Baron Antoine Henri Jomini Ant The Ground Offensive of the Persian Gulf War
CSC 1997
Subject Area - History
Author Major M. F. Campbell
Table of Contents
Section
I. INTRODUCTION 1
Theoretical Framework 19
Methodology 25
II. CASE STUDY: The Use of the Turning Movement, Lines of Operation and 32
Decisive Points in the Ground Offensive of Operation Desert Storm, the Persian
Gulf War 24-28 February 1991
III. CONCLUSIONS 40
NOTES 42
WORKS CITED 47
Hypothesis
This paper will test the hypothesis that certain Jominian principles of war are still applicable for warfighting at the operational and tactical levels. We will examine the validity of three Jominian concepts that remain openly acceptable for the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. Specifically, we will examine the relevance of the Jominian concepts of the turning movement, decisive points and lines of operation to a 20th Century mid-intensity South-West Asian conflict.
To do this we will first establish the theoretical framework that Jomini believed a commander should use in conducting his operations. Next, we will test this framework against a historical example from the Persian Gulf War to determine its applicability in modern warfare. Finally, using the evidence drawn from the case study, we will draw conclusions concerning the potential relevancy of these Jominian concepts to modern operational art.
Introduction
Antoine Henri Jomini's translated works, a total of twenty-seven volumes and numerous pamphlets, deal with military history and theory. His historic works address the operations of Frederick the Great, the Wars of the French Revolution, and the Napoleonic Campaigns. Brigadier General J. D. Hittle, USMC (Ret.) in his book Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War wrote that:
Napoleon appraised Jomini as a man who thought about war. Jomini's writings are more than mere historical recitations or the printed results of theoretical dreaming. He not only told what happened, he continually sought to explain why certain courses of action were successful and why some failed. He always seemed to be seeking the basic principles upon which successful war could be waged. All his previous books seemed to be laying the ground work for his greatest theoretical treatise, the Precis de l'Art de la Guerre (Summary of the Art of War), published 1836.[1][Italics in original]
Jomini developed his principles of war in the early 1800's, and published the Summary "to assist in the military instruction of the Hereditary Grand Duke of Russia."[2] The Summary was recognized as an epic contribution to military thought, and was translated into practically all the important languages.[3] Christopher Bassford suggests that until at least 1888 Jomini was the preeminent figure in the military [English] literature of the day.[4] For at least fifty years Jomini was the foremost military authority of the western world, and his books were considered texts by those who studied military method. In Jomini's admittedly theoretical Summary he utilized the modern and accepted educational technique of explaining by the use of examples. This is a technique still advocated today, for as written in FMFM 1-1 Campaigning: "This book [Campaigning] makes frequent use of familiar historical examples to put its concepts into concrete terms.... These are classical examples intended to illustrate principles with enduring and universal application."[5] The similarities in the nature of basic military thought, which emerged in the early 19th century from the Napoleonic way of war and the techniques of presenting it in the Summary, and in modern doctrinal publications would appear to be more than coincidental.[6] Hittle has suggested that "Napoleon applied the lessons of Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar, borrowed from de Broglie and Bourcet, and fashioned the model of modern war."[7] It has often been said that many a Civil War general went into battle with a sword in one hand and Jomini's Summary of the Art of War in the other. Meaning, Hittle proposes, that: "Through Jomini's writings the Napoleonic technique, characterized by independent maneuvering of corps and divisions, became accepted and apparently permanent military doctrine during the years of our Civil War. Today all officers study and attempt to apply the lessons of Chancellorsville, The Wilderness, The March to the Sea, and Gettysburg."[8] Therefore, Hittle concludes, "In tracing our way back through the chain of Napoleonic influence, it becomes increasingly evident that Jomini's writings were the means by which Napoleonic technique was transfused into the military thought of the Civil War, which was so important in the development of the basic pattern of modern battlefield procedure."[9]
Following General Hittle's rational hypothesis we may then conclude that General Jomini codified and provided the written genesis for much of what constitutes our current fundamental battle doctrine. This contention is supported by the fact that many of Jomini's definitions have been altered little to the present time.
Jomini interpreted the Napoleonic era as the beginning of a new method of all-out or total wars between nations. No longer was war the private affair of a monarch. Therefore Jomini attempted to establish a doctrine based upon his studies, observations and experiences that would help to educate the inexperienced and provide a common recognitional baseline for all of the forces operating within the army. In his Summary, one of the first and most enduring text-books on modern war, Jomini defined for the first time the nature of strategy, tactics, and logistics and postulated four 'principles of war.' Probably more than any other book, Jomini's Summary assembled, analyzed, standardized, and codified the military method and thought inherent in the Napoleonic concept of war.[10] However, Jomini's objective attitude toward Napoleon is clearly summarized by his statement: "One might say that he [Napoleon] was sent into this world to teach generals and statesmen what they ought to avoid. His victories teach what may be accomplished by activity, boldness, and skill; his disasters what might have been avoided by prudence."[11]
In his search for the basic principles of war he became convinced that the fundamentals of war were unchanging, objective, and independent of either weapons or time. So when Jomini wrote his Summary he was writing the first doctrinal publication for warfighters. To do this he realized that a clear definition of terms was a prerequisite to the development of sound military thought. Therefore, definitions constitute an important feature of the Summary.
Jomini was intolerant of the loose military terminology of the early 19th Century and was distressed about the lack of basic information regarding, what we call today, the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of how wars should be fought.[12] He confessed a mania for definitions but strongly argued that he made a "merit of it."[13] Similarly today, our Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have attempted to formalize military terms, and establish a common recognitional set of TTPs and doctrine for warfighting. For example, the JCS Pub. 1-01, states that: "[All] Terms and definitions used in the development of joint doctrine and JTTP will be in accordance with Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."[14] The JCS Pub. 1-02 defines doctrine as -- "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."[15] The JCS Pub. 1-01 further clarifies that: "The purpose of joint doctrine and JTTP is to enhance the combat effectiveness of US forces."[16] The JCS stress, as did Jomini, that the principles in: "Joint doctrine is authoritative but not directive. Commanders will exercise judgment in applying the procedures herein to accomplish their missions. This doctrine (or JTTP) should be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise."[17] Just like Jomini's Summary, textbooks and publications today establish the authoritative doctrinal basis for military operations and warfighting philosophy and are descriptive rather than prescriptive, always requiring judgment in application.
