Can The Mobilization Support Battalion Meet The Challenge Of Future Selected Marine Corps Reserve Mobilization?
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Can the Mobilization Support Battalion Meet the
Challenge of Future Selected Marine Corps Reserve
Mobilizations?
Author: Major A. L. Saunders, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The Marine Corps Reserve cannot accomplish its
mission of rapid reinforcement and augmentation of the
Active component without a responsive mobilization and
training process administered by the Mobilization Support
Battalion.
Background: During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm,
the Marine Corps Reserve was mobilized for the first time
since the Korean Conflict. While this mobilization was not
conducted under harsh time constraints, it enabled the
Marine Corps to evaluate its mobilization policies and
procedures and implement improvements for future
mobilizations. The Mobilization Support Battalion of today
serves as the linchpin in the Marine Corps' efforts to meet
the challenge of future Selected Reserve mobilizations.
Recommendations: (1) Continue to vigorously test and
evaluate the mobilization processes through the annual MOBEX
program. (2) Have Headquarters, Marine Corps, continue to
host annual mobilization conferences with participation by
the key facilitators of the Marine Corps mobilization
policies and processes. (3) Actively integrate training
pertaining to Reserve capabilities and mobilization
procedures into the professional military education arena.
CAN THE MOBILIZATION SUPPORT BATTALION MEET THE CHALLENGE
OF FUTURE SELECTED MARINE CORPS RESERVE UNIT MOBILIZATIONS?
Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 262 states that the
mission of Americas' Reserve forces is to:
provide trained and qualified units and individuals to
be available for active duty in time of war, national
emergency, and at such times as national security may
require.
The Presidential Selected Recall of August 1990, that led to
Reserve participation in support of Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm served as a double-edged sword, notable for
two major accomplishments. The first accomplishment and
"cutting edge" of the sword was the confirmation of
America's commitment to the "Total Force Policy" established
in the 1970s. The second major accomplishment and "dull
edge" of the sword was the highlighting of deficiencies in
our mobilization process. The Marine Corps Reserve cannot
accomplish its mission of rapid reinforcement and
augmentation of the Active component without a responsive
mobilization and training process administered by the
Mobilization Support Battalion. In this study, the term
"Mobilization Support Battalion" refers to the organization
responsible for the processing and training of Selected
Marine Corps Reserve Units at the Station of Initial
Assignment. This distinction is necessary because Camp
Pendleton used the term "Warrior Training Command" while
Camp Lejeune used the term "Mobilization Processing Center"
for their respective mobilization support organizations
during the Desert Shield/Desert Storm mobilizations.
The Presidential Selective Recall of August 1990 marked
the first time that the Marine Corps Reserve was mobilized
since the Korean Conflict (July 1950). The hiatus in the
mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve can be directly
attributed to the national security and national military
strategies that existed during those time periods and not a
state of unpreparedness on the part of the Reserve forces.
A general review of the strategic role of the Reserves is
necessary to understand why they were mobilized for Desert
Shield/Desert Storm and how they might be utilized in the
future.
The only probable means of preventing hostility for any
length of time and from being exempted from the
consequent calamities of War, is to put the National
Militia in such a condition that they may appear truly
respectable in the eyes of our Friends and formidable
to those who would otherwise become our enemies.1
In a paper, entitled "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,"
General George Washington made direct reference to the
necessity of maintaining a national military force in
readiness. At the time of his statement (1783), the
military force of young America was comprised of citizen-
soldiers and known as the National Militia. Today, while
the United States maintains a full-time Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps, the idea of the citizen-soldier
lives on in our Reserve and National Guard forces.
