Army Digitization Master Plan '96
9. RELATED DIGITIZATION IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS
9.1 RiskManagement
The Army digitization effort involves multiple activities, systems development, and operational organizations working together to achieve digitization goals. As with any effort of this size and complexity, there are undesired events or risks which—if they occur—may prevent or impede the attainment of those goals. Prudent management requires that a process be established to identify and manage these risks. The ADO Risk Management Master Plan (RMMP) provides policy and guidance regarding risk management; describes the risk management process; defines an organizational structure to manage risk; and proposes an initial description of suggested broad risk areas perceived to exist with digitization.
Risk management is envisioned as a seamless process beginning with individual programs and projects and continuing to the highest levels of system and systems integration required by Force XXI. Individual programs and projects that are components of the overall digitization and Force XXI effort are expected to have individual risk management plans in accordance with acquisition directives. The RMMP is an overarching master plan focusing on the critical digitization risks.
The RMMP has both far and near–term focus. In the far–term, it orients on the risks associated with the implementation of the TA and the acquisition and assimilation of Information Age capabilities into Force XXI. The near–term focal point of risk management is on the development of key digitization technologies (e.g., FBCB2 software, Tactical Internet, and NTDR) and the successful demonstration of their capabilities in the AWEs.
The RMMP is a living document and will be updated by the ADO after each AWE.
9.2 Experimental Force Fielding Plan
The 4th Mechanized Infantry Division (formerly 2nd Armored Division) stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, was designated as the EXFOR. The following criteria were used in determining the recommended equipment list for the EXFOR:
Exceptions to the June 1996 deadline for fielding will be approved by the EXFOR General Officer Working Group (GOWG), chaired by TRADOC with HQDA participation.
Figure 9-1 reflects the current schedule for providing prototype or production systems to the EXFOR or supporting units. For production systems, the schedule reflects complete fielding, not just the system quantities required for experimentation.
Figure 9-1 EXFOR Fielding Summary as of 1 Feb 96
The Army will not procure an additional brigade or division set of equipment for use solely by the EXFOR. To field the most modernized systems to the EXFOR, the original FUE unit for many digital platforms has changed to 4ID(M). In some cases, 4ID(M) was not originally scheduled to receive an item of required equipment and higher priority units were displaced on the fielding schedule.
Once modernized, no unit will be de-modernized. Additionally, items requested for TF XXI that normally would not be issued to a brigade will be fielded to a divisional or corps supporting unit. FORSCOM, III Corps, and the EXFOR must task organize their assets to ensure that these units participate in appropriate AWEs.
Basis of Issue Plans (BOIPs) on approved requirements will not be violated. If additional items of equipment are required that would exceed BOIP requirements, then FORSCOM must redistribute from within existing assets.
9.3 Security
This section delineates the strategy for ensuring that acceptable information security is provided for Force XXI and all digitization actions leading to Force XXI. It does not address other facets of security (such as physical security and operational security) which are directed by other Army elements.
9.3.1 The Security Challenge
Infusion of Information Age technology into the Force XXI battlespace has increased the vulnerabilities of our information systems and created a more complex scenario for protecting the information distributed throughout that battlespace. Expansion of automation devices in weapons systems and command and control; the increased networking of those devices for improved horizontal and vertical connectivity; and the tremendous increase in supporting data communications have brought about a commensurate increase in protection requirements.
Information security risks have increased exponentially through the sheer numbers of information access devices planned for the Force XXI battlefield. Enemy possession of these devices or unimpeded access to the digital data could inflict severe damage on friendly forces. Such risks must be assessed and properly eliminated, mitigated, or accepted in the evolution to the digital battlespace. Protection must be provided to the information being processed/transported—to avoid compromise, exploitation, or corruption—and to the information systems themselves, to avoid information denial.
The Army’s challenge is to identify the vulnerabilities of the digital infrastructure; assess the corresponding threat/risk; and manage information system development and investment strategies to provide C4 protection at acceptable risk. During any operation, certain near-term information security risks may have to be accepted to capitalize on the technical advantages of today's weapons and battle command systems.
