Insurrection: An Analysis Of The Chiapas Uprising
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - History
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Insurrection: An Analysis of the Chiapas Uprising
Author: Major Grady G. Reese, US Army
Problem or Research Question: Within the conceptual
framework of the strategic/operational/tactical levels of
war, how did the combatants fight the campaign?
Discussion:
The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) limited
its objectives to the betterment of the Indian condition. The
desired end-state was an Indian community with a greater share
of the national wealth. Not wanting to necessarily overthrow the
central government, the Zapatistas were deliberate in designing
their strategy to force the government into negotiations. Their
military operations supported the strategic objectives until
they made the error of trying to capture Rancho Nuevo. The EZLN
leadership timed the campaign well. The greatest strategic
error was to underestimate the readiness of the government to
negotiate. At the point that the government declared a
unilateral cease-fire, the EZLN lost the strategic
initiative.
The EZLN recognized the advantages of the environment.
The area is remote with an underdeveloped infrastructure.
Transportation is poor and the terrain is rugged. The Indian
population is resentful and disillusioned with the central
government. For the Indians, the government no longer holds the
promise of the Revolution of 1910. Unfortunately for the EZLN,
it was unable to tap the resentment of the people to create a
popular uprising.
For its part, the Mexican government was able to achieve
the best end-state that it could realistically attain. It
recognized the political, economic, and psychological elements
at work and designed its strategy to minimize the damage of the
insurrection. Its efforts were successful. The violence was
contained to Chiapas. Moreover, the national elections were
fairly uneventful and the PRI maintained its pre-eminent
position in the political structure.
The military performed well in supporting the national
strategy. It mobilized and deployed rapidly. It used
combined arms in joint operations and quickly gained the
initiative. The success of operations in the field allowed
the government to pursue a negotiated settlement from a
position of relative strength.
Conclusion:
Both the Mexican government and the leadership of the
Zapatista rebels recognized the importance of fighting the
campaign on each of the three levels of war. Both analyzed the
opposing centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Both
designed and adjusted their strategies, operations, and
tactics based upon their judgements. Both sides came close to
achieving their desired end-states.
CONTENTS
Chapter
1. THE UPRISING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. THE BATTLEFIELD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. THE REVOLUTION-OF 1910 AND
THE ISSUE OF LEGITIMACY . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. THE INSURGENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. THE GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendixes
A. The Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
B. Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Enclosure
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
CHAPTER 1
THE UPRISING
As the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went
into effect in the early morning hours of 1 January 1994,
rebels of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN)
attacked four major towns in the Mexican state of Chiapas. The
EZLN, a previously unheard of group claiming to represent the
Indians of southern Mexico, achieved strategic and operational
surprise. Within hours, it had secured its initial military
objectives.
The action was restricted to that portion of the country
east of the Rio Grijaiva to the Lancandona jungle or forest. The
rebels moved west from their bases in the Lancandona jungle to
seize those key towns with the intent of conducting a phased
withdrawal back to their bases before the Mexican Army could
decisively engage them. They would seize additional towns during
their withdrawal to create a false perception that they retained
the offensive and the initiative.
Following normal procedures for situations of domestic
unrest, the Mexican government responded at the lowest level
first with local and national police. Once the Interior and
Defense Ministers decided to commit federal troops, the military
responded quickly. Within a space of 10 days, it deployed
approximately 17,000 troops to the area of operations, fixed the
rebels in the west at San Cristobal, and turned the Zapatistas'
flank in the southeast. It moved north to cut off their escape
routes and lines of communication. As the armed forces were
positioning themselves to defeat the guerrillas in detail, the
operation ended with a declaration of a unilateral cease-fire by
President Salinas and the offer of a negotiated settlement.
Although led by middle class, educated insurgents from
outside the region, the rebels were made up largely of Indians
from Chiapas. Their actions reflected a disillusionment with the
failure of the government to fulfill the promises of the
Revolution of 1910. In spite of the promise of land redistribution
and equality for all, the Indians still lived in a state of de
facto servitude providing menial labor on large farms and
ranches. Indeed, the lot of the Indian in southern Mexico was no
better in 1994 than it was in 1910.
This paper will examine the actions of both the EZLN and
the Mexican government in terms of two insurgency models. The
first, proposed by Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk,
postulates that the legitimacy of the ruling government is
the center of gravity at the strategic level of war. The aim
of the insurgents should be to eliminate the legitimacy of the
government. Conversely, the government has to defend its
legitimacy. Such conflicts will involve military combat at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war;
however, neither side should have as its primary aim the
military defeat of the other.1 In this case, the Zapatistas used
military action to gain an international forum from which they
attacked the legitimacy of the government. Likewise, the
government used military action not as the main effort of
counterinsurgeny, but as a complementary element of national
power in concert with the political, economic, and psychological
elements to shore up its own legitimacy.
The second model, proposed by Bard O'Neill, examines
insurgency in terms of a struggle between the ruling government
and the insurgent group where the insurgents use political
resources and violence to attack the legitimacy of the political
system. The end may not be to destroy the government's
legitimacy, but to change the political system. O'Neill calls
such groups "reformist" because they do not attempting to
overthrow the ruling parties. They are merely trying to gain a
greater voice in the political process.2
The EZLN is a reformist group. It has limited
objectives. It does not desire to overthrow the government
of Mexico. Rather, it is fighting for a greater share of
the resources of the nation. It is trying to obtain for the
indigenous populations their fair share of the promises of
the Revolution.
The Chiapas uprising provides a perfect model to examine
the interrelationships of the levels of war. Both the rebels
and the armed forces fought their campaigns at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. Each side assessed its own
center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities as well as
those of its opposition.
Although the insurgents were outmaneuvered and outgunned
at the tactical and operational levels, they won the campaign
by successfully manipulating the political and psychological
elements of national power. On the other hand, the Mexican
government understood that it could not win the campaign at
the strategic level.
The Salinas administration knew that successes in national
military strategy could not overcome the overwhelming pressures
it faced in the economic, psychological, and political arena.
The military could and did perform well at the operational
level which allowed the government the opportunity of entering
negotiations prior to achieving what would have been a pyrrhic
victory. The government was able to enter into negotiations
with the rebels in a position of parity, if not one of slight
advantage.
CHAPTER 2
THE BATTLEFIELD
The environment of Chiapas is ideally suited to support an
insurgency. According to Bard O'Neill, success or failure of an
insurgency depends in large part on the ability of the
insurgents to develop a strategy that uses both the physical and
human aspects of the environment to advantage.3 Chiapas combines
a rugged, mountainous landscape with a racially and economically
subjugated group within the widely dispersed population.
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
For an insurgency, ideal terrain limits the mobility of
government forces and provides a high degree of security for
base camps.4 The government usually has the advantage in terms of
equipment and materiel. By limiting the mobility of government
forces, the terrain puts the insurgent and the soldier on an
even basis. The government cannot readily move against an
insurgent attack, allowing the insurgent to keep the initiative
in the use of offense and mass. Inherent in the restriction of
mobility is the restriction of maximum effective use of
sophisticated equipment. Limited line of sight visibility in
mountains and jungles limits use of direct fire weapons and
sophisticated optics at their maximum effective ranges.
The terrain restrictions allow an insurgent group to
establish secure base camps from which it can plan, recruit and
train. once they begin to conduct operations, the insurgents
require secure base camps to plan further operations, to
consolidate units and equipment, and to rest. Without a secure
base, the insurgents cannot escalate operations and increase the
size of the force.5 They risk losing the initiative and
momentum.
The rugged topography of Chiapas suits the insurgent's
requirements perfectly [see Appendix B]. The state is split in
the southern third by a valley running from the northwest to
southeast. Surrounding the valley is the Sierra de Madre del Sur
mountain range. This mountain range extends 250 kilometers in
length and 75 kilometers in width. Elevations in the mountains
range from 2550 to almost.8000 feet. Ridge lines channelize
traffic from the northwest to the southeast. The capital,
Tuixtla Gutierrez is in the center of the valley formed by the
Rio Grijaiva. The two major roads in the state, highways 190 and
200, follow the mountain ranges. The transportation infrastructure
is poorly developed. The mountainous terrain lends itself well
to hydroelectric power generation. Indeed, Chiapas provides
60 percent of the electrical needs of the entire country.
Much of the area is considered impenetrable jungle,
especially the Lancandona jungle area in the central eastern
part of Chiapas. The state is located at the southern and
eastern end of the country, bordering on the Istmo de
Tehuantepec in the west and Guatemala in the east. The areas
affected by the uprising are primarily the north slope of the
valley to the Guatemalan border and the northern highlands.7
HUMAN ENVIRONMENT
As important to an insurgency as the physical terrain, the
population of the region largely determines ultimate success or
failure. The demography, social structure, economics, and
political culture and system of Chiapas are characteristic of
O'Neill's model. The Indians of Chiapas display the appropriate
ingredients of popular disaffection. They are poor and
disenfranchised, occupying the lowest rung on the social ladder.
The political system offers them no opportunities to alter the
state of their existence.
Demography
For an insurgency to conduct sustained combat operations
against a government, an underdeveloped rural population is
the ideal. Chiapas has a population of 3.2 million to 3.6 million
inhabitants, widely dispersed throughout the state.
Approximately 60 percent of the population lives outside of the
major cities and towns. of the state's 16,400 towns and villages,
99 percent are classified "rural."8
Social Structure
Chiapas fits the insurgent model of a societal cleavage
along racial, ethnic, and religious lines. The social structure
of the state is vertically striated along white/mestizo/Indian
ethnic lines. The vertical division has created a horizontal
division of class as the Indians are denied the opportunity to
improve their economic standing by the political system.
Approximately 14 percent of the population is Indian. Chiapas
has nine Indian tribes, all offshoots of the Mayas. Each has its
own language, culture, and religion.9
The social structure of rural Chiapas is still based on
the hacienda. Wealthy white landowners and ranchers own the
majority of the land. The Indians, through lack of opportunity,
are forced into virtual servitude as tenant farmers. To maintain
order, each wealthy landowner maintains a private army called
"La Guarda Blanca." The judicial system and governmental
institutions support the wealthy white landowners. The result is
a system in which the Indians occupy the lowest position in the
social order and have no reasonable expectation of improving
their lot in life or that of their children.10
Economics
While it provides 60 percent of the country's electricity
and 28 percent of its natural gas, Chiapas is the second
poorest state in the country. The primary source
of revenue is agriculture, to include cattle ranching.
Nineteen percent of the population has no measurable income
and works in conditions of servitude, usually as tenant
farmers. While 60 percent of the homes have running water, 92
percent of the Indian's homes do not. While 69 percent of all
houses have electricity, only 25 percent of the Indian's
houses do.11
In preparation for-the passage of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, the Salinas administration successfully passed
an amendment to Article 27 of the federal constitution. This
amendment allowed the government to sell the communal lands of
the Indians to encourage commercial development. As a result,
the Indians would be displaced and further disadvantaged.12
Political Culture
Out of 80 million Mexicans, Indians make up less than
ten percent of the population.13 Given that-the Indians have
become a disparaged race occupying the bottom rung on the
socio-economic ladder, it is ironic that Mexico is extremely
proud of its Indian heritage and history, especially that of
the Aztec and Mayan nations.