A national security strategy has historically set the
tone for the role of the Reserves in matters pertaining to
war and national emergencies. The Marine Corps Reserve was
mobilized and played key roles in both World War II and
Korea. Their credible performances during these periods of
conflict are legacies that can be found in history books and
in the spirit of today's Marines. During World War II and
Korea, the Marine Corps Reserve was used primarily to fill
the shortfalls of the Active components tables of organi-
zation and as a manpower source for the expansion of the
Marine Corps' overall structure. In addition, the Marine
Corps Reserve was also seen as a manpower pool for the
forming of cadres that would be responsible for providing
training to younger, inexperienced Marines. Of particular
importance is the fact that except for some aviation units,
Organized Marine Corps Reserve units were disbanded upon
mobilization and integrated with Active component units.2
Post-World War II saw the emergence of the United
States and the Soviet Union as world powers. Both nations
possessed nuclear weapons capability and vastly different
political philosophies (democracy versus communism). The
spread of communism and the Soviet nuclear capability was of
vital concern to the United States and reflected in the
national strategy of containment and massive retaliation
towards communist aggression. While conventional war with
the Soviet Union was viewed as unlikely, emphasis was placed
on deterrence through existing forces with a rapid-response
role for the Reserves.3 The Korean Conflict introduced new
concepts into national security planning that exist today,
namely, limited war and partial mobilization.
In July 1961, President Kennedy addressed the nation
and stressed the necessity for America to "have a wider
choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear war." In
addition, he outlined his proposal for a request to "call
elements of the Ready Reserve to active duty if necessary."4
Kennedy further displayed his willingness to utilize the
Reserves in pursuit of national objectives by mobilizing
150,000 National Guard and Ready Reserve personnel in
support of the Berlin Airlift in October 1961. While
Kennedy saw using the Reserves as a political tool, his
successor would view not using the Reserves as a political
tool.
President Johnson was the Chief Executive during the
period of America's greatest involvement in Vietnam. In a
1965 speech, he stated:
Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and
its freedom from attack... We will do everything
necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only
what is absolutely necessary.5
The reference to doing "only what is absolutely necessary"
to achieve his objectives in Vietnam was not taken lightly
by President Johnson. By personally managing the Rolling
Thunder Campaign, President Johnson attempted to persuade
the North Vietnamese Government to cease their aggression
and to prevent a Chinese military response. Johnson's
deliberate decision not to mobilize the Reserves was partly
made to demonstrate his intent/resolve to limit U.S.
involvement in that conflict and pursue a diplomatic
settlement.6
In 1971, a landmark change in our National Security
Strategy occurred that set the tone for America's future
military forces. By abolishing the draft, America committed
itself not only to an all volunteer force, but also to a
"Total Force."
The Department of Defense adopted a "Total Force
Policy" which made reservists, rather than draftees,
the initial and primary source of personnel to augment
the active forces--particularly the early deploying
forces--in a military emergency.7
Perhaps the greatest impact of the "Total Force Policy" was
that the Reserve components were to be "equal partners with
their active force counterparts in peacetime as well as
wartime and as ready as their active force counterpart."8
Training with the same equipment as the Active component has
enabled the Marine Corps Reserve to become a more effective
member of the "total" Marine Corps Team. The mobilization
of specific Reserve units, National Guard units, and
Individual Ready Reserve members in support of Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm were clear examples of
American commitment to the Total Force Policy.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was the next
major event that would drastically affect our National
Security Strategy. Recognizing that the global balance of
power had shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar world, the
United States remained committed to:
maintaining the strength necessary to influence world
events, deter would-be aggressors, guarantee free
access to global markets, and encourage continued
democratic and economic progress in an atmosphere of
enhanced stability.9
The National Military Strategy of 1992 acknowledges that
while the changing world order and domestic fiscal
constraints have resulted in the reduction in the size of
our military forces, those forces must never become "hollow
forces that are under-manned, undertrained, and not
prepared for immediate deployment.10 Deterrence and crisis
response missions will be handled by forces comprised of an
appropriate mix of active and reserve personnel. Forces for
regional crises will be drawn in large part from the Active
components with essential support from the Reserve
components. As a crisis become larger or more protracted,
the Reserve components would be increasingly relied upon.11
Through national maturation, economic necessity, or a
combination thereof, the Total Force has become a formidable
tool of American policy. The expeditious response required
by America's Total Force in meeting the crises of today and
the future underscores the need for a responsive mobili-
zation process. The most essential elements required for
the Marine Corps to maintain a rapid response reserve force
are available, trained personnel and an effective
mobilization process. For future mobilizations, the bulk of
the personnel required to augment/reinforce the Active
component will come from the Selected Marine Corps Reserve.
