Do Our Current Readiness Procedures Reflect Our Combat Readiness?
CSC 1997
Subject Area - General
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Do Our Current Readiness Procedures Reflect Our Combat Readiness?
Author: Major Terence P Brennan, USMC
Thesis: SORTS is an excellent combat readiness reporting tool. However, manipulation of data and disregard for reporting requirements have minimized the effectiveness of the Marine Corps' only comprehensive readiness reporting system. The solution requires commanders at every level to prioritize SORTS education and training, and for the Marine Corps to automate SORTS reporting procedures.
Discussion: This paper evaluates combat readiness systems and procedures (with emphasis on those used by the Marine Corps). The Services' current readiness reporting system, Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), which is a critical element of the unified commanders' readiness reporting procedures, has been criticized for not providing a comprehensive readiness picture. This paper will argue that, if used properly, SORTS can provide an accurate gauge of a unit's combat readiness. This paper will further suggest why SORTS reporting is inaccurate and the damaging effect inaccurate reporting has on quality of training, maintenance of equipment, and assignment of personnel. Also, this paper explores that, what is necessary is not a change in SORTS reporting procedures, but rather a change in the mindset of those who report readiness. The Marine Corps does not need to create new readiness indicators. Rather, the Marine Corps needs to re-evaluate the ones already established. SORTS should provide a comprehensive picture of selected unit readiness, to include a commander's selective assessment on the unit's ability to execute its full wartime mission in peacetime, crisis, or war. This can only be accomplished through accurate reporting and incorporation of all available information pertaining to personnel, equipment and individual/unit training readiness. SORTS can only be the vital information tool it was designed to be by changing the paradigms that exist today within the Marine Corps. Accurate readiness reporting, and insuring that readiness reports are unbiased, timely and accurate are the keys to implementing SORTS as a vital information tool.
Excepting collective training (vice individual training), all other categories of combat readiness should be reported through automated procedures, thereby providing a more accurate and timely picture of unit readiness levels. If the Marine Corps produces a software system that minimizes, if not eliminates, the ability to manipulate the information being compiled, then SORTS can truly be the readiness tool it was intended to be.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION 1
SECTION 1 READINESS REPORTING 3
SECTION 2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 5
Definition
Components
Sources of Readiness Information
Advisees
SECTION 3 IMPEDIMENTS TO SORTS 10
Timeliness/Accuracy
Manipulation
Redundancy
Training SORTS Personnel
Command Influence
SECTION 4 IMPLICATIONS 19
Shortage of Personnel
Funding as an Information Tool
False Sense of Readiness
SECTION 5 CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 23
Training for Commanders
Automating the Reporting Process
Personnel Reporting System Automation
Training Reporting System Automation
Commanders Comments
Transmission to Higher Headquarters
BIBLIOGRAPHY 34
INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses a problem the Marine Corps has with reporting combat readiness. Until recently, there has been no common set of definitions and measures for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to use in gauging the combat readiness of units. However, with the development of the Chairman's Readiness System, the unified commanders in chief (CINCs) now have a standard method to report readiness. This system allows CINCs to blend units into an all-U.S. joint task force or as elements of a multi-national force.[1]
In 1994 the Chairman's Readiness System was implemented, which directed that in order to fulfill the requirements under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the Armed Forces are required to advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths pertaining to force capabilities.[2]
The Services' current readiness reporting system, Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), which is a critical element of the unified commanders' readiness reporting procedures, has been criticized for not providing a comprehensive readiness picture. This paper will argue that, if used properly, SORTS can provide an accurate gauge of a unit's combat readiness. This paper will further suggest why SORTS reporting is inaccurate and the damaging effect inaccurate reporting has on quality of training, maintenance of equipment, and assignment of personnel. Also, this paper suggests that what is necessary is not a change in SORTS reporting procedures, but rather a change in the mindset of those who report readiness. The Marine Corps does not need to create new readiness indicators. Rather, the Marine Corps needs to re-evaluate the ones already established. There is a critical need for the armed services to examine closely and continuously their means to remain the world's pre-eminent military superpower in light of rapidly declining budgets and the reduction of forces. The ability to obtain an accurate snap-shot of the Marine Corps, and to prioritize manpower, equipment and training based on this picture, is more important than ever. By using SORTS the way it is intended to be used, the Marine Corps can improve its actual readiness without creating a new means of reporting.
By the use of the "commander's estimate" and proper SORTS reporting, areas that are not covered specifically in SORTS can be addressed by the commander. The impact of funding, impending equipment changes, quality of life and participation in non-standard missions, all can be reflected by the commander. It is the commander who must account for the subjective aspects of readiness. For example, there is no indicator for human emotion or desire. SORTS is a viable system for measuring readiness; what is needed to improve this report is a better understanding of its use and method of predicting readiness.
Before examining the particular weaknesses in SORTS, it is appropriate to look briefly at readiness reporting in general and SORTS in particular. Next, in order to gauge the potential effectiveness of SORTS, we will examine the history of SORTS, how it is designed to work, as well as what readiness indicators SORTS reports and why these indicators are necessary.