If we make further comparisons between our current doctrinal publications and the writings of Jomini, we find in some instances that there is a surprising similarity in the wording of the descriptions. If we continue to search for commonality in terms, we find that Jomini defined the 'theater of war' as embracing "all countries in which two powers may assail each other, whether it belongs to themselves, their allies, or to weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest."[18] JCS Pub 1-02 states that a 'theater of war' is "defined by the National Command Authorities [NCA] or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war."[19] Similarly, FM 100-5 Operations explains that, "A theater of war will normally contain more than one theater of operations, which can extend from friendly ports and logistics areas to distant sources of enemy support."[20] The JCS Pub 1-02 defines a 'theater of operations' as, "[a] subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time."[21] Today's definitions are more expansive than Jomini's, yet there is considerable significance in the fact that both definitions contain the same two essential thoughts: that the "theater of war" includes the areas which are involved in the war as well as the areas which might be involved.[22]
The definition of strategy has changed from the time that Jomini wrote his Summary: Whether it is defined in the JCS Pub 1-02 as, "The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat;"[23] or the FM 100-5 definition of: "The art and science of employing the armed forces and other elements of national power during peace, conflict, and war to secure national objectives."[24] Strategy is clearly more encompassing today than, as Jomini defined it, either "the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole of the theater of operations,"[25] nor as "the art of bringing the greatest part of forces of an army upon the important point of the theater of war or the zone of operations."[26] Jomini's definition of strategy is, however, closely captured in the modern definition of the 'operational level of war.' Which JCS Pub. 1-02 defines as, "The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy... sequenc[e] events..., initiat[e] actions, and apply resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives."[27] Again, in this definition, modern thought coincides very closely with the writings of Jomini penned well over 150 years ago. Now, however, operations vice strategy refers basically to broad aspects of the military role in fighting wars.[28]
In Jomini's definition of tactics we find even closer likeness in thought and wording to the modern definitions. Jomini considered tactics as involving "the maneuvers of an army on the field of battle, or of combat, and the different formations for leading troops to the attack" and "is the art of using these masses [troops] at the points to which they shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches; that is to say, the art of making them [troops] act at the decisive moment and at the decisive point of the field of battle."[29] Jomini, recognizing the importance of morale and leadership on a fighting force, added that, "When troops are thinking more of flight than of fight, they can no longer be termed active masses in the sense in which I use the term."[30] The JCS Pub 1-02 describes tactics as the "1. The employment of units in combat. 2. The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potentialities."[31]
While Jomini was less concerned with 'why' men or nation's fight than 'how to fight' and dealt more with the practical aspects of war than did the other theorists of his day, he was far from being a materialist. He catalogued the different kinds of wars and he recognized the importance of political objectives in wars between nations.[32] He discussed the types of wars and devouted the first chapter of his Summary to "Statesmanship in its Relationship to War."[33] Jomini captured early in his Summary that: "War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case."[34]
Conflict termination and its effect on politics and policy was a major consideration for Jomini in the Summary. Jomini thought that Napoleon and other theorists were far too shortsighted, always orienting on the destruction of the enemy's army. While most soldiers of the 19th Century took Napoleon to mean that the only object in war was the total destruction of the enemy,[35] Jomini wrote that: "Formerly the operations of war were directed against towns, camps, and positions. Recently they have been directed only against organized armies, leaving out of consideration all natural or artificial obstacles. Exclusive use of either of these systems is faulty: the true course is a mean between the extremes."[36] Consequently, while Jomini wrote of operations which had as their objective the "destruction of armies,"[37] and made reference to "wars of extermination,"[38] he wrote much less extensively than other theorists on the total destruction of the enemy.
Jomini realized that human thought is such a complex mixture of the conscious and the subconscious, of reason and emotion, of objectivity and subjectivity, that it defies precise description. Many may be surprised that Jomini wrote: "An army is ruined if forced to adhere to precisely the same style of tactical maneuvers in every country it may enter and against every different nation."[39] Consequently, a few further observations on several aspects of military thinking are appropriate. The problems that we face in warfighting vary greatly in their complexity and in the effort required for solving them. Both Bernard Brodie and Peter Paret explain that Clausewitz expected readers to ponder the implications of his philosophy regarding the complex nature of war, and that any rules that had no exceptions were "usually too obvious to be worth much discourse."[40] A fundamental philosophical and educational question would be, where might these "obvious" answers come from?
Psychologists who study the processes involved in thinking and problem-solving have suggested that problems can be categorized as to complexity according to whether they require reproductive (sometimes called analytic, or vertical thinking) or creative (sometimes called intuitive or lateral) thinking. Reproductive thinking is the direct application of previous knowledge to a new problem. In creative thinking, previously learned rules are either unavailable or do not apply directly. We have to generate new rules based on other stores of information, in order to come up with a formula that we can apply to solve the problem. Although we often act in creative ways, with little understanding or thought about how we accomplish these acts, the behavior of problem-solving strategies has, on occasion, been described. All problem situations have certain conceptual elements in common: an individual is prevented by a barrier, either physical or psychological, from reaching a goal, and an effort must be made to circumvent or surmount the barrier. Because there are many different types of problems, each demanding a particular combination of reproductive and creative thought, there are probably also optimal strategies for surmounting the barriers that keep us from solving these different types of problems. Therefore, the pedagogical tenor of the Summary was no accident. Jomini intentionally wrote as a teacher. From his writings in the Summary, Jomini, clearly accepted the reproductive paradigm for training and education regarding 'how to fight' and recognized the need for the creative approach once the battle or war had begun. In other words, Jomini's approach centered on the reproductive character of thinking in battle while accepting the genius of a commander as a prerequisite for success in warfighting. Jomini explained this by writing:
The study of the principles of strategy can produce no valuable practical results if we do nothing more than keep them in remembrance, never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to hypothetical wars, or to the brilliant operations of great captains. By such exercises may be procured a rapid and certain strategic coup-d'oeil, -- the most valuable characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in practice the finest theories in the world.[41]
[And that, a] general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, but not possessed of military coup-d'oeil, coolness, and skill, may make an excellent strategic plan and be entirely unable to apply the rules of tactics in presence of an enemy: his projects will not be successfully carried out, and his defeat will be probable. If he be a man of character, he will be able to diminish the evil results of his failure, but if he lose his wits he will lose his army.[42]
The relation between reproductive thinking and creative thinking and the advantages of having a sense of the structure of the problem were extremely important to Jomini. Jomini's approach was based upon the use of many heuristics (formulated from his study of history) and four algorithmics (his fundamental maxims or 'principles') to speed up the problem solving process. A heuristic is any strategy that provides a general direction for solving problems. The premise behind heuristics is that all goal-directed thinking is influenced by a small number of previously learned strategies. Heuristic strategies rely on familiarity with the task or some parts of it, and they can increase the possibility of success. An algorithm is a precisely stated set of rules that works for all instances of a particular problem. It is not always practical to use algorithms because of the number of possible solutions that some problems have. The major problem with his Summary is that all of his heuristics, or general directions, are frequently misinterpreted as algorithmics, or precisely stated rules. Jomini's retort to his critics, regarding the deceiving simplicity of his theories was,
These truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be no sound rules in war, the observance of which, the chances being equal, will lead to success. It is true that theories cannot teach men with mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; but it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for these rules thus become, in the hands of skillful generals commanding brave troops, means of almost certain success.[43]
Jomini spent so much effort explaining that his principles were not laws and stressing that 'history was the truest school of war' that he was obligated in the "Conclusion" to The Summary of the Art of War, to caution his readers with the following:
