Military

 


War Termination Theory In Operation Other Than War: US Disengagement From Somalia, 1993

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA Topical Issues

War Termination Theory in Operations Other Than War

US Disengagement from Somalia, l993

Military Issues paper

Christopher Wittmann

USMC Command and Staff College

Conference Group 9

18 April l995


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: War Termination Theory in Operations Other Than War: US Disengagement

from Somalia, l993.

Author: Christopher E. Wittmann US Department of State

Thesis: War termination theory can provide useful insight into the process of

disengagement form Operations Other Than War (OOTW).

Background: The study of the theoretical concept of war termination as a process has largely been ignored at the expense of war initiation and war conduct. Recently, however, scholarship has focused on the process by which a country ends its involvement in war. Four major war termination theories have been popularized. One holds that termination is the result of a bargaining process between opposing parties, and that negotiation and bargaining theory adopted from economic modeling is appropriate explain the process of war termination. A second holds that it is the dynamics of the international political system and a unilateral decision linked to a nation's security interests that will impel the decision to end participation in a war. The third holds a key decision maker will have the most influence in a war termination strategy. The final holds that domestic political pressure will cause policy makers to adopt a war termination

strategy when the war loses public support. Each of the theories can be used to explain the decisions involved in determining the end of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). OOTW shares many traits with war but differs in two key aspects: OOTW is more likely to be a consensus decision reached among international actors and thus more ambiguous in its goals. At the same time there is a similar ambiguity in the identity of the "enemy" in OOTW making it difficult for the policy planner to establish a concise mission objectives. Examining the history of the US involvement in Somalia reveals that an ability to place limits on an open-ended nation building policy and the characterization of one of the warring factions as the "enemy" prolonged the decision to establish a OOTW termination strategy. In the end the decision to terminate activities was based on

domestic political pressure following the 3 October attack on US troops.

Conclusion: Policy makers should become familiar with termination theory in order to plan termination strategy. Such strategy should be developed concurrently with all other strategic planning.


INTRODUCTION

The issue of war termination has only recently achieved parity with the initiation and conduct of war as a scholarly topic. It is common sense to acknowledge that every war must end, as Fred Charles Ikle titled his book, but the process of war termination is still uncharted territory to the majority of social scientists, policy makers, and military analysts. That fewer and fewer conflicts in the present day are the high and medium intensity conflicts commonly acknowledged as "war" further complicates the issue. As we enter the post-Cold War era, however, military solutions to social problems are

becoming a common policy option. These solutions, including peacekeeping, disaster relief, and humanitarian intervention, are gathered under the rubric "Operations Other Than War" or OOTW. Although OOTW implies a reduced level of military or offensive operation, troops committed to OOTW may well find themselves in a quasi-war situation as happened in Somalia. Is it practical to use war termination theory as a construct to understand what forces or events might lead to a disengagement from OOTW? Previous US experience with war termination suggests that it is a process that can be analyzed and that strategies can be developed to facilitate war termination, as suggested by Foster and Brewer.1 In the case of Somalia initial US activities succeeded because the mission was focused. Follow-on mission were less coherent, and as such it was impossible to develop an effective termination strategy. Familiarity with applying war termination theory to


OOTW may assist military and civilian planners to plan termination of OOTW as

thoroughly as its initiation.

WAR TERMINATION THEORIES

War termination as a field of study is remarkably young. In the early 60's one researcher remarked that his institution had become the world expert on the subject by assigning two people to examine the subject for three days each.2 This lack of in-depth study is all the more remarkable given extensive study and publications dealing with termination's cousins, the initiation and conduct of war. Most inquiries into the beginning of wars, their conduct, and their termination, at least in the Western democracies, begin in the late 1700's. Foster and Brewer write that the germ of war termination study arose from Western European warfare in the Napoleonic Period.3 Prior to Napoleon, wars were normally fought by forces under the direct field command of political rulers. Goals and objectives were limited, and the operational leaders were also the political planners who determined when the desired end state had been reached.

Social factors such as familial connections among the political and military elites or the inability of small states to finance extended military campaigns against neighbors acted to keep wars short and under tight political control. An additional political control over war was that most wars were fought for small gains in property or power, not the destruction of the political or national legitimacy of the opponent.


