Military

SHOULD MSSGS BE "VICTOR" MCC/UNITS?

            One of the many problems facing the Force Service Support Groups is staffing the MEU Service Support Groups. No matter how hard the manpower personnel try, it seems that each time it is time for another MSSG to deploy, friction occurs in trying to man them at T/O strength with the right MOSs and grade mixes of Marines. However, if you look across the base to the Marine Division, it seems as they are not having the same problems manning their infantry battalions that the Force Service Support Groups are having. After some research, it has become clear that this is because the infantry battalions are "victor" coded units. Accordingly, research has been accomplished to see what was the possibility of establishing "victor" coded MSSGs. In doing this research, numerous arguments for both sides on this issue surfaced. However, this paper will show how similar "victor" coding would benefit the MSSGs, the FSSGs, the Marine Corps and the individual Marine or officer. An assessment will provide the current manner in which the MSSGs are staffed, the proposal that MSSGs be "victor" coded, and the pros and cons for each side of the issue. Additionally, some of the effects on the various units will be provided. In the final analysis, a conclusion will be reached that "victor" coding the MSSGs is in the best interest of all concerned.

            To begin with, a little background on the MSSGs is necessary. All three MEFs deploy MEUs in primarily the same fashion.  The West Coast units, however, will be used as examples. To understand this issue, it is best to review the onset of MEUs. The precursor to the MEU was the Marine Amphibious Unit or MAU. 11th MAU was

formed at Camp Pendleton, California on April 13, 1979...created to plan and participate in large-scale amphibious training exercises. In these early days, the unit also fulfilled requirements for a MAU to respond to contingencies, but was activated and deactivated based largely upon scheduled amphibious landing exercises directed by the Commander, Third Fleet. During this time, the billet of MAU Commanding Officer alternated between Regimental and Aircraft Group Commanders who filled the billet in six-month increments as a secondary duty during their tenure in command. In 1983...the decision was made to "source" the continuously deployed Western Pacific (WESTPAC) MAU's from I Marine Amphibious Force units in southern California vice from 1st Marine Brigade in Hawaii. In February 1988, the Marine Corps more clearly defined the multiple capability of its Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. "Amphibious" was changed to "Expeditionary..." It is composed of approximately 2200 Marines and Sailors, of which about 220 of those comprise the MSSG. The MSSG's mission is to provide Combat support, specifically: supply; maintenance; transportation; explosive ordnance disposal, military police; disbursing (pay services); water production and distribution; engineering; medical and dental services; fuel storage and distribution; and other services to the deployed MEU...It has a wide range of capabilities, with each Marine and Sailor contributing his own specialized skill to ensure that the personnel and equipment of the combat arms are ready for, and sustained during, combat or contingency operations[emphasis added].^[1]

            Making an MSSG a "victor" unit means that HQMC will assign personnel to the MSSGs as they do with the Division using the PREPAS system. Under this system, the units preparing to deploy with the MEUs are required to be staffed at 100% of personnel requirements at 180 days before deployment. Headquarters, Marine Corps is responsible for ensuring that the Marines are ordered into those units. This system is designed "to increase cohesion in the long term and greatly reduce turbulence within the deployment lock-on period."^[2]

            After discussion with a cross-section of other Marine officers, a variety of views emerged. To begin with, one of the arguments against this proposal is that the MSSG commanders and the battalion commanders who provide the Marines would not be able to pick and choose which Marines go on the deployment. Currently, a battalion is tasked by the G-1, FSSG to provide a Marine for a specific billet in the MSSG by rank and MOS. The Marine then goes to the MSSG and is screened by MSSG personnel, and in some cases, the MSSG Commander. If the Marine does not meet the MSSG Commander's requirements based upon service record book or personal interview, then the Marine is returned to the parent unit, who then has to provide another Marine to go through the same procedure. Sometimes this can get a little difficult. This is where the problems occur.