Shall I be understood as saying that there are no such things as tactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful? What military man of intelligence would be guilty of such absurdity? Are we to imagine that Eugene and Marlborough triumphed simply by inspiration or by the superior courage and discipline of their battalions? Or do we find in the events of Turin, Blenheim, and Ramillies maneuvers resembling those seen at Talavera, Waterloo, Jena, or Austerlitz, which were the causes of the victory in each case? When the application of a rule and the consequent maneuver have procured victory a hundred times for skillful generals, and always have in their favor the great probability of leading to success, shall their occasional failure be sufficient reason for entirely denying their value and for distrusting the effect of the study of the art? Shall a theory be pronounced absurd because it has only three-fourths of the whole number of chances of success in its favor?[44]
Jomini's deceptively simple 'truisms' were easy for military minds of the late nineteenth-century to comprehend. He published principles, maxims, and perceived rules that utilitarian thinkers and other shortsighted people could quote with the unabashed appearance of authority. Yet, Jomini realized that leadership was a prime requirement for military success and appraised character as "above all other requisites in a commander in chief."[45] However, he also recognized that a commander who possessed great character but lacked intellectual training would never be a great general. Jomini explained the means for a commander to acquire,
'a certain and ready strategic coup-d'oeil.' ... "Two very different things must exist in a man to make him a general: he must know how to arrange a good plan of operations, and how to carry it to a successful termination. The first of these talents may be a natural gift, but it may also be acquired and developed by study. The second depends more on individual character, is rather a personal attribute, and cannot be created by study, although it may be improved."[46]
Such reasoning brought him to but one conclusion, that the necessary characteristic of a winning general would be the combination of intellect and natural leadership. Or as echoed in FMFM 1 Warfighting: "The military profession is a thinking profession. Officers particularly are expected to be students of the art and science of war at all levels -- tactical, operational, and strategic -- with a solid foundation in military theory and a knowledge of military history and the timeless lessons to be gained from it."[47] And "...every Marine has a basic responsibility to study the profession of arms on his own. A leader without either interest in or knowledge of the history and theory of warfare -- the intellectual content of his profession -- is a leader in appearance only. This is particularly true among officers; after all, an officer's principal weapon is his mind."[48] Jomini's strong feelings regarding this subject are as follows:
As to the special executive ability and the well-balanced penetrating mind which distinguish the practical man from the one who knows only what others teach him, I confess that no book can introduce those things into a head where the germ does not previously exist by nature. I have seen many generals -- marshals, even -- attain a certain degree of reputation by talking largely of principles which they conceived incorrectly in theory and could not apply at all. I have seen these men intrusted with the supreme command of armies, and make the most extravagant plans, because they were totally deficient in good judgment and were filled with inordinate self-conceit. My works are not intended for such misguided persons as these, but my desire has been to facilitate the study of the art of war for careful, inquiring minds, by pointing out directing principles. Taking this view, I claim credit for having rendered valuable service to those officers who are really desirous of gaining distinction in the profession of arms.[49]
Similarly, his observation that "the union of wise theory with great character will constitute the great captain" is an enduring truism, as ageless as war itself.[50]
From his study of history Jomini was as aware of the value of surprise and stressed the advantages of the initiative. "A general," he said, "who stands motionless to receive his enemy, keeping strictly on the defensive, may fight ever so bravely, but he must give way when properly attacked."[51] Jomini realized that mobile war made it impossible for a nation to adopt a defensive philosophy based upon the false security derived from a fortified frontier. While condemning the passive defense and the age-old reliance on fortified positions he explained what he called "the defensive with offensive returns," suggesting that the general who "awaits the enemy with the intent of launching a timely counter-attack will wrest from him [the enemy] and transfer to his own troops the moral effect always produced by onward movement when coupled with the certainty of throwing the main strength into the action at the decisive point."[52] Similarly, the FM 100-5 states: "The offense is an integral part of any defense. A defending force may attack to disrupt an expected enemy offensive, upsetting its preparation while buying time and information."[53] It is interesting to note that nations have been conquered for not heeding Jomini's advice regarding the futility of fortified borders. In the Summary he warned: "It is bad policy to cover a frontier with fortresses very close together ... To bury an army in entrenchments where it may be outflanked and surrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is manifest folly; and it is hoped that we shall never see another instance of it."[54]
Napoleon's new emphasis on mobility in warfighting created for Jomini a new consciousness of the need for adequate intelligence of the enemy. Efficient espionage and aggressive reconnaissance was Jomini's prescription for obtaining the vitally necessary information of the enemy upon which a commander must base his battle plan. Rather than being outmoded by the passing of time, his thoughts on combat intelligence, reconnaissance, and security have been continually reaffirmed and are just as valid today. Jomini believed strongly in what is called today 'recon pull' or 'directive control.' He wrote that: "One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself if he is ignorant what his adversary is about? ... This is one of the chief causes of the great difference between theory and the practice of war."[55] Consequently, he suggested that a commander in formulating a plan or fighting a battle should use four means of obtaining information of the enemy's operations. Jomini summarized the key points of gathering intelligence and information prior to the formulation of a plan and during the conduct of a military operation:
1. A general should neglect no means of gaining information of the enemy's movements. For this purpose he should make use of reconnaissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable officers, signals, and questioning of deserters and prisoners.
2. Ever multiply the means of obtaining information, for no matter how imperfect and contradictory they may be the truth may often be sifted from them.
3. Perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means.
4. As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative situation of the armies enables him to make and never losing sight of the principles of the art.[56]
He stressed in the Summary that: "A skillful general may supply the defects of the other methods by making reasonable and well-founded hypotheses. A mind fully convinced of these truths and conversant with the principles of war will always be able to form a plan which will provide in advance for the probable contingencies of the future."[57] Quite similarly, the FM 100-5 states: "At every level, commanders develop options so that whatever happens, they can maintain the momentum of the attack."[58] Jomini concluded his comments on the importance of reconnaissance and security by writing -- "It cannot be too much insisted upon that the real secret of military genius consists in the ability to make these reasonable suppositions in any case; although their number is always small, it is surprising how much this highly useful means of regulating one's conduct is neglected."[59]
Napoleon was not free from this flaw, for as Jomini wrote, "Since Napoleon's direction of operations was so clearly fixed, what mattered to him to know the details of the [the enemy's] movements?"[60] Jomini used as an example for the criticism the famous 'prophecy' that got him a commission under Napoleon,
Being certain of the correctness of these principles I did not hesitate to announce a month before the war that Napoleon would attempt just what he did, and that if the Prussians passed the Saale battles would take place at Jena and Naumburg! ...I have only been anxious to show that in war a plan of operations may often be arranged, simply based upon the general principles of the art and without much attention necessarily being given to the details of the enemy's movements.[61]
Jomini's strong feelings on the importance of the constant emphasis on intelligence, security, and reconnaissance when planning or conducting a military operation are evidenced as follows:
From this cause arise the mistakes of those generals who are simply learned men without a natural talent for war, and who have not acquired that practical coup-d'oeil which is imparted by long experience in the direction of military operations. It is a very easy matter for a school-man to make a plan for outflanking a wing or threatening a line of communications upon a map, where he can regulate the positions of both parties to suit himself. But when he has opposed to him a skillful, active, and enterprising adversary whose movements are a perfect riddle, then his difficulties begin and we see an exhibition of the incapacity of an ordinary general with none of the resources of genius. I have seen so many proofs of this truth in my long life that, if I had to put a general to the test, I should have a much higher regard for the man who could form sound conclusions as to the movements of the enemy than for him who could make a grand display of theories.[62]
With Jomini's previous explanations fresh in mind the definitions in the U.S. Army's capstone doctrinal publication for operations, FM 100-5, should be seen as readily similar in nature and construct. FM 100-5 identifies:
The initiative is critical to successful offensive operations. Whatever its purpose, campaign plans must be flexible enough to accommodate change so commanders can shift their main effort in response to either setback or opportunity without losing the initiative. Accordingly, commanders anticipate likely enemy actions and prepare contingencies for them and train their units to do likewise. Successful commanders do not run out of options and are always looking for ways to hurt the enemy. Anticipation and continuous formulation of attack options are key."[63]...
