Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters -- A Step in the Right Direction?
CSC 1997
Subject Area - General
Executive Summary
Title: Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters -- A Step in the Right Direction?
Author: Major E. D. Bartch, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: This paper answers the following question: Which is the best way to organize a Joint Task Force Headquarters -- A Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters or the U.S. Commander in Chief European Command's Joint Task Force Headquarters model?
Discussion: With few exceptions, past JTF HQs were ad hoc in nature. The ad hoc JTF HQs has numerous deficiencies (e.g., single-service dominated, dual-hatted commanders, lack of joint liaison officers, set up for a single mission or crisis, and once the mission is accomplished, the JTF HQs is disbanded). In order to eliminate the deficiencies associated with the ad hoc JTF HQs, the combatant commanders are searching for the best procedures and guidelines to organize, prepare, and train the JTF HQs staff. The problem is being approached by two different angles. First, unified combatant commanders or commander in chief (CINCs) have designated service component headquarters as future JTF HQs and have designated some of their CINC staff and service component command personnel by billet position to future JTF HQs. This first method will be referred to as the U.S. Commander in Chief, European Command (USCINCEUCOM) JTF HQs model and is the model used currently by all the CINCs. USCINCEUCOM JTF HQs model includes component core billets, supplemental billets, cells, and joint plugs. In the second option, the CINC establishes a SJTF HQs that is permanently manned by joint personnel. As of this date, none of the CINCs have established SJTF HQs.
Conclusion: When viewed through the lenses of joint doctrine, command and control, interoperability, and teamwork, the SJTF HQs with its permanent joint nucleus staff is the preferable choice. It appears that the SJTF HQs can improve our warfighting capabilities while reducing most of the deficiencies associated with the ad hoc JTF HQs.
Recommendations: In order to create SJTF HQs in each of the unified CINCs, the following steps must be taken: first, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must develop consensus among the unified CINCs that the SJTF HQs is the option that best serves America's needs (warfighting and operations other than war); and second, the Secretary of Defense must convince the Service Chiefs that the SJTF HQs is in their respective services best interest. After the CINCs and the Service Chiefs are on board with the SJTF HQs, the SJTF HQs billets must be placed on the Joint Duty Allowance List (JDAL) and immediately filled. Simultaneously, all SJTF HQs must be supplied with the appropriate command and control equipment and joint doctrine must be published that provides SJTF HQs guidelines and procedures. Once the SJTF HQs are manned and equipped, the CINCs must up the ante in regards to JTF HQs training -- concentrating on increased speed, efficiency, and command and control.
Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters --
A Step in the Right Direction?
Eric D. Bartch, Major, USMC
Marine Corps Command and Staff College Conference Group 8
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Thesis Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Thesis Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
THE DE JURE AND DE FACTO OF JOINTNESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The National Security Act of 1947 with Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
THE CINC's SILVER BULLET -- THE JTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
THE EVOLUTION OF THE JTF HQs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
JTF HQs Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Post Goldwater-Nichols JTF HQs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
FOUR APPROACHES TO ORGANIZING AND TRAINING JTF HQs . . . . . 14
U.S. Commander in Chief European Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
U.S. Commander in Chief Atlantic Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The Standing Joint Task Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
THE COMPARISON -- THE STANDING JTF HQs vs.
EUCOM's JTF HQs MODEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
INTRODUCTION
Retired Admiral William Owens stated that the United States could save billions of dollars and promote more efficient and effective Department of Defense (DoD) operations by creating a new organization called a Standing Joint Command.[1] According to Admiral Owens, the Standing Joint Command would be made up of forces from each Services and would jointly train and operate on a daily basis. He called for a standing joint force command at the regional three-star component commander level with direct operational command over service units that normally would be part of a joint command only in a particular operation or crisis.[2] Admiral Owens call for a Standing Joint Command concept was not based solely on fiscal savings. His joint concept was an attempt to fix one of the weak links in the U.S. post cold war operational capabilities -- the ad hoc nature of Joint Task Force (JTF) contingency operation.[3] Most of the ad hoc JTF problems can be attributed to a single source -- the organization and training of JTF headquarters staff.[4]
The ad hoc JTF Headquarters (JTF HQs) has numerous deficiencies stemming from its short life span. With few exceptions, past ad hoc JTF HQs were single-service dominated, set up for a single mission or crisis, and once the mission was
accomplished, the JTF HQs was disbanded.[5] Most JTF commanders were dual hatted, splitting their service-mission responsibilities and their joint training requirements.[6] When facing a short-fuse JTF mission, the JTF commander forms the JTF HQs with a team he feels most comfortable with -- his own service staff. It is extremely difficult to develop a cohesive JTF HQs staff with unknown officers from other Services arriving in the middle of crisis action planning.[7]
Presently, there is little discussion of Admiral Owens' Standing Joint Command concept at the DoD. However, if presented in the right context, the Joint Chiefs of Staff might be willing to take a small step toward the Owens' construct. That small joint step could be a Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (SJTF HQs). A SJTF HQs should not be confused with the standing JTF concept. The SJTF HQs concept consists of a fully manned HQs staff only. Combat forces remain under their respective service component until the CINC establishes the JTF. The SJTF HQs model should also not be confused with the standing JTFs formed for temporary but indefinite presence (for example, U.S. Commander in Chief Central Command's (CENTCOM's) JTF Southwest Asia or U.S. Commander in Chief Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM's) JTF Bravo and Panama).
