Forward
Air Controllers: Is
It
Time For Joint Training?
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:
Forward Air Controller's: Is It Time For Joint Training?
Author:
Major J. P. Tomczak, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:
Although the Marine Corps and the Air Force maintain comparable schools for
the
training of Forward Air Controllers (FACs), Air Officers (AOs), and Air Liaison
Officers
(ALOs), they both lack a key ingredient that will ensure interoperability--
standardization.
Background:
Currently, two services provide and maintain separate schools for the
training
and qualification of forward air controllers and liaison officers. Although
their
curriculums
differ somewhat, their purpose remains the same -- control and detailed
coordination
of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft in proximity to friendly forces.
Regardless
of service origin, the newly designated FAC must be as equally adept at
requesting
and controlling Marine aviation, and working with the Marine aviation
command
and control system (MACCS), as he is with the Naval tactical air command
system
(NTACS), the Air Force theater air control system (TACS), and the Army air
ground
system (AAGS). The success enjoyed by the FAC, in the joint environment, is
dependent
upon the interoperability of the training received. Inter-service cooperation
and
standardization, amongst the users of CAS, will assist in the prevention of
uncertainty
and confusion during joint operations.
Recommendation:
That the services standardize their current curriculums to ensure the
interoperability
and successful employment of the forward air controllers (FACs), regardless of
service
origin or unit to which assigned.
Table of
Contents
Page
Introduction 1
Close
Air Support-- An Early Perspective 3
Close
Air Support-- World War II 5
Close
Air Support-- Korea and Vietnam 6
Common
Ground 7
Forward
Air Controller Training 8
USMC--Tactical
Air Control Party 9
USMC--Course
of Instruction 10
USAF--Joint
Firepower Control Course 11
USAF--
Course of Instruction 13
Course
Comparison 15
Conclusion 18
Endnotes 19
Bibliography 22
FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER'S:
IT TIME FOR JOINT
TRAINING?
INTRODUCTION
Successful combat operations
involving the use of close air support (CAS) require a
high
degree of coordination and communication between the aircraft overhead, and the
forces
on the ground. The success of these operations depend upon the ground-unit
mission,
the need for support, and most of all, the ability to coordinate. Inadequate
CAS
integration,
on the part of the air and ground coordinators, reduces the effectiveness and
increases
the risks to the air and ground forces.
Ground commanders involved in combat
operations are extremely dependent upon the
forward
air controller (FAC), and his ability to influence mission success. By
Department
of Defense (DOD) definition, a FAC is "an officer (aviator/pilot) member
of
the
tactical air control party who, from a forward ground or airborne position,
controls
aircraft
in close support of ground troops."1 Each FAC, when properly trained and
employed,
provides the maneuver force commander with an expanded capability,
significantly
increasing the speed, range, and maneuverability of the attacking ground
force.
Unfortunately, not all FACs are alike. Debates over the usefulness of CAS,
differing
service priorities, service limitations, and inter-service bias, allow for
parallel
FAC
service schools that are neither standardized nor complementary.
Recent operations in Bosnia have
identified shortcomings within the ranks of our
military
FACs, while operating concurrently during Joint and Combined operations. A
recent
guest speaker at the Marine Corps Command and General Staff School commented
on
these deficiencies, with concerns about additional CAS training, and the
dissimilar
capabilities
of the newly arriving FACs.
Lack of commonalty and
standardization among the services required each FAC to
undergo
additional training in Germany, subsequent to their tactical employment in
theater.
This requirement for additional instruction is a result of doctrinal
inconsistencies
that
exist within our services, and schools, entrusted with the training of FACs.
Currently there are two services
that provide schools to which qualified personnel can
attend,
and upon graduation, receive the designation as a FAC. These schools are the
Air
Force's
-- Joint Firepower Control Course at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and the Marine
Corps
-- Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) schools located at Norfolk, Virginia, and
Coronado
Island, California.
Regardless of the service or school
origin, the mission of the FAC remains the same--
the
planning and coordination "of fixed -- and rotary wing aircraft against
hostile
targets
which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed
integration
of each air mission with fire and movement of those forces."2
The intent of this paper is to
determine if doctrinal limitations exist, between the
services,
preventing inter-service standardization of forward air controller training. In
doing
so, we can overcome service differences, and eliminate inefficiency, while
providing
our forces with a better trained forward air controller, capable of operating
in a
joint
or combined environment.