READINESS REPORTING
Until recently, readiness was defined as "the capabilities of a unit to accomplish the mission for which it was designed."[3] The areas evaluated in individual units were:
- Resources available to operate military systems at the battalion, ship,
aircraft, and squadron level.
- Measure of the effectiveness of the military systems at the output end.
- The linkage between the two, to include measures designed to improve
overall system performance.
- Analytical techniques to make analysis of the above possible.[4]
Also, readiness was Service oriented, without regard to requirements to operate as part of a joint or multinational force. In the 1960's, because the United States relied heavily on nuclear forces which were maintained in good order, less emphasis was placed on conventional forces which experienced degraded levels of readiness such as, aging equipment, decreased training and maintenance budgets.[5] In 1994 Congress determined that a need existed for a comprehensive system for reporting the ability of the armed forces of the United States to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy.[6]
Today within the Marine Corps, there are numerous systems in place which can be used as tools to assess readiness. These evaluation methods normally fall into one of three categories:
Asset reporting: These reports are a compilation of information to determine whether a given unit has all its required resources and if they are in combat operational condition. This can be accomplished through formal evaluations from agencies such as, Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Office (FSMAO) and Supply and Maintenance Assistance Team (SMAT).
Unit modeling: Tests that indicate how changes in one area affect changes in another.
Functional testing: Tests to determine unit proficiency against some agreed-upon standard.[7] This is accomplished through the Marine Corps Combat Readiness
Evaluation System (MCCRES) and Combined Arms Exercise (CAX). These objective evaluation tools already exist in the Marine Corps and, if incorporated properly with SORTS, can provide a more accurate picture of unit readiness.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
DEFINITION
SORTS is an internal management tool used by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), by the respective Services, and by the regional CINCs. SORTS is the single, automated reporting system used within the Department of Defense that functions as the central registry of all operational units of the U.S. Armed Forces and certain foreign organizations. For specific registered units, SORTS indicates, at a selected point in time, the ability of a unit to undertake the mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.[8]
SORTS is designed to support, in priority order, (1) information requirements to support crisis response planning; (2) deliberate or peacetime planning; and (3) management responsibilities to organize, train, and equip forces for use by the CINCs.[9] SORTS reporting is based on the units' on-hand available personnel and combat mission essential equipment, status, and capability to deploy within 72 hours of notification. [10]
COMPONENTS
SORTS is one of the most commonly used forms of reporting a unit's readiness status in all branches of the military. It contains information pertaining to the quantity and condition of combat essential equipment and personnel a unit has on hand, as well as the training level that unit has achieved. SORTS evaluates each unit by assigning a grade, referred to as "C-level," that reflects the unit's on hand resources versus requirements. Grades are assigned for each of the following four categories: (1) equipment on hand,
(2) equipment serviceability, (3) training, and (4) personnel.
There are five readiness categories:
C-1 Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full
wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
C-2 Unit possesses the resources and has accomplished the training necessary to
undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which it is organized or
designed.
C-3 Unit possesses the resources and has accomplished the training necessary to
undertake major portions of the wartime mission for which it is organized or
designed.
C-4 Unit requires additional resources and/or training in order to undertake its
wartime mission, but if the situation dictates, it may be directed to undertake
portions of its wartime mission with resources on hand.
C-5 Unit is undergoing a service-directed resource change and is not prepared,
at this time, to undertake the wartime mission for which it is organized or
designed.[11]
SORTS is not a perfect system because as it currently functions it is susceptible to personal influence by the SORTS Officer, unit commanders or higher headquarters commanders. Although SORTS does provide information to the CINC as to which units are best trained, manned and equipped, it does not provide information on each non-specific mission the unit can accomplish.[12] Congress, the Department of Defense Inspector General, and the General Accounting Office all criticize SORTS as being very subjective and incomplete.[13] What SORTS does not show are the non-quantifiable human factors. It does not provide an accurate picture of what individual units can do, or how well they can do it with the equipment on hand, taking into account leadership and human motivation. SORTS also treats all resource categories as equally important, which can be misleading because not all personnel and equipment are needed for every mission.[14]
SOURCES OF READINESS INFORMATION
Units required to submit SORTS reports include all combat, combat support, and Service-designated combat service support units (regardless of Service designation, e.g., deployable medical units) of the operating forces of each Service (including Active, National Guard and Reserve Units). It also includes task organized units within the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), and CINC Operation Plans (OPLAN) and Concept Plans (CONPLAN). For the Marine Corps these Units include:
(a) Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF),
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB),
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
(b) MAGTF elements: command element (CE),
ground combat element (GCE),
aviation combat element (ACE), and
combat service support element (CSSE).
