Marine
Air-Ground Task Force Aviation: The Use Of Integrated and
Combined
Combat Arms in Maneuver Warfare
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Warfighting
United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
Master of Military Studies
AY 1994-1995
Title: Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation:
The Use of Integrated and Combined Combat
Arms in Maneuver Warfare
1st Mentor: Dr. H. W. Gholson
2d Mentor: LtCol D. A. Driscoll, USMC
3d Reader: LtCol T. V. Wolf, USMC
Author: Major R. M. Rayfield, USMC
CG 10
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Title:
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation: The Use of Integrated and Combined
Combat
Arms in Maneuver Warfare
Author:
Major Richard M. Rayfield, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:
To analyze the evolution of Marine aviation from a supporting arm to an
integrated
combined arm supporting the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in
order
to identify its use as a combat arm applying maneuver warfare.
Background:
The Marine Corps officially adopted maneuver warfare as its warfighting
philosophy
with the publication of FMFM 1, Warfighting, in March 1989. FMFM 1
generated
much discussion as to the merits of maneuver warfare, including its application
to
the aviation combat element (ACE) of the MAGTF. Numerous papers, books, and
articles
expounded on the idea of the ACE as a maneuver element, many appearing in the
Marine
Corps Gazette. A notable proponent of maneuver warfare was William S. Lind.
Official
Marine Corps documents and doctrinal publications began to emerge highlighting
this
view of Marine aviation as a player in maneuver warfare.
In
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the discussion of the ACE as a maneuver element
expanded
to that of the ACE as a combat arm, supporting the entire MAGTF. This
concept
contradicted the traditional view of Marine aviation as a supporting arm of the
ground
combat element. The concept of the ACE supporting the entire MAGTF was
furthered
by the acceptance of the MAGTF, specifically the Marine expeditionary force
(MEF),
as the warfighting organization of the Marine Corps. The MEF's focus was
directed
toward the operational level of war, with the ACE constituting but one combat
arm
in the MEF commander's "toolbox." Again, numerous papers and articles
put forth
the
idea of the ACE as a combat arm supporting the MAGTF. Official Marine Corps
documents
and doctrinal publications adhering to this concept appeared as early as 1989.
Despite
much of the recent discussion of maneuver warfare and the role of Marine
aviation
within this warfighting philosophy, Marines have practiced much of it for
years.
Many
of the tenets of maneuver warfare can be identified as long ago as the 1920s,
in
Nicaragua.
Official Marine Corps publications, such as the Tentative Manual for Landing
Operations
(1935); Marine Aviation: General, 1940; and NAVMC 2890, Small Wars
Manual,
outline the same principles espoused by our current maneuver warfare doctrine.
A
brief study of historical applications, from World War I to Somalia, highlights
successful
and
unsuccessful use of aviation that the Marine Corps can learn from and build
upon.
Literature
Review: Initial research centered on a review of existing and emerging joint
and
Marine Corps doctrinal manuals. Joint doctrine review focused primarily on
Joint Pub
3-0,
Doctrine for Joint Operations, and Joint Pub 3-07 (Draft), Joint Doctrine for
Military
Operations Other Than War. The review of Marine doctrine encompassed both
Fleet
Marine Force Manuals (FMFMs) and Fleet Marine Force Reference Publications
(FMFRPs).
Many historical accounts of Marine Corps operations have been republished
as
FMFRPs. Key publications included FMFM 1; FMFM 1-1, Campaigning; the FMFM
5
series of Marine aviation publications; FMFM 6 (Final Draft), Ground Combat
Operations;
FMFRP 12-26, Marine Aviation: General, 1940; and FMFRP 12-34, History
of
the Marine Corps Operations in World War II.
Other
Marine Corps sources proved invaluable. The written documents included the
Marine
Corps Long-Range Plan (MLRP) (July 1989), the MAGTF Master Plan (MMP)
(July
1991 and July 1993), and a report submitted by Major General James M. Myatt,
USMC
to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. A telephone
interview
with Colonel Michael M. Kurth, USMC provided great insight into the use of
Marine
aviation in the Persian Gulf war.
A
search of Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) holdings identified many
sources.
These sources primarily were monographs, papers and theses submitted by
students
at other US armed forces schools. They proved especially useful in the
discussion
of operations other than war.
Published
books provided an excellent source of material, particularly in the areas
of
maneuver warfare application and historical example. Notable sources on
maneuver
warfare
application included William S. Lind's Maneuver Warfare Handbook and Martin
van
Creveld's Air Power and Maneuver Warfare. Some superb historical examples were
provided
by Robert Sherrod's History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II, Peter
Mersky's
US. Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to the Present, and the accounts of Allied
operations
in Italy in 1944.
Analysis:
This analysis revealed an abundance of information regarding the use of Marine
aviation,
past and present, and its applicability to maneuver warfare. It highlighted
numerous
examples of aviation's successful and unsuccessful use on the battlefield.
Research
identified numerous articles and papers dealing with the ACE and maneuver
warfare.
Nothing existed to tie these concepts into a meaningful document for practical
use.
Analysis
further highlighted the void in Marine Corps doctrine dealing with Marine
aviation
and maneuver warfare. Since the publication of FMFM 1, officially tying the
Marine
Corps to maneuver warfare, no corresponding discussion of the ACE has been
published.
Doctrine Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico,
Virginia,
has as one of its tasks to develop FMFM 5, Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Aviation.
The focus of this masters paper and the desired focus of FMFM 5 were closely
related.
Three
proposed courses of action presented themselves: produce a standard masters
thesis,
do nothing, or produce a draft doctrinal manual.
1. Do
Nothing. Doing nothing obviously does not benefit anyone.
2. Standard
Masters Thesis. A standard masters thesis, although valuable,
would be limited in its
practical use. Its availability to users would be
limited,
and it would bear no official Marine Corps sanction.
3. Draft
Doctrinal Manual. A doctrine manual provides prescriptive
information
on warfighting and is distributed throughout the Marine
Corps.
It is an official Marine Corps publication, governed by
MCO
5600.20M and MCBul 5600. This order and bulletin also outline
the
specific procedures for development, publication, and review of
Marine
Corps doctrinal manuals. The integration of the research required
for
this paper into the development of the capstone manual for Marine
Aviation,
FMFM 5, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation, would
provide
immediate benefit to the operating forces of the Marine Corps.
(See
attached Director, Doctrine Division ltr 5600/C42 of 26 Oct 94.)
Recommendation:
The recommended course of action was the integration of masters
research
with the development of a draft doctrine manual. Input during the developmental
stage
and review of the initial draft was provided by a ground combat arms officer
student,
adding
to the integrated combined arms focus of this book. It is recommended that this
book
be approved by Command and Staff College and forwarded to Doctrine Division,
MCCDC.
Doctrine Division can then prepare the draft for approval by CG, MCCDC and
distribution
to the Marine Corps as FMFM 5 (Draft), Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Aviation.
FMFM
5 (Draft), Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation, discusses how to think about
Marine
aviation--as a combat arm supporting the MAGTF, applying integrated combined
arms
concepts to maneuver warfare. The FMFM 5 (Draft) is the capstone manual for
Marine
Aviation, and is written in a style and format similar to that of FMFM 1.
Special
Note. I am especially indebted to the
personnel of Doctrine Division, Marine
Corps
Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. The Director of Doctrine
Division,
the Aviation Doctrine Branch, the Ground Doctrine Branch, and the Doctrine
Division
Terminologist were particularly helpful and supportive. Their guidance and
assistance
in the source material, format, compatibility with existing and emerging
doctrine,
and content of this draft doctrine manual was invaluable.
UNITED
STATES MARINE CORPS
Doctrine Division C 42
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
2042 Broadway
Street, Suite 2 10
Quantico,
Virginia 22134-5021
5600
C 42
26 Oct 94
From: Director, Doctrine Division
To: Director, Marine Corps Command and
Staff College (Attn: Dr H. W. Gholson
and LtCol D. A. Driscoll, USMC)
Subj: BENEFIT OF STUDENT RESEARCH IN
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINAL
MANUAL
Ref: (a) Master of Military Studies Paper Proposal
submitted by Maj R. M. Rayfield,
USMC to Command and Staff College, AY 94-95
(b) MCO 5600.20M
(c) MCBul 5600
1.
Reference (a) is a Master of Military Studies (MMS) Paper Proposal by Maj
Rayfield.
The
proposed topic concerns the evolution of Marine Aviation from a supporting arm
to
a
combat arm. The topic further includes the application of Marine Aviation in
maneuver
warfare as the aviation combat element (ACE) of the Marine air-ground task
force
(MAGTF). Maj Rayfield lists his 1st Mentor as Dr H. W. Gholson and his 2d
Mentor
as LtCol D. A- Driscoll, USMC.
2.
Doctrine Division is responsible for doctrine development for the Marine Corps.
The
development
approval, publication, and review process for this doctrine is outlined in
references
(b) and (c). Reference (c) also includes specific manuals under development.
Because
of Maj Rayfield's prior assignment to Doctrine Division, he is thoroughly
familiar
with the doctrine development process and procedures.
3.
Per reference (c), one of the manuals to be developed is Fleet Marine Force
Manual
(FMFM)
5, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Aviation. FMFM 5 will be the capstone
manual
for Marine Aviation that will parallel and complement FMFM 1, Warfighting.
The
desired focus of FMFM 5 and Maj Rayfield's MMS proposal are closely related.
His
efforts
would speed the doctrine development and approval process for FMFM 5.
4.
Maj Rayfield's research and assistance in development of FMFM 5, while
simultaneously
satisfying the MMS requirements of Command and Staff College, would
be
of great benefit to Doctrine Division and the Marine Corps.
D. R.
MIRRA
LtCol
USMC
FMFM 5
DRAFT
Marine
Air-Ground Task Force
Aviation
***(TIF)***
U.S. Marine Corps
PCN 139 000150 00
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps
Washington,
D.C. 20380-0001
18
April 1995
FOREWORD
"Marine
aviation units are an integral element of an air-ground combat system. They
are
not merely joined at the top when the time comes to fight. They are fully
integrated
from
top to bottom, and they train that way full-time."1
--
General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC
"It
is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the
different
arms
which will ensure victory."2
--
Henri Jomini
This
book describes the Marine Corps doctrine for using aviation. It provides a
common
ground
for understanding aviation and how the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
operationally
and tactically exploits aviation's capabilities within the battlespace.
We
direct every phrase in these pages towards one goal--success in war. To achieve
victory,
the MAGTF must focus all efforts to this end. This requires a common
understanding
of tactics, techniques, and procedures. Maneuver warfare provides the
basis
for the Marine Corps' warfighting doctrine. Aviation forces, like the other
elements
of
the MAGTF, conduct operations using this doctrine. This book applies maneuver
warfare
to MAGTF aviation.
The
inescapable lesson of history--and the theme of this book--demands the
integration
of
aviation with other combat arms. The Marine Corps uses aviation as an integral
part of
our
naval expeditionary air-ground team. As part of this combined-arms team,
aviation
extends
and expands the MAGTF's warfighting power. This unique combined-arms
capability
remains the strength and hallmark of the MAGTF.
This
book is descriptive rather than prescriptive in nature; it requires judgment in
application.
It does not discuss aircraft tactics, the organization of Marine aviation, how
to
conduct a helicopterborne operation, or how to attack a target. This book
focuses on
how
to think about MAGTF aviation--as a combat arm, supporting the MAGTF, applying
maneuver
warfare.
Recommendations
for improving this publication are encouraged from commands as well
as
from individuals. Forward suggestions using the User Suggestion Form format
to--
Commanding General
Doctrine Division (C 423)
Marine Corps Combat Development
Command
2042 Broadway Street, Suite 205
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5021
BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE
CORPS
C. E.
WILHELM
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding
General
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico,
Virginia
DISTRIBUTION:
PCN 139 000150 00
MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK
FORCE AVIATION
Table of
Contents
Chapter
1. Aviation and the Marine
Corps
Forged
in Combat--Combined Arms--The Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Chapter
2. Aviation and Maneuver
Warfare
To
Achieve a Decision--Aviation at the Operational Level-
Tactical-Operational
Interaction--Focus and Speed--Surprise, Unpredictability, and
Boldness--Lethality
and Effectiveness
Chapter
3. Combat Operations
To
Provide Firepower--To Provide Mobility--To Create Conditions for Success--To
Exploit
Enemy Vulnerabilities--For Exploitation and Pursuit--As a Reserve
Chapter
4. Operations Other Than War
Humanitarian
Assistance--Peacekeeping--The Combat Link
Conclusion
Notes
Appendix
A. Policy for Command and
Control of USMC TACAIR
in
Sustained Operations Ashore
Appendix
B. Glossary
Chapter 1
Aviation and the Marine Corps
"Today
[aviation] is the dominant factor in war. It may not win a war by itself alone,
but
without it no major war can be won."1
--Admiral
Arthur Radford, USN
"That
[aviation] cannot win a war without major efforts of ground troops is perfectly
apparent,
since, in spite of our vast air superiority, the enemy was able to move a
sizable
force
and launch and support a serious counter-offensive well towards the end of the
war."2
-- Major
General Raymond S. McLain, USA
To achieve success, the Marine
Corps integrates aviation with all forms of combat power.
Aviation
is a powerful combat force in modem warfare.
Its
evolution as a viable instrument of war begins in the early 20th century.
Marine
aviation
traces its origin and purpose to 22 May 1912, when First Lieutenant Alfred A.
Cunningham
reported to the naval aviation training camp at Annapolis, Maryland.3 The
purpose
of Marine aviation today parallels that envisioned in 1912. We continue to
maintain
Marine aviation's focus on one goal--to achieve success. We achieve this
success
by integrating aviation with all other forms of combat power. The first
demonstration
of this integration occurs in January 1914.4
We
operate under the concept that aviation is a complementary part of the larger
whole.
In
World War II, aviation plays a major role in helping Marines maintain our
tenuous hold
on
Guadalcanal. Marine aviation provides air cover, flank protection, and
reconnaissance
to
the Army forces (known as the "flying column") that liberate Manila
in the Philippines.
In
Korea, Marine aviation prevents the collapse of the Pusan Perimeter and
supports the
Inchon
landing. The concept of aviation as a complementary part of the larger whole
continues
to serve us well, evidenced by Desert Storm and continuing operations in
southwest
Asia.
FORGED
IN COMBAT
Marines
quickly grasp the great benefit that aviation might provide in combat. Terrain,
vegetation,
or man-made structures fail to affect an airplane's mobility as they affect
ground-surface
movement. Aircraft allow rapid movement above these obstacles that
impede
forces on the ground. World War I provides the first opportunity to employ
Marine
aviation in combat, but participation proves limited.5 Marine aircraft provide
support
to Marine forces operating in Haiti and Santo Domingo beginning in 1919, to
include
beginning to practice dive bombing, with less than decisive results.6 It is not
until
1927,
in Nicaragua, that the full potential of the Marine Corps' air arm begins to
emerge.7
On
15 July 1927, a force of around 500 Sandinistas, led by Agosto Sandino, attack
the
Marine
garrison at Ocotal, Nicaragua. The 38 Marines and 49 Nicaraguan National
Guardsmen
repulse the initial attack. At dawn the beleaguered garrison refuses to
surrender
and Sandino's men resume their assault. During the attack on 16 July, two
aircraft
from Major Ross "Rusty" Rowell's VO-7M arrive over Ocotal by chance.
