War Termination Theory In Operation Other Than War: US Disengagement
From Somalia, 1993
SUBJECT AREA Topical Issues
War Termination Theory in Operations Other Than War
US Disengagement from
USMC Command and Staff
War Termination Theory in Operations Other Than War: US Disengagement
from Somalia, l993.
Christopher E. Wittmann US Department of State
War termination theory can provide useful insight into the process of
disengagement form Operations Other Than War (OOTW).
The study of the theoretical concept of war termination as a process has
largely been ignored at the expense of war initiation and war conduct.
Recently, however, scholarship has focused on the process by which a country
ends its involvement in war. Four major war termination theories have been
popularized. One holds that termination is the result of a bargaining process
between opposing parties, and that negotiation and bargaining theory adopted
from economic modeling is appropriate explain the process of war termination. A
second holds that it is the dynamics of the international political system and
a unilateral decision linked to a nation's security interests that will impel
the decision to end participation in a war. The third holds a key decision
maker will have the most influence in a war termination strategy. The final
holds that domestic political pressure will cause policy makers to adopt a war
strategy when the war loses public support. Each of the theories can be
used to explain the decisions involved in determining the end of Operations
Other Than War (OOTW). OOTW shares many traits with war but differs in two key
aspects: OOTW is more likely to be a consensus decision reached among
international actors and thus more ambiguous in its goals. At the same time
there is a similar ambiguity in the identity of the "enemy" in OOTW making it
difficult for the policy planner to establish a concise mission objectives.
Examining the history of the US involvement in Somalia reveals that an ability
to place limits on an open-ended nation building policy and the
characterization of one of the warring factions as the "enemy" prolonged the
decision to establish a OOTW termination strategy. In the end the decision to
terminate activities was based on
domestic political pressure following the 3 October attack on US
Conclusion: Policy makers should become familiar with termination
theory in order to plan termination strategy. Such strategy should be developed
concurrently with all other strategic planning.
The issue of war termination
has only recently achieved parity with the initiation and conduct of war as a
scholarly topic. It is common sense to acknowledge that every war must end, as
Fred Charles Ikle titled his book, but the process of war termination is still
uncharted territory to the majority of social scientists, policy makers, and
military analysts. That fewer and fewer conflicts in the present day are the
high and medium intensity conflicts commonly acknowledged as "war" further
complicates the issue. As we enter the post-Cold War era, however, military
solutions to social problems are
becoming a common policy option. These solutions,
including peacekeeping, disaster relief, and humanitarian intervention, are
gathered under the rubric "Operations Other Than War" or OOTW. Although OOTW
implies a reduced level of military or offensive operation, troops committed to
OOTW may well find themselves in a quasi-war situation as happened in Somalia.
Is it practical to use war termination theory as a construct to understand what
forces or events might lead to a disengagement from OOTW? Previous US
experience with war termination suggests that it is a process that can be
analyzed and that strategies can be developed to facilitate war termination, as
suggested by Foster and Brewer.1 In the case of Somalia initial US activities
succeeded because the mission was focused. Follow-on mission were less
coherent, and as such it was impossible to develop an effective termination
strategy. Familiarity with applying war termination theory to
OOTW may assist military and civilian planners to plan termination of
thoroughly as its initiation.
War termination as a field of
study is remarkably young. In the early 60's one researcher remarked that his
institution had become the world expert on the subject by assigning two people
to examine the subject for three days each.2
This lack of in-depth study is all the more remarkable given extensive
study and publications dealing with termination's cousins, the initiation and
conduct of war. Most inquiries into the beginning of wars, their conduct, and
their termination, at least in the Western democracies, begin in the late
1700's. Foster and Brewer write that the germ of war termination study arose
from Western European warfare in the Napoleonic Period.3 Prior to Napoleon,
wars were normally fought by forces under the direct field command of political
rulers. Goals and objectives were limited, and the operational leaders were
also the political planners who determined when the desired end state had been
Social factors such as familial connections among the
political and military elites or the inability of small states to finance
extended military campaigns against neighbors acted to keep wars short and
under tight political control. An additional political control over war was
that most wars were fought for small gains in property or power, not the
destruction of the political or national legitimacy of the opponent.
