Gcc Air Forces And The Future Challenge
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Aviation
Author: LtCol Mahdi O.A. Al-Jumah
INTRODUCTION
The geographic location of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in the Arabian peninsula was a meeting point from the civilization of the old world. The GCC countries eventful history was marked by strands and sacrifices to safeguard territory and tradition, despite all obstacles and difficulties. A long, hot, dry, humid climate with dust storms and little rain makes the weather harsh for living conditions. The GCC countries earned their living from the sea diving for pearls, building wooden ships and trading with the other countries nearby in Asia and Africa.
Through patience, perseverance and struggle, when oil was discovered, a new era began. The oil industry was developed, the resources were used to tame the desert through construction and the planting of greenery. The oil resources were used for the good of the GCC countries and other people in developing countries around the globe.
GEOGRAPHICAL HISTORY & BACKGROUND
The Arabian peninsula is located southwest of Asia and consists of the Arabian Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. It's one million square miles (2,564,000 square kilometers), or the equivalent of one-third the size of the United States. The Arabian peninsula is located between West Africa and Iran to the southwest of the levant and to the southwest of the southern most part of the former Soviet Union. It is also near the rim of 44Indian Ocean states, which together have about one-third of the world's population.
A vertical mountain range splits the peninsula on its far western side, with a gradual slope to the Arabian Gulf on the east and a greater drop on the western side of the range to the Red Sea and in the south, at Bab al-Mandab. The remaining area of the peninsula particularly in the north and east consists primarily of desert. For this reason, greater population concentrations have been evident historically in the southwestern parts of the peninsula where water sources are more abundant. Water bodies create natural boundaries in all but the northern part of the peninsula. Western Arabia is defined by a coast of some 1,300 miles with the Red Sea extending from the mouth of the Gulf of Aqba to Bab Al-Mandab and the Gulf of Aden separating Arabia from Africa. To the east, the Gulf, 560 miles in length from the mouth of the Euphrates to the Strait of Hormuz, separates the peninsula from Asia. The southern peninsula has a coastline of 1,250 miles with the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Because of these natural water barriers, the collective area of the Arabian Gulf States has boundaries with only four states, Iraq and Jordan in the north and the Yemens in the south. The limited northern land access and the highly arid nature of the region served to partially insulate the peninsula in past centuries from the full brunt of foreign interference until itsinfluence was extended by the dominant sea and land forces of European powers.[1]
The strategic position of the Gulf, which has constituted a vital trade and communication link between Europe, Africa and Asia, has made the littoral a key target for centuries of designs, attacks, invasions and occupations by foreign actors. In fact, the Gulf has withstood ancient campaigns from Persia and Greece, a century of a Portuguese "iron curtain," another 170 years of Pax Britannia, and intermittent claims and attacks on the Arab Gulf territories by other regional states. This was followed in light by potential actions by the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Germany to realize their territorial designs on the Gulf during the second half of the 19th century. Britain gradually increased its involvement to the protection of politics within its sphere of influence. The process of formalizing British standing in the region though a network of treaties or exclusive agreements began with an agreement with Bahrain in 1861, Qatar in 1869, Oman in 1891 and Kuwait in 1899.
Until the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Empire emerged as the principal threat to British interests in the region. Competition between the two policies for control over the Gulf centered on Kuwait, the envisioned terminus for the proposed Berlin-Constantinople-Baghdad railway system ending in Kuwait. This would have allowed the Ottomans to more effectively project British military force in the area in 1902.[2]
With the discovery of large oil reserves in the 20th century, the Gulf region suddenly held strategic and economic importance to the Western nations who were becoming increasingly dependent on the supply of oil to fuel their high technology equipment and economies. This conferred upon the Gulf an unprecedented geostrategic importance that figures prominently in the current defense and security consideration of diverse entities both at regional and international levels. The Gulf, therefore, evolved into an area of increased competition as well as a potential theater of confrontation, between the superpowers. For these reasons, there was an acute awareness throughout the Arab Gulf states of the need for independence, stability and security in the region. This consideration was a principal component in the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
THE FORMATION OF THE GCC AND ITS OBJECTIVE
A few months after the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, the six regional Arabian Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E., and Oman formed the GCC. The stated purpose was coordination, integration and cooperation among the member states in all fields, economically, socially, and politically. It's main purpose was the creation of a defensive military alliance.[3]
The GCC countries feared, at that time, a decisive Iranian military victory over Iraq would fuel the drive of the revolutionary government of Iran to spread its Islamic revolution into their region. Concurrently, the GCC states acceleratedtheir determination to construct a collective self-defense system without the direct involvement of foreign powers, for both political and practical reasons. The military goals of the GCC are standardization of equipment, coordination of training, integration of forces, and joint planning.