CLOSE
AIR SUPPORT -- AN EARLY PERSPECTIVE
The first aircraft involved with the
mission of supporting front-line troops were
ill-designed
and extremely frail, Barely capable of carrying their aircrew, these planes
struggled
to get aloft when encumbered with the additional weight of ordnance and
radios.
Originally sought after as a reconnaissance platform, these primitively armed
aircraft
"augmented the ground commander's lack of real-time intelligence by
providing
early
warning and position reports of friendly and enemy troop concentrations."3
It was
shortly
after their initial use that the reconnaissance aircraft underwent a
significant
modification
that involved the installation of weapons. This innovation effectively
expanded
the operational capability of aviation from one of purely reconnaissance and
position
reporting, to one that included interdiction and harassment of the enemy -- in
close
proximity to friendly troops.4
In 1915 a new tactical
reconnaissance aircraft, called the "infantry contact control
plane,"
made its first appearance. Initially deployed along the forward trace, this
aircraft
followed
the movement of friendly forces, "relaying important information to the
rear
during
periods of disrupted communications."5
By 1916, the use of these aircraft
were in heavy demand by both the Allies and the
Germans.
Their increased use dictated that the aircraft overhead and the personnel on
the
ground
communicate on a continuous basis in order to synchronize efforts. Lack of
coordination
and planning, by the air and ground forces, had devastating effects on the
morale
of the ground troops. Inadequate coordination and poor communications resulted
in
friendly aircraft attacking the wrong target, not showing up on time to support
the
infantry
attack, and fratricide.6
For the infantry, it was extremely
important that their overflown forces were capable of
identifying
their positions and intentions. Doing so, enabled the pilot to plot friendly
positions
and pass important information to higher headquarters. Although helpful in
identification,
the use of signaling devices presented a dilemma for the ground forces.
The
utilization of devices such as smoke, flares, or lights, (commonly used during
that
time)
made units on the ground extremely susceptible to enemy observation and
artillery.
When
all else failed, the contact patrol pilots simply descended to treetop level;
"in an
attempt
to identify the positions of friendly and enemy troops by observing the
appropriate
uniform."7
In the end, the stalemate of
trench-warfare gave way to massed infantry and
coordinated
air attacks against the retreating German armies. Studies involving the use of
aviation
provided planners with numerous lessons learned. Three rather significant
lessons
are: "First, the sighting of aircraft, either reconnaissance or close air
support,
have
a significant effect on the morale of both the friendly and enemy troops.
Nothing
lifted
the spirits of the men in the trenches, preparing for the attack, like the
sight and
sound
of friendly aircraft passing overhead, enroute to attack enemy positions to
their
immediate
front. Second, the use of aircraft during any close air support mission played
a
far
greater role psychologically than it did with physical damage.
Observers
during the use of aircraft noted:
A division of first class troops,
that received with equanimity four thousand shells per day in
its
sector, has been known to be greatly disturbed and harassed by the efforts of
one persistently
active
day bomber. Inquiry showed that almost every man in the division believed
himself to
have
been in danger from this plane.8
Third,
communications between the ground and air forces are essential if we are to
minimize
confusion, synchronize efforts, and prevent fratricide."9
CLOSE
AIR SUPPORT -- WORLD WAR II
The devastating effects of CAS were
first observed during the German advance into
Poland
during the late 1930s. The Junkers JU-87 aircraft, working in conjunction with
the
panzer units, created a combined--arms shock effect that quickly overwhelmed
forces
unprepared
for this type of warfare.
Although highly successful, the
Germans westward drive through Europe identified
numerous
shortcomings in their ability to effectively integrate CAS. Dynamic battle
conditions,
involving rapid mechanized operations, presented a confusing environment
for
the Germans coordinating CAS. "Above all, reported the First Air Force
(Luftflotte
1),
the communications between ground forces and supporting Luftwaffe units would
have
to be considerably improved."10 Lack of liaison officers, who provided the
constant
flow
of information between the air and ground commanders, resulted in the use of
operating
procedures dating back to WW I. Once again, advancing troops would rely on
the
use of smoke and clearly marked recognition devices, in place of radios, to
indicate
who
they were and what their position was.
