; and, Honorable Thomas Dine, Assistant Administrator for Europe and the Newly Independent States, U.S. Agency for International Development, testimony, 110; and, Harold J. Johnson, Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. Accounting Office, testimony, 66.
[76]Anne Sigmond, Director, Office of East European and Newly Independent States Affairs, U.S. Information Agency, testimony before U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union: U.S. Policy and Assistance, 10-11.
[77]Dine and Aslund testimony to Congress, 28,94, 70, 408.
[78]Dine testimony before Congress, 109.
[79]Elizabeth Tucker, "The Russian Media's Time of Troubles," Demokratizatsiya 4, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 422-423, 436-437.
[80]Morningstar testimony before Congress, 85-86.
[81]Ibid., 87-88.
[82]Manwaring and Corr, 40.
[83]Phil Williams and Ernesto U. Savona, eds., The United Nations and Transnational Organized Crime (Portland: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1996), 82.
[84]Nadelman, 247.
[85]Dine testimony before Congress, 96, 101; and, Aslund testimony, 135; and Leitzel, Gaddy, and Alexeev, 28.
[86]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 31 January 1996, Congressional Information Service, fiche no. H461-46, 1996, 109-111. Summary sheet on the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-42) on International Organized Crime.
[87]Leslie Alan Horvitz, "U.S. Gamble May Pay Off in High Stakes Crime Battle," Insight on the News, 25 July 1995, 7,9.
[88]DOS International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1996, 507
[89]"Colombia's Guerrillas Flourish As Its President Fades," Economist, 11 May 1996, 37.
[90]Joes, 211; and T. David Mason and Christopher Campany, "Guerrillas, Drugs and Peasants: the Rational Peasant and the War on Drugs in Peru,"Terrorism and Political Violence 7, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 141.
[91]Ana Carrigan, "Victims of the 'Dirty War'," Progressive 60, no. 11 (November 96), PAGE???
[92]Paul Jeffrey, "Social Cleansing in Colombia," Christian Century, 12 April 1995, 380-382.
[93]Tom Boswell, "Between Many Fires," Christian Century, 1 June 1994, 561.
[94]James Brooke, Sec. A6.
[95]Elizabeth Rindskopf, "Intelligence and Law Enforcement," U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform, eds. Roy Godson, Ernest May, and Gary Schmitt (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1995), 260. The author of the chapter is L. Britt Snider and the comments are by Rindskopf; and Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General, testimony before U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Intelligence, The Evolving Relationship Between Law Enforcement and Intelligence, hearings, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 25 Oct. 1995.
[96]Report of the Brown/Rudman Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1996), 41.
[97]L. Britt Snider, "Intelligence and Law Enforcement," U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform, eds. Roy Godson, Ernest May, and Gary Schmitt (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1995), 244, 246-247, 250.
[98]Ambassador David C. Miller, "Back to the Future: Structuring Foreign Policy in a Post-Cold War World," Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success, eds. Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olsen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 21.
[99]David Carey, Director, Crime and Narcotics Center, Central Intelligence Agency, testimony before U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 31 January 1996, Congressional Information Service, fiche no. H461-46, 1996, 10; and Horvitz, 8.
[100]L. Britt Snider, 253.
[101] Brown/Rudman Commission, 39-46.
[102]Arnaud de Borchgrave, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies, testimony before U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 31 January 1996, Congressional Information Service, fiche no. H461-46, 1996, 66.
[103]Rodney T. Stamler, "Drug Intelligence Trends," Transnational Crime: Investigative Responses, ed. Harold E. Smith (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, 1989), 30.
[104]Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trumps Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1995), xii; and Roy Godson interview, 8 Feb. 1997.
[105]Roy Godson, "Strategic Intelligence in the Coming Years: Foreign Policy and Defense Asset," Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success, eds. Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olsen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 256-57.
[106]Nadelman, 299.
[107]John Coleman, "Intelligence and Law Enforcement," U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform, eds. Roy Godson, Ernest May, and Gary Schmitt (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1995), 262-263. The author of the chapter is L. Britt Snider and the comments are by Coleman.
[108]Jim E. Moody, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, testimony before U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 31 January 1996, Congressional Information Service, fiche no. H461-46, 1996, 14.