Thesis Purpose
Unified combatant commanders (CINCs) are still searching for the best procedures and guidelines to organize, prepare, and train the JTF HQs staff. The problem is being approached from two angles. First, CINCs designated service component headquarters as future JTF HQs and designated personnel from their CINC staff and service-component commands by billet position to future JTF HQs. This first approach will be referred to as the U.S. Commander in Chief European Command (EUCOM) JTF HQs model.[8] EUCOM JTF HQs model includes component core billets, supplemental billets, and joint plugs. A component core billet is a key billet designated or "battled rostered" on a JTF HQs manning document line number. Joint plugs are cells of personnel with joint experience that provide functional capabilities not available within the service component. A supplemental billet is an augmentee used to provide additional support to the JTF HQs so that the JTF HQs staff can maintain 24 hours a day operations. Upon activation, the joint plugs, component core, and supplemental billets become part of the JTF HQs.[9] In the second option, SJTF HQs can be created by a CINC or by the by Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff with the concurrence of the unified CINCs and Secretary
0f Defense.[10] Using the synergistic goal of "jointness"[11] as the litmus test, this paper answers the following question related to organization of the JTF headquarters: Which is best way to organize a JTF Headquarters to eliminate deficiencies associated with the ad hoc JTF HQs -- Standing JTF HQs or the EUCOM JTF HQs model?
Following the introduction, this paper is in six sections. The first section examines how legislation affected the CINCs, starting from the Security Act of 1947 with its Amendments of 1949, 1953, and 1958 to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The second section reviews how CINCs organize JTFs. The third portion reviews the evolution of the JTF HQs. The fourth section describes four approaches to organizing and training JTF HQs: EUCOM; U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific Command (PACOM); U.S. Commander in Chief Atlantic Command (ACOM); and the SJTF HQs. The next portion presents a comparative analysis between the SJTF HQs and EUCOM's JTF HQs model and how they resolve ad hoc JTF HQ's deficiencies. The paper's final section includes appropriate conclusions and recommendations.
Thesis Significance
The goal of a joint operation is the successful completion of the joint mission. JTF HQs should be organized in the most effective manner possible to achieve that goal. Currently, CINCs do not have the best trained and capable JTF HQs. The Nation's warfighters are the unified CINCs. They have the authority to organize, train, or use any of their subordinate component commands (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) or any combinations in joint operations.[12] Currently, each CINC has designated and trained its three-star service component commanders and their staff as potential JTF commanders and JTF headquarters.[13] When a CINC establishes a JTF, he requires his service component commanders provide fully trained and capable forces to the JTF commander. The CINC's JTF commanders are getting the best trained forces in the world from the four services, but are these forces getting the best trained and capable JTF HQs the CINC can provide? Upon examination, the answer is clearly "no." The DoD can provide better JTF Headquarters, but is the added expense worth the cost?
Methodology
This paper examines the organization and training of JTF HQs in each unified CINC. The base for this study consists of Center of Naval Analysis (CNA) studies, lessons learned from JTF exercises since 1983, CINC JTF SOPs, interviews with CINC commands and subordinate components planning staffs, interview with CNA analysts, and professional articles.
THE DE JURE AND DE FACTO OF JOINTNESS
To determine if the CINCs can provide a better JTF HQs, it is essential to know the rules of the joint game -- what are the laws (de jure) and what really takes place (de facto). Additionally, it is important to understand the role and the authority of the CINC in the new era of jointness. Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 because of their concern with the excessive power and influence of the four services, which had precluded the full integration of their separate capabilities for effective joint warfighting.[14] Congressman and later Secretary of Defense Less Aspin described the act as: "one of the landmark laws of American history and...is probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775."[15] Despite Aspin's enthusiasm for the Act, defense reformers realized these massive changes would not take place over night for one of the largest bureaucracies in the world.[16] The jointness of today is relatively new and evolving, but its origins and concepts date back over 50 years.