One
pilot
lands to get a report on the situation while the other strafes the rebels.
After
expending
their ammunition, the pilots fly 125 miles to Managua, Nicaragua to report to
Major
Rowell. Major Rowell responds to the crisis by leading his five available DH-4B
and
02B-1 aircraft to the besieged garrison's defense. Forming in a column, the
flight
dive
bombs and strafes the attacking rebels. This first organized dive bombing
attack and
first
low-altitude attack in support of ground troops8 breaks up the rebel attack,
causing
an
estimated 200 Sandinista casualties.
On
30 December 1927, Sandinistas ambush two Marine columns. Although aircraft
twice
drop medicine to aid the wounded Marines, it becomes necessary to fly the
wounded
to
safety to save their lives. Ten times from 6 to 8 January 1928 Lieutenant
Christian
Schilt
lands on a hand-made landing strip (the early use of an expeditionary airfield
or
forward
operating base), under fire, to evacuate the 18 wounded Marines. Lieutenant
Schilt
earns the Medal of Honor for what the citation calls his "almost
superhuman skill."
Marine
experimentation with aviation in Nicaragua does not stop with close air support
and
air evacuation. On 10 January 1928, three Fokker trimotor aircraft make
military
history
by transporting 9,564 pounds of cargo. With the addition of more and larger
aircraft,
Marine aviation's contribution to logistical support continues to increase.
During
one
week, Marine aviators haul over 68,000 pounds of cargo.
In
January 1928, Marines provide air reconnaissance and preliminary bombing and
strafing
attacks
prior to a major Marine-National Guard attack on Sandino's mountain-top
stronghold
of El Chipote. On 14 January 1928, Major Rowell leads a four plane flight on
a
strike in advance of a major ground attack against San Albino, Nicaragua. These
missions
essentially qualify as deep air support.
Thus
in Nicaragua, Marines begin to employ many concepts of Marine aviation,
including
air
reconnaissance, close air support, deep air support, air logistical support,
and air
evacuation.
Marine aviation's functions and expeditionary nature start to emerge, forged
in
combat. Even while exploring its complete possibilities, Marines understand
that
aviation
is useless if employed alone. We cannot use aviation or think of it as an end
unto
itself. To do so invites failure. Aviation succeeds
when it is part of the combat power the
commander
uses to achieve a decision. Integration of aviation with all other forms of
combat
power provides the most effective use of aviation.
COMBINED
ARMS
Combined arms put the enemy in
a dilemma-any action he takes to counteract one threat makes
him vulnerable to another.
Combined
arms is a method of fighting. Maneuver
warfare employs fire support systems not as
just
supporting arms, but as combined arms.9 Combined arms strikes the enemy with
two or more
arms
simultaneously in such a way that whatever course he takes means devastation.
We use
combined
arms to create a dilemma for the enemy--to place him in a situation where
whatever
action
he takes to avoid one "arm" opens him up to another. Any action we
take likely provokes an
enemy
reaction. We design our actions so that any enemy reaction proves equally
disastrous.
The "arms" we use to create a dilemma go beyond use of the firepower
means
of
aviation, artillery, and infantry. We create combined arms effects using
movement of
forces,
sustainment capability, deception, electronic warfare, and psychological
operations.
Law
provides the basis for the Marine Corps' use of combined arms. United States
Code,
1988,
Volume III, Title 10 - Armed Forces, Chapter 507, Section 5063 states:
The Marine Corps shall be organized,
trained, and equipped to provide
fleet marine forces of combined
arms, together with supporting air
components, for service with the
fleet.10
The
Marine Corps uses combined arms at the tactical and operational level of war.
Major
Rowell
and his fellow aviators' air attacks against the rebels at Ocotal, Nicaragua on
16
July
1927 likely provide the first example of the use of Marine air-ground combined
arms.11
Aviation allows the commander to present the enemy with tactical and
operational
dilemmas.
The commander combines many tactical dilemmas to produce an operational
dilemma
for the enemy force as a whole.
Tactically,
a commander pins down the enemy with direct and indirect fire weapons,
making
him vulnerable to close air support. If the enemy moves to escape the air
attacks,
he
comes under direct and indirect fire. We link the combined arms effects of
individual
units
to produce a larger MAGTF combined arms effect.
Operationally,
a commander uses aviation to isolate an enemy force from reinforcements
or
supplies. He can accomplish this by interdicting enemy lines of communications.
The
commander
then strikes the isolated enemy force to shape the battlespace for future
operations.
The enemy must either fight and face irreplaceable losses or abandon the field
and
come under aviation and artillery attack.
THE
MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE
The separate elements of the
MAGTF are not viable combat forces. As
an integrated air-ground-
logistics force, the MAGTF
provides a combined arms team capable of accomplishing assigned
tasks with little to no external
support.
The
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is the Marine Corps' way to organize for
combat.
The
Marine expeditionary force serves as the Marine Corps' primary warfighting
organization.
Marine
Corps Forces Atlantic and Pacific provide MAGTFs, as part of the Marine
component, to
theater
and joint force commanders. The MAGTF commander task-organizes his MAGTF based
on
his
assigned mission and the theater, joint force, or naval expeditionary force
commander's
operational
requirement or task and intent. The size and composition of the MAGTF varies
depending
on the mission. All MAGTFs, regardless of size, contain a command element, a
ground
combat
element, an aviation combat element, and a combat service support element.12
The
separate
elements of a MAGTF by themselves are not viable combat forces. The MAGTF
provides
the
theater, joint force, or naval expeditionary force commander with a
self-sustaining,
integrated
air-ground combined-arms team capable of accomplishing assigned tasks.
The
MAGTF offers unique capabilities, limitations, and organizational requirements.
Using
maneuver warfare, the MAGTF achieves decisive results with forces of moderate
size.
These decisive results reflect the distinct nature of the aviation combat
element and
the
combat power it brings as part of the MAGTF. This aviation combat power must
remain
part of the MAGTF, whether the MAGTF functions as part of a naval
expeditionary
force or a larger joint/combined force. The MAGTF commander advises
higher
headquarters on the effective use of the MAGTF. Without the MAGTF
commander's
participation and input, the risk of improper strategic, operational, and
tactical
employment of the force exists.
The Aviation Combat Element
The ACE is specifically
organized, trained, and equipped to support the MAGTF.
The
size and composition of the aviation
combat element (ACE) reflects the MAGTF commander's
mission.
The ACE commander task-organizes the aviation assets of the MAGTF based on the
tasks
assigned
to the MAGTF and the ACE and the MAGTF commander's intent. The MAGTF
commander
ensures that the task organization of the ACE supports his vision for success.
The
mission of Marine aviation traditionally focuses on support of the Fleet Marine
Force
in
landing operations. The creation of the Fleet Marine Force on 8 December 1933
incorporates
Marine aviation, and subsequent publications and boards outline the concept
of
employment for Marine aviation. Marine aviation roles become solidified with
the
approval
of the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations on 9 July 193 5 and the General
Board
of the Navy in January 1939.13 These two occurrences serve to restate Marine
aviation's
mission and highlight its tasks in support of the Fleet Marine Force. These
tasks
include
air superiority, air reconnaissance, reduction of hostile defenses, protection
of the
landing
forces, artillery spotting, and close air support. Over the years this concept
translates
to support of the infantry, the division, or the ground combat element (GCE).
The
adoption of maneuver warfare as the Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy
signals a
reevaluation
of Marine aviation. The emergence of the Marine expeditionary force as the
warfighting
MAGTF, focusing on the operational level of war, contributes to this
reexamination
of the ACE.14 The MAGTF commander retains the option of using the
ACE
to support the GCE's decisive close operations, but other possibilities exist.
For
example,
he may task the ACE to conduct deep shaping operations that isolate the
battlespace
for future operations. The MAGTF commander can also direct the ACE to
support
the combat service support element's force sustainment operations.
The
ACE provides a newly realized dimension of flexibility, firepower, and mobility
to add
to
the MAGTF commander's tools for victory. The traditional concept of the ACE as
solely
a supporting arm of the GCE expands to that of a combat arm in support of the
entire
MAGTF. The ACE, as part of the integrated combined-arms team, "...is
specifically
organized,
trained, and equipped to function in support of the MAGTF mission."15
Within a Naval Expeditionary Force
In operational maneuver from
the sea, the sea and land viewed as one maneuver space for a single,
seamless operation.
A
naval expeditionary force specializes in operational maneuver from the
sea. Operational
maneuver
from the sea includes the capability to conduct amphibious operations.
Operational
maneuver
from the sea integrates the maneuver of both land and naval forces, to include
the
actions of organic aviation assets.16 A naval expeditionary force always
includes a
MAGTF.
As part of this force, the MAGTF gains additional operational mobility,
flexibility,
and firepower. Operational maneuver from the sea requires four key
operational
capabilities: battlespace dominance;
power projection; force sustainment;
and
command, control, and surveillance.17 Aviation, both Navy and Marine Corps,
plays
a
major role in all four operational capabilities.
Battlespace
dominance provides the focus of naval expeditionary warfare, allowing control
over
the area of concern to the commander. This degree of control enhances friendly
and
denies
enemy freedom of action. It includes all actions against enemy capabilities to
influence
future operations, allowing sustainment of the force and projection of power
from
the sea. MAGTF aviation participates in battlespace dominance by isolating and
shaping
the battlespace.
Power
projection enables the naval expeditionary force to mass forces rapidly. The
ability
to
mass allows the force to generate high intensity, precise offensive power at
the decisive
place
and time of the commander's choosing. It uses maneuver and combined arms
against
enemy forces to achieve a decision. MAGTF aviation and the MAGTF GCE work
together
as an integrated combined arms team to project decisive power ashore.
Force
sustainment from the sea gives the naval expeditionary force its staying power.
It
allows
the force to remain at sea, safely on station as long as necessary, ensuring
continuity
and freedom of action. It provides logistics support and maintains lines of
communication for the force. The ACE assists the combat service support element
in
providing
sustainment for the MAGTF.
Command,
control, and surveillance provides a flexible, responsive, and integrated
system
through
which the naval expeditionary force gathers, processes, and distributes
information
vital to plan and conduct operations. Command, control, and surveillance
links
the operational capabilities to allow the naval expeditionary force commander
to
exercise
decentralized leadership and make decisions more rapidly than the enemy. The
Marine
air command and control system of the ACE enables the ACE commander to
exercise
centralized command and decentralized control of MAGTF aviation in support of
the
MAGTF.
Marine
aviation participates as part of a naval expeditionary force under two separate
forces.
Marine aviation always remains a part of the MAGTF and under the command of
the
MAGTF commander. Separate Marine aviation units not part of the MAGTF may be
part
of the Navy's carrier forces. The MAGTF commander possesses no command
authority
over these Marine aviation assets. Augmenting Navy carrier forces must not be
at
the expense of the MAGTF's aviation requirement.
Within a Joint and Combined Force
Joint/combined operations
provide a means to an end, not the end in itself.
Joint
and combined operations provide a means to an end, not the end in itself.
These
operations prove essential when a strategic task requires the capabilities of
more
than
one Service or nation. However, joint and combined operations possess limits to
their
utility. Their utility reflects the direct proportion between the size of the
forces
necessary
and the time available for preparation.
The
planning, execution, and sustainment of joint and combined operations occurs as
an
act
of compromise. A joint or combined force exists as an ad hoc assembly of
military
units
joined at the highest command level. The separate Services and nations bring
individual,
and at times, incompatible procedures, training, and logistics arrangements.
Whenever
possible, theater commanders make use of existing Service and nation combat
capabilities.
When a single Service or nation possesses the capability to accomplish the
task,
the need to form a joint or combined force proves unnecessary.
The
MAGTF commander normally makes Marine aviation sorties available to the joint
force
to support the joint force as a whole or another component of the joint force.
These
sorties
are previously agreed to between the MAGTF commander and the joint force
commander.
They normally include sorties for air defense, long range [air]
reconnaissance,
and long range [air] interdiction. The MAGTF commander additionally
provides
to the joint force any MAGTF aviation sorties beyond those required for direct
support
of the MAGTF. The MAGTF commander can request aviation support from the
joint
force in those instances where organic MAGTF aviation assets are not sufficient
to
meet
MAGTF requirements.
MAGTF
aviation best supports the joint and combined force when it functions as
designed,
as an inseparable part of the MAGTF. Rather than fragment the tactical and
operational
integrity of the MAGTF, the joint force commander maintains the unity of
effort
of the joint force using support relationships.18 If the joint force commander
separates
MAGTF aviation from the MAGTF, major reductions in the MAGTF's
contribution
to joint force combat effectiveness offset any minor gains in joint force
aviation
combat capability. When MAGTF aviation functions as part of the MAGTF to
achieve
a decision, it increases the successes achieved by the supported force.
Chapter 2
Aviation and
Maneuver Warfare
"In
brief, the whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the employment of
mobile
armies,
relatively small but of high quality, and renedered distinctly more effective
by the
addition
of aircraft."1
--General
von Seeckt
"Battle
should no longer resemble a bludgeon fight, but should be a test of skill, a
maneuver
combat, in which is fulfilled the great principle of surprise by striking from
an unexpected direction against an unguarded spot'."2
--B.
H. Liddell Hart
Maneuver warfare seeks to
shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and
unexpected actions which
create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he
cannot cope.
Aviation
provides a key element in the MAGTF's ability to conduct maneuver warfare.
Maneuver
warfare
requires opportunistic maneuver in time and space to gain a positional
advantage over the
enemy.3
Maneuver warfare concentrates on those actions which present the enemy with a
hopeless
situation--a
dilemma. Maneuver warfare capitalizes on use of the main effort; focus and
speed;
surprise,
unpredictability, and boldness; and lethality and effectiveness.4 Aviation
expands
the
MAGTF commander's ability to gain a decisive advantage and create a dilemma for
the
enemy. The MAGTF commander uses aviation to aid and reinforce his maneuver by
attacking
the enemy's ability to maneuver. If the enemy moves rapidly to counter ground
actions,
he exposes himself to aviation actions. If the enemy defends against aviation
actions,
he cannot move fast enough to counter ground actions. Whichever course the
enemy
takes, he faces disaster.
Marine
aviation, task-organized into the ACE, operates in direct support of ground
maneuver
forces or provides a separate maneuver force within the MAGTF.5 These
employment
options for Marine aviation give the MAGTF commander added combat
power
and flexibility to shatter the enemy's will to fight. Our use of mission-type
orders,
vision
and intent, and ability to focus on the enemy play a major role in the conduct
of
maneuver
warfare. They apply equally for ground and aviation forces.