The rise of Revolutionary France and the concept of a nation-at-arms, however, ended this era of "chivalric wars." Competing political ideology such as democracy versus monarchy became a driving force in the decision to attack another nation. Increases in the size and complexity of modem warfare (especially of logistics and arms) made it less likely a small aristocracy could control the forces required to oppose a mobilized nation effectively. Political and military authority was no longer centered in the same individual or small group of individuals. Inevitably tensions arose as political leaders and military leaders clashed over the objectives of a war. Carl von Clausewitz,

the 19th century military student and author, wrote extensively on the relationship between parties within the State as political actors and the use of war as a political tool. His famous dictum that "war is the continuation of policy by other means" is key to understanding modem Western concepts of war and policy.

Viewing the decision to start a war as a policy decision leads to the conclusion that the termination of war is also a policy decision. Clausewitz's ideas on the relationship between political leaders and the military serve a useful role in analyzing this decision. The subordination of military operation to political control is a major component of Clausewitz's theories on war. Clausewitz held war to be a servant of the political interests of the state and never a means in and of itself. War thus formed only a part of the activity that was of interest to society.4 At the same time Clausewitz notes that political leaders must also be knowledgeable of military affairs to ensure that


military power is used for its most suitable purpose. Intellectually he felt that any conflict between military and political objectives must result from a failure of one side to understand the other, and this criticism of civil-military relations continues to the present day.

Social scientists have emphasized the subordinate role of the military to civil authority in the security considerations of Western democracies in the past fifty years. Clearly the military influence over German and Japanese decisions to go to war popularized the view that civilian control of the military would result in shorter and possibly fewer wars. The increase in the destructiveness and mobility of modern military power, especially nuclear weapons, further spurred the theory that policy makers, not military leaders, should decide the acceptable risks for a nation to take when waging war. Fears that the competing ideologies of the US and the USSR would cause the two nations to become involved in a nuclear war were somewhat alleviated as proxy wars broke out in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Because comparatively little damage was done to superpower interests in these wars no one really became concerned with developing a termination strategy for them.5

Given the political nature of war, termination theories examine the actions of statesmen in the process of ending a war. In general there are four major schools of thought. In the first, war is viewed much like an economic transaction that can be explained by economic modeling such as bargaining. Wars are, in effect, efforts by


parties to get the best deal -- which can include economic or territorial gain -- at the expense of their opponent. One is reminded of Clausewitz's observation that the purpose of war is to bend the opponent to one will.6 A rational evaluation of the costs and benefits of following certain identifiable courses of action should thus serve to identify at what point it is most beneficial to both parties to end the conflict. This theory depends on rational actors making rational choices. Paul Pillar expounds on this theory using mathematical modeling to correlate gains and losses against time as a predictor of war

termination decisions.7 In other words, wars tend to continue as long as a country believes it can achieve some solid gain at minimal cost. As time goes on, however, the cost to obtain the same objective increases. At a certain point each side agrees they have reached the optimal level of gain and are prepared to finalize the bargain by ending hostilities. A key point of his theory is that most wars share certain traits, among them a conflict of interests, substantial costs that end only when the war ends, and the need for each side to agree to an end. This last trait ultimately undermines Pillar and the bargaining theory, for some wars end when a party unilaterally decides to quit.

This unilateral withdrawal forms the basis for a second theory, focused on the strategic interests of a nation within the international system. Under this theory there is no real consideration of the benefits of making a negotiated settlement with an opponent; a party to conflict will cease its participation when the costs it pays to conduct a war exceed the possible value to it of continuing the conflict. An example of the theory in action might be the response of the colonial powers in the 19th and 20th centuries to


popular revolutions in their empires. After a certain period of attempting to put down the revolts, most colonial powers simply packed up and went home leaving significant investment behind. In some cases, such as the British Commonwealth or the Francophone Conference, colonial powers sought to maintain an economic or cultural presence in their former possessions. One might argue the transition of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a modern-day example of this idea, that rather than attempt to keep its empire intact the Soviet leadership simply gave up. A variation of this theory was applied to the Second World War to evaluate whether there was a cost in casualties that would have forced a Japanese surrender.8

The third theory involves the actions of a "decision maker," a key figure (or perhaps a fractional elite) within a country which either by his presence or absence affects the decision to continue war.9 The reported influence of Emperor Hirohito in forcing the Japanese Government to sue for peace or conversely the suicide of Hitler as the Soviets entered Berlin lend a considerable amount of weight to the validity of this theory in certain circumstances. In Somalia, Somali warlord Mohammed Aideed was identified as the "enemy" center of gravity in Somalia by some policy makers. Attacks on UN peacekeepers were often blamed on Aideed before the attacks were investigated. US and UN policy at times seemed designed to marginalize Aideed, but it had the opposite effect of raising his influence, according to many observers.


