Military

The JFC's Dilemma: The USMC Tactical Recovery Of Aircraft And Personnel

Mission Verses The Combat SAR Mission

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Aviation

 

 

 

 

                                    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: The JFC's Dilemma: The USMC TRAP mission verses the Combat SAR mission.

 

Author: Major Matthew D. Redfern, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis: Although Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) missions and U.S. Marine Corps

Tactical Recovery of Personnel (TRAP) missions are very similar, they differ in capability.

It is important for joint planners and commanders to understand TRAP and CSAR

differences to task the most capable force to conduct combat rescue or recovery.

 

Background: The history of CSAR demonstrates the need for detailed planning and

dedicated efforts for combat rescues during war. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable) is very capable force that conducts tactical recovery of aircraft and

personnel. Too often, comanders confuse CSAR with TRAP and task the MEU to

conduct CSAR missions. The U.S. Marine Corps' position on CSAR is that it does not

conduct the search in CSAR. However, the limiting factor is the U. S. Marine Corps

inadequate capability to conduct recovery. Joint doctrine is vague on assigning CSAR

responsibilities contributes to the confusion between CSAR and TRAP. Other service

component's force structure for combat rescue, particularly during OOTW, adds to

the JFC's tasking dilemma. USSOCOM, with its specially equipped aircraft, is the force

normally tasked with theater CSAR even though it detracts from their primary mission.

 

Recommendation: Joint planners and commanders must understand the difference

between CSAR and TRAP. Joint doctrine needs to combine the capabilities of the service

components with the JFC's requirements to avoid the combat rescue dilemma.

 

 

                                                            Is TRAP the same as CSAR?

 

            Combat rescues required more than a crew, a helicopter and good

            intentions .. men often died attempting a rescue simply because available

            crews lacked rescue training and were ignorant of proper recovery

            techniques. There was a misconception on the part of some helicopter

            crewmen that rescue entailed nothing more than flying over a downed

            crewman and picking him up.

                                                                         -CDR D. G. Hartley, U.S. Navy helicopter pilot1

 

 

            On 3 September 1992, United Nations' relief flight 2117, an Italian G-222 transport

 

aircraft, went down near Sarajevo airport from suspected hostile fire in the former country

 

of Yugoslavia. The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable

 

MEU(SOC), operating aboard the helicopter carrier USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) in the

 

Adriatic Sea, received a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) mission

 

task to rescue or assist any survivors of the Italian G-222. Within two hours after the

 

receipt of this TRAP mission, two Marine CH-53E heavy lift and two AH-1W attack

 

helicopters launched for the rescue. For approximately three hours, the aircraft flew over

 

the war torn area in search of the crash site. Fired upon a minimum of twice during their

 

flight, the helicopters did not successfully locate the UN 2117 crash site.2 Upon the

 

helicopters safe return aboard the LPH-2, a postflight inspection of one the CH-53E

 

helicopter's tail rotor revealed it had taken a hit by groundfire during the mission. The

 

26th MEU(SOC) was very fortunate it did not lose critical aircraft and personnel during

 

this mission.

 

            Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, defines combat search

 

and rescue (CSAR) as "a specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of

 

distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations."3 The U.S. Marine Corps

 

defines TRAP as "the capability to conduct overland recovery of downed aircraft and

 

personnel, aircraft sanitation and provide advanced trama-life support in a benign or

 

hostile enviromnent."4 Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-35, the Assault Support

 

Helicopter Tactical Manual, describes TRAP as "a mission performed by an assigned

 

briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment and/or

 

aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue assets from responding and

 

when survivors and there locations have been confirmed."5 The FMFM 5-35 definition of

 

TRAP makes the assumption that TRAP is a mission solely performed by helicopters.

 

Although Joint Pub 3-50.2's definition of TRAP is similar to FMFM 5-35's definition,

 

a disclaimer exists in their glossary that its definition not be referenced outside the JCS

 

publication.6 However, it is clear from the first two definitions that CSAR is the rescue of

 

only personnel while TRAP is the recovery of personnel and equipment.

 

            The MEU(SOC) is a task oriented, self-sustainable, and amphibious Marine Air Ground

 

Task Force (MAGTF). The MEU(SOC) is capable of conventional and selected maritime

 

special operations of limited-duration in support of a combatant commander's mission.