(c) Battalion, squadron, and separate deployable or
deployed companies, batteries or detachments.[15]
ADVISEES
SORTS is used to reflect unit readiness in all the Armed Services, including the Joint Staff. The Services use information from SORTS when making presentations to senior leaders.[16] This information is consolidated in the form of the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR), which provides the CJCS a current and broad assessment of the military's overall readiness.[17]
The full JMRR, the most extensive review, is conducted quarterly or as requested by the CJCS. The Services present their assessment of unit readiness and the CINCs submit an assessment of Joint readiness. The Joint Staff Director of Operations (J-3) presents the combined readiness assessments of the CINCs and Department of Defense (DOD) agency directors.[18] The JMRR also produces a current list of CINC and Service readiness deficiencies that are aggregated into elements of strategic concerns. These concerns are used to make an overall risk assessment at the strategic level which is then reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.[19]
The Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) consists of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, the Under Secretaries of Defense and of each Military Department, and other senior Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials. The SROC brings the senior civilian and military leadership together monthly to review significant readiness topics. At each meeting, the SROC provides a joint readiness assessment to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, the Vice Chairman presents to the JCS an overall assessment of readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy.[20]
Presently, SORTS serves as the central registry of all operational units in the U.S. Armed Forces and contains readiness information on selected resources for those units. SORTS contains several, but not all, unit readiness indicators. Its greatest significance for this study, however, is the fact that SORTS is currently being used differently by all four Services and Joint Staffs.[21]
IMPEDIMENTS TO SORTS
TIMELINESS/ACCURACY
In order to be useful to the JCS, SORTS must be timely. Only through rapid, but still accurate reporting, can the JCS (or any other level of military command responsible for assessments) accurately gauge the combat readiness of our nation's military. Commonly accepted practice is for a Marine Corps unit to submit a SORTS report each month. However, if used exactly as designed, SORTS reports should be submitted every time a unit's readiness status changes. The frequency of readiness reporting is a critical point and underlies two fundamental questions: (1) how frequently should a unit submit a SORTS report to ensure an accurate readiness picture?; and, (2) is readiness reporting subverted by disinterest from many commanders and by common practices such as the mandatory monthly report?
Significant changes in any category that affect a unit's readiness must be reported in a timely manner. A change in readiness status does not always have to be of a negative nature. These changes may reflect either an improvement or a decline in readiness. For example, if a unit has mission essential equipment previously reported as non-combat ready, and that equipment comes back into an operational status, or if a unit completes required training not noted on a previous report, an update to SORTS is required. In 1994, eighty-five percent of infantry units submitted a SORTS report at an average interval of 90 days.[22] By extension, this means that only fifteen percent reported their readiness more frequently than once every three months. This figure is especially alarming when one considers the fact that readiness is a key factor in an infantry battalion's qualification to participate in the Unit Deployment Program, let alone serve as part of a MEU (SOC).[23] The crucial point of this observation is that a 90 day old readiness report is neither accurate nor timely.
Even if units were reporting changes on a timely basis, the average time for transmission of a unit's report from the reporting unit to the JCS is anywhere from eight days to six weeks. It is reasonable to conclude that, when the JCS receives information that is over a month and a half old, it may not reflect an accurate picture of a unit's readiness.[24]
MANIPULATION
Many factors can cause a report to take up to six weeks to be received by the JCS. For one thing, even though SORTS is not intended to be used as a basis for performance appraisal of the unit or the unit commander, that perception still exists. The report therefore is often delayed while it is consolidated and scrutinized at every level.[25]
The phrase "commander's subjective assessment" is a potential source of conflict which can affect accurate reporting. Research produced by the Headquarters Marine Corps' Office of Readiness Analysis, Operations Division, Plans, Policies & Operations, shows that the lower level units (i.e., squadron, regiment, group, battalion, wing, and division) are reporting SORTS on a timely basis (at least once a month). However, somewhere between the battalion and the JMRR the reports are either delayed or sent back to the unit, either for administrative corrections or possibly to re-evaluate the unit's readiness rating. By the time the unit makes the correction required by the higher level headquarters, it is time for the next report and the same situation is played out again.[26] It should also be noted that regardless of individual readiness categories, the overall readiness category for the report is ultimately a commander's decision. For example, a unit may be C-2 in training or C-3 in equipment. However, if the unit commander believes his command is C-1, then he can rate the command at that level with a simple two line justification on the report. The rating that is provided by the commander is the rating that goes forward to the JCS.
In most cases, the SORTS report at the lower level may provide an accurate picture of the unit's readiness at the time of the report. However, the SORTS officer can be instructed by the commander, using the commander's assessment of the unit, to report a higher level of readiness than indicated by the unit's SORTS percentages. This is possible because by the current criteria, the unit may be capable of performing its wartime mission even though the SORTS percentages do not reflect this readiness level. For example, a unit may report C-1 for equipment, but on inspection one discovers that there are three aircraft that are not operational because they are awaiting engines. The response from the commander might be, "Well, the shipping status on the Daily Process Report indicates we should receive those engines within 72 hours and we could accomplish our Wartime Mission." The obvious problem is that since the unit did not have the parts at the time of the report, and may not receive them within 72 hours, by the objective SORTS criteria they are not ready.[27] It is for this type of situation that the commanders' comments were originally designed to provide amplifying or explanatory information to higher headquarters. This again reflects negatively on the SORTS report procedures. SORTS reports could possibly be submitted on a daily basis, so a unit does not have to remain in a low readiness status for thirty days when there has actually been a change to its readiness status. However, this is neither feasible nor desirable.