Of more concern was the impact that
uncoordinated air attacks had on morale.
"Throughout
the campaign, 10th Panzer Division's units were constantly machine-gunned
and
bombed from the air by German aircraft. One of its units received a
particularly
graphic
demonstration of Luftwaffe effectiveness that left thirteen dead and
twenty-five
badly
wounded Germans. This event occurred eventhough visual marking and signal
devices
were in use."11
Allied forces operating against the
Japanese in Guadalcanal, Bouganville, and the
Philippines
were quick to capitalize on the advantages offered by CAS. The successful
introduction
of the FAC, and the development of standardized marking procedures,
presented
a winning combination against the dug-in Japanese forces.
Operating
in a triple-canopy jungle was not without its challenge. Ground operations
required
continuous and detailed coordination in order to effectively integrate CAS
throughout
the attack. Lack of maps, unfamiliar terrain, and thick vegetation, made it
difficult
to distinguish between friendly and enemy forces. Although improvements via
radio
enhanced coordination and control during CAS, the FAC continued to resort to
the
use
of visual marking devices in order to assure identification. "Panels,
bedsheets,
reflecting
surfaces, smoke shells, and even rockets were tried as a means of identifying
friendly
positions or enemy targets. "12
KOREA
AND VIETNAM
CAS played an integral role during
its extensive use throughout the Korean and
Vietnam
conflicts. Increased requirements for missions to support the ground troops
necessitated
the need for continuous communications in order to request, advise, and
control
the aircraft supporting the ground forces. The use of advanced weaponry to
support
the ground forces during all-weather conditions, day or night, reaffirmed the
need
for
the FAC to coordinate their use and ensure its proper employment.
More recently, operations in Desert
Storm illustrated the importance of coordination
during
the fast paced mechanized operations that characterized the ground offensive.
Although
successful in the attack, joint and combined forces suffered several instances
of
fratricide
due to misidentification of friendly forces and loss of situational awareness.
Once
again, advancing forces would resort to the age old use of visual marking
devices--
orange
panels and inverted Vs -- in order to assist in the identification of friendly
troops.
Future upgrades to the communication
and navigational equipment will allow pilots to
strike their targets with unprecedented
accuracy. The increased lethality and precision of
air
delivered munitions highlight the need for increased vigilance by the FAC, in
order to
integrate
the advantages of CAS into the ground commander's scheme of maneuver.
C0MMON
GROUND
CAS assists ground commanders by
adding depth and flexibility to their combat force.
When
properly coordinated, no other function can react as quickly or decisively for
the
ground
commander. FACs act as a conduit between the air and ground forces, providing
essential
coordination and communication for CAS.
Operations
involving CAS require the FAC to perform several simultaneous tasks during
the
terminal control of one or more aircraft. Marking the target, suppression of
enemy
air-defenses,
fire support coordination, and terminal control, all occur within thirty to
forty-five
seconds of each other. Each FAC, in order to perform his tasks in a confident
and
competent manner, must be capable of exhibiting the following traits. These
traits
are:
1) knowledge of maneuver warfare and operating procedures that assist ground
operations;
(2) knowledge and capabilities of all aircraft under his direction; (3) special
techniques,
such as briefing methods or marking targets, to assist in the identification of
targets;
(4) and, familiarity with the various types of ordnance.13 Although
not-inclusive,
these
attributes form the basic foundation from which the FAC schools orient their
instruction.
As the FAC matures, he will add and take away from this foundation to
become
a sought after asset by the ground commander.
FORWARD
AIR CONTROLLER TRAINING
Currently, two services provide and
maintain separate schools for the training and
qualification
of forward air controllers. Although their curriculum design differs
somewhat,
their intent remains the same -- control and detailed coordination of fixed
and
rotary-wing aircraft, in close proximity of friendly forces.
