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Toward a National Security Architecture Prepared for Information Warfare







Toward a
National Security Architecture Prepared for Information Warfare


 


CSC 1995


 


Subject Area -
National Security


 


 


                     EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


 


 


Title: Toward
a National Security Architecture prepared for               Information Warfare


 


 


Author: Mark
K. Ward, LCDR, USN


 


 


Research
Question:


 


     How can the National Security apparatus
be restructured to meet the challenges and opportunities that Information
Warfare presents?


 


 


Discussion:  


 


     The U.S. leads the World in the
information "sciences" but organization, policy and doctrine are not
keeping up with technology in either the military or governmental sectors.  The lag not only disallows the U.S. from
taking advantage of new technological developments, but makes the U.S.
vulnerable.  An overarching structure
that is flexible, lean, and responsive is needed to provide coordination
between all of the "producers" and "users" of Information
Warfare (IW) support.  The synergy that
would result from DOD and non-DOD governmental organizations coordinating
operations across the "information spectrum" would greatly increase
the overall security of the U.S.


 


 


Conclusions:


 


     The greatest progress is occurring in
DOD, therefore IW must first be refined there, shown to be successful, and migrated
throughout the U.S. Government.  The
first step in the process outside of DOD should be to square away the National
Security apparatus.  Next, protection of
the industrial and civilian sectors will need to be provided for.  the new information technologies that are
emerging will require a very close look at the Constitution.  Laws, policies and oversight bodies will be
required so that the protection of individual and corporate rights are balanced
with the need to counter the threat of Information Warfare.  The requirement to respond to the threat
posed by IW, and the resulting efficiencies gained in the process, will
transform the civilian society, and change the way the U.S. military is
organized and fights.     


 


 


 


 


 









 


                        CONTENTS              


 


 


PAGE 1.  INTRODUCTION and What is a National Security
Architecture?


 


 


     3. 
What is Information Warfare (IW)     



 


 


     6. 
Why is IW important?


 


 


     9. 
Challenges and a Very Bright Future


 


 


     14. 
Reorganizing National Security for IW


 


 


     15. 
DOD Out In Front   


 


 


     16. 
Systems Must Be Seamless


 


 


     23. 
Emphasizing the CINCs


 


 


     24. 
IW/C2W Centers of Excellence 


 


 


     25. 
Legal Questions of IW


 


 


     28. 
The Interim Architecture: Phase One


 


 


     31. 
The Interim Architecture: Phase Two


 


 


     34. 
Conclusion


 


 


     36. 
Bibliography


 


 


     38. 
End Notes


 


 


     43. 
Abbreviations   


 


 


 









     Napoleon Bonaparte said,
"The battlefield is a scene of constant chaos.  The winner will be the one that best controls that chaos, both
his own and that of his enemy." 
Napoleon might judge the advances in Command, Control, Computer,
Communication and Intelligence (C4I) technologies in recent years to be a grand
opportunity, for both the US and its potential adversaries.  U.S. C4I prowess has contributed to great
success in recent years, such as that seen in the Persian Gulf war.  Harnessing advances in C4I before an
adversary can is the essence of Information War (IW), the ongoing battle to
limit ones own information chaos while contributing to or exploiting an
adversary's chaos.  A National Security Architecture1
that includes IW concerns will ensure the U.S. continues to enjoy information
dominance in peacetime or war.  This
paper will discuss how the U.S. can update its existing National Security
Architecture to respond to the challenges and opportunities IW presents.  


WHAT
IS A NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE?


     The term
"structure" has historically been used to describe the relationships
between and within organizations charged with a particular function or
mission.  MBA students have studied
organizational structures in the past but as computers and information systems
have swept into all parts of modern life, the students now study architectures
or relationships.  The word
"structure" can connote rigidity, while the information age meaning
of the word "architecture," as one envisions a computer program
flowchart, better describes the fluid relationships that have to 


                              1


exist within any successful, efficient organization in today's
competitive world.  U.S governmental
organizations that are tasked with National Security can be no less flexible
and responsive than civilian high technology companies.  While the issue may seem to be a matter of
semantics to some, the responsiveness issue is really about mindsets and
paradigm shifts.                         



     The very real threat that
IW poses is pervasive and can be 


manifest in minutes.  The IW
threat does not afford the defender long lead times to counter it.  For example, during the Cold War, the
discovery of a new weapon the Soviets may have planned to field eight years
hence could be reacted to.  IW changes
all past concepts of time and space. 
U.S. sovereignty and property can be attacked in the next moment from
anywhere by anyone with a computer modem. 
A National Security "Architecture" that is capable of winning
the Information War every moment is needed. 


     There now exists a National
Security Structure that is incomplete and somewhat dysfunctional, with a
semi-formal Architecture that is inadequate. 
The Structure and Architecture are inadequate because they are too
reactive in nature, which will suffice against enemies that fly at sub-mach
speeds to drop weapons, drugs, or contraband on US territory, but against the
stealthy, insidious, lightning threat that IW represents, more responsiveness
and constant vigilance is needed.  The
National Security Structure will require time for staff study and legislation,
but the problem can be stemmed with an interim Architecture that is aggressive
with respect to the IW threat.  In 


                             2


other words, it must be proactive and intrusive with respect to
adversary systems while remaining impregnable to the most talented hacker,
professional criminal, or foreign country.   



WHAT
IS INFORMATION WARFARE?


     Due to the relative newness
of IW as a concept, much of the 


work is classified.  IW
terminology is only now becoming standardized within U.S. Governmental
circles.  Open source 


writings on IW are still interlaced with the hard to understand 


slang of "Cyberpunk" publications.  Cottage industries have sprung up to serve the new subcultures
who wander "Cyberspace" or world "information
superhighways."  There is a great
deal of excitement about the endless possibilities that new found systems, such
as Internet, hold for the U.S. and the world. 
Some of the excitement is hype, similar to that seen at the beginning of
the personal computer age, when manufacturers sought to encourage families to
buy personal computer's to put recipes on diskette; however, just as the value
of personal computers became clearer over time, the possibilities of IW are
becoming clearer with every news headline describing a thwarted attempt to electronically
rob or manipulate a data base.  A
discerning professional tasked with U.S. National Security concerns should
examine IW for the real challenges and opportunities it presents.  The challenges include protecting
increasingly vulnerable U.S. information pathways, while the opportunities
include preventing undesired domestic and international events through
attainment of near perfect intelligence upon which appropriate actions can be
taken.  In an 


                            3


austere environment, overreaction must be avoided, but an expedient,
but measured and steady approach is needed to incorporate IW tactics,
techniques and procedures into National Security organizations, individually
and collectively.


    For the purpose of this
paper, Information Warfare (IW) will be the term used for the broadest view of
the new field, while the 


strictly military applications of IW are called Command and Control
Warfare (C2W).  Much of the current IW
thought has gone on at 


National Defense University (NDU) and the Joint Staff, the latter 


concentrating on C2W.  While the
Joint Staff has not published doctrine or even a definition for IW, it has
distributed a second draft doctrine for C2W and has great appreciation for IW.  The reason for this seeming incongruency of
having a subset of a warfare approach maturing before the overall concept, is
quite simply that the basic tenets of C2W (operational security/deception/early
warning/psychological operations/physical destruction) have been practiced for
many years by DOD and defense-related non-DOD entities, mainly in wartime.  IW is a newer, larger concept, which to a
greater extent involves peacetime and economic issues.  IW is described as a concept because it is
still taking shape and only now being recognized by the whole of the National
Security Community for the paradigm shifts it will require and continue to
require, as the rest of this paper will describe.  IW is a silent killer with no rules of engagement.  IW changes the nature of warfare because it
is pervasive and omnipresent.  Warning
time in IW is nil because the enemy only needs a modem and phone 


                             4


line to softkill your operation.  The enemy (or your ally) could be
(metaphorically) staring at you through the screen you are typing into.  IW goes beyond the C2W actions, many of
which are rudimentary and have been practiced for years, yet are still
essential.      