POLITICAL SYSTEMS
The GCC is the framework of the political systems of the Gulf states. The newly emergent governmental structures of six Arab Gulf states evolved from the Arab tribalism that has existed in the region for centuries, despite persistent foreign occupation and influence. They represent, in general, a continuum of previous and long-established governing systems. These systems are all vertically based on traditional authority structures, led by ruling families and influenced heavily by Islamic principles and practices. Ruling systems continually involve other segments of the population directly into the government. GCC states have shown considerable ability to adapt to changing political and economic circumstances. These governments share a number of perceptions regarding foreign policy issues, including an ideological opposition to communism, adherence to free market principles and practices, and a desire to remove the region from foreign designs and potential conflict. In conventional Western political terms, it's difficult to classify the governmental systems of the Arab Gulf states. Despite the apparent contractions, the political systems of the Arab Gulf states are most accurately described as traditionalmonarchies. With the exception of the UAE, the Arab Gulf governments are each led by a single extended family or clan, which is an intricate process of consultation and alliances appointed by an emir to serve as ruler. The UAE consists of a federation of seven sheikhdoms that individually have similar political systems and ruling families through the country and rules by a president appointed among the sheikhdoms through yet another process of consultation and alliance-building.
Islam constitutes the fulcrum of political activity in the Gulf states and is likewise essential to the political legitimacy of the governmental systems. To varying but substantial extent, the tenents of Islam, the Koran, and Sharia represent the formal basis of governance and the judicial systems of each Arab Gulf state.
Since the Arab Gulf states gained their formal independence, however, certain efforts have been made to institutionalize procedures and consultative bodies in government structures to make them similar to Western political systems. Formal constitutions were promulgated in Kuwait in 1967, Bahrain in 1973, UAE in 1971, and Qatar in 1975 formed a provisional constitution.[4] Kuwait, in the final analysis is the only Arab Gulf state that has an enduring and active national assembly.
MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE GCC
During the decade after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, all GCC members set out to strengthen their armed forces by converting to the most modern weapons they could obtain andassimilate. But the limited reaction of the GCC to the August 2 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait exposed its weakness when faced with direct aggression against a member of the alliance by a much stronger power. The GCC immediately condemned the Iraqi action but was unable to take any action to back up the condemnation because they did not have the military capability to counteract the huge Iraqi forces.
At the conclusion of the war on March 3, 1991, the six members of the GCC along with Syria and Egypt met in Damascus to agree on the establishment of a permanent security force to protect Kuwait and the other members against future aggression. Syria and Egypt were to contribute troop contingents on a reimbursable basis.[5] The Damascus Declaration soon unraveled when differences emerged over the desirability of long-term Egyptian and Syrian presence in the Gulf.
However, Egypt and Syria remain committed under the agreement to send military aid to Kuwait and the other Gulf States. With the setback of the Damascus Declaration of 1993, each state had the latest and most modest inventory of weaponry from the West and the East for the troops and other armament equipment.