As SORTS stands now, accuracy derives solely from the integrity of the reporting unit, the commander, and reviewing chain. Interpretation of personnel availability is at the reporting level's discretion. The possibility of manipulating the appropriate numbers to reflect either good or bad percentages is a systemic problem.[28]
To be more effective, SORTS should provide a broad band of information on selected unit readiness indicators and include a commander's selective assessment of the unit's ability to execute its full wartime mission(s) in peacetime, in crisis, in war, or, that portion of the mission for which the unit has been alerted or committed.[29]
REDUNDANCY
Much of the information reported by SORTS is already available more accurately and in a more timely fashion by other, already existing reports. All the information required to compile the SORTS report, except training standards, is available via automated information systems, such as the Unit Diary/Marine Integrated Personnel System (UD/MIPS), the Marine Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS), Standard Accounting and Budget Reporting System (SABRS), Marine Corps Automated Readiness Evaluation System (MARES), and the Mechanized Allowance List (MAL). The only two areas found at the unit level, that are not reported separately, are the training requirements and commander's overall rating.
The highest state of combat readiness is C-1, and in order to achieve this rating a unit must be able to report at least a ninety percent readiness status in all areas. C-2 status, by comparison, is at least 86%. These percentages of readiness reporting within SORTS theoretically provide an essential tool for higher headquarters to determine if a unit can carry out its prescribed mission.
Every unit supply section produces a Daily Processing Report (DPR) that reflects the condition code, delivery status of parts, and priority needed for that unit's mission essential equipment to be combat operational. One aspect of the DPR is the status of equipment maintenance. For example, if a unit reports a high readiness status of C-1 on SORTS, but has numerous Equipment Repair Orders (EROs) open with an urgent delivery need of priority 03, then there is a disconnect between the readiness reporting rating given to the unit's maintenance status and the actual combat readiness of equipment.[30] When a unit designates a part priority 03, it is in effect stating that the equipment is combat reportable and the equipment can not accomplish its combat mission without the named repair part. Therefore, if a unit has more than one piece of equipment in disrepair, and submits an 03 priority request for the replacement parts to fix these broken items, then that unit is not C-1 and should not report itself as such through SORTS.
Similarly, every unit in the Marine Corps produces a Daily Morning Report which reflects the number of Marines assigned, those who are actually on hand, and those who are not deployable for combat (e.g., number on legal or medical hold or pending discharges). Many units count Marines in these categories as deployable until their discharges have received final approval.[31] Since this criterion is subject to individual interpretation, the resulting problem is that higher commanders both receive and report a possibly incorrect personnel readiness picture. Although the Marines are on his rolls, the commander knows they would not actually accompany the unit to combat. However, because of a bureaucratic dilemma (waiting for the discharge to be officially approved) the commander is required to report these "non-deployable" Marines as "deployable."
The unit monthly training report is another example of a tool that can more accurately reflect a unit's training readiness. Each unit is required to develop an annual, semi-annual, quarterly, monthly and weekly training plan, to manage its necessary combat proficient training. All these plans are required to be updated as changes occur. In the case of combat mission essential training which must be accomplished, this information is provided in the monthly training report. This system provides a more accurate picture than is currently being reported every three months by many infantry units via SORTS.
All these systems ( UD/MIPS, MIMMS, SABRS, etc.) generate a report on a daily basis, and if properly integrated can provide the JCS a more accurate readiness picture than currently available. This visibility is vital in case a conflict arises and units must be called upon to deploy. Use of these existing reports, as a means to update SORTS on a more timely basis, can eliminate some of the senior command's influence on the readiness reporting process. The additional comparison of these existing reports against SORTS can increase both the accuracy and timeliness of the SORTS reporting system. If a method existed to integrate the information from these systems directly into SORTS, it would consequently eliminate the duplication of effort currently caused by the way we compile readiness reporting information. One of the reasons these reporting methods have not been exploited is simply because as long as a commander reported a high readiness rating, few of his superiors challenged him to account for his readiness. In short, "no-harm, no-foul." A high readiness rating rarely got attention from higher headquarters, while a low rating was sure to get unwanted attention.
TRAINING OF SORTS PERSONNEL
Another shortfall of SORTS is the lack of training for SORTS personnel. Training for SORTS presently consists of a seven day course for the SORTS Officer, and in some cases, the SORTS clerk who actually prepares the report. There is no mandatory course for the unit commander to attend. Therefore, many commanders share a similar mindset that SORTS is not a viable indicator of readiness.[32] Many believe it is just a report card on how well the unit commander is commanding. However, this has never been a prudent use of SORTS and such a mindset continues to subvert accurate readiness reporting. To fully exploit SORTS as a readiness reporting tool, it is imperative that commanders at all levels support the accurate use of SORTS.
Within each category of SORTS, there are subsequent codes that define the specific deficiency a unit is experiencing. Because in the past the Marine Corps did not emphasize SORTS as a viable information tool, lack of attention to detail resulted in many administrative errors, (e.g., commanders accepted inaccurate reason codes). As an example, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps found that some units cited inaccurate reason codes to explain their personnel shortages, a mistake that prevents units from receiving the manpower needed to achieve a higher readiness posture. Another problem of inaccuracy is the added danger that the incorrect reason code is not spotted by the senior headquarters. An example would be if the SORTS report reflects a reason code citing a lack of fuel and parts shortages when, in fact, the unit remains short of personnel.[33] The reason code should reflect personnel on medical or legal hold.