Mission
MAGTF
aviation conducts air operations using mission tactics. Mission tactics focus
on
the
assignment of a subordinate mission--including a clearly stated
purpose--without
specifying
how the mission must be accomplished. Mission tactics begin with mission-
type
orders. Mission tactics allow subordinates the freedom to take whatever steps
necessary
based on the situation. This freedom for initiative proves vital for the high
tempo
of operations required in maneuver warfare. However, initiative without unity
or
focus
squanders the MAGTF's strength. We achieve unity, not through imposed control,
but
through the commander's vision.
Vision
and Intent
Commander's intent gives
subordinates a standard by which to judge their own decisions, a
constant reminder of what the
larger organization is trying to accomplish.
The
commander expresses his vision through his intent. A mission consists of two
parts:
the
task to accomplish and the reason, or intent. Of the two, the intent is the
critical
element.6
The intent clearly defines the commander's vision of success and his
desired
end state. When the ACE commander receives his mission, he conducts an
analysis
based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time
available
(METT-T). The ACE commander considers the MAGTF commander's intent
and
the intent of the MAGTF commander's superior to develop his own desired end
state.
The
ACE commander reflects his end state when he formulates his commander's intent.
The
ACE commander task organizes his forces and tasks subordinates to achieve the
desired
end state. The commander's intent also provides guidance for achieving the
conditions
necessary for decisive maneuver. While a situation may change, altering or
abolishing
a mission, the intent continues to guide our actions. The commander's intent
must
not inhibit initiative. A clear understanding of commander's intent provides
the
essential
ingredient to ensure unity of effort.
Main Effort
Another
method for providing unity is the main effort. A commander assigns one specific
subordinate
unit to achieve the decision. That unit represents his main effort, focused on
the
enemy. The main effort may be associated with battlespace dominance, power
projection,
or force sustainment. We direct the main effort where it will cause the most
damage
to the enemy and where we have the best opportunity for success. The main
effort
represents our bid for victory. The MAGTF commander designates any element of
the
MAGTF--including aviation--as the main effort.7 Because it is his bid for
success, the
commander
augments his main effort with every means available. The commander stakes
the
success of each specific phase of the operation on the performance of his main
effort.
With
this action we -achieve a decision; everything else remains secondary.
The success of the main effort
can only be achieved by the responsive and unselfish actions of
supporting units.
We
focus the main effort on an enemy critical vulnerability while exercising
economy of force
elsewhere.
At the tactical and operational levels of war, commanders seek to identify and
attack
critical
vulnerabilities. Enemy critical vulnerabilities are enemy capabilities that
prove both
susceptible
to attack and crucial to the enemy's success. These vulnerabilities lead to the
enemy's
center
of gravity. The center of gravity includes whatever characteristics,
capabilities, or localities
that
provide the source of a military force's freedom of action, strength, or will
to fight. The
enemy's
center of gravity may be his leadership, command and control, or mechanized
forces.
Mission
analysis and higher commanders' intent help identify the enemy's center of
gravity.
The destruction of the center of gravity achieves the objective of defeating
the
enemy
forces or shattering their will to fight.
All
units not part of the main effort assume a supporting role. The needs of the
main
effort
outweigh the needs of supporting units. Supporting units contribute to the
overall
success
by economizing on resources--fires, mobility means, supplies--that the main
effort
may
require. Similarly, unless specifically ordered to do otherwise, units give
priority of
support
to the main effort. Supporting commanders must anticipate the main effort's
direction
and requirements. The main effort succeeds only through the immediate,
unselfish,
and voluntary actions of the supporting units. Supporting units
ensure
that their actions either directly assist the main effort or provide the main
effort as
much
freedom as possible.
A
commander may need to refocus his actions and combat power to achieve
success--the
main
effort may change. Deliberate planning or changing battlespace conditions
contribute
to this decision to change. A commander designates his main effort for a
particular
phase of an operation. He then may shift the main effort to another unit in
accordance
with his plan or the developing situation.
The
MAGTF commander normally designates the ACE as the main effort in the initial
phase
of an operation or campaign to gain and maintain the air superiority necessary
for
the
MAGTF to conduct operations. The ACE may be designated the main effort to
conduct
deep operations to shape and isolate the battlespace. To conduct forcible entry
and
secure the initial lodgement, the MAGTF commander switches the main effort to
the
GCE.
After securing the lodgement, the main effort may then shift to the combat
service
support
element for force sustaintnent operations. Next, the MAGTF commander may
designate
the GCE as the main effort to conduct decisive close operations. The focus may
shift
back to the ACE to quickly exploit an opportunity or pursue a fleeing enemy.
The
goal remains to exploit success, not reinforce failure. Like the commander's
intent,
the
main effort harmonizes the various actions of the force. It allows all the
parts to act as
a
whole. The MAGTF commander uses aviation at the tactical and operational level
to
achieve
a decision that realizes strategic results. Marine aviation capitalizes on its
inherent
speed,
surprise, and unpredictability, focusing its lethality and effectiveness on a
critical
enemy
vulnerability to achieve a decision.
TO
ACHIEVE A DECISION
MAGTF aviation focuses on but
one goal: to achieve a decisive effect
on the outcome of the battle
and campaign.
To
be effective within the battlespace, the MAGTF commander uses aviation to
achieve a decision.
The
MAGTF commander does not attempt to
achieve an aviation decision. He attempts to achieve
an
air-ground decision applying combined arms and maneuver warfare. Ten years
after the first
combat
use of aircraft, the Italian air power theorist, Guilio Douhet, recognizes the
need to direct
all
combat forces toward the ultimate goal:
The use of military [ground], naval,
and aerial forces in war should be
directed toward a single end, to
win. To attain maximum effectiveness
these forces must be coordinated and
in harmony with one another. The
three forces should function as
ingredients--or factors--of a single product
in which the best results can be
obtained only by a proper apportioning of
the ingredients used.8
The
MAGTF commander may designate the ACE as the main effort. The MAGTF
commander
may use the ACE in direct support of ground maneuver forces or may employ
the
ACE itself (or any elements thereof) as a maneuver force. MAGTF aviation
contributes
significantly to all forms of maneuver--in support of, or as part of--a frontal
assault,
flanking attack, envelopment, or turning movement.9 If the ACE does not provide
the
main effort, it functions in a supporting role or provides the reserve. MAGTF
aviation
can
function to support the offense, the defense, and security operations. The ACE
is a
combat
arm of the MAGTF--not a supporting arm of the GCE. With two combat arms,
the
MAGTF commander possesses the ability to shift the main effort and keep the
enemy
off
balance. To achieve an air-ground decision, the MAGTF commander uses aviation
to--
.
Fix the enemy while another force destroys him.
.
Destroy the enemy after another force fixes him.
.
Fix and destroy the enemy.
The MAGTF commander uses
aviation to see and shape his battlespace; extend the range of his
ground forces; and discover,
delay, degrade, and manipulate the enemy.
The
MAGTF commander uses his organic aviation to see and shape his battlespace
in
time and space in advance of close combat. He uses aviation's inherent reach
not only for the
direct
application of firepower, but also to extend the range
of
his ground forces. The MAGTF commander uses aviation to discover the enemy's
operational
intentions; to delay enemy reinforcements; to degrade critical enemy functions
or
capabilities, such as command and control or logistics; and to manipulate the
enemy's
perceptions.
OPERATION
DESERT SHIELD: THE ACE AS A MANEUVER FORCE10
On 2 August 1990, Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein's forces invade Kuwait. The
United States is asked to provide
military assistance to the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia to prevent any further
southward aggression by Iraqi forces. Later, the
United Nations forms a military
coalition to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait.
The phase to deter the Iraqis from
invading Saudi Arabia and defend the
Kingdom becomes known as Operation
DESERT SHIELD. The offensive to
drive the Iraqis from Kuwait will be
called Operation DESERT STORM.
The first Marine forces to arrive in
Saudi Arabia comprise the 7th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB),
commanded by Major General Hopkins. Arriving
with these forces is the I Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) ACE commander,
Major General Moore, and HMLA 369,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kurth.
HMLA 369 consists of eighteen AH-1W
Cobra attack helicopters and six UH-1N
Iroquois ("Huey") utility
helicopters. HMLA 369 constitutes the initial ACE
striking power and a considerable
portion of 7th MEB's.
Around 18 August, at a meeting among
Major Generals Hopkins and Moore and
Lieutenant Colonel Kurth, concern
arises over how to prevent an Iraqi attack into
Saudi Arabia. Lieutenant Colonel
Kurth is given a verbal mission-type order to
deploy his squadron along with 1st
Light Armored Infantry Battalion to fight a
covering action to delay any Iraqi
attack. HMLA 369 is placed in direct support
of 7th Marines. Kurth integrates
with assets of the Army's 82d Airborne Division.
In early September 1990, Kurth meets
with the Commanding General of the 1st
Marine Division, Major General
Myatt, at Manifah, Saudi Arabia. The division
comprises the GCE of I MEF. The use
of firepower to stop an Iraqi attack is a
concern. Kurth is given a
mission-type order to act as a screening force
designed to fight a delaying action
should the Iraqis attack along the Tap Line
Road or the coastal road. Kurth
remains in direct support of 7th Marines,
supporting the overall division
plan. Initially this is strictly an attack helicopter
force, with UH-1Ns providing
airborne command and control. Major General
Myatt desires the largest number of
attack helicopters in history to be used at the
decisive time and place. Task Force
Cunningham is thus born.
With the arrival of the entire ACE
of I MEF, it is decided that all aviation assets
will contribute to Task Force
Cunningham. Assets include (in addition to the
helicopters) AV-8B Harrier attack
aircraft, F/A-18 Hornet fighter attack aircraft,
and EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare
aircraft. Forward air controllers (airborne)
(FAC[A]) will provide airborne
command and control. Information obtained by
remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) will
be displayed on a remote receiving station
mounted in a UH-1N. Task Force
Cunningham is to be employed in the defense
to handle any Iraqi armored attack.
If the Iraqis cross the border, the task force
will attrite them as they move
south, pushing them west, away from Jubayl
towards fire-sacks established by
the division. General maneuver positions and
engagement areas are established.
The plan calls for fixed-wing aircraft to
attack along the long axis of the
Iraqi formation to disrupt and destroy, killing as
many as possible. As the Iraqi armor
starts to deploy their formation, the attack
helicopters then will strike their
flank.
Aviation
can prove decisive by providing key information on the enemy. It gives us data
on
the position of vital enemy assets that expedite targeting them for
destruction. Air
reconnaissance
lets us know what the enemy plans to do while leaving him blind about
our
movements and intentions.
Aviation
can delay or prevent intervention of the enemy's operational and tactical
reserves.
We achieve these results through direct attack on the enemy units. We also
achieve
these results through attack on enemy infrastructure (logistics capabilities
and
lines
of communication).
Aviation
can provide firepower to augment the organic fire support of ground forces.
With
suitable air support, a ground force will be lighter, more mobile, and more
lethal.
This
reduces internal and external transportation requirements.
Aviation
can provide mobility to the ground forces through movement of troops,
equipment,
and supplies. This often translates into increasing the time or distance the
MAGTF
can operate before reaching its culminating point.
Aviation
can deny the enemy the ability to mass or control his forces. By preventing the
enemy
from massing, we can achieve local combat superiority with an overall small
force.
We
can then defeat the enemy in detail. The MAGTF commander uses aviation to
create
a
window of opportunity for decisive action.
While
aviation can be decisive, it is a limited, exhaustible resource which requires
time and
effort
to replace. This holds true of men and material, both within the battlespace
and on
the
production line. Limited numbers exist of aircraft, aircrews, ground-based
radars, air
control
agencies, air control personnel, maintenance personnel, ordnance, fuel, and
spare
parts.
To prevent exhausting aviation assets needlessly, we use aviation to perform
actions
that infantry, artillery, tanks, mortars, naval surface fire support, or trucks
cannot
accomplish.
Commanders must use aviation
on necessary actions to achieve a decision; this avoids missing a
window of opportunity for
decisive action.
A
level of activity exists which aviation can sustain virtually forever. When a
commander
exceeds this sustained level of
activity, he reduces the length of
time
that aviation can maintain the heightened pace. Aviation will exhaust one of
its resources or
outpace
its replacements.
After
a period of increased activity, aviation requires a recovery period. During
this
recovery
period, aviation will not even be able to deliver its normal sustained level of
activity.
The longer the period of increased activity or the greater the increase in
activity,
the
longer the recovery required and the lower the "sustained" level will
be during that
period.
Commanders must not squander aviation on unnecessary actions which cannot
achieve
a decision only to discover that they have missed a window of opportunity for
decisive
action.
A
Comparative Case Study: OPERATIONS
STRANGLE AND OPERATION DIADEM
Operations STRANGLE and DIADEM provide ideal
examples to illustrate the difference in effectiveness of aviation acting alone
and as part of a combined arms operation.
Operation STRANGLE is planned as an independent air operation to drive
the Germans from central Italy. The air
planners intend to make a ground offensive unnecessary. Operation DIADEM is a combined arms
operation. Coordinated air and ground actions
deny the Germans their critical requirement- - tactical mobility. A study of these tow operations provides
important insight into the effective use of aviation.
BACKGROUND
By the middle of January 1944, after four months
of bitter fighting, the Allied advance up the Italian peninsula grinds to a
halt. The Germans have been conducting
a skillful withdrawal, stopping the Allies in front of the formidable Gustav
Line in central Italy. Three times the
Allies try to break the German defenses.
Three times they fail. By the
middle of March 1944 a stalemate sets in.
Six months of intensive combat exhaust both sides. Allied ground forces rest and regroup as
they wait for reinforcements and better weather. The allies schedule the ground offensive to resume in May 1944.
OPERATION STRANGLE
As the Allied ground forces prepare for the
upcoming assault against the entrenched German, Allied air officers have their
change to prove that air power alone can win on the battlefield. Having achieved air superiority and free
from providing air support for the Allied armies, Mediterranean Allied Air
Forces (MAAF) officers concentrate on an independent air interdiction
campaign-Operation STRANGLE.
Operation STRANGLE begins with the MAAF
directive of 19 March 1944. The
objective of this independent air campaign aims "To reduce the enemy's flow of
supplies to a level which will make it impractical for him to maintain and
operate his forces in central Italy."11
The German forces in Italy depend almost
entirely on the Italian rail network to bring supplies to the south. The MAAF officers plan to "strangle" the
Germans by severing their vulnerable supply line. The MAAF plans to wreck the rail network by placing an air
interdiction belt across all of Italy north of Rome. The Allies cut every railroad and reduce rail capacity from
80,000 tons per day to 4,000 tons per day.
The destruction by air power proves extensive, but despite the damage
German front line troops do not fall short of supplies or prepare to withdraw.
Operation STRANGLE occurs while no major ground
action takes place along the front.
MAAF officers plan the operation without completely considering the
ground situation. While the lull in the
action frees all MAAF aircraft to conduct the independent air campaign, the
Germans are not forced to use their supplies in combat against Allied ground
forces. In fact, during the conduct of
Operation STRANGLE, the Germans actually increase their supply stockpiles at
the front line.