Figure 9-2 Digital System Security Approach
9.3.2 ADO Information Security Approach
To manage and/or address all ongoing actions necessary for providing information security to the digital battlespace, the ADO has divided the overall security effort into four general activities:
Near-term efforts are focused on successful conduct of the TF XXI AWE. Fundamental to this approach is a continuous risk management process led by the ADO to:
The Army is currently addressing broad information security requirements and efforts in its Command and Control Protection (C2 Protect) Program. ADO security-related tasks are accomplished both within the context of and in support of this program. The C2 Protect Program is a fundamental portion of the new concept of Information Operations which is being developed to capitalize on information age technologies. The security lessons learned in TF XXI will provide significant input to this program and subsequently to the future security of Force XXI.
During the conduct of the TF XXI AWE, specific experimentation will be conducted in the areas of the four general activities. Red Teaming will be conducted in support of vulnerability assessments. Lessons learned from experimentation and applied to improved security measures will lead to a more secure digital infrastructure. The C4I architectures must incorporate and document these results to enable implementation in future systems (see Figure 9-3).
Figure 9-3 ADO Information Security Implementation
9.3.2.1 Security Risk Management
Digitization security will be risk-based rather than rule-based. The old rule-based methodology demanded that lock-tight security be maintained by stringently meeting global security rules (regulations). In the explosion of technology, such rules are no longer effective in protecting information. Costly, rule-based information systems with less capability than projected systems have been unable to provide the level of protection required because the rules have been unable to keep up with advances in technology. Risk-based systems being implemented for the digital battlespace are the result of extensive examination of realistic security requirements; tradeoffs between device-provided security and other security means; and acceptance of reasonable security risks adapted to the real-time environment of these digital systems. Through its risk management process, the ADO intends to expedite the development and implementation of information-age capabilities while knowingly accepting some inherent risks in the process.
9.3.2.2 Policy/Regulations
Policy and regulations are being reviewed to determine their applicability within the digital battlespace. Subsequent modification may be necessary to accommodate the operation of digital systems in a fast-moving tactical environment in which information is extremely time sensitive, critical to current operations, and may not meet current security requirements. If policies and regulations are not modified, capabilities will be significantly curtailed or operational commanders may have to exercise their authority to waive the restrictive rules which—if not thoroughly addressed beforehand—could cause needlessly large security risks.
The ADO intends to guide and oversee the development of modified policies and regulations in coordination with the DCSINT to accommodate the security needs of this new technology.
9.3.2.3 Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTP) and Training
TTP and training in the security realm are extremely important in mitigating security risks inherent in the digitized battlespace. They serve as a realistic means of offsetting the need for other security products that may be too costly to implement on a widespread basis (such as current in-line network encryptors) or that may not currently be available (such as multilevel security products).
TRADOC and the EXFOR are responsible for developing and implementing these TTP and training programs within guidance provided by the ADO. TTP developed from the Focused Dispatch and Warrior Focus exercises will be available for the TF XXI AWE.
9.3.2.4 Technology Integration
Digital technology integration has been a primary mission of the ADO since its inception. Security technology integration is just as important to the overall ADO mission and is being addressed as a separate, complementary entity. Many of the related ADO security actions are directed toward researching, analyzing, and ranking evolving military and commercial security technologies and then incorporating subsequent recommendations into the System and Technical Architectures as appropriate.
9.3.2.5 Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability assessment is important to the overall security effort. It addresses the weaknesses of current systems—to include the human element—as well as the ability of new security concepts to accomplish their intended purpose. In the context of current threats, it also is a fundamental driver for security requirements.
Guidance from the Defense Science Board (DSB) and OSD has stressed the importance of determining information system vulnerabilities and capabilities when making implementation decisions. The ADO will continue to direct a number of actions in this area (see Section 9.3.4).