            The Marine Corps has established deployment criteria and created a "deployment checklist" that is normally used by units preparing to deploy. The FSSG battalions utilize the same checklist when they screen Marines for assignment to the MSSG. The problems occur when the MSSG commander might decide based upon something in the record book or personal interview that the Marine is not suitable for deployment, even though the parent battalion commander felt the Marine had satisfied the checklist. By making the MSSGs victor units, this process would be streamlined. HQMC would have the T/O for the MSSG and assign a Marine to that T/O line number based upon the rank and MOS required. If the MSSG commander did not feel that the Marine was deployable, then he would go through the procedures to have the Marine processed for discharge for the appropriate reasons and or work with HQMC on getting a replacement for that Marine. The argument against this proposal can be summed up by Colonel Rick L. Kelly, currently the Executive Assistant for the Installation and Logistics Department, HQMC, who commanded both 1st Landing Support Battalion, and 1st Supply Battalion and was the G-3, 1st FSSG on two separate occasions. Colonel Kelly said, "I feel that the commanders would lose their flexibility"^[3] Colonel Kelly's argument is that by doing this, the commanders on either end are not able to screen the candidates for the MSSGs as well as they would like to do. It would prevent the MSSG commanders from picking their team of the finest Marines for that "tip of the spear" deployment.

            There are examples of both the battalion commanders and the MSSG commanders detracting from this procedure. Most of the time battalion commanders ensure they send the "right" Marine to fill the billet--that the Marine has no personal or professional problems that would prevent him from deploying. Sometimes, however, battalion commanders do not do quite as good a job at screening their candidates, and a Marine who is non-deployable is assigned.

            Additionally, MSSG commanders normally screen the candidates as they check-in at the MSSG and accept the Marines sent by the Battalions. However, there are times when the MSSG commander does not accept a Marine for a variety of reasons, even though the battalion commander feels that the Marine is a good candidate. By making the MSSGs "victor" units, neither commanders would be involved in detailed screening. Granted, the MSSG commander would do their deployment screening, but would not be able to send Marines back to HQMC if for some reason the Marine did not meet the commander's criteria. There have been occasions when Marines sent to MSSGs were returned just because they stated that they did not want to deploy. Another case exists where a Marine had NJP while assigned to the MSSG and the commander just did not feel that he could deploy him. There were other cases where the Sergeant Major did not think the Marine would make it. If HQMC were to do the assigning, the MSSG commanders would not have this kind of latitude.

            Another argument against making the MSSGs victor units comes from Major Ted Devlin, G-1, 1st FSSG. He states,

If converted to victor MCC's, we, the FSSG lose control of the structure (T/O). Therefore, anytime we want to change the composition of an MSSG, whether it be increases, decreases, or grade/MOS mixes, we would have only two options: either submit a formal T/O change(take forever), or revert back to what we do now, add additional notional structure. Another disadvantage to VMCCs is that if we did have a reduction, the structure savings would be distributed throughout the Marine Corps, not just the FSSG...[it]takes the flexibility away from the commander to task organize CSS for a given MEU deployment. For example 13th MEU is considering taking tanks on their next deployment. East Coast already has. This will require additional tank mechs, optics repairmen, etc. If we had to do a formal TOCR, it would not be responsive enough, and we would end up bastardizing the system anyway.^[4]

            Major Devlin went on to state that in his discussions with Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department, HQMC, the personnel working there think that making the MSSG "victor" coded units would be in the "too hard" category by being too difficult to manage the assignment of so many diverse low density MOSs. However, having said that, Major Devlin also recognizes advantages in making the MSSG victor units, especially from a G-1 perspective. He says

 the benefits would be continuity in assignments, especially for officers. [It] would increase the possibility of officers making two deployments, rather than the common practice of one. [It] puts the onus of responsibility on HQMC to have manning levels attained at E-270 and E-180. [It] eliminates the necessity of negotiation between the G-1 and providing organizations. [It] creates greater visibility of stabilization by monitors [and] reduces personnel switches before deployment.^[5]

            This last statement is one that plays a large role in this issue, primarily with the officers. There have been many occasions where the monitors received requirements for "hot fills" that required a Marine officer to move on short notice to a high visibility position. Since the infantry battalions were "victor" units, they were untouchable. However, that leaves the MSSG. There were several occasions where officers were pulled out of an MSSG just before its deployment to fill one of these "hot fill" positions. This also happened with SNCOs for Inspector and Instructor Staff billets. Additionally, the enlisted Marines on the MSSG were not excluded from recruiter screening like their division counterparts. The "victor" coded Marines were not screened until they had made their two deployments with their unit. There were cases where a MSSG Marine had made one deployment and was screened and transferred to recruiting duty without making a second deployment and establishing an overseas control date.  