The final theory emphasizes the effects of national domestic politics, not

international relations, on a nation's decision to end a war. Both Bracken and Holl held that it is the action and influence of domestic groups on a nation's leaders that is the greatest determinant of the decision to end a war. Holl was particularly interested in how asymmetrical wars, where one belligerent is more powerful than the other in some way, are terminated on terms unfavorable to the stronger party.10 In both Algeria and Vietnam French forces were unable to make effective use of their greater resources. Neither was the United States able to win in Vietnam. Popular opposition with the war in both countries prior to national elections forced decision makers to reign in and ultimately end

participation in each of the conflicts. In these cases it was popular pressure, not personal choice, political courage, or a sense of righteousness that forced policy makers to terminate the war. A cynical view, no doubt. One problem with applying this theory to a wider range of conflicts is that it would seem by its very nature that such a theory requires that at least one of the participants be a popular democracy. Holl also downplays the political impact of the legislature on the process, a nuance that has obviously changed since the Vietnam War era.11

These theories regarding the mechanics of war termination are not necessarily exclusive. Certain shades of the four color many decisions to terminate particular wars. Holl's argument that domestic political consideration forms the most important influence is tempered by Pillar's observations that thoughtful consideration of cost and benefits analysis are equally applicable in the same situation. Another comment on Holl, and


perhaps reflecting more the changes in the international system since the 1970's than a flaw in her reasoning, is that her approach implies that termination from domestic political considerations is a lengthy process that requires an gradual attitude shift by the policy maker to terminate a war. Are there in fact more influences on the decision to terminate a conflict? The impact of direct access media has been considered by some of the theorists, particularly Holl.12 As seen in Somalia and the end of Desert Storm a sudden negative public reaction to an operational incident can force an immediate decision to terminate involvement. Events in Somalia -- the televised images of a dead US Army Ranger being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu -- suggest that a "CNN factor", named after the US based international news station, can by itself force policy

makers into a conflict termination process.

War Termination Applied to Operations Other Than War

The theories above provide concepts that help examine the process of terminating wars. But war as a whole is an endangered method to resolve disputes. Increasingly, conflicts between nation-states, among peoples in a state, or with sub-national forces utilize low intensity conflict (LIC). A useful explanation of LIC is that it is "a broad area of military and non-military operations below the level of conventional combat between regular military forces."13 Among the many policy options that can be used as part of a LIC strategy are economic manipulation through insurgency to terrorism. LIC

may also develop from an increasingly common use of military force, Operations Other


Than War (OOTW), especially when armed forces are deployed into non-combat

situations to provide security or logistical support.

There are two key differences that differentiate OOTW from war and which affect using war termination theory as an analytical tool. First, OOTW are generally the result of consensus action by a coalition of countries or an international organization such as the United Nations or the Organization for African Unity (OAU). Proposals for a particular course of action are floated either bilaterally or multilaterally, and are modified in response to support or criticism until they are palatable to the greatest number of international actors (perhaps more importantly not opposed by key international players).

This process does not by its very nature offer the military planner the clear-cut objectives he needs to create a mission statement. Because modifications to political objectives continue even as military operations are launched, military plans are often out-of-date even before they are initiated. This was very evident in UN and US policy in Somalia evolved from humanitarian assistance to nation building.

Second, OOTW rarely have a defined "enemy" to focus the military effort. Of course in OOTW such as disaster relief the objective is clear cut. In peacekeeping or peacemaking operations, or in operations in non-premissive environments, however, policy planners may not be able to identify centers of gravity to exploit to ensure the success of the mission. There may be a temptation to create such an enemy center of gravity when a mission begins to falter or to justify a modification to a mission statement.


This seems to have happened in Somalia in 1993 with the increasing characterization of Mohammed Aideed as the center of gravity for opposition to relief efforts.

Somalia

The US experience in Somalia was marked by three distinct military missions in succession. The first two, Operation Provide Relief and Operation Restore Hope were characterized by definite objectives and general, if imprecise, timelines. The third operation, an extension of Restore Hope in conjunction with the second United Nations Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM II), has been characterized as a prime example of "mission creep."