The lack of training is not only limited to the commander and the SORTS Officer and his clerk, but also to anyone who provides basic information to the SORTS Officer. If the supply clerk does not understand the importance of the information he is providing, then he is less likely to understand the impact on the unit's readiness if he provides inaccurate information about combat deadlined equipment.[34] Better training of personnel is a critical first step in providing more accurate readiness information through SORTS.
COMMAND INFLUENCE
Another shortfall of SORTS is its susceptibility to command influence. When discussing command influence, this does not always refer to the immediate lower level unit commander. Although the final readiness level of a unit is determined solely at the discretion of the commander, if in the commander's estimate he can justify a higher readiness status, then in the commander's comments section he must explain why he has elevated his unit's status. In most cases, the SORTS report does not go directly from the reporting unit to the JCS. Rather, the report is first scrutinized by other levels in the chain of command who can send the report back and influence the unit to inflate or deflate their rating. This situation can possibly be avoided if the chain of command emphasizes SORTS as primarily an information tool and not as a report card on how the unit/commander is performing.
The impediments to the effective use of SORTS include Timeliness/Accuracy, Manipulation, Redundancy, Training SORTS Personnel, and Command Influence. The implications of these impediments are serious and warrant our close attention. It is to these implications that we now turn.
IMPLICATIONS
HORTAGE OF PERSONNEL
At the unit level, UD/MIPS is the tool used for reporting manpower strength. The manpower level for each unit is based on the unit's Table of Organization (T/O) manning level. The T/O is the base number of individuals in a unit needed to accomplish the combat mission set forth by the Marine Corps. When a unit incorrectly lists individuals who are "non-deployables" into the UD/MIPS as "deployable," it detracts from the ability of the higher headquarters to manage the flow of incoming personnel to the units needed to meet the T/O of organizational strength for deployment.
When a unit is preparing for a deployment, there are numerous training work-ups that the unit must accomplish prior to the deployment in order to ensure its ability to accomplish its wartime mission. This deployment training usually culminates with some form of readiness evaluation. The most common form of evaluation is the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES). All combat essential tasks are subdivided into Mission Performance Standards (MPS) which must be successfully met by the unit. The MCCRES is considered to be a valid indicator of combat readiness of the unit. If this deployment training is conducted with personnel who will not deploy with the unit (i.e., non-deployables), then the MPS's accomplished could be invalid. However, if a unit met these training standards while using non-deployable individuals and reported its personnel readiness as C-1, based on the results of the MCCRES, then the SORTS report could be invalid, not only for personnel, but also for training. This information would be misleading because the unit accomplished these tasks with Marines who would not actually deploy with that unit. When the unit is 90 days away from deployment it is required to transfer all non-deployable personnel and any personnel shortages are usually filled by its own parent organization. Moving Marines around like this is, in effect, "robbing Peter to pay Paul." This does not allow SORTS to be used as the information tool it was meant to be.
FUNDING AS AN INFORMATION TOOL
Another factor which affects equipment and training is funding. Funding can be tracked through SABRS and through unit Job Order Numbers (JONs). As with personnel, each unit is assigned a Table of Equipment (T/E) which identifies the amount and type of equipment the unit is responsible for maintaining. This system of T/E, SABRS and JONs works in much the same way as the unit manages personnel. If a unit reports C-1 for all combat reportable items, but does not actually possess this equipment, or if the equipment is not in combat operational condition, then the data provided by the unit are incorrect. In addition to misinforming the CINC, this could degrade the ability of the Division or Regimental commander to provide a unit with the funds necessary to obtain the equipment that the unit needs to accomplish its mission. Similar problems exist with training. There are two sets of training standards a unit must meet. First, are the individual training standards (ITS). These apply to each Marine in the unit, such as the individual weapons training, physical fitness training, and various field skills and Military Occupational Specialty training. Secondly, there are the MPS's, which have to be met by the unit as a whole, such as the MCCRES. Each unit is funded for 120 days of training per fiscal year.[35] This implies that if a unit reports to SORTS that they have met all their MPS's and all their ITS's in an average year, that unit would have expended all its training dollars for that fiscal year and would be eligible to receive the same amount plus a 3% increase that is automatically added for inflation for the following year.[36] On average, infantry units in the Marine Corps only accomplish about 90 days of training a year.[37] However, if the unit is actually only accomplishing 90 days of training, the unused training funds should be made available either to purchase equipment the unit is short, repair equipment that is not operational, or reallocate equipment to another unit. This could only be accomplished after the unit reports the training days on their SORTS and its higher headquarters deems the funds are not needed elsewhere in the command.