     While advances in
technology have been the major contributing factor, "IW" also came
into being because of the influence of 1986 legislation to promote jointness
and the idea that a seamless DOD C2W effort would gain effectiveness through
synergy.  Technological advances created
unconventional opportunities for both the U.S. and its potential
adversaries.  NDU has been empowered to
move forward with the IW concept as executive agent, and to teach IW seminars
for senior defense and governmental community players until a broader national
IW concept and architecture can be negotiated between DOD and many other governmental
entities (e.g. CIA, State, Treasury, and Interior Departments).  NDU uses the following definition of IW that
has heretofore found favor with a broad audience:


       ...an approach to armed conflict focusing on the                    management and use of
information in all its forms and at          
all levels to achieve a decisive military advantage              especially in the joint and
combined environment.  IW is           both offensive and defensive in
nature -- ranging from           measures
that prohibit the enemy from exploiting                 information to corresponding measures to assure
the              integrity, availability
and interoperability of                 
information assets.  While
ultimately military in nature,           IW is also waged in political, economic and
social arenas           and is
applicable over the entire national security              continuum from peace to war.  Finally, IW focuses on the           command and control needs of the
commander by employing           state
of the art information technology and synthetic            environments to dominate the battlefield.  NDU IW
STUDENT           HANDOUT


 


                                5


 


The Joint
Staff has defined the strictly military applications 


of IW, or C2W,
as follows:


       The integrated use of operations security
(OPSEC),military        deception,
psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic          warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually
supported        by intelligence, to
deny information to,influence,degrade,       
or destroy adversary command and controlcapabilities,while        protecting friendly command and
control capabilities             against
such actions.  Command and control
warfare applies        across the range
of military operations and all levels of       
conflict. C2W is both offensive (counter-C2) and defensive        C2-protect).  The goal of C2-protect is to maintain              effective command and control of own forces by
turning to        friendly advantage or
negating adversary efforts to deny        
information to, influence, degrade or destroy the friendly        C2 system.  The goal of counter-C2 is to prevent effective        C2 of adversary forces by denying
information to,                influencing,
degrading or destroying the adversary C2            system.                                Joint Pub 3-13 


 


WHY
IS IW IMPORTANT?


     IW can contribute
significantly in any operation.  As the
U.S. leads the world into the 21st century, what threats, challenges and
opportunities face the country? 
Depending on how U.S. political leaders come to see national interests,
the country could be involved in a wide range of actions.  The threat of IW to U.S. information systems
in peacetime alone is significant enough to 


warrant a reworking of American National Security Architecture.  The peacetime IW threat is now, and will
remain, a constant danger that is arguably more serious a consideration than
the more traditional IW missions, such as jamming a communication frequency or
radar during an airstrike.  A disruption
in Wallstreet trading  by a hacker or
fanatic/terrorist would have severe repercussions around the world.  The first and most important capability in
the future will be to ensure friendly communications and systems are 


                            6


secure.  The U.S. federal and
state governments, and the American public and industries must become more
aware and act to counter potential threats.          


     IW actions must go beyond
peacetime considerations of OPSEC, to missions such as PSYOPS in Operations
Other Than War (OOTW), or selective Command and Control (C2) destruction
through nodal analysis in Major Regional Conflicts (MRC).  While the possibility of conflict in Korea
or Iran cannot be discounted, the predominant types of military operations for
the foreseeable future will be OOTW. 
Preparedness for IW in an MRC goes a long way toward readiness for IW in
OOTW and vice versa, as the major difference is the degree of physical
destruction involved.  These OOTW
missions may involve combat and non-combat missions, to include peace keeping
and enforcement, counter drugs/ contraband/proliferation/terrorism, and
others.  No matter what the operation,
IW is integral because at a minimum it involves the protection of friendly
information management capability.  Even
a peaceful disaster relief or nation building mission will require the U.S. to
manage and protect its communication abilities.  The figure below describes the near universal utility IW (from
Joint Pub 3-13/figure II-3).   


                               7


          IW APPLICABILITY IN OPERATIONAL
CONTINUUM


Range of Peacetime Ops   
OPSEC------------------> OOTW


Range of Military Ops    
OOTW-------------------> War             Levels of Conflict        Tactical---------------> Strategic       Disciplines               Offensive--------------> Defensive      Planning Cycle            Crisis-----------------> Deliberate      Size of Force             Platoon----------------> Multi-Corps     Composition of Force      U.S. ----------------->
Multinational   Rules of Engagement       Restricted------------> Unrestricted     Geography/Terrain/Weather
Jungles---------------> Deserts         
Opponents               
Allies----------------> Arch enemies     Techniques Available     
SIGINT----------------> Destruction     


     The extent to which the
U.S. can gather inteligence on 


increasingly sophisticated opponents, disseminate necessary 


information to decision makers, and manipulate control of that which is
available to a potential or actual adversary will grow geometrically in
importance.  IW capability will grow in
importance much faster than even the projected technological advances in
precision guided weapons (PGM) and stealth technologies, which were so
successful in the Persian Gulf war.  The
new opportunities, and conversely the new vulnerabilities, lie in the realm of
IW.  


     Peacetime decisionmakers
must have the information necessary 


to influence events, thwart terrorist acts, stop WMD proliferation, or
predict opponent negotiating positions on decision points.    The future wartime Commander must, in
near-real time, be able to see all of his forces on the battlefield and take
advantage of U.S.                                 8 



intelligence dominance to coordinate the use of lethal and non-lethal
weapons to effect mission success with near impunity.  The American public demands "no-hitters", which
requires steady investment in the technological advances that will allow a
leaner force to prevail in those future situations that the U.S. government
hopes to influence.  Today's theater,
joint force, or civilian Commander needs what a powerful IW concept can give,
the ability to get inside the enemies observation, orientation, decision and
action cycle (or "OODA loop").2


    A bold IW capability cannot
be supported by the existing National Security Architecture.  The current Architecture is inefficient,
inadequate and already vulnerable.  DOD
and non-DOD organizations are not operating in conjuction for a variety of
reasons.  No coordinating oversight body
has ever provided effective leadership. 
These organizations function together only because dedicated men and
women use secure phone lines to conduct liaison on known issues of mutual interest;
they're systems are not tied together and they lack synergy.  Additionally, many systems of the National
Security Architechture are "stovepiped," preventing DOD and non-DOD
organizations from efficiently sharing information and working together.  Stovepiping exists when an organization or
system exists for a single or few purposes, and uses an inordinate amount of
assets for the extremely specialized purposes it accomplishes; conversly, the
absense of stovepiping inmplies an asset able to accomplish much more for
less.  Stovepiping has persisted because
of incompatible information handling systems and 


                               9


databases, lack of incentive and strong Joint leadership, fear of
change, and the vestiges of overrestrictive security measures from the Cold War
which still hamper information exchange. 
Another contributing factor to American unpreparedness for IW is that
information pathways procurred for the National Security Architecture have inadequate
capacity to support a robust IW effort. 



     The National Security
Architecture is vulnerable because only the most classified systems are
adequately protected.  Some of the most
important American security concerns are embodied in the protection of files of
defense contracters, not those at CIA, NSA, or FBI.  Increasingly frequent reports of various individuals hacking
their way into less well defended U.S. systems suggests a rising sophistication
that endangers U.S. information security. 
The security stakes and monetary costs of ineffiecency and inadequacy
are too high to continue to respond to the challenges and opportunities of IW
this way.  


CHALLENGES
AND A VERY BRIGHT FUTURE


     The U.S. dominates the
world in all aspects of the use and management of information.  Primarily the dominance has occurred in
civilian applications because Government use of new technology has always
lagged the civilian environment. 
American industries still lead in computer development and are
unchallenged in software.  Innovative
spirit and an inventive nature are American characteristics that have kept the
U.S. on top in information management in a fast changing and competitive
world.   The U.S. 


                            10


military, and National Security organizations in general, however,
resist change until stressed, and they weren't stressed quite enough in the
last conflict.  


     There were problems with
aspects of IW during Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS).  The problems were visible to 


insiders, but not to the media, which fed a proud public a steady
stream of cockpit footage of Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) destroying
targets.  Fortunately, Iraq turned out
to be inept in IW/C2W and most Coalition problems involved the efficient use of
its own communication systems.  The
largest problem was that U.S. Architecture was inefficient with the inadequate
bandwidth available.  Adaptations and
workarounds were sometimes required to make communications functional, and it
wasn't very reassuring.  For  example, many in the military are familiar with
how slow routine to immediate message traffic became because of competing flash
(highest level) precedence traffic that clogged information transfer
"arteries."  The problem came
with multi-section messages, which kept being preempted by flash traffic; a
major message system that connected DOD and non-DOD organizations would simply
restart at the beginning of a preempted message and new messages would continue
to que-up.  Soon, another flash message,
perhaps regarding a SCUD warning, would delay the system again. In frustration,
those sending msgs would increase the precedence of their traffic in order for
it to arrive on time, which further compromises the fidelity of the
system.  Huge messages like the Air
Tasking Order (ATO), the daily "blueprint" by which all aircraft
conduct their 


                               
11


missions, had to be physically flown out to a Navy carrier from the
Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) HQ at Riyadh, Saudia Arabia to
ensure proper coordination.  There were
other similar problems, like systems not being able to transfer data due to
lack of interoperability, but the positive thing is the U.S. still dominated in
IW.  