In recognition of the great strategic importance of their air and sea defenses, and the instability caused by Iranian and Iraqi influences in the region, the Gulf states all introduced modern combat aircraft and air defense missile systems. The United States supplied the Hawk and Patriot surface air-to-airmissiles which several states now have in their inventory or on order. Combat aircraft for ground attack or air defense such as the F-15C and F-15E, F-16 and F-18, the Apache attack helicopter to help the ground forces, protect the oil facilities and drilling platforms in the Gulf.[6]
All the Gulf states have communications, control, and warning systems for the effective use of their fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles. But each air force is small, and unless integrated with others, the overall effectiveness of the GCC in air defense is marginal in spite of the attention the problem has received. There is no common network linking all air defense squadrons and SAMS to the Saudi Arabian air defense system and to the Saudi airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Technical difficulties, including the
incompatibility of national communication systems and the reluctance to turn control of national air defense over to a unified command structure, account for this weakness.
KUWAIT AND GCC AIR FORCE
In 1953, Kuwait established a flying club which later became the Kuwaiti Air Force. Influenced by the RAF, and adopting the British flight training manner of teaching and flying, it remained a peacetime air force until the 1973 border clashes with Iraq.
New air bases and air defense became part of the air force with more manpower and new aircraft such as the Mirage F-1, A-4, C-130, DC-9; and the Gazelle, Puma and Super Puma helicopters. As a result of the effects of the Iran/Iraq war so near to home, the Kuwaiti Air Force began developing SOP's and ROE's and purchased a new C3 system and set air defense alerts to counter Iranian silkworm attacks. Just before the Gulf War, Kuwait purchased new F/A-18 aircraft from the United States and the Hawakraner from the United Kingdom establishing a new air defense battalion.
On August 2 at 0525, the Iraqi Air Force attacked all three bases simultaneously. Kuwaiti air defenses shot down 17 Iraqi aircraft while Kuwaiti A-4's and the Mirage F-1 shot down 20 Iraqi aircraft. On August 3, all three bases fell to Iraq and the rest of the Kuwaiti Air Force took refuge in Saudi Arabia.[7]
The GCC Air Force consists of a number of military forces from the area.
The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) was established in the 1950's. It is the largest air force in the Gulf region. The troops are well-trained and use modernized equipment which was purchased beginning in the 1980's from the West. Its members are combat experienced having fought in the 1960's in the Yemen crisis, in the 1980's in the Iran and Iraq War, and in the 1990's during Desert Storm.
The Royal Air Force of Oman was formed in 1957 with assistance from the United Kingdom. The force is comprised of two squadrons of Jaquars and five squadrons of various transport aircraft. After restructuring their force, they are considered to be highly effective and well prepared for battle. However, incases where a prolonged campaign is probable, allies are required for success.
The Qatar Emirate Air Force was organized into United Kingdom and French type squadrons having received aircraft from both countries. As a result of the invasion of Kuwait and Desert Storm, the government has focused on building additional air bases and purchasing a number of the French Mirage 2000-5 aircraft. The Qatar Air Force possesses a well balanced helicopter force but they lack transport aircraft which the other countries possess.
Bahrain Amir Air Force began in 1976 as a Defense Force which later evolved into a small and well-equipped unit. In 1985 they purchased eight U.S. F-5's and in 1990 added eight F-16C's. They subsequently built Sulman Air Base to support the aircraft. This small country is capable only of a 24-hour defensive, giving the other GCC members time to assist. They are dependent on the U.S. and GCC for funding of any future expansion.
The United Arab Emirates Air Force consists of the air forces of the seven Emirates, with Abu Dhabi and Dubai having the largest forces. In 1976 they formally merged into one force, but continue to maintain some individual procurement, organizational and non-operational training policies. They experience some integration problems, but are capable of defense until GCC allies arrive.
GCC COUNTRIES AND U.S. POST WAR
GCC and Kuwait post war foreign policy is based on two assumptions: the first is that the GCC countries and Kuwaiti security is threatened, notably from Iraq (Kuwait) and Iran (UAE); the second is that security ultimately can be guaranteed only by the United States. It is clear that Kuwait or another state alone, or even Kuwait with the support of the Gulf Cooperation Council and other Arab members of the Coalition (Damascus Declaration, Egypt and Syria) cannot provide for its own defense needs.