As a result of their disparagement by the ruling elites,
the Mayans harbor a deep-seated hostility toward the government.
This animosity is readily apparent in a review of their history.
During the Spanish Conquest and the first century of
independence, over 100 Indian uprisings and revolts occurred.14 As
today, most addressed regional complaints against the government
and did not have broad support.
Much of the Indian hostility toward the central
government resulted from the policies of the president at the
time of the Mexican Revolution, Porfirio Diaz, and his Ivy
League-educated advisors, the "Cientificos." The Cientificos
felt that the Indians were inferior and not capable of
developing. Rather than have the Indians impede the
development of the rest of the nation, the Cientificos
advocated the elimination of all Indians.15
In spite of the promises of land reform since the 1910
Revolution, the Indian campesinos have received very little
land from the government. Peasants in Chiapas and other states
have sporadically occupied large landholdings to force the
redistribution of land promised them under the Constitution of
1917. Most incidents have been short-lived as the Mexican Army
has usually retaken the land.16
Ironically, the majority of the Indian population did not
join the EZLN in its uprising, rather they eschewed violence to
achieve the desired reforms. In the Almond and Verba model used
by O'Neill, they were "Parochials" in that they avoided
participation in political activity in spite of their status.17
However, their reluctance was not based upon lack of awareness
of the workings of the political system, but upon a resigned
awareness that violence would be counterproductive and only lead
to further repression, if not from the government, then from
the private armies of the landowners.18
Political System
As mentioned above, the de facto political structure in
chiapas is based upon race and wealth. Therefore, the
judicial, executive, and legislative arms of the state and
of the locally-based elements of the federal government
serve to support the status quo in spite of the formal
ideals dictated by the constitution. They reinforce the
ascendancy of the wealthy landowners and the subjugation of
the Indians. For those participating in the political
system, it is a zero sum game. Greater participation in
government or other social gains by the Indians would
threaten the status quo by taking away from the power or
wealth of an established party. No party is willing to give
up power, status, or wealth.19
External Influences
There is a large population of Guatemalan refugees in
Chiapas near Guadelupe Tepeyac. The Indians in the provinces of
Chiapas and Campeche are vulnerable to an infusion of leftist
ideology from Guatemalan Indians fleeing persecution in
Guatemala. The situation has been exacerbated by great numbers
of refugees from throughout Central America attempting to migrate
to the United States. The Guatemalan insurgent group, the Guatemalan
National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) is said to use the refugee camps as
a recruiting ground and base of operations for operations in
Guatemala.20
The Mexican government has established a de facto "clear
zone" to control the refugee populations within their
territories without disrupting normal cross-border commerce. The
border between Chiapas and Guatemala is very lightly guarded.
The Suchiate River between Ciudad de Hidalgo and Tecun Uman is a
popular site for illegal border crossings because it is only 50
centimeters deep and can be easily forded.21
CHAPTER 3
THE 1910 REVOLUTION AND THE ISSUE OF LEGITIMACY
To fully understand the Zapatista uprising, one must
first examine the role of the Revolution of 1910 in modern
Mexican society, especially with regard to the issue of
governmental legitimacy. The 1910 Revolution had such a
significant impact upon Mexico that even today it dominates
Mexican life and thought. The Revolution approached
Clausewitz's ideal of "total war." Every facet of society
was mobilized. The entire social structure of the country
was dramatically altered. In one of the few instances in
history, women and children were fully integrated into the
armies and fought side by side with the men. The population
was more than decimated by both intense fighting and
starvation resulting from the destruction of crops. As many
as two million people (one quarter of the population) may
have died during the Revolution.22 The impact of such a cost
on society can be likened to that of World War I on England
and France. It should be no surprise that the expectations
of the people today are deeply rooted in the promises and
ideals of the Revolution.
The Indians and Zapata
The Indians in the south were united behind Emiliano
Zapata in a quest to regain communal land that they had lost to
the large haciendas. The absorption of Indian lands by the
hacendados (large landholders) led to the virtual enslavement of
the Indians, since, in order to survive, they were forced to
work as laborers on the haciendas to survive. Spurred by
promises of land reform by Francisco Madero, Diaz's opponent,
Zapata led his forces against the regime, defeating government
forces in the south. Although Zapata was ultimately defeated in
internecine fighting among the Revolution's leaders, the ideal
of agrarian reform became a pillar of the Revolution.23
Zapata's most notable contribution to the ideology of the
Revolution was the Plan of Ayala. The key provisos in the Plan
dictated the return of Indian lands that had been expropriated
and the seizure of one third of the hacienda lands for
redistribution to the peasants. This proviso was designed to
break the hold of the wealthy landowners on the peasants.
Additionally, it provided for the seizure of all property of any
of the elite who opposed the Plan. The desire for agrarian
reform was so strong that it kept the original Zapatistas
fighting until real reform was initiated by President Lazaro
Cardenas (1935-1940), long after Zapata's death.24 Those ideals
are the roots of today's Zapatista movement.
Cardenas
The part played in the Revolution by Lazaro Cardenas,
president from 1934 to 1940, has widespread, implications in Mexican
society today. An Indian from Michoacan, he was the first to
conduct the significant agrarian reform promised in the
Constitution of 1917. His administration redistributed 41 million
acres as opposed to 17 million by all of his predecessors. He
greatly revitalized the ejido system which was based on the
Indian principles of communal ownership. The organization of the
ejidos into the National Confederation of Farmers (CNA) as a
branch of the PRI has kept the farmers under the control of the
Party while guaranteeing the rural peasant a voice in the
government.25 Unfortunately, land redistribution has dwindled to
such a point that the hacienda system once again is the rule and
Indians a subjugated class of tenant farmers.
The Constitution of 1917
Out of the conflict of diverging forces, the
revolutionaries created a new constitution-that would
institutionalize the Revolution. It would come to embody the
ideals that today every Mexican demands as basic rights. Of
particular significance, Article 27 invalidated the seizure of
all private lands since 1876 and provided for their return to the
people. This provision contained more symbolism than substance.
With various interests being excluded and shielded, Article 27
actually applied to only a fraction of the peasants seeking
restitution. However, in spite of its inherent weaknesses, it
has become a symbol for the Mexican people of their right to
own land.26 Very few provisions of the Constitution of 1917 have
had as significant of an impact upon the people of Mexico.
The Constitution of 1917 served as a unifying instrument
that provided-the structure to rebuild the nation. As an
egalitarian device, it eliminated much of the old caste and
status framework. Additionally, it provided for workers, rights
and for basic civil liberties.27 This constitution is the
document by which the separate factions and interests of
the Revolution became unified.
Although the 1910 Revolution fell short of the
expectations of the peasant class, it still figures
significantly in the people's toleration of today's economic
woes. The Revolution itself is a symbol of reform after
centuries of exploitation. Along with the French and Russian
revolutions, the Mexican people see it as one of the three
greatest social revolutions in world history. This reverence for
the Revolution is a key stabilizing element in the Mexican
political situation. As long as the people associate the PRI
with the Revolution, the Party will retain its base of popular
support. For that reason, the PRI pointedly reminds them that it
is the "Party of the Revolution" and that it has provided the
only government to help them through such reforms as land
redistribution and social egalitarianism. A shrewd but key
tactic used by the PRI to keep the hopes of the people alive
is the fostering of the belief that the Revolution is not over,
rather it is ongoing. Tomorrow brings the promise of additional
reform.28
The danger to the PRI is a loss of identification as the
"Party of the Revolution." The Revolution confers legitimacy.
The Mexican people are willing to tolerate much adversity as
long as they believe that the government still embodies the
ideals of the Revolution.29 NAFTA and the amendment of Article 27
threaten those beliefs in the minds of the Indians. They fear
losing their tribal lands to progressive and modern agriculture.
The loss of land threatens not only their livelihood, but their
cultural identity.
The Zapatistas are a product of those fears. In turn, the
EZLN uses the issues raised by NAFTA and Article 27 to
undercut the foundations of legitimacy. The Zapatistas
challenge the legitimacy of the government, saying that it has
abandoned the Revolution and the Indians.
CHAPTER 4
THE INSURGENTS
PHILOSOPHY
The EZLN is a reformist movement whose goal is to achieve
land and social reform for the Indians. A reformist group has
limited aims, usually a greater share of national wealth.
Additionally, a reformist group considers the established
government discriminatory and illegitimate; therefore, achieving
reform through the participation in the political process is
impossible.30 True to form, the EZLN does not seek to overthrow
the current government, rather it seeks greater representation
in the allocation of national and state resources. It believes
that the government discriminates against the Indians. In the
opinion of the rebel leadership, the government has abandoned
the ideals of the 1910 Revolution; therefore, it is
illegitimate.
Initially, the group's rhetoric was pluralist, if not
socialist. It called for all Mexicans to rise up against the
government and march on Mexico City. It called for a return
to the democratic foundations of the country, claiming that
the ruling party had become a dictatorship disguised as a
democracy. The EZLN accused the government of committing
genocide against the Indians.31 This allegation not-so -subtly
links the PRI with the Cientificos of the Parfiriato,
thereby challenging the government's legitimacy.
Although it is primarily an Indian movement, the
group's early rhetoric was extremely nationalistic. It
identified the Army and the government as the enemies while
exhorting the Mexicans as a people to unite in support of
its cause. One of the six points of the EXLN's declaration
of war went so far as to brand soldiers as traitors who had
been trained outside Mexico.32
The EZLN quickly published statements denying links to
other guerrilla movements, liberation theologians, or
narcotraffickers, revealing its reformist nature. One
theory holds that the Guatemalans who participated in the
revolt did so out of loyalty to the Mayan race and not as
representatives of the URNG.33 Leaders emphatically denied
that their objectives was to establish a socialist state.
After the first days of the insurrection, the majority of
their rhetoric focused on local grievances such as land
reform, an end to electoral fraud, and increased social
services for the Indians. Specifically, the group opposed
the implementation of NAFTA because they feared that it
would lead to increased exploitation and privatization of
communal lands. 34
Early in negotiations with the government, the EZLN
focused its rhetoric on autonomy and the improvement of
Indian living conditions. The rebels demanded (and were
granted) additional government investment to include
electrification of the villages, bilingual education, and
improved housing. Significantly, they required the aid be
distributed through the Indians themselves, rather than
through the established political system. The rebels were
also demanding the amendment of Articles 4 and 27 of the
Constitution to give all-Indian groups autonomy and to
regain protection of tribal lands. The only demand that
exceeded a regional or ethnic dimension was for the
resignation of President Salinas.35
Organization
The EZLN started in 1983 with a nucleus of five
non-Indians, at least some of whom came from a middle class
background.36 The EZLN had a fairly sophisticated structure. The
rebels were armed with an assortment of weapons, to include AK-
47s, AR-15s, M-1 carbines, and Mini-14 automatic weapons, in
addition to assorted hunting rifles, shotguns, and pistols.