FALSE SENSE OF READINESS
SORTS is a tool that was designed to be used at all levels of command to monitor the readiness of subordinate units. For SORTS to work as intended, it must be applied two ways: first, to reflect how ready a unit actually is; and second, for a commander to justify how ready the unit is. It is both common and natural for a commander to want to present his or her unit in the best light possible. Because of this phenomenon, commanders and the staff officers who work for them are susceptible to inflating the combat readiness of their respective unit. Inflated readiness indicators are inordinately counter-productive, not to mention dangerous. Obviously, inflated ratings suggest a unit is at a higher state of readiness than is actually the case. Not only does this give senior headquarters a false picture, but in the case of a commander who has largely delegated SORTS reporting procedures, he or she runs the risk of gaining a genuinely wrong perception of the command. The danger of false reporting is likewise obvious. First, the risk exists that a unit may be committed to combat when it is neither equipped nor trained to perform. Second, degraded and poorly maintained equipment is inherently dangerous for Marines to use and operate. For example, an artillery battalion that is reported as C-1 overall, but is actually C-3 because of damage to the sights for those howitzers, could cause gunners to fire inaccurately, and in reality, would degrade the unit's ability to accomplish its wartime mission. Moreover, this same false readiness rating would give higher headquarters the impression that the unit has more firing capability (more howitzers) than it actually has.
SORTS is a tool which can provide senior headquarters with the information needed to redirect necessary funds to lower level units to obtain combat essential parts, equipment, and training, if required. In addition SORTS allows higher headquarters to monitor manning levels within subordinate units, and provides higher headquarters the ability to assign incoming personnel to units that are under staffed, as well as realign individuals who are non-deployable, to units which do deploy. This information can be provided to higher headquarters if the information reflected on the SORTS report is accurate and timely.
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
TRAINING FOR COMMANDERS
Training for commanders is the first step in correcting misunderstandings regarding the purpose of SORTS. Unit commanders need a basic understanding of what SORTS is, how it works, who it assists, and why. Already in place in the Marine Corps is a two day course whose purpose is to teach the use of SORTS, for commanders or anyone the commander deems appropriate to attend. It is essential that a commander ensures that the information reported in SORTS is valid and accurately reflects the actual combat readiness of the unit. Currently it is not mandatory for the commanders to attend the training course provided to them, and very few do.[38]
As long as SORTS can be considered a report card, it will not matter what type of reporting system, automated or manual, the Marine Corps puts in place. The Marine Corps needs to reduce the vulnerability of SORTS to manipulation. If the ability to manipulate SORTS remains, the validity of the report will always be open to question. Only by understanding the criticality of valid readiness reporting, and insuring that readiness is reported in an unbiased, timely, and accurate manner, can SORTS be used as the information tool it was meant to be, and not as a report card for the commander. This is the first step to be taken to ensure that SORTS produces an accurate picture of a Marine Corps unit's readiness.
AUTOMATING THE REPORTING PROCESS
Equipment modernization remains a top priority in the Marine Corps and throughout the Department of Defense. In addition to weaponry, it is essential that future automated information systems be modernized, as well. Presently, in the Marine Corps, there are various automated systems such as MIMMS and Unit Diary/ Marine Integrated Personnel System (UD/MIPS) that, if properly integrated, could be exploited to more rapidly and accurately facilitate the information flow needed to update the SORTS report provided to the JCS. The modernization of current collection/reporting methods used for the four readiness categories in SORTS can be expedited by using many systems now in existence.
PERSONNEL REPORTING / SYSTEMS AUTOMATION
The system currently in place for the unit commander to monitor personnel who are non-deployable is the Unit Diary/ Marine Integrated Personnel System (UD/MIPS). This system, if used properly, can track every member of that unit daily, and provide the commander an accurate picture of his actual deployable forces. However, this will provide an accurate picture only if the unit diary clerk inputs the proper codes into the system which reflect the status of every Marine on that particular day.
The Marine Corps needs to expand the UD/MIPS software to do one of two things. The software must either (1) interface with the SORTS software or (2) allow the information to be visible at higher headquarters where the information can be integrated. At every level, the most important element of this procedure is that the information must be collated automatically by the computer software, using only the data entered into the automated information system. This should significantly reduce the ability for the reporting unit to manipulate the data already entered into the system.
TRAINING REPORTING / SYSTEM AUTOMATION
When discussing automation of training there are three tracking programs that need to be integrated: Individual Training Standards (ITS); Mission Performance Standards (MPS); and the Standard Accounting and Budget Reporting System (SABRS). Let us first discuss ITS and MPS since they deal most directly with training evaluation, and currently are not automated.
The Marine Corps requires each unit to accomplish the prescribed tasks listed in the ITS's and MPS's. The Marine Corps currently enters a Marine's ITS in his Basic Training Record, which is also maintained in the UD/MIPS system. The Marine Corps needs to produce a software that will allow the unit to download this information to a central server and track the average ITS completed per unit per Marine. This process would allow calculation of the averages of all Marines in the unit, with a safeguard that precludes individuals from manually adjusting the percentages. Today, if 40% of the Marines accomplished 60% of the ITS's, the information provided to update the Marines' Basic Training Record in the UD/MIPS system would produce the appropriate ITS percentage for that unit's ITS training year-to-date. This data would portray a more accurate training readiness picture of the unit.