9.3.3 Basic Information Security Requirements
9.3.3.1 Mandate vs Objective
Rules—in the form of security policies and regulations—still exist. In the rules-based methodology from which current information security requirements emanate, those rules are mandates. In a risk-based methodology, they provide information protection objectives. The difference is significant, providing needed flexibility for intelligent trade-offs between security and capability.
9.3.3.2 Information Protection
Information on the battlespace that is important to the employment and effectiveness of friendly forces must be protected from exploitation, corruption, and denial actions by opposing forces.
This information is given a classification level—or label—according to the criticality of that information to friendly forces and the level of damage that could be inflicted by the opposing forces if the information was available to them. Classification labels are currently applied to output (e.g., messages, reports, documents), but classification labeling is gradually evolving to labeling of the data elements themselves.
Systems which transport or process such information must provide the necessary level of protection through security devices, routines, procedures, or related means. Such systems must be certified (proven) and accredited (approved) in accordance with the provisions of AR 380-19. Similarly, a system-of-systems must provide proper protection at the individual system level as well as at the interfaces between the systems. Personnel who use this information or who have access to information through system operations must also be properly cleared for that access. When properly addressed on a total system basis, these individual requirements provide the necessary protection for the information itself. As an additional requirement, the protection of information—and systems themselves—from denial actions ensures that the information is available for its intended use.
9.3.3.3 Closed System Constraints
Unfortunately, today's information systems have not been designed to handle individual information message or data element segments on the basis of their individual classifications and then route them accordingly. A current system must handle all information segments on a closed system basis as if those segments were all classified at the highest level that the system is approved to handle. This precludes the ability to interface systems of different classification levels for the purpose of automatically exchanging information at a lower level of classification, even though both systems can and do process information that is actually at that level.
For example, a system that processes sensitive but unclassified information cannot automatically send—or write–up— unclassified information to a system that processes SECRET information. Similarly, a system that processes SECRET information cannot automatically send—or regrade—unclassified information to a system that processes unclassified but sensitive information. This is due to difficulties in trusting the systems to accomplish those processes correctly without compromising the resident information not transmitted. Operators can manually accomplish write-ups and regrades, but systems cannot do so until the NSA approves certain multi-level security (MLS) products which are currently in development. This poses severe constraints in an automated information system-of-systems which relies on automatic routing and data transfer—without operator interference—to attain near real-time receipt of critical battlefield information.
9.3.3.4 Protection Requirements
The overall Army digitization security requirement is to apply current and state-of-the-art practices, designs, and security devices to the systems being deployed for Force XXI and supporting experiments in such a manner as to ensure that information protection—from both compromise and denial—is provided to an acceptable level of risk. This applies to systems being developed specifically as a part of the digitization effort (e.g., appliques, INCs, TMGs) and to existing legacy systems that will become a part of Force XXI.
9.3.4 Army Digitization Information Security Actions
To conduct the four general security activities—policy/regulations, TTP/training, technology integration, and vulnerability assessment—the ADO is working on several individual security tasks:
All contribute to the development of secure digitization infrastructure designs and security inputs to the three digitization architectures to meet Force XXI security requirements. In the near–term, this security effort must be focused on the system design for TF XXI.
9.3.4.1 System Security Design
Information system security mechanisms have been evolving toward increased capabilities in parallel with the information systems they are designed to protect. NSA has been working to achieve multi-level security capabilities through its MISSI, which is now beginning initial production of INEs for end-to-end protection on packet networks and Fortezza cards for e-mail protection. Industry and commercial enterprises are also improving commercially available devices such as firewalls and security guards, while write-up and regrade capabilities discussed earlier are emerging in various prototype forms.
To provide proper protection of digital information on the future battlefield, PEO C3S has been tasked to develop the security overlay for the TF XXI system design. This overlay will incorporate existing security mechanisms such as COMSEC devices, security procedures, firewalls, and INEs to accomplish necessary operational system protection and security device prototypes for experimentation. The security overlay will be key to ensuring no sensitive information is compromised, while at the same time allowing sufficient connecting interfaces for accomplishing overall situational awareness system objectives.