The GCC has recently demonstrated a willingness to seek U.S. help in the pursuit of common objectives. Discussion of policy options led to the conclusion that it is in the interest of the United States to remain actively engaged in stability issues of the Gulf, and to specifically increase the overt level of support to the GCC. Recommendations were made concerning the appropriate mix of U.S. and Gulf Arab state military forces.
In September 1991, Kuwait and the United States signed a formal ten-year defense agreement. It permits the U.S. to pre-position weapons and conduct military exercises in Kuwait. In 1992, U.A.E., Bahrain, and Qatar also signed defense agreements with the United States.[8]
In 1992, Kuwaiti and United States forces carried out joint exercises under the defense agreement. Kuwait backed up its formal security arrangements with close political and economic relationships with the United States. It has given much of itspostwar reconstruction business to United States firms including civil reconstruction contracts that have been awarded through the United States Army Corps of Engineers and many contractors directly related to meeting defense needs.
HOW KUWAIT & GCC PLAY A PART IN THE FUTURE OF
AIR FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Before Kuwait and GCC countries play a role in the future of air force in the Middle East, they need teamwork and standardization of all operations, regulations, training, doctrine, terms of reference and organization.
The GCC should improve the infrastructure and find ways to utilize high tech equipment and develop air/land concepts to fit GCC operations and, by studying, learning, and benefitting from previous wars and conflicts, especially Desert Storm.
They should participate in mutual defense cooperation with regional friends and developing the infrastructure to facilitate the rapid reception and combat support of allied forces deployed to the region during regional crises and maintaining a joint command to coordinate and direct, single country or multi-country operations. By having a well defined operational chain of command to transmit instructions rapidly and effectively to all forces, will increase the effectiveness of the forces.[9]
APPLICATION OF AIR POWER IN THE GCC
Peacetime. The GCC will use air power to help preserve and strengthen international security when national disasters obscure the speed of response which is vital to alleviate human suffering(airlifts, food, shelter, etc.). This has proven effective in the past and will continue to be used in the future.
Crises. The unique ability to generate and project military power rapidly over long distances makes air force an ideal instrument for international crisis management. Air force has a wide variety of important crises management applications, most of which involves no recourse to violence. For example, it provides prior and timely early warning of intended aggression allowing appropriate preventative action to be taken.
The air force can send clear and unambiguous political signals and can provide timely moral and physical support for allies and friends. It can be used in international rescue to improve stability in the region threatened by civil strife, or in areas where regional conflict threatens to spill over into neighboring states. The GCC Air Force can also be used for implicit deterrence, or explicit deterrence or to face down of a potential or actual aggressor without having to resort to physical violence and a way of punishment.
War. GCC air forces have four primary roles should war break out.
1. Observation: Observing the enemy in war and provides the basis for intelligent planning and successful execution of military operations.
2. Destruction: Air force most obvious wartime application is to destroy.
3. Lethal Coercion: The ability of air force to reach deep can be used to coerce an enemy during conflict, and utilized to deny an enemy the ability to employ his air and surface and sub-surface forces effectively.
4. Diversion: Air force may be used to divert enemy forces in order to delay or destroy them and demoralize them.
PROBLEMS FACING KUWAIT AND GCC AIR FORCES
There are a lot of problems facing the GCC military, especially related to air force, which is their most important concern. The problems affect the culture and the leadership, technology, absorption, managerial and administrative skill levels, military modernization over time, combat readiness and operational capability, weapons utilization, coordination between forces, training and education, social factors and lack of mission definition.
The number one problem facing GCC countries is manpower because of its population size, recruiting standards, retention in relationship to incompetence, promotion criteria (merit, capability, knowledge, loyalty, dedication, work ethic, etc), education, social class, discrimination, wide gap recruiting between enlisted, NCO and officers.