The Marine Corps also does not currently have an automated system for collecting MPS data. Appropriate software must be designed to compute the unit's MPS that have been performed. This software should also have the ability to calculate the percentage of standards performed year-to-date, as well as the ratio of training days to yearly training days funded. This would give commanders at all levels two important pieces of information. Senior commanders could determine if the unit was on schedule to meet its MPS's for the year and also if the unit was using all the training days allocated. This automation of training percentages could enable the higher headquarters to see how a unit had progressed in completing its annual training.
The automation of training standards can provide higher headquarters with a more accurate picture of where the unit is in completing its annual training requirement. However, this still remains the one area where the commander's comments are vital, since readiness, or lack thereof, is usually more of a problem of overcommitment or excessively high operational tempo. This results in a commander having to choose between either conducting combat essential training or responding to higher headquarters' "crises of the day" (e.g., VIP visits, dental stand down, barracks inspections, base cleanup, safety stand down, etc.). The commander's comments can expound upon the high tempo the unit has been maintaining or experiencing.
The current SORTS system also does not reflect the beginning of the new calendar year. Even though a unit may have completed individual rifle qualification in September, as of October 1st of the same year, the unit training management system will show that unit as having no individuals qualified with their individual weapon. True, but not accurate. Just because it is the beginning of a new fiscal year does not make those Marines any less qualified than they were 30 days prior. This is an occasion when the commander's comments can explain the automated percentages compiled as integrated into SORTS, not to change the percentages, but to inform higher headquarters that the percentages do not accurately reflect this particular MPS or ITS.
Another tool to assist higher level commanders in monitoring unit training is the SABRS, which automatically reports the unit's status of funds. The information is only as accurate as the data being processed. This provides another example of the importance of training of SORTS personnel. Through the monitoring of this system, commanders can more efficiently plan the training and fiscal requirements of subordinate units, thus not wasting funds or training time. SABRS is already a viable element in the Marine Corps software system. It is necessary only to link the SABRS percentage of funds spent on training data with the percentage of MPS and ITS standards accomplished by the unit to determine if there are sufficient or insufficient funds remaining for training in the fiscal year.
Automated equipment reporting systems are already in place. Integration of existing systems (Asset Tracking for Logistics and Supply System (ATLASS) and MIMMS, remains the linchpin for optimizing resources required to process SORTS reporting of equipment readiness. Currently the Marine Corps has a fielding plan to integrate these systems into one master system. The Mechanized Allowance List (MAL), which tracks all the authorized and on-hand equipment possessed by a reporting unit, needs to be interfaced with the LM-2 report to reflect the status of equipment of the unit. Presently, a reconciliation between the supply clerk and the maintenance management clerk is conducted on an average of once a week for all combat essential equipment. In some cases, it is possible to interpret one piece of equipment as equivalent to another, and report a higher overall equipment readiness status than is actually present. For example, if a unit rates 100 new (more modern) radio sets, but possesses only 84 of the new radios, the commander may feel he can compensate for this shortfall by counting old radio sets as part of the 100 sets he is required to possess in order to meet his combat essential mission. By automating and interfacing the MAL with MIMMS, a percentage of only the authorized combat essential equipment currently on the MAL will be reflected on SORTS. Also, only the operational status of each piece of equipment that the unit possesses will post on the LM-2, which reflects the operational condition of that piece of equipment. This will allow the unit and higher headquarters to better manage the operational status of their on hand and excess equipment. This could also save manpower by not having to maintain equipment a unit does not rate. Additionally, funds would not be allocated to maintain outdated or excess equipment.
By following the proper automated reporting procedure there is a well outlined path to explain how a unit derived the C rating it currently maintains. No change should be made to the SORTS report directly. All changes need to be made to the original source document from which the percentages come. If a unit alters the source document in order to present a higher readiness rating than the unit actually has, then when an inspection is performed on the unit, such as a FSMAO inspection, the readiness rating of the unit could be validated and automatically adjusted to reflect the appropriate combat readiness rating.
COMMANDER'S COMMENTS
The Commander's Comment section will remain a vital part of the SORTS reporting system. However, it is still subject to manipulation to erroneously justify an individual issue or readiness rating. To reduce the possibility for abuse of this section, it should only be used to comment on issues that influence the command's readiness rating that cannot be expressed through the readiness percentages already a part of SORTS. For example, an artillery unit might retain a C-1 personnel rating, even though it had lost the individual qualified to calibrate the sights on the unit's howitzers. But if the unit is unable to calibrate the sights on its howitzers, it could result in an equipment rating of C-3. Prediction of future readiness ratings provide another positive example of commander's comments. Knowing when key personnel are scheduled to depart from a unit, its commander can highlight their departure as a way to underline the need for timely assignment of replacements. The impact of high operational tempo on unit morale provides yet another opportunity for a commander to comment on the SORTS report. Exceptionally high operational tempo can often have a considerable effect on a unit. Even though a unit should be well trained after returning from a training exercise, if the unit has to immediately redeploy to support operations other than war, such as humanitarian relief operations, it may not matter how well trained for combat the unit is. The increase in operational tempo can also have a direct effect on the Marine through increased family problems.