In 1992 international relief organizations were flooding Somalia with ever

increasing amounts of private aid to offset the threat of starvation created by turmoil following the l99l coup against Siad Barre. Local and regional "warlords," or clan faction heads, were stealing or diverting up to 85% of the humanitarian assistance, according to the relief agencies.14 Television coverage of both the suffering in Somalia and the breakdown of the distribution system led to domestic political pressure from private citizens that governments "do something" to ensure that humanitarian aid was distributed. The spectacle of armed thugs stealing and diverting relief supplies forced policy makers to shift the focus of relief efforts from simply providing humanitarian assistance to providing security for its provision and distribution.


The Bush administration decided that the Somali situation would require a

political as well as a military focus. John Bolton, Assistant Secretary for State in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO), testified that "[t]o be effective, UN peacekeepers in Somalia will have to oversee a continuing political process whose goal will be not only a cease-fire, but a resolution of the fundamental political differences [emphasis added] among the warring factions..."15

The UN Security Council (UNSC) authorized the deployment of military

observers to monitor a cease fire agreement among the warring parties on 24 April l992.16 This mission became the first United Nations Observer Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM I). The efficacy of UNOSOM I had to be re-evaluated when the 50 UN military observers were able to do little more than observe the looting. Although US pressure had earlier kept the mission small, policy in Washington was undergoing a revision.17 In August President Bush authorized the use of US military assets to airlift food to Somalia as well as transport a 500 man Pakistani contingent to provide security for food distribution under the mission name "Operation Provide Relief." Cynics suggested that the timing of the US moves, two days before the opening of the Republican National Convention, signified nothing more than an attempt by Bush to reap domestic political benefits from his actions.18 Other observers felt that US involvement

in the issue was simply a political move to placate Muslim allies upset by US failure to protect Bosnian Muslims more aggressively.19 Provide Relief was successful in its


objectives, providing needed relief supplies by direct airdrop. Once the short-term objective had been realized emphasis shifted to political and diplomatic resolution of the problem of restoring a Somali government that would be able to provide security for relief efforts.

Civilian US officials felt that the success of these efforts, especially after Somali factions broke a shaky cease-fire that autumn, depended on a US led military operation to provide security throughout the country. The perception that military leaders would oppose such involvement seemed to eliminate that as an option. This all changed in the Deputies Committee20 meeting of November 22, 1992, when the Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. David E. Jeremiah, stated "if it was necessary" the US military could handle the job of providing troops for a humanitarian mission in Somalia.21 The US passed the offer to UN Secretary General Butros-Ghali at the UN the next week, where it was viewed as a solid offer of assistance instead of a proposed course of action.22

In a 29 November letter to the Security Council the Secretary General laid out five options the UNSC had to create conditions suitable for distribution of aid:

1. Continued deployment of UNOSOM under existing UN principles of peacekeeping (i.e., no offensive military capability and military action for self-defense only);

2. Leave international NGO's and humanitarian agencies to negotiate distribution with the competing factions themselves;


3. UNOSOM would undertake a show of force in Mogadishu only as an attempt to pressure the factions to stop fighting;

4. A country-wide security enforcement effort under UN command and control; or

5. A country-wide effort under command of Member states authorized

by the UNSC.

Butros-Ghali personally believed only the last option was credible and passed on the US offer of assistance conditional on the understanding that rules of engagement would allow forces to take offensive actions in support of the UN mission.23

On December 3 the UNSC passed Resolution 794 (l992) which established for

the first time a UN peacekeeping force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Normally reserved for conflicts that are characterized as threats to peace and acts of aggression (such as the UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo and Desert Storm), Chapter VII was invoked because the "unique character [of the Somali crises] requir[ed] an immediate and exceptional response."24 UNSC Res 794 authorized the use "of all necessary means to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid." In using "all necessary means" the resolution allowed the US to establish offensive rules of engagement. At the same time, however, it left the resolution open ended. Some interpreted the resolution as authorizing disarmament of Somali factions.25

President Bush announced on December 4 that 28,000 American troops would be deployed in a joint task force (JTF) in support of UN efforts (under the United Nations International Task Force (UNITAF)) to restore order in Somalia as Operation Restore


Hope. This action caught the American public by surprise, but was generally supported in public opinion polls.26 In briefings to the Senate the J-3 of the JCS established the mission of the JTF as follows:

. Secure major airports and sea ports, key installations, and food distribution points;

. Provide security for convoys and relief operations;

. Provide open and free passage of relief supplies;

. Assist UN and non-governmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.27

There was no end state defined in the mission statement. The end state, however, was identified as the final phase in the concept of operations briefed to Congress the same week. There were four phases to the concept of operations: In phase one, US Marines would secure the airfield and port. Phase two would be the deployment of Army forces into Somalia. Phase three would expand operations into South and Central Somalia, while in phase four US forces would hand off of responsibility UN-led peacemaking force.28 This UN force, UNOSOM II, was to assist in the restoration of Somalia as a country by providing security while diplomatic and humanitarian tracks were followed elsewhere.

