China's PLA: A Sleeping Dragon or Asian Goliath?
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: China's PLA: A Sleeping Dragon or Asian Goliath?
Author: Major R. Scott Buran, U.S. Marine Corps
Thesis: In developing a power projection potential, does China's defense modernization program create the significant military capabilities necessary to achieve her ambitions in East-Asia?
Discussion: The end of the Cold War has created an uncertain security environment in the world. The Asia-Pacific region is the most economically dynamic in the world. With the demise of the Former Soviet threat China is emerging in East-Asia as a major regional power. China, a major nuclear power and possessing the largest army in the region, is experiencing explosive economic growth coupled with political instability. This situation has created concern among her neighbors, thereby raising the importance of China in the Asian security equation. The United States also has interests in the region and it is in her best interests to remain engaged not only in the entire Asia-Pacific region, in general, but with China, specifically.
China is pursuing a long range military modernization strategy that develops a power projection capability. Specifically, modernization efforts are directed toward improving air and naval capabilities and realigning the military's force structure. The principle driving force behind these modernization efforts is the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA is the world's largest military force; however, much of its equipment is antiquated and its troops are not well trained in combined arms and joint warfare. However, with China's tremendous economic growth and expansion the PLA has assumed a greater role in domestic and foreign affairs. This has led to the PLA as a potential destabilizing factor within China as well as throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
Despite military modernization being the last of the Four Modernizations and subordinate to economic development in China, the PLA and the civilian leadership are committed to military modernization, albeit at a reduced pace. The PLA realizes that modernization must occur in order to address obsolete military equipment based on antiquated technology, the capability and need to protect economic and territorial interests, and the necessity to keep current in regard to modern tactics and weapon systems as evidenced from the lessons learned in the Gulf War.
Conclusion: China desires to be a major regional power in the Asia-Pacific region. She also understands that this can only be accomplished by achieving a strong economy and a military that possesses the ability to cope with a variety of largely new and specific post-Cold War threats. China has embarked on a military modernization program which emphasizes an offensive power projection capability. This capability increases the level of anxiety among China's East-Asia neighbors and specifically poses a potential future threat to Taiwan. Recognizing these destabilizing factors the U.S. can adjust and amend its national security strategy for the immediate future and the 21st century.
CHINA's PLA:
A Sleeping Dragon or Asian Goliath?
The Asia-Pacific region is the most economically dynamic in the world. China, a major nuclear power and possessing the largest army in the region, is experiencing explosive economic growth coupled with political instability; this situation has created concern among her neighbors, thereby raising the importance of China in the Asian security equation. The United States has vital national interests in East Asia such as creating economic prosperity and promoting democratic values and human rights. Therefore, it is in America's long term interest to remain engaged not only in the entire Asia-Pacific region, in general, but with China, specifically. In promoting American interests the United States must understand the wide range of threats affecting stability in the region and the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a potential destabilizing factor. With China's tremendous economic growth and expansion the PLA has assumed a greater role in domestic and foreign affairs. In developing a power projection potential, does China's defense modernization program create the significant military capabilities necessary to achieve her ambitions in East-Asia? By examining this destabilizing factor the U.S. can adjust and amend its national security strategy for the immediate future and the 21st century.
