Doctrine For A Corps In Transition; A Command And Control Support Perspective

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Intelligence

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Doctrine for a Corps in Transition; A Command and Control Support Perspective

Author: Major Robert L. Rusch, United States Marine Corps

Problem: The shift of Marine Corps doctrinal focus from tactical events to operational goals has

been insufficient in depth to ensure consistent integration of Marine Air Ground Task Force

(MAGTF) command and control support systems with those of joint headquarters.

Discussion: Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-1 Campaigning exhorted Marines to orient the focus

of MAGTF operations on the operational level of war. Subsequent to that document, maneuver

warfare concepts assumed the doctrinal focal point; it emphasizes the theory of mission control to

establish and maintain operational tempo. However, its advocacy of reliance on human

characteristics rather than technology and procedures sanctions intellectual dalliance in a doctrinal

comfort zone of combat forces at the tactical level of war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Commanders-in-Chief are aggressively pursuing unity

of effort through a broad strategy of command and control of functional areas via the Global

Command and Control System (GCCS). Consequently, application of the theory of detailed

control is pervasive in Joint doctrine.

Operations Other Than War will showcase combat support, not combat, forces. MAGTF

missions will be pursued under a joint umbrella. To achieve today's tactical through strategic

missions, Marine command and control support doctrine must interlock, like a bayonet to a

lugnut, to that of joint commanders and agencies.

Thesis: The command and control support necessary to extend leadership and control across

Marine forces is outmoded in theory and practice.

DOCTRINE FOR A CORPS IN TRANSITION;

A COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT PERSPECTIVE

Command and control - The exercise of authority and

direction by a properly designated commander over assigned

forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and

control functions are performed through an arrangement of

personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and

procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing,

coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the

accomplishment of the mission.1

1. INTRODUCTION

Command and control is the most complex and the most vital

of the six functions -- maneuver, fires, logistics, protection,

intelligence, and command and control -- recognized in joint

training.2 It encompasses both the imperceptible intellect of

the commander and the sophisticated technical assets, the command

and control support system, necessary to support and disseminate

the decisions of the commander. Hence, it relies on both

philosophy and technique, art and science. It demands risk in

decision-making and certainty in the availability of

decision-making support. All functions suffer if the function of

command and control is uncertain.

The Marine Corps enjoys a near-universal appreciation for

the quality of Marine leadership. By close association, Marine

command and control is generally held in similar high regard.

Marine command and control doctrine is notable for its focus on

the attributes of an effective commander. However, it is not our

purpose here to recount that strength, nor to compare a

Montgomery to a Patton, or a Lee to a Grant. There is a related

issue of much greater importance. In truth, Marine Air Ground

Task Force (MAGTF) command and control is potentially one of the

Marine Corps' most serious deficiencies. For the command and

control support necessary to extend that splendid leadership is

outmoded, both in principle and in practice.

Marine command and control deficiencies identified in

Southwest Asia (SWA) were correctly traced to resource shortages

inherent in an organization trained and equipped to focus no more

than thirty kilometers inland to the force beachhead line.

However, while conceptual deficiencies involving C2 support were

also recognized, they were less easy to isolate and resolve.

Over time these fundamental conceptual deficiencies have

opened doctrinal gaps both internal and external to the command

and control support function. The G-6 historically shared

command and control responsibilities with the G-3 but remained

the acknowledged MAGTF command and control support system expert.

However, a host of trends (see section 7) have de-emphasized the

function of communications and the status of the G-6. By

association it seems, the technical aspects of command and

control support have suffered a similar doctrinal de-emphasis

(see sections 3 and 4). Generally speaking, the net result is a

low regard for the ability of the G-6, and technical specialists

in general, to make vital contributions to warfighting.

Simultaneously, joint operations and operations other than

war (OOTW) have generated technically sophisticated command and

control and command and control warfare challenges. As a result,

MAGTF mission success requires warfighters who are equal parts

gunfighter and "data dink". However, internal to command and

control doctrine, the requirement for such a hybrid,

"techno-warrior" is not recognized. Externally, doctrine has

setup an inaccurate, "wrong-way/right-way" paradox between the

detailed control necessary for the combat support functions and

the mission control tenets predominant in the combat functions.

This paper will investigate the nature of these

developments: first, by identifying fundamental shortfalls in

Marine doctrinal thinking about the command and control support

facet of the command and control function; and second, by

considering the ramifications of failing to deal with those

shortfalls. Potential solutions, for the most part, must be left

for future exploration. Functional and organizational

relationships will be considered, but force structure analysis,

including tables of organization and equipment, is not the focus.

Since all future Marine operations will be conducted in a

joint, or joint/combined, environment, it is assumed that Marine

command and control doctrine must dovetail with Joint doctrine.

Additionally, the thrust of this paper is based on a second

assumption: that two criteria -- speedy integration of cutting

edge technology and substantive enhancement of operational

effectiveness - must guide any reassessment of Marine concepts

of command and control support.

Technological development is not only expanding, it's

accelerating. But the relevant issue here is not whether the

acquisition process is outmoded. The issue involves the current

ability of the warfighting commanders-in-chief (CINCs) to procure

and push to operating forces diverse, sophisticated,

off-the-shelf command and control devices. The extent to which

sharp, technical experts (i.e. personnel able to integrate and

install non-table of equipment items into a Service component's

command and control support system) are resident in the structure

of a Service's operating forces is a significant gauge of

readiness. The notion that years will be available to integrate

new technology by revamping training and education,

organizations, and doctrine is passe. Additionally,

the gamesmanship involved in the tact "the CINC gave it to me, so the

CINC can give me the people to make it work" is a sword that cuts

both ways. Department of Defense (DOD) force structure

downsizing involves identifying the operationally and technically

ready -- and unready.

The test of operational effectiveness of Marine forces is no

longer limited to the ability to dominate a numerically superior

enemy on the battlefield. The global perception of US military

superiority, US public sensitivity to humanitarian issues and

casualties, and intense media scrutiny of military operations

abroad have changed the standard. Today, media interest may

invest tactical forces with strategic and even national

importance far beyond the scope of assigned missions. Tactical

Marine forces, working in consonance with elements of other

Services, are called upon to instantly respond to displaced

senior commanders to achieve tactical, operational, and even

delicate, strategic objectives. With national interests in the

balance, intrusive guidance from multiple senior headquarters,

organizations, and agencies is the norm. Consequently, today the

measure of operational effectiveness, real and perceived, is

extremely complex. Giving loose rein to a competent commander,

reporting needs and results to seniors, and sharing information

with subordinates is a meaningless process model for a command

and control support system designed to achieve today's standard.