After nearly a month and a half, it becomes
apparent to MAAF officers that the original objective appears unrealistic and
overly optimistic. On 28 April 1944,
with less than two weeks left before the beginning of the renewed Allied ground
offensive, a new directive provides reorientation. The new directive contains careful words to redefine ".the
objective of the air operations as being to make it impossible for the enemy to
maintain his forces on their present line in Italy in the face of a combined
Allied offensive. A change in emphasis
will be noted here which reflects our growing recognition that we had been
unduly optimistic in our original hopes for STRANGLE in the directive of 19
March."12 This change to the objective
admits that air power alone cannot drive the Germans from Central Italy.
OPERATION DIADEM
On 11 May 1944, the rested and reequipped Allied
forces launch Operation DIADEM. The
Allies commence the ground assault on the Gustav Line. MAAF air attacks shift from the air
interdiction belt north of Rome to areas immediately behind the German
lines. Three weeks after beginning
their combined ground and air assault, the Allies drive 80 miles and link up
with the forces stranded on the beaches at Anzio. The Allies then begin their drive to Rome. The commander of the XIV Panzer Corps,
General von Senger, describes the effectiveness of aviation.
The enemy's mastery of the air space immediately
behind the front under attack was a major source of worry to the defender, for
it prevented all daylight movements, especially the bringing up of the
reserves. We were accustomed to making
all necessary movements by night, but in the event of a real breakthrough this
was not good enough. This was what
actually occurred in the May breakthrough.
In a battle of movement a commander who can only make the tactically
essential moves by night resemble a chess player who for three of his
opponent's moves has the right to only one.13
The Germans require tactical mobility to defend
the Gustav Line. During Operation
DIADEM, aviation cripples the Germans'
tactical mobility. With not tactical
reserves near the front, the Germans are forced to shift forces from one
threatened sector to another. Without
tactical mobility, they cannot laterally move forces to strengthen weak areas
or prevent penetrations form becoming breakthroughs. When the Germans finally release strategic reserves in northern
Italy, air attacks savage them en route.
These reserves fail to arrive in time and prove too decimated to affect
the battle.
The combined use of Allied ground and air
operations creates a vicious cycle for the Germans. If Allied ground operations force the Germans to rapidly reposition combat forces or
supplies, they must travel on roads.
When they travel they become vulnerable to Allied air attacks. Even if Allied air fails to destroy the
German reinforcements and supplies, they usually arrive too late to be of use.
LESSONS
Aviation alone does not prove to be effective in
central Italy. As a self-contained air
operation, Operation STRANGLE fails because it does not accomplish its intended
objective. Without the pressure of
concurrent ground operations, the Germans do not have to use supplies or
reposition forces. While Operation
STRANGLE cannot deny the Germans critical supplies, aviation in Operation
DIADEM does deny the Germans tactical mobility. When the Allied ground offensive forces the Germans to move,
aviation produces a devastating effect.
Without continuous and significant pressure from ground forces, aviation
proves ineffective.
Time also plays a critical role in aviation's
effectiveness. For Operation STRANGLE,
MAAF planners neglect to ensure Allied air attacks become time-critical events
linked to ground operations. The
Germans have time to repair roads and bridges or reroute supplies. During Operation DIADEM, Allies ground and
air operations force the Germans to react immediately. Air attacks make it impossible for the
Germans to match the Allies' operational speed. By the time the Germans can react, the situation has changed.
When the MAAF air officers realize that air
power alone cannot successfully achieve the objective, they change the
objective. This change make Operation
STRANGLE appear successful. The MAAF
air officers fail to recognize that Operation STRANGLE owes its "success" to
the timely resumption of the Allied ground offensive-Operation DIADEM. MAAF planners intend to make Operation
DIADEM unnecessary; however, their plan fails.
Ironically, the failure to recognize what makes the original Operation
STRANGLE successful gives rise to another Operation STRANGLE, this time during
the Korean conflict. Like the original
, this Operation STRANGLE (actually two) focuses on destroying the rail system,
forcing the enemy to retire northward to shorten his supply lines. Planners seek to conduct this operation
possibly without the pressure of a United Nations ground offensive. The United Nations never launches a ground
offensive, the Chinese and North Koreans never retreat conflict. Like the original, this Operation STRANGLE
(actually two) focuses on destroying the rail system, forcing the enemy to
retire northward to shorten his supply, and Operation STRANGLE is viewed as a
failure.14
AVIATION
AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
At the operational level, the
MAGTF commander uses aviation to shape his batttlespace, to
accept-or refuse-combat on his own terms.
We
fight war simultaneously at three strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategy is the art of
winning
wars; tactics is the art of winning battles and engagements. The operational level links
tactical
results to strategic aims. At the operational level, the MAGTF commander uses
aviation to
create
conditions for success. Aviation allows the MAGTF commander to shape his
battlespace,
to
accept--or refuse--combat on his own terms.
The
strategic use of aviation falls beyond the scope of this book. The tactical use
of
aviation
is well understood by Marines and is covered indepth in current doctrine. The
operational
level of war deals with the discipline of campaigning.15 At the operational
level,
we focus aviation on achieving the decisive elements of the commander's
intent
against targets and capabilities of operational significance.
The
MAGTF commander must possess an operational outlook; he must think in a broader
dimension
of time and space. He aims to elevate the effect of tactical success to a
higher
level.
He wants to achieve strategically meaningful results through tactics. The
operational
level provides the framework for tactical actions. It defines the battlespace
and
provides the assets to fight; it sets the goal. Without this framework,
tactical battles
remain
a series of disconnected and, unrelated actions. The operational level decides
when,
where, and under what conditions to engage the enemy.
The
operational use of aviation during the initial Normandy landing (Operation
OVERLORD)
in World War II offers an example of this ability to decide. The
operational
role of aviation seeks "...to ensure that the enemy forces attacking the
bridgehead
did not increase at a more rapid rate than the Allied forces defending and
extending
it."16 Allied aviation successfully delays the movement of German reserves
that
can
counter the Allied landing. Operationally, the German army remains paralyzed.
Field
Marshal
Erwin Rommel reports in his 10 June 1944 dispatch:
During the day, practically our
entire traffic--on roads, tracks, and in open
country--is pinned down by powerful
fighter-bomber and bomber
formations, with the result that the
movement of our troops on the
battlefield is almost completely
paralyzed, while the enemy can maneuver
freely.17
Commanders
must include aviation in campaign planning from the start. Aviation
personnel
who think operationally and understand aviation's operational capabilities and
limitations
must be part of the planning staff. Aviation's roles for each campaign differ.
No
preset formula exists for using aviation. Aviation planners ensure that
commanders
and
staffs understand what aviation can contribute to achieve a decision.
TACTICAL-OPERATIONAL
INTERACTION
The MAGTF commander can use
aviation to provide a tactical victory or an operational decision.
Actions
at one level of war do not remain confined to just that level. The results at
one
level
dictate the results at another. During planning and execution, we must consider
every
action for its effects on other levels.
While the natural flow of influence goes
from
the top down, the flow works in reverse as well. Success at the operational
level
can promote success at the tactical level. Success at the tactical level can
foster
success
at the operational level. Success at the tactical level proves meaningless
without
coherent
operational and strategic goals and plans. The Vietnam conflict illustrates
this
point--we
win at the tactical level, but no clear operational or strategic guidance ties
the
tactical
actions together. Aviation proves uniquely suited to effect and expand success
from
one level to another. We realize that aviation provides the operational
framework to
create
conditions for tactical success. Aviation can also play a significant role in
turning a
tactical
success into an operational decision.
Marine
aviation makes significant contributions to the defeat of the Japanese in the
Pacific
during
World War II. Beginning in the Solomon Islands with Guadalcanal in 1942,
Marine
aviation plays a major role in the destruction of the best elements of the
Japanese
naval
air forces, considered superior in quality to the Japanese army air forces. In
response
to the threat to their major base at Rabaul on the island of New Britain, the
Japanese
commit and lose all of their fully trained naval air units, including those
that
survive
Midway. They additionally commit and lose a portion of their best trained army
air
units. The Japanese never fully recover from these losses, the results of which
influence
all further campaigns.18 The onslaught against Rabaul by Allied aircraft, over
half
of them flown by Marine aviation,19 prevents Japanese aircraft from
prohibitively
interfering
with American landings in the Solomons area, most notably at Cape
Glouchester.
The continued pressure of Marine aviation against Rabaul eventually causes
the
withdrawal of Japanese aircraft from the island fortress. The combined result
of these
continuous
tactical actions neutralizes Rabaul's offensive power, permiting the Allies to
execute
an operational maneuver and bypass Rabaul, isolating around 100,000 Japanese.
The
outcome of a single battle at the tactical level can determine the outcome at
the
operational
level. The German campaign in France during May 1940 provides an ideal
example
of aviation helping a ground tactical victory achieve an operational
decision.20
At
the crossing of the Meuse River, the Luftwaffe helps Guderians's tactical
victory of
crossing
the river become the operational decision. The ability of aviation to mass
firepower
quickly where the enemy proves weakest makes this decision possible. As at
the
Meuse crossing, this often translates to close air support and air
reconnaissance for the
ground
forces making the breakthrough.
We
can also use ground operations to guarantee aviation's success. During the 1973
Yom
Kippur
War, Israeli General Sharon leads a ground attack against four Egyptian
surface-
to-air
missile sites along the Suez Canal (Operation GAZELLE, 17 October 1973). The
resulting
gap in the surface-to-air missile screen allows the Israeli air force to
destroy the
Egyptian
surface-to-air missile belt and regain control of the air. Once the Israelis
destroy
the
Egyptian surface-to-air missiles, the Israeli air and ground forces quickly
drive the
Egyptians
from the Sinai.
FOCUS
AND SPEED
Focus allows us to achieve a
decision. Speed allows us to shift our
focus rapidly.
Aviation
adds dimension to two of the central concepts of maneuver warfare, focus and speed.
Focus
remains central to the goal of warfare, achieving a decision. Speed permits us
to set the
tactical
and operational pace. The faster we operate, the less time the enemy has to
react. Speed
allows
the MAGTF to catch the enemy off guard. Speed proves essential, especially in
response
to changes in the situation. The key is not actual speed but relative speed to
the
enemy. We strive to operate faster than the enemy in time and space.
Speed
allows aviation to shift its focus rapidly. Enemy critical vulnerabilities
shift over
time,
or new ones emerge. Aviation's ability to concentrate rapidly over large
distances
allows
the MAGTF to attack these vulnerabilities. Speed proves important because the
"window
of opportunity" may be fleeting. Aviation can quickly shift its focus over
large
distances.
Aircraft from dispersed locations can come together in a single effort in a
very
short
time. They can travel hundreds of miles in a matter of minutes. Aviation can
assist
ground
forces shift their focus rapidly. A similar, unaided shift of ground forces
could
take
hours or days.
Aviation's
ability to shift its focus rapidly is not only important tactically, but also
operationally.
A shift of the operational focus often entails a move of several hundred
miles.
This may mean days of repositioning for ground forces. Aviation can reposition
in
hours
or even minutes. This ability to shift focus rapidly can be operationally
decisive
even
without engaging in combat.
Again
the German campaign in France during 1940 provides an excellent example. The
Germans
stress the importance of the Allies not recognizing their main effort until it
proves
too late. They also stress the use of overwhelming firepower when the main
effort
smashes
into the Allies. By using its ability to shift operational focus rapidly, the
Luftwaffe
plays a pivotal part in solving this problem. At the start of the German
campaign,
the Luftwaffe concentrates its support for Army Group A, coming through the
Netherlands
and Belgium. This helps convince the Allies that Army Group A constitutes
the
Germans' main effort. Once it becomes evident that the real main effort lies
with
Army
Group B, slashing through the Ardennes, the Luftwaffe swiftly shifts its
support in
favor
of Army Group B.
Aviation's
ability to focus its effort over large distances may prove critically important
in
the
defense. If the enemy achieves a breakthrough, little time may exist to stop or
delay
him
except through use of aviation. Repositioning of ground forces to block the
enemy
takes
time. Aviation can provide that time by quickly massing firepower on the enemy
to
delay,
disrupt, or destroy him until ground forces seal the breach.
SURPRISE,
UNPREDICTABILITY, AND BOLDNESS
To
achieve surprise in aviation operations, we use imagination, unpredictability,
and
boldness.
These qualities remain as important in the operational and tactical planning of
air
operations as on individual missions. We must not reduce air operations to a
formula
by
repeating the same actions in predictable patterns. The air attacks on North
Vietnam
occurring
at the same time of day and on the same axis provide a clear example of
predictability.
The subsequent loss in aircraft and pilots is high.
Air
attacks against an alert, prepared opponent will likely accomplish little and
prove too
costly
to the attackers. The first attack most enemies expect comes from aviation.
Strategic
surprise remains hard to achieve. History does show how imagination achieves
tactical
surprise, reduces losses, and makes air attacks extremely effective.
The
Japanese air attack on the U. S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December
1941
illustrates
a bold action. The attack aims at removing the only threat to Japanese
domination
of the western Pacific Ocean. The Japanese attack achieves both strategic and
tactical
surprise. The Japanese realize that surprise plays an essential role in the
success of
the
attack. Surprise proves essential to offset American naval superiority because
of the
great
strength of the U. S. fleet. Aviation provides the only force available to the
Japanese
possessing
the capability to carry out this attack. The fact that it takes the U. S, Navy
over
two years to recover and regain its strength demonstrates the scope of the
Japanese
success.
LETHALITY
AND EFFECTIVENESS
Lethality provides the
means-effectiveness provides the end.
Destruction
is not an end in itself, but merely a means to a larger end--effectiveness. We
define
effectiveness by results. We must not
confuse lethality with effectiveness. Lethality only
assures
that we can destroy a target. A direct relationship between lethality and
effectiveness does
not
exist. While bomb (battle) damage assessment measures lethality, it proves more
difficult to
measure
effectiveness. If aviation fails to kill a dug-in enemy (often the case), it is
not lethal.
However,
if aviation keeps the enemy under cover or prevents him from manning his
weapons
systems
while the ground force attacks, then aviation is effective. Aviation is not
effective if the
time
between the air and ground attacks is long enough to allow the enemy to
recover.
During
the Vietnam conflict, aviation fails to effectively stop the movement of
supplies
from
North Vietnam to South Vietnam. The tactical objective of Operation ROLLING
THUNDER
aims to reduce the level of supplies reaching the enemy, causing his fighting
capability
to suffer. At the height of their power in 1967, North Vietnamese forces only
require
100 tons of supplies a day to sustain military operations. This amounts to less
than
50
truckloads. Although aviation destroys hundreds of truckloads a day, at least
50 truck
loads
of supplies safely make it to the south.21 Lethality is high, but effectiveness
is low.
The
failure of air power in Vietnam does not lessen the lethality of aviation. It
does warn
that
aviation may not achieve its political and military goals even when lethal.