            The remaining battalions within the FSSG are busy trying to accomplish their daily mission as well as any other "pop ups" that might happen to come along. There are constant disruptions in unit integrity by personnel being pulled out of units to deploy on MSSGs. Considering the fact that there are always three MSSGs fully manned always, the other battalions are constantly getting tasked to provide personnel for replacements.

Another way to look at this picture comes from Colonel (select) John L. Sweeney who is currently on the staff at the Naval Command and Staff College and was the Commanding Officer of 7th Engineer Support Battalion. He feels that by making the MSSG victor units, you "reduce the turbulence in the battalions...locks in specific MOS, into specific billets."^[6]    

            Another argument against making MSSG "victor" units discusses again the commander is loss of flexibility in putting together his team for deployment. Lieutenant Colonel Richard M. Nixon, who is currently at the Installation and Logistics Department, HQMC and was the Commanding Officer of MSSG-11, feels that the MSSG's should not be "victor" coded after once believing that they should be. His reasons for changing his mind are:

You wind up with whomever HQMC sends you for the tour. You fail to cross-pollinate the FSSG with Marines that have deployed on Amphibs, thus reducing your knowledge base. The Marines you get can have any capability base vice being top quality. You can get brand new 2d lieutenants with no fleet experience to be the "duty" expert in the MSSG.   You can get a brand new lance corporal from school to fill a billet that is one deep and you need the experience.^[7]

            Lieutenant Colonel John Valentin, USMC, currently a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and previously the Commanding Officer, 7th Motor Transport Battalion has another recommendation. Lieutenant Colonel Valentin thinks that the key billets of the staff should be "victor coded" and filled by graduates of professional military education institutions. This would assist in ensuring that the MSSGs get top notch officers. He feels that

the answer to the vexing problem of MSSG manning should be that ...HQMC should identify students in the Intermediate Level School (ILS) and Career Level School (CLS) pipelines and vector these highly qualified officers directly to the MSSGs...The graduates of the Marine Corps' professional military education programs are arguably better suited for and served by an opportunity to forward deploy with MSSGs as they would fulfill their own personal overseas requirements and provide critically needed continuity to the MSSGs.^[8]

 The continuity issue here is that officers will be returning to the fleet after a year away at school. Under current manpower guidelines, that officer will normally do at least two if not three years in the FSSG, assisting in the stabilization of the MSSGs.

            The rationale for each of these arguments is readily apparent. Each one of them is a valid argument. To begin with, it is a great asset for commanders to have the flexibility of putting together their "team" for deployment. However, in the current environment of reduced manpower, reduced budgets, and learning how to work smarter, not harder, MSSG commanders cannot afford to hand pick this "team." Commanders of deploying infantry battalions would love to hand pick their "team" for deployment. However, they do not have the luxury due to personnel restraints. At times, they are happy just to fill the holes in the organization. Even though the mission that is assigned to the MSSG is a little different from an infantry battalion, the infantry battalion commander would assuredly argue that it is just as important, if not more, for him to have the cream of the crop.

            Having the "cream of the crop" does not always solve all the problems. Additionally, are not all Marines the "cream of the crop" just by the fact that they are Marines? If a Marine is non-deployable, there are provisions in the personnel regulations to process that Marine for separation. The Marine Corps has taken this "kinder, gentler" Marine Corps concept out of text and it has gone too far to the left. Just because a Sergeant Major does not think a Marine "will make deployment" is not a sound reason for a Marine not to go on deployment. If the Marine cannot deploy and it is not a problem that is going to resolved in the near future, then maybe it is time he or she sought employment elsewhere. The standards should be the same as they are for humanitarian transfers. The Marine Corps provides for personal problems, but gives the Marine an allotted time to resolve the problem. If the Marine cannot resolve the problem in the given time, then the Marine is advised to put in for a hardship discharge. There are few spouses who truly look forward to their Marine deploying for six months. Therefore, if Marines say they cannot deploy because their spouse does not want them to, they need to seek employment elsewhere.