[And that,] security of the force is crucial. Successful reconnaissance is vital to success. The high-speed mobility of modern forces can create exposed LOCs and gaps between large, friendly formations. Commanders should anticipate this and take precautions to keep it from happening.[64]
For Jomini, the importance of ascertaining what the enemy's intentions was only slightly more important than giving a subordinate commander the freedom to respond to changing battlefield situations. Jomini identified that superior mobility and morale were combat multipliers, which could only be exploited if all units knew their mission and their commander's intent. How much information a commander should provide a subordinate, and the amount of discretion allowed in determining the execution of an order, has been a controversial issue in military thinking. Jomini strongly disapproved of what he called the 'old school' of issuing minutely detailed orders to even the high ranking field commanders who, he wrote, "are supposed to be of sufficient experience not to require the same sort of instruction as would be given to junior subalterns [Lieutenants] just out of school."[65] While simultaneously rejecting excessively detailed orders, he quite radically criticized Napoleon for the other extreme -- Napoleon's directives were usually issued to his subordinates without a general concept of the operation in which they were to participate. In Jomini's opinion a proper order would give the subordinate commander all the necessary information pertaining to the nature of the entire contemplated operation, today what we call 'the commander's intent'; instructions pertaining to the execution of his mission would be restricted to only the necessary directives stipulating what was to be done.[66] Jomini's military thinking has been reflected in the contents of our current doctrinal publications, which universally prescribe that an order should not trespass on the province of a subordinate. It should contain everything that the subordinate must know to carry out his mission, but nothing more. The FM 100-5 suggests, "To preserve synchronization on a fluid battlefield, commanders conduct detailed initial planning. Subordinates understand the intent of the next two higher commanders so well that they can properly exploit battlefield opportunities even when communications fail."[67] In short, Jomini advocated adherence to the principle by which subordinates are directed "what" to do but not "how" to do it.[68]
For Jomini, simplicity in battle planning was a cardinal virtue, for he postulated that "the more simple a decisive maneuver is, the more certain will be its success."[69] Jomini's discussions of battlefield difficulties indicated that he was thoroughly aware of the fact that friction was an ever-present combat factor. In the Summary Jomini admonished his readers with this warning -- when he wrote,
If every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit under the influence of one man's will and as rapidly as thought, the art of winning battle would be reduced to choosing the most favorable order of battle and a general could reckon with certainty upon the success of maneuvers arranged beforehand. ... Inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will be understood and executed by the subordinates of the general-in-chief, excess of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective coup-d'oeil militaire, -- every thing of this kind may interfere with the simultaneous entering into action of the different parts, without speaking of the accidental circumstances which may delay or prevent the arrival of a corps at the appointed place.[70]
Numerous of his contemporaries as well as many of his successors in the field of military writing, have continued to describe Jomini as an advocate of geometrical battle methods. This he denied even as he wrote,
I think we may hence conclude that it is absurd to desire to mark out upon the ground orders of battle in such regular lines as would be used in tracing them on a sketch, ... a skillful general ... should endeavor in all his combinations, whether deliberately arranged or adopted on the spur of the moment, to form a sound conclusion as to the important point of the battlefield; and this he can only do by observing well the direction of the enemy's line of battle, and not forgetting the direction in which strategy requires him to operate.[71]
Hittle has suggested that: "Military writers, past and present, who adhere to this false interpretation as the basic concept of Jomini's theory read only the words on the page and go no deeper than the printing ink."[72] Hittle points out that some of the current operational orders and doctrinal publications posses a much more intricate geometric appearance than many of Jomini's diagrams. "For instance, a present-day plan for fires for a weapons company or a landing diagram for an amphibious [or heloborne] operation, would give an erroneous impression of rigidity and geometrical formalism if interpreted by a critic lacking the necessary professional knowledge to understand their proper usage."[73]
Jomini accurately perceived the significant developments in the use of combined arms as they emerged from the Napoleonic school of war by writing, more than 150 years ago: "I advise that the different arms be posted in conformity, with the character of the ground, according to the object in view and the supposed designs of the enemy, and that they be used simultaneously in the manner best suited to them, care being taken to enable them to afford mutual support."[74] Similarly, the MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES FOR THE THEATER AIR-GROUND SYSTEM (TAGS), today helps explain the basic concept of combined arms in modern military method, and stresses the coordinated employment of all arms toward attaining the common battle goal. It says, "No arm wins battles. The combined action of all arms and services is essential to success. The characteristics of each arm and service adapt it to the performance of its specific functions. The higher commander coordinates and directs the action of all, exploiting their powers to attain the ends sought."[75] Fire-and-movement was in Jomini's opinion the most highly desired type of tactical procedure.[76] His advice in this regard is as valid today as it was when he originally wrote, "an order of battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of the fire of the arms with the impulsion of the attack and the morale effect it produces."[77] The Napoleonic technique of massing artillery did not escape Jomini's attention. He advised that artillery "should concentrate its fire upon the point where a decisive blow is to be struck."[78]
Unlike some of the more impressionable and less discerning of current writers who acclaim new developments in arms or technique as being the key to total victory, Jomini began his discussion of infantry with the flat assertion that "The infantry is the most important arm ... however infantry without proper support is quite ineffective."[79] As a product of an age that thought in terms of mass and maneuver, Jomini evidenced an amazing understanding of the use of cover and concealment when he pointed to the necessity for using the irregularities in the terrain and wooded areas to provide shelter for large groups from artillery fire, as well as to gain protection for skirmishers in the assault.[80]
Today the FM 100-5 has captured these key Jominian constructs in the following: "a commander's statement of intent or concept of operations should articulate how fires will be used to support whatever form of maneuver he decides to use. Reconnaissance is a precursor to maneuver and fire. Reconnaissance elements maintain contact with the enemy, develop the situation, and forewarn maneuver units prior to initial engagements."[81]
Jomini believed that war was a field of human activity in which some general, reproductive, principles could be applied. He argued that Napoleon had simply used, usually successfully, some principles that had always been applicable to war. He sought to set down those principles for the guidance of future commanders. Therefore, while his Summary may not provide an answer in every modern combat situation it still presents some definitive options. The enemies, weapons, and organizations have changed and some of his incorrectly perceived 'cookbook' recipes for success may be now only historic examples, but the advice and the underlying rationale he provides warfighters in the Summary will always provide a starting point for those who fight in wars. At least as an historic reference of how things have been done in the past; at the strategic (now considered operational) and tactical levels of war Jomini's theories will always be applicable.
Theoretical Framework
As we stated previously, Jomini's battlefield framework was not so much a matter of 'confusing geometry' as a failure to understand from nascence, or inexperience of the reader. To that end we will attempt to explain the concepts of decisive points and lines of operation and how they fit into Jomini's theoretical framework. We will then compare them to the current definitions in FM 100-5. The following section entitled Methodology will explain how Jomini thought terms should be incorporated into an effective offensive, and present the similarities inherent within the U.S. Army doctrine of today.
Having discussed how Jomini thought of war, and continuing with Hittle's outline, it is important now to consider why Jomini thought certain courses of action were successful and why some failed. Out of the Napoleonic era came a new and stronger appreciation of the concentration of force upon the decisive point of battle. Jomini considered the placing of maximum force at the decisive point as "the guiding principle of strategy and tactics."[82] Jomini wrote that identifying the decisive point was the responsibility of the commander on the scene, and a product of executive talent, skill, energy and a quick comprehension of events.
He concluded that there was one "Fundamental Principle of War" (these are frequently referred to as 'Jomini's four principles of war' by readers of the Summary, however, Jomini frequently referred to them collectively and inseparably as 'the principle of the art') key to war-fighting reducible to four maxims. These maxims were: 1) To maneuver the mass of the army, successively upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and attack the enemy's lines of communication as frequently as possible while still protecting ones own. 2) To maneuver and engage fractions of the enemy's army with the majority of one's own. 3) To focus the effort of the attack at the critical place. 4) To economize one's own force on supporting attacks so that the focus of effort could attack the decisive point at the proper time with sufficient force. Therefore, a thinking commander could engage fractions of the enemy's force, with less risk, at the critical time with the bulk of his own army.[83]
Jomini, once again stressed the importance of the creative genius of the commander by writing. "It is almost always easy to determine the decisive point of a field of battle, but not so with the decisive moment; and it is precisely here that genius and experience are every thing, and mere theory of little value."[84] Jomini added that if the art of war was to bring the decisive force at the decisive point, at the decisive time, then the choice of the correct line of operations was "...the fundamental idea in a good plan of a campaign."[85] To explain how to do this effectively Jomini proposed the following theoretical framework.