The National Security Act of 1947 with Amendments of 1949, 1953, and 1958
In 1958, to bolster support for the Amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, President Eisenhower noted:
"separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one regardless of Service"[17]
The National Security Act of 1947 was passed in an effort to clarify and codify the new joint roles for the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, eleven years later in 1958, President Eisenhower was not satisfied with the National Security Act of 1947 nor the amendments of 1949 and 1953.[18] Eisenhower referred to the Security Act of 1947 as "little more than a weak confederation of sovereign military units."[19] To instill jointness in the DoD, President Eisenhower spearheaded the 1958 Amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. The 1958 Amendment was President Eisenhower's idea for the "bifurcation of the DoD into administrative and operational chains of commands."[20] The 1958 Amendment made it clear there were two chains of authority, one to the armed services and the other to the CINCs. Like today, respective services were required to train, equip, and prepare their forces for combat.[21] The 1958 Amendment made the joint chain responsible for employing forces provided by the military departments. When tasked by the President, the CINCs were responsible for winning our Nation's wars using the combat forces provided by the services.[22]
The 1958 Amendment resembles the present Goldwaters-Nichols Act, so why was the latter necessary? It could be that the Goldwater-Nichols Act was needed because the Service Chiefs didn't always follow the law.[23] Before 1986, despite the de jure model, DoD was dominated by service chiefs who bullied the JCS through their veto authority and were not always supportive of CINCs.[24] With the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress specified the command authority of the CINCs. This gave the CINCs the same authority as service commanders. As a result, CINC's could organize, train, discipline, hire and fire, and employ their commands and forces as they saw fit. The CINCs now had the command authority to make them truly the Nation's warfighters.[25] With that authority, they could focus their attention on their joint warfighting mission.
THE CINC'S SILVER BULLET -- THE JTF
The CINCs primary means for responding to an emerging crisis are the capabilities-based Joint Task Forces (JTF). Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), states that a JTF can be established by "SECDEF, a CINC, or an existing JTF commander."[26] The UNAAF gives a joint force commander authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations.[27] Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, enables combatant commanders to "directly control the conduct of military operations or delegate that authority to a subordinate commander."[28]
Retired Admiral Charles Larson, PACOM, introduced a two-tiered command and control construct in PACOM in 1991 where short-term missions were assigned to a JTF commander reporting directly to the CINC. Admiral Larson stated that; "nothing we've accomplished in PACOM has contributed more to the jointness, readiness, and agility of my forces than implementation of the two-tiered C2 structure."[29] This two-tiered approach for forming JTFs is now established practice for all unified CINCs today.[30] For example, JTF HQs can be formed and commanded by either the CINC himself, such as General H. Norman Schwartzcopf, CENTCOM, for operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM or CINC designated commander, Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) for Operation RESTORE HOPE.[31]
THE EVOLUTION OF THE JTF HQs
JTF HQs and JTF HQs doctrine continues to evolve. JTF HQs are evolving from single-service dominated JTF HQs of the past (ad hoc) to the joint or synergistic JTF HQs of the future. The weakness associated with the single-service dominated JTF HQs stems from the lack of joint representation on the JTF HQs staff[32] Because of this lack of joint representation on the JTF HQs staff, the CJTF is not aware or understands all the joint capabilities or options available to him. Unfortunately for the CJTF, there is no joint doctrine defining exactly how the JTF HQs forces should be organized. The current Joint Pub 5-00.2 provides basic guidelines, but specifics are left to the individual CINCs. CINCs tailor their JTF HQs to the particular mission and crisis. The CINC can use a standing JTF HQs, a core service component commander, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, or create a completely ad hoc JTF headquarters. The CJTF has maximum freedom and flexibility to organize his JTF HQs, but his freedom and flexibility is limited regarding the composition of the JTF HQs staff. Joint Pub 5-00.2 states, "When fully formed, the JTF staff will be composed of appropriate members in key positions from each Service or functional component having significant forces assigned to the command."[33] Even though Joint Pub 5-00.2 is clear on the joint composition of the JTF staff, a CJTF faced with executing a short-notice JTF operation, will normally select his own staff and service to form the JTF HQs.[34]
JTF HQs Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
An example of a JTF HQs before Golwater-Nichols Act was Operation URGENT FURY, the 1983 invasion of Grenada. URGENT FURY (JTF 120) was considered a success since it met its mission goals with a relatively small loss of life (18 U.S. servicemen killed, 116 U.S. servicemen wounded).[35] After action reports prepared by the services revealed serious problems in the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to operate jointly in 1983.[36] A number of problems encountered by JTF 120 could be attributed to the ad hoc nature of the JTF HQs.[37] The JTF 120 HQs was small; a total of 25 officers.[38] ACOM designated the Commander, Second Fleet as the CJTF 120. His deputy was the Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division. Seventeen U.S. Navy officers of the Second Fleet staff formed the nucleus of the JTF 120 staff.[39] Upon activation as a JTF, Second Fleet was augmented by only by a handful of liaison officers from the Marine Corps, the Army, Special Forces, the Air Force, the State Department, and CIA.[40] The meager representatation of staff officers from other services at the JTF HQs limited the scope of joint advice available to CJTF 120.[41] Representives from the other services were
not involved in planning for URGENT FURY.[42] For example, the senior U.S. Army officer (then Major General Norman Schwarzkopf) was assigned to the JTF less than 48 hours before the invasion[43] The short notice character of the operation -- Special Forces operations were under way within hours after JTF establishment -- reinforced the inherent problems associated with the ad hoc JTF HQs.[44]
Post Goldwater-Nichols JTF HQs
After passage of Goldwater-Nichols Act, JTF HQs were still ad hoc, short notice, and single-service dominated. However, the CINCs took measures to reduce ad hoc JTF HQs deficiencies.[45] CINCs used Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cells (DJTFAC) and joint plugs to augment the ad hoc JTF HQs.[46] The DJTFAC and joint plug provided the CJTF with the joint experience and knowledge lacking in the single-service JTF HQs. Even though the Post Goldwater-Nichols Act JTF HQs were still composed largely of one service, JTF HQs staff now had representatives from the respective services that made up the JTF as a whole.[47] Operation SEA ANGEL, a 1991 disaster relief operation in Bangladesh, highlighted the no-notice, single-service character of many JTF operations of its day.[48] After reviewing 23 JTF operations between 1983 and 1993, CNA found that nearly half of them (10 of 23 cases), the CJTF had less than 72 hours notice to plan and prepare for execution.[49] In fact, the JTF HQs staff for SEA ANGEL had only 48 hours between the JTF establishment and deployment.[50] PACOM designated Major General H.C. Stackpole, Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) as the CJTF. The SEA ANGEL JTF HQs was primarily comprised of III MEF staff.[51] PACOM augmented the III MEF staff with its DJTFAC (the first time PACOM had used it). The DJTFAC reduced but did not eliminate the problems associated with the single-service dominated JTF HQs (joint coordination, staff cohesion, etc.).[52] The DJTFAC (comprised of 50 service members) provided the CJTF with the joint experience and knowledge lacking in previous JTF HQs.[53] Additionally, the DJTFAC improved liaison between the CINC and the JTF staff.[54] The DJTFAC is covered in detail later in the paper.