Keeping in mind these criteria, we will first examine Marine

doctrine, and second, general applications of that doctrine. Our

examination of doctrine, both Marine and Joint, will include

standing doctrine, emerging doctrine (draft) and relevant Fleet

Marine Force Reference Publications (FMFRPs). While FMFRPs are

not approved Marine Corps concepts or doctrine, they frequently

presage emerging doctrine or describe the intellectual

foundations of doctrine. We will apply that doctrine to the

battlefield functions, with an emphasis on command and control,

to assess whether that doctrine is relevant to the MAGTF today

and by extension, whether the MAGTF is relevant to the

warfighting CINCs not just today but tomorrow.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to review terminology

essential to a uniform understanding of this article. According

to FMFM 3 Command and Control, MAGTF "command and control demands

an effective infrastructure"3 consisting of an organization;

information to plan for, direct, control, and coordinate the

employment of forces; and a command and control (C2) support

system. Since organization includes commanders, staff, and

supporting forces - virtually the entire MAGTF 4 -- and

information is a nebulous commodity, the C2 support system is the

only finite, boundable command and control infrastructure

element.

A successful command and control infrastructure must

accomplish the following:

a) "facilitate the commander's influence of events,

b) adapt to the situation,

c) support information requirements, and

d) exploit MAGTF capabilities."5

To accomplish each of the above, a reliable, flexible C2 support

system is needed. Hence, the C2 support system is the central

dynamic that connects an organization with information, making

the command and control function viable.

What exactly is this cornerstone element of command and

control, the C2 support system? It is "...a network of people,

equipment, facilities, and operating procedures that collect,

transport, process, disseminate, and protect essential

information... (and) supports command and control warfare

functions."6 Given that the MAGTF will frequently deploy as part

of a joint task force (JTF), it is notable that "the

establishment of an interoperable C2 support system is a

prerequisite in joint operations".7

The C2 support system is essential not only for MAGTF

command and control, but for Marine forces to participate in all

JTF operations. However, before elaborating on the role of the

C2 support system in MAGTF doctrine, we must review the salient

features of today's US Marine Corps doctrinal landscape.

2. DOCTRINAL SHIFT

A reevaluation of operational effectiveness in Vietnam, the

collapse of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia, stunning

operational success in Kuwait, force reductions, roles and

missions reviews, and humanitarian, peacemaking and peacekeeping

operations -- these are just a few of the many events which have

stimulated a broad shift in the focus of Marine doctrine over the

last seven years. Three major concepts have emerged as the core

of this shift; collectively, they expand the breadth of MAGTF

operations. They include the following:

a) a reassessment of Marine doctrine vis-a-vis the levels of

war,

b) a functional approach to warfighting, and

c) an emphasis on maneuver warfare.

First, the tactical level of war, centered on the Ground

Combat Element (GCE), has been de-emphasized and subordinated to

the operational level of war, centered on the MAGTF. While some

might say that the current focus is specifically on the "primacy"

of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), not the MAGTF in

general, FMFM 1-1 Campaigning makes clear that a MAGTF of any

size may be assigned responsibility for an objective in the

operational or even the strategic realms.8 Nonetheless, the

objective of the shift was to spotlight the warfighting skills

required to employ task-organized MAGTFs, MEF Forward-sized or

larger, which are normally associated with accomplishing missions

at the operational level of war.

An operating systems approach to the mission and the

battlefield is a second "doctrinal"9 shift. Objectives at

different levels of war and in different areas (rear, close, and

deep) of the battlefield are now interrelated by the operating

systems methodology introduced by FMFM 2-1 (Draft).10

Battlefield operating systems, or battlefield functions, unify

each of the following: maneuver; aviation; fires; mobility,

countermobility, and survivability; combat service support;

command and control; and intelligence.

A third point of Marine doctrinal emphasis is maneuver

warfare. FMFM 1 Warfighting states " ...the Marine Corps concept

for winning...is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible,

and opportunistic maneuver".11 Gaining superior combat power

relative to that of the enemy by generating an operational tempo

faster than that of the enemy is the central dynamic of maneuver

warfare.12 The convergence of events in space and time --

regardless of whether it's called "concentration" or

"synchronization" -- is a fundamental prerequisite for maneuver

as described in FMFM 1. The Marine concept of maneuver entails

relative, not constant, force at a particular moment in time.13

It recognizes the limited resources of the MAGTF and seeks to

optimize those resources by dictating the agenda and controlling

the rate of battlefield activities.

Current Marine doctrine appropriately is based to a large

extent on Joint doctrine which, like Marine doctrine, emphasizes

theater operating functions and their synchronization. Joint

functions include maneuver, fires, logistics, protection,

intelligence, and command and control. Logistics and

intelligence support operations while protection

operations; all three take place in peace, crisis or war.

Maneuver and fires, while planned for in peace and crisis, are

only employed in war.14 "Command and control is the glue that

holds these functions together."15 In other words, without

effective command and control, functions will not mesh and

synchronization will be impossible.

Unfortunately, while Marine Corps doctrine has changed to

exploit the full combat might of the MAGTF, command and control

support doctrine has changed very little. It does not provide

the "glue", referred to in Joint doctrine, necessary to support

the scope and pace of MAGTF operations. A flawed doctrinal

emphasis on the correctness of the theory of mission control and

the incorrectness of the theory of detailed control is part of

the problem.

3. DOCTRINE AND THEORIES OF CONTROL

Marine doctrine is intended to inculcate in individual

Marines a gut-level grasp of the violence, friction and

uncertainty of combat and the initiative necessary to overcome

them. In this regard Marine doctrine is essentially tactical in

nature. Section 2 discussed the attempt to shift the doctrinal

focus from the tactical to the operational level of war. A

doctrine intended for units engaged at the operational level of

war, however, must not be preoccupied with friction and visceral

responses to tactical events. marine doctrine remains just that.

The result is an operational level of war doctrine which

minimizes essential principles of command and control support,

fostering a muddled view of their proper application.

In the "Philosophy of Command" section, FMFM 1 emphasizes

that... "in order to generate the tempo of operations we desire

and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of

combat, command must be decentralized".16 The principle of

centralized control and decentralized execution is sound for all

battlefield functions. However, it goes on to endorse a

philosophy... "based on human characteristics rather than on

equipment or procedures" 17 ; a philosophy which ... "exploits

implicit communication -- to communicate through mutual

understanding... or even anticipating each others thoughts"18.

The above dichotomy -- "human characteristics" versus

"equipment or procedures" -- is pervasive in Marine maneuver

warfare doctrine. It is prejudiced in favor of the human

dimension to such an extent that it subtly denigrates reliance on

technology or procedures. This oppositional, "right way versus

wrong way" approach skews one's understanding of the command and

control function, particularly at the MEF level. Furthermore, it

obscures the fact that for functions other than maneuver, the

appropriate type of command and control exercised may

intrinsically require rigid procedures.