The rise of Revolutionary
France and the concept of a nation-at-arms, however, ended this era of
"chivalric wars." Competing political ideology such as democracy versus
monarchy became a driving force in the decision to attack another nation.
Increases in the size and complexity of modem warfare (especially of logistics
and arms) made it less likely a small aristocracy could control the forces
required to oppose a mobilized nation effectively. Political and military
authority was no longer centered in the same individual or small group of
individuals. Inevitably tensions arose as political leaders and military
leaders clashed over the objectives of a war. Carl von Clausewitz,
the 19th century military student and author, wrote
extensively on the relationship between parties within the State as political
actors and the use of war as a political tool. His famous dictum that "war is
the continuation of policy by other means" is key to understanding modem
Western concepts of war and policy.
Viewing the decision to start
a war as a policy decision leads to the conclusion that the termination of war
is also a policy decision. Clausewitz's ideas on the relationship between
political leaders and the military serve a useful role in analyzing this
decision. The subordination of military operation to political control is a
major component of Clausewitz's theories on war. Clausewitz held war to be a
servant of the political interests of the state and never a means in and of
itself. War thus formed only a part of the activity that was of interest to
society.4 At the same time Clausewitz notes that political leaders must also be
knowledgeable of military affairs to ensure that
military power is used for its most suitable purpose.
Intellectually he felt that any conflict between military and political
objectives must result from a failure of one side to understand the other, and
this criticism of civil-military relations continues to the present day.
Social scientists have
emphasized the subordinate role of the military to civil authority in the
security considerations of Western democracies in the past fifty years. Clearly
the military influence over German and Japanese decisions to go to war
popularized the view that civilian control of the military would result in
shorter and possibly fewer wars. The increase in the destructiveness and
mobility of modern military power, especially nuclear weapons, further spurred
the theory that policy makers, not military leaders, should decide the
acceptable risks for a nation to take when waging war. Fears that the competing
ideologies of the US and the USSR would cause the two nations to become
involved in a nuclear war were somewhat alleviated as proxy wars broke out in
Africa, Latin America and Asia. Because comparatively little damage was done to
superpower interests in these wars no one really became concerned with developing
a termination strategy for them.5
Given the political nature of
war, termination theories examine the actions of statesmen in the process of
ending a war. In general there are four major schools of thought. In the first,
war is viewed much like an economic transaction that can be explained by
economic modeling such as bargaining. Wars are, in effect, efforts by
parties to get the best deal -- which can include
economic or territorial gain -- at the expense of their opponent. One is
reminded of Clausewitz's observation that the purpose of war is to bend the
opponent to one will.6 A rational evaluation of the costs and benefits of
following certain identifiable courses of action should thus serve to identify
at what point it is most beneficial to both parties to end the conflict. This
theory depends on rational actors making rational choices. Paul Pillar expounds
on this theory using mathematical modeling to correlate gains and losses
against time as a predictor of war
termination decisions.7 In other words, wars tend to continue as long as a country believes
it can achieve some solid gain at minimal cost. As time goes on, however, the
cost to obtain the same objective increases. At a certain point each side
agrees they have reached the optimal level of gain and are prepared to finalize
the bargain by ending hostilities. A key point of his theory is that most wars
share certain traits, among them a conflict of interests, substantial costs
that end only when the war ends, and the need for each side to agree to an end.
This last trait ultimately undermines Pillar and the bargaining theory, for
some wars end when a party unilaterally decides to quit.