FOUR APPROACHES
TO ORGANIZING AND TRAINING JTF HQs
U. S. Commander in Chief European Command
EUCOM headquarters, located at Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany, recently revised its Standard Operating Procedures for standing up JTF HQs.[55] The new directive incorporates the combined strengths from all the unified CINCs SOPs into a single document that reduces most of the deficiencies associated with ad hoc JTF HQs. EUCOM's JTF HQs model is based on two pillars: first, each of the CINC's service component commanders organize and train a highly capable and multi-service JTF HQs; and second, EUCOM has a corps of joint trained and proficient personnel that form the
joint plugs and fill the core and supplemental billets (See figure 1). Each Service
component commander must maintain the capability to establish JTF HQs based on the following assigned scenarios and missions:
1) U.S. ARMY EUROPE (USAREUR) headquarters, Heidelburg, Germany, is a theater headquarters with a corps headquarters, corps troops, and two divisions.[56] USAREUR is responsible for deploying the nucleus of two different JTF HQs. One JTF HQ is focused on humanitarian, disaster relief, and non-combatant
evacuation operations (NEO) and the other JTF HQ nucleus is prepared to conduct mid to high intensity combat operations.[57]
Figure 1. EUCOM's JTF HQs model
(2) U.S. NAVAL FORCES, EUROPE (NAVEUR) headquarters, London, England, consists of the Sixth Fleet, Fleet Air Mediterranean, and U.S. Naval Activities, United Kingdom.[58] NAVEUR is responsible for deploying one JTF HQ oriented toward maritime and littoral operations (to include NEOs).[59]
(3) U.S. AIR FORCES IN EUROPE (USAFE) headquarters, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, consists of the 3rd, 16th, and 17th Air Forces.[60] USAFE is responsible for deploying one JTF HQ, oriented toward air campaigns or airlift intensive operations.[61]
(4) SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND EUROPE (SOCEUR) headquartered at Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany, exercises operational control over all assigned or attached in-theater special operations forces.[62] SOCEUR is responsible for deploying one JTF HQs oriented toward special operations (particularly short notice NEO operations).[63]
(5) MARINE FORCES EUROPE (MARFOREUR) is a small headquarters staff located in Boeblingen, Germany.[64] The remainder of the staff comes from Marine Forces Atlantic in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. MARFOREUR is responsible for deploying one JTF HQ, oriented toward the employment of maritime prepositioned forces.[65]
EUCOM Policy Letter 94-1 directs each component to develop and maintain a training program focused on preparing selected core personnel to rapidly form a JTF HQ
and commence join operations. Policy Letter 94-1 also requires components to exercise their JTF HQ annually.[66] EUCOM's goal is to have key people trained and ready for
The billets in every JTF HQ are classified and divided into the following three distinct categories:
(1) COMPONENT CORE BILLETS. The nucleus of each EUCOM's JTF HQs comes from an existing staff organic to one of EUCOM's service components (USAREUR, NAVEUR, USAFE, SOCEUR, and MARFOREUR). This plan provides six JTF nucleus staffs from the four services and SOCEUR and provides EUCOM the flexibility to select the JTF core whose overall expertise is best suited for the specific mission at hand.[67]
-Key billets in this existing staff are designated or battle rostered to provide the core of each component's JTF HQ. A battle rostered billet is an individual duty position on a JTF HQ staff that is directly linked to a manning document line number from the organization sourcing the billet.[68] In each core, a limited number of battle rostered billets are sourced from other services to ensure there exists and ample base of joint expertise to meet all planning requirements.[69]
(2) JOINT PLUGS. To augment these mainly service component cores, EUCOM maintains a variety of battle rostered joint plugs to provide the JTF HQ the required joint experience and functional capability not available within a service component. These joint plugs are selectively added for specific operations. Service components augmented with the prescribed joint plug, regularly train together and form the trained and ready backbone of any EUCOM JTF. There is only one set of joint plugs in EUCOM. They train with each of the component cores (minus MARFOREUR) annually and are the most highly trained JTF personnel in EUCOM. Joint plugs include:
(a) EUCOM Core. This element is selected from personnel assigned to joint billets on the EUCOM HQs staff. Following a decision to activate a JTF, the EUCOM core augments the JTF HQs and brings to that newly formed staff the background and staff products developed. EUCOM core personnel, when combined with the JTF HQs personnel, provide the CJTF the minimum essential joint and service expertise needed to rapidly form a credible JTF HQ nucleus staff, and normally account for 30 to 40% of the full JTF HQ staff. EUCOM core personnel are most valuable to a JTF Commander during the planning and initial operational phases of any contingency. After the situation stabilizes, EUCOM core personnel are individually replaced so that the EUCOM core can be reformed in preparation for the next crisis.[70]
(b) Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). Individual JFACC HQ organizations were developed for each JTF HQ based on the notional staff organization, mission statements, and contingency scenarios of that component-based JTF HQ. Each JFACC trains annually with associated JTF HQ.[71]
(c) Civil Military Operations Cell (CMOC). This cell forms the cadre of a CMOC and augments the JTF HQ when activated by EUCOM. The CMOC built from EUCOM staff, core billets (come from the service component that has lead for each JTF HQ), and supplemental billets sourced from continental U.S. based reserve units. The CMOC is made up of 57 personnel (45 officers and 12 enlisted) and includes public facilities, education, health, safety, finance, agriculture, legal, labor relations, cultural affairs, and commerce specialists.[72]
(d) Theater Missile Defense Cell (TMDC). When activated by EUCOM, this cell provides the JTF HQ with a capability to facilitate defense of critical assets from theater missile threats and to coordinate attacks to neutralize threat weapon systems and support infrastructure. The TMDC is sourced from EUCOM core (EUCOM HQs staff) and supplemental (Army, Air Force, and Navy service components) billets.[73]
(e) Engineering Cell (EC). When activated by EUCOM, this cell provides JTF HQ with the full range of theater-level engineering capability needed to plan and execute extensive engineering operations. The EC is sourced from EUCOM core and supplemental billets.[74]
(g) Joint Mobility Assistance Team (JMAT). When available, JMATs provided by U.S. Transportation Command, augment EUCOM and JTF HQ staffs to provide strategic deployment.[75]
(3) SUPPLEMENTAL BILLETS, provided by the service components during a contingency, enables the JTF HQs to operate on a 24-hour a day basis.[76]
EUCOM's JTF HQs training goal is to prepare the specific personnel tasked to participate in actual JTF contingencies and to keep those personnel trained without generating debilitating operations and personnel tempo. To accomplish this goal, EUCOM adopted a two-year training cycle.[77] Excluding SOCEUR and MARFOREUR, each service-specific JTF core headquarters conducts a major JTF exercise once every two years.[78] During this biennial event, the JTF core headquarters is augmented by joint plugs appropriate for the exercise mission while supplemental billets complete the JTF HQs organization. The notional EUCOM JTF HQs training year includes five JTF training opportunities: first, a full scale JTF exercise, followed three months later by short command post exercise, followed three months later by another full-scale JTF exercise, and followed three months later by the second short command post exercise of the year.[79] MARFOREUR exercises its JTF HQ capability during the major Maritime Preposition Force (MPF) exercise scheduled every four years in EUCOM's area of responsibility. In off years, MARFOREUR JTF HQs training requirements are fulfilled by the training II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) conducts with ACOM.[80]
U.S. Commander in Chief Atlantic Command
U.S. Commander in Chief Atlantic Command (ACOM) headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, forms JTF HQs around an existing three-star service component HQs.[81] The JTF HQs staff is organized by the CJTF in accordance with the mission and forces assigned. There is no standard JTF HQs organization.[82] ACOM provides a notional JTF HQs table of organization sized to undertake a Lesser Regional Contingency as a starting point to assist the CJTF with organizing his headquarters.[83] However, the ACOM JTF HQs SOP states that it is not feasible to designed a JTF HQs in advance and still be relevant to the range of JTF missions, command mixes, and sizes.[84] ACOM leaves it up to the CJTF to decide which, if any, JTF staff key positions will be assigned to officers not of the same service as the CJTF and his core staff.