 

The TRAP mission is one tasked performed by the MEU(SOC).7 The 26th MEU(SOC)'s

 

mission on 3 September 1992, was a CSAR mission vice a TRAP mission. As a derivative

 

of CSAR, joint planners and commanders frequently misunderstand the Marine Corps'

 

TRAP mission as equivalent to CSAR. Contributing to the confusion are vague

 

definitions of CSAR and TRAP. The vague definitions combined with each service

 

component's diverse approach to rescue operations, leads to tasking problems of combat

 

rescue and recovery missions. The decisive factor in delineating between the two terms is

 

the location and execution of the search and recovery.  For a better understanding of the

 

differences between recovery and search and rescue, it is important to discuss and explore

 

the history of search and rescue as it influenced the Marine Corps development of the

 

TRAP mission.

 

                                               

                                                History of Search and Rescue

 

            During World War II (WWII), the German Luftwaffe, under Reich Marshal Hermann

 

Goering, developed the first search and rescue efforts for their pilots during the Battle of

 

Britain.  In the air battles over the English Channel, the airmen of the Battle of Britain

 

often found themselves in a predicament of attempting to fly a crippled aircraft to shore or

 

bail out into dangerous waters of the English Channel.  The Germans made a conscious

 

and determined effort to rescue downed Luftwaffe pilots from the English Channel.  The

 

Germans used rescue floats, anchored approximately two miles off the coast of France, to

 

keep the downed German airmen warm and sheltered until rescued by a friendly ship.

 

These rescue floats contained blankets, rations and medical supplies to aid in the downed

 

airman's survival while he awaited rescue.8 In the event of a rescue fleet of the Heinkel-59

 

seaplanes.  The Heinkel-59 was a medical supply float plane that would locate the downed

 

Luftwaffe pilots usually through identification of their pilot flares, yellow skull-caps and

 

visible one-man dinghies.9  The Germans soon quickly learned that painting large red

 

crosses on the wings of the white Heinkel-59 did not prevent the Royal Air Force (RAF)

 

from attacking.  The British felt that attacking the Heinkel-59 aircraft prevented the

 

Luftwaffe's pilots from returning to combat.  The Germans learned that these rescues were

 

actually combat rescues. So thereafter, they painted the float planes camouflage colors and

 

used Messerschmitts Bf 109s to escort and provide cover during the rescue.

 

            The British took a different approach and did not plan recovery operations for downed

 

RAF pilots. They relied on chance spotting of a downed airman by a ship or an airplane.

 

The RAF pilot only had a "Mae West" life Jacket to keep him afloat and hope a ship or

 

plane saw him go down. Even if a ship or plane saw him go down in the English Channel,

 

the pilot only had about two hours of consciousness before hypothermia set in because of

 

the icy channel waters. In just three weeks during July 1940, the British lost more than

 

220 RAF airmen at sea.10 These losses of airmen persuaded the RAF to develop their own

 

procedures for search and rescue. The British would preposition special observation

 

aircraft to locate the downed airmen and radio to offshore rescue boats to direct his

 

pick-up. Similar to the Germans, the RAF began to issue the pilots flares and fluorescine

 

dye to assist the observation plane in locating the downed aviators. These measures

 

proved to be effective. As fighting increased in the following months during the Battle of

 

Britain, the RAF lost fewer airmen to the sea.11

 

            World War II witnessed the development of various forms of search and rescue in both

 

the Pacific and Europe. The partisan underground, float planes, coast watchers and

 

submarines, played a vital role in the rescue of many downed airmen. In fact, in the

 

Pacific Ocean, after the shoot down of his Torpedo Bomber Avenger during the attack

 

of the island of Chichi Jima, a submarine rescued former President and Naval Aviator,

 

George Bush.12 Although World War II saw numerous innovations in combat rescue, the

 

fundamental lesson learned was the importance of the planned rescue effort. A

 

well planned rescue effort resulted in a successful recovery of personnel.