The entire aim of the war, as defined by the political circumstances, drove the selection of the initial objective point.[86] The objective point was the 'aim-point' in the theater of war and was determined by the political and military leadership. Jomini wrote, "Of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. The objective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan to be followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be undertaken for this end..."[87][emphasis added] This is what he called the "object of first attempts" or as he wrote:
This is choosing an objective of operations [Jomini later adds, "the choice of the objective is by far the most important thing in a plan of operations" ]. There are two very different kinds: some, that are called territorial or geographical objectives, refer simply to an enemy's line of defense which it is desired to get possession of, or a fortress or entrenched camp to be captured; the other, on the contrary, consist entirely in the destruction or disorganization of the enemy's forces, without giving attention to geographical points of any kind. This was the favorite objective of Napoleon.[88][emphasis added]
Therefore, a geographical objective point could be the seat of power of an enemy government which could be in the capital city. Or an objective point of maneuver could be an enemy force itself or the most important component thereof. So while he identified either an objective point of maneuver or a geographic objective point depending upon the political objectives and the relative military capabilities of the two sides, these objective points, were oriented primarily on their impact upon the enemy and not on the seizure or retention of terrain. Perhaps this is why this concept was so difficult for earlier practitioners to grasp, as we presented earlier most soldiers and theorists since Jomini have oriented on the destruction of the enemy's army. An objective point of maneuver was force oriented and gained its importance from the relative positions of the opposing forces. A geographic objective point was terrain oriented, but enemy focused, and could be anything from a capital city to a key terrain feature which ended the war. By properly selecting these objective points the operational commander would almost certainly defeat the enemy army.[89]
Jomini also identified the importance of secondary types of 'points' within a forces theater of operations. The two other types of points Jomini discussed in the Summary were decisive points and strategic points, also either geographic or maneuver. These points could be used to 'get at' an objective point and were usually decided upon by the military commander as a way to achieve the wartime objective. Therefore, to be a decisive point, the point had to be capable of exerting a major influence upon the results of the campaign or major operation. Jomini insisted that identifying decisive points was a matter of executive talent, skill, energy and a quick comprehension of events. By doing so a thinking commander could aggressively engage fractions of the enemy's force, with less risk, at the critical time with the bulk of his own army.[90] According to Jomini, geographic oriented decisive points might include significant terrain features or road networks. Maneuver decisive points resulted from the relative position of the troops on both sides. This was most frequently an exposed flank but could also include weak areas in the opponent's front of operation.[91] Jomini also identified those decisive strategic points which are "capable of exercising a marked influence [on either force] either upon the result of a campaign or upon a single enterprise."[92] Strategic points, were simply any point of the theater of war which had any military significance. Therefore, all strategic points were not necessarily decisive points. "This might include a road network or major military concentration."[93]
The only one of these types of points that survives today is the decisive point defined in the FM 100-5 as:
Decisive points provide commanders with a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points are often geographical in nature, such as a hill, a town, or a base of operations. They could also include elements that sustain command such as a command post, or a critical boundary. Normally, more decisive points will be in a theater than a commander can seize, retain, or destroy with his available resources. Commanders designate the most important decisive points as objectives and allocate resources to seize or destroy them. Decisive points help commanders gain or maintain the initiative. Controlling these points in the attack helps them gain freedom of maneuver, thus maintaining the momentum of the attack and sustaining the initiative. If the defender controls such a point, it interferes with the attacker's momentum and facilitates the defender's counterattack. Decisive points include transportation nets or terrain features that are critical for the continued momentum of operations or the rapid shifting of the direction of maneuver and provide a pathway for advancing forces. They allow for passage of combat power in deeper and increasingly damaging thrusts against the enemy. By correctly identifying and using decisive points, commanders can place the enemy at a great disadvantage. Securing decisive points can give the commander the flexibility to select from more than one line of operation for further advance.[94] [emphasis added]
Through the identification of objective, decisive, and strategic points, Jomini postulated that the commander then chose the lines of operation on which his army would operate. For Jomini the art of maneuver consisted of applying the greatest amount of force and achieving decisive results always were the enemy was weakest. Jomini wrote that "...the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of campaign."[95] The correct choice of the line of operation would provide flexibility, and maintain the initiative critical to the success of any operation. In the offense the correct line of operation could enhance the magnitude of a victory or in the defense, minimize the effects of a defeat. To support his contention, he described an entire series of different types of lines of operation. Part of the confusion which has arisen regarding these lines of operation was because Jomini was referring to both the conceptual and the physical using the same broad category of lines of operation. Within a theater of operation, a line of operation extended from an army's base of operation through the decisive points to the objective point. This concept was not a lock-step or methodical approach, as might be equated to a direction of attack or axis of advance in today's terminology, but rather based upon the overall intentions of the military and political commanders. Therefore, while objective points provided some directional orientation for the force, lines of operation were more than a simple route or road between two or more points. More generally, a line of operation was an avenue of approach, made up of suitable mobility corridors, broad enough to accommodate the force as well as allow some lateral shifting of forces to permit necessary maneuver.[96]
Jomini wrote that selection of the proper line of operation, while dependent upon the topographical characteristics, should be determined more upon the position of the hostile forces in the theater of operations. Jomini was the first to develop what he termed a line of operation as an aid to maneuver, mass, concentration, security and flexibility. Major General Henry Lloyd and others had previously explained a line of operation, although their definitions were more concerned with support and supply and were therefore more similar to today's Line of Communication or (LOC).[97] Jomini wrote that others had suggested that he use a different term, perhaps radii to explain his new concept, unfortunately he did not -- it could have eliminated some confusion.[98] Like decisive points lines of operation are still included in U.S. Army doctrinal publications and are defined as follows:
Lines of operation define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate enemy forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger force but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker opponent.[99]
Jomini felt that a general adept at strategy (operations) would plan his operation from the objective point back through the decisive points taking care to allocate forces appropriately. By doing this in planning he would be assured of having the forces when and where he needed them most when the battle or campaign was fought.[100] This is a technique that is still used today. Jomini defined it in the following: "It was stated above that strategy [operations], besides indicating the decisive points of a theater of war, requires two things: -- 1st, that the principal mass of the force be moved against fractions of the enemy's, to attack them in succession; 2d, that the best direction of movement be adopted, -- that is to say, one leading straight to the decisive points already known, and afterward upon secondary points."[101]
Methodology
The preceding introduction and theoretical orientation provides the conceptual framework of Jomini's suggested approach to warfighting. To effectively test whether Jomini's principles, of a turning movement, decisive points and lines of operation were used in Operation Desert Storm, during the Persian Gulf War, we must first provide some background on how Jomini thought these specific terms and methods could be successfully integrated into an effective offensive. We will then attempt to show the correlation to today's offensive methodology.