            There is also some misconception about the loss of flexibility of the MSSG commanders. A lot of that depends upon what is meant by flexibility in this regard. If the MSSGs are made into victor units, the MSSG commander arguably loses the flexibility of "rejecting" one of these "non-deployable" Marines. However, it will hold Marines' feet to the fire by requiring them to put in for a hardship discharge for personal reasons. The infantry battalion is faced with these same problems. The flexibility remains in the fact that an MSSG commander will still be allowed to process these Marines, just as the infantry battalion does, when it finds Marines unfit for deployment.

            In reality, the MSSG commanders will be given more flexibility in that by "victor" coding the units, they will have a "team" that has worked together for at least six months and not have to worry about one of their "team" being transferred out to go to an Inspector and Instructor Staff, recruiting duty, or other "higher staffed" unit. This stabilization process will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the unit.    Additionally, each and every Marine will initially check into the FSSG, allowing the Commanding General the flexibility of owning all of the Marines in the Group, thus giving him the flexibility of assigning that Marine to a unit that might need that Marine on a higher calling than what HQMC initially thought necessary. This is not in line with the PREPAS system, but it could be applied on a case by case basis. These types of reassignments would be on an extremely limited basis and only for emergency requirements within the FSSG. This would give the MSSG commanders the needed continuity and flexibility by allowing them to keep their team and organize it as they see fit to accomplish their assigned mission.

            On the numbers side of this equation, the FSSG would benefit greatly. In the summer of 1996, HQMC was staffing the FSSG at approximately 80 percent. The FSSG then had to staff the MSSG's at 100%. By making the MSSGs victor units, the staffing goal in the FSSG would increase overall. The FSSG's T/O of 400 3521's, Motor Transport Mechanics, serves as an example. At 80 percent staffing, the FSSG would rate 320 Marines with the MOS 3521, of which about 30 would be in MSSGs. If the MSSGs were victor units, the FSSG would rate 370 by T/O, with the 30 taken out for the MSSGs. Their staffing goal would be 296 Marines, while the MSSGs would be 30, bringing the total to 326 Marines. Granted, this is not a large gain, but relatively small differences in low density MOSs can be significant. The same can be said on the officer side. For example, if the FSSG rates 400 Officers, apply the same math as before and the FSSG ends up with six more officers. This could be six more company commanders.

            From the MSSG's perspective, granted, they might arguably lose their team building, but this method of manning them as "victor" units would create a better "team." The team would predominantly be together for at least eighteen months and some even longer. This would create a more cohesive unit for training and deployment purposes. The infantry battalions have seen a change since they went to the PREPAS method of assigning Marines into the FMF. Their units are tighter, train better, and have less turbulence as they prepare to deploy. Granted, they might not have the "cream of the crop," but they have Marines, and are not all Marines the "cream of the crop?"

            Since the Marine Corps is in a position where it can pick and choose its force of Marines, there is no reason for commands to retain Marines who cannot deploy. There are too many other Marines out there who can deploy and are willing and able to.   As the Services continue to "draw down" and do more with less, the Marines with deployment problems should really find other employment. Deployments will most likely increase as will a Marine's time on deployment. If you add in the fact that you have Marines that cannot deploy and another Marine has to deploy in that Marine's place, then the Marine that can deploy is on deployment a very long time. Just because a Marine might have a personal problem, does not make him or her non-deployable. This is why we have officers and staff and non-commissioned officers to help Marines overcome their problems. If we continue to carry these Marines and do not hold their feet to the fire, we are only perpetuating the problem. The system of allowing MSSG commanders to "pick" their team reinforces this issue.