 

                                                                                    Korea

 

            Although the first military helicopter rescues occurred in Burma during WWII,

 

the Korean war witnessed the first extensive use of helicopters in rescue operations. Korean

 

War helicopter rescue operations taught three major lessons. First, that control of the air

 

is essential to conduct a helicopter recovery. Military helicopters are vulnerable from

 

anti-air attack and rely on air superiority to operate under. Second, that the rescue vehicle

 

must be long range capable and able to fly anywhere on the battlefield. During the Korean

 

War, the U.S. Air Force upgraded their Sikorsky H-5 helicopters to the longer range and

 

more capable Sikorsky H-19 helicopters. This upgrade enabled the USAF to range the

 

entire battlefield by a helicopter. Third, that downed pilots, utilizing the new URC-4

 

emergency radio, assisted the search effort in locating the survivor behind enemy lines.13

 

The radio eliminated the requirement of dangerous visual search missions in enemy

 

controlled areas. These three lessons enabled the U.S. Air Force to rescue 170

 

aircrewmen out of 1690 aircrewmen shot down during the Korean War.14

 

                                                                        Vietnam

 

            Every "downed" pilot hopes heaven and earth will be moved in order to

effect his rescue, but this pilot was one of the few successfully plucked

            from the waters of Vietnam. Rescue concepts used by the Navy in Vietnam

            were woefully inadequate--not as a result of inability but because of

            studied neglect by the Navy. This is a historical reality, and it is

            inexcusable.

 

                                                                                                            -CDR D. G. Hartley, USN15

 

 

            With the advancement of military helicopter technology, search and rescue took on a

 

different dimension. The helicopter enabled the commander to deploy a rescue asset

 

rapidly anywhere in the theater to recover a downed airman. Given the terrain and dense

 

jungles of Vietnam, the Vietnam War was the golden age of helicopter search and rescue.

 

The services began using the helicopter as the primary vehicle of search and rescue. Its

 

greatest advantages, flexibility and mobility, were also its greatest deficiencies. The over

 

dependence on them helicopter's flexibility and mobility led rescue planners to neglect the

 

thorough and detailed planning required for effective combat search and rescue.

 

            Due to detailed planning, the U. S. Air Force's search and rescue had a better rescue

 

record than the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps. Fifty percent of the 321 Naval aviators

 

shot down in North Vietnam survived the downing. Of the 161 aviators that did survive,

 

the U.S. Navy and Marine only rescued 16 percent while the Vietnamese captured the

 

remainder.16 For every 1.4 recovery made, the Navy and Marines lost one rescue

 

aircraft. For every 1.8 recovery made, the Navy and Marines lost a rescuer.17 This high

 

turnover of pilots and aircraft is simply unacceptable.

 

            Concurrently, the U. S. Air Force had 2700 pilots and aircrewmen downed over

 

Vietnam and recovered 980 of them. The recovery percentage is twice the rate of the

 

U.S. Navy and Marine Corps' rate. The USAF made 4.5 rescues for every rescue aircraft

 

lost and 9.2 rescues for every rescuer lost.18 One of the largest reasons for the USAF's

 

higher recovery rate over that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps' recovery rate was the

 

USAF's approach to search and rescue.

 

 

            The USAF first located and authenticated the survivor. Then they planned a detailed

 

rescue effort. Finally, they executed their preplanned rescue. The Navy and Marine

 

Corps, on the other hand, often conducted brash and "ad hoc" recoveries that usually

 

ended in failure.

 

            Of the captured downed airmen in Vietnam, 8 0% were on the ground only 30 minutes

 

before being captured.19 During these first thirty minutes, sufficient time to plan and

 

execute a successful rescue mission -did not exist. If they survived the first thirty minutes,

 

the downed airmen had hours and even days to evade the enemy. After the first thirty

 

minutes, while the downed airman was escaping and evading (E&E), there was the time to

 

locate and attempt a rescue. During this E&E stage, the mission planners could

 

specifically and effectively plan. Commander Daniel G. Hartley, a helicopter pilot in

 

Vietnam, said, "This fact was obvious from the outset but was ignored by the Navy

 

planners."20  The Navy lost too many personnel and aircraft because of their hastily

 

launched helicopter rescue attempts. Essentially, the military needed to relearned the same

 

lessons of WWII and Korea during the Vietnam War. It was obvious by the end of the

 

war that search and rescue under combat conditions needed to become a specified task of

 

combat SAR.