This unilateral withdrawal
forms the basis for a second theory, focused on the strategic interests of a
nation within the international system. Under this theory there is no real
consideration of the benefits of making a negotiated settlement with an
opponent; a party to conflict will cease its participation when the costs it
pays to conduct a war exceed the possible value to it of continuing the
conflict. An example of the theory in action might be the response of the
colonial powers in the 19th and 20th centuries to
popular revolutions in their empires. After a certain
period of attempting to put down the revolts, most colonial powers simply
packed up and went home leaving significant investment behind. In some cases,
such as the British Commonwealth or the Francophone Conference, colonial powers
sought to maintain an economic or cultural presence in their former
possessions. One might argue the transition of the Soviet Union into the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a modern-day example of this idea,
that rather than attempt to keep its empire intact the Soviet leadership simply
gave up. A variation of this theory was applied to the Second World War to
evaluate whether there was a cost in casualties that would have forced a
The third theory involves the
actions of a "decision maker," a key figure (or perhaps a fractional elite)
within a country which either by his presence or absence affects the decision
to continue war.9 The reported influence of Emperor Hirohito in forcing the
Japanese Government to sue for peace or conversely the suicide of Hitler as the
Soviets entered Berlin lend a considerable amount of weight to the validity of
this theory in certain circumstances. In Somalia, Somali warlord Mohammed
Aideed was identified as the "enemy" center of gravity in Somalia by some
policy makers. Attacks on UN peacekeepers were often blamed on Aideed before
the attacks were investigated. US and UN policy at times seemed designed to
marginalize Aideed, but it had the opposite effect of raising his influence,
according to many observers.
The final theory emphasizes
the effects of national domestic politics, not
international relations, on a nation's decision to end
a war. Both Bracken and Holl held that it is the action and influence of
domestic groups on a nation's leaders that is the greatest determinant of the
decision to end a war. Holl was particularly interested in how asymmetrical
wars, where one belligerent is more powerful than the other in some way, are
terminated on terms unfavorable to the stronger party.10 In both Algeria and
Vietnam French forces were unable to make effective use of their greater
resources. Neither was the United States able to win in Vietnam. Popular
opposition with the war in both countries prior to national elections forced
decision makers to reign in and ultimately end
participation in each of the conflicts. In these cases
it was popular pressure, not personal choice, political courage, or a sense of
righteousness that forced policy makers to terminate the war. A cynical view,
no doubt. One problem with applying this theory to a wider range of conflicts
is that it would seem by its very nature that such a theory requires that at
least one of the participants be a popular democracy. Holl also downplays the
political impact of the legislature on the process, a nuance that has obviously
changed since the Vietnam War era.11
These theories regarding the
mechanics of war termination are not necessarily exclusive. Certain shades of
the four color many decisions to terminate particular wars. Holl's argument
that domestic political consideration forms the most important influence is
tempered by Pillar's observations that thoughtful consideration of cost and
benefits analysis are equally applicable in the same situation. Another comment
on Holl, and
perhaps reflecting more the changes in the international
system since the 1970's than a flaw in her reasoning, is that her approach
implies that termination from domestic political considerations is a lengthy
process that requires an gradual attitude shift by the policy maker to
terminate a war. Are there in fact more influences on the decision to terminate
a conflict? The impact of direct access media has been considered by some of
the theorists, particularly Holl.12 As
seen in Somalia and the end of Desert Storm a sudden negative public
reaction to an operational incident can force an immediate decision to
terminate involvement. Events in Somalia -- the televised images of a dead US
Army Ranger being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu -- suggest that a
"CNN factor", named after the US based international news station, can by
itself force policy
makers into a conflict termination process.
War Termination Applied to Operations Other Than War
The theories above provide
concepts that help examine the process of terminating wars. But war as a whole
is an endangered method to resolve disputes. Increasingly, conflicts between
nation-states, among peoples in a state, or with sub-national forces utilize
low intensity conflict (LIC). A useful explanation of LIC is that it is "a
broad area of military and non-military operations below the level of
conventional combat between regular military forces."13 Among the many policy
options that can be used as part of a LIC strategy are economic manipulation
through insurgency to terrorism. LIC
may also develop from an increasingly common use of
military force, Operations Other
Than War (OOTW), especially when armed forces are
deployed into non-combat
situations to provide security or logistical support.