Lethality
does
not automatically equate to effectiveness.
The
effectiveness of an air attack is fleeting in time and space. A basic
difference exists
between
air attacks and ground attacks. In ground operations, a successful attack
causes
a
penetration or results in a flanking of the enemy. We bypass or encircle him.
Time
works
against the enemy. He must break out or surrender. In contrast, time works for
the
enemy under air attack. He protects his combat power during the air attack and
waits
for
the aircraft to leave. When they leave, the enemy resumes his activities.
Ways
exist that aviation can extend the duration or effectiveness of the attack.
They
include
a continuous flow of aircraft into a target area or the use of cluster
munitions,
mines,
or delayed-fuze ordnance. Most importantly, we can counter aviation's time
disadvantage
by integrating air and ground actions to apply combined arms effects on the
enemy.
An air attack creates a temporary effect on the enemy; coordinated ground
actions
exploit
and increase this effect. Subsequent air attacks can pursue and devastate the
fleeing
enemy. If we fail to integrate air and ground actions, little benefit results
from
either
action.
Chapter 3
Combat
Operations
"On
our drive to Manila, I depended solely on [Marine Aircraft Groups 24 and 32] to
protect
my left flank against possible counterattack...I can say without reservation
that
the
Marine dive bombers are one of the most flexible outfits that I have seen in
this war.
They
will try anything once, and from my experience with them, I have found that
anything
they try usually pans out in their favor. The Marine dive bombers of the First
Wing
have kept the enemy on the run. They have kept him underground and have
enabled
troops to move up with fewer casualties and greater speed I cannot say enough
in
praise of these men of the dive bombers...for the job they have done in giving
my men
close
ground support in this operation.
--Major
General Verne D. Mudge, USA
"Previously,
Marine commanders in attacking an enemy have been limited to a two
dimension
plane of action attack frontally or from the flank. The ability of the
helicopter
has
made possible a third dimension of action which will permit a commander to
bypass
a
position by going over it...Thus, the helicopter enables the attacker to choose
the point
of
contact to hit the defender where it will hurt him Most."2
-- Major Archie I Clapp, USMC
Aviation
is offensive by nature. As part of naval expeditionary power projection, its
purpose
is to carry the battle to the enemy. Offensive action allows us to seize and
retain
the initiative. When we use aviation for defense, it does not put pressure on
the
enemy.
The Marine Corps clearly expresses this attitude over fifty years ago in Marine
Corps
Aviation: General, 1940:
Combat aviation is designed,
equipped, and trained for offensive
employment as a striking force
against hostile air and surface targets. It is
purely an offensive weapon,
regardless of whether the commander
employing it is operating his
surface forces offensively of defensively.
Combat aviation has no passive
defensive value.3
The MAGTF gains victory
through the decisive offense; the MAGTF uses the defense to avoid
defeat and await opportunity
for the offense.
The
MAGTF achieves a decision--victory--through decisive offensive operations
characterized by
integrated
combined arms and maneuver warfare. The MAGTF
conducts
defensive operations to avoid defeat, waiting for the opportune moment to seize
the
initiative and go on the offense. Aviation supports MAGTF offensive and
defensive
operations
as the main effort, supporting effort, or reserve. Aviation can provide
firepower,
mobility, surprise, and speed to create conditions for success in a movement to
contact
or attack. It makes great use of the same characteristics during exploitation
and
pursuit
operations. Aviation can create a faster tempo of operations than the enemy,
allowing
the MAGTF to attack or counterattack to exploit a vulnerability. With its
range,
speed,
and ability to mass firepower quickly at a chosen spot, aviation can provide a
significant
counterstrike capability, protect the flank of a ground force, or function as
the
reserve
in the defense.
MAGTF aviation provides six
functions- -
·
Antiair warfare
·
Offensive air support
·
Assault support
·
Air reconnaissance
·
Electronic warfare
·
Control of aircraft and
missiles
MAGTF
aviation provides more than just fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft.
Ground-based
air defense assets constitute another
essential component. To unite
these
individual parts into an effective combat arm, MAGTF aviation possesses
a
flexible, adaptable, deployable, redundant, and survivable air command and
control
system.
This Marine air command and control system is completely integrated into the
MAGTF
command and control system.
Two
of the best concepts to use when considering the employment of military forces
are
firepower
and mobility. Proper application of firepower and mobility creates conditions
for
success and allows us to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. They provide great
capability
when
used during exploitation and pursuit or when we commit the reserve. Firepower
and
mobility
are complementary. Firepower aids mobility by causing so much destruction or
chaos that the enemy remains helpless to block
or oppose our movement. Aviation increases the firepower and mobility of the
MAGTF. These capabilities do not reside solely with aviation, but aviation
offers some unique capabilities within each. While we separate firepower and
mobility for discussion, in combat they remain inseparable parts of a larger
whole.
TO
PROVIDE FIREPOWER
The greatest value of
firepower lies not in physical destruction- -but in the mental chaos it
produces in the enemy.
Firepower damages or threatens to damage enemy
personnel, facilities, and equipment. This damage (or its threat) sometimes
fulfills the purpose of the mission: to destroy an enemy force or keep him from
using a certain road, More often, firepower aids movement; an air attack
destroys a bunker whose fires immobilize a ground force.
The
naval expeditionary nature of the MAGTF means that it may not possess enough
heavy
ground combat weapons. We select targets which when attacked will help yield a
decision.
Our goal does not center on the unfocused application of firepower to
incrementally
reduce the enemy's strength. The purpose of firepower focuses on allowing
friendly
movement rather than bombarding the enemy into oblivion.4 Maneuver warfare
demands
the focused use of firepower to fit our larger purpose. We use the selective
application
of firepower to contribute to the enemy's shock and mental disruption; he
loses
the will to fight and his moral courage evaporates. Aviation allows the MAGTF
commander
to select and attack such targets at the operational level. Operation DESERT
STORM
provides an excellent example of the integrated application of combined arms
and
its ability to condition and shape the enemy mentally. In this example, actions
at the
tactical
level create conditions for success for actions at the operational level.
OPERATION DESERT
STORM: COMBINED ARMS RAIDS
During the first six months of
Operation Desert Shield, We [1st Marine Division]
spent a great deal of time studying
how the Iraqis fight and looked extensively at
the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. We
learned that the Iraqi artillery was very
effective in trapping Iranian
soldiers time and time again in confined areas called
'fire-sacks' where thousands of
Iranians perished. We knew there were over
1200 artillery pieces belonging to
the Iraqi divisions facing the 1st Marine
Division. In our studies of the two
obstacle belts in Kuwait and the positioning of
the Iraqi artillery, we concluded
that the Iraqis were planning on trapping us in at
least two fire-sacks when we
attacked. We also recognized that there wasn't
enough ordnance in the aviators
inventory to 'destroy' all that artillery during the
first phase of Desert Storm. So we
designed a series of ambushes (combined
arms raids) to 'defeat' the Iraqis
before we even attacked into Kuwait.
Desert Storm kicked off on 17 Jan
and the Iraqis began firing their artillery into
Saudi Arabia at Marine and Arab
units. On 19 Jan, we ran our first raid. Our
scheme was to move an artillery
battery close to the Kuwaiti border at night,
escorted by a Light Armored Infantry
Company. We would station a Marine
EA6B Electronic Warfare aircraft
inside Saudi Arabian airspace to jam the Iraqis
ground surveillance radars until
after we had fired the entire artillery battery on
the target, using Dual Purpose
Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM).
Then, just as the artillery battery
started its withdrawal phase of the raid, the
EA6B aircraft would stop jamming
just long enough for the Iraqis to detect the
artillery battery's movement before
"turning on the buzzer" again. Our intent was
to cause the Iraqi artillery to
respond to our fires, which they did each and every
time, meaning that there were Iraqi
soldiers on their guns. Once they would
begin firing, a Marine flying as an
airborne Forward Air Controller (FAC) in a
Marine F/A 18 (which we call a
FASTFAC) would detect their muzzle flashes and
then direct the 'wolfpack' of Marine
F/A 18s and AV8Bs waiting in orbit to roll in
on the firing Iraqi artillery.
Our aim was to defeat the 'minds' of
the Iraqi artillerymen --to convince them
that it just wasn't smart to man
their artillery pieces because every time they did,
Marine aircraft came rolling in on
them. We achieved this objective in the 3d
week of Feb. when Iraqi artillerymen
were observed by the RPV [remotely
piloted vehicle] abandoning their
howitzers as our aircraft began attacking their
positions after such a raid!
...We felt reasonable [reasonably]
confident, based on the 'shaping of the
battlefield' done during our
combined arms raids that if we could get Marine air
over the Iraqi artillerymen, they
would abandon their guns! ...With the Iraqi
artillerymen discouraged, and in
spite of the poor weather and lack of visibility,
we were able to proceed through both
of the Iraqi obstacle belts more rapidly
than CENTCOM had imagined.5
TO
PROVIDE MOBILITY
Mobility creates superiority
at the point of battle or allows avoidance of disadvantageous battle.
Mobility
allows the MAGTF commander to focus firepower where it best can
achieve
a decision. The MAGTF ties mobility to the use or threat of
firepower.
Aviation provides the MAGTF tactical and operational mobility; that is, the
ability
to move within an engagement or battle and to move between engagements or
battles.
While
all the elements of the MAGTF possess organic mobility means, aviation allows the
MAGTF
commander to rapidly reposition forces to any location in the battlespace.
Armed
with this ability, we can conduct tactical and operational actions at a tempo
faster
than
the enemy. We use these relative tempo advantages to shift quickly from one
action
to
another. Aviation can also provide a tempo advantage to the MAGTF by stopping
or
slowing
enemy movement.
Aviation
provides mobility directly and indirectly. It adds directly to the MAGTF's
mobility
through the tactical and operational movement of combat forces and equipment.
In
addition to the movement of these forces, it provides logistical support to
reduce or end
reliance
on surface lines of communication. This ability to move forces, equipment, and
supplies
allows the MAGTF to maneuver freely in the battlespace.
Indirectly,
aviation increases the MAGTF's tactical and operational mobility by providing
protection
from enemy aviation, reconnaissance, and intelligence. If aviation prevents the
enemy
from seeing us or knowing what we are doing, we gain relative speed. While
aviation
provides high-speed movement of combat forces, it can reduce this need by
blinding
the enemy.
TO
CREATE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS
Aviation crates conditions for
success y shaping the battlespace.
Aviation
creates conditions for success by forcing the enemy to react as we desire.
Aviation
can force the enemy to move against his will and prevent his massing of forces
and
equipment.
It can impede or prevent him from moving when he must. Aviation can delay the
arrival
of
enemy forces, compel him to commit them piecemeal, and deny him the supplies he
needs to be
effective
on the battlefield. The MAGTF commander uses aviation to help him shape the
battlespace
and to seize the initiative from the enemy. FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, states--
...the MAGTF commander can use ...
his organic aviation to see and shape
the course of the campaign in time
and space well in advance of the close
combat of ground forces.
This...applies not only to the direct application
of aviation combat power, but also
to the range it provides ground forces
as well. Such activities include
attempting to ascertain the enemy's
operational intentions; delaying
enemy reinforcements by interdiction;
degrading critical enemy functions
or capabilities such as command and
control, offensive air support, or
logistics; and manipulating the enemy's
perceptions.6
To
create conditions for success, the MAGTF must be able to operate freely within
the
battlespace,
both in the air and on the ground. While not always possible immediately, the
MAGTF
must gain control of the air--air superiority--as soon as possible. Control of
the
air
remains a priority for the entire MAGTF--not just the ACE. Air superiority
allows the
MAGTF
the freedom of action it requires to conduct operations. It denies the enemy
freedom
of action. Besides enabling us to see and attack the enemy, control of the air
prevents
the enemy from attacking us while leaving him both blind and largely unable to
move
or communicate. Air superiority is not simply "air-to-air combat." It
includes the
neutralization
or destruction of enemy air defenses, airfields, and aviation command and
control
facilities. The air operations phase (17 January to 23 February 1991) of
Operation
DESERT
STORM illustrates the devastating effectiveness of air superiority vividly. At
no
time during the ensuing ground operations (24 to 27 February 1991) did the
Iraqis
possess
the air capability or will to prohibitively interfere with our actions.
Aviation
influences the way the enemy fights on the operational and tactical level. In
the
World
War 11 island hopping campaign, aviation forces the Japanese to man literally
hundreds
of outposts. Aviation's ability to attack anywhere compels the Japanese to
spread
their combat forces to defend everywhere. Thinly spread, the Japanese prove
unable
to mass forces to withstand the combined might of United States air, land, and
sea
forces.
The tactical operation and victory that the aircraft carriers and aviators
under Rear
Admirals
Fletcher and Spruance achieve at Midway in June 1942 decisively blunts the
Japanese
naval offensive of Admiral Yamamoto and Vice Admiral Nagumo. In August
1942,
the 1st Marine Division, commanded by Major General Vandegrift, lands on
Guadalcanal.
The island is secured by February 1943, after a hard fight involving crucial
support
by Marine aviation, directed by Brigadier Generals Geiger and Woods. The
results
of these two tactical operations together produce far reaching operational
consequences.
They place the Japanese on the defensive for the remainder of the war,
perhaps
signalling the turning point in the Pacific theater.
With
the European landings in Italy and France, the Germans feel the full impact of
aviation
at the tactical level. Allied aviation denies the Germans free movement by day,
disrupts
timetables, and disorganizes units. The Germans depend on tactical mobility for
success.
The loss of tactical mobility prevents them from rapidly repositioning forces,
committing
reserves, or arriving at the battlefield in unit strength.
TO
EXPLOIT ENEMY VULNERABILITIES
Aviation can directly attack
an enemy vulnerability or create vulnerability.
Aviation
creates conditions for success by pitting our strength against enemy weakness. To be
effective,
we destroy that which is most important to the enemy. This weakness--or
critical
vulnerability--is
not a permanent feature. It presents a window of opportunity that will
eventually
close.
A critical vulnerability must be both vulnerable and critical. We seek the
enemy's critical
vulnerabilities,
then focus all our combat power to strike them.
We
attack enemy critical vulnerabilities to achieve a decision. Rarely can we
achieve a
decision
as a result of our initial actions. Our initial actions create unforeseen,
fleeting
opportunities
which we must quickly seize to exploit. These opportunities may be the
result
of our actions, enemy mistakes, or even chance. By exploiting opportunities, we
create
more opportunities for exploitation. We achieve a decision through our
willingness
to
ruthlessly exploit these opportunities.7
Aviation
allows us to shift our focus swiftly to avoid enemy strengths and attack his
new
weaknesses.
As the campaign or battle unfolds, vulnerabilities shift. The enemy covers
some
vulnerabilities while new ones develop. Aviation can attack existing enemy
weaknesses
or uncover new vulnerabilities which it or other MAGTF forces can exploit.
FOR
EXPLOITATION AND PURSUIT
Aviation
allows the MAGTF to turn a successful attack into exploitation and pursuit.