 

 

                                                            Desert Storm/Shield

 

            During the 1980's, all the services developed the concept of combat SAR vice

 

peacetime SAR. The Vietnam experience taught us that CSAR is a requirement of

 

conventional warfare, yet requires special equipment and trained crews over that of

 

peacetime SAR. Because of these lessons of Vietnam, most of services believe that CSAR

 

is a function of Special Operation Forces (SOF) during hostilities. During Desert

 

Shield/Storm, USCINCCENT tasked SOCCENT with CSAR because "SOF possessed the

 

best capability in theater to conduct long range recovery missions given the threat in the

 

KTO."21 However, U.S. Special Operations Command's (US SOCOM) primary mission is

 

unconventional warfare, not CSAR. Every asset that SOF dedicates for CSAR, takes

 

away from their available assets for unconventional warfare. Although the specially

 

trained SOF units conducted CSAR during Desert Shield/Storm, the recovery results

 

remained relatively the same as previous conflicts.

 

            Of the 52 downed airmen during Desert Shield/Storm, only 22 survived. Of these 22

 

survivors, the Iraqis immediately captured fourteen. Five survivors evaded capture for 3

 

to 48 hours. U. S. military forces rescued only three aircrew. With one UH-60

 

Blackhawk lost and five personnel killed in action attempting a rescue, three of the eight

 

CSAR missions launched were successful.22

 

            The lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm indicate that the U.S. military is still

 

conducting "ad hoc" CSAR missions. CSAR should be the responsibility of all the

 

services not just USSOCOM. The military addressed these deficiencies and developed

 

Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, in July 1994.

 

                                                                                    USMC TRAP

 

            In the late 1970s, as a result of the Vietnam experience, the U.S. Marine Corps

 

established Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS- 1) to

 

standardize aircrew training throughout the aviation community. Well aware of the

 

history of combat rescue, MAWTS-1 recognized that CSAR requires a consecrated effort

 

and specifically trained personnel. MAWTS-1 taught aviators that USMC CSAR requires

 

dedicated rescue assets be held in reserve during an operation. The Marine Corps could ill

 

afford to spare the aviation assets necessary to dedicate for CSAR. Furthermore, in a joint

 

and combined environment, this CSAR mission would conflict with the accomplishment of

 

the MAGTF's primary mission. In 1987, the Marine Corps changed their rescue doctrine

 

to TRAP vice CSAR. The stated reason for the change was that the Marine Corps does

 

not conduct the "search" portion in CSAR. Joint Pub 3-50.2 collaborates this position by

 

stating; "MAGTFs do not routinely train to conduct the search portion of CSAR."23

 

However, search is not the key term in CSAR; it is rescue.

 

            First of all, CSAR does not mean that a helicopter must accomplish the entire mission.

 

An E-3 AWACS, fighter aircraft or national asset can normally conduct the search for a

 

downed airman. Ground reconnaissance forces or anyone capable of receiving a downed

 

pilot's radio distress signal can also conduct the search for a downed airman. The

 

probability that the search portion of CSAR executed by a helicopter is very low because

 

very few helicopters operate deep within the battlespace.

 

            With the arguable exception of the AH-1W Corbra, USMC helicopters by design do

 

not permit operations too far beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL).24

 

However, the Marine Corps has assets, such as, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), that

 

could conduct the deep search function, if required. National, theater, host nation and

 

other component's intelligence resources can also conduct the search function. It is

 

important to remember that TRAP evolved prior to the deployment of the UAV and the

 

Marine Corps ability to utilize national search level assets at the MEU level. In today's

 

joint environment, the Marine Corps should have access to these important assets in any

 

given theater.

 

            The term rescue, not search, is the portion of CSAR that divides TRAP from CSAR.

 

If search is the key difference between CSAR and TRAP, would the USMC launch a

 

rescue effort for a survivor whose location was in a deep operational area? The answer to

 

this question is that it depends on the situation. If the threat is low and a recovery vehicle

 

available, the USMC could conduct a recovery. However, the USMC cannot attempt a

 

rescue if the threat is high or the impact of allocating recovery assets to conduct a rescue

 

adversely effects the USMC ability to accomplish their primary mission.