9.3.4.2 System Vulnerability Assessment
The second task is assessment of individual system vulnerabilities to information exploitation, corruption, and/or denial though the study of technical/operational test data and empirical operational data. This task has been assigned to the Army Research Laboratory's (ARL) Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate (SLAD) which is the recognized expert in this area. This is a continuing task which was initiated in 1994 and periodically provides reports of significant value to PEO C3S, the System Design Engineer. The effort involves studies of existing data as well as the conduct and evaluation of specific system testing in the areas of information, electronic, and physical vulnerabilities.
9.3.4.3 System Design Analysis
The third task is identification of specific security issues through analysis of the TF XXI system design with respect to current policy and procedures. The goal is to identify issues in time to find solutions, apply fixes, and/or provide waivers prior to the TF XXI AWE in FY97. DISC4 was given this task on 22 March 1995, and the initial review was provided to the ADO in September 1995. The issues identified in that initial review are being addressed by the ADO and the TF XXI Security IPT which is discussed later in this section.
9.3.4.4 Red Teaming
The fourth task is the operational Red Teaming of the system design. This task is designed to determine system vulnerabilities through opposing force-like actions (see Figure 9-4). Red Teaming of TF XXI information systems will be incorporated into all digitization exercises leading to Force XXI which appear to be potential Red Teaming opportunities. This task will incorporate the results of the tasks assigned to SLAD and DISC4, as described above, to make more global recommendations to the digitization system design.
Red Teaming will require a highly controlled process to ensure the effort is complete and addresses all operational vulnerabilities (see Figure 9-5). The C2 Protect Council of Colonels (C2PCOC) and the C2 Protect General Officer Steering Committee (C2P GOSC)—with membership from the ADO, DISC4, DCSOPS, and DCSINT—provides guidance, priorities, and resolution decisions. A number of working groups support the necessary analyses and provide recommendations. The ADO and the supporting TF XXI Red Team Working Group provide the supervision and coordination mechanism to manage the process.
Red Teams will be task organized as necessary to accommodate specific events. Operations will be conducted in conjunction with scheduled testing, training, and experimentation. There are four primary Red Team opportunities in the near-term during:
Figure 9-4 Red Team (Working) Definition
The ADO will provide day-to-day direction to organizations assigned to conduct the actual Red Teaming efforts, which for TF XXI are focused on six assigned sub–tasks:
Figure 9-5 Digitization Red Team Process
9.3.4.5 Additional Security Actions
Although the previous six sub–tasks are primarily oriented on vulnerability assessments, the responsible agencies will also provide recommendations for resolving discovered weaknesses and security issues. These recommendations will be considered by the ADO; analyzed in terms of cost and benefits; and submitted to the system architects and/or engineers for action.
DISC4 is conducting a separate task to improve the incorporation of security into systems under development. This task involves the creation of security standards for inclusion in the TA, thus providing necessary guidance for system developers and improving the likelihood of interoperability between the system and its security means.
9.3.4.6 Task Force XXI Security Integrated Product Team (IPT)
In order to expedite the security process for TF XXI, a Security IPT (SIPT) has been formed by agreement of TRADOC, ADO, and DCSINT. The ADO chairs the SIPT and all agencies with security involvement provide representatives. The IPT addresses major information security issues brought to its attention, and assigns a responsible agency to take the lead on each.
9.3.5 Organization for Security Task Execution
The organizational relationships for conducting security tasks in support of TF XXI digitization are shown in Figure 9-6. Although the described tasks are predominantly accomplished by Army activities, they must accommodate the requirements of other Services, as well as provisions of guidance and regulations published by other DoD agencies.