The Mobilization Support Battalion will serve as the
facilitator for the augmentation/reinforcement and training
of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve units and personnel.
The Mobilization Support Battalion is an organization
that exists on series "W" tables of organization. The
command nucleus of the organization is the Reserve Support
Unit (RSU) of bases/air stations that are designated as
Stations of Initial Assignment. The Commanding Officer of
the RSU has a dual mission that makes him the linchpin in
all matters pertaining to the Reserves at his specific
installation. The mission statement of the Camp Lejeune RSU
best describes these responsibilities.
The Reserve Support Unit conducts planning for, and
provides administrative and logistic support to Reserve
units and Individual Ready Reservists from all Reserve
components to accomplish monthly, annual, and other
Reserve training duty aboard the Base. Upon
mobilization, the RSU becomes the command nucleus for
the Camp Lejeune Mobilization Support Battalion,
responsible for the processing, training and staging of
those individuals for whom Camp Lejeune is the Station
of Initial Assignment.12
The RSU Commander works under the administrative and
operational control of the Commanding General of his
particular base/air station and receives technical direction
from the Commanding General, Marine Forces Reserve.
As appropriate, The RSU Commander coordinates with:
Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Support
Command (MCRSC), and the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Manpower, Marine Corps Base (or Air Station) for the
activation, recall, assignment, and reporting
instructions of Individual Manpower Augmentees,
preassigned Individual Ready Reservists, and
retired personnel for the timely fill of "W" series
table of organization billets.13
The W-series table of organization designates the personnel
required to fill specific billets within the Mobilization
Support Battalion. The Individual Manpower Augmentee (IMA)
is the backbone of the Mobilization Support Battalion. The
IMA is defined as "selected reservists who fill mobilization
billets on active component W-series tables of organization
for which an early fill has been identified."14 These
reservists are trained specifically to perform the
processing functions required of the Mobilization Support
Battalion.
Within the Mobilization Support Battalion are two
elements known as the Mobilization Processing Center (MPC)
and the Mobilization Training Coordination Center (MTCC).
The MPC is responsible for the actual processing of
Reservists and the MTCC is responsible for training
Reservists. It is at the MPC and MTCC that the "rubber
meets the road" regarding reserve mobilization and training.
Mobilization processing of the Selected Marine Crops
Reserve is a complex procedure. The Mobilization Processing
Center consists of various stations designed to expedite the
integration of the Selected Marine Corps Reservists into the
Active component. The In-Processing Station is responsible
for ensuring the documented reception and control of
arriving mobilized personnel. The Legal Processing Station
is responsible for ensuring that legal briefs and services
are provided to the mobilized personnel. Examples of legal
services provided include powers of attorney preparation,
wills preparation, and provision of general legal
assistance. The Service Record Book Processing Station is
responsible for ensuring that all mobilized personnel have
Service Record Books/officer Qualification Records on file.
In addition, the record books will be screened to ensure
that the following forms are present and properly completed:
Serviceman Group Life Insurance (SGLI)
Record of Emergency Data (RED)
Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ)
Dependent Eligibility Enrollment System (DEERS)
Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)
Family Separation Allowance (FSA)
Privacy Act Statement
Chronological Record (page 3)
correct home of record
The Orders Processing Station is responsible for ensuring
that the original orders of all mobilized personnel are
properly endorsed and that sufficient copies are available
as required by regulation. The Unit Diary Processing
Station is responsible for ensuring that mobilized personnel
are transferred from the Reserve Manpower Management System
(REMMPS) to the Active component's Joint Uniform Military
Pay System. In addition, all source documents are verified
for completeness and are certified as appropriate. The Pay
Processing Station is responsible for ensuring that
mobilized personnel receive an initial payment of eighty
percent of thirty days base pay if it was not drawn at the
Home Training Center. Travel claims assistance will be
provided and class "D" allotments and Direct Deposit
requests will be processed. The Identification Station is
responsible for ensuring that all mobilized personnel
possess valid active duty identification cards and tags.