 

            Another misconception about combat rescue is that CSAR requires a helicopter

 

recovery into an unknown threat where the survivor's location is also unknown. CSAR

 

has two basic types of recovery methods; a single unit and a Combat Search and Rescue

 

Task Force (CSARTF). Under the single unit method, Joint Pub 3-50.2 states:

 

            This method employs a single type of vehicle, normally a helicopter or

            flight of helicopters, to penetrate hostile or denied territory without support

            of a CSARTF. This recovery requires knowledge of the exact location of

            isolated personnel. The single unit recovery is the preferred method of

            recovery, but terrain, enemy activity, and lighting conditions may suggest

            using the CSARTF method.25

 

The CSARTF method normally launches the recovery helicopters: "Only when the

 

location and authentication of isolated personnel have been verified and an actual recovery

 

is feasible."26 It is clear by these definitions that rescuers require the survivor's location

 

before they launch the recovery effort. Colonel Johnson, the Special Operations

 

Commander during Desert Storm, decreed that, "reasonable confirmation of a survivor's

 

location and predicament be established," before he would authorize a rescue mission.27

 

Based the requirement of the confirmation of the survivor's location for CSAR rescues,

 

there appears to be no difference between CSAR and TRAP. However, the fundamental

 

difference lies in the operational assets capable and available to conduct the rescue effort.

 

            The USMC does not possess the number of dedicated operational assets required for

 

combat rescue missions outside the MAGTF's mission. The typical MEU(SOC) aviation

 

component possesses twelve CH-46 Sea Knights, two to four UH-1N Hueys, and four

 

CH53E Super Stallions that are capable to conduct recovery missions. The CH-46 and

 

the UH-1N helicopters are two to three decades old and have limited range and reliability

 

problems. All tactical USMC transport helicopters lack an integrated navigation and night

 

infrared systems. Most USMC helicopter pilots rely solely on night vision devices and a

 

map to navigate at night. While some USMC helicopters have the Trimble Trimpack

 

navigational global position systems (GPS) wiring installed, this hand-held GPS is not

 

night vision goggle compatible. Although the UH-IN possesses the heaviest armament of

 

the three helicopters, it has limited range and does not possess an aerial refueling

 

capability of the CH-53E. Of the three transport helicopters, the CH-53E possesses the

 

longest range and fuel for time on station.  However, because it was designed for cargo

 

missions, such as the lifting of the M-198 howitzer, the CH-53E carries little protective

 

armor. Both the CH-46 and CH-53E carry self protection.50 caliber weapons but have

 

very limited fields of fire. Because the design of Marine transport helicopters is to provide

 

mutual support to one another in combat, they can support recovery efforts of their own

 

missions, but provide little support outside their operating area. It is important to

 

remember that the intent of TRAP is the recovery of the MAGTF's equipment and

 

personnel during a specific mission. For this reason, TRAP is an implied mission rather

 

than a specified mission like that of CSAR.

 

            The rescue of a F-14 pilot during Desert Storm and the ill-fated H-60 recovery

 

operation in Somalia is an example of the difference between a CSAR and TRAP mission.

 

The recovery of the F-14 Tomcat pilot during Desert Storm was a CSAR mission. It was

 

the recovery that occurred more than 160 miles into IRAQ. Throughout the rescue, an

 

AWACS controlled a section (two) of A-10s and MH-53 Pave Low SOF helicopters

 

deep into Iraqi territory. The recovery attempt occurred in poor weather under combat

 

conditions. As the MH-53s approached the pick-up site, the A-10s destroyed an Iraqi

 

radio pick-up truck attempting to intercept the F-14 pilot.28 The specific missions of the

 

MH-53s A-10s and F-14 were unrelated. While the A-10's and the F14's respective

 

missions were offensive and deep air support, the MH-53's specified mission was solely

 

CSAR.

 

            The attempted recovery of the downed NM-60 Blackhawk in Somalia is an example of

 

a TRAP mission. On 3 October 1993, during a raid to capture three principal Aidid aides,

 

Somali anti-aircraft fire brought down a NM-60 Blackhawk. During the rescue attempt of

 

the downed MH-60, Somali gunmen brought down another Blackhawk in the same

 

vicinity. Nearly nine hours later, United Nations' armored personnel carriers rescued the

 

stranded ranges near the downed helicopters. This failed rescue attempt cost 18 American

 

lives.29 It was not a successful TRAP because it lacked the specific planning required for

 

the recovery mission. Confusion about the responsibility for the recovery mission existed

 

between the Pakistani forces and the U. S. forces. The rescue Blackhawks were the same

 

assets used in the initial raid and most of their efforts were "ad hoc". Some of the rescue

 

effort teams consisted of "cooks and other assorted rangers including an electronics

 

expert."30 This incident demonstrates two points. First, this mission failed because TRAP

 

requires the same specific planning as CSAR Second, this was not a combat search and

 

rescue mission, but it was a combat recovery mission. The key point is that the recovery

 

force's assets were the same assets used in the initial mission.