In China the main form of struggle is war and the main form of organization is the army. - Mao Tse-tung
The modern Chinese military has its origins in the Red Army, which grew out of the peasant Nanchang uprising on 1 August 1927. It was an army comprised of the peasant masses and lead by the Great Helmsman of China's Communist revolution, Mao Tse-tung.[1] The primary method of warfare conducted initially by the Red Army was guerrilla operations. These tactics led to the formation of the "people's war" concept, which became the primary doctrine of the Chinese military. It was not until the Korean War that China realized the shortcomings in its doctrine. For the first time, China was in combat against a modern adversary, an international force capable of delivering intensive firepower, both from the air and the ground.[2] The PLA was severely demoralized during the conflict. If not for the Soviets supplying military equipment and assistance, the outcome for the Chinese would have been much different. Soviet aid, coupled with the growing frustration with the strategy outlined in Mao's Little Red Book, provided the necessary impetus for China's quest to modernize its military forces. However, due to the Cultural Revolution between 1965 and 1969, China made little headway in modernizing its forces. In fact, after having adopted the classic Marxist system, the military fell upon ruin. Rank structures were abolished, having a detrimental impact on the operational effectiveness of the PLA. Although the PLA had some 2.7 million members under arms, troop quality was poor and equipment was often primitive.[3] In 1979 China invaded Vietnam, and although China succeeded in accomplishing her objectives, the costs associated with the incursion were enormous. It was apparent to the PLA that their doctrine of "people's war" was obsolete and the nature of warfare was clearly changing to one of combined arms operations. The lessons learned in Vietnam were obvious; still China found itself unable to capitalize on modernization. The final "wakeup call" rang for the Chinese during the Gulf War. According to David Shambaugh, an American expert on China, "the Gulf War . . . had a jarring effect on the PLA. The military nature of Desert Storm and the swiftness of the allied victory stunned the Chinese high command . . . Every element of the allied strategy and capabilities left the PLA aghast and hammered home as never before the backwardness of the PLA. The PLA was forced to confront the elements of modern warfare . . . this was the PLA's first exposure to a high tech war, and they were stunned."[4] China is indeed a country in transition. Recalling Mao's dictum that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun and given the increased role allowed the PLA in domestic and foreign affairs, coupled with its modernization and reform initiatives, what strategic direction will China pursue in the future and how will it affect the security equation in East-Asia?
Although the leadership in China recently changed hands with the demise of Deng Xiaoping, Deng should be hailed by his countrymen for his success in guiding China towards the 21 st century and away from Mao's Tse-tung's failed programs of the 1960's and 1970's. He managed to maintain national unity and internal order while abandoning central planning in favor of truly visionary economic reforms.[5] In 1975, the so called four modernizations were announced by Premier Chou En-Lai. They were, and remain today, (1 ) agriculture; (2) manufacturing industry; (3) science and technology; and (4) defense.[6] Agriculture became the number one priority based on the need to feed a population of over 1 billion people. Manufacturing industry and science and technology were in serious need of revitalization after having been decimated by the cultural revolution. The order of these priorities were significant in that Deng Xiaoping, when he assumed power, realized that China would remain an underdeveloped military power well into the foreseeable future.
Defense having been relegated last place among the four modernizations created often heated debate between civilian leadership of the Party and military leaders within the PLA. However, it was Deng Xiaoping who argued successfully that in order for successful military modernization to occur a strong economic foundation, possessing both a vibrant technological and industrial base, would be required. In mid-1985, after a political consensus was forged, Deng Xiaoping announced that the PLA would subordinate its interests to those of the national economy and contribute to development.[7] As a result of this announcement, the defense budget was reduced; however, the Chinese military and civilian leadership became committed to military modernization, albeit at a reduced pace.
The reasons for China's force modernization are numerous. First and foremost is the PLA's desire to address its problem of antiquated and obsolescent military equipment. Many of the current weapon systems are tied to 1950's and 1960's technology. Other factors include: China's ability to cope with a variety of largely new and specific post-Cold War threats and concerns, including possible threats to claimed territories along China's periphery in Asia as well as potential long term threats from major powers; and to support China's overall power ambitions and augment its growing political and economic influence in East-Asia and beyond.[8]
The degree to which the PLA will be capable of modernizing its forces and instituting reforms will depend largely on the future relationship between the Communist Party and the military. In the past the PLA has often been the victim of radical politics within the Communist Party. During the cultural revolution the PLA became deeply involved in civilian politics and administration. It is estimated that during that period some 2 million troops were involved in political activities and the PLA reportedly suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties.[9] Lin Bao was chiefly responsible for the PLA's active participation in civilian affairs during this time period. His sudden death in 1971 brought about the reduced role of the military. Subsequent Chinese leadership has sought to disengage the PLA from politics.[10]
During the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping was successful in reestablishing the Communist Party's political control over the military. He created the Central Military Commission in 1982, which further stressed the separation of the military and the Communist Party. As a result of these changes, defense expenditures between 1984 and 1988 actually dropped in real terms.[11]
Since the events in 1989 in which the PLA was used to crush the demonstrations at Tiananmen, the void between the military and the Party have reversed direction. Since Tiananmen, the military budget has increased in real terms, even when other parts of the budget were reduced.[12] It appears there is a growing level of autonomy within the ranks of the PLA despite attempts by the Chinese Communist Party to retain strict control of the military. The reassertion of the PLA into the political fray clearly is contrary to Mao's 1929 dictum in which he stated "our principle is that the Party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.[13] The question which remains is who controls the gun in China today?