Exploitation
extends the destruction of the enemy by maintaining continuous offensive
pressure,
The purpose of exploitation lies in destroying the enemy's cohesion. As enemy
cohesion
breaks down, the exploitation may develop into a pursuit. The pursuit seeks to
annihilate
the enemy force. The difference between exploitation and pursuit rests with the
condition
of the enemy. The opportunity to conduct a pursuit is often fleeting and must
be
seized
quickly by the commander.
An
effective pursuit requires the entire MAGTF. While aviation may be responsible
for
the
physical destruction during the pursuit, the results characterize the use of
maneuver
warfare
and combined arms. In a classic demonstration of maneuver warfare, the
commander's
intent aims to "...render the enemy incapable of resisting by shattering
his
moral
and physical cohesion--his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated
whole."8
Without
the pressure of ground operations to force the enemy to flee, the enemy will
not
be
driven into the waiting arms of aviation.
AS
A RESERVE
Aviation reserves can shift
support quickly to reinforce success and permit decisive maneuver.
The
MAGTF organizes a reserve not to prevent defeat but to reinforce success.
A
reserve provides the commander the flexibility to rapidly conduct decisive
maneuver.
Aviation reserves allow the MAGTF commander to shift air support rapidly
from
one area to another. The aviation reserve may be airborne (loitering) or on the
ground.
We can use aviation reserves in offensive or defensive operations.
The
concept of an aviation reserve does not clash with the principle of
concentration. The
use
of Marine aviation as a mobile reserve appears as early as 1940.9 While we want
to
attack
the enemy with the strongest force, the fog of war comes into play. When no
initial
opportunity
exists for aviation to achieve a decision, the MAGTF commander may
organize
an aviation reserve. We cannot possess perfect knowledge of the enemy, his
intentions
or disposition. The commander attempts to make contact with the enemy with
the
smallest possible force. He uses this force to develop the situation, determine
the
critical
enemy vulnerability, and then strike with the bulk of his combat power--his
reserve.
Aviation
reserves allow us to exploit an enemy weakness discovered during combat.
Additionally,
aviation reserves can increase the enemy's uncertainty with the introduction
of
new forces. Aviation reserves, like any reserve, require commitment in total
and at the
same
time. Avoid piecemeal employment of reserves. Because aviation assets remain a
limited
asset, normally employ them as an operational reserve.
The
use of aviation reserves claims historical precedence. Both the Soviets
(offensively)
and
the British (defensively) make use of aviation reserves in World War II. As
early as
1941,
the Soviets assemble large aviation reserves to provide operational
flexibility.10
They
use these aviation reserves to increase air support for threatened fronts. In
the
summer
of 1941, reserve aviation groups form to reinforce critical sectors. This leads
to
the
formation a year later of reserve aviation corps to support air armies.
The
British use an aviation reserve during the Battle of Britain.11 As the battle
begins, the
Luftwaffe
enjoys a 2 to I aircraft advantage over the Royal Air Force. Air Marshal
Dowding
keeps a third of his forces in safe areas as a reserve. His two subordinate
commanders
maintain their own tactical reserves. Even during Britain's darkest hour, the
British
maintain an aviation reserve. When on 15 September 1940 the Germans launch
what
they believe to be their decisive blow, the British commit all their air
reserves. The
Luftwaffe
suffers such heavy losses that they never again challenge the Royal Air Force
in
the
skies over England. The British use of air reserves wins the Battle of Britain
and
permanently
postpones Operation SEALION.
Chapter 4
Military
Operations Other Than War
"We
are now concerned with the peace of the entire world and the peace can only be
maintained
by the strong."1
--General
George C. Marshall, USA
"We
are not the World's policeman, but guess where the people look when they need a
cop."2
--General Colin L. Powell, USA
Military operations other than
war prevent war, promote peace, and support civil authorities.
In
the future, as in the past, Marines will be frequently called to take part in
actions
short
of war. Military operations other than war do not directly relate to combat or
hostile actions
by
any party. Military operations other than war fall into two categories: deter
war and resolve
conflict
and promote peace.3
Military
operations that deter war and resolve conflict include--
·
Peace
enforcement.
·
Counterterrorism.
·
Support
to counterinsurgency.
·
Noncombatant
evacuation.
·
Show
of force.
·
Raid.
·
Strike.
Military
operations other than war that promote peace include--
·
Counterdrug.
·
Peacekeeping.
·
Noncombatant
evacuation.
·
Nation
assistance.
·
Humanitarian
assistance.
·
Antiterrorism.
·
Disaster
relief.
·
Civil
support.
We conduct peacetime military
operations in support of vital national interest.
Operations
other than war equate to peacetime military operations. We
conduct
peacetime military operations for the
same reason we enter combat--in
support
of vital national interests. Many of the same combat tenets, principles,
tactics, and
procedures
apply to peacetime military operations.4 As Marines, we must be ready to
conduct
peacetime military operations while remaining primarily organized, trained, and
equipped
for combat.
The
traits we prize and encourage in combat are essential for peacetime military
operations-boldness,
initiative, and flexibility. Peacetime military operations are governed
by
many of the same considerations as combat. While no difference exists in most
aspects,
a
few areas require increased emphasis. The rules of engagement during peacetime
military
operations employ more restrictive and politically sensitive conditions than in
combat
operations. This requires restraint and the careful application of military
force.
The
presence of military forces may provoke military, civil, and terrorist
reactions. We
must
take appropriate security measures to protect the force and prevent disruption
of the
mission.
Units must retain the ability to rapidly transition from a peacetime to a
combat
posture.
Peacetime
military operations may account for a significant part of Marine actions. More
peacekeeping
operations have occurred between 1988 and 1993 than in the previous forty
year
history of the United Nations.5 The Marine Corps contributes significantly to
these
terminated
and ongoing operations. Involvement includes peacekeeping and humanitarian
assistance
in Bosnia; humanitarian assistance in Iraq and Bangladesh; humanitarian
assistance,
peacemaking, and peacekeeping in Somalia; and disaster relief in Florida.
Forward
deployed Marine expeditionary units may be tasked to carry out operations other
than
war. Other operations may require the deployment of larger MAGTFs. In either
case,
the ACE of the MAGTF will provide significant capability.6 The CH-46E Sea
Knight
can carry twenty combat Marines on a helicopterborne assault or twenty
noncombatant
civilians during an evacuation. The KC-130 Hercules can move 35,000
pounds
of combat supplies to support ground combat operations or 35,000 pounds of
life-
sustaining
food for humanitarian assistance. The F/A-18 Hornet can carry air-to-air
ordnance
to
gain air superiority or air-to-ground ordnance to conduct peacekeeping. The
direct
air support center can control aircraft dropping bombs for the division or
coordinate
aircraft
bringing in sandbags to a flood ravaged region.
HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE
Humanitarian assistance saves
lives or prevents great damage to or loss of life.
Humanitarian
assistance relieves or reduces the effects of natural or
manmade
disasters that present a serious threat to life or loss of property. This
assistance involves a
friendly
population victimized by the destruction of part of its support infrastructure.
Humanitarian
assistance
includes disaster relief, rudimentary construction, water and sanitary
assistance, and
resettlement
of displaced civilians.
OPERATIONS
IN SOMALIA
In August 1992, United States
military forces begin airlifting food and relief
supplies into Somalia as part of
Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. This action is
plagued by the uncertainty and
instability of the Somali political situation. Civil
unrest and armed gangs interfere with
the safe operations of these flights. The
distribution of relief supplies is
subject to robbery and outright obstruction by the
local "warlords."
To safeguard relief workers and
supplies requires military forces. In December
1992, a joint task force commanded
by Lieutenant General Johnston, USMC,
arrives off Somalia. Operation
RESTORE HOPE thus begins. Operating under
United Nations authority (UNOSOM 1),
Marines and special operations forces
secure the port and airfield in the
capital city of Mogadishu. Maritime
prepositioning ships provide
essential initial support. Over the next three
months, the task force moves
throughout Somalia, establishing and securing
relief centers and escorting supply
convoys. The spread of weapons throughout
the country during the civil war is
a major concern. This requires identifying and
disarming individuals and groups
that pose a threat to military forces and relief
workers.
The task force, together with the
State Department, establish an environment
that allows humanitarian operations
to proceed. Relief workers return and
distribute food and other relief
supplies. Operations are turned over to a United
Nations force (UNOSOM II) in May
1993.
In March 1995, a combined joint task
force led by Lieutenant General Zinni,
USMC executes Operation UNITED
SHIELD. It covers the withdrawal of all
United Nations peacekeeping troops
from Somalia.
Disaster
relief provides emergency assistance to victims of natural and manmade
disasters.
These
operations depend heavily upon the sustainment capability of MAGTF aviation.
Because
of this critical requirement, aviation may be the first element the MAGTF
commits.
On
the night of 29 April 1991, Bangladesh is struck by a cyclone named Marian. It
kills
over
130,000 people and more than one million cattle. The country's entire
infrastructure
along
the Bay of Bengal is destroyed. The disaster is beyond the capabilities of the
country
and nongovernmental organizations. On 10 May, the U.S. Ambassador formally
requests
military assistance. On 11 May, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
issues
the
execute order to U.S. Pacific Command to provide assistance.
Within 24 hours, General Stackpole
and a small team had reached the
scene--the leading element of a
joint task force that would touch the lives
of 1.7 million survivors during a
five-week operation. To the people of
Bangladesh, they were angels of
mercy, coming from the sea. The
operation's code name was a perfect
fit: Sea Angel.7
On
15 May 1991, the joint task force headquarters is augmented by an amphibious
task
force
returning from Operation DESERT STORM. Helicopters and air cushion landing
craft
prove instrumental in the transportation of supplies to the survivors
JOINT
TASK FORCE ANDREW
At 0500 on 24 August 1992, Hurricane
Andrew strikes south Florida,
extensive destruction. The Governor
of Florida requests federal assistance. In
response to this request, Joint Task
Force Andrew is formed to commence
humanitarian operations. Composed of
elements of all Services and both active
and reserve military forces, Joint
Task Force Andrew begins operations on 28
August 1992.
Joint Task Force Andrew provides
field feeding sites, storage and distribution
warehouses, local and line haul
transfer, and other logistical support to the
people of south Florida, Success is
defined as getting life support systems in
place and relieving immediate
hardships until civilian federal, state, and local
agencies can reestablish normal
operations.
Operations are conducted in three
phases. Phase I provides immediate life
support systems: food, water,
shelter, medical supplies and services, sanitation,
and transportation. Phase II--the
recovery phase--continues to provide Phase I
services while helping civil
authorities reestablish public services. The task
force coordinates with many
government and private agencies. Finally, a
reconstruction phase continues to
reestablish services while the task force
redeploys.
The
scope of humanitarian assistance is limited. These operations are normally
initiated in
response
to requests for immediate help and rehabilitation from a domestic or foreign
government
or an international agency. Military assistance supplements or complements
the
efforts of the host-nation civil authorities or international agencies that
possess the
primary
responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.
PEACEKEEPING
Peacekeeping maintains peace
with the approval of all major belligerents.
Peacekeeping
operations support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of
potential
conflict. We conduct peacekeeping operations with the approval of all major
belligerent
parties.
These operations monitor and maintain an existing truce during diplomatic
efforts to reach
a
comprehensive peace settlement. Peacekeeping operations require the
peacekeepers to
deal
with tense and dangerous situations without becoming a participant.
Peacekeeping
differs from peace enforcement. Peace enforcement uses military force to
create
peace between warring factions. Peace enforcement occurs without a prior
agreement
or commitment by the combatants.
THE
COMBAT LINK
Peacetime
military operations may occur simultaneously with combat operations. While
our
intent remains peaceful, combat is always a possibility. A humanitarian
assistance
operation
may flare into an armed confrontation. Providing food and water to displaced
civilians
may also require establishing and maintaining security for the relief supplies,
the
civilians,
and the military force itself. Our recent incursions in Haiti and Somalia offer
clear
examples. Our past operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua
in
the
early to mid twentieth century reinforce this possibility.
It
may prove difficult to identify or discriminate between friend or foe. The need
to
provide
peacetime assistance must be balanced with the security of the MAGTF and the
people
being helped. MAGTF aviation can play a vital role to create conditions for
success
during operations other than war.
Conclusion
"Aviation
is still so much an infant that only those who possess that brand of
imagination
commonly
generated by a pipe and a pill are competent to prophesy its final
development."1
--Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham,
USMC
"You
mayfly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe
it
clean
of life--but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for
civilization, you
must
do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men
into
the mud."2
--T.R.
Fehrenbach
Marine
aviation makes the Marine Corps unique. To understand Marine aviation,
we
must understand maneuver warfare, combined arms, and the MAGTF. The
fundamental
difference between Marine aviation and other aviation forces is
that
Marine aviation is part of a combined arms organization--the MAGTF. MAGTF
aviation
never operates independently--it remains an integral part of the MAGTF. The
starting
point for the successful use of Marine aviation lies in our history, a history
forged
in
combat.
To secure the full measure of
cooperation between the air and ground
forces, it is necessary that each
understands the problems of the other. The
aviator must know something of the
tactics of the ground patrol, and he
must be ready and willing to go
assume any justified risk to assist the
ground commander. On the other hand,
the ground commander should
understand the hazards and
limitations imposed on aviation operating over
difficult terrain, and should not
expect the impossible.3
The
MAGTF commander uses aviation "to materially shorten each campaign."4
To
achieve
this goal, we must understand the tactical and operational use of aviation. We
must
fully grasp the impact that aviation actions at one level will produce at
another. To
successfully
employ aviation tactically and operationally, we must fully integrate it into
all
aspects
of MAGTF planning and execution. Separate air and ground operations yield
disparate
effects on the enemy. The MAGTF commander combines his air and ground
combat
power into one operation, projecting overwhelming firepower at the point of
decision.
Aviation
has been used in every type of combat operation, from small scale insurgencies
in
the
Caribbean to global conflict in World War II. In many cases, aviation produces
a
major
effect in battles and campaigns.
Without
Luftwaffe support, it is unlikely General Guderian crosses the Meuse River in
1940--the
decisive act of the German campaign in France. U.S. Navy carrier-based
aviation
turns the tide against the Japanese navy at Coral Sea and Midway. Marine
aviation
plays a pivotal role in the battle for Guadalcanal and is decisive in the
isolation
and
neutralization of Rabaul, opening the door for an operational maneuver to
bypass the
island
fortress.. When Operation STRANGLE fails to force the Germans from Italy, the
Allies
launch Operation DIADEM, where aviation proves pivotal. Without
control
of the air, United Nations forces will be pushed off the Korean peninsula in
midsummer
1950. In Operation DESERT STORM, aviation sets the stage for the
decisive
act of the campaign--the ground offensive. While aviation is crucial to our
victory
against
Iraq, "Air power alone could not have brought the war to so sharp and
decisive a
conclusion."5
No
formula exists for the proper employment of aviation. We must understand its
capabilities
and limitations when used as a maneuver force, the main effort, supporting
effort,
or reserve. To effectively use aviation, we must use it as part of the MAGTF
combined-arms
team. Aviation can pin down the enemy while ground forces attack.