 

                                                                        Joint Operations

 

            It is in the joint theater that CSAR and the Marine Corps' TRAP mission differences

 

become an issue. Vague joint doctrine and each service component's diverse approach to

 

CSAR during operations other than war (OOTW), causes rescue mission tasking

 

problems. The ever-present MEU(SOC) is an effective force to conduct OOTW.

 

However, the MEU(SOC)'s offshore presence with their TRAP capability is a tempting

 

force to task with the responsibility of conducting CSAR (e.g., the G-222 incident in

 

former Yugoslavia). This would not be a problem if the Marine Corps possessed more

 

CSAR capable assets and had no other missions in theater.

 

Joint Pub 3-50.2 adds to the tasking problem by stating that:

 

            Each service and USSOCOM are responsible for performing CSAR in

            support of their own operations, consistent with their assigned functions.

            In so doing, each service and USSOCOM should take into account the

            availability and capability of the CSAR capable forces of others, including

            the U.S. Coast Guard.31

 

In the above statement, during joint operations, the phrase, "Each service and US SOCOM

 

are responsible for performing CSAR in support of their own operations," is more of a

 

requirement for TRAP than CSAR. As in the H-60 rescue attempt in Somalia, TRAP is

 

the recovery of personnel and equipment in support of the service's own operation.

 

However, CSAR during joint operations, normally require each service to conduct rescues

 

in support of other operations. This is evident by the CSAR mission tasking of the F-14

 

shootdown in Desert Storm and the G-222 shootdown in former Yugoslavia.

 

            The intent of the joint doctrine is to give the JFC battlefield flexibility in tasking any

 

service component with a CSAR mission. Joint Pub 3-50.2 clearly assigns primary

 

responsibility for CSAR to the JFC. The JFC must rely on each service and USSOCOM

 

to provide the proper formula of assets for CSAR. The problem occurs when each service

 

possesses its own unique solution to meet this CSAR requirement. Because no particular

 

service is responsible to specifically conduct CSAR, the JFC receives a diverse set of

 

rescue capabilities within his theater. In the aforementioned Joint Pub 3-50.2 statement,

 

"take into account the availability and capability of CSAR capable forces of others,"32 adds

 

to the services' and JFC's predicament. Does this statement mean one service can rely on

 

another service to meet their CSAR requirements or that one service must provide assets

 

to meet another service's requirement? Because of the inequalities of each service's CSAR

 

capabilities, the JFC may find it easier just to task USSOCOM with the CSAR mission.

 

            Each service component's rescue assets, capabilities and limitations directly effect the

 

            service's approach to satisfying their joint CSAR requirements. The U.S. Army does not

 

have dedicated CSAR units or assets. In the U. S. Army, CSAR is a secondary mission for

 

aviation, medical evacuation, watercraft, and some ground maneuver units. Similar to the

 

Marine Corps, the U.S. Army has insufficient quantities of rescue equipment that can

 

operate deep in a hostile environment without relying on adequate protection from other

 

forces.

 

            US SOCOM, similar to the Army and Marines, uses collateral assets that have other

 

primary missions. However, of all the service components, USSOCOM has the most

 

capable assets to conduct deep operational rescues in a hostile environment. The U.S.

 

Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) have a more explicit and dedicated approach to

 

CSAR. This fact combined with USSOCOM's rapid response capability makes it the force

 

of choice for CSAR.

 

            The USN specifically procured the HH-60H helicopter to conduct the dual function of

 

CSAR and Naval Special Warfare (NSW) support missions near the carrier battle group

 

(CVBG). The HH-60H limits the Navy to CSAR operations in the vicinity of the CVBG

 

and out to 250 nautical miles from the HH-60H's last refueling point. Other than the

 

HH-60H, Navy helicopters lack most battlefield survivability equipment and features (i.e.,

 

radar warning receivers, defensive countermeasures, and global navigational systems).33

 

To reduce the cost of maintaining a large CSAR force, the USN structured their CSAR

 

forces from both active duty and reserve components. Because of numerous commitments

 

and their active and reserve duty force structure, USN CSAR assets are not always

 

available for military operations short of major regional conflicts (MRCs)