The direction of future civil-military relations in China remains in the hands of its current civilian leader, Jiang Zemin. With the death of Deng Xiaoping, it is not clear which direction the relationship between the Party and PLA will take. Although Jiang currently leads the party commission that runs the military he has never served in the military, nor does he possess the clout of former revolutionary leader Deng Xiaoping. Following the death of Deng, Jiang Zemin was quoted in the Xinhua News Agency as saying that "the Party's absolute leadership over the army is fundamental.''[14] It is expected that Jiang Zemin will soon initiate legislation to formally subordinate the military to the Party. The survival of Jiang's political future will undoubtedly rest on the support of the PLA. It is also clear that the PLA's success in modernization and reform efforts depends greatly on the leadership and support of Jiang Zemin. Whether the PLA defends the party-state in the future will invariably depend on which direction it is pulled, towards increased professionalism or increased politicalization.
The driving factor in China's force modernization and reforms is the adoption of new doctrine, strategic principles and operational tactics. The military doctrine Mao advocated and which the PLA subscribed to from the 1950s through the mid-1970s was termed "People's War". No longer is the object to "lure the enemy in deep, to drown it in a People's War."[15] This strategy was defensive and protracted in nature. When the Soviet Union became the predominant threat, and as the PLA began to incorporate technology into its strategy, the doctrine evolved into "People's War under modern conditions." This was a major shift in PLA doctrine; the strategy was no longer defensive and reactive in nature but, instead, emphasized offensive characteristics. Military operations would now entail the combined arms approach to warfare and would be complemented by advanced weaponry. Nuclear weapons also became part of the doctrine.
The demise of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraqi forces during the Gulf War brought further refinement to the PLA's war fighting doctrine. With the threat of global war diminishing, China transitioned from being prepared for total war to limited war. This doctrine termed "limited war under high technology conditions" was adopted with the belief that future conflicts facing China would be local and regional in nature and of relatively low intensity and short duration.[16] The success of this doctrine requires the Chinese military to develop a highly mobile and flexible military force capable of responding rapidly. In addition, it must also possess concentrated and coordinated firepower and offensive power projection capabilities.
The PLA has identified four strategic and operational principles which are deemed necessary to support its new doctrine. These principles are: (I) winning victory through elite troops, (2) gaining the initiative by striking first, (3) winning victory over inferiority through superiority, (4) fight a quick battle to force a quick solution.[17] These principles form the underpinnings of an offensive minded strategy capable of conducting combined arms and joint forces operations. With a doctrine firmly in place, the PLA has begun to implement its modernization programs and reforms.
In order for the PLA to achieve its objective of a fully modernized military force, it must initiate reforms which address improvements in force structure, professionalism, education and training of its forces, command and control, weapons procurement and the acquisition of power projection capabilities.[18] The goal of these reforms is to acquire a military that is smaller, more flexible, better motivated, highly trained and with a well-equipped ground force, centered on rapid reaction combat units with airborne drop and amphibious power projection capabilities. In addition, the PLA desires to acquire a more versatile and accurate nuclear weapons inventory.