Other examples of low readiness that can be explained in the commander's comments are: not recovering overdue equipment, or not being force fed combat essential equipment which would affect the unit's ability to perform its prescribed mission. In the area of personnel readiness, an example that would warrant comment by the commander, and a situation which is common in the Fleet Marine Forces, is the instance of detaching one or several Marines to another unit for a local exercise. While these detached Marines frequently provide needed expertise to ensure a successful exercise, their departure decreases the parent unit's readiness, even if only for a short time. Both of these situations are short-term problems that would affect the unit's immediate readiness rating. This short-term significance can not be explained through automated figures. What the commander's comments should not be used for is justifying "what if's" such as a unit not accomplishing its combat skill training, or explaining in the commander's comments that if the unit went to war it would accomplish this training during the work up phase before deployment; or that it would have a specialty team attached to the unit so it would not need to meet this MPS. The commander's comments should be an information tool, not a manipulation tool. Commander's comments are vital when explaining performance levels and previous training conducted within a reasonable time limit not already represented in SORTS. This is important not only when the commander is reporting training percentages, but also when reporting training levels. SORTS only reports percentages completed, not levels of performance.
TRANSMISSION TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS
The routing for transmitting SORTS information from the reporting unit should begin at the Division, Wing and FSSG level. Currently the report proceeds from the Battalion to Regiment to Division to MARFOR to JCS. Division/Wing/FSSG units should have the capability to consolidate all information at their level, eliminating Battalion and Regimental SORTS officers. SORTS should be a closed system that would allow
"information only " copies to the intermediate higher level headquarters in the chain of command. The chain of command should not be able to influence the readiness rating reported by subordinate units. It could be possible for the higher level headquarters to expand on the commander's comments, if deemed necessary. However, with the readiness percentages being calculated from the original source documents, any manipulating at a higher level could not be supported by any formal source document.
In the Marine Corps, readiness status of deployable units is the key information provided by SORTS. It is not feasible to produce a SORTS report daily for JCS or the CINCs. What is possible is to provide the JCS and CINC's access to the information through existing automated information systems. This could be accomplished by software that could receive an automated download continuously refined from each reporting unit. For example, a unit could automatically have all daily transactions from all the Division/ Wings/ FSSG, etc., staffs downloaded on to the SORTS program. Information copies can be obtained by whomever requires them. The originals could then be stored in a server at the JCS for viewing whenever necessary.
SORTS should provide a comprehensive picture of selected unit readiness, to include a commander's selective assessment on the unit's ability to execute its full wartime mission in peacetime, crisis, or war. This can only be accomplished through accurate reporting and incorporation of all available information pertaining to personnel, equipment and individual/unit training readiness.
SORTS can only be the vital information tool it was designed to be by changing the paradigms that exist today within the Marine Corps. Accurate readiness reporting, and insuring that readiness reporting is unbiased, timely and accurate are the keys to implementing SORTS as a vital information tool.
In all cases, except collective unit training, which require the commander to comment on the unit's current training level, automation can provide a more accurate and detailed picture of a unit's readiness level. If the Marine Corps produces a software system that minimizes, if not eliminates, the ability to manipulate the information being compiled, then SORTS can truly be the readiness tool it was intended to be.
The commander's comments will continue to be a vital part of the SORTS reporting system if those comments objectively add value to the report. Commander's comments should be used to further explain a low readiness rating, not to justify a higher rating than is reflected by the SORTS percentages.
SORTS can provide the commander at any level an accurate picture of a particular combat unit, at any time. Anything less could have the potential for planning for or deploying units that are not truly ready to carry out their assigned mission.
SORTS reporting will continue to provide our nation's leadership with vital defense readiness information. The challenges enumerated herein must be recognized and addressed in order to optimize limited resources and, more importantly, provide the most accurate assessment of the readiness of Marine units.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barbara, Elma E., Readiness Analyst Operations Division, Plans Policies & Operations
Interview by author, 12 November 1997, telephone interviews; 15 November 1997 and 16 January 1997.
Betts, Richard K., Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences. Washington DC., The Brookings Institution, 1995.
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)", Memorandum of Policy No. 11, Issued 16 March 1990, 1st revision 24 December 1992.
Chavez, Col. Rocky J., Formerly with Plans, Policy and Operations; Current Operations; exercises. Interview by author, 23 and 26 January 1997.
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Kollar, Gunnery Sergeant Gregory. SORTS officer 1/14. Interview by author, 16 November 1996.
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Robinson, Matthew T., "Defining the Hollow Force: Is it More Than Just a Readiness Problem?" Center for Naval Analyses, 4401 Ford Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22302-1498.
Robinson, Matthew T., "Measuring and Predicting Marine Readiness Study", Center for Naval Analyses, September 1996.
Robinson, Matthew T., with Baxter, Christine H., Ganoe, Courtney, Measell, Barbara H., Oi, Jessica S., "Measuring and Predicting Marine Readiness: An Interim Report", Center for Naval Analyses, 4401 Ford Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22302-1498.
Robinson, Matthew T., "A Review of Recent Readiness Research: A first step to measuring and predicting Marine readiness", Briefing to: Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Oster, Deputy Chief of Staff, (P&R), HQMC, Center for Naval Analyses, 4401 Ford Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22302-1498.
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A source, in a battalion level S-3 shop in the Marine Corps, who wishes to remain anonymous. Interview by author, 12 November 1996.
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