The Medical Processing Station is responsible for providing
medical examination, immunizations, and creating/updating
military health records for all mobilized personnel. The
Dental Processing Station is responsible for providing type
two examinations and creating/updating military dental
records for all mobilized personnel. In addition, this
station will schedule required treatment in accordance with
the services available and the training schedules of the
reservists. The Clothing Issue/Inventory Processing Station
is responsible for ensuring that all mobilized personnel
meet the minimum uniform requirements and are issued any
clothing identified as missing or unserviceable. The Out-
Processing Station is responsible for ensuring that each
individual has completed the processing chain of events and
is forward to the appropriate gaining command.15
While the Mobilization Processing Center of the
Mobilization Support Battalion has a myriad of duties to
perform in order to expedite the mobilization process, it
must be stated that they do not shoulder the entire burden
of the process. The mission to maintain mobilization
readiness of Selected Marine Corps Reserve Units falls upon
the Inspector-Instructor Staffs.16 Their collective
abilities to achieve a high mobilization readiness posture
coupled with the time available between activation and
departure from their Home Training Centers will have a
dramatic impact on the degree of services provided by the
Mobilization Support Battalion. One of the chief ways that
the Selected Marine Corps Reserve monitors its mobilization
readiness posture is with a unique tool known as the
Mobilization and Operational Readiness deployment Test
(MORDT). The MORDT is a demanding, "surprise" inspection
(held every two years) that provides an indication of
mobilization readiness by evaluating unit participation by
means of a short notice muster; evaluating unit
administrative readiness by a thorough review of service
record books/officer qualification records; evaluating the
ability of a unit to conduct on-site mobilization
processing; and evaluating the embarkation plans of
personnel and equipment. A MORDT-and-Stay inspection is
conducted at the Home Training Center of the Reserve Unit
and greater emphasis is placed upon administrative
processing and readiness and equipment embarkation
readiness. A MORDT-and-Go inspection, involves a partial
mobilization processing and the actual departure of the unit
from the Home Training Center to a Station of Initial
Assignment (for training). After Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, many Reservists pointed to the MORDT as a crucial
element in preparing their units for actual mobilization.11
Administrative processing of the reservists represents
only half of the mobilization process. The second half of
the process is ensuring that the reservists receive training
that will enable them to successfully accomplish their
mission of augmentation and reinforcement of the Active
component. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, all Selected
Marine Corps Reservists were required to attend Individual
Refresher Training. This was a seven-day, Southwest Asia
oriented, training package designed to "provide intensive
combat refresher training in those weapons skills necessary
to produce combat ready Marines. ,18 This course of
instruction, conducted at Camp Lejeune and the Marine Corps
Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, California, focused on
the following weapon systems:
a. .45 caliber pistol
b. M16A2 rifle
c. M203 grenade launcher
d. M249 SMAW
e. M2 .50 caliber machinegun (familiarization)
f. MK 19 machinegun (familiarization)
g. M60E machinegun (familiarization)
h. AT4 (familiarization)
The need for this refresher training is by no means a
condemnation of the Reserve component. We simply cannot
afford to overlook the fact that the limited training time
available during regularly scheduled drill periods and the
complexity of today's equipment does have an effect on the
MOS proficiency of the Reserve component.19
From a processing and training standpoint, the
Mobilization Support Battalion must be viewed as an absolute
necessity. Major General Livingston, Commanding General,
Marine Forces Reserve, and Colonel Chase, Commanding
Officer, 4th Civil Affairs Group, warn that:
the successful activation of 31,000 Marine reservists
and their noteworthy performance during Desert
Shield/Desert Storm did not truly test or prove the
Reserve's ability to deploy into harm's way on short
notice....it would be dangerous business--even folly--
to measure the quality of Reserve readiness by the
response to that war.20
The basis for this assertion lies in the fact that "the
United States, alone or with allies, may never again enjoy a
luxury comparable to the 5-month, uncontested buildup of
forces, in-theater, prior to hostilities."21 While the
above statement is basically true, the fact remains that the
mobilization process was tested and shortfalls were
identified. It was not dangerous business or folly for the
Marine Corps to analyze the problems encountered and to
implement procedures that will result in an improved
mobilization and training process for future mobilizations.