There are two key differences
that differentiate OOTW from war and which affect using war termination theory
as an analytical tool. First, OOTW are generally the result of consensus action
by a coalition of countries or an international organization such as the United
Nations or the Organization for African Unity (OAU). Proposals for a particular
course of action are floated either bilaterally or multilaterally, and are
modified in response to support or criticism until they are palatable to the
greatest number of international actors (perhaps more importantly not opposed
by key international players).
This process does not by its very nature offer the
military planner the clear-cut objectives he needs to create a mission
statement. Because modifications to political objectives continue even as
military operations are launched, military plans are often out-of-date even
before they are initiated. This was very evident in UN and US policy in Somalia
evolved from humanitarian assistance to nation building.
Second, OOTW rarely have a
defined "enemy" to focus the military effort. Of course in OOTW such as
disaster relief the objective is clear cut. In peacekeeping or peacemaking
operations, or in operations in non-premissive environments, however, policy
planners may not be able to identify centers of gravity to exploit to ensure
the success of the mission. There may be a temptation to create such an enemy
center of gravity when a mission begins to falter or to justify a modification
to a mission statement.
This seems to have happened in Somalia in 1993 with the
increasing characterization of Mohammed Aideed as the center of gravity for
opposition to relief efforts.
The US experience in Somalia
was marked by three distinct military missions in succession. The first two,
Operation Provide Relief and Operation Restore Hope were characterized by
definite objectives and general, if imprecise, timelines. The third operation,
an extension of Restore Hope in conjunction with the second United Nations
Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM II), has been characterized as a prime example of
In 1992 international relief
organizations were flooding Somalia with ever
increasing amounts of private aid to offset the threat
of starvation created by turmoil following the l99l coup against Siad Barre.
Local and regional "warlords," or clan faction heads, were stealing or
diverting up to 85% of the humanitarian assistance, according to the relief
agencies.14 Television coverage of both
the suffering in Somalia and the breakdown of the distribution system led to domestic
political pressure from private citizens that governments "do something" to
ensure that humanitarian aid was distributed. The spectacle of armed thugs
stealing and diverting relief supplies forced policy makers to shift the focus
of relief efforts from simply providing humanitarian assistance to providing
security for its provision and distribution.
The Bush administration
decided that the Somali situation would require a
political as well as a military focus. John Bolton,
Assistant Secretary for State in the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs (IO), testified that "[t]o be effective, UN peacekeepers in Somalia
will have to oversee a continuing political process whose goal will be not only
a cease-fire, but a resolution of the fundamental political differences
[emphasis added] among the warring factions..."15
The UN Security Council
(UNSC) authorized the deployment of military
observers to monitor a cease fire agreement among the
warring parties on 24 April l992.16 This mission became the first United
Nations Observer Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM I). The efficacy of UNOSOM I had to
be re-evaluated when the 50 UN military observers were able to do little more
than observe the looting. Although US pressure had earlier kept the mission small,
policy in Washington was undergoing a revision.17 In August President Bush
authorized the use of US military assets to airlift food to Somalia as well as
transport a 500 man Pakistani contingent to provide security for food
distribution under the mission name "Operation Provide Relief." Cynics
suggested that the timing of the US moves, two days before the opening of the
Republican National Convention, signified nothing more than an attempt by Bush
to reap domestic political benefits from his actions.18 Other observers felt
that US involvement
in the issue was simply a political move to placate
Muslim allies upset by US failure to protect Bosnian Muslims more
aggressively.19 Provide Relief was successful in its
objectives, providing needed relief supplies by direct
airdrop. Once the short-term objective had been realized emphasis shifted to
political and diplomatic resolution of the problem of restoring a Somali
government that would be able to provide security for relief efforts.