Possessing the largest military in the world, China is routinely criticized for maintaining such a large force structure despite the lack of a significant threat facing China today. To placate some of these critics, China has announced it will cut its armed forces by more than a quarter in order to pose a less threatening stance to its neighbors in East Asia. The facts are that China has begun a cutback in manpower from its 4 million underequipped troops in service in the mid-1980s to a force of 2.5 million envisaged by 1998; however, the motives are quite contrary to what China proclaims in its propaganda rhetoric.[19]
China clearly does not require such a large standing army based on threat potential from other East-Asian countries, and, more importantly, China does not have the financial resources to support such a large military system. Current Chinese leadership feels that the surplus manpower in the military could better serve the civilian work force by contributing to economic growth and development.[20] Reasons for demobilization are purely military and economic. Economically, the savings derived from the troop reductions will be reinvested into weapons procurement and modernization. The military benefits are simple, the quality of the force is preferred over the quantity.
The demobilization of some of the forces in no way has eroded the capability of the PLA. In reality, the PLA has become a much leaner and more effective fighting force. One of the challenges facing the Chinese bureaucracy was how to absorb the losses from the armed forces into the civilian sector. Many of the former PLA members were reassigned to the PLA's Production and Construction Corps (PCC).[21] Although the PCC is engaged mainly in civilian projects it does support the regular forces in time of war. A large majority of the reduced troop strength was transferred to the People's Armed Police (PAP), a para military organization that maintains close ties with the PLA.[22] In face value, it appears the PLA is undergoing rather significant and painful reductions in force structure; however, the losses are more illusion than reality. Even after China achieves its demobilization goals, it still will possess the largest military in the world, and the overall quality of its regular forces will undoubtedly be significantly enhanced.
Reforms in education and training and overall professionalism of both the officer and enlisted corps are critical to successful implementation of Chinese military doctrine. Quality personnel possessing the requisite leadership skills and technical expertise will be required to maintain and operate the weapon systems of the future. More importantly, it will be critical to understand the employment of these weapon systems in combined arms and joint operations. The principle method of realizing these objectives are educational initiatives for both officers and enlisted personnel from the entry level to top level schools for military personnel.
The years during and immediately proceeding the Cultural Revolution proved devastating to the overall professionalism and quality of both officers and enlisted personnel. Schools were virtually disestablished during this time period and it was not until 1978 when the PLA's officer training program was reinstituted.[23] Currently, all newly commissioned officers must be graduates of a military academy. However, the quality of officer assessions is in question today. It is reported that because of higher paying jobs in the civilian sector and the relatively low prestige associated with serving in the military, it is assumed that the ranks are not being filled with the most qualified applicants.[24] If, however, modernization trends in the Military continue to increase, the military may gain additional prestige and prominence in society. As officers progress in rank (captain and major) they are eligible for advanced schooling similar to U.S. advanced and intermediate level officer schools. In 1985, a senior level school, the National Defense University, was established by merging three senior service institutions: the Military Academy, the Political Academy and the Logistics Academy. In addition, a three month capstone course is offered to senior level personnel, mainly to flag and general officer rank.[25] It appears the emphasis on education is paying off. It is reported that 54 percent of active duty PLA officers possessed college degrees by 1994, while 88 percent of those serving in group armies, 90 percent at the division level, and 75 percent at the regimental level were reported to have graduated from university or equivalent.[26]
Two principle hurdles facing the PLA are the establishment of a professional noncommissioned officer corps and retention of first term personnel. Most leadership billets associated with the responsibilities of an NCO are filled by junior company grade officers. Approximately one quarter to one third of the troops in the PLA are considered first year soldiers.[27] This lack of institutional knowledge at both levels severely inhibits the growth of a professional service of arms. Lastly, ranks were again reestablished by the 1984 Military Service Law after having been eliminated during the cultural revolution. [28]
Training reforms are probably the truth teller of whether the PLA will be capable of meshing weapons modernization with evolving doctrine. Given the existing political, economic and social environment, it is questionable whether the PLA is capable of conducting successful combined arms and joint operations. In order for the PLA doctrine of "local war under high technology conditions" to be effective, it must first be validated by field training exercises and then operationally tested. Unit training at the regimental and division level is fairly frequent. Larger exercises comprising army and group sized units are conducted infrequently.[29] The PLA is also plagued by a lack of combat experience within its ranks. Most combat experience gained today is restricted to small units involved in border incidents. With the exception of the massive training exercise aimed against Taiwan in 1995, combined arms and joint training operations for large PLA forces are limited in duration and frequency. One may assume that the PLA is not capable of projecting power with sufficient force well beyond its present boundaries in order to conduct its "local war under high technology conditions."
