Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals
Authored by Dr. Stephen J. Blank.
March 1995
54 Pages
Brief Synopsis
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the creation of five new states in Central Asia. These states: Kazkahstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, have become both the object of international rivalries in Central Asia and the sources of new political forces as they act to enlarge their independence in world politics. This monograph attempts to trace the importance of the new forces unleashed by the advent of these states by focusing on the struggle around energy and security issues involving them. These issues will have significant impact upon the security of the Middle East; the Commonwealth of Independent States, especially Russia; South Asia; and even China. Already the impact of these new states is making itself felt in international politics in these regions.
Summary
Five Central Asian states emerged out of the Soviet Union's Central Asian republics in 1991. Although U.S. policymakers presumed that Iran would inevitably sweep them into its sphere of influence, this has not happened. Nor is it likely to occur. Instead there has developed a multi-state competition for influence and even control of these new states. This competition involves Russia as the leading force in the area and Moscow's main rivals are Turkey, Iran, Pakistan (and India), China, and the United States. This rivalry is particularly strong in the struggle among these states to gain positions of leverage over the energy economy, i.e. production, pipelines, and refining in Central Asia because this region is blessed with enormous energy deposits. These deposits are crucial to Central Asia's integration with the world economy and economic progress. Indeed, energy exports may be the only way these governments can hope for any economic stability and progress in the future.
Therefore, whoever controls the energy economy will determine the destiny of the region. This monograph offers a detailed look at how and why Russia is trying to control that economy and thus the destiny of these states, as well as the strategies of its rivals. Moscow is aiming to reintegrate Central Asia into an economic, political, and ultimately military union with Russia. It is trying to dominate their economies and subject them to Muscovite direction. Russia, therefore, resorts to blocking energy production, hindering foreign firms' activities in Central Asia, obstructing exports, and conducting currency policies that export inflation. Russia also has devised policies that coerce Central Asian states into giving Russians residing there dual citizenship. All of these policies signify Russia's efforts to fashion a new model of economic and, hence, military-political hegemony over the region and a new form of Central Asia's colonial dependency upon Moscow. The monograph argues that though Moscow is conducting a strong policy, it is not ultimately able to achieve such control because Central Asian states have alternatives in other states and because of Russia's own economic weakness.
Presently, none of Russia's other rivals for influence in Central Asia are able alone to check Russia's renewed imperial thrust. Should they combine their efforts, an option that has some limited possibility of fruition, they might achieve something in the way of lasting positions of leverage over Central Asia. But China is likely to be an exception to that general trend. China, arguably, is driven by compelling energy and political needs of keeping its own Muslims docile to expand its economic and political influence into Central Asia. Although for now cooperation with Russia is a greater priority for China, in the longer term there are significant possibilities for China to become Russia's main rival in Central Asia. These conclusions derive from a detailed examination of the role Central Asia plays in the international policies of Turkey, Iran, India-Pakistan, and China. In all these cases, energy and transportation, as well as the Islamic factor, figure prominently in efforts to gain leverage. However, detailed examination of their policies suggests that if Moscow's rivals act alone, except for China, they cannot save Central Asia from Russia.
Implicitly, however, a second factor is operating that will make any Russian effort to reimpose empire difficult. Russia's own economic situation will not permit it to use its economic power to lift up and modernize Central Asia. Rather Central Asia will remain trapped in an inequitable division of labor and backwardness, not to mention authoritarianism, that will not lead to internal stability. Indeed, quite the opposite will be the result if Russian imperial policies prevail. Therefore the monograph argues that the U.S. policy that has essentially accepted Russian policies here is mistaken. If we want to foster conditions of economic growth, democratic progress, and global integration, we should promote policies that open Central Asia to foreign investment and economic growth. We should not consign the region to a Moscow-directed integration that leaves it as the backward raw materials periphery of a stalled Russian economy. That policy can only lead to further instabilities and conflicts in the area which will then increasingly bring all of the rivals into the conflict zone. Such an outcome conforms neither to Central Asia's interests nor to those of the great powers which contend for influence there. In that case regional economic and political rivalry could become an intractable international military rivalry.
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