Civilian US officials felt
that the success of these efforts, especially after Somali factions broke a
shaky cease-fire that autumn, depended on a US led military operation to
provide security throughout the country. The perception that military leaders
would oppose such involvement seemed to eliminate that as an option. This all
changed in the Deputies Committee20 meeting of November 22, 1992, when the
Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. David E. Jeremiah, stated
"if it was necessary" the US military could handle the job of providing troops
for a humanitarian mission in Somalia.21 The US passed the offer to UN
Secretary General Butros-Ghali at the UN the next week, where it was viewed as
a solid offer of assistance instead of a proposed course of action.22
In a 29 November letter to
the Security Council the Secretary General laid out five options the UNSC had
to create conditions suitable for distribution of aid:
Continued deployment of UNOSOM under existing UN principles of peacekeeping
(i.e., no offensive military capability and military action for self-defense
international NGO's and humanitarian agencies to negotiate distribution with
the competing factions themselves;
would undertake a show of force in Mogadishu only as an attempt to pressure the
factions to stop fighting;
4. A country-wide security
enforcement effort under UN command and control; or
5. A country-wide effort
under command of Member states authorized
by the UNSC.
Butros-Ghali personally believed only the last option
was credible and passed on the US offer of assistance conditional on the
understanding that rules of engagement would allow forces to take offensive
actions in support of the UN mission.23
On December 3 the UNSC passed
Resolution 794 (l992) which established for
the first time a UN peacekeeping force under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. Normally reserved for conflicts that are characterized
as threats to peace and acts of aggression (such as the UN peacekeeping mission
in the Congo and Desert Storm), Chapter VII was invoked because the "unique
character [of the Somali crises] requir[ed] an immediate and exceptional
response."24 UNSC Res 794 authorized
the use "of all necessary means to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid." In
using "all necessary means" the resolution allowed the US to establish
offensive rules of engagement. At the same time, however, it left the
resolution open ended. Some interpreted the resolution as authorizing
disarmament of Somali factions.25
President Bush announced on
December 4 that 28,000 American troops would be deployed in a joint task force
(JTF) in support of UN efforts (under the United Nations International Task
Force (UNITAF)) to restore order in Somalia as Operation Restore
Hope. This action caught the American public by
surprise, but was generally supported in public opinion polls.26 In briefings
to the Senate the J-3 of the JCS established the mission of the JTF as follows:
Secure major airports and sea ports, key installations, and food distribution points;
Provide security for convoys and relief operations;
Provide open and free passage of relief supplies;
Assist UN and non-governmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief
under UN auspices.27
There was no end state
defined in the mission statement. The end state, however, was identified as the
final phase in the concept of operations briefed to Congress the same week.
There were four phases to the concept of operations: In phase one, US Marines
would secure the airfield and port. Phase two would be the deployment of Army
forces into Somalia. Phase three would expand operations into South and Central
Somalia, while in phase four US forces would hand off of responsibility UN-led
peacemaking force.28 This UN force, UNOSOM II, was to assist in the restoration
of Somalia as a country by providing security while diplomatic and humanitarian
tracks were followed elsewhere.
While there was no precise
picture of the end state the Bush administration generally believed it would be
completed soon after the inauguration of President-elect Clinton. Speaking to
reports that US forces would have reached phase four and be ready
to redeploy as early as 20 January l993, Defense
Secretary Cheney stated that it was not an unrealistic date.29 Congress was
advised that the transition to UNOSOM IT would occur when the CJTF decided that
the security situation on the ground was stabilized to allow the UN forces to
assume US positions. The moment at which this point was reached was to be "a
judgment call on his ECJTF] part."30 Clinton
agreed that the timetable would have to be determined after an
assessment of the tactical situation on the ground. JCS representatives
testified to Congress that there had been no change from the operator's perspective
because of the presidential transition.31 Elizabeth Drew characterized this
period as the inheritance of an unthought-through mission in Somalia.32 It is
obvious that close attention to Somalia and other foreign policy issues had
taken back seat to the domestic agenda that many believed had won Clinton the
From a Washington perspective
the UNITAF portion of Restore Hope was
fulfilling its promise. Phases one and two of the
concept of operations had been
completed, and phase three was in progress. On 4
February l 993 the Senate authorized using US forces in Somalia. House
concurrence was not obtained until 25 May l993, authorizing US forces to remain
in Somalia for an additional 12 months. Although there was some grumbling on
the Hill the success of the mission forced criticism to the background. Public
opposition was rare.