[109]Simon Crawshaw, "Managing an International Investigation," Transnational Crime: Investigative Responses, ed. Harold E. Smith (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, 1989), 115.
[110]Ibid.; and Peter Lupsha, telephone interview by author, 29 Jan 1997; and, Donald Lavey, "The Role of Interpol When Dealing With International Criminal Acts," Transnational Crime: Investigative Responses, ed. Harold E. Smith (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago, 1989), 34-35.
[111]Moody testimony before U.S. Congress, 14.
[112]Nadelman, 184.
[113]Nadelman, 11.
[114]Oliver "Buck Revell, Associate Deputy Director, FBI (Ret.), "The International Black Market: Coping With Drugs, Thugs, and Fissile Materials," Transnational Organized Crime: The New Empire of Evil, eds. Frank J. Ciluffo and Lennea P. Raine (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 87, 101.
[115]Lupsha interview, 29 Jan 97.
[116]Peter Chalk, "EU Counter-Terrorism, the Maastricht Third Pillar and Liberal Democratic Acceptability," Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 103-104, 135-136..
[117]John Holdren, Professor of Energy and Resources, and member of Presidents Council of Advisers on Science and Technology, testimony before U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Loose Nukes, Nuclear Smuggling, and the Fissile-Material Problem in Russia and the NIS, Hearings, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 22-23 Aug. 1995, Congressional Information Service, fiche no. S381-4, 1996, 52
[118]The Honorable Harold Smith, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, Department of Defence, testimony before U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union: U.S. Policy and Assistance, 122-124,126.
[119]Dr David Osias, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, CIA, testimony before U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Loose Nukes, Nuclear Smuggling, and the Fissile-Material Problem in Russia and the NIS, 10.
[120]Thomas Cochrane, Director of Nuclear Programs, National Resources Defense Council, testimony before U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Loose Nukes, Nuclear Smuggling, and the Fissile-Material Problem in Russia and the NIS, 63-65.
[121]Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking: An Interim Assessment," Transnational Organized Crime, 1, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 213, 218-219.
[122]John Holdren, testimony before U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Loose Nukes, Nuclear Smuggling, and the Fissile-Material Problem in Russia and the NIS, 54, 98.
[123]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Global Organized Crime, Hearings, 109-111. Summary sheet on the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-42) on International Organized Crime.
[124]Patrick Clawson, "Sanctions as Punishment, Enforcement, and Prelude to Further Action, Ethics and International Affairs 7 (1993): 36-37.
[125]Williams and Savona, 170, 194; and United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Control of the Proceeds of Crime,5th session (21-31 May 1996), Official Record, E/CN.15/1996/3, paragraph 72.
[126]Adopted by the United Nation's "World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime", held at Naples, Italy from 21 to 23 Nov 94.
[127]United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Implementation of the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan (NPD/GAP), 5th session (21-31 May 1996), Official Record, E/CN.15/1996/2, paragraphs 4,92.
[128]Ibid., 187-189.
[129]Ibid., 184-186.
[130]Ibid., 177.
[131]Ibid., 180.
[132]DOS International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1996, 505-506.
[133]Ibid., 504.
[134]Ibid., 107, 102.
[135]Ibid., 98-99.
[136]Ibid., 100-101.
[137]Steven Metz, America in the Third World: Strategic Alternatives (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), 36-37. The term "strategic entrepreneurship" implies that future national security challenges require a more "enterprising" approach. This is particularly true with TOC because it is both a law enforcement and national security threat. If strategic disengagement occurs as Mr. Metz predicts, new means must emerge to ensure long-term stability in the Third World. Bolstering governability in the Third World is an "enterprising" means of ensuring that nation-states are capable of dealing with current and future threats unilaterally. Creating a new mindset in the Third World through "strategic entrepreneurship" that stresses cooperation, respect for authority, and sustainable growth will allow the U.S. to disengage safely.
[138]Brian Urquhart, "The Limits to Sovereignty," The United Nations' Role in World Affairs, ed. Donald Altschiller (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1993), 131.
[139]Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," America's Strategy in a Changing World, eds. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1992), 341-343.
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