The sweeping, doctrinal promotion of human characteristics

is reiterated and broadened in FMFRP discussions of theories of

control -- theories designed to deal with the fundamental problem

of uncertainty in war. Mission control is on one end of a

theoretical spectrum of control, and detailed control is on the

opposite end.

FMFRP 15-3 seems to endorse mission control for the command

and control support system. "The Marine Corps command and

control system is built around mission control -- spontaneous,

informal, accepting of disorder and uncertainty -- which allows

us to create tempo, flexibility and the ability to exploit

opportunities."19

On the other hand, FMFRP 15-3 characterizes command and

control based on detailed control as an attempt to eliminate

uncertainty "by creating a powerful, highly efficient command and

control apparatus able to process huge amounts of information and

intended to reduce nearly all unknowns."20 It further asserts

that "Such a system stems from the belief that if we can impose

order and certainty on the disorderly and uncertain battlefield,

then successful results are predictable. Orders and plans are

detailed and explicit and their successful execution requires

strict obedience and minimizes subordinate decision making and

initiative. The command and control process moves slowly and

ponderously."21

However, FMFRP 15-3 notes that... "detailed control [is]

...appropriate in the performance of specific, precise tasks."22

"Precise tasks" are the essence of the command and control

support system as defined in section 1 above. Only through

precision can this complex, technical system handle all MAGTF

information and contribute to the denial of information to the enemy.

In fact, both mission and detailed control coexist,

complementing -- not competing with -- each other within the

command and control function. According to Martin van Creveld,

"... the two basic ways of coping with uncertainty...are not so

much opposed to each other as perversely interlocking."23 The

key is striking the proper balance between mission and detailed

control, not arbitrarily selecting the "correct" theory.

Furthermore, when not balanced by the detailed control

emphasis on procedures, the mission control philosophical

emphasis on human intangibles provides inadequate guidance to

Marines in general and MEF-sized MAGTF staffs in particular.

The Marine Corps is a young force. Over 60% of the officers

are captains or below; nearly 70% of enlisted Marines are

corporals and below and are ages 25 years and younger.24

Promoting the operational utility of esoteric qualities such as

"human characteristics" and "communicating through mutual

understanding" is of limited practical value to the youthful

majority of Marines.

Similarly, these concepts fall short of providing relevant

guidance to Marines composing a MEF-sized MAGTF staff. In all

likelihood such a MAGTF will have to deal with the following:

a) mission responsibilities at the operational level of war,

b) a sustainment tail which might cross continents and

oceans back to CONUS,

c) a globally sourced, pick-up team staff operating together

as a command element for the first time, and

d) a fundamental requirement to mesh with other Service

component staffs and a JTF commander who collectively may not

possess the ability to communicate "implicitly" with the MAGTF

staff.

A command philosophy based solely on mission control may

accommodate combat forces operating at the tactical level of war

-- within the force beachhead line perhaps -- but fails to

enlighten MEF staff and combat support forces operating within

the broader dimensions of time and space envisioned for a MEF.

Collectively, FMFMs and FMFRPs clearly recommend mission

control, loose rein, without regard for function, level of

mission (i.e. tactical, operational or strategic), or type of

conflict (i.e. peace, crisis or war). In all cases, one would

deduce, the practitioner of mission control is the confident,

competent commander. Conversely, whenever detailed control,

tight rein, is practiced, the practitioner is an incompetent

commander.25 This is erroneous.

4. DOCTRINE, FUNCTIONS AND TOLERANCE OF UNCERTAINTY

In discussing mission tactics -- "assigning a subordinate

mission without specifying how the mission must be accomplished"

-- FMFM 1 defers to coordination as the solution; "... we cannot

allow decentralized initiative without some means of providing

unity, or focus, to the various efforts. We seek unity, not

through imposed control, but through harmonious initiative and

lateral coordination."26 The fact is, different functions are

exposed to greater threats, and the accompanying uncertainties,

than others. And different functions experience different types

and degrees of friction than others. Each function should employ

that type of control that allows the most effective results. The

command and control system must be tailored to the task at hand.

Generally, combat functions -- focused on defeat or

destruction of the enemy -- can be expected to encounter greater

friction than the combat support functions due to an ongoing

interplay with an unpredictable variable, the enemy. Mission

tactics or mission control and the acceptance of risk are

essential to maintain momentum.

Generally, the combat support functions -- those functions

which furnish operational assistance to combat forces -- are

subject to enemy interdiction, but generally are not subject to

constant, decisive enemy action. Maximum throughput of

information, intelligence, Marines, and materiel is the focus.

The uncertainty that must be overcome by the combat support

functions results from human error -- mistaken dates, times,

locations, and quantities. Detailed control is needed to reduce

this type of uncertainty and to ensure the necessary throughput

to combat forces.

To fashion fitting functional control, it is important to

consider where (garrison or field) and when (peace, crisis or

war) a function's assets principally are employed to support

operating forces. Functions supporting OOTW are performed by

Marines in peacetime year-round (see figure 4-1). The

disorienting shock of intense, combat operations and the

associated requirement for mission control are not factors.

"This is important for defense analysts who think only in

terms of war fighting," states General C.E. Mundy Jr., Commandant

of the Marine Corps. "In fact our nation fights major wars about

every 20 years, but we operate small, crisis-response,

war-avoidance forces -- sailors and Marines -- every day."27 To

support the small forces and to prepare for the major wars, the

combat support functions chug along 365 days a year. Combat

readiness relies on the appropriate control of the combat support

functions in peacetime, including the ongoing identification and

incorporation of procedures.

In war combat functions and combat support functions

synchronize to achieve a common mission. But each function's

command and control support system is driven by the priorities

critical to that function's success. Martin van Creveld asserts,

"It is vital for the structure and modus operandi of any command

system to be adapted to the measure of uncertainty involved in

the task at hand."28

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5. DOCTRINE AND TYPES OF CONTROL

Long before the maneuver warfare debate fostered advocacy of

one theory of control over another, doctrine recognized the

legitimate need for five types of control. They were and are

administrative, operational, and tactical control; coordination;

and technical direction. Three of these -- operational control, coordination,

and technical direction -- are relevant to our

discussion.

Every budding tactician graduating from the Basic School

knows that he who gains operational control -- the authority to

direct forces assigned to accomplish a specific mission29 -- of

the most stuff wins. Myth has it that all other forms of control

ultimately are subordinate to operational control. But the fact

of the matter is that technical direction can supersede

operational control; "it carries the direction of command

authority across boundaries of command and is directive in

nature."30 Just as in the detailed control theory, the goal of

technical direction is precise, reliable accomplishment of tasks.