     The media feeding frenzy
surrounding "lessons learned" was largely unsuccessful at defining any
major failures, although it made a run at fratricide and the time-honored scape
goat, 


intelligence.  As a result of
the IW/C2W abilities not being severely stressed and no major faults publicized
following DS/DS, National Security leaders have been slow to move.  Greater mental energy has been spent on
justifying plans for "rightsizing" than on IW.  The U.S. National Security Architecture
can't wait for stress or failure, to whatever degree, to be the agent of
change.  Decision-makers must recognize
that there are not only solutions to problems, but great opportunities in
IW/C2W if the energy and 


appropriate asset prioritization is afforded it.  This is a hard sell because IW is primarily
a supporting function, not about riveting cockpit footage, but it is all about
ensuring cockpit success.


     The opportunities lie in a
new level of power to shape a situation, mindset or battlefield so that U.S.
leaders need only act on near perfect intelligence to quickly settle many
issues.  No other military in history
has ever had near perfect intelligence and own force situational awareness, and
U.S. technology is fast 


                             12


approaching the capability to field such an Architecture.  Sun Tzu said "know thine enemy and
thine self and you will win every battle."  Add near perfect intelligence and the own force situational
awareness which will come with a functional IW Architecture, with new
generations of PGMs, and the resulting conventional power advantage the U.S.
will possess will be near absolute over any foe in any regime of conflict. 


     Additionally, the ability
IW will bring to unconventional challenges like terrorism and the drug war will
be devastating.  Imagine not being three
steps behind Iranian sponsored terrorism or the Cali Cartel but in its face, or
perhaps two steps ahead. 
"Messages" could be sent or perceptions modified via IW
through unconventional IW activities. 
The messages could be as covert as manipulting data so that the
computers controlling a refinery or nuclear "research" facility cause
a damaging explosion, or as overt as manipulating an adversarial Nation's
media.  Imagine what these acts might do
to the minds of leaders who would otherwise attempt 


terrorists acts.  Many might be
convinced to play by the rules and work within the international system through
negotiation.  Many of the problems
responsible powers are fretting about in Sudan, Algeria and Egypt could
fade.  


     IW has incredible potential
and offers the U.S. a brighter, more secure future.  That more secure future will require the U.S. National Security
Architecture better keep up with IW related C4I capabilities being
marketed.  The turnaround time for C4I
technology in industry is about eighteen months, vice DOD average 


                              13


of approximately seven years to field a weapon system.  The U.S. must develop a security
"culture" that is always looking outward for IW threats in the
marketplace, and willing to be flexible in procurement so that IW security can
be maintained.  Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) using prototypes must be utilized to test new
systems. 


REORGANIZING
NATIONAL SECURITY FOR IW/C2W


      The IW threat requires
interim action in the form of Presidential Directives.  Presidential directives established NSA and
DIA years after the 1947 National Security Act; the same decisive action is
needed now to provide interim guidance while the 1947 Act can be reworked.  A task force led by a senior executive branch
person should be empowered to review new requirements with those governmental
organizations involved with National Security. 
The review should result in possible courses of action for the President
to act on.  These courses of action
should identify and 


seek to rectify current impediments to progress toward a viable
National Security Architecture.  Current
impediments include the lack of articulated relationships between all the IW
participants, equipment and data bases that are not interoperable, lack of
doctrine or tactics, techniques and procedures, legal questions, 


and a general lack of appreciation for the IW threat.


      The President's National
Security Adviser and his staff would be the appropriate leadership of a body
tasked to work on an interim National Security Architecture; the body would
include select members and staff of the Senate and House Armed Service 


                          
14  


Committees, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and House
Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence (HPSCI), the National Foreign
Intelligence Board (NFIB), and traditional (CIA, DIA, etc) and non-traditional
(Commerce, Justice, etc) National Security Organizations.  From the HPSCI and SSCI should be formed a
legislative oversight committee to provide continuous monitoring and chairmanship
duties when the National Security Advisor is unavailable; this committee would
form the cadre to continue work toward a new National Security Act.   


DOD
OUT IN FRONT      


     DOD has led other National
Security Organizations in public recognition of the importance of IW/C2W and
has set about to reorganize accordingly. 
CIA, FBI and NSA have long used aspects of IW but have operated
individually and kept operational efforts and funding classified.  In contrast, the Services have cooperated at



the tactical level and are better suited culturally to forward IW.  DOD has historically practiced the basic
functions of IW/C2W (deception, etc) but also participated in classified
National efforts through Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP).  DOD has become a leader because the
publicity surrounding greater funding for IW and desire to coordinate the 


IW/C2W efforts of the Services under Joint auspices has brought more
attention to the subject.


     Assuming it can be believed
that the U.S. is at the forefront of the IW/C2W race, so far as is currently
known, how does it shore up present inadequacies and stay ahead?  The following paragraphs 


                              15


will discuss the areas where progress is needed and where some plans
have been made.  The changes will
involve procurement and a significant and evolving, preferably long term
reorganization of DOD and non-DOD National Security Organizations.  The changes must first occur in DOD, which
is the largest single National Security Organization, with a built-in, strong
coordinating leadership in OSD and JCS that is able to push through the needed
changes.  As DOD approaches proper
calibration, the IW culture should be migrated to other National Security
Organizations.


      The first step in the process outside of DOD should be to tie
together the remaining organizations, responsible primarily for internal U.S.
National Security.  Next, protection of
the industrial and civilian sectors will need to be provided for.  While outside the scope of this paper, the
author recognizes new information technologies that are emerging will require a
very close look at the Constitution. 
Laws, policies and oversight 


bodies will be required so that the protection of individual and
corporate rights are balanced with the need to counter the threat of
Information Warfare.


    Reorganization of the
National Security Architecture would not only ensure preparation for IW, but
also result in greater efficiencies, energy and effectiveness in providing for
total U.S. 


security. 


SYSTEMS
MUST BE SEAMLESS


     One of the largest hurdles
to overcome in the development of a U.S. IW architecture is that both DOD and
non-DOD programs have 


                              
16


historically attempted to maximize systems for their own needs.  This is especially true of DOD, and to a
lesser degree, non-DOD organizations that use more Commercial Off The Shelf
(COTS) technology.  Only since the
demise of the Soviet Union, and the attendant search by elements of the National
Security Structure to look for ways to justify their size or even existence,
has greater cooperation between the elements been emphasized.  Security concerns and more than enough work
to go around contributed to maintaining the status quo; different organizations
had different security rules and there was institutional fear that if something
was lost or leaked, careers would be lost. 
With so much work to do, and little emphasis on exchange other than
publication or message traffic, short term coordination issues were deemed
"too hard."   Most
coordination between DOD and non-DOD organizations still occurs via secure
phone, but people are thinking, planning and talking.  New technology, the threat of consolidation with another
organization or worse, and more time to think because the Cold War is over,
have brought on paradigm shifts.  The
U.S. military, and DOD in general, is out in front due to the strong central
leadership exerted by the Joint Staff. 
It should be mentioned that of the non-military elements of national
security apparatus, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 


National Security Agency (NSA) have had tremendous success in IW/C2W;
however, the nature of those independent agencies is unlikely to allow them to
be leaders in the development of an overarching IW architecture.  The cultures of CIA and NSA remain 


                          
17  


decidedly covert in outlook and neither can compare, to use a joint
phrase, to the "preponderance of forces" brought to the effort by
DOD.  Additionally, DOD has the large
staff required to see such a large undertaking to fruition.  DOD's early successes in implementing the
tenets of IW/C2W,  will lead the way for
the rest of the government; however, there is much remaining to accomplish in
C2W.


     The main challenges lie in
the C2-protect area, specifically, having secure communication and data
display/manipulation/transfer systems that will talk to each other.  The security needed for communications are
different than those needed for data storage and manipulation.  Communications are discrete bursts of energy
that can be recorded by the enemy, and given powerful enough computing power,
any crypto can be broken eventually. 
Thus, protection from a sophisticated foe intent on reading a targeted
transmission that he can physically capture, cannot be thwarted; however, the
defending party can, by powerful hardware and software, delay the crytoanalysis
so that the traffic is of less value. 
For extremely sensitive transmissions the defending party must guarantee
security by moving communications to other means, like
low-probability-of-intercept Satallite Communications (SATCOM).  SATCOM, for example, is expensive and cost
prohibitive for large volumes of traffic. 
A great deal of work is ongoing in defense and industry to expand the
capabilities of SATCOM.  A technological
advance like the use of multiplexing, or time sharing fiber optic phone lines
based on sensors that connect random transmitters and recievers when a user 


                            18


talks, makes SATCOM more economically feasible and changes the C-2
protect equation.  Protection of data is
more challenging and an area where less emphasis has been placed.  The U.S. is now becoming aware that a
database or network of databases is only as secure as the least capable system
connected.  A talented attacker can
enter a moderately protected system.  A
few brilliant people have entered some very well protected defense and banking
systems, without the use of highpower computers that might aid in breaking the
code for password entry.  New computer
software warns if a system is being attacked, but in a recent U.S. attack the
perpetrator was able to accomplish his goal so fast that he outmaneuvered the
protection.  Noted IW writer and speaker
Robert Steele believes there is value in recruiting and hiring such talents to
ensure they work on the side of good. 
In any case, to stay ahead of potential adversaries in C-2 protect, the
U.S. must invest in new communications-related technologies and stay on par if
not ahead of the competition.          
There are considerations in the C2-attack arena as well, like the need
for coordinating attack methods so that fratricide does not occur.  For example, if the enemy is using a
particular communication frequency you would like to use, or use to listen to
him, coordination is needed to ensure the frequency is not jammed or
interferred with.  