The PLA is slowly modernizing its naval, air and ground forces. Although the PLA today remains at least 10 to 15 years behind the state-of-the-art in almost all weapon systems, it has markedly improved its defense posture during the past decade.[30] Much of the PLA's current weapons systems are tied to 1950's and 1960's technologies. To overcome these deficiencies the PLA has had to turn to foreign suppliers, notably Russia and Israel. Current U.S. and European Union laws ban the sale of weapons and defense technology to the PRC.[31] China is all too aware of the growing gap between the technological capabilities of many western nations and its own forces. It appears that the PLA is principally procuring weapons technologies which provide China with an enhanced maritime, air and naval capability. This modernization strategy would give the PRC a power projection capability, thereby allowing China the ability to reassert her proclaimed sovereignty in the South China Sea and also pose a credible threat against Taiwan.
The PLA Navy (PLAN) has undertaken significant steps in acquiring naval assets which will give them significant maritime power in the South China Sea. The PLAN's modernization effort has been to move from a brown water to a limited blue water capability.[32] Key modernization programs for the PLAN include: a modest blue water naval capability centered on a new generation of frigates and destroyers with improved air defense and fire control systems; more modern nuclear and non-nuclear submarines; a more capable naval air arm; a potent amphibious attack capability; improved submarine warfare and antisubmarine warfare capabilities; and, possibly, at least one carrier battle group.[33] Notable enhancements to its blue water capability are the indigenously built Luhu-class destroyers and the new Jiangwei-class frigates. These two class ships provide a quantum leap in electronic warfare technology over their predecessors.[34] The PLAN has also purchased two new Russian built Kilo-class submarines with two more on order. Interest has also been demonstrated in acquiring an aircraft carrier. Though acquisition of a carrier in the near future is probably unrealistic, if China did acquire one, it would significantly alter the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. At present, the PLAN's ability to project power is marginal at best. It is estimated that only an 18 ship task force could sortie at any one time due to the lack of forward operating bases servicing the fleet.[35]
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) provides the other arm associated with power projection capability. Due to the technical aspects of aviation, the PLAAF has had to rely on purchases from the Former Soviet Union to modernize it forces. The goal for modernization of the PLAAF is to acquire a more versatile, advanced air force with longer-range interceptor/strike aircraft, improved air defense, extended and close air support, and overall improved power projection capabilities with long range transport and lift and mid-air refueling capabilities.[36] The majority of PLAAF aircraft are antiquated and many are on the verge of retirement. However, the PLAAF has purchased 50 advanced Russian-built Su-27 multi role fighter aircraft. Negotiations between the PLAAF and Russia are ongoing to reach a co-production agreement to assemble and eventually manufacture approximately 200 additional aircraft in the PRC.[37] The PLAAF has also purchased 10 Russian-built IL-76 long range transport aircraft. The combination of converted H6 bombers and midair refueling tankers provide the beginnings of a significant power projection capability in the future.
The PLA ground forces receive the lowest priority in modernization efforts of the three armed forces. To compensate for their deficiencies the ground forces have created a two tiered force. The majority of PLA forces are comprised of the ground forces. Efforts to modernize the bulk of its forces would be an almost insurmountable task. In order to create a high level of readiness in some of its forces, the PLA leadership has created elite units of combat ready deployable troops. These rapid reaction units or "Fist troops" are capable of conducting amphibious and airborne operations.[38] The PLA possesses three corps of these units, numbering some 200,000 troops.[39] Preferential treatment is given these troops; funding, lodging and training are normally superior to that provided the regular PLA troops. The rapid reaction unit is capable of being transported by the IL-76 heavy transport which can carry 125 troops and has a range of 4,163 miles.[40] The Fist troops provide an excellent power projection capability to the PLA.