Upon completing either of these
schools, the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) course
for
the Marine Corps, or the Joint Firepower Control Course for the Air Force, the
graduate
is capable of advising the ground combat commander on the proper use and
limitations
of supporting aircraft for CAS, reconnaissance, and airlift; requesting
immediate
and preplanned CAS; assessing battle damage (BDA); gathering intelligence
and
providing information to the ground commander on the capabilities of threat
aircraft;
and
remaining continuously aware of the friendly positions, and the ground scheme
of
maneuver,
in order to prevent fratricide while supporting the efforts of the ground
commander.14
Regardless of service origin, the
newly designated FAC must be as equally adept at
requesting
and controlling Marine aircraft, and working with the Marine aviation
command
and control system (MACCS), as he is with the Naval tactical air command
system
(NTACS), the Air Force theater air control system (TACS), and the Army air
ground
system (AAGS). The future success of the FAC depends upon the
interoperability
of his training. Inter-service cooperation, in a joint training
environment,
provides the FAC with the best education available to prevent uncertainty
and
confusion during joint or combined operations.
USMC
-- TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY (TACP) COURSE
The Marine Corps currently maintains
two tactical air control party (TACP) schools,
located
with the Landing Force Training Command-Atlantic, in Norfolk, Virginia, and
the
Landing Force Training Command-Pacific, in Coronado, California. Normally, only
naval
aviators or naval flight officers attend these three week schools. Other
personnel
who
desire this education may attend the school whenever funding and openings are
available.
Upon graduation the naval aviators and naval flight officers receive the
secondary
military occupational specialty (MOB) code, of 7207 -- forward air controller.
Classroom instruction encompasses a
wide variety of topics with emphasis placed on
the
Marine Corps bread and butter -- the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and
Amphibious
Operations. Classroom lectures discuss (in detail) joint doctrine dealing
with
amphibious operations, preparation of the landing plan, and passing command and
control
ashore. Requesting, ,spotting, and making adjustments of Naval Shore Fire
Support
(NSFS), Artillery, and Mortars, while simultaneously integrating CAS, receives
heavy
emphasis throughout the course.
Classroom training climaxes in a
live-fire CAS exercise in which the future FAC
requests
and controls CAS missions -- both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft -- to include
the
occasional
AC-130. Additionally, each student FAC receives an opportunity to conduct
missions
involving the suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), and the employment of
mortars,
artillery, and laser designators for the marking of targets.
The culmination of this education
produces a highly trained FAC, who is capable of
operations
that utilize maneuver warfare through the application of combined arms.15
USMC
-- COURSE OF INSIRUCTION
Block
1 Introduction to maneuver warfare, terminology, and concepts
Joint doctrine for amphibious operations
Amphibious exercise -- practical exercise
Introduction to the TACP
Block
2 Introduction to the Amphibious landing plan
Landing plan -- practical exercise
Helicopterborne operations -- Assault support requests, Controlling
assault
support missions
Preparation of the overall fire support plan
Block
3 Aviation estimate of supportability
Estimate of supportability -- practical exercise
Preparation of the air operations annex
Preparation of the air fire plan tab to the fire support appendix
Air fire planning -- prepare the air fire plan tab to the fire support
annex
Block
4 Introduction to the navy tactical control system
Introduction to the marine air command and control system
Introduction to the theater air control system
Introduction to the army air ground system
Block
5 Aviation Weapons characteristics
Target location, effect
desired
Fire support coordination and air control measures
Conduct artillery/mortar mission
Conduct a naval surface fire support -- call for fire
Conduct an artillery mission -- call for fire and adjustments
Apply the targeting process to support the commander's battle plan
Fire support plan
Block
6 Request and control air support
Practical exercise -- Phasing control and coordination ashore
Block
7 Plan SEAD fires for air support missions
Plan for air defense of ground units
Selection of ordnance
Request OAS
Request CAS
Block
8 Control a laser mission
Assault support requirements
Request and control CIFS mission
Block
9 Plan SEAD fires for air support missions
Practical exercise -- Fire support coordination
Block
10 Control a RABFAC mission
Fire support coordination measures
Block
11 Map reading, artillery, and naval gunfire
Planning amphibious operations
Amphibious landing plan
*The current USMC-TACP schools do
not arrange their curriculum according to the
training
blocks provided above. The eleven training blocks shown above reflect a break
between
subject course material, where subject matter changed, allowing for an easier
digestion
of the curriculum. The classes shown above reflect the correct order of
presentation
during the course.16
USAF
-- JOINT FIREPOWER CONTROL COURSE
The Air Force instructs the Joint
Firepower Control Course (JFCC) at the Air-Ground
Operations
School (AGOS) at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Like the Marine Corps, the Air
Force
obtains the majority of its FACs from the aviator ranks. Additionally, the Air
Force
supports a program in which qualified enlisted personnel, upon meeting the
stringent
requirements, receive the designation as a Enlisted Terminal Attack Controller
(ETAC).