     These problems in both
C2-attack/protect are both hardware and software related, but are not
insurmountable; they only call for definitive, aggressive management according
to a joint plan.  The plan is embodied
in the Joint Staff's Global Command and Control 


                             19


System (GCCS).  Although the DOD
programs (mainly the military services) pay homage to the need to conform to
GCCS plan, progress has been painfully slow due to legitimate service-specific
requirements for future systems, adaptation to "legacy" (mature
operating) systems, and lack of incentive to do the very difficult and expensive
coordination and acquisition required.4  The coordination and acquisition is difficult and expensive
because all of the requirements of the participants must be taken into
account.  In past decades, several Joint
aircraft and missile programs have been cancelled because the participants
couldn't compromise.  Strong leadership
was needed but no mechanism was in place.    



     A powerful direct influence
is needed to tie together today's systems as quickly as possible, but also
those being fielded and developed.  A
SECDEF task force studied this issue, recommending in October 1994 that the
Battlefield Information Task Force (BITF) become permanent and provide liaison
within DOD to ensure adherence to the GCCS plan and coordinate other IW
initiatives.  The sage Undersecretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Emmit Page Jr.,
noted that the J-6 organization had been created in 1979 to do the same thing
recommended to be done by the BITF.  A
different and potentially more successful approach would be to use the Joint
Staff's reinvigorated Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) to
coordinate issues such as this.  The 


JROC, chaired by the Vice Chief, has recently moved toward
becoming  much more involved in
coordinating and overseeing service procurement, and is currently reviewing IW
initiatives as one of 


                            20


its top future interests. 
Aggressive JROC involvement in IW development, especially at this early
stage, would undoubtably yield quick, positive results and provide impetus for
further JROC involvement in joint coordination issues.     


     With respect to non-DOD
systems, the same challenges exist.  


System standards are needed to allow cross talk within and between DOD
and non-DOD organizations.  This is a
very important issue because herein lies the lost unity of effort.  Tie systems together and professionals can,
for instance, "pull" from other databases what they need or don't
even know.  The synergy from this
mid-range goal would provide a phenomenal improvement.  


     A computer system can only
be as resistant to compromise as its weakest link.  Consider a system tied together between non-DOD and DOD
organizations.   If information is to be
shared in the future, and it must be, an invader could conceivably break into
any  participant database, then pass
into another.  For example, in the drug
war, DEA and the Justice Department may request information of the Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI) on a suspect U.S. merchant ship.  Currently, the request and information is
limited to being passed back and forth via secure phone, for technology and
legal reasons.  (The U.S. military can't
be involved in spying on Americans and ONI/DEA/Justice data-handling systems
will not interact).  Wouldn't the
transfer of information be more efficient if the data bases could be
shared?  Time spent coordinating between
various analysts could be spent more productively.  How much useful information is not discovered or used because
information is not 


                              21 



shared efficiently?  The answer
to this question will be known when systems can talk to each other and
requisite security measures are in place. 
The security measures will be expensive.  Physical security is important but each link of a reworked
National Security Architecture will require the same level of electronic
security.  


For example, if it is known that the Russians, or even the competitive
French, Germans or Japanese, have a certain computing power, the U.S. had better
have a more powerful one creating encryption against the possible attempt at
entry in any point of the U.S. system.     



     The military is leading the
way in the sharing of data bases. 
Military data bases are moving to a "pull down" vice
"push" philosophy, where users can obtain what they want instead of
large messages being sent to them.  The
previous method of "shotgunning" background and current information
to a theater would swamp point 


to point communications, and give the recipient a headache trying to
sift through the delayed and irrelevant information.  The Military Integrated Intelligence Data Base (MIIDS) is the
best example.  It can be accessed
through a JDISS (Joint Defense Intelligence Support System)5
terminal via satellite communication from anywhere in the world.  The problem is that JDISS has only been
provided to joint commands, or the theater level.  JDISS is a Navy-developed system and it is the only Service with
a sufficient number of terminals to make the system feasible at the Service 


level.  While the other Services
have bought one or two terminals for some of their headquarters, the full
capability of the system 


                              22


has not been realized.  This
situation is a prime example of where an aggressive JROC, acting on behalf of
the Joint Staff, could guide the services toward a better functioning
information architecture.     


EMPHASIZING
THE CINC's


     Before Goldwater-Nichols
and the gradual transfer of power to the Joint Staff and the CINC's, the Cold
War had dictated an information architecture that served the National Command
Authority.  It has become evident that
Information Architecture must be readjusted to emphasize theater CINC
(Commander IN Chief) or CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force) while still
maintaining sufficient support to the top rungs of decisionmaking.4  The Commander needs total enemy and friendly
situational awareness, with the ability to impart this information in a timely
manner and in a format tailored to each level of command.  The information must have the appropriate
security but not be encumbered to an extent that it becomes so time-late as to
be of little or no advantage.


     Existing architecture will
not currently support a CINC or Joint Force Commander (JFC) that desires to
exploit the current and developing capabilities of IW, as was clear in
DS/DS.  In DS/DS it became apparent that
insufficient satellite access and bandwidth limitations were a hindrance.  The inefficient distribution of 


message traffic via point to point communications made the overall
communication system dangerously slow. 
Flash traffic was sometimes not, and priority traffic became so delayed
that many commands 


                              23


marked more routine traffic as priority hoping for it to arrive so as
to be useful.  We cannot do this
again.  Fortunately, there are fixes
that can be quickly added while Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation
(RDT&E) continue.  One Architecture 


modification that shows great and immediate promise is to use the
broadcasting mode to disseminate information. 
The idea is not new.  Data links
like Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) or intelligence broadcasts have been sent
periodically via HF in the past.  Better
technology promises to make this method an efficient means to send certain
types of information.   


IW/C2W
CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE


     Recognizing that the C2W
warfare area required what in Total Quality Leadership (TQL) parlance is called
a "center of excellence," 
CJCS established the Joint Command and Control 


Warfare Center (JC2WC) in September of
1994.  Establishment of the JC2WC was a
first in that no other warfare area has ever had a "Joint Center"
established for the purpose of coordinating between the services and geographic
CINC's, all aspects of a particular warfare area.6  This was a significant milestone on several
accounts.  Most importantly, it shows
that DOD/JCS recognize that IW/C2W are high priorities.  It also signals a continuation of a process
toward greater jointness between the services begun in 


1986; DOD/JCS will lead the services toward a desired end state with
respect to research, development, testing, evaluation and procurement in new
warfare areas and challenges.  The JC2WC
is likely the prototype for future DOD/JCS organizations that, in 


                            24


consonance with the Joint Doctrine Center
recently established in Norfolk, Va., will be influential in defining future
warfare challenges and possibly redefining traditional warfare areas (i.e.
ground warfare or air warfare).    


LEGAL
QUESTIONS OF IW


     The ability to easily read
other peoples mail, or potentially have your own read raises many legal
questions.  U.S. relative sophistication
in IW compared to all but the most developed economic challengers creates a
cornucopia of opportunities in law enforcement, economics, politics and
military preparedness.  How
Machiavellian does the U.S. constitution allow the national security apparatus
to be?  As with euthanasia and fetal
tissue research, information technology has outrun laws and ethics.  Until 
recently, DOD has basically been allowed to work against foreign issues
and the FBI has worked the domestic side, with the CIA doing whatever was
required.  Under this old division of
labor DOD didn't need warrants to investigate because it ostensibly did not
investigate the activities of U.S. citizens. 
So why won't the old architecture work? 
Because information crosses many national boundaries and when an
American is discovered to be involved, legal considerations for privacy can
become a limiting issue for DOD.  