By reviewing some of the problems identified during the
Desert Shield/Desert Storm mobilizations and the actions
taken to resolve them, we can better speculate how well the
Mobilization Support Battalion will meet the challenge of
future mobilizations.
The Marine Corps has participated in Joint mobilization
exercises, the last being held in 1989. Excluding the
MORDT-and-Go Inspections, prior to Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, the Marine Corps did not conduct exercises that would
test the mobilization process at the designated Stations of
Initial Assignment. During August 1994, the Marine Corps
conducted its first (Service type) mobilization exercise.
The purpose of this exercise was to:
Validate portions of the recently revised Marine Corps
Mobilization Management Plan which reflects post-Desert
Storm mobilization plans.
Educate personnel and provide practical experience in
mobilization manpower and training processes and
requirements.21
A key feature of this exercise was incorporating IMA annual
training requirements with the "mobilization" of Individual
Ready Reserve Marines. Participating bases and stations
activated all of their mobilization agencies; the Commanding
Generals Marine Forces Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve
Support Command also exercised their mobilization operations
centers. If Headquarter, Marine Corps continues to conduct
the MOBEX annually (as intended), it will become an
invaluable tool for improving the mobilization processes and
proficiencies of our Corps. An additional benefit would be
that a base of knowledge pertaining to Reserve mobilization
requirements will be continuously expanded at the Station of
Initial Assignment's installation support level.
Since Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Headquarters, Marine
Corps, has hosted four Marine Corps Mobilization
Conferences. The most recent conference was held earlier
this month and one of the main purposes of the conference
was to review the 1995 draft of the Marine Corps
Mobilization Management Plan. Some of the participants in
this conference were the RSU Commanders; representatives
from Marine Forces Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve Support
Command; and the Training and Education Division, Marine
Corps Combat Development Command. These conferences, and
the participants attending represent high levels of Marine
Corps leadership actively focusing on the importance of
maintaining an the effective mobilization program for our
Reserve component. It is essential that these conferences
continue to be held annually if the Marine Corps to keep the
mobilization of its Reserve component as a priority issue.
During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it was discovered
that there was not a joint Navy/USMC program that
synchronized reserve mobilization of the Selected Marine
Corps Reserve Unit and its attached Navy Corpsmen. In
numerous instances the Reserve corpsman would arrive at the
Station of Initial Assignment after the unit they were
attached to. In addition, there are certain billets at the
naval hospitals aboard Marine Corps Bases that rely upon the
Navy Reserve for the backfill of billets during mobili-
zation. This situation continues to be a concern of the RSU
Commander/Mobilization Process Battalion Commander at Camp
Lejeune.22 If not resolved, these shortfalls of medical
personnel will adversely affect the medical processing
portion of future Selected Marine Corps Reserve
mobilizations and the support provided to the installations'
community. Since Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Navy has
decided to augment its Personnel Support Detachments at the
Stations of Initial Assignment with Personnel Mobilization
Teams (Naval Reservists) to assist with our mobilization
process.