Potential ACOM JTF HQs come from XVIII Airborne Corps, Eighth Air Force, II MEF, and Second Fleet. Additionally, ACOM provides the JTF commanders with a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC). The DJTFAC is a specially trained Joint planning cell (13 officers and one enlisted) drawn from ACOM's staff that can be activated and deployed within 48 hours.[85] It is used in rapidly evolving contingency operations to augment the CJTF's joint planning capability and assist with transition of the planning process from the CINC's strategic level to the CJTF's operational level. Upon activation, the DJTFAC is designed to form the nucleus of the JTF J5 for Joint or multinational contingency operations. The JTF J5 develops, updates, reviews, and coordinates JTF future plans.[86]
ACOM assumed its duties as the joint force integrator, trainer, and provider of the majority of the Nation's combat forces in 1993.[87] ACOM has a three-tier training program that focuses its training on the JTF HQs. Tier one training focuses on the Service core competencies. Soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen train for their service mission tasks.[88] Tier two accomplishes the joint interoperability training by field training exercises based on a list of critical interoperability tasks from supported CINCs.[89] Tier three focuses on joint doctrine training and operations order development for the JTF commanders and staffs.[90] Tier three training uses the UNIFIED ENDEAVOR series of exercises as post graduate level JTF HQ training.[91]
U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific Command
U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific Command (PACOM) headquarters at Camp Smith, Hawaii, uses three measures to ensure JTF success: first, JTF HQs are pre-selected; second, pre-designated commanders and staffs participate in CINC-assisted seminars and exercises; and lastly, the PACOM staff, in conjunction with and component and supporting CINCs, staffs and trains a cadre of roughly 150 potential augmentees.[92] From this cadre, a tailored group of about 40 personnel are selected to make up the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) and augment the JTF staff in a crisis.[93] PACOM established and maintains three basic JTF cores for planning purposes: Seventh Fleet or III MEF for a maritime effort, I Corps for land operations, and JTF 510 for a short notice special forces response.[94]
To prepare its components as JTF Headquarters, PACOM uses a two-phased training program.[95] The first phase lasts five days -- two days for doctrine and procedures and three days for the JTF staff command post exercise TEMPEST BRAVE.[96] PACOM staff are the instructors and training is aimed at the JTF staff formed around one of the component headquarters augmented by the DJTFAC.[97] The first phase training takes place within three months of Phase II -- a JTF field exercise (TANDEM THRUST, TEMPO BRAVE, or COBRA GOLD).[98] Rotating annually among the three major JTF field exercises, each of PACOM's three contingency JTF components are able to play the component core for one of these exercises.[99]
The Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters
Standing JTFs of one kind or another have been around for over 20 years. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), JTFs 4, 5, and 6, JTF-Bravo, and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) are all standing JTFs activated within the past 20 years.[100] The RDJTF stood up in 1976 as a Joint Chief of Staff JTF for unspecified contingency operations. By 1983 the RDJTF had been disbanded and incorporated into CENTCOM.[101] JTF 4, 5, and 6 support counter narcotics missions. JTF-Bravo executes command and control of U.S. Forces training in Honduras for SOUTHCOM and JSOC is the JTF executing the nation's dedicated standing external counter-terrorist operations.[102] Experience gained in creating these SJTFs heightens joint and interagency staff experience, but provided little benefit regarding crisis generated contingencies. Lessons learned from these SJTFs are not appropriate or useful for no-notice staff activations and contingency operations.
As previously mentioned, this paper focuses on the JTF HQs for short-notice, limited-duration, contingency operations and deficiencies associated with ad hoc JTF HQs. A SJTF HQs offers important advantages over ad hoc JTF HQs in terms of responsiveness, inherent jointness, and staff cohesion. The strength of the SJTF HQs is that it can progress and improve based on capturing and applying lessons learned, training together year round, and staying together after one mission and thus improving capabilities for future operations.[103]
Although the SJTF HQs concept has the potential to increase the Nation's warfighting capability, the concept has fallen on deft ears. The unified CINCs have not established SJTF HQs yet and are unlikely to do so in the future. There are two ways for a unified CINC to establish and man a SJTF HQs: one, he can take personnel from his own service components to build the SJTF HQs; or two, he can request that SJTF HQs billets be placed on the Joint Duty Allowance List (JDAL) and filled by the DoD. In both cases, the Service Chiefs and the Service component commanders will have great concerns with the CINCs meeting their needs at the expense of the Services. As an example, in July 1995, the Marine Corps started a SJTF HQs in ACOM. As of this date, the Marine Corps SJTF HQs experiment has generated little interest inside or outside the DoD community, as evidenced by the lack of articles in military journals and periodicals on the subject. The main opposition facing the Marine SJTF HQs experiment centers on its lack of command and control equipment and it geographic specificity.[104] Ultimately, the success of the Marine Corps' SJTF HQs experiment hinges on whether it will get permanent sister-service (Army and Air Force) representation on its staff. In an effort to accomplish this, the Marine Corps has been trying to get its SJTF HQ's staff billets placed in the JDAL. Without the sister-service representation, the Marine Corps SJTF HQs is not a joint HQs.
To evaluate the SJTF HQs potential, it is necessary to examine how the CINCs would employ them. Rather than forming the SJTF HQs by mission, the SJTF HQs would be organized by function. Using a functional approach might yield the following SJTF HQs (See figure 2):
1. Land SJTF
2. Air SJTF
3. Maritime SJTF
4. Special Operations Command (SOC) SJTF HQs (already exists)
Figure 2. Example of a Combatant Commander organized by SJTF HQs.