An understanding of the scope of technical direction and its

crucial role in the command and control support system are

essential to understanding the command and control function and

its dependence on detailed control theory.

Technical direction is "the performance of a specialized or

professional service, or the exercise of professional guidance or

direction through the establishment of policies and procedures

[relating to] technical matters."31 Marine communications

equipment and information processing equipment absolutely require

centralized technical direction due to the nature of digital

technology. Switch, server and router databases at all levels

must be programmed to recognize each other throughout the

network. The composite database that results from compiling

major subordinate element (MSE) databases at the MEF level, and

Service components at the JTF level, demand management control.

Generally speaking, the larger the force, the greater the

requirement for technical direction, the greater the complexity

of technical direction, and the more devastating the impact of

inadequate technical direction on C2 support systems.

Coordination, another one of the five types of control, is a

term commonly used in doctrine to characterize communication

planning efforts. "The proper coordination of [communication]

planning efforts will involve the prompt exchange of information,

decisions, plans, orders and instructions among all interested

parties."32 In the past, doctrine has emphasized coordination

during the planning phase of an amphibious operation because upon

embarkation, limited available communication paths slowed

external information exchange to minimum essential command

traffic. Detailed rewrites of operations plans, especially those

involving more than one Service, were almost impossible to

disseminate and staff once afloat. Common sense dictated the

doctrinal emphasis on coordination; get to know your

counterparts' minds prior to embarkation because once at sea

there may be few opportunities for extensive communication.

Hence, coordination, while always necessary, was not so much the

preferred type of control but the only type of control

practicable to "maintain unity of effort ... essential to MAGTF

integration." 33

In the past, coordination and sharing plans adequately

supported deployed MAGTFs -- primarily standing MEUs and Marine

Expeditionary Brigades -- operating with limited communications

means and relatively simple analog technology. Although planning

variables were numerous, communications management, not technical

engineering, characterized MAGTF systems. However,

communications management by coordination is no longer adequate.

Today's digital systems demand real-time control to stay on line.

Additionally, the potential scope, duration and flexibility

of MAGTF operations has increased, necessitating ongoing C2

support system control for an area of operations far beyond the

force beachhead line. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

in 1990-91 provide extreme examples as the MEF operated in an

area of responsibility hundreds of kilometers square, included

two Marine divisions and an Army brigade, and conducted sustained

land operations for nearly ten months (including deployment and

redeployment).34 Somalia operations in 1992 involved a much

smaller MAGTF of some 1800 Marines yet C2 support systems covered

hundreds of kilometers.

Essential to the success of these operations is an area --

not hierarchical, as in yesteryear -- C2 support system

controlled by the MAGTF command element (CE). All nodes of vital

interest to the commander -- airfields, ports, and adjacent,

senior and subordinate headquarters in theater, and sustainment,

intelligence and C2 hubs out of theater -- must be linked. The

type of control required for this area network of nodes and links

is technical direction; coordination is wholly inadequate. "The

commander depends on the technical direction of command and

control forces ..."35; there is no other viable option.

6. DOCTRINE, FUNCTIONS AND SUSTAINMENT

Because the functions of logistics, intelligence and command

and control carry on during peace, crisis, and war, each has

elaborate networks of facilities and procedures, both in CONUS

and in friendly countries abroad, which are designed to push

materiel and services forward. Obviously, the deployed elements rely

on procedures and technology to tap into this support

infrastructure. Fifteen years ago, the external connectivity of

an amphibious group might include just one common user message

circuit and two dedicated voice circuits. Today, the amphibious

ready group sailing to and from Norway in March 1995 displayed

greatly expanded capabilities, including enroute common user

voice access to the Camp Lejeune Base telephone switch (with

worldwide access) and common user data access to the Marine Corps

Wide Area Network via the Camp Lejeune Local Area Network.

Marine doctrine has been reluctant to acknowledge the

improved availability of logistical, intelligence and command

and control support to MAGTFs from garrison as a result of reliable

data systems and high data rate, satellite communications. After

all, the MAGTF and the facilities of the supporting establishment

(i.e. bases, posts, and stations) each belong to totally separate

subdivisions, the operating forces and the supporting

establishment respectively, of the USMC.36 "The relationship

between the Fleet Marine Forces and the supporting establishment

bases, camps, and installations at which they are tenants is one

of coordination and support."37 Doctrinally, coordination is

continuous and installation commanders provide support "...within

[their] capabilities"38. But fiscally, facility commanders' top

budget priorities do not include support of deployed units.

The traditional image of a MAGTF is a forward-leaning, self

sustaining, independent fighting force. The MAGTF concept

resonates with economy, efficiency and autonomy. Its wire

diagram -- just four elements -- is striking in its simplicity,

especially when compared to Army organizations. This simple

building block concept39 has been an asset not only for force

requirement estimates but for easy articulation of Marine

employment concepts to non-Marines.

However, times have changed. The Marine Corps has shrunk

11% in the last four years. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)

headquarters have been eliminated, tacitly acknowledging that the

increase in size of deploying Marine forces may not necessarily

involve a predictable interplay of MEUs, MEBs, and MEFs. Combat

service support element-heavy, ground combat element-light MAGTF

deployments (i.e. Hurricane Andrew and Operation Restore

Democracy/Haiti) indicate that traditional notions of relative

"building block" size may no longer apply. Extensive combat

support from sources external to the MAGTF (i.e. the JTF, Marine

rear elements in CONUS, etc.) is available due to advances in

information systems technology. Highly specialized Surveillance,

Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group (SRIG) teams, not even

organizational entities seven years ago, may be the focus of main

effort in OOTW missions. These are just the highlights.

Despite an unprecedented expansion of mission variety in

recent years, the Marine Corps remains committed to the utility

of the MAGTF building block concept. That concept's seeming

simplicity does not lessen the scope and complexity of the above

changes. The challenges, then, are to recognize that each MAGTF

can be a radically different organization and to take steps to

minimize the "ad hocery" necessary to deploy each MAGTF.

"Ad hocery" produces counter-productive command and control

systems such as in Lebanon in 1982-83. "The instances where

either the Commandant of the Marine Corps or the Force Commander

weighted-in on operational matters [in Lebanon] are many and

simply too numerous to recount."40

Annunciation of the "primacy of the MEF" doesn't provide

sufficient guidance to effectively reduce the risk of future

command and control debacles. And FMFM 2-1 is short on guidance;

it describes the echeloning of a MEF into a theater by

compositing self-sustainable MAGTFs in the traditional sense.

"In most cases a brigade-sized force will be viewed as the lead

element of the MEF, or the MEF Forward."41 A deployment on a

MEF-scale requires up-to-date, substantive combat support

doctrine, in addition to notional force deployment and employment

guidance.