While there was no precise picture of the end state the Bush administration generally believed it would be completed soon after the inauguration of President-elect Clinton. Speaking to reports that US forces would have reached phase four and be ready


to redeploy as early as 20 January l993, Defense Secretary Cheney stated that it was not an unrealistic date.29 Congress was advised that the transition to UNOSOM IT would occur when the CJTF decided that the security situation on the ground was stabilized to allow the UN forces to assume US positions. The moment at which this point was reached was to be "a judgment call on his ECJTF] part."30 Clinton agreed that the timetable would have to be determined after an assessment of the tactical situation on the ground. JCS representatives testified to Congress that there had been no change from the operator's perspective because of the presidential transition.31 Elizabeth Drew characterized this period as the inheritance of an unthought-through mission in Somalia.32 It is obvious that close attention to Somalia and other foreign policy issues had taken back seat to the domestic agenda that many believed had won Clinton the election.

From a Washington perspective the UNITAF portion of Restore Hope was

fulfilling its promise. Phases one and two of the concept of operations had been

completed, and phase three was in progress. On 4 February l 993 the Senate authorized using US forces in Somalia. House concurrence was not obtained until 25 May l993, authorizing US forces to remain in Somalia for an additional 12 months. Although there was some grumbling on the Hill the success of the mission forced criticism to the background. Public opposition was rare.

The hand-off from UNITAF to UNOSOM II occurred on 4 May 1993 and US

troops were already in the process of turning control over to approximately 25,000 troops


from 30 other nations. Some 3,000 US troops were to remain in country to assist in logistical matters and to provide a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to the UNOSM II commander. Senior policy makers took pains to assure Congress that it was in

"America's interest to ensure that the UN's first multi-national peace enforcement effort under chapter VII of its charter was a success."33 Congressional leaders such as Senator Pressler expressed concerns that US troops had become entangled in Somalia with no clear end state.34 States Department officials continued to stress the national interest of promoting an effective UN presence and multi-national peacekeeping operations. The unprecedented nature of the UN experiment provided an effective alternative to US intervention in such humanitarian missions. The JCS supported the State Department views.35 However, neither agency provided details on what the end state was or how the US would withdraw.

On the ground of course the situation was changing. Following the ambush and murder of 24 Pakistani troops in June the Security Council confirmed the authority of the UNSG's representative to arrest and detain the parties responsible for the attack. In Washington this was viewed as no big deal, more of an insurance policy to indicate the UN would protect its own.36 The effect in Somalia, however, was to torpedo efforts by the UN to maintain its neutrality. UNSG Special Representative Adm. Howe apparently took the resolution to be a mandate to arrest Aideed at any cost. He further reportedly was able to convince policy makers in the NSC, State Department, and CIA of the need for increasing the involvement of US forces despite Pentagon opposition. Aideed


responded by targeting the increased US force presence. The 8 August attack killing four patrolling American soldiers led to a JCS recommendation to commit additional troops.37

The failure of the Ranger mission to capture Aideed and the large number of casualties did not force a decision to terminate operations. The policy was already under development in Washington. In August the Administration was becoming concerned that the military focus of UNOSOM II had overtaken the political and humanitarian. Pressures on the UN to clarify its policy led to a UNSC resolution requesting that UNSG Butros-Ghali prepare a detailed plan with "concrete steps setting out UNOSOM II's...strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities."38 A few days after the raid Clinton was presented with four options, ranging from a face saving reason to get out to a beefed up effort to clean out Mogadishu with more US troops.

Clinton had rejected an immediate withdrawal (favored by a plurality in public opinion polls39), concerned that an apparent running away would damage the military credibility of the US. In the end it was determined that additional troops would be committed to provide security for a phased withdrawal to be completed by 31 March 1994. At the same time diplomatic efforts to bring the Somali parties would be stepped up under the leadership of Robert Oakley, a former US Ambassador to Somalia.40


CONCLUSIONS

It is useful to examine operations other than war using some of the theoretical construct of war termination. As noted above, however, the tendency for OOTW to be multi-lateral and unfocused makes it more of a challenge to apply war termination theories without modification. Of the various theories, both the domestic politics and the bargaining models appear to have the greatest applicability to conflicts involving the United States. The American experience in Somalia is still being evaluated, but initial impressions seem to confirm that mission creep remains a cause for conflict between civilian and military planners, particularly in a foreign policy that increasingly emphasizes the use of military forces in OOTW. Decisions to terminate conflicts and OOTW can be forced by adverse media coverage, therefore effective termination options

should be developed at the same time as other aspects of strategic plans. Termination of the Gulf War and the reconstruction of Kuwait provides a valuable example.41


1 James L. Foster and Garry D. Brewer, And the Clocks Were Striking Thirteen: The Termination of War (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, l976), 2.