They were organized into local cells with an overall committee
to direct operations. The basic element was the squad which
"...consists of one sergeant, one corporal, one radio
operator, one health provider [medic], and 20 militants
[soldiers]." They restricted their radio communications to a
period from midnight to 0600 and used equipment that had 23 to
40 channels [possibly citizen band radios]. The communications
base station was allegedly in Las Margaritas. The EZLN had at
least 16 training camps, 11 of which were clustered around Las
Margaritas and Ocosingo. There were two in Sabanillas, one in
Altamirano, two in Larrainzar, and one in Chanel.37
STRATEGIC
The grand strategy was to attack the legitimacy of the
government. The Zapatistas' goal was to gain greater autonomy
for the indigenous groups. They saw the will of the people of
Mexico as the center of gravity. The legitimacy of the
government was the critical vulnerability. Realizing that it
could not defeat the government militarily, the EZLN hoped to
force a negotiated settlement by turning the national will
against the government. The intent was to create a schism
between the people and the government. As explained earlier in
this paper, the ties between the government and the 1910
Revolution are the basis of governmental legitimacy. The EZLN
intended to sever those ties and undermine the support of the
people of Mexico for the government.38
Political
The objectives of the uprising were political. The
military action of occupying key cities in the region was
designed to apply political pressure against the government.39
The rebels launched their attack to coincide with the national
election year in order to maximize the pressure. The initial
socialist rhetoric was intended to gain the support of the
country's intelligentsia and left wing political parties. The
EZLN hoped to use those organizations along with the human
rights organizations and the Catholic Church to force the
government to negotiate. In this regard, the rebels were
extremely successful. Recognizing a potential vulnerability
upon which they could capitalize in the upcoming national
elections, the opposition parties used the opportunity to
attack the government's social policies.
Economic
The rebels launched their attacks on the day NAFTA went
into effect. The timing was an instrument of economic warfare.
The rebels intended to nullify the effects of NAFTA by creating
an international perception of instability. International
corporations, especially in the United States, would dampen
their enthusiasm for investing large amounts of capital in
Mexico until the situation stabilized.40 Knowing that the
government was relying upon the infusion of foreign capital to
bolster the economy before the elections, the government would
be under great pressure to meet the rebels, demands quickly.
Psychological
On the psychological front, the Zapatistas attempted to
mobilize three populations; the Indians of southern Mexico, the
general population of Chiapas, and the general population of
Mexico. To challenge the government's claim of being the
standard-bearer of the Revolution, the Indians invoked the name
of Emiliano Zapata, the leader who had organized the indigenous
peoples against the regime of Porfirio Diaz. By using his name,
they recalled the promises of land redistribution under the Plan
of Ayala and Article 27 of the constitution. Likewise, by
accusing the government of genocide, the rebels linked the
Salinas administration with Porfirio Diaz and his Cientificos.
Simultaneously with the insurrection, they launched a
sophisticated propaganda campaign. They issued statements and
gave exhaustive interviews all of which were designed to
justify their actions and to gain popular support.41 They
distributed a professional, two-color, 20 page brochure
detailing its revolutionary program of land reform and equal
opportunity.42
Although the EZLN did garner the support of the
intelligentsia and liberal sector of the country and of the
rural indigenous peoples, it did not gain the support of the
majority of the population of Chiapas. The inhabitants of the
occupied cities did not rise up and join the guerrillas. In
fact, they were against the use of force to redress their
grievances. The EZLN attributed the lack of support to
racism in that the majority of inhabitants of the cities
were white or mestizo.43 The EZLN had nominally more success
in gaining the support of the people in the rural areas.
Even though the majority of those who abandoned their homes
and villages sought refuge away from the fighting, many
joined the rebels in the jungle.44
The EZLN attempted to gain the support of the
international community by emphasizing executions and atrocities
committed by the Army while minimizing its own. It found a
willing ally in the myriad of human rights organizations that
descended upon the area (within a week, representatives of over
130 local, national, and international human rights
organizations were in Chiapas). While the government was
universally excoriated for the alleged execution of five rebels
and the strafing of noncombatants, very few organizations
condemned the EZLN for its alleged execution of at least 24
policemen and the rape of a female civilian.45
The EZLN sought to involve the Guatemalan Nobel Prize
recipient, Rigoberta Menchu. By warning that the Mexican
government would use the uprising to repress the Guatemalan
refugees in Chiapas, the EZLN hoped to isolate the government
in the international arena. Additionally, it demanded that she
and the local bishop and activist liberation theologian,
Samuel Ruiz, act as mediators.46 The degree of its success is
shown by the magnitude of the pro Zapatista demonstrations in
Mexico City. While the EZLN never garnered more than 2,000 to
3,000 active supporters in Chiapas, over 100,000 protesters
marched on the National Palace in Mexico City on 12 January.47
Ironically, the lack of support of the Indians did not
hamper their cause while national and international support were
critical in achieving it. President Salinas was pressured to
resolve the crisis quickly. To pursue a prolonged
counterinsurgency strategy would cost a great deal of political
capital. Human rights organizations were already present en
masse and were turning international and domestic opinion
against the government. With the 1994 national elections
imminent and American businesses waiting on the sidelines to
provide investment capital to the country under NAFTA, Salinas
declared a unilateral ceasefire and asked for negotiations.
Military
The Zapatistas' military operations were designed not to
defeat the Mexican Army, but to avoid being beaten by the Army.
The EZLN occupied cities, making much of the fact through
propaganda, then moved to other towns to repeat the process
before the Army could react.48 The major strategic error of the
EZLN was to fail to foresee the rapid shift from armed
confrontation to negotiation. The Mexican government achieved
strategic surprise by declaring a unilateral cease-fire.
The Zapatistas had planned on a prolonged campaign and had
not foreseen the eventuality that they would be maneuvered
into early negotiations. As a result, the EZLN was unprepared
to conduct negotiations and lost the strategic initiative.49
OPERATIONAL
The EZLN had prepared for a war of attrition. Knowing that
it could not defeat the Army in a conventional battle, it tried
to fight the campaign in such a manner so as to preserve its own
forces while inflicting as many casualties upon the Army as
possible. The EZLN's operational plan was to seize the state's
key cities and conduct a phased withdrawal to the Lancandona
jungle where it had its bases. EZLN columns would withdraw
without becoming decisively engaged and seize other towns and
villages on their withdrawal routes. The intent was to create
the impression that the rebels were more successful and active
than they really were. The plan included conducting supporting
attacks against the Army base at Rancho Nuevo to keep those
forces from countering the EZLN offensive and deny the
government the use of that garrison as the base of operations
for which it was ideally suited.50 The campaign was designed to
support the movement's strategy of attacking the state
psychologically through propaganda while maintaining low
casualties so that it could continue the campaign for an
extended period. With regard to supporting the group's propaganda
effort, it succeeded remarkably well. However, when the Zapatistas
attempted to adjust their plan to the situation on the battlefield,
they lost their focus on the strategic objectives and became
involved in a costly battle with the Army.
Before dawn on the first of January, the rebels
realized that they had not been successful in synchronizing
their attacks. The rebel leadership lost its grasp of its
own unit dispositions and those of the Army. The rebels had
fallen victim to the fog and friction of war. Expecting an
immediate response from the Army, they now feared that their
columns would be defeated in detail while attempting to
withdraw. The EZLN decided to slow its withdrawal from San
Cristobal and divert those forces to augment the rebel
column already near Rancho Nuevo to make a major effort to
seize the 31st Military Region garrison there. The goal was
to capture additional weaponry and to fix government forces
in place in order to buy time to organize the withdrawal
from the objective areas. The attack on Rancho Nuevo would
allow the Zapatistas the opportunity to determine the
dispositions of not only the government forces, but their
own as well. Finally, a victory at Rancho Nuevo would
greatly enhance their propaganda effort.51 The supporting
attack had become the major effort. The Army successfully
reinforced its garrison at Rancho Nuevo. The Mexican Army
units fought well, even when key company-level leaders
became casualties. Although the rebels were successful
in denying the Army the initiative by pinning down the
government forces in Rancho Nuevo, they were never able to
capture it.52
In its attack on Rancho Nuevo, the EZLN committed a
serious error. By concentrating their largest force against
31st Military Zone garrison, the rebels strayed from their
strategic objective of minimizing contact and casualties. They
sustained their highest casualties in this battle. More
importantly, their withdrawal from Rancho Nuevo was poorly
executed and disrupted the operations of two other guerrilla
columns; one between San Cristobal and Rancho Nuevo and one
between Altamirano and San Cristobal.53
The EZLN violated Clausewitz's principle that the means
must always support the end. The operation needed only to divert
government troops from EZLN objectives to delay a counterattack
while the rebels withdrew. Instead, the EZLN made the attack a
major effort with the result that it needlessly sustained
casualties and disrupted adjacent operations, endangering two
other rebel columns.
The Zapatistas b came involved in one other pitched
battle during the campaign. While the Zapatistas were
engaging the government forces at Rancho Nuevo to delay
reinforcement from Tuixtla Gutierrez in the west, the Army
as not only reinforcing Rancho Nuevo, but maneuvering to
envelop the rebels from the east. Government forces controlled
the eastern portion of the area of operations and were
establishing a security cordon to isolate the battlefield. The
Army quickly occupied Comitan, Las Margaritas, and Altamirano.
Its forces were advancing on Ocosingo and had retaken Chanal.
The escape route for the rebel columns in San Cristobal and
Rancho Nuevo was in danger of being cut. In this case, the EZLN
had to engage government troops in direct combat or risk losing
a sizeable portion of its forces. Ordinarily such combat
violated their strategic precepts; however, Ocosingo was crucial
to their withdrawal. The rebel columns in Ocosingo engaged the
Army for the entire campaign. Although they readily withdrew
from the municipal buildings, they fought house to house to tie
down the Army troops. President Salinas declared a cease-fire
before the envelopment was completed and the rebel columns
destroyed.
TACTICAL
Realizing that they did not have sufficient strength to
seize and hold entire towns, the rebels seized the municipal
buildings in the cities they targeted. When threatened or
attacked by the Army, they would attempt to exfiltrate the area
while continuing to harass the government forces with sniper
fire and ambushes. In some cases, they took over private homes
to use as ambush positions to attack government
troops. They used stay-behind forces extensively to delay Army
forces.