Split-based operations, an Army concept associated primarily

with the function of logistics, provides such a doctrine; it must

quickly be integrated into Marine operational doctrine. It's

general thrust is to divide management functions so that only

those that are "absolutely necessary [in theater] are deployed,

allowing some management functions to be accomplished from CONUS

or another theater."42

If split-based operations are applied routinely but

imaginatively to the combat support functions, three major

benefits would result. First, supporting establishment fixed

plant facilities could push more products and services forward

than would normally be available in an immature theater. Second,

lift required for combat support personnel and equipment could be

reduced (scenario dependent), thereby allowing more combat forces

to deploy forward, faster. Third, by tying into out-of-theater

assets, more capability would be available in theater than would

be available even with all tactical assets in theater.

Of even greater importance, doctrinal validation of the

split-based operations concept is essential to the timely

evolution of key Marine policies; policies relevant to the

improvement of a dated command and control support doctrine and

structure. They include:

a) Identify command relationships and communications

needlines to efficiently accomplish the "notion" of Global

Sourcing.

b) Clarify HQMC's apparent force provider role in

warfighting as the source and allocator of marines (by name, rank

and/or MOS as required i.e. Somalia 1992 43) for forward deployed

MAGTFs.

c) Recognize the capabilities of and the requirements for

garrison headquarters and supporting establishment combat support

of deployed forces.

d) Refine the tasks list of a Marine Forces (MARFOR)

component headquarters from the standpoint of identifying those

tasks which can only be accomplished in theater and determining

generally when MARFOR component headquarters elements must deploy

from CONUS to theater to accomplish those tasks.

e) Establish notional MEF concept of command and control

for a typical, multiple, simultaneous MAGTF depolyment scenario

(i.e. MEU, Gulf of Guinea/CINC crisis; SPMAGTF, Caribbean

Sea/CINC humanitarian; and MEF MAIN, Aegean Sea/United Nations)

involving unrelated missions; retain uninterrupted, positive

control and sustainment as required.

Each of the above provides a force multiplier to MAGTFs by

improving crisis response time, information and intelligence

support, sustainment, and command and control efficiency as well

as by reducing planning requirements. Each of the above relies

on a standing infrastructure of technology and procedures made

viable through detailed control. They exemplify how detailed

control enhances maneuver warfare while being cognizant that the

"...command system that makes possible the successful completion

of preparations for a military enterprise may be inadequate or

even positively harmful once that undertaking is under way."44

Click here to view image

Split-based operations concepts demonstrate how command and

control support must be broadened to accommodate the expanded

requirements of a MEF-sized MAGTF. However, application of this

concept could be a step toward unifying more than just individual

MARFOR component or MAGTF operations. Readily available

technology (some already in use) and the smaller size of the

Corps make possible a seamless, Marine Corps-wide command and

control network supporting forces engaged at all levels of war

(figure 6-1). HQMC, Marine Forces Pacific, Marine Forces

Atlantic, their deployed elements, centralized logistics nodes,

centralized intelligence nodes, and supporting establishment

facilities, all applying push-pull principles, could be

interlinked.

This is not a technology or a hardware issue; it is a

doctrine issue. To achieve a truly cross-supporting, effective,

total Marine force, doctrinal divisions separating operating

forces and the supporting establishment need to be restructured.

More importantly, a total force doctrine detailing the necessary

command and control support infrastructure and requisite staff

responsibilities must precede, not follow such a sweeping

reorganization.

7. DOCTRINE, COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT AND THE G-6

In terms of accountability for command and control support,

one could argue that Marine doctrine has regressed. Fifteen

years ago, a Marine might define the term communications as "a

process by which information is exchanged between individuals"45

-- just as would Webster's Dictionary. The focus is on

information and people (two of the fundamental elements of

command and control as defined in section 1), not the technical

means by which information is provided to people. The G-6 was

held personally accountable for this relay of information. The

prevailing mindset toward the G-6 might best be illustrated by

quoting Col Wesley Fox's description of operations at Dewey

Canyon, Vietnam: "The message was so critical that I put my CommO

(S-6) on the radio". An organization's communicator was

personally responsible for not only the communications equipment,

but the exchange of information via that equipment.

Additionally, prior to the fielding of digital

communications, single channel voice radio nets and Naval

Messages were the predominant means of communications among

sites. The G-6 had near-exclusive authority to source the

communications hardware necessary for information exchange. If

you wanted to exchange information, one way or another, you had

to go through your organization's communicator.

The net result was that the G-6 generally held primary

responsibility for two of the three broad elements of the command

and control function identified in the introduction: information,

or more accurately the exchange of information, and the command

and control support system. The only remaining element of

command and control, organization, fell under the authority of

the commander. Had the operating systems approach been adopted

fifteen years ago, the G-6 would clearly have been tabbed with

the lead role in performing the command and control function. In

fact the G-6 was and is still responsible for the Command,

Control and Communications Annex of all operations orders.

Today, responsibility for communications at the MEF level

means providing communications paths and telephone instruments.

The "users" -- employing their own hardware such as Worldwide

Command and Control Systems terminals (G-5), Tactical Combat

Operations terminals (G-3), and Intelligence Analysis System

terminals (G-2) to name a few -- are responsible for information

exchange.

Not only has the number of discrete information systems

increased, but the number of information terminals requiring

management control has mushroomed. For example, from 1979 to

1994 the number of personal computers in 1st Marine Division grew

from zero to over 2500.46

Additionally, hardware "fixes" continue to spring from

Southwest Asia lessons learned and are not limited to data

systems or terminals. Communications assets dedicated to single

functions, such as Trojan Spirit for the intelligence function,

further fragment responsibility for the command and control

support function. Today, nearly every G-staff owns his own data

system and/or communications system. And while every good

communicator still holds him/herself personally responsible for

MAGTF information services, in reality accountability for systems

reliability is impossible.

As a result of systems proliferation, G-6 authority over

hardware and responsibility for information have been drastically

diminished. Consequently, one can now intellectually separate

the command and control function from the communications function

and argue that communications is simply the seventh function of

combat service support --along with supply, maintenance,

transportation, general engineering, health service, and

services. Further justifying a diminished role for the G-6,

communications is not a doctrinal battlefield operating system.

Doctrinal responsibility for the command and control

functional area is normally associated with the G-3 47 , not the

G-6. Responsible also for the combat functions of maneuver,

fires, and aviation, the G-3 accepts a tremendous span of control

challenge with the addition of the ongoing combat support

function of command and control. The G-3 assumes the G-6 will

craft a reliable C2 support system despite it's transformation in

terms of hardware ownership and associated responsibilities.