The hand-off from UNITAF to
UNOSOM II occurred on 4 May 1993 and US
troops were already in the process of turning control
over to approximately 25,000 troops
from 30 other nations. Some 3,000 US troops were to
remain in country to assist in logistical matters and to provide a Quick
Reaction Force (QRF) to the UNOSM II commander. Senior policy makers took pains
to assure Congress that it was in
"America's interest to ensure that the UN's first
multi-national peace enforcement effort under chapter VII of its charter was a
success."33 Congressional leaders such as Senator Pressler expressed concerns
that US troops had become entangled in Somalia with no clear end state.34
States Department officials continued to stress the national interest of
promoting an effective UN presence and multi-national peacekeeping operations.
The unprecedented nature of the UN experiment provided an effective alternative
to US intervention in such humanitarian missions. The JCS supported the State
Department views.35 However, neither agency provided details on what the end
state was or how the US would withdraw.
On the ground of course the
situation was changing. Following the ambush and murder of 24 Pakistani troops
in June the Security Council confirmed the authority of the UNSG's
representative to arrest and detain the parties responsible for the attack. In
Washington this was viewed as no big deal, more of an insurance policy to indicate
the UN would protect its own.36 The effect in Somalia, however, was to torpedo
efforts by the UN to maintain its neutrality. UNSG Special Representative Adm.
Howe apparently took the resolution to be a mandate to arrest Aideed at any
cost. He further reportedly was able to convince policy makers in the NSC,
State Department, and CIA of the need for increasing the involvement of US
forces despite Pentagon opposition. Aideed
responded by targeting the increased US force
presence. The 8 August attack killing four patrolling American soldiers led to
a JCS recommendation to commit additional troops.37
The failure of the Ranger
mission to capture Aideed and the large number of casualties did not force a
decision to terminate operations. The policy was already under development in
Washington. In August the Administration was becoming concerned that the
military focus of UNOSOM II had overtaken the political and humanitarian.
Pressures on the UN to clarify its policy led to a UNSC resolution requesting that
UNSG Butros-Ghali prepare a detailed plan with "concrete steps setting out
UNOSOM II's...strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security
activities."38 A few days after the raid Clinton was presented with four
options, ranging from a face saving reason to get out to a beefed up effort to
clean out Mogadishu with more US troops.
Clinton had rejected an immediate withdrawal (favored
by a plurality in public opinion polls39), concerned that an apparent running
away would damage the military credibility of the US. In the end it was
determined that additional troops would be committed to provide security for a
phased withdrawal to be completed by 31 March 1994. At the same time diplomatic
efforts to bring the Somali parties would be stepped up under the leadership of
Robert Oakley, a former US Ambassador to Somalia.40
It is useful to examine
operations other than war using some of the theoretical construct of war
termination. As noted above, however, the tendency for OOTW to be multi-lateral
and unfocused makes it more of a challenge to apply war termination theories
without modification. Of the various theories, both the domestic politics and
the bargaining models appear to have the greatest applicability to conflicts
involving the United States. The American experience in Somalia is still being
evaluated, but initial impressions seem to confirm that mission creep remains a
cause for conflict between civilian and military planners, particularly in a
foreign policy that increasingly emphasizes the use of military forces in OOTW.
Decisions to terminate conflicts and OOTW can be forced by adverse media
coverage, therefore effective termination options
should be developed at the same time as other aspects
of strategic plans. Termination of the Gulf War and the reconstruction of
Kuwait provides a valuable example.41
1 James L. Foster and Garry D.
Brewer, And the Clocks Were Striking Thirteen: The Termination of War (Santa
Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, l976), 2.
2 Paul Bracken, "Institutional
Factors in War Termination," in Controlling and Ending Conflict ed.