The EZLN displayed good tactical acumen by delaying the
Army's pursuit during the rebels' withdrawal. Along the San
Cristobal to Ocosingo axis, the Zapatistas established company
sized ambushes to slow the Army advance. Initially, the Army
would rely on helicopter transport to vertically envelop the
ambushing force; however, the EZLN had prepared secondary
ambushes to entrap the helicopters.54
The rebels achieved only limited success in delaying the
Army's pursuit and relieving pressure on the withdrawal. For an
irregular force, it fought well; however, the loss of momentum
on the first day and the resulting error in committing the bulk
of its forces at Rancho Nuevo and San Cristobal endangered the
entire operation. If President Salinas had not declared a cease
fire so quickly, the guerrillas would have been cut off and
defeated in detail.
CHAPTER 5
THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND ARMY
ORGANIZATION
The Army is made up of 130,000 troops, 60,000 of whom
are conscripts. It is organized into two light infantry
brigades, one mechanized infantry brigade, and three armor
regiments. These are stationed in garrisons in each of the
country's military zones. Each garrison is organized for
combined arms operations with motorized cavalry, infantry,
and artillery.55 Chiapas has three military zones, the
31st in Rancho Nuevo, the 36th in Tapachula, and the 38th in
Comitan. Above the military zones, there are nine military
regions. VII Military Region, commanded during the uprising
by General Miguel Angel Godinez Bravo, is responsible for
the states of Chiapas and Yucatan. Its headquarters is in
Tuxtla Guitierrez.56
Most of the Army's 71 infantry battalions are scattered
throughout the country as independent garrisons. Most military
zones have at least two battalions of 300 men each.
Additionally, most military zones have a motorized cavalry
regiment or an artillery regiment. Each military zone has its
own engineer, air defense, support and service support units.
The 31st Military Zone at Rancho Nuevo which bore
he brunt of the fighting, probably consisted of two
infantry battalions (one of which was the 83rd Infantry
Battalion) and a portion of a cavalry regiment. In addition to
its garrison at Tapachula, the 36th Military Zone had
operational control over the 24th Motorized Cavalry
Regiment based at Comitan de Dominguez.58
STRATEGIC
The Mexican government is often criticized for reacting
too slowly to the uprising. That criticism is unjustified. Two
key facts impact upon the speed with which the Army responded.
First, the attack happened on New Year's Day when the troops
were not necessarily in their barracks and the military was not
on alert. Second, seizure of municipal buildings in the outlying
states as a form of protest is not uncommon. In fact, on the
same day the EZLN attacked, other groups were occupying the
municipal buildings of 11 other towns in Mexico state.59 The
Mexican government followed its standard operating procedures
for reacting to such occurrences.60
To avoid overreacting to the provocation, the federal
government first moved to isolate the uprising and waited for
local and state authorities to react to the situation.61
Once it became clear that federal troops would be needed to
meet the threat, the government committed the Army. Within
a week, the federal government had assessed the situation,
mobilized and deployed approximately 17,000 troops to a remote
area of the country, and occupied all of the EZLN's initial objectives.
The government was successful in isolating the violence.
The uprising did not spread to the adjacent states. Apart from
a few sympathetic bombings in Acapulco and Mexico City and
demonstrations primarily in Mexico City, the rest of the
country -remained calm.62
Political
Politically, the government knew that it could not win, it
could only minimize the damage. NAFTA had just gone into effect
and many American and Canadian companies that had been gearing
up to expand into Mexico were now waiting to see how the
situation would be resolved. The ruling party, the PRI, was
facing a difficult national election later in the year and could
not afford the negative publicity of a protracted insurgency in
its hinterlands. The government needed to defuse the
insurrection so that sufficient foreign capital would arrive to
bolster the economy prior to the elections. Also, the government
had to restore order without appearing too repressive. If it
could not achieve the former, the opposition parties would paint
the PRI as impotent. If it could not accomplish the latter, the
opposition would paint it as dictatorial and genocidal, which
was extremely plausible given the almost immediate presence of
representatives from over 130 non-governmental human rights
organizations.
In a worst case scenario, foreign investment would not
occur, the government would be branded as just another Latin
American repressive regime, the people would become disenchanted
with the unfulfilled promises of NAFTA, and the PRI would face a
serious challenge to its continued rule. The best case scenario
would produce a political defeat in which the government
restored stability by granting significant concessions to the
rebels, but at the cost of appearing impotent.
The government designed its strategy around the best case
scenario. The strategic goals of the Mexican government were
to achieve a quick end to the uprising. In the military arena,
the Army would move as quickly as possible to retake the
occupied towns and maneuver to threaten the Zapatistas with
the destruction of its forces in the field. If the Army could
accomplish this, the government hoped to minimize the
appearance of impotence.
The single effective political move by the government
was the declaration of a unilateral cease-fire and issuance
of a request for negotiations. By 12 January, the Army had
turned the EZLN's flank in the east and had effectively cut
off its combatant forces from their bases, threatening to
defeat them in detail. By issuing his cease-fire at this
point, President Salinas was being magnanimous in not
destroying the rebels. Already having the operational
initiative, the government achieved political surprise and
regained the initiative on that front also. The EZLN could not
continue military action without losing the moral high ground
that it sought. The rebels had no deliberative structure to
handle the negotiations. Even though they were in disarray and
completely unprepared to begin negotiations, the rebels would
have risked abandoning their goals by rejecting negotiations on
the terms offered by the government.
Psychological
The government conducted a propaganda campaign to paint
EZLN rebels as criminals to deny political legitimacy to the
movement. In his New Year's message to the country on 7 January,
President Salinas stated that "There is no Indian uprising in
Chiapas. There is an action by a violent armed group against the
peaceful state of the communities...."63 President Salinas
tried to divide the EZLN from its base of support by delineating
between the guerrillas and the Indians who rejected them or were
coerced into participating. Further, he tried to erode support
for the rebels by immediately granting 30 land titles to Indians
in Chiapas with a promise of 6,500 to soon follow. On 4 January,
he sent the Social Development Secretary to the state to
develop new assistance programs.64 The government intent was
to show that it was already moving to address the complaints
of the EZLN so armed insurrection was not necessary.
By negotiating with those he had already labeled
criminals, Salinas risked a degree of his own legitimacy;
however, the need for a speedy resolution to the crisis
necessitated negotiation. To minimize the risk, the government
portrayed itself as reasonable and even compassionate in its
dealings with the rebels. It tried to transfer the strength of
its military position to the psychological front by appearing
merciful and magnanimous.
The government recognized the potential of the damage
that could be caused by the allegations of human rights
violations and acted quickly to minimize it. On 5 January, as
soon as the first allegations were made, President Salinas sent
the president of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) to
Chiapas to investigate all accusations against the government.65
The CNDH and Attorney General acted quickly. They launched an
investigation of the allegations that the Air Force had bombed
and strafed civilians. By the end of February, it had resolved
404 of the 427 reports of disappearances. It had started cases
in 56 homicides and 25 incidents of abuse of authority. In
spite of this effort, political opposition parties and human rights
groups conducted enormous demonstrations in Mexico City, leading
to the loss of popular support for the government.
Military
The government executed a standing operations plan to
counter a popular insurrection, National Defense Plan II (DNII).
DNII was a general operations plan. It was the blueprint for
action anywhere in the country. It was not focused on Chiapas.
The objective of this plan was to isolate the battlefield. of
paramount importance was the prevention of an insurrection from
spreading to the rest of the country. The plan relied upon a
rapid military response to contain the threat. Once the threat
was contained, the military would systematically move to defeat the
insurrectionists.68
The Mexican government fought the strategic war in three
phases. The first was the military occupation of the EZLN's
initial objectives. Without that, the government would lose
face. Attempts at negotiation would appear to be reflections of
weakness. The second phase was to maneuver to gain advantage
over the rebels in the field. By achieving a battlefield
advantage, the government could negotiate from a position of
strength. It could appear generous rather than defeated when
granting concessions. Once that was accomplished, the government
shifted priority of effort to the diplomatic arena. President
Salinas, declaration of a unilateral cease-fire and offer of
negotiations achieved political strategic surprise. The EZLN
was completely unprepared for this development. The resulting
delays bought the government time to consolidate and reinforce
both at the national political level and on the battlefield.
To their credit, the Mexican Armed Forces performed very
well. They mobilized and deployed quickly. They achieved their
desired end state in the field within the context of the
nation's political objectives. They made the shift in strategy
with ease. They maintained their role under the constitution by
responding to a threat against the government. Finally, they
showed that they were clearly under the control of the civil
government.69
OPERATIONAL
By the time the government decided to commit the military
on 2 January, the Army had a good idea of the EZLN dispositions,
if not the strengths of the rebel columns. The majority of the
area of operations fell inside of a 150 square kilometers
triangle formed by San Cristobal, Comitan, and Ocosingo. San
Cristobal was the forward position of the rebels, the farthest
point from their bases in the Lancandona jungle. The Army
believed that the EZLN center of gravity was its bases in the
Lancandona jungle. The critical vulnerability was its lines of
communications (LOCs). Whoever controlled the highway from
Comitan to Ocosingo would control the Zapatistas' LOCs.
The VII Military Region headquarters in Tuxtla Gutierrez
devised a three phase plan to achieve the national military
strategy to fight the insurrection.70 The first phase was the
reinforcement of the 31st Military Zone garrison in Rancho
Nuevo. If the garrison could be relieved, the post could be used
for a forward operating base to conduct sustained combat
operations against the rebels. If not, it was crucial to
national prestige that the garrison not fall to the rebels. The
defeat of roughly a brigade of Mexican troops would be
disastrous on the national psychological front. Whether or not
the forces could break out of their perimeter, a pitched battle
there would engage a significant amount of the rebel forces
while the Army attacked on other fronts.
The second phase of the operation had two objectives. The
first was to cut off the rebels from their withdrawal routes and
lines of communication. Forces from the 36th Military Zone in
Tapachula on the Pacific coast drove north to Comitan, Las
Margaritas, Altamirano, and Ocosingo. On 4 January, two infantry
battalions retook the municipal buildings in Ocosingo. EZLN
forces in Ocosingo continued to fight government troops until
the cease-fire; however, the government has effectively isolated
the battlefield. The rebels were cut off and in a position to be
defeated in detail.
The second objective of this phase was the retaking of
rebel-held towns. The priority of effort was to the towns
initially seized on 1 January by the Zapatistas. Retaking the
towns was not difficult; however, harassing fires from snipers
and stay-behind forces kept the troops from truly securing them
during the entire campaign. To increase the psychological
impact, the government declared victory as soon as the
municipal buildings were reoccupied. This painted a not too
accurate picture in that while the Army controlled the
municipal buildings and had the initiative, the towns were not
completely secure and the troops were still being engaged by
the rebels.
The forces that achieved the first objective also
achieved this objective in the towns of Ocosingo, Las
Margaritas and Altamirano. By 12 January, the Army had
cordoned the triangle and occupied all of the contested
towns except for Guadelupe Tepeyac deep in the highlands. By
the time the cease-fire was declared, the Army had advanced
to within 30 kilometers of Guadelupe Tepeyac and was massing
forces to assault the town.