Each Air Force ETAC is required to: (1)complete an introductory apprentice
course,
(2) operate successfully -- for approximately two years -- as a radio operator,
assisting
the Air Liaison Officer (ALO) during Army field operations, (3) and
successfully
complete the JFCC course prior to becoming a fully qualified terminal air
controller.
Each ETAC, when assigned to the battalion, works directly for the ALO in a
capacity
similar to the Air Officer (AO)/FAC relationship that exists within a Marine
infantry
battalion. Although members from other services attend the JFCC school, only
Air
Force personnel receive the designation as a ALO/FAC/ETAC.
Air Force FACs support Army ground
operations utilizing a program commonly
referred
to as "Rent-a-FAC." This program envisions trained pilots, who as
FACs,
remain
with their respective squadrons until their assigned ground unit deploys for
training
exercises or real world contingencies. Exceptions with this policy allow for
the
permanent
assignment of FACs to special Army units -- such as the Rangers. The FAC,
upon
completion of the exercise or contingency, returns to his respective squadron
in an
effort
to continue pilot training and maintain his proficiency as an airborne FAC
(FAC(A)).
Although this program appears to
work well for both the Army and the Air Force, it
comes
with several strings attached. First, not having permanently assigned FACs
makes
it
difficult for the ground commander to develop a rapport with an essential
element of
his
combat team, (the FAC). Second, the FACs initial absence, during the early
stages of
gathering
information, does not facilitate air-ground planning and coordination. Third,
the
combination of the first two -- counteract any attempt by the ground commander
to
instill
unit cohesion.
Classroom instruction throughout the
joint firepower control course places heavy
emphasis
on the doctrine, missions, and organizations within the four services.
Classroom
instruction on enemy capabilities, and associated weaponry, is particularly
relevant
given the requirement for detailed coordination during CAS missions requiring
SEAD.
Planning for and requesting indirect fire for target marking, and fire support
coordination,
allows each student to become extremely familiar with the various
command
and control agencies.
Classroom instruction concludes with
an outdoor exercise involving actual aircraft
conducting
CAS missions. Unfortunately, a shortage of training assets -- artillery and
mortars
-- prevents the students from planning and coordinating actual missions that
require
the marking of targets and/or SEAD.17
Upon graduation, the newly trained
FAC is capable of advising the ground commander
on
CAS employment, assisting with planning and coordination, and controlling
aircraft
involved
in CAS. Like the Marine Corps, emphasis progressively shifts from control, to
liaison,
at each higher echelon of assignment.18
USAF
-- COURSES OF INSTRUCTION
Block
1 Air threats, characteristics, strengths and weakness'
Introduction to threat armor, antiarmor, armored personnel
Introduction to armored carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery,
and air
defense systems.
Block
2 Army mission and organization, roles that support the national military
strategy
Basic operational concepts and doctrine of the Army
USAFs roles, missions, and organization
Doctrine of USAF, aerospace, and aerospace power
USN roles, missions, and organization
USMC warfighting philosophies -- maneuver warfare, firepower and
mobility,
and combined arms.