 

            The USAF's approach to CSAR is similar to that of the Navy. The USAF

 

characterizes CSAR as a primary mission and procured the HH-60G as a dedicated CSAR

 

asset. Similar to Navy, active duty and reserve personnel makes up the USAF's CSAR

 

forces and satisfies joint doctrine CSAR requirements for two MRC's However, during

 

OOTW deployments, such as, Deny Flight, Provide Promise, Provide Comfort, and

 

Southern Watch, the USAF had to rely on USSOCOM to conduct CSAR for some of

 

these commitments.34

 

            When CSAR mission detracts from USSOCOM's primary unconventional warfare

 

mission, the JFC tasks another component to conduct CSAR. For this reason,

 

expeditionary forces, such as, the MAGTF, is an attractive service to cover the CSAR

 

problem during OOTW. Until the other service components revise their service structure

 

or joint doctrine changes, the Marine Corps must be aware that they may find themselves

 

tasked with a CSAR mission even though they only conduct TRAP. Until joint doctrine

 

resolves the issue of tasking CSAR within the joint theater, the Marine Corps should

 

continue to update and procure combat rescue capable aircraft (e.g., MV-22 Osprey) and

 

equipment until to conduct deep operations rescues.

 

                                                                        Conclusion

 

            CSAR and TRAP are similar but not the same tasks. History has taught that successful

 

TRAP and CSAR missions require detailed planning. The key factor to both CSAR and

 

TRAP is the rescue or recovery; not the search. CSAR is the planned rescue of distressed

 

personnel (e.g., downed airmen) anywhere in the joint theater. TRAP is the planned

 

recovery of personnel or equipment of your own operations located in your own area of

 

responsibility. The U.S. Marine Corps does not conduct CSAR because it does not

 

possess the assets capable to conduct rescues under high threat conditions anywhere in

 

theater. It is important for the JFC to know the differences between CSAR and TRAP to

 

avoid assigning a CSAR mission task to a TRAP capable force.

 

            Joint doctrine needs to revise the CSAR requirements to balance the capabilities of

 

each service with the requirements of the JFC. Each service should expand their capability

 

to conduct CSAR without adversely effecting their primary mission. Until the time comes

 

when all the services can independently conduct CSAR, the JFC will task USSOCOM to

 

conduct theater CSAR and the dilemma between CSAR and TRAP will continue.

 

                                                                                    Notes

 

1          John B. Nichols, CDR, USN(Ret.) and Barrett Tilman, On Yankee Station: The

            Naval Air War over Vietnam, (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute,

            1987), p. 119.

 

2            Matthew T. Sampson, Captain, USMC, "Providing Promise", U.S. Naval

            Proceedings, February 1993: pp. 11-13.

 

3          Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, (Washington

            D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1994) p. GL-6.

 

4          U.S. Marine Corps Order 3120.9, subject: "Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit

            (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC))," 29 April 1994.

 

5          Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-3 5/NWP 55 -9-ASH, Assault Helicopter

            Tactical Manual (U), (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy and U.S.

            Marine Corps, 1992) pp. 57-58.

 

6          Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, p. GL-1 1.

 

7          U.S. Marine Corps Order 3120.9, 29 April 1994.

 

8            Leonard Mosley, The Battle of Britain, (Alexandria, Virginia, Time-Life Books,

            1977) p. 96.

 

9          Len Deighton, Fighter, The True Story of the Battle of Britain, (New York: Haper

            Collins Publishers, 1993) p. 176

 

10        Ibid., p. 207.

 

11            Mosley, The Battle of Britain, p. 96.

 

12        Joe Hyams, Flight of the Avenger: George Bush at War, (Orlando, Florida:

            Harcourt Brace Jovanvich, 199 1), p. 119

 

13        Joseph J. Falzone, Major, USAF, Combat Search and Rescue; CSEL

            Enhancements for Winning Air Campaigns, Research Report

            AU-ARI-94-3, (Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Dec

            1994), p. 53.

 

14        Ibid., p. xiii.

 

15        Daniel G. Hartley, CDR, USNR, "Keeping Faith With Our People," U.S Naval

            Institute Proceedings, February 1983, p. 58.

 

16        Ibid., pp. 58-63.

 

                                                                                    Notes

 

17        Student Handout, "Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel" Marine Aviation

            Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, 11 September 1992.