The second is organization and its duplication of the army organization. A bureaucratically organized structure reduces the military effectiveness. Definition of the role of the air force needs clear-cut guidelines (prestige/air shows), moral image of the military, no deterrence and lack of mission definition.
Training involves language, science and math. It searches for quality versus quantity. There is also a prejudiced approach towards on-the-job-training (OJT).
Operations requires coordination between the services, clear Rules of Engagement (ROE), command, control, and communication (C3), electronic warfare (EW), tactics, night and for all weather operations. The operations training must also include different and/or changing situations.
Because of this, GCC countries must also utilize high technology advanced weapon systems. They must be able to educate their troops to maintain and service the systems independently.
FUTURE CHALLENGES OF THE GCC AIR FORCE
Threat. The capabilities of potential enemies are a major factor in shaping force structure and determining the best ways to conduct military operations. Identifying and qualifying the nature of the threat helps to ensure that air for the air force matched to its task and the required level of security is achieved at the lowest practical means.
Capabilities. A nation's military capabilities are affected by its natural resources, literacy and level of education, manpower, industrial base, level of technical advancement and percentage of GNP spent on defense.
Doctrines, Policy and Military Objectives. GCC air force should formulate coherent strategic operational doctrines and policy formulated by the governments. They should decide boththe size and direction of military effort, air force existence to support the policy.
Operation. Principles of agility, unit of command, simplicity, economy of force, initiative, and jointness all play a major role in shaping future applications of air forces in the GCC states.
Changing Geo-political Climate in which the air force must operate and the extent to which the resources of the air force might be made available among competing priorities and how can air force be a force multiplier.
SOLUTIONS
The GCC military must compete with the civilian sectors for manpower possessing the necessary skills and talents to function in a highly technical world. The concentration of technology often obscures the fundamental importance of people power. The administrative and management arrangements must be designed to give the commanders the maximum freedom of action in executing the plan. A high operational readiness rate, should be the measure of success not air shows.
The GCC air forces must decentralize decision making since the effect will positively reflect on the overall success of operations of the air force. GCC air forces should work on national military cooperation. It is necessary to attain concentration of force with the economy of effort in pursuance of the objective. Otherwise, objectives will not be reached and success cannot be guaranteed.
Goodwill and the desire to cooperate are essential at all levels, not only interservice, but intraservice as well. Education plays a fundamental role. The relation between modernization and military effectiveness cannot be understood unless special considerations are given to the following: literacy, female labor force participation, mental and physical characteristics of troops, military leadership, management and administrative hierarchies, and the qualities of leadership.
CONCLUSIONS
A fundamental constrain for all the Gulf states has been the limited pool of qualified manpower and in most countries, the problem is the same, of attracting recruits when better employment opportunities exist in the civilian sector.
The emphasis on advanced weaponry is part of an effort to minimize the need for personnel, as stated by a senior Kuwaiti Officer, "the object is to obtain the best equipment technologically, easy to maintain, understand and operate - the greatest firepower for the smallest human effort."[10]
Solutions that were valid yesterday may produce a disaster tomorrow. It is essential to select an objective and define it with absolute clarity before proceeding. Success in all forms of air warfare depends on morale and organization which is based on a clear understanding of the objective, training, discipline and effective leadership.
What history offers is not lessons, not prescription or unchanging solutions, but insights, and reflections upon a widevariety of historical episodes which should at best suggest to those who will be in command tomorrow, not answers to the problems of tomorrow, but ways to identify and approach the problems of the future.
REFERENCES
1.Kuwait, Facts and Figures, Fifth Edition, published by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information.
2.Persian Gulf States, Country Studies, published by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.
3.The Arabian Peninsula, Society and Politics, edited by Derek Hopwood, Etnlory's College, Oxford.
4.The Gulf Cooperation Council, Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region, by Erik R. Peterson.
5.RAF Air Power Doctrine, AP 3006.
6.Building and Operating An Air Force in Less Developed Countries, U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College, Student Report, 1981 by Lt. Col. Saber M. Suwaidan, KAF, current Major General, Kuwaiti Air Force Commander.