Given the doctrinal minimization of detailed control, user

ambivalence toward technical direction, lack of direct G-6

control of assets, and lack of functional visibility, the posture

of the G-6 when pursuing C2 support system design is by default

reactive, not proactive. The G-6 is left with moral persuasion

as his primary tool to mesh the discrete data systems of major

subordinate elements and G-staff functional areas into a single

entity. He must ruefully accept the fact that every MAGTF

functional area will be suboptimized as the coordination of the

MAGTF C2 support system lurches forward.

While Marines grapple with their interminable coordination

difficulties, Joint staffers responsible for command and control

support have taken steps to solve theirs.

8. DOCTRINE, FUNCTIONS AND THE GCCS

As mentioned in Section 2 above, FMFM 2-1 (Draft) Fighting

the MEF established two important points. First, it reiterated

the Marine commitment to maneuver warfare in accordance with FMFM

1. Second, it promoted the battlefield function approach to

warfighting. Ironically, maneuver warfare stresses decentralized

operations, while "... function-oriented command systems

are ... more centralized and mechanized than output-oriented

(operational) ones, ,48 according to Martin van Creveld.

The functional approach to warfighting provided the Unified

CINCs with the framework for centralized organization of diverse

efforts and forces. Now the Global Command and Control System

(GCCS) provides the "mechanics" to control those forces. GCCS is

the epitome of a system based on the detailed control theory.

Conceptually, GCCS provides a DOD-wide baseline command and

control network capable of pushing tailored information to task

organized JTFs. GCCS is intended to provide commanders (the

CINC, JTF, and subordinate) a common picture of the battlefield

down to battalion-level. Common picture of the battlefield is

not limited to situation maps depicting blue-red force

dispositions. Through software standardization, "... joint

service and cross-mission area information exchange (is] an

integral element of the system design."49 As a result

documentation or data pertaining to a situation can be imported

from all functional areas without hardware or software

incompatibility or reformatting delays.

over the last decade, forward thinking, aggressive Marine

leaders have initiated sound automated systems to support their

individual functional area. However, to enable migration to

GCCS, the following stovepipe systems have been targeted for

transition to a unified software architecture:

a) "Command Information Systems - Systems which provide

tactical information to the MAGTF Commander, portraying

friendly/enemy dispositions, intelligence assessments, mission

planning capabilities, etc. Nature of information does not

require 'real-time' responsiveness."50

1) Tactical Combat Operations (TCO),

2) MAGTF Tactical Warfare Simulation MTWS),

3) Intelligence Analysis System (IAS),

4) Tactical Control Analysis Center (TCAC),

5) Systems Planning Engineering Evaluation Device

(SPEED),

6) Advanced Tactical Air Command Central (ATACC), and

7) Improved Direct Air Support Central (IDASC).51

b) "Source Data Entry Systems - Systems which serve as an

entry point for tactical information, based on manual entry on

Digital Communication Terminals (DCT), sensor readings or

electronic intelligence."52

1) Position/Location Reporting System (PLRS),

2) Tactical Remote Sensor System (TRSS),

3) Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and

Reporting System (TERPES),

4) Team Portable COMINT System (TPCS), and

5) Air Defense Communications Platform (ADCP).53

Marine battlefield functions dependent on these systems, and

subsequently dependent on GCCS to a certain extent, include

maneuver, aviation, intelligence and command and control.

The Marine Corps had little choice but to commit to GCCS

to both economic and interoperability considerations.

Maintenance of up-to-date software code is expensive; there are

software utilities (i.e. mapping, imagery, message processing,

etc.) implemented by all the above command information systems,

but implemented by using unique code within each system.

Migrating these utilities to a unified build eliminates this

costly redundancy. Additionally, the Joint Staff and the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,

Communications and Intelligence are committed to support of

Department of Defense (DOD) standard systems; after October 1996,

systems not conforming to a selected standard will be candidates

for termination unless justified as absolutely essential to

support critical DOD missions.54

No one expects this transition to happen overnight, but it

is on a fast track. GCCS terminals are currently installed in

most unified command operations centers. The Joint

Communications Support Element (JCSE) received deployable

prototype terminals in 1995. The Marine systems listed above

were selected for migration more because there coding allows an

expeditious transition than because of functional

considerations.55

Soon the JTF will possess an overarching C2 support system.

System control will reside at the headquarters level -- the JTF,

the Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) and the MAGTF. "Rigid

Configuration Control across [the] Commander, JTF, command and

control domain is inherent in the system design. The

charting/overlay process used at the battalion level is

consistent with that used at the Commander, JTF, level --

ensuring interoperability."56

It would be out of character for Marine doctrine to embrace

such a coercive concept of command in control as that made

possible by GCCS. But such a powerful capability cannot simply

be dismissed as being outside the maneuver warfare paradigm when

the concepts it is based on permeate DOD and the JTF. "Far from

determining the essence of command, communications and

information processing technology merely constitute one part of a

general environment in which command operates."57

9. DOCTRINE, FUNCTIONS AND THE JOINT TASK FORCE

The recent history of MAGTFs operating in concert with the

CINCs provides a string of lessons learned. For example in

Lebanon (82-83), "The EUCOM liaison officers were by definition

staff officers, yet they had been delegated more authority than

the "on scene" commander and the Marine commander ashore by

CINCEUR."58 The tragic terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks

in Beirut was an outgrowth. GCCS provides one example of how the

CINCs have sought to correct command and control deficiencies;

the evolution of JTFs provides another.

JTFs have evolved from ad hoc, fractured farces into

expeditionary, combined arms teams more than capable of rapidly

responding to a variety of threats and contingencies. This

evolution depended on a refocusing of Joint doctrine. Employment

complexities associated with multi-service operations were

simplified by categorizing forces by type -- such as land, sea or

air -- or by function -- command and control, intelligence,

logistics, fires, maneuver and movement, and protection. This

categorization by type presented an obvious opportunity to

increase JTF unity of effort by designating type commanders as

needed.

A less obvious but logical possibility is to pursue JTF

unity of effort by function. The Marine battlefield function of

aviation, straddling both "type" and "function" categories, was

an obvious candidate for consolidation at the JTF-level. The

joint force air component command was the result. It was the

power of information systems -- primarily, the Contingency

Tactical Automated Planning System (CTAPS; now a subsystem of

GCCS) -- that ultimately provided the means to effectively unify

JTF air operations.

Another function evolving toward centralized control at the

JTF level is logistics. JTF missions of a peacekeeping and

humanitarian nature with a focus of effort on logistics have been

increasing in number. Similar operations involving coalition

forces under United Nations auspices will likewise increase.