All of the billets for the four SJTF HQs will be on the JDAL and will be permanently staffed with the appropriate proportion of joint personnel. Based on the Land SJTF HQs
mission, the commander and half of his staff will be sourced from the Army. Based on the Air SJTF HQs mission, the commander and half of his HQs staff will be sourced from the Air Force. Based on the Maritime SJTF HQs mission, the commander of the Maritime JTF HQs will rotate between the Navy and Marine Corps and half of his staff will be split between the Navy and Marine Corps service components. A possible fourth JTF HQs exists in the Special Operations Command.
This section addressed the shortfalls of the ad hoc JTF HQs and outlined four approaches for creating and employing SJTF HQs. Still unresolved is which is the best method to organize a JTF HQs and eliminate the deficiencies associated with the ad hoc JTF HQs -- SJTF HQs or the EUCOM JTF HQs model?
THE COMPARISON -- THE STANDING JTF HQs VS.
THE EUCOM JTF HQs MODEL
After reviewing the unified CINC's standard operating procedures for forming JTF HQs, it is apparent that the CINCs are committed to eliminating the deficiencies associated with the ad hoc JTF HQs.[105] In the combatant commands, the trend is to form JTFs around an existing core headquarters structure -- usually a structured, three-star headquarters augmented from a core and supplemental billets, joint plugs, or a DJTFAC.[106] This augmentation usually comes from billets within the combatant command's own staff. Although these organizations differ in size and specific billet structures, they employ a similar procedure to augment the JTF HQs and provide critical planning "bridges" from the CINC staff to the JTF staff.[107]
As mentioned previously, a fully manned SJTF HQs eliminates most of the problems of past ad hoc JTF HQs. Additionally, it appears now that the EUCOM JTF HQs model can now provide a ready and capable JTF HQs that also eliminates a majority of the deficiencies of the ad hoc JTF HQs.[108] Accordingly, in order to determine the best option, the SJTF HQs and the EUCOM JTF HQs model must be judged against how well they counter the following ad hoc deficiencies (See figure 3):
1) Dual Hatted Commanders. Potential or designated JTF HQs can't focus exclusively on joint operations. Dual-hatted commanders (service mission and JTF HQ mission) must also train for their respective service functions and missions as
outlined in DoD Directive 5100.1.[109] For example, 18th Airborne Corps does a tremendous job forming a JTF HQs. They have equipment, personnel, and facilities set aside for the JTF HQs, but their training focus remains split between their service mission and joint operations. a) SJTF HQs - SJTF HQs eliminates the requirement for dual-hatted service component commanders. If the SJTF HQs concept is established DoD wide, it is doubtful that a JTF commander would be dual hatted.
b) EUCOM JTF HQs Model - Dual-hatted commanders are still required.
Figure 3. The SJTF HQs and the EUCOM comparison.
2) Single-Service Dominated JTF HQs. The weakness associated with the single-service dominated JTF HQs stems from the lack of joint representation on the JTF HQs staff.[110] Because of this lack of joint representation on the JTF HQs staff, the CJTF is not aware or understands all the joint capabilities or options available to him. The single service-nature deficiency effects the JTF HQs staff in terms of responsiveness,
inherent jointness, and staff cohesion.[111] After reviewing 23 joint operations, CNA determined that close to half of the JTFs form and deploy within 72 hours.[112] The short fuse nature of JTFs will continue to pressure JTF commanders to use the staff they feel most comfortable with--their own service staff.
a) SJTF HQs - The SJTF HQs concept eliminates the single-service nature of past JTF HQs.
b) EUCOM JTF HQs Model - Reduces the number of the single-service JTF HQs. Mission is still paramount when organizing a JTF and there are cases when a single service can better accomplish the mission than an a four-service JTF
combination created for the sake of jointness. In these cases, the EUCOM JTF HQs model gives the CINC more flexibility than the SJTF HQs to tailor his forces to the mission. In these circumstances, the CINC creates a single service Task Force (TF) vice a JTF.
3) Lack of Joint Service Liaison Officers. The lack of permanent joint service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) liaison officers on JTF HQs staff inhibits joint planning, training, and building teamwork. The majority of PACOM after-action reports from JTF commanders highlighted a need for permanent sister-service liaison officers to complement the infusion of joint personnel they receive during crisis augmentation.[113] Joint Publication 5-00.2 states that the "Services and combatant commands should ensure qualified personnel are nominated to fill JTF augmentation billets."[114] In ad hoc JTF HQs, the quality of the liaison officer is not the only problem, often it is a question of timing. Getting a quality joint-service liaison officer after the crisis action planning has started and the team has formed is not conducive to team building.
a) SJTF HQs - Provides permanent joint-service representation.