The MAGTF
Block
3 USAF -- theater air control system JACS)
Army air ground system (AAGS)
Primary agencies, basic functions and locations of TACS and AAGS
Ground liaison officer/air recon liaison officer responsibilities
FSCOORD
Joint Airspace Control
Communications systems of the TACS
Electronic threat on the battlefield
Marine air command and control system (MACCS)
Block
4 Air defense artillery (ADA)
CAS mission planning
Map reading
Emergency procedures for CAS
Tactical Air Reconnaissance
Introduction to Joint Publications
Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT)
Joint SEAD
Laser use and target acquisition for laser guided munitions
Block
5 USAF aircraft
USAF weapons
Weapons seminar
Introduction to artillery, armor, and infantry weapons
Introduction to Army aviation
Six functions of Marine aviation
Intro. to U.S. Navy ships and aircraft
Introduction to Naval Gunfire
Introduction to Air
Defense Artillery
Block
6 TACP and its functions
AN/GRC-206 communications system
Army operations and doctrine
Communications security
Authentication/SOI
Portable radios
Artillery adjustments
Practical exercise -- combat planning
Air Liaison Officer (ALO) responsibilities"
COURSE
COMPARISON
Close air support, by its very
nature, requires considerable planning and coordination
between
the ground commander, and the forward air controller. As a force multiplier,
close
air support enhances the capability of the ground commander by increasing his
available
firepower and responsiveness.
The success of our future forward
air controllers depends upon the training he receives,
and
the expectations placed on him by the ground force commander. In order to
compare
the
relevance of our service FAC training, and to dispel any myths about what a FAC
can
and
cannot do, the following questions need addressing:
First,
what is the desired end-product?
The Marine Corps envisions the FAC,
as an operator, working inconjunction with the
forward
elements of the battalion. As a liaison between the air and ground forces, he
advises
the infantry company commander on the proper employment of all aircraft
involved
in supporting the ground scheme of maneuver. The air officer (AO), as the
senior
most FAC -- of the three assigned -- works alongside the battalion-level fire
support
coordinatior during operations. The duties of the AO require him to: advise the
battalion
level commander on the proper use of supporting aircraft; monitor and be
prepared
to exercise, control of aircraft during the terminal phase of CAS missions;
and
relay pertinent information to the appropriate tactical air control agency.
Regardless
of their duties, each AO/FAC is adept at fire support coordination at the
company
and battalion level. The training received on the use of mortars, artillery,
and
naval
gunfire, allow each AO/FAC to competently function as an additional forward
observer
(FO); effectively increasing the flexibility of the ground force commander.
The
Air Force employs their TACP school graduates as Air Liaison Officers (ALOs),
working
with the ground force planners to integrate CAS with the ground scheme of
maneuver.
Furthermore, they plan reconnaissance and airlift missions, and assist in the
coordination
of all types of air support for the supported Army unit. When the situation
requires
it, the ALO may function as a FAC, providing terminal control and clearance to
any
aircraft expending its weapons in the supported unit's area.
ETACs, as the enlisted members of
the USAF TACP, assist the ALO by providing
final
control and liaison assistance when required. Although similar in function, the
ETAC
is not a FAC replacement. Instead, they operate as an extension of the ALO,
providing
competent terminal control guidance when required."20 Although the ETAC
program
appears to have merit, their use raises concerns over the ability of the
non-aviator-controller,
assisting the ground commander with planning and guidance.
Second,
does the school trained FAC/ALO serve the needs of the ground commander?
Flexibility,
in the employment of his assets, provides the ground commander with a
distinct
advantage. FACs provide this flexibility to the ground commander in their
ability
to
perform additional tasks, other than terminal guidance.
Does this make CAS a secondary
mission for the FAC? Certainly not! This additional
flexibility
allows the FAC to become a force multiplier, filling in or assisting those
personnel
he normally relies upon during the execution of the CAS mission.
How
does the FAC get this training? It's already there, but the emphasis is
missing.
Currently,
the Marine Corps school places heavy demands on the student, training him in
the
classroom, the simulator, and during live fire exercises to ensure that he can
confidently
plan, request, and adjust indirect weapons of all types. Although current Air
Force
instruction covers the subject of requesting, spotting, and making corrections
for
indirect
fire weapons, it lacks emphasis and actual training.
This additional training should not
be perceived as an attempt to make an FO out of
every
FAC. Instead, it will reinforce the fundamentals of fire support coordination,
while
it
educates the FAC on the various fire support systems that can assist the
aircraft
conducting
CAS.
Third,
is there room for improvement? If so, how?