For the last 50 years the U.S. has focused on the USSR and its
satellites, and the GCCS served well. 
The information the US sought emanated from the USSR and it was
boresighted by collection agencies.  Now
the U.S. has the wherewithal to turn attention to all those issues that have
been backburner or resulted from the new                               25


world disorder, but the targets are different in nature and often more
sophisticated.  U.S. IW architecture is
not presently organized/chartered to maximize its potential.  Guidance is adhoc and much that is not
wholly legal is probably occurring.  The



Clinton administration is said to be working on guidance to support the
implied IW tasks in the July 1994 National Security Strategy document.  For instance, should it be legal for U.S. IW
assets to be used in a manner such that a U.S. company obtains a foreign
contract as a result, no matter what depth the competitor stoops to?  If so, which companies, or segments of the
world market, or geographical targets does the U.S. focus on with its superior
but not unlimited assets.  The
opportunities for scandal, national embarrassment and animosity among friends
is great, as evidenced by  the early
March expulsion of six U.S. diplomats by France, which was angered because it
claimed that U.S. spying made it lose a lucrative contract.  And how does one catch an opponent, or an
American proxy who tries to break into a system?  With global connectivity the opponent may be a hired gun anywhere
in the world representing a militarily unsophisticated, but well advised
adversary; the goal may be to bring down international trade if a cause is not
recognized.  Another example of a challenging
IW 


scenario might involve the laundering of drug money.  Current restrictions on DOD IW assets make
coordination between IW and enforcement entities awkward and cumbersome when
illegal transactions or activities that involve (at least some) Americans
crosses national boundaries numerous times. 
Is a IW "hot pursuit" 


                            26


needed?  Better yet, a clearly
defined yet flexible set of guidances is needed, soon.  


     To make matters even more
challenging, potential adversaries are obtaining encryption capability that could
evaporate many 


current collection capabilities. 
Secure phones have been available for several years and are affordable
to third world countries, industries, terrorist and would-be traders in
contraband of all kinds.  Encryption
software for personal computers was recently put on Internet by an American
computer expert named Philip Zimmmerman. 
His act may violate U.S. export laws which have sought to protect the
capabilities of DOD.  These capabilities
are so important that the US has pushed the purchase of the "Clipper
Chip," which allows U.S. security organizations to monitor communications
when needed.  The Clipper has been a
resounding failure with industry and the public.  Zimmerman believes Privacy is as apple-pie as the Constitution,
and adds "If you really are a law-abiding citizen with nothing to hide,
then why don't you always send your paper mail on postcards?" There is
sure to be a legal battle, but the damage has probably been done, and it could
only be slowed down a bit by the Clipper Chip. 
Encryption cripples IW, and to a lesser degree C2W, because finding a
signal of interest could eventually 


become much harder as more systems are used.  The biggest problem could be that breaking the information will
tie up greater amounts of expensive main frame computer time.  The information may take so long to find and
break that it will become of marginal use. 
Billions of dollars of U.S. security investment is at stake. 


                            27


     These issues need careful
study as the U.S. is vulnerable and needs to act decisively, yet is on thin ice
with respect to the constitution and international law.  The best return on IW investment will not
occur until all IW participants know their 


responsibilities and community tactics, techniques and procedures are
in place.


THE
INTERIM ARCHITECTURE: PHASE ONE


     Some sage from a past
conflict wrote, "If it looks stupid, but it works, its not
stupid."  Another asked, "Why
reinvent the wheel"?   When seeking
to provide an interim National Security Architecture, primarily to respond to
the IW threat, the hippocratic oath should be the guide; only those changes
that reap significant gain should be made, while major reorganizations should
be left to a new National Security Act. 



     The author can offer a
series of actions that would provide for greater preparedness for IW.  The first goal toward an interim National
Security Architecture (after negotiating a plan of action under the cognizance
of the National Security Adviser with the backing of the President as discussed
earlier) should be to share common databases and communication systems.  As stated 


earlier, work must start in DOD first. 
One example of a major step toward this goal has been made within DOD by
the establishment of MIIDS and Joint Military Command Information System
(JMCIS) 7.  The next step
would be to fill up databases like MIIDS through production responsibilities
that are delegated to the Services and agencies.  To use an example from the Intelligence field, the case 


                                28 


of MIIDS this delegation has already been coordinated and the guidance
promulgated by DIA, but action has been slow. 
Service Intelligence Organizations are overtaxed and sufficient priority
has not been given to this important endeavor that will hasten a quality
information pull down capability. 
Personnel within DOD are adjusting well to the information pull down
concept.  The Services are still attempting
to draw on their own remaining assets to do the specialized support operators
came to expect, however, many of those assets have been reduced or provided to
the CINC.  The Navy and Marine Corps,
for example, gave up Fleet Intelligence Center Europe and Atlantic (FICEURLANT)
to form Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC). 
The resultant inability to satisfy some Service specific needs has
caused friction (not unlike that described by Clausewitz regarding war) that
often comes with growth and change.  The
road will smooth as the players adjust to thinking about shared assets and the
difference between needs and desires. 
The Navy may desire strike planning packages to be physically made for a
likely target but if they can be held at AIC and accessed when needed via
JDISS, the result will be greater efficiency and probably accuracy due to ease
of update.  More emphasis is needed on
Joint databases so that duplication of effort is reduced and a standardized
frame of reference can be attained in all areas of IW.  Of note, the incorporation of NSA and its
databases into a greater IW effort would provide a test case in this phase for
the assimilation of quasi-civilian organizations in phase two; the lessons
learned would prove valuable.


                              
29


     Data is useless if it
cannot be pulled by those who need it. 
Sufficient communications bandwidth is needed to support systems like
MIIDS, JMCIS, JWICS8 and JDISS9.  The military is inextricably tied to
satellite communications and is now planning for the replacement of existing
systems during the period 2005 to 2010 10.  DOD has accepted major portions of the Navy satellite
communication architecture plan shown below for its master plan.  The vision brings more efficient,
anti-jam/anti-spoof, low-probability-of-intercept EHF capability in the near
term; it seeks to capture 


ongoing technology gains through flexibility in procurement,
constellation establishment and broadcast techniques 11.


                              
30


        MIIDS, JDISS, JMCIS,
JWICS and the communications to support their use should be made mandatory by
DOD/JROC/DIA so that the Services will buy common equipment; this would prevent
multiple non-interoperable systems from coming into the Services.  Joint operations would be easier because
personnel would no longer be unfamiliar with other Services' IW equipment.  JDISS is the best example of success in this
area 12.


THE
INTERIM ARCHITECTURE: PHASE TWO


     The first step of phase two
would be to gradually tie together DOD databases like MIIDS with the databases
of non-DOD organizations.  Assimilating
all non-DOD organizations would be too much too soon.  CIA, FBI, and Department of State (DOS) should be included first
over a year-long transition.  Database
security protocols and communication connectivity would be designed to be
appropriate to the classification level of information and need to know of
particular participants in all organizations. 
When hardware, software, and personnel adjustments are complete, the
remainder of the non-DOD organizations should be connected together in a
separate database which allows appropriate data exchange between the two data
bases.  Participants in a second
database would include the Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Treasury,
Secret Service, Department of Justice, Department of Energy, Department of
Commerce, Department of Immigration, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms.


     The next step in phase two
is bold.  First, to create efficiencies
and ensure unity of effort, the FBI should be subsumed                                31   


by the CIA over a two year period following creation of the two main
databases and attendant assimilation period. 
The major missions of CIA and FBI relate to HUMINT and these
organizations working together would be more effective against current and
future threats to U.S. National Security, most importantly IW.  Much of C2-protect in IW is related to
HUMINT; to catch a professional IW warrior or terrorist, one must think like
him or her and possess the infrastructure to react.  While this paper argued in earlier pages that DOD must lead the
total IW effort in the beginning, and will continue to lead in the areas of
C2-attack, a new CIA must carry the torch of C2-protect.  (Consideration should be given to NSA being
eventually subsumed by a larger CIA, as NSA's mission is essentially C2-protect
through SIGINT.)  There would admittedly
be some loss of specialized capability with the combination of the CIA and FBI,
and great consternation over centering too much power in one organization;
afterall, a consideration in the creation of the CIA was to provide a
counter-advisory body to the incredible power accumulated at the FBI under
President Hoover.  The leveling factor
that is needed is an empowered Justice Department.  An individual (perhaps the Attorney General) or small group
within the Justice Department, approved by Congressional vote, would have the
ability to have knowledge of all systems and databases in order to ensure
American civil liberties are protected and to coordinate legal questions of
immediate nature that relate to National Security.  This role would be advisory to the President and have special
powers of investigation, just as the current Justice Department 


                           32


possesses, but the empowered Justice Department would be able to monitor
the operations of all former proprietary organizations.  The time for this culture change has
come.  This step needs to be taken now,
but to remove politics from National Security questions, exploration into the
establishment of a person or body within Justice that would be permanent is
needed.  A possible model is the office
of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. 
Current Chairman Alan Greenspan holds a position of no less trust than a
Justice Department "Information Czar" would have.  A better title, given the current FBI being
eventually subsumed by CIA, would be Chairman of the Federal Board of
Information (FBI).  Confirmation of the
Chairman of a new FBI should be as somber a process as that for a Justice of
the Supreme Court.     