Jomini's meticulously identified terms; revolutionary constructs regarding intelligence, command and control, combined arms; and the TTPs to effectively employ them were assimilated by the military and military historians. Michael Howard in his 1965 essay on Jomini stressed the importance of Jomini's concepts on the manner in which a general or a commander-in-chief conducted campaigns. Howard correctly interpreted Jomini as saying that a campaign would be decisive through the selection of the appropriate line of operation to attack at the decisive point along the flank of the opponent. However, if the same commander failed to plan his campaign properly, the result would be a costly and indecisive battle.[102] Similarly today, the FM 100-5 states: "The main feature of an offensive battle is the outflanking or bypassing of the defender -- that is, taking the initiative. Initiative, combined with maneuver, makes decisive offensive operations possible."[103]
Jomini believed that a successful offensive would incorporate his 'fundamental principle,' or four maxims, which included:
that a commander should seize the strategic initiative; should maneuver so as to impede the enemy's lines of communication and supplies without endangering his own; should concentrate the bulk of his forces against the decisive point, taking care to attack only a portion of the enemy's forces; should achieve victory by use of mobility and surprise; and should follow rapidly in pursuit of the defeated foe.[104]
Jomini identified that the enemy's army was invariably Napoleon's primary focus and the seizure of terrain had become of only secondary importance. Jomini wrote that:
This was the most conspicuous merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old systems, which were satisfied by the capture of one or two points or with occupation of an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile army, -- since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no organized force to protect them.[105]
While Jomini recognized that this was Napoleon's favorite strategy he did not, as previously written, agree with it. Jomini astutely recognized that destroying armies or tactical victories alone would not equate to strategic success. As is suggested in the following definitions from his Summary:
Battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about great questions of national policy and of strategy. Strategy [what we now refer to as the operational art][106] directs armies to the decisive points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance, the results of battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius and fortune, gains victories.[107]... The guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession of which promises the most important results.[108]... Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding features of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as armies have been destroyed by strategic operations without occurrence of pitched battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. It is also true that a complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the same character when there may have been no grand strategic combinations.[109]
Therefore, Jomini's preferred concept of operations was to orient on the enemy force and force the commander to capitulate or face destruction. Jomini proposed that this would be accomplished by an initial frontal attack conducted to seize the initiative and force the enemy to commit his reserves.[110] Then a prepositioned highly mobile, combined arms, force would be committed towards an enemy flank, effectively putting the enemy commander 'on the horns of a dilemma.' (as General W. T. Sherman, USA would later call it). If the enemy commander responded to the new threat, the friendly commander would then commit his reserve, effectively changing the main effort and widening the gap in the weakened enemy line, exploiting the penetration and pursuing the fleeing enemy or defeating him by severing his lines of communication.[111] Jomini wrote in the Summary:
Laying aside ... geometrical figures, ... for the purpose of fighting battles in a truly scientific manner, the following points must be adhered to: -- As it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy from his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best means of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can be accumulated against him. It sometimes happens, however, that the direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat. He may when thus threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if attacked by main force. History is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers, especially when used against generals of weak character [we will later use Saddam Hussein as an example]; and, although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain them when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine these turning movements with attacks by main force.[112]
According to Jomini, the perfect attack would always attack enemy weakness with strength and be based upon the combination of maneuver, assault, penetration, exploitation and remorseless pursuit into one coherent and continuous process. As he wrote in the Summary:
An order of battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of the fire of the arms and of the moral effect produced by an onset [assault]. A skillful mixture of deployed lines and columns, acting alternately as circumstances require, will always be a good combination. In the practical use of this system many variations must arise from differences in the coup-d'oeil of commanders, the morale of officers and soldiers, etc..[113]
Collecting accurate intelligence or making reasoned hypotheses regarding the enemy's plans; gaining and retaining the initiative; and coordinating all of his forces in a combined arms effort, were the 'long poles' in this strategy. If communication was lost between the supporting and supported forces then disaster could and historically did occur.[114]
Jomini recorded and attempted to pass on two primary tactical approaches. If the enemy was stronger in numbers, or had had time to prepare significant defenses then the force should be organized into an advance guard, normally consisting of two wings and a reserve. These forces would move along separate lines of operation and attempt a penetration or what Jomini referred to as advancing to seize a central position with the objective of dividing the enemy into parts.
Jomini believed that through the combination of timing and correct maneuvering of the reserve along a well chosen line of operation -- and a common purpose based upon the identification of decisive and strategic points, a series of small battles would then be fought with local superiority of force against each part in turn.
Conversely, if the enemy was weaker * (see Jomini's note below), or had less time to prepare defenses, a turning movement would be invariably preferable.[115] Jomini explained this form of maneuver in the following:
In every case, however, it [an attack] must be directed upon the center or upon one of the extremities. Only when the assailing [friendly] forces are vastly preponderating [superior] would it be otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center and the two extremities at the same time. [To which Jomini adds the note: *-- "The inferiority of an army does not depend exclusively upon the number of soldiers: their military qualities, their morale, and the ability of their commander are also important elements." {italics in original} He continued,] It may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy divide his forces on an extended front, the best direction of the maneuver - line will be upon his center, but in every other case, when it is possible, the best direction will be upon one of the flanks, and upon the rear of his line of defense or front of operations.[116]
Jomini added that, if a turning movement was decided upon as the main effort, then it should be supported by limited attacks with the remainder of the force; fixing enemy forces in place, or cutting their line of retreat:
In case of superiority in numbers or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent were the forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver to outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the enemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the center. Finally, [by previously conducting] operations to cut an enemy's line of communications [with separate detachments] before giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected maneuver during the battle.[117]
Jomini, therefore, concluded that the ideal attack would incorporate, "the combination of these two methods that is to say, the attack in front by force and the turning movement will render the victory more certain than the use of either separately; but, in all cases, too extended movements must be avoided, even in presence of a contemptible enemy."[118] However, he cautioned, "These attempts have much greater probability of success if concealed from the enemy until the very moment of the assault."[119] This ideal situation Jomini insisted, will usually be successful when, "... it happens sometimes that an army succeeds in seizing the enemy's line of retreat before fighting a battle, as Napoleon did at Marengo, Ulm, and Jena. The decisive point having in such case[sic] been secured by skillful marches before fighting, it only remains to prevent the enemy from forcing his way through your line."[120] What Jomini was trying to present to his readers was an attack similar to the following example; in which Chandler clearly describes the method Napoleon used to defeat a weaker opponent.
After inducing the foe to make the first move, Napoleon left a small force to hold up the enemy and deceive him into believing that he was facing the complete French army. Meanwhile the mass of the army executed forced marches to sweep into the enemy's rear so as to cut his communications with his bases. This maneuver was particularly effective against convoy-bound opponents, who found their supplies interrupted. His morale shaken, the foe's first thought was to fight his way out of the trap, and the result would often be a reversed-front battle fought out on ground of Napoleon's choosing. First used [with only partial success] during the maneuver of Lodi, May 1796, this concept lay behind Marengo, Ulm, and Jena campaigns of later years.[121]
Jomini cautioned his readers regarding the use of "detachments" and the risks of losing the initiative or the force if they were too far separated from mutual support, however, as always this consideration had to be made based upon the appraisal of the enemy commander's capabilities. Jomini further explained in the Summary that:
It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless, as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain coup-d'oeil of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many maneuvers of this kind [turning movements] have failed against some commanders and succeed against others, and why such movement which would have been hazardous in presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington might have entire success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to take the offensive himself at the proper moment.[122]
The current offensive methodology used by the U.S. Army closely resembles Jomini's pedantry. The U.S. Army still accepts that the main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. And that other offensive operations may be used to secure decisive terrain, deprive the enemy of resources, gain information, deceive and divert the enemy, hold the enemy in position, disrupt his attack, or set up the conditions for future successful operations.[123]
The FM 100-5 states that, "Commanders build up sufficient combat power in their main effort to overwhelm the enemy at the critical time and place while accepting risk with supporting efforts."[124] Or that: "At the point of their attack, commanders avoid the enemy's main strength, turning him out of his defensive positions, isolating his forces from sources of support, and forcing him to fight in an unintended direction over ground he has not prepared. By attacking this way, the disadvantages of fighting exposed and surprised shift to the defender."[125] To accomplish these offensive maneuvers the FM 100-5 addresses the forms of offensive maneuver available to today's U.S. Army commander; these include the turning movement and a penetration.