United Nations Operation Somalia II (UNOSOM II) from May 1993 to

February 1994 provided an example, as 3300 US troops wore the

blue beret of UN Logistics Support Command. Armed Forces Staff

College describes logistics as "... a collateral operation not

solely the responsibility of a particular force (Service) [which

is] enhanced when performed jointly." 59

Automation in general and GCCS in particular will continue

to unify functions across a JTF. The resultant functional

relationships are creating command and control relationships not

explicit in the MAGTF and the JTF Task Organization Annexes. In

the short run, these relationships do not compete with the

authority of a MAGTF Commander. But in the long run, they

challenge the very essence of the MAGTF concept. If the

functions performed by MAGTF elements are not unique, then what

makes the MAGTF different from any other deployable force?

10. DOCTRINE, FUNCTIONS, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE

OOTW is the most likely venue for future Marine operations.

They include support to diplomacy as well as peacemaking and

peacekeeping missions. Command and control Warfare (C2W)

provides the potential for military engagement in peacetime, both

to accomplish non-combat missions and to shape the enemy in case

of combat. Consequently, C2W expertise is vital to an

expeditionary force today.

C2W illustrates Marine doctrine's failure to reconcile

MEF-sized MAGTF employment concepts, an operating systems

approach to the battlefield, and the necessary command and

control support concepts.

First, C2W is a complex integration of diverse functions and

organizations. Functionally, C2W is the "integrated use of

operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological

operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical

destruction, mutually supported by intelligence to deny

information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command

and control capabilities and to protect friendly Command and

Control against such actions."60 Organizationally, emerging

Joint doctrine recognizes that assets for certain functions are

limited across DOD ... "and are often enhanced when performed

jointly"61; collateral operations, as they are called, include

C2W. Within the MAGTF, the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and

Intelligence Group (SRIG) Detachment and the Aviation Combat

Element provide assets which specialize in C2W tasks; however,

each MSE may be required to provide assets to support the overall

C2W campaign plan (i.e. the deception plan). To be successful,

operations integrated both across functional lines and across

Service organizational lines require detailed control.

Second, the diminished role of the MEF G-6 hampers the

achievement of the goal of C2W, command and control

superiority/supremacy. "The 'Age of Information' implies that he

who sees the battlefield best and can react to the changing

windows of vulnerability the quickest will have a significant

advantage over his enemy."62 But as Section 7 above described,

the MEF G-6 no longer provides the commander with a central staff

officer accountable for MEF information throughput.

Additionally, there is no criteria to evaluate or facility

responsible for assessing the degree of success of friendly

information throughput, other than in terms of communication

links "up" or "down".

Furthermore, while Marine doctrine minimizes the overall

operational role of the G-6, Joint training is doing the

opposite. The JTF J-6 is charged with writing the C2 Protection

Annex -- to include targeting of enemy counter-C2 nodes as

required -- and working closely with the J-3 to formulate the C2W

strategy.63

Third, C2W is doctrinally a "supporting strategy"64 aimed at

the enemy's command and control and, by extension, his combat

support capabilities. However, because "A combat role for US

armed forces in Third World conflicts has to be viewed as an

exceptional event, 1165 C2W frequently may be the focus of effort.

The C2W campaign would commence during the period prior to open

hostilities (peacetime); its conduct would be very deliberate

with the timing of events strictly controlled for optimal effect.

C2W may be the primary means to engage, deter, or neutralize the

more oppositional, militant elements of an indigenous populace.

Regardless of the level of conflict, the ideal C2W campaign

waged on the combat support assets of the enemy would so erode

his will, that he would decide to avoid armed confrontation.

(See figure 10-1.) It is worth noting that an understanding of

the same theories of detailed control inherent in our combat

support functions will be necessary to cripple the similar

functions of the enemy.

Click here to view image

Fourth, few nations, if any, can match the capability of the

United States to synchronize devastating, long range, precise

fires from air and sea with little notice. Consequently, "... in

a situation where the Joint Force has technical superiority and

favorable combat power ratios, Counter-C2 -- preventing effective

command and control of adversary forces by denying information

to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary command

and control system -- may become the enemy commander's primary

warfighting strategy."67 The adversaries MAGTFs will encounter d

during OOTW and low intensity conflict fit this profile. Hence,

ongoing, active command and control protection will be a

prerequisite for maneuver.

Marine maneuverists may have a very difficult time

protecting key command and control nodes against a crafty

opponent if their command and control protection concept disdains

the scale, architecture and importance of a MEF-level C2 support

system. A simple, hierarchical template of the MAGTF will not

reveal what sites are critical to maintaining reliable command

and control of maneuver forces. "The traditional or vertically

structured military chain of command may be anachronistic for the

Beirut-type, humanitarian interventions the United States may be

called upon to perform in the 1990s and beyond."68

Marine capabilities and limitations for the conduct of C2W

reflect a broader command and control support issue; that is,

Marine doctrine's frequent preoccupation with MEU models which

may or may not be appropriate for larger MAGTFs. In the case of

C2W," ... the MEU does not really have the assets to conduct

comprehensive, independent C2W; the MEU does have a number of

capabilities that the joint C2W planner can use."69 Providing

the capability for MEF-sized MAGTFs to conduct C2W involves more

than enlarging a MEU table of organization and table of

equipment. In many scenarios, existing MEU capabilities depend

on Naval Expeditionary Force or Joint Task Force participation

either for planning, installation, operation or maintenance.

Substantial lead time would be required for a MEF to organize,

train and equip to conduct effective, independent C2W in an OOTW

scenario.

Marine doctrine has tediously modified existing,

decentralized MEU-sized MAGTF maneuver concepts to fit a MEF --

with little emphasis placed on originating fresh command and

control support concepts. Meanwhile, Joint doctrine has

conceived a centralized C2 support system which cuts across all

Service and functional lines. Comparatively speaking, the

genesis of the GCCS renders inconsequential Marine doctrinal

debates of the theory of control best-suited for Marine forces.

11. CONCLUSION

The MAGTF concept achieves clarity of purpose and unity of

effort due to its pragmatic task-organized approach to

warfighting missions. Since World War II, the focus of effort

has been amphibious assault. Lift and firepower were necessary

capabilities to defeat the mechanized, Soviet bloc or client enemy.

In effect, the function-oriented70 JTF is based on the same

organizational principle as the MAGTF only on a larger scale.

The CINCs seek unity of effort by command and control of

functional areas via GCCS. The command and control theory to

achieve centralized control of multi-Service and frequently

multi-national forces operating at the operational and strategic

level of war is predominantly detailed control.

To accomplish missions at the operational and strategic

levels, detailed control is necessary. Marine forces will be

charged with accomplishing missions at those levels as part of,

or while in command of, joint and multi-national forces. It will

not be unusual for a single MAGTF to be assigned missions ranging

from tactical to strategic during a single deployment. Marine

forces must be equipped with the doctrinal underpinnings to

accurately assess the mission and to appropriately mesh their C2

support system with those of other forces.