     Other less dramatic changes
would see NSA brought under closer DOD control in order to increase its
relevancy and responsiveness, and greater emphasis on Joint Intelligence by
scaling back Service Intelligence in favor of a leaner Defense Intelligence
Agency.    Service Intelligence
personnel should serve most non-operational billets in the Joint arena, either
at a Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) or at DIA.  As discussed earlier, with today's connectivity, deployed
personnel can take advantage of databases, imagery and expert analysis back in
the U.S. through systems like JDISS.   


     The steps outlined in
phases one and two would contribute in different ways to greater awareness,
capabilities and effectiveness in IW. 
The National Security Architecture might look similar to the outline
below.


       


                             33  


 


 


                       National Security


                        -   Council 
- 


                      -                 -


                    -      ____________     -


                  --------I           
I________


                  I       I  JUSTICE   I       
I


                  I       I__READ ALL__I        I


        __________I________            _________I___________    


       I                  I           
I                   I


       I     
CIA/FBI     I <------>   I   
TREASURY       I


       I                  I           
I                   I


       I     
STATE       I            I    COMMERCE       I 


       I                  I           
I                   I 


       I   
SERVICES      I   DATA    
I      DEA          I


       I                  I           
I                   I


       I  
DOD/DIA/NSA    I EXCHANGE   I     
ATF          I  


       I                  I           
I                   I


       I                  I           
I   SECRET SERVICE  I


       I "shared" databaseI
<------->  I                   I                    I                  I           
I    IMMIGRATION    I 


       I__________________I            I                   I    


                                       I      ENERGY       I


                                       I                   I 


                                       I__"shared"database_I


                                 


CONCLUSION


     IW has tremendous potential
for U.S. National Security. 
Unfortunately, IW also has potential for adversaries if the U.S. does
not act with vigilance and decisiveness. 
The U.S. has tended to use IW in one dimension; the true power of U.S.
IW capabilities lies in massing the efforts of all National Security
organizations under an overarching Architecture.  A U.S. National Security Architecture that connects security
organizations must be reorganized and made more responsive in order to stay ahead
of the IW threat.  Clear, coherent, aggressive
policy and doctrine will need to be staffed at the level of the National
Security Advisor so that Presidential action can be taken swiftly.  Modifications to the current National
Security Architecture will ensure coordination                                34


between the "producers" and "users" of Information
Warfare (IW) support is more responsive. 
The synergy resulting from DOD and non-DOD governmental National
Security organizations, fully coordinating operations, will ensure U.S.
dominance of IW.  To stay ahead in IW
the U.S. must not wait to act, but must move to change, and fully recognize
that it is already at war.      


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


                              35


                          BIBLIOGRAPHY


 


 


Army
Regulation 525-20, "Information Warfare," 09 November 1994.


 


Army Focus 94,
Force XXI, September 1994.


 


Auster, Bruce
B., "Info Wars; When knowledge is Military Power"


 


US News and
World Report, 24 October 94. 


 


CJCS Command
and Control Warfare, MOP 30 (Rev. 1 08 March 1993).


 


Boyd, Austin
B. CDR, USN, "Satellite Communications for the 21st Century", Space
Tracks, Winter 1995.


 


Boyd, Austin
B. CDR, USN, "Don't Shoot!," Space Tracks, Spring 1995. 


 


Boyd, Morris
J., MGen, "Force XXI Op," Military Review, Nov 1994.


 


Busey, J, B. IV,
Adm, "Info War Calculus Mandates Protective Actions, "Signal",
Oct 1994.


 


Campen, Alan
D., The First Information War, AFCEA International Press, Fairfax, Virginia,
October 1992.


 


Campen, Alan
D., "Intelligence leads Renaissance in Military Thinking, "Signal",
August 1994.


 


Carey, John,
"From Internet to Infobahn; The Information Revolution", October
1994.  


 


Clapper, James
R., LtGen, and E. H. Trevino, Lt Col, "Critical Security Dominates
Information Warfare Moves, Signal, March 1995.


 


Cohen,
Frederick B., "Information Warfare - Concepts and Concerns, The 1st
Information Warfare War Game", Presentation by Science Applications
International corporation for Office of the Secretary of Defense, December
1993.


 


Command and
Control Warfare, HQ USAF, AFPD 10-17, 12 August 1993.


FM 100-6,
Information Ops, Coordinating Draft, HQ USA, 22 July 94. 


Handel,
Michael, J. "Technological Surprise in War, " Intelligence and
National Security, January 1987.


 


Dixon, James
H., "National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, processes, and
issues," National Defense University, 1984. 


 


DOD Directive
TS-3600.1, "Information Warfare", 21 December 1993.


 


 


                               36


Hingtgen,
David L., LCDR, USN, "Honing Information Warfare Skills,", Space
Tracks, Spring 1995.


 


Information
Architecture for the Battlefield, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology, October 94.


 


Jelinek,
Michael L., CDR, "Integrated Air and Space Make Every Shot Count,"
Space Tracks, Winter 1995.


 


CJCS INST 5118.01,
Charter for JC2WC. 


 


Joint Pub 2-0,
"Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," Draft June
1991


 


Joint Pub
3-13, 2nd Draft, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W), 01
September 94. 


 


Joint Pub 3-0,
Doctrine for Joint Operations, Final Draft.


 


National
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, Washington
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McConnell, J.
M., VAdm, "New World, New Callenges, NSA into the 21st Century, "
American Intelligence Journal, Spring/Summer 1994.


 


Naval Doctrine
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30 September 1994.


 


Perry, W. J.,
Annual Report to the President and Congress, Feb 1995.


 


Powell, Colin
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Schwartz,
John, "Privacy Program: An On-Line Weapon?," The Washington Post, 03
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                             37


 


                          END NOTES


 


1     Historically, those writing on National
Security have used the term "structure" to describe the organizations
that taken together are tasked with U.S. National Security.  The term architecture has become common in
recent years, as it better describes the informal lines of communication,
tasking and responsibility that exist within and between organizations that
today deal with National Security. 
Information Warfare reinforces, even accelerates the trend toward less
structured organizations and groupings of organizations. 


      Coordination within the National
Security Architecture was enhanced in the years following the establishment of
the 1947 National Security Act by the use of interagency working groups and
working groups and task forces.  Within
the Information Age, dynamic requirements have forced more responsive reaction
to security threats.  The National
Command Authority needs the right advice quickly.  To provide more responsive service, individuals and small groups
from different National Security organizations often work together based on
Memos of Understanding (MOUs). (An example would be a Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) analyst with special expertise in nuclear technology working with
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capability within CIA, National Security Agency
(NSA) capabilities in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and with the Department of
Energy (DOE) to provide advice to brief the NCA on the advisability of
conducting an airstrike on a beligerants nuclear facility.


     Today's National Security Architecture
must take advantage of C4I improvements and emphasize responsiveness in order
to stay ahead of the threat, so that the NCA has the chance of shaping events,
but definitely can at least react gracefully to them. 


        


2     Office of the Undersecretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology, "Information Architecture for the
Battlefield," October 94.  The
Defense Science Board reports...Future "capabilities that are necessary
for command and control, for integrated situation awareness to all appropriate
levels, for effective support to the shooters, and for effective analysis and
training.  Information systems of
appropriate capacity are required between and among all levels of command to facilitate
access to and exchange of information vital to collaborative planning and the
effective execution of combat operations. 
This connectivity is accomplished by highly interactive switched,
wideband networks at the higher echelons of command providing interactive video
and distributed database transfer capability. 
Effective command and control among deployed warfighting tactical voice
and data networks requires more complex connectivity with narrower band
information.  


     The warfighter should have dynamic
control over the information form and flow. 
He should be able to lay out his information needs tailored to the
specific mission.  Commanders should be
able to specify what information he needs, to what level of detail, at what
frequency of update, with which access controls,                               38


with which
other information it should be fused, and in what form it should be
displayed... 


    Within the constraints of the current
situation, the information officer would then "reprogram the sensor,
communications and computing assets to respond to these needs.  This capability to reconfigure is not
available today.  The systems are not
capable of being rapidly reconfigured and the tactical staffs do not have the
technical capability or necessary tools to do the job.  This is and important refocus area for R
& D investment."  


 


3     ibid, 2."Corresponding directives
are needed to ensure that individual programs have adequate cost an schedule
provisions to allow the separate initiatives to achieve full interoperability
and a common operating environment. 
Until a process is put in place to ensure that the joint warfighter's
interoperability requirements are considered, these well intentioned but
service and agency-unique programs will tend to drift away from migration
objectives.