Colonel Siegel, Commanding Officer, Mobilization
Support Battalion, Camp Lejeune, has looked forward and
identified an essential requirement that must be met if the
Mobilization Support Battalion is to efficiently meet the
challenge of future mobilizations. Simply put, the IMA
billets identified on the W-series table of organization
must receive priority fill during peacetime. If the
Selected Marine Corps Reserve is needed during future
crises, the Mobilization Support Battalion must be ready to
process a larger number of Selected Reservists in a shorter
amount of time than that which occurred during Desert
Shield/Desert Storm.
Training throughout the Marine Corps in matters
pertaining to Reserve capabilities and mobilization
processing is woefully inadequate. If the Selected Marine
Corps Reserve is to augment or reinforce the Active
component, it seems only natural that their abilities and
limitations be understood by the Active component. One way
to foster this knowledge is through education at our
professional military education institutions. In 1991, it
is interesting to note that no curriculum at any Marine
Corps school includes detailed courses of instruction about
the Marine Corps Reserve.23 In 1994, the Marine Corps
Command and Staff College held a series of courses
pertaining to the capabilities of the Marine Corps Reserve.
Hopefully, the classes presented will be expanded, and the
total mobilization process will be addressed. Leaders of
tomorrow must learn their lessons today.
Throughout the course of this research, it was evident
that the Marine Corps did not waste the opportunity to
improve its mobilization policies and processes. Interviews
with the Commanding Office, RSU Camp Lejeune and the
Executive Officer, RSU Camp Pendleton, prove that the
commitment to improving the mobilization process at their
respective bases is ongoing and the confidence in their
organizations was readily apparent. The professionalism and
dedication of the Marines at Headquarters, Marine Corps
(MPP-60 and PP&O), who were working with ideas that would
provide for the most efficient means of mobilizing our
Reserve component was equally impressive. With all of the
dedication and effort the Marine Corps is now placing
towards improved mobilization, there can be no doubt that
the Mobilization Support Battalion will successfully meet
the challenge of future Selected Marine Corps Reserve
mobilizations.
NOTES
1. George F. Eliot, Reserve Forces and the Kennedy
Strategy, The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, PA, 1962, 3
2. Candace G. Quinlan, "Employment of the Selected Marine
Corps Reserve Forces as Units: A Needed Commitment,"
Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University,
Quantico, VA, 1990, 3-4
3. Martin Binkin, U. S. Reserve Forces--The Problem of the
Weekend Warrior, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
1974, 20
4. Eliot, 2
5. Depart of State Bulletin, 26 April 1965, as quoted in
Kahin and Lewis, "A Threat to the Peace: North Vietnam's
Effort to Conquer South Vietnam," 495
6. Binkin, 21
7. Roles of the Reserves in the Total Force Policy,
Statement of Richard A. Davis before the Subcommittee on
Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services, U.S. General
Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., 23 February 1989, 2
8. Ibid, 2
9. Colin Powell, National Military Strategy of the United
States, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
July 1994, 2
10. Ibid, 8
11. Ibid, 8, 19
12. Marine Corps Base Organization and Functions Manual,
Camp Lejeune, NC 1994
13. Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, Mobilization Manual,
Camp Lejeune, NC, June 1994
14. Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN),
Volume II, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps,
Arlington, VA, March 1993
15. Station of Initial Assignment, Standard Operating
Procedures, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton
16. Statement of LtGen M. T. Cooper, USMC, Deputy Chief of
Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, before the
Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, House Armed
Services Committee, concerning "The Inspector-Instructor
Program" 21 April 1993
17. Mark F. Cancian, LtCol, USMCR, "Marine Corps Reserve
Forces in Southwest Asia" Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps
Association, Quantico, VA, September 1991
18. Warrior Training Battalion, Standard Operating
Procedures, Camp Pendleton, CA, 1991, 4
19. This assertion is based upon my personal experience as
an Inspector-Instructor in the 6th Engineer Support
Battalion from August 1985 to July 1988.
