Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean Insights
Authored by Professor Douglas C. Lovelace Jr., Dr. Thomas-Durell Young.
September 01, 1995
51 Pages
Brief Synopsis
The authors define a formal strategic plan: one that contains specific strategic objectives, offers a clear and executable strategy for achieving objectives, illuminates force capability requirements, and is harmonized with the Future Years Defense Program. They discuss the reasons why a strategic plan is needed and the value it would have in coherently connecting the guidance provided by the National Command Authorities to the integrated activities of the unified commands, the Services, and other components of DoD. They conclude by examining three alternatives to improve the strategic planning processes and to facilitate efficient development of strategic plans. They settle on a set of recommendations that they believe would comprehensively link the major elements of current strategic planning, albeit modified in some cases, and establish a clearer military foundation for DoD resource decisions.
PRECIS
The development of strategic plans by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should provide the critical nexus in connecting the National Command Authorities’ strategic direction of the U.S. armed forces with the planning and operations conducted by the combatant commands and the support provided by the Services and defense agencies. Title 10, United States Code, establishes a structured hierarchy for strategic direction, strategic planning, and contingency planning for the Department of Defense. The Chairman is responsible for assisting the National Command Authorities in their strategic direction endeavors, for preparing strategic plans, and for providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans. The absence of strategic plans in the post-Cold War era has precluded the identification and establishment of priorities for specific strategic objectives, inhibited planning for future military capabilities, and has not allowed for the integration of the operation planning and theater strategies of the combatant commands. Additionally, without strategic plans, there is a void in the underlying rationale for the assignment of service functions and the development of joint doctrine. This essay defines “strategic plans” and offers an approach to their development.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Chairman should develop a National Military Strategic Plan.
• The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan should continue in its current form, but the guidance, force apportionments, and taskings it provides should be based on the National Military Strategic Plan.
• The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments should be reoriented so they evaluate, integrate, and prioritize the CINCs’ requirements.
• The JROC should be divested of its oversight responsibility for the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments reaffirming its original charter. Oversight of the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments should become a Director of the Joint Staff responsibility on behalf of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman.
• The Chairman’s Program Recommendation should be published as a product of the reoriented Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process.
• Assessment of force capabilities, strengths and deficiencies identified by the CINCs should be based on the National Military Strategic Plan.
• The evaluation, integration, and establishment of priorities for the CINCs’ requirements should be based upon the National Military Strategic Plan.
• DoD should discontinue use of Defense Planning Guidance scenarios in the development of service programs in favor of conformance to the National Military Strategic Plan.
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