Compared to western nuclear powers, China currently possesses a limited nuclear capability consisting of air, land and sea based warheads. China remains committed to upgrading its arsenal both in size and operational sophistication. The only hurdles facing the nuclear modernization program is its unproven missile guidance systems and C3I.[41] Current Chinese official nuclear policy proclaims a no-first use of nuclear weapons. They also pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations and nuclear-free zones. It is debatable whether China's increased nuclear capability will adversely affect other nations in the Asia-Pacific region. China, however, does possess the missile technology to range the U.S. with its Dongfeng (east-wind) 5 intercontinental ballistic missile.[42] It is thought that China may flaunt its nuclear strike capability if and when the Taiwan/PRC issue becomes a crisis. Chinese nuclear capability could possibly neutralize U.S. participation in the crisis. China will continue to modernize its nuclear delivery capability with upgrades to its Quang-5 nuclear-capable attack aircraft and development of cruise missile technology.[43]
The extent to which China will become a major regional power, and potentially a world power, will greatly depend on the success of the progress of the Four Modernizations. China clearly understands that an effective military can only be realized if a strong, vibrant economy can be sustained well into the future. Success of the first three modernizations would undoubtedly give the PLA the political clout and economic underpinnings to aggressively pursue its modernization and reform initiatives. The ability of China to fully develop and exercise a power projection capability to achieve its overall power ambitions in East-Asia will have significant impact on security relationships among other Asian countries as well as U.S. foreign policy interests in the region. Whether the U.S. regards China now as a sleeping dragon or a future Asian goliath, it will have serious ramifications for decision makers involving national security in East-Asia.
1. John Robert Young, The Dragon's Teeth: Inside China's Armed Forces(New York: Orion, 1987) 36.
2. Ibid., 66.
3. Gary Brown, China as a Military Power: Peril or Paper Tiger? (Canberra, Australia: Parliamentary Research Service Paper No. 1 1996-1997) 3.
4. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1997) 67.
5. Ibid., 55.
6. Brown, 3-4.
7. Shirley Kan, China's Military: Roles And Implications For U.S. Policy Toward China (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service Report 91-731F, 1991) 14.
8. Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Military Modernization: Motives, Objectives, and Requirements," in China's Economic Future: Challenges to U.S. Policy; Study Papers. (Washington: GPO, 1996) 321.
9. China: A Country Study, 4th ed., ed. by Robert L. Worden, Andrea M. Savada, and Ronald E. Dolan, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, DA Pam. No: 550-60 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988) 550.
10. Ibid., 551.
11. Bernstein and Munro, 73.
12. Bernstein and Munro, 73.
13. David Shambaugh, "China's Military in Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement and Power Projection," in The China Quarterly, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 274.
14. "Jiang Demands Military Loyalty," (text), AP, International Section, (AP-NY-03-05-97 0808 EST.).
15. Shambaugh, 280.
16. Shambaugh, 283.
17. Nan Li, "The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985-95: A Chinese Perspective," in The China Quarterly, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 451-53.
18. Swaine, 327.
19. Bernstein and Munro, 73.
20. Yitzhak Shichor, "Demobilization: The Dialectics of PLA Troop Reduction," in The China Quarterly, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 336.
21. Shichor, 353.
22. Shichor, 354-5.
23. June T. Dreyer, "The New Officer Corps: Implications for the Future," in The China Quarterly, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 318.
24. Ibid., 320.
25. Ibid., 320.
26. Shambaugh, 282.
27. Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapakis and John F. Corbett, Jr.,"Training Tomorrow's PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks," in The China Quarterly, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 493.
28. China: A Country Study, 567.
29. Blasko, Klapakis, and Corbett, Jr., 516.
30. Shambaugh, 285.
31. U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security: Impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: GAO Report NSIAD-95-84, 1995) 19.
32. Shambaugh, 288.
33. Swaine, 328.
34. U.S. General Accounting Office, 20.
35. Shambaugh, 288.
36. Swaine, 328.
37. Swaine, 330.
38. Bernstein and Munro, 74.
39. Chong-Pin Lin, "The Military Balance in the Taiwan Straits," in The China Quarterly, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Oxford University
Press,1996) 590.
40. Shambaugh, 284.
41. Alastair lain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control, " in The China Quarterly, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 574-5.
42. Lin, 590.
43. Lin, 591.
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