2 Paul Bracken, "Institutional Factors in War Termination," in Controlling and Ending Conflict ed. Stephen J. Cimbala, Greenwood Place Press, l992, l83.

3 Foster and Brewer, 3.

4 Martin Kitchen, "The Political History of Clausewitz," Strategic Studies 11, no. 1 (November l988): 30,32.

5 For an interesting discussion of this sort of decision to decide nothing see Paul Seabury, "Provisionality and Finality," The Annals of the American Academy of Politicial and Social Science 392 (November l970: 96-l04.

6 Bracken, ibid.

7 Paul Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) l983. Within Pillar is a more detailed analysis of Zeuthan's approach that correlates risks and benefits of various courses of action to predict the behavior of an actor.

8 e.g., Frank L. Klingburg, "Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Loss." Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol 10,

no. 2.

9 Jane Holl, From the Streets of Washington to the Roofs of Saigon: Domestic

Politics and the Termination of the Vietnam War, Doctoral Thesis, (Washington DC: Defense Technical Information Center, DTIC AD-A209 460), May l989, 36.

10 Holl, 53

11 Holl, 76-78. Holl mentions Congressional power of the purse as an influence Presidential decision making in foreign and military policy. But Congressional pressure extends to legislative restraint on Presidential power. The effects of the War Powers Act on these areas have yet to be tested in court. This is, of course not a criticism of Holl but a caution that the dynamics of the Executive/Legislative process on foreign and miltary policy continue in flux.

12 Holl, 73-76.

13 Heinz Vetschera, "Low Intensity Conflict: Theroy and Concept," in International Military and Defense Encyclopaedia ed. Trevor Dupuy, (Washington DC: Brassey's (US) Inc., l993), l578.


14 Eric Ransdell and Carla Ann Robbins, "Operation Restore Hope," US News and

World Report, 14 December l992, 26.

15 U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on International Operations and

Subcommittee on Human rights and International Organizations of the Committee on

Foreign Afairs, The Future of UN Peacekeeping Operations Joint Hearing, 102nd

Cong., 2nd sess., 25 March l992, Committee Print, 2l-2l.

16 United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/75l (l992) 24 April l992.

17 Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somolia," Foreign Affairs. 72 No 3 l993.

18 Clark, l20.

19 George J. Church, "Anatomy of a Disaster," Time (October l8, l993), 45.

20 The Deputies Committe is composed of the Deputy Secretaries of most of the

Cabinet offices and meets on a regular or ad hoc basis as needed. They usually act on issues of importance in place of full Cabinet consideration.

21 Don Oberdorfer, "The Path to Intervention," Washington Post, 6 December l993, Sec. A1.

22 Ibid.

23 UN Department of Public Information, "Operation Restore Hope," UN Chronicle 30, no.1, (March l993), l3.

24 Ibid.

25 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Restore Hope.

The Military Operation in Somalia Hearing, lO2nd Cong., 2nd sess., 9 December l992, l2 ff.

26 Church, 42.

27 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Operation Restore Hope, the Military Operations in Somalia, Hearing, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., 9 December l992, 4.

28 Ibid., 8.

29 Ibid., 27.


30 Ibid., 10.

31 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Briefing on Current Military Operations in Somalia, Iraq, and Yugoslavia, Hearing, 103rd Cong., lst sess., 29 January l993, 39.

32 Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and

Schuster, l994), 3l9.

33 US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Policy in Somalia

Hearing, 103rd Cong., lst sess., 20 July l993, 5-8.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Drew, 320.

37 Drew, 323.

38 United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/865 (l993), 22 September l993.

39 Church, 42.

40 US Congress, House of Representatives, Message from the President of the

United States Transmitting a Report on the Military Operations in Somalia, 103rd Cong., lst sess.,l993, H. Doe. 103-l49.

4l John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue, Carlisle PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993.


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