Yes, first, each service must review
their respective doctrinal publications to ensure
that
the training reflects the needs of each service, and our allies. Second, each
service
must
require mandatory core subjects that enable the graduate to: perform all the
functions
associated with CAS; act as, or assist the fire support coordinator in
planning;
plan
for, request, and adjust all types of indirect fire; conduct an actual live
fire exercise,
with
a requirement for a minimal number of missions -- similar to the minimum number
of
terminal controls a FAC must obtain prior to completing school; employ the
laser
designator;
and demonstrate a complete understanding of all U.S. and allied weapon
systems
utilized during CAS.
Fourth,
are recommendations for changes and improvements cost effective and
beneficial?
Yes! The advantages with change are
many. First, our ground forces gain a FAC,
capable
of operating with any service and any country, with no hidden supprises
concerning
his capability. Second, the benefit of this training allows the FAC to return
to
flight status with a superior understanding of fire support coordination and
fire support
planning.
This training provides our services with a better trained aviator, capable of
performing
his duties as a Forward air controller - airborne (FAC(A)), or a Tactical air
controller
-- airborne (TAC(A)). Third, the cost is minimal if each of the services that
benefit
from CAS contributes accordingly.
CONCLUSION
The ability to destroy the enemy, in
close proximity of our friendly forces, allows CAS
to
make a substantial contribution to the success of the ground commander. Taking
advantage
of this potential requires a comprehensive understanding of the ground-air
relationship,
which can only occur through purposeful training.
The joint environment ensures that
all services share in the responsibility of supporting
the
ground forces. One of ways in which we accomplish this is through the forward
air
controller
and CAS. Present-day FAC training by the Air Force and the Marines reflect
parochial
differences in their mission and their employment. Current joint and combined
operations,
employing FACs from different services, demonstrate the need for
standardization
among the schools and their curriculums.
Presently, doctrine writers from
each of the services are working on a joint publication
involving
the use of CAS. Still in draft, Joint Pub 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques,
and
Procedures
for Close Air Support, is the first attempt by the users of CAS to
"standardize
the
procedures for use by commanders, terminal controllers, air control agencies,
and
aircrews
in fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft to attack targets in close proximity to
friendly
forces."21
Although this publication provides
excellent guidance for the users of CAS, it still
neglects
the issue of FAC associated training. Debates over the usefulness of CAS,
differing
service priorities, and service limitations, must not prevent our schools from
combining
or standardizing the training of a universally utilized asset -- the FAC.
ENDNOTES
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCA) 1-02,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated
Terms, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 1989), 70.
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1-02,
70.
3. Peter C. Smith, Close Air
Support: An Illustrated History, 1914 to the Present
(New
York: Orion Books, 1990), 1.
4. United States Air Force, Case
Studies in the Development of Close Air Support,
Study,
July 1990, 15.
5. Case Studies of Close Air
Support, 16.
6. Case Studies of Close Air Support,
17-20,
7. Case Studies of Close Air
Support, 17.
8. Case Studies of Close Air
Support, 20.
9. Case Studies of Close Air
Support, 20.
10. Case Studies of Close Air
Support, 83.
11. Case Studies of Close Air
Support, 86.
12. Case Studies of Close Air
Support, 305.
13. Department of the Air Force,
Air-Ground Operations School, Joint Firepower
Control Course, (Hurlburt Field, FL: 1994),
I.
14. Department of the Navy,
Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic, Tactical
Air
Control Party, (Norfolk, VA: 1993).
15. Department of the Navy,
Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic, Tactical
Air
Control Party, (Norfolk, VA: 1993).
16. TACP Course,
17. Major Mark Cocharan, Marine
instructor at the U.S. Air Force Air-Ground
Operations
School, interview by the author, 15 January 1995.
18. Department of the Air Force,
Air-Ground Operations School, Joint Firepower
Control
Course (JFCC), (Hurlburt Field, FL: 1994), I.
19. JFCC School,
20. Ltcol Sandy Lewis, Air Force
instructor at the U.S. Air Force Air-Ground
Operations
School, interview by the author, April 1995.
21. Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air
Support(DRAFT).
United States Marine Corps. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the
Navy.
November 1994), IV.
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