    
Current acquisition practices exacerbates the tendency to drift since
each program is independently supported by mostly independent agencies; a joint
corporate perspective is not built into the acquisition process.  The warfighting CINC's and JTF commanders
have little influence on systems under development or being modified, but they
have perhaps the most at stake when systems reach their ultimate
application.  The joint warfighters'
concerns should be represented during the acquisition process to ensure the C4I
systems that will support the warfighter, have maintained pace with
commercially available technology, and will intermesh well with legacy systems.


     Legacy systems must either be migrated
into or interfaced with common systems. 
The motivation to diverge from a common joint 


interoperation
structure is aggravated by the need to maintain compatibility with
Service-unique, legacy systems that are not targeted for migration.


     There is a need for establishing a
process, in a manner akin to that used for the Internet, that identifies
incremental improvements and ensures that each can be accommodated and accepted
by the other participants.  The part of
the Internet process that establishes standards, adaptation of commercial
products, and distribution of value-added products, has been shown
successful.  Some variant of that
process is appropriate to institute for the DOD.  Unlike the DOD, the DOD will need a method of measuring overall
cost and benefit of modifications, and ensuring that appropriate benefits
accommodate each incremental change. 
This requires refocused investment to develop and/or acquire tools to
facilitate these efforts."


 


4    The author has extensive experience with
JDISS.  JDISS is an extremely capable
system that allows the transfer and annotation of imagery, serves as a (up to
top secret) level message handling system, and can allow two sites to go into a
real-time chat mode at top secret level. 
Communications requirements mandate a minimum 96  kilobyte baud rate to run at an acceptable
speed.  This very 


                             39     


successful
system has been deployed throughout the U.S. Government and even to the UN in
support of OOTW.  JDISS is a fine
example of how the planned universal buy of a single system can create
significant synergy in operations.  


 


5     Office of the Undersecretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology, "Information Architecture for the
Battlefield," October 94.  The
Defense Science Board reports "The existing methods for moving and distributing
information in the fighting forces are largely hierarchical and
sequential.  Information flows in a very
orderly pattern up and down the operational chain of command.  While the new users of information are the
regional CINC and JTF commanders, the old patterns of distribution are embedded
in doctrine, force structure, and equipment. 
As a result, the top leadership is well serviced but lower levels are
increasingly unable to meet their information needs.  There isn't enough access or enough capacity at the lower levels,
due to bandwidth limitations as well as equipment and frequency
availability."


 


6     CJC Instruction 5118.01 is the charter
for the JC2WC.  It states that "the
JC2WC mission is to provide direct Command and Control Warfare (C2W) support to
operational commanders.  The JC2WC will
support the integration of the constituent elements of C2W--OPSEC, PSYOP,
military deception, EW, and destruction as well as the noncombat military
applications of Information Warfare (IW)--throughout the planning and execution
phases of operations.  This direct
support will be provided in the following priority order: joint force
commanders (combatant commanders, subordinate unified 


commanders,
and joint task force commanders), Service component commanders, and functional
component commanders.  Support will also
be provided to OSD, the Joint Staff, Services, USG agencies, NATO, 


and allied
nations.  The JC2WC will maintain
specialized expertise in C2W-related systems engineering, operational
applications, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.  The JC2WC, through the Director for Operations (J-3), serves as
the principal field agency within DOD for non-Service specific
support."   


 


7     The author has extensive experience with
Joint Military Command Information System (JMCIS).  JMCIS is a C3 support system that functions as a message handling
system for secret and below message traffic. 
Other functions allow the building of graphics to support operational
planning up to basic IPB level, a near-real-time display of reporting units
(UHF SATCOM), and a operational note ("opnote") function that allows
any unit to send a note to another unit in the net.  Like JDISS, this system was developed by the Navy and offered to
the Joint arena for modification and acceptance as standard Joint C3 gear.  Software functionalities of other services
has been melded into JMCIS, an example being CTAPS software used by the Air
Force to produce the ATO.      


   


8     The author has extensive experience with
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) while serving aboard
2nd Fleet Flagship, USS Mt Whitney. 
JWICS is a secure (to top secret) 


                            40


videoteleconferencing
system that allows intelligence personnel to talk face to face regarding difficult
issues.  The system has turned out to be
much more valuable to deployed Commanders to discuss campaign planning, ROE,
etc.  The system is distributed
throughout the world and allows the NCA to talk with CINCs and CJTFs at will,
face to face.  President Clinton
discussed issues over JWICS with the JFC during the Haiti operation.  When deployed aboard the USS George
Washington, the system was even used by medical personnel to discuss X-rays.      


 


9     The 52nd Director of Naval Intelligence,
RADM Thomas A. Brooks, came back to his office in 1991 following an office call
with the Chief of Naval Operations and said "We will lead Joint
Intelligence."  The Navy was the
only Service that would give up its best intelligence assets to the Joint arena
and was rewarded by the visionary Gen. Colin Powell with command of the major
Joint intelligence commands at AIC, JICPAC and JAC Molesworth.  The Navy knew Joint was coming and sought to
lead rather than have the strength of its very successful, opintel oriented
community diluted from the goal of supporting tactical commanders.  The Navy continued working toward joint aims
by developing JMCIS and JDISS.  The
author believes these events were watersheds for a tradition-bound Navy that
suffered the pain of change early, so that it could position itself solidly
behind Jointness and prepare its culture for the future.         


 


10     CDR Boyd in "Satellite
Communications for the 21st Century" writes "This unprecedented
expiration of space segment requires that Navy and DOD take a fresh look at
concepts and technologies, requirements, and resources as plans are made to
replenish these 


critical
communication satellites.  In an era of
diminishing budgets and burgeoning communication requirements, DOD must find a
way to meet more needs with fewer dollars."   


 


11     ibid 2, "UFO is based on a
commercial spacecraft bus, launched on a commercial vehicle, and is managed
with a lean minimalist team.  The Navy
vision is to free the spacecraft supplier to do his job the most efficient way
possible, free of strict government control. 
A second vision is the provision of a follow-on to UFO and MILSTAR in a
single constellation.  The NAVSPACECOM
proposal recommends that a medium launch vehicle class commercial spacecraft be
configured with UHF and EHF.  This
smaller, cheaper (than MILSTAR and UFO) constellation would be deployed with
three spacecraft per orbital slot, achieving economy of scale, graceful
degradation at end of life, and robust performance in the event of a single or
dual bus failure.  Among other visions
is the provision of a follow-on to DSCS using a commercially procured
spacecraft with X-band and direct broadcast capabilities, piping megabits to
small antennas (16 


inches)...satellite
resource management at the CINC, jointly interoperable ground sites, polar EHF
communications for operations north of 65 degrees and enhanced EHF packages on
UFO are among the other visions..." 


                           41


12     The intelligence functions of C4I are
leaned on heavily in this paper to show examples of where an IW architecture
can be fostered.  The author recognizes,
and thanks the reader for recognizing that IW success will require migration
toward system commonality in all C4I areas. 
The early success gained in intelligence and communications should be
carried over into accomplishments in areas such as sensors, decision support
hardware/software, etc.  Again, the
author would look to JROC to ensure success at the DOD level and a national
coordinating body at the inter-agency level.  
     


   


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


                             42


                         ABBREVIATIONS


 


ACTD             Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration


AIC              Atlantic Intelligence Command


ASD (C3I)        Assistant Secretary of Defence for C3I


ATM              Asynchronous Transfer Mode


ATO              Air Tasking Order


BITF             Battlefield Information Task
Force


C2               Command and Control


C2W              Command and Control Warfare


C3               C2 and Communications


C3I              C3 and Intelligence   


C4I              C3, Computers and Intelligence


CINC             Commander IN Chief


COTS             Commercial Off The Shelf


CJCS             Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff


CJTF             Combined Joint Task Force


CTAPS            Contingency TACS Automated
Planning System


DS/DS            Desert Shield/Desert Storm 


ELINT            Electronic Intelligence


FLTSAT           Fleet Satellite


FLTSATCOM        Fleet Satellite Communications


GCCS             Global Command and Control System


HF/UHF/SHF/EHF   High/Ultra/Super/Extremely High Frequency


IW               Information Warfare


JAC
Molesworth   Joint Analysis Center
Molesworth (England) 


JC2W             Joint Command and Control Warfare
Center


JDISS            Joint Defense Intelligence Support
System


JFACC            Joint Forces Air Component
Commander


JFC              Joint Force Commander


JICPAC           Joint Intelligence Center Pacific


JMCIS            Joint Military Command Information
System 


JROC             Joint Requirements Oversight
Committee 


JTF              Joint Task Force


JWICS            Joint Worldwide Intel
Communication System


MIIDS            Military Integrated Intelligence
Database System NDU              National Defense University