b) EUCOM JTF HQs Model - Provides the best alternative to permanent joint-service representation. EUCOM's joint plugs, core, and supplemental billet personnel are identified and train with their respective JTF HQs throughout the year. In many cases, these personnel have more joint experience than average SJTF HQs personnel. EUCOMs joint plug, core, and supplemental billet personnel are the CINC's best and brightest personnel and have specific, hands-on joint experience.[115]
4) Lack of Quality Joint Training. On paper, most CINCs have credible training programs. A few of the designated JTF HQs are receiving quality joint-service liaison officers for training and exercises; however, this is not consistent throughout all of the unified commands.[116] CINCs must ensure that individual augmentees and the personnel making up plugs are of the highest caliber and the appropriate rank. Additionally, the CINC must ensure that the augmentees and plug members involved in training are the same ones that go to war. Links between billet-holders and their counterparts build teamwork that cannot be developed if stand-ins are used in training. a) SJTF HQs - Provides year round quality joint training.
b) EUCOM JTF HQs Model - The CINC's joint training programs have improved exponentially over the past five years and would be very close to or on par with the joint training a SJTF HQs would receive.[117] Plugs are constantly training and conducting exercises with their designated JTF HQs. The same plug personnel that train are the same ones that will go to war with the JTF HQs.
5) "Domino" Effect. Standing up a JTF HQ from a pre-existing headquarters creates a void in the service HQs sourcing the JTF HQs. Usually, a subordinate command has to fill this void. For example, if a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Command Element (CE) becomes a JTF HQs, then one of the MEF's subordinate commanders would have to take its place (e.g., Division Commanding General and staff have move up to fill the now vacant MEF CE and staff).
a) SJTF HQs - The SJTF HQs eliminates the "domino" effect. If SJTF HQs becomes a reality, their billets would be part of the Joint Duty Assignment List and the personnel would be sourced by the four respective services.
b) EUCOM JTF HQs Model - It lessens but does not eliminate the "domino" effect. The CINCs provide joint plugs, DJTFACs, and core billets that mostly come from the CINC's own staff. This in turn reduces the number of billets that subordinate commanders have to fill; however, it still does not eliminate the domino effect. For example, if II MEF is part of a JTF that is headed by the Marine SJTF HQs, II MEF CE will require augmentation from one of its major subordinate commands to completely man the II MEF CE.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In conclusion, this paper established that there are many problems associated with the ad hoc JTF HQs (e.g., single-service dominated, set up for a single mission or crisis, dual-hatted commanders, lack of joint service liaison officers, and once the mission is accomplished, the JTF HQs is disbanded). Currently, there are two approaches taken to resolve the deficiencies of the ad JTF HQs. First, unified CINCs designated service component headquarters as future JTF HQs and designated some of their CINC staff and service component command personnel to fill future JTF HQs (EUCOM JTF HQs model). Currently, all of the unified CINCs use a variation of EUCOM's JTF HQs model. In the second approach, a CINC establishes a SJTF HQs that is permanently manned by joint personnel (SJTF HQs concept). To date, none of the CINCs have established SJTF HQs. To determine which approach is the best, this paper examined legislation, how JTFs are organized, how JTF HQs have evolved, four approaches to forming and training JTF HQs, and finally, a comparative analysis of the two approaches.
When viewed through the lense of joint doctrine, command and control, interoperability, and teamwork, the SJTF HQs with its permanent joint nucleus staff is the preferable choice. The SJTF HQs improves our warfighting capabilities while reducing most of the deficiencies associated with the ad hoc JTF HQs. The SJTF HQs is in harmony with the tenets of jointness and the first step toward Admiral Owens' Standing Joint Command concept.
In order to create SJTF HQs in each of the unified CINCs, the following steps must be taken: first, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must develop consensus amongst the unified CINCs that the SJTF HQs is the option that best serves America's needs (warfighting and operations other than war); and second, the Secretary of Defense must convince the Service Chiefs that the SJTF HQs is in their respective service's best interests. After the CINCs and the Service Chiefs are on board with the SJTF HQs, then the SJTF HQs billets must be placed on the JDAL and immediately filled. Simultaneously, all SJTF HQs must be supplied with the appropriate command and control equipment and joint doctrine must be formalized and published that provides SJTF HQs guidelines and procedures. Once the SJTF HQs are manned and equipped, the CINCs must up the ante in regards to JTF HQs training -- concentrating on increased speed, efficiency, and command and control.
With few exceptions, ad hoc JTF HQs of the past successfully completed their missions. However, even though the ultimate results were successful for the JTF, the ad hoc nature of the JTF HQs prevented the CJTF from effectively uitlizing all the joint resources available to him. Ad hoc JTF HQs forces the CJTF to play catch up when time, efficiency, cohesion, and synergy are critical -- during crisis action planning. Due to time constraints, the CJTF of an ad hoc JTF is unaware, forgets, or chooses to ignore all of the joint capabilities and assets that are available to him. Future JTF HQs scenarios will not resemble DESERT SHIELD or STORM -- with its long lead time between establishment of the JTF HQs and combat. Future JTF HQs will be established and deployed within days. Accordingly, DoD needs to establish JTF HQs that can take advantage joint capabilities and resources of the best military in the world. The EUCOM JTF HQs model is a tremendous improvement over the ad hoc JTF HQs of the past. The EUCOM JTF HQs model is half way between the specialization of the past (ad hoc) and the synergistic goal of the future. By establishing SJTF HQs throughout the unified CINCs, we can take that next step to reach that synergistic goal.
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