The penetration is similar to Jomini's instructions for defeating a stronger opponent and includes the following guidance for commanders: Commanders use penetration when enemy flanks are not assailable. The FM 100-5 does caution -- "However, such attacks are nearly always costly in lives and materiel. Commanders should undertake them only when no other approach will accomplish the mission."[126] A penetration may be necessary to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front, to create an assailable flank or gain access to the enemy's rear. Multiple penetrations may be desirable if they force the enemy to disperse his fires and consider multiple threats before committing his reserves. In either case commanders mass sufficient combat power at the point of penetration to overwhelm the enemy and gain the advantage. Other attacking forces support these efforts by employing feints and demonstrations, fixing the defender along the front, or catching the defender by surprise with rapid and violent execution.[127]
Conversely, the definition of a turning movement in FM 100-5 still closely resembles Jomini's definition or his suggested tactic for attacking a weaker opponent. The FM 100-5 explains that a turning movement through maneuver pits strength against the enemy's weakness. To do this the commander should fix the enemy's attention forward through a combination of fires and supporting or diversionary attacks while he maneuvers his main effort to strike at the enemy's weak flanks and rear. A commander then finds (the enemy may unintentionally expose a flank) or creates an assailable flank by arriving from an unexpected direction and positions greater relative combat power against a defender to strip him of his previous advantages.[128] The FM 100-5 states that through a turning movement the commander
... uses freedom of maneuver to create a decisive point where the enemy is unprepared. The attacker secures key terrain deep in the enemy's rear and along its LOCs by maneuvering around the enemy. Commanders carefully weigh the advantage of attacks on multiple axes to avoid undue costs and casualties. This threat forces the enemy to abandon his prepared defense and attack in an undesirable direction and at a time of his opponent's choice.[129] [emphasis added]
The Use of the Turning Movement, Lines of Operation and Decisive Points in the Ground Offensive of Operation Desert Storm, the Persian Gulf War 24-28 February 1991
This paper will now test the validity of the theory presented. This test will be whether the Jominian concepts of a turning movement, decisive points and lines of operation were used by the U.S. Army during Operation Desert Storm, of the Persian Gulf War. This operation illustrates that the line of operation and the decisive points which the commander chooses can have a major impact on the success of his operation.
Since the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) was a U.S. Army officer (General Schwarzkopf) and his planners were primarily U. S. Army officers, it appears appropriate to assume that U.S. Army doctrine would have been used in their planning and execution. While we have found no reference citing the actual terms turning movement, decisive point or lines of operation, in the published histories or battle plans, we have found numerous references to objectives, and attacks or assaults. Therefore, because the FM 100-5 states that: "Commanders designate the most important decisive points as objectives and allocate resources to seize or destroy them."[130] [And that a line of operation is used to] "... connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives."[131] [And that a] " turning movement uses freedom of maneuver to create a decisive point where the enemy is unprepared,"[132] it is plausible that these constructs were used in the development and execution of the plans and subsequent battles and engagements during the ground offensive of Desert Storm.
As written previously, the following definitions while taken from the FM 100-5 are Jominian constructs. "By correctly identifying and using decisive points, commanders can place the enemy at a great disadvantage. Securing decisive points can give the commander the flexibility to select from more than one line of operation for further advance."[133] Also, "that a line of operations defines the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. ... A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger force but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker opponent."[134] Lastly, "a turning movement uses freedom of maneuver to create a decisive point where the enemy is unprepared. The attacker secures key terrain deep in the enemy's rear and along its LOCs by maneuvering around the enemy. This threat forces the enemy to abandon his prepared defense and attack in an undesirable direction and at a time of his opponent's choice."[135][emphasis added]
The offensive form of maneuver termed a turning movement and the concepts of decisive points and lines of operation helped to shape the manner in which the General Schwarzkopf and the subordinate U.S. Army commanders conducted their operations. By maneuvering to bypass the enemy's strength, sever his lines of resupply and retreat and force him to fight on ground of his choosing, General Schwarzkopf executed a classic turning movement. Jomini wrote that when conducting a turning movement:
The decisive point is that wing of the enemy which is nearest his line of retreat, and this line you must seize while protecting your own. When an enemy has one or two lines of retreat perpendicular to and behind his position of battle, it will generally be best to attack the center, or that wing where the obstacles of the ground shall be the least favorable for the defense; for in such a case the first consideration is to gain battle, without having in view the total destruction of the enemy.[136]
In this operation the Army commanders generally recognized four geographical decisive points along their lines of operation -- the initial penetrations, the key road junctions, the Euphrates river crossings, and the capital cities (Kuwait City and Baghdad). Exclusive of terrain, the Army commanders also identified the forces overwatching the breach sites, the Iraqi tactical reserves, and the Republican Guard Units (the entire Republican Guard Force would be identified by Jomini as an objective point of maneuver and was identified by the Coalition as the operational center of gravity) as maneuver decisive points. The ebb and flow of this operation can be traced by following the opposing sides possession of these decisive points. To the extent that the Coalition succeeded in penetrating and encircling the enemy forces and capturing key road junctions, their offensive advanced. To the extent that the Coalition held and denied access to the key road junctions along the Iraqi lines of retreat their defense failed.
The Desert Storm ground offensive followed 38 days of preparation by air, sea, psyops, and special operations forces attacking decisive points throughout Kuwait and Iraq. These decisive points were both maneuver and geographic and included Iraqi missile sites; command and control centers; telecommunications facilities; power generating plants; airfields and runways; aircraft storage shelters; bridges; and troop positions.
In preparation of the ground attack which would use a turning movement, numerous, feints, probes and mock attacks were conducted by various coalition forces. These operations were designed to hide the movement of an entire field Army (the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps and the U.S. VII Corps); to fix the Iraqi troops along the Saudi Arabia/Kuwaiti border; and to mislead and confuse the Iraqi leadership regarding the Coalition's intentions. This move was carried out as Jomini had suggested that it be done, in almost total secrecy. Consequently, when the ground war began General Schwarzkopf had succeeded in severing most of the Iraqi lines of communication, grounding or destroying its airforce, defeating its navy, and attritting the Iraq ground forces by nearly fifty-percent. These elements could all be considered decisive points from both the Jominian and Army definitions because their attainment or negation was recognized or identified as striking the enemy where and when he could be hurt the most while simultaneously maintaining the initiative to maneuver and posture for the attack.
The major ground operation began in the early morning hours of 24 February. The Jominian geographical objective point, or the purpose of the war for the forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) was to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait, requiring defeat of the Republican Guard Forces (what Jomini would have called the objective point of maneuver) in the KTO. From the beginning Jomini would have had questions. Referring back to the theoretical framework, Jomini identified the 'objective point' or the 'object of first attempts' as being either geographic or maneuver oriented. Therefore, he would have asked for clarification. Was the objective point the seizure of Kuwait, (a geographic objective point) or the defeat or the destruction of the Republican Guard Forces (an objective point of maneuver) in the KTO? The commanders who fought this battle were not in agreement, which resulted in a large portion of the Republican Guard Forces eventually escaping.
The plan for achieving this was a classic turning movement, and reflected how Jomini explained a weaker opponent should be attacked. This plan envisioned deception operations by various units and an attack along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabia border by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and Arab coalition forces, all to fix Iraqi forces; while the highly mobile main effort (VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps) maneuvered to the west of the Iraqi defenses to turn them, and force commitment of the operational reserve, the Republican Guard Force. The decisive points of this turning movement were both geographic and maneuver based, and were derived by working backwards from the identification of the objectives assigned to the major subordinate units. The geographic decisive points identified were to seize key terrain to sever Iraqi LOCs and to isolate the Republican Guard while the maneuver decisive points were to penetrate the obstacles, turn the Iraqi forces and ultimately engage and defeat the Iraqi operational reserve, the Republican Guard.[137]
At 0800 hours, February 24, the coalition attack began with supporting attacks on both flanks and a feint in the center of sector. The western force with two divisions, attacked to seize the geographic decisive point of As-Salman Airfield which would protect the coalition's west flank.[138] Capitalizing on the initial successes a third Division was airlifted approximately 70 miles into Iraq to set up a series of geographic and maneuver decisive points as forward refueling and resupply bases. Both Jomini and the FM 100-5 would identify forward bases as decisive points because as the FM 100-5 points out: "Decisive points include transportation nets or terrain features that are critical for the continued momentum of operations or the rapid shifting of the direction of maneuver and provide a pathway for advancing forces. They allow for passage of combat power in deeper and increasingly damaging thrusts against the enemy."[139] This Division then continued along its line of operations helo-transporting brigades north to seize the geographic decisive points that would interdict the Iraqi lines of communication along the Euphrates River, and cut them off should they attempt to escape.