The third phase of the operation was the pursuit of rebel
forces into the Lancandona jungle to locate and destroy their
bases. This phase was well under way when President Salinas
declared the cease-fire. The military made good use of combined
arms by using armor and mechanized infantry on the roads and
light infantry in the jungles. The Air Force flew close air
support missions, rocketing and strafing rebel positions.
Helicopters acted as spotters for the ground forces and
transported quick-reaction troops to vertically envelop the enemy.71
At the operational level of war, the Mexican Armed
Forces performed well. In a very short period of time, they
deployed significant ground and air combat forces to a
remote region of the country. The military fixed the bulk
of the rebel force around Rancho Nuevo, turned the rebels,
flank and cut them off from their lines of communication.
It successfully integrated not only ground combined arms
assets, but both rotary and fixed wing aircraft. The
military could easily have annihilated the Rebel forces had
combat operations continued.
The operation had two major shortcomings. The first
was a difficulty in exercising command and control. The
military attributes this to communications failure.72
Second, the Army is alleged to have committed numerous human
rights violations by torturing and executing prisoners.
Human rights organizations claim that the Air Force
indiscriminately attacked noncombatants while attempting to
provide close air support.73
TACTICAL
From what little is known of the tactical battle, the
Army appears to have performed well. It was aggressive,
seizing and keeping the initiative. It pursued rebel forces
well. It used organic mortars to provide fire support and
incorporated close air support effectively. The Army used
combined arms concepts in cleared rural and urban areas,
integrating armor, mechanized infantry and dismounted infantry.
In the jungle and forested regions, the Army pursued with
infantry, using aircraft to vertically envelop the rebels with
quick-reaction forces and to locate and engage rebel forces.
A failure of the Army at the tactical level was the
reliance on the same tactic so often that they became
predictable. When engaging the rebels, the Army would fix them
in place with ground forces and vertically envelop them using
rotary wing aircraft. The rebels adjusted to this by
establishing multiple ambush sites. The first would target the
Army patrol on the ground and subsequent sites would target the
helicopters of the quick reaction force. After the loss of
several helicopters, the Army became less aggressive in its
pursuit and relied more on fire support.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Both the Mexican government and the leadership of the
Zapatista rebels recognized the importance of fighting the
campaign on each of the three levels of war. Both analyzed the
opposing centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Both
designed and adjusted their strategies, operations, and
tactics based upon their judgements. Both sides came close to
achieving their planned end-states.
The EZLN recognized the advantages of the environment.
The area is remote with an underdeveloped infrastructure.
Transportation is poor and the terrain is rugged. The Indian
population is resentful and disillusioned with the central
government. For the Indians, the government no longer holds
the promise of the Revolution of 1910. Unfortunately for the
EZLN, it was unable to tap the resentment of the people to
create a popular uprising.
The EZLN limited its objectives to the betterment of the
Indian condition in Chiapas. The desired end-state was an
Indian community with a greater share of the national wealth.
Not wanting to necessarily overthrow the central government,
the Zapatistas were deliberate in designing their strategy to
force from the government economic and development assistance.
They timed their insurrection superbly to place maximum pressure
on the government by coinciding with the effective date of NAFTA
and the beginning of the campaign season for the national elections.
The tactics of the Zapatistas were well planned and
executed. They made good use of the terrain to ambush and
harass the Army. With a few notable exceptions, they
recognized the limitations of their relative lack of firepower
and did not become decisively engaged.
The rebels' military operations supported the strategic
objectives until they made the error of trying to capture Rancho
Nuevo. At that point, they contradicted their own strategy and
risked the annihilation of their western forces. Additionally,
by underestimating the rapidity with which the military would
respond, they left their lines of communication unprotected. The
government readily took advantage of the fact and forced the
EZLN into direct combat at Ocosingo to prevent being cut off
from their sanctuaries in the Lancandona jungle.
The greatest strategic error was to underestimate the
flexibility and agility of the government. It was not prepared
for the rapid introduction of forces into the area of
operations, nor was it prepared when the government shifted
from a military focus of effort to a political/diplomatic focus.
At the point that the government declared a unilateral cease-fire,
the EZLN lost the strategic initiative and was unprepared to react.
For its part, the Mexican government was able to achieve
the best end-state that it could realistically attain. It
recognized the political, economic, and psychological elements
at work and designed its strategy to minimize the damage of the
insurrection. Its efforts were successful. The violence was
contained to Chiapas. The national elections were fairly
uneventful and the PRI maintained its pre-eminent position in
the political structure.
The Mexican government displayed a high degree of
sophistication in dealing with the threat. It correctly analyzed
the situation to determine the most favorable end-state and
devised its strategies, operations, and tactics to achieve it,
fighting the campaign at all levels of war. Unlike the Russians
with their recent experience in Chechnya, the government
recognized the consequences of using overwhelming military force
to achieve its objectives. It realized that although such
actions would win the campaign on the operational level, it
would ultimately lose in the psychological and political arenas
on the strategic level.
The government understood the psychological and political
impact of allegations of human rights violations. Recognizing the
effectiveness of human rights groups as a force multiplier for the
opposition, the government realized that, regardless of the veracity
of the accusations, it would lose popular and international support.
Military victory on the ground at the operational level would be
nullified by a political and psychological-loss at the grand
strategy level. The best end-state would be at least partial loss
of support. Therefore, to minimize the negative impact, it acted
quickly to investigate allegations made against the Mexican military.
Although it was not able to prevent an unfavorable result, it
did prevent the political and psychological defeat it feared.
The military performed well in supporting the national
strategy. The military strategy supported the grand strategy of
the government. The Armed Forces correctly assessed the intent
and disposition of the EZLN along with the centers of gravity
and critical vulnerabilities on all of the levels of war. It
mobilized and deployed rapidly with no warning. It used combined
arms in joint operations and quickly gained the initiative. The
success of operations in the field allowed the government to
pursue a negotiated political settlement from a position of
relative strength.
The actions of the rebels in Chiapas reflect the
postulations of both the Manwaring and Prisk and the O'Neill
models of insurgency. With regard to the former, the insurgents
planned their actions at the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels of war in a complementary fashion focusing on the desired
end-state. The primary aim was not to defeat the Army on the field
of battle, but to defeat the government politically and psychologically.
Likewise, the military fought the campaign in such a manner that it
complemented the political, economic, and psychological
elements of national power in supporting the national
strategy.
As a reformist movement, this insurgency comports well
with the O'Neill model. The objectives of the rebels were
limited to greater autonomy and representation in the
political process. The Zapatistas did not intend to overthrow
the established government.
The student of insurgency is left with a troubling
question: "Why did not the Indian population rise up in support
of the EZLN?" The demographic environment appears to be ideal.
The preconditions are abundant. The Indians live in virtual
servitude and abject poverty. Not only do they not have any
hope of improving their lot in life, they have no realistic
expectation that their children would fare better.
The newly elected President, Ponce Zedillo, is facing
an economy that has foundered with the destabilization of
the currency and a new round of Zapatista attacks. This
time the pressures are different. National elections are
not imminent and international business concerns are calling
for firm resolve on the part of the government. It remains to be
seen if the government will employ the same restraint in
settling the current dispute. Likewise, it remains to be seen if
the Zapatistas will repeat the tactics and strategy that brought
them political success in the previous campaign or if they will
be compelled to adapt to a new reality.
APPENDIX A
THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE UPRISING
The following is a chronology of the events as they
unfolded. This information was derived by reviewing hundreds of
conflicting press reports and represents the author's best
efforts at reconciling the disparate accounts. By correlating
the events and local maps and analyzing the results, the author
derived his interpretation of the operational plans for the
opposing forces.
D-230+ (22 May 1993)
Approximately 40 EZLN guerrillas kill two soldiers in a
meeting engagement. The Army deploys 3,000 troops to hunt
down the guerrillas. In this same area, the 830th Infantry
Battalion finds six training camps allegedly belonging to the
URNG, capturing 10 guerrillas and 28 light and heavy weapons.75
D-1 (Friday, 31 December 1993)
EZLN forces attack the RSS-6 exploration brigade of the
Mexican Petroleum Corporation's (PEMEX) Ocosingo facility,
capturing 1.566 metric tons of dynamite, 10,440 detonators, and
a truck.76
D-DAY (Saturday, 1 January 1994)
Just after midnight, the EZLN launches attacks against
the municipal offices of four major population centers. At 0100,
rebels attack San Cristobal de las Casas (population 89,251) , securing
it by 0200. At 0300, they attack Las Margaritas (86,635) and secure
it by 0400. At 0700, EZLN forces initiate attacks against Altamirano
(16,980) and Ocosingo (120,687), but are not able to secure their
objectives until 1600. Guerrillas seize the radio station in Ocosingo
and begin to make propaganda broadcasts. Using the demolitions they
captured from the PEMEX facility on 31 December, they destroy two
bridges at the approaches to Ocosingo to impede an Army counterattack.77
The EZLN seizes the villages of Huixtan and Chanal.78 Twenty four
policemen are killed in the takeover or executed shortly thereafter.
Estimates of EZLN strength vary wildly from a low of 200-300 and to a
high of 2,000.79
State officials order police to avoid confrontation with EZLN. The
military remains 20 kilometers outside of downtown San Cristobal and
conducts aerial reconnaissance.80
D+1 (Sunday, 2 January 1994)
State officials direct the police to establish a dialogue
with the rebels in order to defuse the, crisis.81 All military
personnel in VII Military Region are restricted to their bases to
allow state officials an opportunity to resolve the situation. 82
The EZLN withdraws from San Cristobal. Its forces surround
and attack the 31st Military Zone garrison at Rancho Nuevo.83
Guerrillas ambush an Army patrol near Rancho Nuevo at 0700,
killing two officers and three noncommissioned officers. Two
officers, one NCO, and one soldier are wounded. In spite of
the casualties, the patrol counterattacks, repelling the EZLN
force and capturing nine rebels and various shotguns, grenades,
and rifles, to include two AR-15s.84
The federal government authorizes the military to defend
its bases and to secure those areas not under rebel control.85
Attacks against the garrison at Rancho Nuevo continue
throughout the day. The EZLN frees 120 inmates from the San
Cristobal prison in the suburb of Chiberos and is engaged by
Army elements.86 The rebels withdraw from San Cristobal de las
Casas, but they continue to occupy Ocosingo, Altamirano,
Chanal, and Las Margaritas. They burn down the municipal
building in Ocosingo, but maintain their positions in the town
and continue to operate the radio station.87 Ten guerrillas and
soldiers are reported killed in what the government and press
describe as heavy fighting.88
After withdrawing from San Cristobal, the rebels surround
two military posts approximately 10 kilometers away [one is
probably Rancho Nuevo and the other is probably an Army
reconnaissance patrol].89
Rebels conduct resupply by air at the Ocosingo airport
while the inhabitants steal from the EZLN stockpiles.90 Army and
EZLN forces fight at least seven skirmishes around Ocosingo
during the day.91
The EZLN seizes the towns of Oxchuc, Huixtan, and
Guadelupe Tepeyac.92 It controls the highway between Altamirano
and San Cristobal and operates several roadblocks from which it
controls access to Ocosingo.93
Army forces move from Palenque to reinforce the VII
Military Region are engaged by rebels in Ocosingo.94 Army and
EZLN forces of unknown strength fight in Los Altos de Chiapas.95
D+2 (Monday, 3 January 1994)
Reinforcements begin to arrive in the 31st and 36th
Military Zones. The armor forces are believed to be from the IX
Military Region in Acapulco armed with M-3 and M-5 Stuart tanks
and M-8 armored cars. Two Army and one Air Force airborne
infantry battalions deploy from the Brigada de Fusileros
Paracaidistas Jose Maria Moruelos y Pavon in the I Military
region (the Mexican Federal District). The Mexican Air Force
deploys Pilatus PC-7 fixed wing aircraft for close air support
as well as Bell 206s and 212s, and Hughes MD5OOMG helicopters.