 

18        Joseph J. Tarzana, Major, USAF, Combat Search and Rescue; CSEL

            Enhancements for Winning, Air Campaigns, p. 53.

 

19        Hartley, "Keeping Faith With Our People," pp. 58-63.

 

20        Ibid.

 

21            Department of Defense, "Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf

            War," April 1992, pp. 533-534.

 

22        LtCol J. R. Taxeras, USMC, Combat Search and Rescue, Point Paper, APP-33,

            4-2261, 5 Oct 1992.

 

23        Joint Pub 3 -5 0.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, (Washington

            D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1994) p. C-1.

 

24        The FSCL is a control measure and not a boundary between close and deep areas.

            However, to describe the limitations of USMC transport helicopters for the

            purpose of this paper only, the FSCL is a good measure to separate the deep

            operational areas from close operational areas.

 

25        Joint Pub 3 - 5 0.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, (Washington

            D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1994) p. II-9

 

26        Ibid., p II-10.

 

27        Joseph J. Falzone, Major, USAF, Combat Search and Rescue; CSEL

            Enhancements for Winning, Air Campaigns, p. 29.

 

28            Department of Defense, "Final Report to Congress:  Conduct of the Persian Gulf     

            War," April 1992, pp. 533 -534.

 

29        Tom Post and Douglas Waller, "Anatomy of a Disaster", Newsweek, Volume

            122, Issue 16, October 18, 1993, pp. 40-42.

 

30        Ibid., p. 42.

 

31        Joint Pub 3 -5 0.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, (Washington

            D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1994) p. II-9.

 

32        Ibid.

 

                                                                                    Notes

 

33        Ibid., B-1.

 

34            Department of Defense, "Combat Search and Rescue: Are responsibilities for

            combat search and rescue (CSAR) properly assigned?" Unpublished

            research briefing draft, 6 Feb 1995, p.-2.

 

                                                                        Bibliography

 

Deighton, Len, Fighter, The True Story of the Battle of Britain. New York: Harper

            Collins, 1993.

 

Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War.

            April 1992

 

Department of the Defense, "Combat Search and Rescue: Are responsibilities for combat

            search and rescue (CSAR) properly assigned?" Unpublished research briefing draft, 6

            February 1995.

 

Falzone, Joseph J., Major, USAF, Combat Search and Rescue; CSEL Enhancements for

            Winning Air Campaigns. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, December 1994.

 

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-35/NWP 55-9-ASH. Assault Helicopter Tactical

            Manual (U). Washington D.C. Department of the Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. March

            1992.

 

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-42. Deep Air Support. Washington D.C.

            Department of the Navy. 4 March 1993

 

Hartley, Daniel G., Commander, USNR, "Keeping The Faith With Our People." U.S.

            Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1983, pp. 58-63.

 

Hyams, Joe, Flight of the Avenger: George Bush at War. Orlando: Harcourt Brace

            Jovanvich, 1991.

 

Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, Washington D. C.

            Office of the Chairman, he Joint Chiefs of Staff. July 1994.

 

Marine Liaison, CENTAF letter to Commanding General I Marine Expeditionary Force.

            Subject: "Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. " 18 March 1991.

 

Marine Weapons and Tactics Squadron One. Subject: "Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and

            Personnel." Student Handout. MCAS Yuma, Az. 11 September 1992.

 

Mosely, Leonard, The Battle of Britain. Alexandria: Time Life Books, 1977.

 

Nichols, John B., and Tilman, Barrett, On Yankee Station: The Naval Air War over

            Vietnam. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, !987.

 

Sampson, Matthew T., Captain USMC, "Providing Promise. " U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings, February 1993, pp. 11-13.

 

                                                                                    Bibliography

 

Post, Tom and Waller, Douglas, "Anatomy of a Disaster." Newsweek, Volume 122, Issue

            16, 18 October 1993, pp. 40-42.

 

Schwartz, John and Waller, Douglas, "Bring them Back Alive", Newsweek, Volume 117, Issue

            5, 4 February 1991, p. 55.

 

Taxeras, J. R., LtCol, USMC, "Combat Search and Rescue". Unpublished Point Paper,

            APP-33, 4-2261. 5 October 1992.

 

U.S. Marine Corps Order 3120.9. Subject: "Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit

            (Special Operations Capable), MEU(SOC). " 29 April 1994.