Therefore, Marine doctrine must reconcile mission control

with detailed control in principle and practice; it must

recognize their symbiotic relationship. The key to Marine

success has been the ability to grasp the nature and subtleties

of essential tasks required for mission accomplishment;

organization and operations followed. Those essential tasks are

more complex, technical and situation-dependent today.

Generally, the "what" of Marine missions may demand a focus

of effort -- as the situation evolves from peace to crisis or war

-- on each of the combat support and combat functions. The

"when" and the "where" of Marine missions can theoretically

connote the larger dimensions of time and space associated with

operational and strategic missions. Capabilities for a wide

range of missions and tasks are required. Command and control

oriented toward global contingencies must be ongoing. For many

missions, firepower and mass will not be top priorities. The

ability to dictate the agenda and the tempo of all operations --

MAGTF, enemy, and when required, JTF and/or coalition -- is

critical.

Five years ago, FMFM 1-1 acknowledged: "As tactics has long

been a Marine Corps strength, we have tended to focus on the

tactical aspects of war to the neglect of the operational

aspects."71 To date we have only recognized and dealt with the

problem in the broadest terms. We have yet to identify

total-Corps, command and control principles and practice which

will provide "operational design which synthesizes tactical

results into a coalescent whole."72

1 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication (JCS Pub.) 1, Department

of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

(Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 June 1987), 77.

2 Armed Forces Staff College Publication (AFSC Pub) 2, Part II

Joint Synchronization (Norfolk, VA: National Defense University,

AY 1994-95), II-5-2.

3 Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 3, Command and Control

(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 16 June 1993), 10.

4 FMFM 3, 10.

5 FMFM 3, 10.

6 FMFM 3, 10.

7 FMFM 3, 35.

8 Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1-1, Campaigning

(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 25 January 1990), 28-29.

9 Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-1, Fighting the MEF

(Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 30

October 1992), 5. FMFM 2-1 notes that "Operating systems" is

identified as a non-doctrinal issue at this point in time.

Nonetheless, scores of man-years in the form of the MAGTF Staff

Training Program have been invested in teaching and

institutionalizing this concept throughout the Marine Corps.

10 FMFM 2-1, 1-7 to 1-8.

11 Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting (Washington,

DC: Department of the Navy, 6 March 1989), 58.

12 FMFM 1, 58.

13 FMFM 1, 31-32.

14 AFSC Pub 2, II-5-3.

15 AFSC Pub 2' II-5-3.

16 FMFM 1, 62.

17 FMFM 1, 62.

18 FMFM 1, 63 .

19 Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 15-3, A

Concept of Command and Control (Washington, DC: Department of the

Navy, 3 August 1994), 40.

20 FMFRP 15-3, 27.

21 FMFRP 15-3, 27.

22 FMFRP 15-3, 28.

23 Martin van Creveld, Command In War (Cambridge MA: Harvard

University Press, 1985), 274.

24 LtCol. R.L. Higgins, editor, "Almanac '95: People," Marines,

Jan 95, Vol.24, No.1, 25-26.

25 FMFRP 15-3, 29.

26 FMFM 1, 71.

27 Gen. Carl Mundy, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps,

"Flexible, Fast, Effective Forces: Call Out the Marines," Defense

95, Issue 1, January 1995, 23.

28 van Creveld, 268.

29 JCS Pub 1, 263.

30 FMFM 3, 17.

31 Marine Corps Manual (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy,

1980), A-4.

32 Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 3-30, Communications

(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 3 April 1989), 4-3.

33 FMFM 3, 17.

34 Colonel Charles J. Quilter II, U.S. Marines in the Persian

Gulf, 1990-1991: with the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert

Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, DC: Headquarters, United

States Marine Corps, 1993), 6-111.

35 FMFM 3, 40.

36 Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 1-11, Fleet

Marine Force Organization-1992 (Washington, DC: Department of the

Navy 1992), 1-1.

37, Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1-2, The Role of the Marine

Corps in the National Defense (Washington, DC: Department of the

Navy, 21 June 1991), 4-5.

38 FMFM 1-2, 4-5.

39 FMFM 1-2, 4-8.

40 John B. Matthews, "The US Chain of Command in Lebanon: Web

of Confusion." (Unpublished chapter of book, April 1995), 81.

41 FMFM 2-1, 5-2 to 5-3.

42 Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC:

Department of the Army, June 1993), G-8.

43 As Operations Officer, 8th Communication Battalion, II MEF,

I observed HQMC-issued, by-name orders to all school-trained

2532s (UHF multichannel radio operators), PFC through Sergeant,

to report immediately to I MEF for Somalia operations in 1992.

In redressing MARFORPAC's immediate need for critical MOSs, HQMC

rendered MARFORLANT combat ineffective in the same skill areas in

support of United States Atlantic Command missions.

44 van Creveld, 268.

45 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, under the word

"communication," 266.

46 Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) C4I Working

Group Conference Handout 7-9 March 1995, Meeting the Challenge

Updating Command and Control Structure (Quantico, VA: MCCDC,

March 1995), 25.

47 MCCDC C4I Working Group 7-9 March 1995, 27.

48 van Creveld, 268.

49 Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) Pamphlet, MAGTF

C4I Transition to the Global Command and Control System (GCCS)

Common Operating Environment (Quantico, VA: United States Marine

Corps, 15 March 1994), 22.

50 MARCORSYSCOM, 7.

51 MARCORSYSCOM, 15.

52 MARCORSYSCOM, 7.

53 MARCORSYSCOM, 15.

54 MARCORSYSCOM, 4-6.

55 MARCORSYSCOM, 8 and 16.

56 MARCORSYSCOM, 14.

57 van Creveld, 275.

58 Matthews, 106.

59 AFSC Pub 2, G-3.

60 Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) Student Text, Joint

Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Staff Officers Course (Norfolk,

VA: Commandant, AFSC, January 1994), 1-3 to 1-4.

61 AFSC Pub 2, G-3.

62 AFSC C2W Student Text, 1-8.

63 AFSC C2W Student Text, 4-5.

64 AFSC C2W Student Text, 1-4.

65 Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Military Operations in Low

Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: Departments of the Army and

the Air Force, 5 Dec 1990), 2-15.

66 AFSC C2W Student Text, 1-7.

67 AFSC C2W Student Text, 6-2 to 7-2.

68 Matthews, 63.

69 AFSC C2W Student Text, 18-11 to 18-12.

70 Function is defined as "the appropriate or assigned duties,

responsibilities, missions or tasks of an organization." JCS

Pub. 1, 155.

71 FMFM 1-1, 87.

72 FMFM 1-1, 87.

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