Additionally, it deploys its five IAI Aravas and nine C-130As
for airlift.96 The armed forces are using the military airport
at Tuxtla Gutierrez as a base of operations.97
EZLN forces attack Rancho Nuevo again, but are repelled. The
Army reinforces the garrison at Rancho Nuevo and begins to
expand its operations from that base.
The rebels abandon Las Margaritas and the Army occupies
the town unopposed.98 Army units retake Ocosingo, but fighting
continues in the outskirts as the EZLN makes repeated
counterattacks. By 1300, EZLN resistance dwindles to harassing
sniper fire.99 EZLN rebels withdraw from Chanal and Army troops
take Comitan unopposed. The EZLN still holds Altamirano, Oxchuc,
Huixtan, and Cuxujla in addition to occupying Guadeloupe Tepeyac.100
Army and EZLN forces continue to clash in Los Altos de
Chiapas.101
Approximately 40 EZLN rebels kidnap former Chiapas
governor Absalon Castellanos Dominguez in Comitan along with his
wife and brother.102
D+3 (Tuesday, 4 January 1994)
The rebels withdraw from Oxchuc; however, angry civilians
capture six rebels and turn them over to the Army after binding
them and beating them up.103 A rebel column advances to within 16
kilometers of the state capital of Tuxtla Gutierrez while
withdrawing from Ocosingo. Both sides establish blocking
positions on the highway linking the two towns and the rebel
column turns away.104
Approximately 5,000 soldiers reinforced with 27 tanks,
two armored vehicles, 18 all-terrain vehicles [probably HUMVEEs]
and support vehicles move into San Cristobal. They engage an
EZLN force on the highway linking San Cristobal with Ocosingo.
Three fixed-wing aircraft and a helicopter fly close air support
missions in support of this engagement [the helicopter was
probably used to spot enemy locations and to direct fires].
Allegedly, the rebels were using the highway to withdraw to
Ocosingo." The Army's 17 and 73 Infantry Battalions retake
Ocosingo, to include the radio station; however, Army forces are
still receiving harassing fires from EZLN troops.106
In heavy fighting, the rebels abandon Altamirano before
daylight, withdrawing into the mountains. The Army pursues as
far as San Juan Chamula. EZLN stay-behind forces continue to
harass government troops in Altamirano.107
Army and EZLN forces continue to clash in Los Altos de
Chiapas.108
D+4 (Wednesday, 5 January 1994)
The Army has retaken San Cristobal, Ocosingo, Las
Margaritas, and Altamirano; the rebels are maintaining harassing
fires on the troops.109
At approximately 1140, an Army squad near San Cristobal is
surrounded by rebels. The Army attempts to relieve it by
dispatching air assault forces, but the helicopters receive too
much ground fire. Air Force aircraft fly close air
support to break the encirclement. The squad is relieved by
additional Army forces. A Bell 212 receives 12 rounds in the
fuselage and has a hydraulic failure.110 Air Force aircraft fly
close air support missions south of San Cristobal during
scattered skirmishes between Army and EZLN forces.111 An Army
helicopter is shot down by rebels during a firefight around
Ocosingo.112 EZLN guerrillas have barricaded themselves in houses
and Army patrols are trying to find and eliminate them.113
Army and EZLN forces continued to clash in Los Altos de
Chiapas.114
D+5 (Thursday, 6 January 1994)
The EZLN captures Tenejapa, approximately 40 kilometers
from San Cristobal.115
The Army cordons a triangular area between San Cristobal,
Ocosingo, and Las Margaritas and launches an offensive to clear
the area of EZLN forces. Federal troops occupy Huixtan, Oxchuc,
and Altamirano, all of which had already been abandoned by the
rebels.116 Army troops seize the town of Chanal from the EZLN.117
At 0700, the Army engages a rebel force on Maria Auxiliadora
Hill, eight kilometers southeast of San Cristobal, with mortars
and close air support.118
Army and EZLN forces continue to clash in Los Altos de
Chiapas in the towns of El Corralito, San Isidro, El Ocotal,
San Antonio de los Bajos, Corazon de Maria, and ocosingo.119
The Army conducts combined arms and joint operations
against the EZLN. While pursuing a rebel column that was en
route to destroy a microwave tower on Huitepec Hill, the Army
employs infantry, armored vehicles, tanks, helicopters, and
Pilatus fixed wing aircraft to engage the guerrillas. The
Mexican Air Force flies close air support missions against
targets near Corralito and San Antonio de los Banos in the
southeastern portion of the mountains.120
D+6 (Friday, 7 January 1994)
The Army increases the intensity of its attack on the EZLN
column near Huitepec Hill. The EZLN reportedly damages three
fixed wing aircraft and two helicopters in the engagement. The
Army commits approximately a company of infantry (transported in
10 trucks), a company of armor (12 tanks of undetermined type),
and various "artillery-equipped jeeps" (most likely jeeps or
HUMVEES armed with recoilless rifles).121
Army and EZLN forces continue to clash in Los Altos de
Chiapas.122
D+7 (Saturday, 8 January 1994)
Army and EZLN forces continue to clash in Los Altos de
Chiapas.123
The government initiates efforts to restore civil services
to recaptured cities. The rebels had cut off electricity, water,
sewage, and gas.124
D+8 (Sunday, 9 January 1994)
EZLN forces again attack the Army garrison at Rancho Nuevo
without success. Army and EZLN forces continue to clash in Los
Altos de Chiapas.125
The Army attacks guerrilla positions around Ocosingo and
Tenejapa.126 Additionally, the Army captures a Mexican priest,
Isidro Guillermo Badillo Brana, at the border between Chiapas
and Tabasco who was allegedly leading a rebel group.127
D+9 (Monday, 10 January 1994)
The EZLN releases the 80-100 hostages it had taken in
Guadeloupe Tepeyac as the guerrillas are preparing to withdraw
from the town. Most of the hostages are doctors and nurses at
the Social Security Hospital. The former governor of Chiapas,
Absalon Castellanos Dominguez, is reportedly being held in the
town.128
The Mexican Army recovers a PEMEX pickup truck in
Guadeloupe Tepeyac taken in the raid in which the EZLN captured
the 1.5 tons of dynamite.129
The Army is preparing to assault Guadeloupe Tepeyac. It
has massed 15,000 [number not verified] troops to include
paratroopers, 40 tanks, fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.130
The Army is pursuing the EZLN in the Lancandona jungle and
is searching for the group's headquarters. Troop positions and
roadblocks are constantly being reinforced as additional troops
arrive. The Army emplaces armor forces at the approaches to San
Cristobal, reinforcing the infantry. official reports estimate
200 soldiers, rebels, and civilians have been killed thus far
and 1,000 injured.131
D+10 (Tuesday, 11 January 1994)
During the morning, EZLN forces retake the town of Chanal,
50 Kilometers east of San Cristobal. The Army advances to within
75 kilometers of Guadeloupe Tepeyac where the EZLN has reportedly
prepared significant obstacles.132
D+11 (Wednesday, 12 January 1994)
The Defense Secretariat announces that the Army had retaken
all of the major towns seized by the EZLN with the exception of
Guadeloupe Tepeyac. Army units advance to El Momon, 30
kilometers from Guadeloupe Tepeyac. All combat is now confined to
rural areas.133
EZLN and Mexican Army troops fight sporadic battles in the
Lancandona jungle.134
President Salinas orders a unilateral cease-fire.135 Prior to
the announcement of the cease-fire, the EZLN releases a
threatening to take the state capital of Tuxtla Gutierrez
and calling on the people to rise up. The attack does not materialize.136
In Mexico City, approximately 100,000 demonstrators protest against
the use of force to put down the uprising. The protesters are made up of
student groups, human rights groups, opposition political parties,
and labor unions.137
D+12 (Thursday, 13 January 1994)
Army troops and EZLN forces continue to have sporadic
engagements in the Lancandona jungle. Mexican press reports that
the Army is conducting combined arms operations against the
guerrillas in San Miguel, Patate Viejo, and Chivi [Chiste?],
using armor and air support.138
EZLN forces conduct harassing fire against the 31st Military
Zone garrison at Rancho Nuevo.139
D+13 (Friday, 14 January 1994)
In spite of the cease-fire, EZLN guerrillas attack the garrison
of the 31st Military Zone at Rancho Nuevo.140 They also fire upon
an Army reconnaissance patrol on the road linking Ocosingo and
Suchila. No casualties are reported.141
D+14 (Saturday, 15 January 1994)
The Army begins to withdraw from the towns of San
Cristobal, Las Margaritas, and Ocosingo, setting up
checkpoints on the roads entering each.142 The Army
establishes bases outside of Las Margaritas, Altamirano,
Ocosingo, Oxchuc, and San Cristobal.143
D+15 (Sunday, 16 January 1994)
The EZLN leadership announces that its forces would honor
the unilateral cease-fire declared by the government, but would
respond if attacked.144
D+19 (Thursday, 20 January 1994)
The Mexican Chamber of Deputies approves an amnesty for those
rebels who cease violent actions surrender their weapons, release
all hostages.145
D+36 (Friday, 6 February 1994)
The EZLN and the Coordinating Board of Nongovernment Human Rights
Organizations (CONPAZ) agree to establish a security cordon around the
negotiations in San Cristobal to act as a buffer between the Mexican
Army and the EZLN. CONPAZ represents 11 local human rights organizations
in Chiapas (over 130 groups are now active in the area).146
D+89 (Thursday, 31 March 1994)
After three months, the VII Military Region begins to rotate
troops out of the contested areas, bringing in fresh troops to
continue the military isolation of the EZLN.147
END STATE
Negotiations are being conducted between the EZLN and the
Mexican government. Human rights organizations are providing a
security cordon around the negotiation sites for the rebels to
guarantee their safety during the deliberations. The Mexican
Army is in control of all the cities and villages of chiapas.