NTDS             Naval Tactical Data System


ONI              Office of Naval Intelligence


OPSEC            Operational Security


OODA             Observation, Orientation,
Decision and Action 


OOTW             Operations Other Than War


MRC              Major Regional Conflict


PGM              Precision Guided Munitions


RDT&E            Research, Development, Testing and
Evaluation


PSYOPS           Psychological Operations


SIGINT           Signals Intelligence


STRED            Standard Tactical Recieve Equipment Display


TACS             Tactical Air Control System  


TENCAP           Tactical Exploitation of National
Capabilities    TRE/TRAP         Tactical Receive Equipment/TRE
Applications


UFO              Ultra High Frequency Follow-on 


 


                             43


 


                             36


 


 


SUPPORTING
TECHNOLOGIES FOR IW/C2W


OUTLINE:


    DOD information architecture, or Global
Command and Control System (GCCS),   The
GCCS should be reconfigured and improved to allow the flexible and immediate
response to OOTW anywhere in the world, but also be robust enough to adequately
support, or ramp-up to a totally engaged U.S. military.  Changes must be made to the GCCS in cooperation
with non-DOD customers, both organizationally and in procurement, to create an
overarching U.S. IW architecture.- BROADCASTS VICE POINT TO POINT COMMS


- VIRTUAL
REALITY ISSUES AND TECHNOLOGIES


- OTHER
TECHNOLOGIES


- COSMIC
STUFF/BLACK PROGRAMS 


- TRAINING 


- COSTS VICE
BENEFITS


                


Today's
communications are more capable and sophisticated, but there are fewer
resources.  The management of friendly
communications has been challenge enough, but the possibilities of IW demands
an integrated approach between keeping ones own situational awareness while
confusing, deceiving or destroying an adversaries.  This responsibility is more, to use a military example, than can
be handled by the Communications and Intelligence Officers.  To reach maximum potential, IW requires the
proper liaison which a functional architecture provides, whether the operation
in question is military or otherwise.  


     While communications probably held its
proper place of precedence with respect to funding, importance, etc., during
the Cold War, world changes and technological advances have thrust the IW
concept to the fore.


 


GROUND - MOST
UNITS WITHIN THE AOA HAVE BEEN ATTRITED TO 50 PERCENT OF COMBAT CAPABILITY


 


NAVAL - TWO
KILO SS REMAIN UNLOCATED.  A CRUISE
MISSILE SITE LAUNCHED THREE SILKWORMS AT XXXX BUT NO DAMAGE WAS INFLICTED.  ANOTHER ? CRUISE MISSILE SITE WAS
DESTROYED.  COALITION ASSETS DESTROYED
ONE ALVAND CLASS DD AND ONE PARVAN CLASS PB IN THE NORTHERN PERSIAN GULF.  A SHIP WAS SCUTTLED IN THE PORT OF JASK,
WHICH COULD AFFECT G-4 THROUGHPUT IN SUPPORT OF MEF FWD AND FOLLOW-ON OPS.  


 


AIR - THE
JOINT FORCE COMMANDER HAS DECLARED ACHIEVEMENT OF LIMITED AIR SUPERIORTY WITHIN
THE JOA.  IRANIAN MARITIME ACFT REMAIN A
MEDIUM THREAT TO NEF/MEF ASSETS AFLOAT. 
JFACC AIR ASSETS FLEXED TO ATTACK A GROUND UNIT NOTED BY RECON TEAM THAT
POSSIBLY WAS TRANFERING CHEMICAL WEAPONS VIA TRUCK (BASED ON TWO BATTALIONS OF
INFANTRY PROVIDING SECURITY AND HANDLING THE DRUMS IN MOPP GEAR.  FOUR OF FIVE TRUCKS WERE DESTROYED.  


OTHER - THREE
SCUD WERE FIRED AT MIHAB AIRBASE AND THREE NODONG WERE FIRED AT XXXXX DURING
THE 0400Z HOUR.  AN END TRAY RADAR WAS
NOTED PRIOR TO THE LAUNCH.  AN END TRAY
EMISSION REPRESENTS THE BEST INDICATOR OF IMPENDING LAUNCH.  


 


ESTIMATE - 


 


12TH INFANTRY
DIVISION HQ DR375156


 


121ST INFANTRY
BDE HQ DR720293


 


1ST BN
DR774286 6 81MM


2ND BN
DR753289 5 81MM


3RD BN
DR736287 7 81MM


 


122ND INFANTRY
BDE HQ


 


1ST BN


2ND BN


3RD BN


 


************************************************************


 


 


11TH ARMORED DIVISION HQ



 


111TH ARMORED
BDE HQ EQ049678


 


1ST BN (TANK)
EQ055660    05 T-62


2ND BN (TANK)
EQ069697    05 T-62


3RD BN (MECH)
EQ030652    0-3 122MM MTR


4TH BN (ARTY)
EQ071671    1-3 152MM


ARM. RECON CO
EQ053634    2 BMP, 1 BMD


 


112TH ARMORED
BDE HQ EQ058815


 


1ST BN
(TANK)  EQ104798   18 T-62, 1 BMD


2ND BN (TANK)  EQ063801  
20 T-62, 1 BMD


3RD BN
(MECH)  EQ055827   4 120MM MTR 


4TH BN
(ARTY)  EQ074824   9 152MM 



ARM. RECON
CO  UNKNOWN


 


113TH MECH BDE
HQ UNKNOWN


 


1ST BN
(MECH)  UNKNOWN


2ND BN
(MECH)  UNKNOWN


3RD BN
(TANK)  EQ063933   14 T-62


4TH BN
(ARTY)  EQ063924   9 152MM


ARM. RECON
CO  UNKNOWN  


114TH ARTY BDE
HQ EQ119855


 


1ST BN
EQ106828 8 155MM


2ND BN
EQ102840 8 155MM


3RD BN
EQ120844 10 122MM MRL


 


**************************************************************


 


13TH INFANTRY DIVISION HQ UNKNOWN


 


131ST INFANTRY
BDE HQ IVO EQ180430


 


1ST BN IVO
EQ130390


 


2ND BN IVO
EQ130440


3RD BN IVO
EQ125535


 


132ND INFANTRY
BDE HQ IVO EQ160510


 


1ST BN IVO
EQ160510


2ND BN IVO
EQ110410


3RD BN IVO
EQ125470


 


133RD INFANTRY
BDE HQ EQ 163273


 


1ST BN
EQ182250


2ND BN
EQ190200


3RD BN
EQ150235


 


134 TANK BN
EQ030290


 


135 ARTY BDE
HQ IVO EQ210400


 


1ST BN IVO
EQ201315


2ND BN IVO
EQ235350


3RD BN IVO
EQ201390


 


105 INDEP
PASDARAN ARTY BDE HQ IVO EP490599


 


1ST BN
EP500600


2ND BN
EP510585


3RD BN
EP520600


 


106TH INDEP
PASDARAN MECH BDE HQ EP299742


 


1ST BN (MECH)
EP304812


2ND BN (MECH)
EP303782


3RD BN (TANK)
EP305750


4TH BN (ARTY)
EP434609


 


107TH INDEP
PASDARAN ARMORED BDE HQ VIC EP410610


 


1ST BN (MECH)
EP436602


2ND BN (MECH)
EP465561


3RD BN (TANK)
EP400583


4TH BN (ARTY)
EP434609


 


108TH INDEP
PASDARAN ARMORED BDE HQ UNK


 


1ST BN (TANK)
IVO EP640550


2ND BN (TANK)
IVO EP650530


3RD BN (MECH)
IVO EP650565


4TH BN (ARTY)
IVO EP740500


 


193RD INDEP
PASADARAN INFANTRY BDE HQ VIC UNKNOWN


 


1ST BN
EP897430


2ND BN
EP913466


3RD BN
EP891451


4TH BN
EP635599 (ARTY)


 


 


192ND INDEP
PASDARAN INFANTRY BDE HQ UNKN0WN


 


1ST BN
EQ080868 4 120MM MTR


2ND BN
EQ063877 3 120MM MTR


3RD BN UNKNOWN


4TH BN UNKNOWN
(ARTY)


 


193RD INDEP
PASDARAN INFANTRY BDE HQ UNKNOWN


 


1ST BN
EP897430


2ND BN
EP913466


3RD BN
EP891451


4TH BN
EP635599 (ARTY)


 


194TH INDEP
PASDARAN INFANTRY BDE HQ UNKNOWN


 


1ST BN
EP881451 


2ND BN
EP881451


3RD BN UNKNOWN


4TH BN UNKNOWN
(ARTY)


 


195TH INDEP
PASDARAN INFANTRY BDE HQ UNKNOWN


 


1ST BN UNKNOWN


2ND BN UNKNOWN


3RD BN UNKNOWN


4TH BN UNKNOWN
(ARTY)




      













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