Aviation
can decimate the enemy that ground forces have cornered. Aviation can strike
where
the enemy is not prepared.
In
the end, air operations prove effective only when integrated with ground
operations.
Aviation
cannot substitute for strong, aggressive ground operations. Aviation does not
provide
a cure that can independently achieve results. When aggressive ground
operations
exploit
the results of air operations, decisive and lasting effects can be won.
Aviation and
ground
maneuver are complementary.
While
aviation alone cannot achieve an independent victory, when we integrate it with
other
combat forces, aviation can be the dominant force within the battlespace. We
use
aviation
where it will achieve a decision--in a battle or a campaign. The MAGTF
commander
uses aviation to increase the combat power of the MAGTF. The firepower
and
mobility of aviation allow the MAGTF to remain light and mobile--naval
expeditionary
in nature--yet powerful enough to accomplish its mission.
Marine
aviation functions as an integral element of the MAGTF. The use of each element
requires
cooperation of all the others. Only when we employ the MAGTF as a whole can
we
fight and win. This basic concept--the very purpose of Marine aviation--is the
framework
that guides the employment of Marine aviation.
Perhaps
Major General James M. Myatt, USMC, best sums it up--
Marine Aviation's mission is to
support the rest of the Marine Air-Ground
Task Force. Sometimes Marine Air can
be a maneuver element on its own,
with a 'mission-type' order assigned
to "...prevent the Iraqis from attacking
down the coast road" as was
done in Operation Desert Shield. Most often its
mission is to support the Division
as was done in Desert Storm. Close Air
Support is only one of the functions
of Marine Aviation. As you read my
response, I hope you have gained an
appreciation for the type of coordination
and close cooperation that exists in
the Marine Air-Ground team.
One night during one of the combined
arms raids, I heard over our radios the
voice of the F/A 18D FASTFAC pilot
telling the 'wolfpack' pilots: "...hurry
up! They are attacking our
Marines..." as he watched muzzle flashes of the
Iraqi artillery firing at our ground
raid force. That was one of the most
poignant moments of my life. I never
take this Air-Ground team for granted.
Such teamwork doesn't just
happen-and it can't be legislated by Congress or
created by some instruction. Nor can
it really be explained why it's like it is.
But, the result is a marvelous
marriage, more powerful than the sum of the
parts, where a Marine's most sought
after privilege is to be able to fight for
another Marine.6
Notes
Foreword
1 Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC,
"Reflections on the Corps...Marine Tactical
Aviation,"
Marine Corps Gazette (May 1992), 15.
2 Henri Jomini, The Art of War
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), x.
Aviation
and the Marine Corps
1 Attributed to ADM Arthur Radford by
Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of
Military
and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1985), 6.
2 GEN Omar N. Bradley, USA, and others,
Effect of Air Power on Military
Operations:
Western Europe (Wiesbaden, Germany: Twelth Army Group, 15 July 1945),
200.
3 Peter B. Mersky, U.S. Marine Corps
Aviation: 1912 to the Present (Baltimore,
MD:
Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1987), 2.
4 Mersky, 4. On 5 January 1914, a
group of Marine aviators and enlisted
mechanics,
with their equipment, embarked aboard Navy transport Hancock and sailed for
Puerto
Rico to join the Advance Base Brigade in the annual Atlantic Fleet exercises.
It
was
the first time an all-Marine aviation force operated as a special part of
Marine ground
forces.
5 Mersky, 11. On 14 October 1918,
Marines of Squadron 9, 1st Marine Aviation
Force
flew a mission against the German-held railyards in Belgium. The flight of five
DH
4
and three DH-9A bombers, led by Capt R. S. Lytle, conducted the first mission
to be
flown
by Marines on their own in World War I. The strike was essentially a deep air
support
or air interdiction mission.
6 Lt Col Edward C. Johnson, USMC, Marine
Corps Aviation: The Early Years
1912-1940
(Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1977), 53. Aircraft took part in
bombing
and strafing attacks on bandits, but because of the limited armament and
maneuverability
of the planes and the lack of rapid, reliable air-ground communications,
aviation
was not a decisive anti-bandit weapon. Aviation did enhance the mobility of
forces
operating in largely roadless terrain. In Haiti in 1919, Lt Lawton H. M.
Sanderson
of
E Squadron (formerly 4th Squadron) began practicing a bombing technique
whereupon
he
entered a 45 degree dive, releasing the bomb at 250 feet. His squadron mates
soon
took
up the practice, as did Marines at Quantico in 1920. Also see Robert Sherrod,
History
of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (Baltimore, MD: Nautical &
Aviation
Publishing
Co. of America, 1987), 23.
Notes
7 For detailed information on Marine
aviation activities in Nicaragua, see Maj Gen
John
P. Condon, USMC (Ret.), U.S. Marine Corps Aviation (Washington, DC:
Department
of the Navy, 1987); Johnson, Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years 1912-1940;
Mersky,
U.S. Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to the Present; and Sherrod, History of
Marine
Corps Aviation in World War II.
8 Robert Sherrod, History of Marine
Corps Aviation in World War II (Baltimore,
MD:
Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1987), 25. Major Rowell
trained all
of
his pilots in dive bombing. Rowell first noticed Army pilots practicing the
technique at
Kelly
Field, TX in 1923. The Army pilots credited its invention to the British in
World
War
I. The Marines were the first to adopt
it as a standard operating procedure.
9 William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare
Handbook (Boulder and London: Westview
Press,
1985), 20. Lind discusses the difference between combined arms and supporting
arms
in detail. Of supporting arms he says, "In contrast, supporting arms is
hitting the
enemy with two or more arms in sequence, or if
simultaneously, then in such combination
that
the actions the enemy must take to defend himself from one also defends him
from the
other(s)."
He further states, "Combined arms, like other elements of maneuver
warfare,
seeks
to strike at the enemy psychologically as well as physically. It puts him on
the horns
of
a dilemma..Supporting arms, in contrast, just faces the enemy with a
problem."
Additionally,
Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF, discusses the integration of air and ground
(combined
arms) in an article entitled "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the
Operational
Art," that appeared in the March 1989 edition of Parameters.
10 Title 10 Armed Forces, USC, 1988 ed.,
Volume III (Washington, DC: GPO,
1989),
913. This information is also included in Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1-2,
The
Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense (Washington, DC: U. S. Marine
Corps,
21 June 1991), 3-6. Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-26,
Marine
Corps Aviation: General, 1940 (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, 11 June
1990),
a reprint of an original 1940 manual, alludes to the use of aviation as a
combined
arm.
On pp. 48-49, FMFRP 12-26 discusses the use of aviation in the absence of
artillery
or
against such targets that are either out of range or unsuitable for engagement
by ground
weapons.
On p. 51, the combination of weapons (including aviation) is discussed.
11 Johnson, 56.
Notes
12 Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication
(FMFRP) 2-12, Marine Air-Ground
Task
Force: A Global Capability (Quantico, VA: U. S. Marine Corps, 10 April 199 1),
16.
Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and, Associated
Terms (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23
March 1994), 228 contains the
definition
of a MAGTF. See figure below for the elements of a MAGTF.
Click
here to view image
13 Mersky, 24-25. On 9 July 1935,
Headquarters Marine Corps approved the
Tentative
Manual for Landing Operations, which included Chapter VI, "Aviation."
In
January
1939, the General Board of the Navy restated Marine aviation's mission to
support
the Fleet Marine Force.
14 Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1-1,
Campaigning (Washington, DC: U.S.
Marine
Corps, 25 January 1990), 28. Additional reference to the Marine expeditionary
force
as a warfighter, focused at the operational level, are contained in the Marine
Corps
Long-Range
Plan (MLRP) (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, July 1989) and the
MAGTF
Master Plan (MMP) (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, July 1993).
Additional
discussion of this concept is contained in "Who Fights the MAGTF?," a
June
1992
article in Marine Corps Gazette by Marine Majors Curtis A. Munson and Dwight
Lyons.
15 Marine Corps Long-Range Plan (MLRP)
(Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps,
July
1989), 4-6. For information on earlier missions of Marine aviation, see FMFRP
12-26,
particularly
p. 3. FMFM 5-1, Organization and Function of Marine, Aviation
(Quantico,
VA: U.S. Marine Corps, 16 October 1991), 1-2 and 2-1 reflect the concept of
the
ACE supporting the MAGTF., FMFM 6 (Final Draft), Ground Combat Operations
(Quantico,
VA: U.S. Marine Corps, December 1994), 1-2, includes the statement, "The
ACE
is a combat arm of the MAGTF, not a supporting arm of the GCE." The Marine
Corps officially adopted maneuver warfare
in March 1989, with the approval of FMFM 1,
Warfighting.
16 Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint
Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of
Staff,
9 September 1993), IV-12.
Notes
17 The Honorable Mi. Sean O'Keefe,
Secretary of the Navy; ADM Frank B. Kelso,
USN;
and Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC; Navy and Marine Corps White Paper,
"...From
the
Sea" (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 1992), 7. These
operational
capabilities are also discussed in, Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1, Naval
Warfare
(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 28 March 1994), 61-70; and FMFM
5-60,
Control of Aircraft and Missiles (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, 22 June
1993),
2-15. The Marine Corps was the first to define these terms, in FMFM 5-60
initially,
followed by FMFRP 0-14, Marine Corps Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of
Military
and Associated Terms (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, 27 January 1994).
18 For an additional discussion of
organizational concepts and supported/supporting
relationships,
see Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (Washington,
DC:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 1994); Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint
Operations;
and
GEN Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CM-1502-92, 23
November
1992, A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts.
Aviation
and Maneuver Warfare
1 B. H. Liddell Hart, The German
Generals Talk (New York: William Morrow and
Co,
1948), 16.
2 B. H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts of War
(London: Faber and Faber, 1944), xiv.
3
FMFM 1, Warfighting, 58.
4 FMFM 1, Warfighting, focuses on these
same concepts. Martin van Creveld
identifies
six elements of maneuver warfare in Chapter 1 of Air Power and Maneuver
Warfare:
tempo, Schwerpunkt (main effort), surprise, combined arms, flexibility, and
decentralized
command.
5 See Marine Corps Long-Range Plan
(MLRP) 4-6; MAGTF Master Plan (MMP)
(Washington,
DC: U.S. Marine Corps, July 1991), A-2-6; and MAGTF Master Plan
(MMP)
(Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps,, July 1993), 4-5. The ACE as a
maneuver
force is also mentioned in FMFM 5-50, Antiair Warfare (Quantico, VA: U.S.
Marine
Corps, 22 June 1994), 4-5 and FMFM 5-60, Control of Aircraft and Missiles
(Quantico,
VA: U.S. Marine Corps, 22 June 1993), 1-1. Martin van Creveld's book, Air
Power and Maneuver Warfare, elaborates on new
"vistas" offered by aviation and
maneuver
warfare on p. 206: "In terms of combined arms symbiosis, ground forces
compel
enemy forces into reactive movements. As a result, it is not necessary for
friendly
air
to achieve many kills; all it must do is to slow down the enemy's tempo of
operations
(by
attrition, disruption, and prevention of timely movements and junctures of
units) so
that
friendly ground forces can pin, envelop, and breakup opposing forces."
Notes
Discussions
of the ACE as a maneuver element appear in numerous Marine Corps Gazette
articles.
They include: "The Art of MAGTF Warfare," by Maj R. Scott Moore, USMC,
April
1989; "Maneuver Warfare: Can the ACE Adopt This Philosophy of War?,"
by
Marine
Majors Gordon C. O'Neill and Daniel A. Driscoll, Jr., May 1991; "The ACE
is not
a
Maneuver Element-Yet," by Maj William H. Dixon, Jr., USMC, February 1992;
and
"Air
as a Maneuver Element: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?," by Maj Thomas X.
Hammes,
USMC, February 1992.
6
FMFM 1, Warfighting, 71.
7
See FMFM 5-50, Antiair Warfare
(Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, 22 June
1994),
4-5, FMFM 5-60, Control of Aircraft and Missiles (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine
Corps,
22 June 1993), 2-15; and FMFM 5-70 (Final Draft), MAGTF Aviation Planning
(Quantico,
VA: U.S. Marine Corps, June 1994), 1-1.
8 Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air,
trans. Dino Ferrari, reprinted by the
Office
of Air Force History (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 70.
9 Martin van Creveld, Air Power and
Maneuver Warfare (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
University
Press, July 1994), 39 and 206. Van Creveld outlines the ability of aviation to
"
strike deep into the rear of an enemy counterattack to protect a long, exposed
flank." He
cites
as an example the use of the Luftwaffe to blunt a Polish counterattack in
Poland in
1939. The task fell to the Luftwaffe because German
armored forces were too faraway to
help.
He further elaborates by stating that maneuver gives aviation two unique
missions:
"(1)
to protect the Ranks of thrust-line forces from blinding counterstrokes and (2)
to
protect
against wide circling envelopments from remote routes." He states that
ground
forces
could perform this missions by "positioning forces everywhere, but the
resource
cost
would be considerable. Only air power can screen and bring concentrated
firepower
rapidly
and accurately to bear."
10 Col Michael M. Kurth, USMC, Executive
Officer, Marine Corps Air Station,
Tustin,
CA, telephone interview by author, 17 March 1995. Then Lt Col Kurth was the
Commanding
Officer of HMLA 369 during the Persian Gulf War, receiving the Navy
Cross
for his actions. Maj Scott P. Haney, USMC, a Cobra helicopter pilot during the
war,
provided additional information concerning Task Force Cunningham in a personal
interview
on 13 March 1995.
11 Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cates,
eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II,
Volume
Three, Europe: Argument to VE Day January 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago:
Univ.
of Chicago Press, 1949), 373.
Notes
12 Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue:
Recollections and Reflections (London:
Cassell
and Company, Ltd., 1956), 597.
13 Frido Von Senger und Etterlin, Neither Fear
Nor Hope (New York: E. P. Dutton,
1964),
224; cited by F. M. Sallagar, Operation "STRANGLE" (Italy, Spring): A
Case
Study
of Tactical Air Interdiction (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, February 1972), 66.
14 Robert L. Futrell, The United States Air
Force in Korea 1950-1953 (New York:
Duell,
Sloan, and Pearce, 1961), 435. Ten months after Operation STRANGLE began,
the
new Supreme Commander in Korea, GEN Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, thought the
enemy had "a substantially greater potential
than at any time in the past." The
Commandant
of the Marine Corps, Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, stated that Operation
STRANGLE
was "recognized as a fizzle."
15 See FMFM 1-1, Campaigning; and Joint Pub
3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations
for
an in-depth discussion of campaigning.
16 E. J. Kingston McCloughry, The Direction
of War (New York: Praeger, 1955),
85;
cited by William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (Washington, DC: GPO,
1979),
165.
17 B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel
Papers (New York: Harcourt and Brace,
1953),
476-477.