Figure 9-6 Digitization Security Task Execution
A number of other WGs and CoCs have been established to address various information security needs for both the Army and DoD. These include the C2 Protect Working Groups (C2PWGs), the beforementioned C2PCOC, and the Army Battle Command System Security Working Group (ASWG). In order to ensure optimum information security progress and synchronization of all Army information security developments, it is important that the ADO and other activities involved with digitization have representation at these groups. This will provide WGs and CoCs with the benefit of hands-on and field experience as they attempt to establish future directions for information security, while the digitization community will benefit by using the latest concepts as they are developed by these groups.
9.4 Spectrum Management
The transfer of information in the digitized battlespace is almost totally dependent on using the radio frequency (RF) spectrum as the transfer medium. Battlespace sensors and weapons systems also make increasingly extensive use of the RF spectrum. Simultaneous use by joint /multinational forces, commercial/civil systems, and the enemy poses a potentially confusing and disruptive obstacle to the essential goal of achieving and maintaining spectrum supremacy. Consequently, the RF spectrum becomes as critical a domain in the digitized battlespace as the other battlespace dimensions. Spectrum supremacy will be assured through a rigorous approach to achieving spectrum supportability of each and every RF-dependent system that conducts digital information transfer, from the Tactical Internet to AGCCS.
Spectrum supportability in the digitized battlespace must be addressed by balancing multiple factors such as bandwidth, power, spectrum availability/accessibility, spatial parameters, temporal parameters, electromagnetic wave behavior, electromagnetic environments, regulatory provisions, technical restrictions, and national and multinational variations of each. While these issues will not change appreciably as a direct result of digitization, the manner in which the digital RF systems will drive spectrum use requirements will have a dramatic impact on spectrum management technology and practices. The introduction of COTS and NDI procurements, along with new digital system acquisitions, have already served notice that the RF systems within future digital battlespace will:
9.4.1 Spectrum Supremacy Strategy
As digital battlespace evolves, the electromagnetic environment will be faced with increasing numbers of self-managing, non-conventional systems. The challenge is to re-engineer spectrum management processes and procedures so that increased emphasis is placed on pre-acquisition system designs to assure spectrum supportability of digital systems, while less emphasis is placed on manual, post-acquisition management of system parameters during operations.
Achieving the scope and meeting the requirements of vertical and horizontal battlespace integration in will require increases in the information capacity and adaptability of RF communications systems. Each increase in system capacity or adaptive characteristics will have consequences directly relating to spectrum requirements. Re-engineering the spectrum management process to achieve spectrum supportability for the next generation of RF systems designed to carry the digitized battlespace information flow will require the ability to predict the interactions of systems in the electromagnetic portion of the battlespace.
This process can be accelerated by aggressive adaptation of lessons learned from the Force XXI AWEs. Technical data and information derived from equipment specifications, engineering analyses, lessons learned, and feedback from exercise spectrum managers and AWE units will be used for revising spectrum management techniques, requirements, and far–term strategies.
9.4.2 Spectrum Support to the Battlefield Information Transmission (BITS) System
The BITS acquisition strategy must process its commercial system spectrum requirements through the spectrum supportability process in accordance with AR 5-12, Army Management of the Electromagnetic Spectrum. The spectrum supportability objective is to validate that the equipment meets technical parameters and specifications which permits the equipment to operate within the designated spectrum. Approval provides accessibility to frequencies for operations in the U.S. and worldwide, but the certification process is complicated because friendly nation approval must be obtained prior to actual operations and their frequency spectrum allocations are not necessarily consistent with U.S. allocation tables. Consequently, early planning and coordination facilitates spectrum supportability in the Pacific and European theaters.
RF requirements for systems supporting the Tactical Internet will rapidly evolve beyond the ability of current practices and procedures to deal effectively with spectrum supportability issues. The NTDR will be the first in a series of multiple evolutionary steps that will change the behavior of RF systems in the battlespace. The acquisition strategy must include consideration of the role of spectrum certification in the face of new, potentially unconventional, and potentially non–compliant technologies.