Stephen J. Cimbala, Greenwood Place Press, l992, l83.
3 Foster and Brewer, 3.
4 Martin Kitchen, "The
Political History of Clausewitz," Strategic Studies 11, no. 1 (November l988):
5 For an interesting
discussion of this sort of decision to decide nothing see Paul Seabury,
"Provisionality and Finality," The Annals of the American Academy of
Politicial and Social Science 392 (November l970: 96-l04.
6 Bracken, ibid.
7 Paul Pillar, Negotiating
Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) l983. Within Pillar is a
more detailed analysis of Zeuthan's approach that correlates risks and benefits
of various courses of action to predict the behavior of an actor.
e.g., Frank L. Klingburg, "Predicting the
Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Loss." Journal of
Conflict Resolution. Vol 10,
9 Jane Holl, From the
Streets of Washington to the Roofs of Saigon: Domestic
Politics and the Termination of the Vietnam War,
Doctoral Thesis, (Washington DC: Defense Technical Information Center, DTIC
AD-A209 460), May l989, 36.
11 Holl, 76-78. Holl mentions
Congressional power of the purse as an influence Presidential decision making
in foreign and military policy. But Congressional pressure extends to
legislative restraint on Presidential power. The effects of the War Powers Act
on these areas have yet to be tested in court. This is, of course not a
criticism of Holl but a caution that the dynamics of the Executive/Legislative
process on foreign and miltary policy continue in flux.
12 Holl, 73-76.
13 Heinz Vetschera, "Low
Intensity Conflict: Theroy and Concept," in International Military and Defense
Encyclopaedia ed. Trevor Dupuy, (Washington DC: Brassey's (US) Inc., l993),
14 Eric Ransdell and Carla Ann
Robbins, "Operation Restore Hope," US News and
World Report, 14 December l992, 26.
15 U.S. Congress, House,
Subcommittee on International Operations and
Subcommittee on Human rights and International Organizations of the
Foreign Afairs, The Future of UN Peacekeeping Operations Joint
Cong., 2nd sess., 25 March l992, Committee Print, 2l-2l.
16 United Nations, Security
Council, S/RES/75l (l992) 24 April l992.
17 Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in
Somolia," Foreign Affairs. 72 No 3 l993.
18 Clark, l20.
19 George J. Church, "Anatomy
of a Disaster," Time (October l8, l993), 45.
20 The Deputies Committe is
composed of the Deputy Secretaries of most of the
Cabinet offices and meets on a regular or ad hoc basis as needed. They
usually act on issues of importance in place of full Cabinet consideration.
21 Don Oberdorfer, "The Path to
Intervention," Washington Post, 6 December l993, Sec. A1.
23 UN Department of Public
Information, "Operation Restore Hope," UN Chronicle 30, no.1, (March
25 U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Armed Services, Restore Hope.
The Military Operation in Somalia Hearing, lO2nd Cong., 2nd sess., 9 December l992, l2 ff.
26 Church, 42.
27 U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Armed Services, Operation Restore Hope, the Military Operations
in Somalia, Hearing, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 9 December l992, 4.
28 Ibid., 8.
29 Ibid., 27.
30 Ibid., 10.
31 U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Armed Services, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Briefing on Current Military Operations in Somalia,
Iraq, and Yugoslavia, Hearing, 103rd Cong., lst sess., 29 January l993, 39.
32 Elizabeth Drew, On the
Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and
Schuster, l994), 3l9.
33 US Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, US Policy in Somalia
Hearing, 103rd Cong., lst sess., 20 July l993, 5-8.
United Nations, Security Council,
S/RES/865 (l993), 22 September l993.
40 US Congress, House of
Representatives, Message from the President of the
United States Transmitting a Report on the Military Operations
in Somalia, 103rd Cong., lst sess.,l993, H. Doe. 103-l49.
4l John T. Fishel, Liberation,
Occupation, and Rescue, Carlisle PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993.
Albert, Stuart and Edward C.
Luck, eds. On The Endings of Wars. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press,
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