18 Sherrod, 132-133.
19 FMFRP 12-34-II, History of the US.
Marine Corps Operations in World War II.
Isolation
of Rabaul, Volume II (reprint of 1971 edition) (Quantico, VA: U. S. Marine
Corps,
16 August 1989), 537. Part V covers Marine aviation's role extensively.
20 See Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader
(Washington, DC: Zenger Publishing, 1952)
for
an account of Guderian's actions at the battle for Sedan, France in May 1940.
21 Earl H. Tilford, SETUP: What the Air
Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell
AFB,
AL: Air University Press, 1991), 122.
Notes
Combat Operations
1 MG Verne D. Mudge, USA, in Marine
Aviation in Close Support File, cited in
FMFRP
12-34-IV, History of the U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II.
Western
Pacific Operations, Volume IV (reprint of 1971 edition) (Quantico, VA: U.S.
Marine
Corps, 16 August 1989), 347. Also see Mersky, U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, pp.
106-107.
Mudge was the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division.
2
Maj Archie J. Clapp, USMC,
"Their Mission is Mobility," Military Review, Vol
XXXIII,
No. 5 (August 1953), 12. FMFM 5-30, Assault Support (Quantico, VA: U.S.
Marine
Corps, 24 June 1994) provides details on Marine Corps helicopter employment.
3 FMFRP 12-26, Marine Corps Aviation:
General, 1940, (reprint of 1940 edition),
40.
4 Lind, 20. Lind elaborates that in
maneuver warfare, "firepower permits
movement
(the attack of the assault units) and maneuver (the encirclement of the entire
enemy force)."
5 Maj Gen James M. Myatt, USMC,
"Close Air Support and Fire Support in
Operation
Desert Shield and Desert Storm," a report submitted to the Commission on
Roles
and Missions of the Armed Forces, 8 December 1994.
6 FMFM 1-1, Campaigning 62-63. See p.
246 of van Creveld's Air Power and
Maneuver
Warfare for a further discussion of aviation's missions in maneuver warfare.
It
mentions use of aviation to "strike the primary blows, screen surface
maneuver forces,
destroy
or delay enemy counterattacks, support surface forces in contact, provide
comprehensive
surveillance and reconnaissance, resupply isolated forces, prevent resupply
of
enemy forces, insert surface forces at critical points--just about anything you
can
imagine."
The ability of aviation to shift from one of these roles to another more
rapidly
than
any other force is also put forth.
7
FMFM 1, Warfighting, 37.
8
FMFM 1, Warfighting, 59.
9 NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual,
(reprint of 1940 edition), (Washington, DC:
U.S.
Marine Corps, 1 April 1987), Chapter IX, 20.
10 Kenneth R. Whiting, "Soviet
Air-Ground Coordination," in Case Studies in the
Development
of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, DC:
Office
of Air Force History, 1990), 117, 124, and 133.
Notes
11 Brigadier Peter Young, ed., World
Almanac Book of World War II (London:
Bison
Books, Ltd., 1981), 67-76.
Military
Operations Other Than War
1 LTC James M. Willey, USA, Collective
Engagement, Peacekeeping, and
Operations
Other Than War, Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College (Carlisle
Barracks,
PA: 5 April 1993), Abstract Page.
2 Maj Shimon Stone, USMC and Capt James
A. Hogberg, USMC, Humanitarian
Assistance:
Adapting the Process to Meet the Military's Evolving Role in Non
Traditional
Missions, MS Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December,
1993),
113.
3 Joint Pub 3-07 (Draft), Joint Doctrine
for Military Operations Other Than War
(Washington,
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18 July 1994), I-7. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for
Joint
Operations, also discusses the range of military options. See Joint Pub 3-07.3,
Joint
Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, 29 April 1994, for
specifics
on peacekeeping.
4 NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual
(reprint of 1940 edition) provides some of
these
enduring applications. For more on the tactical side of operations other than
war,
see
MAJ John M. Kelley, USA, Tactical Implications for Peacemaking in an Ethnic
Conflict,
Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and
General
Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 4 February 1993).
5
Willey, 4.
6 Maj R. Bruce Rember, USAF, Wings for
Peace: Air Power in Peacemaking
Operations,
Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and
General
Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 17 December 1992). Maj Rember
provides
some interesting discussion on the use of aviation in operations other than
war.
7
Stone and Hogberg, 35.
Conclusion
1 1st Lt Alfred A. Cunningham, USMC,
"Aviation in the Navy," Marine Corps
Gazette
(December 1916), 334.
Notes
2 T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War
(New York: MacMillan, 1963), 427.
3
NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual,
(reprint of 1940 edition), Chapter IX,. 1.
4 Maj Alfred A. Cunningham, USMC,
"The Value of Aviation to the Marine
Corps,"
Marine Corps Gazette (September 1920), 223.
5 U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of
the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to
Congress,
Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization
and
Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102 -25), Chapters I through VIII
(Washington,
DC: GPO, April 1992), xiv.
6 Maj Gen James M. Myatt, USMC,
"Close Air Support and Fire Support in
Operation
Desert Shield and Desert Storm," a report submitted to the Commission on
Roles
and Missions of the Armed Forces, 8 December 1994, 6. Maj Gen Myatt
commanded
the 1st Marine Division in the Persian Gulf War.1
Appendix A
Policy Command and Control
of USMC TACAIR in
Sustained
Operations Ashore
Joint
Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) contains the "Policy for
Command and
Control
of USMC TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore." The policy deals with
MAGTF
aviation during sustained operations ashore:
The MAGTF commander will retain
operational control of organic air assets. The
primary mission of the MAGTF air
combat element is the support of the MAGTF
ground element.1 During joint
operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be
in support of the MAGTF mission. The
MAGTF commander will make sorties
available to the joint force
commander, for tasking through the joint force air
component commander, for air
defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range
reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of
MAGTF direct support requirements will be
provided to the joint force commander
for tasking through the joint force air
component commander for the support
of other components of the joint force or
the joint force as a whole. Nothing
herein shall infringe on the authority of the
theater or joint force commander in
the exercise of operational control, to assign
missions, redirect efforts (e.g.,
the reapportionment and/or reallocation of any
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
TACAIR sorties when it has been
determined by the joint force
commander that they are required for higher priority
missions), and direct coordination
among the subordinate commanders to ensure
unity of effort in accomplishment of
the overall mission, or to maintain integrity of
the force.
NOTE: Sorties provided for air
defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range
reconnaissance are not
"excess" sorties and will be covered in the ATO. These
sorties provide a distinct
contribution to the overall joint force effort. The JFC
must exercise integrated control of
air defense, long-range reconnaissance, and
long-range interdiction aspects of
the joint operation or theater campaign. Excess
sorties are in addition to these
sorties.
________________________
1
The primary mission of MAGTF aviation is to support the entire MAGTF--not just
the ground
element.
Appendix B
GLOSSARY
battlespace--All
aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum
which
encompass the area of influence and area of interest. (FMFRP 0-14)
battlespace
dominance--The degree of control over the dimensions of the battlespace which
enhances
friendly freedom of action and denies enemy freedom of action. It permits force
sustainment
and application of power projection to accomplish the full range of tactical
missions.
It
includes all actions conducted against enemy capabilities to influence future
operations.
(FMFRP
0-14)
centers
of gravity--Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a
military force
derives
its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (Joint Pub 1-02)
close
operations--Military actions conducted to project power decisively against
enemy forces
which
pose an immediate or near term threat to the success of current battles or
engagements.
These
military actions are conducted by committed forces and their readily available
tactical
reserves,
using maneuver and combined arms. (FMFRP 0-14)
coalition
force--A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a
temporary
alliance
for some specific purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)
combined
force--A military force composed of elements of two or more allied nations.
(Joint
Pub
102)
combined
arms--The tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by a force to integrate
firepower
and mobility to produce a desired effect upon the enemy. (FMFRP 0-14)
commander's
intent--The commander's intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise
expression
of the purpose of the operation. It may include how the posture of units at
that end
state
facilitates future operations. It may also include the commander's assessment
of the enemy
commander's
intent. The commander's intent is not, however, a summary of the concept of
operations.
(Joint Pub 3-0, p. III-33) There are two parts to a mission: the task to be
accomplished
and the reason, or intent. The task describes the action to be taken while the
intent
describes
the desired result of the action. Of the two, the intent is predominant. While
a situation
may
change, making the task obsolete, the intent is more permanent and continues to
guide our
actions.
Understanding our commander's intent allows us to exercise initiative in
harmony with
the
commander's desires. The intent should convey the commander's vision. The
senior must
make
perfectly clear the result he expects, but in such a way that does not inhibit
initiative.
Subordinates
must have a clear understanding of what their commander is thinking. Further,
they
should
understand the intent of the commander two levels up. (FMFM 1, pp. 71-72)
critical
enemy vulnerability--Of all the vulnerabilities we might choose to exploit,
some are
more
critical to the enemy than others. It follows that the most effective way to
defeat our enemy
is
to destroy that which is most critical to him. We should focus our efforts on
the one thing
which,
if eliminated, will do the most decisive damage to his ability to resist
us....Therefore, we
should
focus our efforts against a critical enemy vulnerability. (FMFM 1, under
"Exploiting
Vulnerability
and Opportunity", pp. 35-36) Note: Doctrine Division, MCCDC recommended
that
the term "critical enemy vulnerability" not be used, and
"critical vulnerability" be used to
describe
that weak point within a "center of gravity" which can be exploited.
They also
recommended
that term "decisive point" be used to define it as a catalytic
geographic feature.
culminating
point--In the offense, the culminating point is the point in time and space at
which
an
attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. A defensive
culminating point
is
the point in time and space when the defending force no longer has the
capability to go on the
counteroffensive
or defend successfully. (Joint Pub 3-0, p. III-29)
decisive
point--Decisive points are usually geographic in nature, such as a constricted
sea lane, a
hill,
a town, or an air base. They could also include other elements such as command
posts,
critical
boundaries, airspace, or a communications node. Decisive points are not centers
of
gravity;
they are the keys to attacking protecting centers of gravity. (Joint Pub 3-0,
pp. III-28 to
III-29)
deep
operations--Military actions conducted against enemy capabilities which pose a
potential
threat
to friendly forces. These military actions are designed to isolate, shape, and
dominate the
battlespace
and influence future operations. (FMFRP 0-14)
force
sustainment--Capabilities, equipment, and operations which ensure continuity,
freedom of
action,
logistics support, and command and control. (FMFRP 0-14)
joint
force--A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements,
assigned or
attached,
of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force
commander.
(Joint
Pub 1-02 as modified by Joint Pub 0-2)
joint
force air component commander--The joint force air component commander derives
authority
from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational
control,
assign
missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and
organize forces
to
ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint
force commander
will
normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air
component
commander's
responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these
would
include,
but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on
the joint
force
commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance
and
authority,
and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned
and
supporting
commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint
force
commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas.
Also
called
JFACC. (Joint Pub 1-02)
main
effort--The most important task to be accomplished by the force. It is assigned
by the
commander
to a specifically designated subordinate unit. The commander ensures the
success of
the
main effort by providing it the preponderance of support and by alerting
reserves to rapidly
reinforce
the main effort or, if necessary, to assume the main effort. (FMFRP 0- 14)
maneuver--The
traditional understanding of maneuver is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver in
space
to gain a positional advantage. However, in order to maximize the usefulness of
maneuver,
we
must consider maneuver in time as well; that is, we generate a faster
operational tempo than
the
enemy to gain a temporal advantage. (FMFM 1, p. 58) Thus, maneuver is more
accurately
defined
as the employment of forces within the battlespace through movement in
combination
with
fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in time or space in
respect to the
enemy
in order to accomplish the mission.
maneuver
warfare--A philosophy for action that seeks to collapse the enemy's cohesion
and
effectiveness
through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a
turbulent
and
rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope. (FMFRP 0-14)
Marine
air-ground task force--A task organization of Marine forces (division, aircraft
wing, and
service
support groups) under a single command and structured to accomplish a specific
mission.
The
Marine airground task force (MAGTF) components will normally include command,
aviation
combat, ground combat, and combat service support elements (including Navy
Support
Elements).
Three types of Marine airground task forces which can be task organized are the
Marine
expeditionary unit, Marine expeditionary brigade [Marine expeditionary force
(forward)],
and
Marine expeditionary force. The four elements of a Marine air-ground task force
are: a.
command
element (CE)--The MAGTF headquarters. The CE is a permanent organization
composed
of the commander, general or executive and special staff sections, headquarters
section,
and requisite communications and service support facilities. The CE provides
command,
control,
and coordination essential for effective planning and execution by the other
three
elements
of the MAGTF. There is only one CE in a MAGTF. b. aviation combat element
(ACE)--The
MAGTF element that is task organized to provide all or a portion of the
functions of
Marine
Corps aviation in varying degrees based on the tactical situation and the MAGTF
mission
and
size. These functions are air reconnaissance, antiair warfare, assault support,
offensive air
support,
electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles. The ACE is organized
around an
aviation
headquarters and varies in size from a reinforced helicopter squadron to one or
more
Marine
aircraft wing(s). It includes those aviation command (including air control
agencies),
combat,
combat support, and combat service support units required by the situation.
Normally,
there
is only one ACE in a MAGTF. c. ground combat element (GCE)--The MAGTF element
that
is task organized to conduct ground operations. The GCE is constructed around
an infantry
unit
and varies in size from a reinforced infantry batalion to one or more
reinforced Marine
division(s).
Normally, there is only one GCE in a MAGTF. d. combat service support element
(CSSE)-The
MAGTF element that is task organized to provide the full range of combat
service
support
necessary to accomplish the MAGTF mission. CSSE can provide supply, maintenance,
transportation,
deliberate engineer, health, postal, disbursing, enemy prisoner of war,
automated
information
systems, exchange, utilities, legal, and graves registration services. The CSSE
varies
in
size from a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) service support group (MSSG) to a
force service
support
group (FSSG). Normally, there is only one combat service support element in a
MAGTF.
(Joint Pub 1-02)
operational
level of war--The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are
planned,
conducted,
and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of
operations.
Activities
at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives
needed to
accomplish
strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives,
initiating
actions,
and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These
activities imply a
broader
dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and
administrative
support
of tactical forces, and provide the means by whic tactical successes are
exploited to
achieve
strategic objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)
power
projection--The application of measured, precise offensive military force at a
chosen time
and
place, using maneuver and combined arms. (FMFRP 0-14)
rear
operations--Military actions conducted to support and permit force sustainment
and to
provide
security for such actions. (FMFRP 0-14)
strategic
level of war--The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group
of
nations,
determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security
objectives and
guidance,
and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives.
Activities at
this
level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence
initiatives; define limits
and
assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power;
develop global
plans
or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces
and other
capabilities
in accordance with strategic plans. (Joint Pub 1-02)
supporting
arms--Air, sea, and land weapons of all types employed to support ground units.
(Joint
Pub 1-02)
tactical
level of war--The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and
executed
to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.
Activities at
this
level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in
relation to each
other
and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)
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