            The issue of having the "best" Marines for the MSSG is good for a perfect world. However, considering that the MSSG only supports the MEU, while the remainder of the FSSG supports the remainder of the MEF, where do the priorities lie? Do you take away from the battalions that stay CONUS and support the remainder of the MEF just to ensure that one MEU has the best and brightest support. A better solution is a compromise. The MSSGs get a Marine that should be able to do the job. It is a happy medium. MSSGs need quality personnel, but then, they cannot have all the best Marines from each MOS. That is just not an equitable solution for the remainder of the MEF's support requirements. This is why a balance of effectiveness is achieved by making the MSSGs victor units. Some of the Marines that are assigned to the "victor" code will be the best in their field, while others might not be as experienced. However, with sound leadership, guidance and training programs, these "less-experienced" Marines will be allowed to get up to speed. It is not as if they will be joining the ship the day before deployment. They will be in place 180 days out; that is six months of training and working together that should be adequate to put together a great team for deployment that will continue to develop. If the MSSG cannot do this, what are they saying about the infantry battalion? The infantry battalions get Marines right out of initial infantry training and other basic MOSs that are inexperienced, yet they rely on the rest of the unit to bring those new Marines up to speed.

            Additionally, Marines in the combat arms fields go out on independent duty at normally a higher rate than the support MOSs. This is due to the decrease in requirements in the numbers of Marines in these MOS as the Marines get more senior. Accordingly, there are more of them available for the Marine Corps to send out on independent duty. They must subsequently return to the infantry battalion when they have completed their independent and special duty tours. The infantry battalions appear to accommodate and adapt for these changes. Why should the CSS element be any different? Are we saying that it's quality requirements are any better than the infantry battalion and thus require different rules and special treatment? There are many infantry battalion commanders who would justifiably argue that point.

            The existing process for staffing the MSSGs has been great for the past. However, in this era of reduced budgets and personnel, the Corps cannot afford this type of luxury. The MSSGs should become victor units for the best overall benefit to the Marine Corps, the FSSG and the MSSGs. The only party who feels that they lose out in this deal is the MSSG commander. However, the Marines gain in that there is no nepotism in getting a Marine on an MSSG. If the MSSGs are "victor" coded, the Marines get stabilized and are allowed to make two deployments and get an overseas control date. Too many times in the past, Marines spent time in a battalion, got assigned to the MSSG, made one deployment, and then got orders out of the FSSG, and often to an unaccompanied overseas tour. In other words, in a four year enlistment, a Marine might spend 18 months deployed vice the average Marine only spending 12 months.    If we make the MSSGs victor units, this problem will go away.

            Granted, making the MSSG "victor" units will cause some growing pains, just as it did in the division back in the 1980s, but they are feeling the benefits as we speak. Marines do not like change. They are such creatures of tradition, but sometimes need to see beyond the aversion to change for the sake of what is best for most. In this case, making the MSSGs victor units is what is best for the Corps, the FSSG, the MSSGs and the individual Marine. It is time MSSG commanders got over our own personal wishes and do what is right, even though it might be painful. If the Marine Corps starts now, the changes would probably be seen within about 12 months. It takes about that long for a personnel process to take place when you account for attrition and those already in the pipeline. Let us do the right thing and now.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ballard, John R. Captain, USMC, "Winning the Infantry Manpower Battle," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1989, pp 54-58.

Brooks, Michael A. Colonel, USMC, G-1, 1stMarDiv, e-mail of 23 December 1996.

Devlin, Ted E. Major, USMC, G-1, 1st FSSG, e-mails of 12 December 1996 and 30 January 1997.

Forrester, Michael, Captain, USMC, "PREPAS as a Manpower Management Tool," Marine Corps Gazette, October 1984.

Kelly, Rick L., Colonel, USMC, I & L, HQMC interview of 31 January 1997.

Nixon, Richard M., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, LPO, Headquarters, Marine Corps, e-mail of 16 December 1996.

Sweeney, John L., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Staff, Naval Command and Staff College, Newport, Rhode Island e-mail of 19 December 1996.

Undeland, David K. Capt, USMC "Get Rid of the MEU?" Marine Corps Gazette, June 1988, pp20 - 22.

Valentine, John, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, comments given in written form of January 1997.

Internet:http://www.usmc.mil/baseguid/11meu.htm