The role of spectrum certification in the acquisition strategy must also be reexamined to consider the introduction of processor-driven, adaptive RF technologies. The RF systems that will be introduced as a necessary adjunct to the battlespace digitization effort will also introduce waveforms and parameter variations that are not considered in the certification process for conventional systems.
Adherence to technical standards and allocations will be challenged in many designs. These challenges must be met objectively, with a clear and consistent view of how future digital RF transmission systems can best serve the objectives of the digitized battlespace without causing disruption and chaos in the electromagnetic environment.
9.4.3 Spectrum Supportability, Multinational Strategy
Spectrum supportability from an allied nation with different or more stringent standards than the U.S. can become a significant obstacle to equipment fielding and operational use. These difficulties were experienced in the 1980s when the U.S. introduced JTIDS, REGENCY NET and SINCGARS into the multinational arena. Spectrum compatibility has historically proven to be a difficult challenge in Germany, Japan, and South Korea.
These challenges will grow as the Army digitization plan introduces equipment and systems that do not necessarily adhere to clearly defined—but obsolete—allocation tables. A dynamic mix of new conventional and adaptive digital systems will be introduced over the next decade into a multinational arena in which understanding and acceptance of advanced, processor-driven digital RF technologies will vary from country to country. Electromagnetic compatibility and interoperability at the RF–level will thus become critical issues within the multinational strategy.
9.5 Training
The full integration of digitization in the battlespace will only be possible with timely, effective training of soldiers, leaders, and units. Training initiatives associated with Joint Venture—Warfighter, Warrior, Warnet—must address operation, employment, and maintenance of the digital equipment. PEOs and CECOM, in coordination with TRADOC, are responsible for developing EXFOR training programs. Training development will follow the Army systems approach to training and must be compatible with current Army automated training development and information systems.
The ADO will synchronize combat, materiel, and training development of digitization hardware and software systems. Existing live, virtual, and constructive (L/V/C) training systems will be upgraded to integrate digitized systems, and future training systems must be developed with digitization as an integral design aspect. Structured training programs must be developed for L/V/C automated training systems to ensure progressive, sequential training of all relevant tasks, conditions, and standards. Training systems supporting digitized hardware and software must be designed, developed, tested, and ready to field with the equipment at FUE.
TT/OTs, AWEs, and supporting evaluations will include tests of embedded and supporting training and training systems to ensure timely fielding of training packages consistent with operational and training requirements. Training and training development will become an integral aspect of life–cycle cost estimating to ensure adequate, timely resourcing of required training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS) and embedded training systems. Training will also become an integral aspect of configuration management to ensure compatibility and interoperability of operational and training systems.
Digitization adds a new dimension to battlespace command and control that must be analyzed, assessed, and evaluated to determine its most effective use. Functional information and lessons learned must be inserted into TTP. Digitization doctrine and technical information must be integrated into existing and future doctrinal publications, soldier training publications, Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) Mission Training Plans, automated training and training development systems, institutional training, and unit training strategies and plans.
Total Army digitization training will begin with training in support of TT/OT or NET and progress to become integral to Force XXI training programs at the individual, institution, and unit levels using a mix of L/V/C training techniques. Institutional training and training support requirements must be identified and resourced early in the digitized system’s life–cycle to ensure availability of training support prior to FUE. Techniques will include use of embedded training, multimedia training (e.g., distant learning, computer-based instruction, and training video tapes), TADSS, hands-on training, and collective training of tasks from the team/crew/section level through EAC. L/V/C simulations will be conducted using a combination of embedded training and existing/future simulations and simulators linked in STOW unit training exercises. Embedded and stand alone training systems will be designed to provide both immediate and deliberate evaluation as part of the Standard Army After Action Review System (STAARS). Training will be conducted on the system, in learning centers, in classrooms, in simulation centers, in motor pools, in local and major training areas, and at Combat Training Centers (CTCs). Training developments will follow the Systems Approach to Training (SAT) and be compatible with the Automated Systems Approach to Training (ASAT) and the Standard Army Training Systems (SATS).
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