20. James E. Livingston, MajGen, USMC and Eric L. Chase,
Col, USMC, "Marine Reserve Force: Critical-Back-UP Muscle
for America's Post-Cold War Force-In-Readiness" Marine Corps
Gazette, Marine Corps Association, Quantico, VA, March 1994,
21. MPP-60 Information Paper on MOBEX-94, Headquarters,
Marine Corps, Arlington, VA August 1994
22. James R. Siegel, Col, USMCR, Commanding Officer,
Reserve Support Unit, Camp Lejeune, NC, Interview of 3
February 1995
23. Rex Williams, Col, USMCR, "If It Aint Broke, Can It BE
Improved?" Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association,
Quantico, VA, September, 1991, 41
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. A. L. Ambrosi Jr., Captain, USMCR, "Plan to Improve the
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2. Martin Binkin, U.S. Reserve Forces--The Problem of the
Weekend Warrior, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
1974
3. Robert D. Brown, LtCol, USMCR, "Mobilizing the
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6. Statement of LtGen M. T. Cooper, USMC, Deputy Chief of
Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, before the
Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, House Armed
Services Committee, concerning "The Inspector-Instructor
Program" 21 April 1993
7. Richard A. Davis, "Role of the Reserves in the Total
Force Policy" Statement before the Subcommittee on
Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. General
Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. 23 February 1989
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9. George F. Eliot, Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy,
The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, PA, 1962
10. William Y. Elliott, Mobilization Planning and the
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11. Robert L. Goldrich et al, Strategic Study, The U.S.
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National War College, National Defense University,
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United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. 1951
13. K. Kirkman, Major, USMCR, Executive Officer, Reserve
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1995
14. William F. Levantrosser, National Security Management--
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Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C.
October 1967
15. James E. Livingston, MajGen, USMC and Eric L. Chase,
Col, USMC, "Marine Reserve Force: Critical Back-Up Muscle
for America's Post-Cold War Force-In-Readiness" Marine Corps
Gazette, Marine Corps Association, Quantico, VA, March, 1994
16. Mobilization and the National Defense, edited by Hardy
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Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University,
Quantico, VA, 1990
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Corps Reserve Structure" Marine Corps Command and Staff
College, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 1992-1993
19. Karim Shihata, LtCol, USMCR, Headquarters, United
States Marine Corps, Interview of 14 March 1995, Arlington,
VA
20. James R. Siegel, Col, USMCR, Commanding Officer,
Reserve Support Unit, Camp Lejeune, NC, Interview of 3
February 1995
21. Guy A. Stratton, Major, USMCR, Headquarters, United
States Marine Corps, Interview of 3 March 1995, Arlington,
VA
22. James B. Whisker, The Citizen Solder and the United
States Military Policy, North River Press, Inc. November
1979
23. Rex Williams, Col, USMCR, "If It Aint Broke, Can It BE
Improved?" Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association,
Quantico, VA, September, 1991
24. The Marine Crops Reserve--A History, by Reserve
Officers of Public Affairs Unit 4-1, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1966
25. OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM Use of Navy and Marine
Corps Reserves, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. General
Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. June 1991
26. RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS-Fiscal Year 1991, Report to
the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Washington, D.C. February 1992
27. RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS-Fiscal Year 1992, Report to
the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Office of the Secretary, of
Defense, Washington, D.C. January 1993
28. Reserve Component Categories of the Reserve Components
of the Armed Forces, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Reserve Affairs, Washington, D.C. October 1967
29. National Military Strategy of the United States, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. January 1992
30. Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN),
Volume II, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps,
Arlington, VA, March 1993
31. (Draft) Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan
(MPLAN), Headquarters, United States Marine Corps,
Arlington, VA, 1995
32. Warrior Training Battalion, Standard Operating
Procedures, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, CA, September
1991
33. Station of Initial Assignment, Standard Operating
Procedures, Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton
34. Desert Shield/Desert Storm--Mobilization/Demobilization
MCLLS Items Binder, Headquarters, United States Marine
Corps, Arlington, VA. 1991
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