However, to minimize the profile of the armed forces, troops
have been withdrawn from most urban areas. Instead, the Army has
established roadblocks and checkpoints on the roads leading into
the contested areas, effecting a cordon sanitaire to isolate the
EZLN.
ENDNOTES
1. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, editors, El Salvador at
War: An Oral History of Conflict from the 1979 Insurrection to
the Present, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1988) 480-482.
2. Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism (Washington,
D.C.: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1990), 13-17, 20.
3. Bard E. O'Neill, 53.
4. O'Neill, 53-57.
5. O'Neill, 53-57 and Manwaring, 481.
6. Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, Problematica en Chiapas,
(Mexico City: Government of Mexico, undated), 2, 7 and
Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto y Secretaria de
Desarollo Urbano y Comunicaciones, "Carta Geografica del Estado
de Chiapas," map (Mexico City: Government of Mexico, 1994).
7. Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, 7.
8. O'Neill, 59-61; Jose Virtuoso, "Insurrection in Chiapas...
Revolution in Mexico?," Envio 13, no.153 (April 1994): 30-35.
See also "Poverty in Chiapas Seen as Major Source of Strife"
(text), PA1001201794 Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca
Network in Spanish, 1300 GMT (10 January 1994). Translation by
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 11 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-007, 19).
9. O'Neill, 59-61 and Virtuoso, 31.
10. Virtuoso, 31.
11. Virtuoso, 31; "Poverty in Chiapas Seen as Major Source of
Strife;" and "Mexico: Fine-Tuning the Picture," Latin American
Weekly Report, 20 January 1994, 14.
12. Jose Luis Morin, "An Indigenous People's Struggle for
Justice," Covert Action Quarterly, no. 48 (Spring 1994): 38.
13. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 199 and World Bank, World
Development Report 1988 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1988), 275.
14. Nelson Reed, The Caste War of Yucatan (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 1964), 289 and Michael C. Meyer and William L.
Sherman, The Course of Mexican History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979), 142 and 278.
15. Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New
York: Harper and Row, 1969), 13-14.
16. Thomas Chittick, Policy Officer, Policy and Plans
Coordination Office, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, interview by author, 8 September 1988.
17. On page 63 of his book, O'Neill describes "parochials" as
... those citizens who have little or no awareness of the
political system at the national level and no
perception of their ability to influence it. They are
generally illiterate, live at a subsistence level, and
are located in isolated areas. Although relatively
deprived and neglected, they eschew involvement in
political activity, including insurgencies."
18. "Peasant Organizations Reject Violence" (text) PA0401033594
Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish, 0127 GMT (4 January
1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 4
January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-002, 28) and "Mayors Report People
Leaving Towns to Join Rebels" (text), PA0901004994 Mexico City
NOTIMEX in Spanish, 0117 GMT (8 January 1994). Translation by
FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10 January 1994 (FBIS
LAT-94-006, 17).
19. "Mexico: Municipal Protests Engulf Chiapas," Latin American
Weekly Report, 24 February 1994, 75. See also "Mexico: Organized
Reaction Begins to Emerge, 11 Latin American Weekly Report, 24
March 1994, 122.
20. Richard J. Kilroy, Jr. , Observations on the Mexican
Insurgency, Chiapas, and the Mexican Military, Monograph, U.S.
Army Combined Arms Command Foreign Military Studies Of f ice
(Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: April 1994), 2.
21. "Officials Confirm Low Surveillance at Border" (text)
PA0901183594 Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish,
1600 GMT (9 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 11 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-007, 16.
22. Wolf, 44.
23. Robert P. Millon, Zapata: The Ideology of a Peasant
Revolutionary (New York: International Publishers, 1969), 11-14,
36.
24. Millon, 40-41, 45, 128.
25. Meyer and Sherman, 596-603, Wolf, 45 and John Dunn, Modern
Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political
Phenomenon (Cambridge: University Press, 1972), 66-65.
26. Ramon E. Ruiz, The Great Rebellion: Mexico 1905-1924 (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1980), 343-345, Meyer and Sherman, 542-543
and Hart, 330-332.
27. Hart, 331-332.
28. John Bailey, Department of Government, Georgetown
University, in a discussion attended by author, conducted at
U.S. Department of State on 9 September 1988.
29. Bailey, 9 September 1988.
30. O'Neill, 20.
31. O'Neill, 19, "Mexico: Indians Take up Arms in Chiapas,"
Latin American Weekly Report, 13 January 1994, 2-3, and "EZLN
Publication Carries 'Government Program'" (text) PA0601204994
Paris AFP in Spanish, 1916 GMT (6 January 1994). Translation by
FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 7 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT
94-005, 9).
32. "Mexico: Indians Take up Arms in Chiapas," Latin American
Weekly Report, 13 January 1994, 2-3, and "EZLN Publication
Carries 'Government Program'" (text) PA0601204994 Paris AFP in
Spanish, 1916 GMT (6 January 1994) Translation by FBIS, FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America., 7 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-005,
9).
33. J.I.S. Stevenson, The 1994 Zapatista Rebellion in Southern
Mexico: An Analysis and Assessment, Monograph, U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 1994), 13.
34. "Declare War on Government" (text) PA0101221094 Paris AFP in
Spanish, 2010 GMT (1 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS
Daily Report-Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic] (FBIS-LAT-94
001, 19-20) and "Rebel News Conference" (text) PA0201041594
Paris AFP in Spanish, 2353 GMT (1 January 1994). Translation by
FBIS, FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic]
(FBIS-LAT-94-001, 20) See also "Radio Reports Situation" (text)
PA0201170094 Mexico City ACIR Network in Spanish, 1512 GMT
(2 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--
Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic](FBIS-LAT-94-001, 21-22).
35. "Mexico: Zapatistas Still Want Salinas Out, Latin
American Weekly Report, 10 March 1994, 98.
36. "EZLN's Marcos Interviewed on Personal History" (text)
PA1603000494 Monterrey El Norte (Foreign Edition) (11 March
1994), 1A, 12A. Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 16 March 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-051, 7-10).
37. "Document Profiles Zapatista National Liberation Army"
(text) PA0801143394 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish, 0435 GMT (8 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 11 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-007,
15-16), "EZLN's Marcos Interviewed on Personal History" (text) ,
PA1603000494 Monterrey El Norte (Foreign Edition) (11 March
1994), 1A, 12A. Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 16 March 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-051, 7-10), and "Official
Cites Identity of Rebel Leaders" (text), PA0801165794 Mexico
City XEW Television Network in Spanish, 1300 GMT (8 January
1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10
January 1994, (FBIS-LAT-94-006, 1718).
38. Enrique Flota, "Chiapas and the Crisis of Mexican
'Democracy'," Envio 13, no. 154 (May 1994) 33, "Mexico: The
Rebels," Latin American Weekly Report, 13 January 1994, 2-3,
"Further on Rebel Group" (text), PA0101200694 Paris AFP in
Spanish, 1908 GMT (1 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic] (FBIS-LAT-94
001, 19) and Anthony R. Ierardi and E. Casey Wardynski, "The
Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas," Military Review 74, no. 10
(October 1994): 69-70.
39. Flota, 31.
40. Flota, 31-32.
41. "Declare War on Government," 19; Julio Montes, "The Mexican
Revolution -- 1994 Style," Jane's Intelligence Review 6, no. 3
(March 1994): 138; Morin, 38-43; and Virtuoso, 33.
42. "EZLN Publication Carries 'Government Program'," 9.
43. "Marcos Claims Only Fraction of His Forces in San Cristobal"
(text) BR0701144494 Turin LA STAMPA (7 January 1991), 12.
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 14
January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-010-A, 15).
44. "Mayors Report People Leaving Towns to Join Rebels," 17.
45. Human Rights Watch/America, "Human Rights and the Chiapas
Rebellion, 11 Current History , March 1994, 121-123; "Indians Say
Army Burned Warehouse 'Full of Bodies' 11 (text) PA1501224494
Paris AFP in Spanish, 2135 GMT (15 January 1994) . Translation
by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 18 January 1994
(FBIS-LAT-94-011, 23-24); "Military Rejects Human Rights
Charges" (text) PA1601045194 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish,
0357 GMT (16 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 18 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-011, 24)
and "'Tense' Situation in San Cristobal Reported" (text)
PA0301170194 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish, 1518
GMT (3 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report
-Latin America, 4 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-002, 22-23). See
also "EZLN Using Hostages as 'Human Shields'" (text)
PA0801022294 Madrid EFE in Spanish, 0033 GMT (8 January 1994) .
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10
January 1994, (FBIS-LAT-94-006, 14-15).
46. "EZLN Accuses Army of Executing Prisoners" (text) PA0601173194 Paris AFP in
Spanish, 1447 GMT (6 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 7 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-005, 6-7) ; "Bishop Agrees to Mediate in Chiapas Conflict" (text), PA0901045494 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish, 0334 GMT (9 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10 January 1994 (FBIS LAT-94-006, 13) ; and "PROCESO Director Declines to Mediate; Menchu Accepts" (text), PA0901214794 Paris AFP in Spanish, 1929 GMT (9 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-006, 13-14).
47. "'Security Cordon' Accepted" (text) PA0702003594 Mexico
City NOTIMEX in Spanish, 2141 GMT (7 February 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 7
February 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-025, 13-14) and "Peace
Demonstration Held in Mexico City 12 January" (text),
PA1301015694 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish, 0045
GMT (13 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 13 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-009, 16)
48. The author produced and analyzed the chronology presented in
Appendix A to deduce the strategic, operational and tactical plans
and objectives of both combatants.
49. "Views Future of Peace Negotiations," (text), PA0503043694 Mexico City La Jornada in Spanish (4 March 1994) , 3 and 12. Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 7 March 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-044, 11-14).
50. Flota, 31 and "Views Future of Peace Negotiations," 11-14.
51. "Views Future of Peace Negotiations," 11-14.
52. "Defense Secretariat Bulletin No. 111 (text) PA0301054994
Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish, 0430 GMT (3
January 1994). Translation by THIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 3 January 1993 [sic] (FBIS-LAT-94-001, 25) and
"Bulletin No. 211 (text) PA0301055594 Mexico City XEW Television
Network in Spanish, 0430 GMT (3 January 1994) . Translation by
FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic],
(FBIS-LAT-94-001, 25); see also Flota, 31 and "Views Future of
Peace Negotiations," 11-14.
53. "Views Future of Peace Negotiations," 12.
54. "Mexico: Political Fall-out as Rebellion Continues,
Latin American Weekly Report, 20 January 1994, 14-15.
55. Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, 22 and The Statesman's
Yearbook: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the
World for the Year 1994-1995, 131st ed., under "Mexico," 948.
56. Lieutenant Colonel Diego Ayala Sanchez, Mexican Embassy in
Washington, in telephonic conversation with author, 24 January
1995; Montes, 140; Area Handbook for Mexico, 3rd ed, by James D.