Simultaneously, to the east, the Marines in the Gulf feinted an assault along their line of operations towards the maneuver decisive point occupied by Iraqi forces dug in along Kuwait's coast as part of the plan to deceive the Iraqis as to the location of the Coalition's main effort. Coupled with this, in the center, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted a feint oriented on a maneuver decisive point (the overwatching forces) along a line of operations about 12 miles up the Wadi al Batin. These operations fixed the enemy and deceived the Iraqis as to where the main attack would come.[140] Gen. Schwarzkopf wrote: "By concentrating their forces along the southern Kuwaiti border and by fortifying the beaches east of Kuwait City, the Iraqis made it clear that they expected a headlong attack into their most heavily fortified areas."[141] Gen. Schwarzkopf (CINCCENTCOM) therefore, committed his main attack to the west because he was reasonably sure that the deceptions had succeeded and that the Iraqis thought that the main attack was coming directly into Kuwait City.
This offensive started with two simultaneous attacks, "On the Coalition's eastern flank, the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, ... attacked [along their lines of operation] north into Kuwait."[142] The Marines breached the first line of Iraqi defenses consisting of two minefields (certainly geographic decisive points) and continued along their designated lines of operation toward the geographic strategic decisive point of Kuwait City. Jomini identified decisive strategic points as being "capable of exercising a marked influence [on either force] either upon the result of a campaign or upon a single enterprise."[143] Since the geographic objective point was the seizure of Kuwait it is fairly safe to assume that the capital and largest city would have to be 'liberated' to achieve this goal. Just to the west, "VII Corps, conducting the main effort for USCENTCOM, attacked in the center penetrating the main Iraqi defensive belt. [a maneuver decisive point]"[144] "The 1st (UK) Armored Division attacked through the breach [along its line of operation] to defeat Iraqi tactical reserves [maneuver decisive points] and secure the VII Corps eastern flank. [geographic decisive points]"[145]
On February, 25 VII Corps units continued along their lines of operation and prepared to turn north to envelop the Iraqi reserve force, the elite Republican Guard, (the objective point of maneuver, however portions of the Republican Guard were further split up by the Coalition as maneuver decisive points). Along the western flank other units continued to orient on their decisive points along their lines of operation, securing and seizing supply routes and geographical decisive points, for forward logistics bases. Meanwhile, two additional Divisions secured the geographic decisive points that blocked the Iraqi Army's withdrawal along the Euphrates River and to a lesser degree at this point the Iraqi's ability to reinforce or resupply. All other elements of both the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps turned east and redirected their lines of operation to the east to trap and destroy what was left of the Iraqi Republican Guard (the original objective point of maneuver).
On February 26 , having driven almost 100 miles into Iraq, "The 24th Infantry Division had completed the turning movement; reached the Euphrates River, blocking Iraqi western routes of withdrawal, and had turned east with the 3d ACR to engage the Republican Guard."[146] At the same time, VII Corps units turned east to attack the Iraqi reserve, the maneuver decisive points composed of the Republican Guard forces positioned southwest of Basrah. As stated in the FM 100-5: "This threat forces the enemy to abandon his prepared defense and attack in an undesirable direction and at a time of his opponent's choice." Subsequently, the main effort was turned toward the strategic decisive point at Basrah to cut off retreating Iraqi forces. Basrah would appropriately be called this because its seizure and control would allow the defeat of the objective point of maneuver in the theater of operations, the Republican Guard Forces.
With the turning movement complete and the Iraqi operational reserve either attacking or attempting to flee, the coalition forces concentrated their efforts on the objective point of maneuver the Republican Guard Forces, and its subordinate elements, the maneuver decisive points that would assist the Coalition in defeating them. Consequently, "Coalition forces attacked on the night of 26 February, with VII Corps making the main attack against three Republican Guard Armored Divisions and parts of other Iraqi formations, to include the Jihad Corps. [Which resulted in the destruction of (among others) the Tawakalna and Medina Republican Guard Divisions, all previously identified as maneuver decisive points.]"[147]
On February 27, the geographic objective point was achieved -- Kuwait was liberated. "The allies pressed the attack relentlessly through the night and during the day of 27 February toward the Iraqi city of Basrah and the coast of Kuwait."[148] However, while most Iraqi divisions in Kuwait were defeated or routed and the vaunted Republican Guard, now badly mauled, was rendered ineffective, it was still attempting to escape. The FM 100-5 emphasizes that: "VII Corps' night turning movement into the flank of the Iraqi Republican Guard units and the rapid exploitation, which put the 1st Infantry Division in blocking positions on the North-South Coastal Highway and the 24th Infantry Division astride Highway 8 blocking the enemy's retreat or reinforcement, completely surprised the Iraqi forces caught on the road."[149]
"By the morning of 28 February, the Republican Guard divisions were effectively routed and incapable of further coordinated resistance, however, a large portion of them had managed to escape [if the Republican Guard was the objective point of maneuver then the Coalition had failed in Jomini's view]. At 0800 hours on the 28th, [after the coalition seized the geographic objective point of the operation] President Bush called for the Coalition forces to cease offensive operations."[150]
Conclusions
Jomini wrote as a practical theorist whose teachings were based upon long battle experience. In presenting his beliefs he wrote as a teacher to the world's military thinkers, specializing in teaching the Napoleonic manner of war. By so doing he was actually teaching the world the art of modern war. When one realizes that it was largely through his writings that Napoleonic doctrine was first made available to the military world, when it is remembered that our total wars of today are but magnifications of Napoleonic wars, as taught by Jomini, there is considerable justification for concluding that there have been few people in history who have exerted such a strong influence on the development of military thought as did Antoine Henri Jomini.[151]
This study of the ground offensive of Operation Desert Storm during the Persian Gulf War validates the applicability of three of Jomini's concepts. The preceding analysis of the U.S. Army ground operations of Operation Desert Storm during the Persian Gulf War supports the contention that the Jominian concepts of the turning movement, decisive points and lines of operation still have applicability to the modern battlefield. Based upon U.S. Army doctrine, the coalition forces, and especially the U.S. Army, used these three Jominian concepts when planning and executing offensive operations during Operation Desert Storm. Given these results, the turning movement, decisive points and lines of operation still have a general application.
If these ideas are applied in a conceptual rather than a literal sense, then they are particularly valuable to the military planner. However, it is important to qualify any assertions of universal applicability. As the concepts are largely applicable in relationship to both the terrain and the enemy force, any use must first be tempered with a detailed understanding of the theater of war in which the operation might be conducted. The operations examined occurred in a very specific region of terrain which had a major impact on the shape of the operation.
Similarly, the possession of decisive points provided the U.S. led -- Coalition forces with a significant advantage over the Iraqis. The Coalition, by choosing multiple parallel lines of operation in extremely restricted terrain, limited its opportunities for maneuver. Furthermore, the choice of an exterior line of operation played a major role in determining the extent of victory and many have argued may have led to failure, through the cessation of hostilities once the geographic objective point had been attained, by allowing a large portion of the objective point of maneuver, the Republican Guard Forces, to escape destruction or capture. Consequently, the National Command Authorities (NCA), by choosing to focus on seizure and retention of terrain and not on isolation and destruction of the Republican Guard Forces (the Iraqi Reserve), accepted the opportunity to decisively defeat the Iraqi forces, while not destroying them. Therefore, the choices made in determining the decisive points and the appropriate lines of operation after the decision was made to conduct a turning movement had a profound impact on the relative success of the operation.
Still, given these caveats, the concepts of the turning movement, decisive points and lines of operation may be of significant value to the modern commander in designing and fighting future operations.