Rudolph, Foreign Area Studies, The American University, DA Pam.
No. 550-79 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985) 336; and Ignacio Ramirez,
"El Ejercito: Su Estructura Estrategica y Su Doctrina de
Guerra," Proceso, 14 February 1994, 7-13. Translation by LTC
Geoffrey B. Demarest, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command Foreign
Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
57. Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, 22; Area Handbook for
Mexico, 336; and "Attorney General Files Charges Against 8
Rebels" (text) PA0701044294 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in
Spanish, 0117 GMT (7 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 7 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-005,
13).
58. Ramirez, 7-13.
59. Rosa Maria de la Torre and Veronica Golos, "Insurrection:
Mexican Poor Rise Against Hunger, NAFTA, 11 published electronic
version of Revista Farabundo Marti, no. 10, 24 January 1994.
Retrieved from INTERNET "Zapatista/Chiapas" data base,
University of Texas, Austin and reprinted by U.S. Army Combined
Arms Command Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
60. Stevenson, 17. The government responds in three phases. In the first
phase, the local police react to the situation. In the second phase,
the national police respond. Finally, if the police cannot handle the
situation and the Interior and Defense Ministers give their authorization,
the military will intervene.
61. "Churchmen Analyze Underlying Cause of Revolt" (text)
BR0301094594 Rome ANSAMAIL Database, 2206 GMT (2 January 1994).
Extracted by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 12 January
1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-008-A, 14-15) and "Official on Chiapas Incidents"
(text) PA0301060694 Mexico City XEW Television Network AFP in Spanish,
0456 GMT (3 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--
Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic] (FBIS-LAT-94-001, 26).
62. "Caller Claims EZLN Responsible" (text) PA0801221994 Paris
AFP in Spanish, 2034 GMT (8 January 1994) Translation by FBIS,
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-006, 15);
"Groups Protest Chiapas Crisis, NAFTA 7 Jan" (text)PA0801160094 Mexico
City XEW Television Network in Spanish, 1300 GMT (8 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10 January 1994
(FBIS-LAT-94-006, 14) ; and "Stricter Security Measures for Mexico
City" (text) PA0801141394 Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish,
0435 GMT (8 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--
Latin America, 10 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-006, 15).
63. "Delivers Message" (text) PA0701040694 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network
in Spanish, 0202 GMT (7 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 7 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-005, 11-12), 11.
64. "Delivers Message," 11; "Development Secretary in Chiapas for
Roundtable" (text) PA0501000394 Mexico City Canal 13 Television
Azteca Network in Spanish, 1900 GMT (5 January 1994) . Translation by
FBIS, FBIS Daily Report- -Latin America, 5 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-003,
15-16; and "Salinas on Crisis; Scores Rebels" (text) PA0601214594
Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish, 2025 GMT (6 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Re-port Latin America, 7 January 1994
(FBIS-LAT-94-005, 10-11).
65. "Salinas Asks Ombudsman to Ensure Human Rights" (text)
PA0601015994 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish, 0041 GMT
(6 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 6 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-004, 20).
66. "Fact Sheet: Human Rights in Mexico," Dispatch 5, supplement no.
3 (May 1994) 16-17 and "Mexico: Direct Talks Are About to Begin,
11 Latin American Weekly Report, 17 February 1994, 62 and "Attorney
General Investigates Possible Executions" (text) PA0801131294 Mexico
City XEW Television Network in Spanish, 0435 GMT (8 January 19941).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10 January
1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-006, 12). See also "Defense Secretariat Explains
Aircraft Missions in Chiapas" (text) PA1201131694 Mexico City Canal
13 Television Azteca Network in Spanish, 1200 GMT (12 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 13
January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-009, 16).
67. Ramirez, 7-13.
68. The author produced and analyzed the chronology presented in
Appendix A to deduce the strategic, operational and tactical
plans and objectives of both combatants.
69. "Army Heeds Cease-Fire" (text) PA1201192794 Hamburg DPA in
Spanish, 1816 GMT (12 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 13 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-009,
12); "Army Holds News Conference, Urges Political Solution"
(text), PA2801152294 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish, 0535 GMT
(28 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 31 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-019, 18); "Defense
Secretariat Issues Bulletin Announcing Cease-Fire" (text)
PA1201205194 Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish, 2000
GMT (12 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report-
Latin America, 13 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-009, 11); and
"President's Statement" (text), PA1201210694 Mexico City XEW
Television Network in Spanish, 2002 GMT (12 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 13
January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-009, 11-12).
70. This is the author's interpretation of the plan based upon
analysis of open source reporting. The Mexican government has
not responded to requests for information.
71. "Mexico: Political Fall-out as Rebellion Continues," 14.
72. Stevenson, 18.
73. Human Rights Watch/America, 121-123.
74. Ramirez, 7-13 and "Churchmen Analyze Underlying Cause of
Revolt," 14.
75. Montes, 138.
76. "Rebels Steal 1.5 Tonnes of Explosives from Pemex" (text)
PA0501175994 Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish, 0430
GMT (5 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--
Latin America, 6 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-004, 15)
and "Pursuit of Rebels Continues in Altos de Chiapas" (text)
PA1001145294 Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca Network in
Spanish, 1300 GMT (10 January 1994) Translation by FBIS, FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 11 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-007,
17).
77. "Mexico: Political Fall-out as Rebellion Continues," 14;
"Free San Cristobal Inmates" (text) PA0201223394 Madrid EFE in
Spanish, 2152 GMT (2 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic] (FBIS-LAT-94-
001, 24) ; "Defense Secretariat Bulletin No. 1," 25; and "Rebels
Steal 1.5 Tonnes of Explosives from PEMEX," 15.
78. "Rebel News Conference," 21 and "Catechist Role Noted," 20.
79. "Marcos Urges Civilian Commitment to Peace" (text)
PA0403211494 Madrid EFE Spanish, 1902 GMT (.4 March 1994) .
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 7 March
1994, (FBIS-LAT-94-044, 11-14), 11 and "Links Between Rebels,
Clerics Noted" (text) PA0201162294 Paris AFP in Spanish, 1145
GMT (2 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report-
Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic] (FBIS-LAT-94-001, 20-21).
80. "Rebel News Conference," 20.
81. "Radio Reports Situation," 21.
82. "Boletines de Prensa Emitidos por la Secretaria de la
Defensa Nacional," El Ejercito y la Sociedad Mexicana: Revista
del Ejercito y Fuerza Aerea Mexicanos, no. 88 (January- February
1994): 16 and "Government Bulletin on Crisis" (text) PAO301061494
Mexico City XEW Televis ion Network in Spanish, 0501 GMT
(3 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 3 January 1993 [sic] (FBIS-LAT-94-001, 25-26).
83. "Bulletin No. 2," 25 and "Churchmen Analyze Underlying
Cause of Revolt," 14-15 and "Armed Clash, Reported" (text)
PA0301013694 Mexico City in Spanish, 0109 GMT (3 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January
1993 [sic], (FBIS-LAT-94-001, 27).
84. "Attorney General Files Charges Against 8 Rebels," 13.
85. "Government Bulletin on Crisis," 25.
86. "Mexico: Political Fall-out as Rebellion Continues," 14
and "Free San Cristobal Inmates," 24.
87. "Rebels Oppose NAFTA" (text) PA0201171194 Paris AFP in
Spanish, 1555 GMT (2 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic] (FBIS-LAT-94
001, 22).
88. "Churchmen Analyze Underlying Cause of Revolt," 15.
89. "Churchmen Analyze Underlying Cause of Revolt," 15.
90. "Churchmen Analyze Underlying Cause of Revolt," 15.
91. "Occupy Guatemalan Border Towns" (text) PA0301004294 Madrid
EFE in Spanish 0000 GMT (3 January 1994) Translation by FBIS,
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic]
(FBIS-LAT-94-001, 24-25).
92. "Mexico: Political Fall-out as Rebellion Continues," 14-15
and "Occupy Guatemalan Border Towns," 24-25.
93. "Rebels Said to Reject Talks with Government" (text)
PA0301223894 Paris AFP in Spanish, 2115 GMT (3 January 1994) .
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 4 January
1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-002, 24-25).
94. "Boletines de Prensa Emitidos por la Secretaria del la
Defensa Nacional," 16-17.
95. "Pursuit of Rebels Continues in Altos de Chiapas," 17.
96. Montes, 138-139 and "Armed Forces Reinforce Troops by
6,000" (text) PA0401002994 Paris AFP in Spanish, 2341 GMT (3
January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 4 January 1994, (FBIS-LAT-94-002, 26).
97. "Army Reinforces Chiapas State Capital" (text) PA0401134994
Madrid EFE, 0703 GMT (4 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 5 January 1994, (FBIS-LAT-94-003,
9) and "'Sources' Disclose Increased Clashes" (text)
PA0401173394 Madrid EFE in Spanish, 1627 GMT (4 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America,
5 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-003, 11).
98. "Radio ACIR Roundup on Chiapas Situation" (text) ,
PA0401143294 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish, 1259 GMT
(4 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 5 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-003, 10).
99. "Guatemala Institutes 'Strict' Border Security" (text),
PA0301200094 Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca Network in
Spanish, 1927 GMT (3 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 4 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-002,
24) ; "Clashes Continue" (text), PA0401195294 Mexico City Canal
13 Television Azteca Network in Spanish, 1857 GMT (4 January
1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 5
January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-003, 11) ; and "Rebels Said to
Partially Retreat" (text) PA0401221794 Paris AFP in Spanish,
2047 GMT (4 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 5 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-003, 12-13).
100. "Rebels Maintaining Presence in at Least Five Towns"
(text), PA0401021294 Paris AFP in Spanish, 0108 GMT (4 January
1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 4 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-002, 27).
101. "Pursuit of Rebels Continues in Altos de Chiapas," 17.
102. "Former Chiapas Governor Kidnaped" (text) PA0301065994
Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish, 0633 GMT (3 January 1994) .
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January
1993 [sic] (FBIS-LAT-94-001, 27).
103. "Rebels Said to Partially Retreat," 13 and "Armed Forces
Retake Town" (text) PA0401041994 Paris AFP in Spanish, 0345 GMT
(4 January 1994) Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 4 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-002, 28-29).
104. "Army Reinforces Chiapas State Capital," 9 and "Fighting
Near Capital Denied" (text) PA0401201294 Mexico City Canal 13
Television Azteca Network in Spanish, 1907 GMT (4 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 5
January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-003, 11).
105. "Armed Forces Resume Bombing of EZLN Positions" (text)
PA0501192694 Madrid EFE in Spanish, 1834 GMT (5 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 6 January
1994, (FBIS-LAT-94-004, 18-19) ; "Air Force Planes Bomb Hill in
Outskirts of Town" (text) PA0501013694 Paris AFP in Spanish,
0031 GMT (5 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 5 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-003, 13) ;
and "Town Under Civilian, Military Control" (text) PA0501021994
Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish, 0132 GMT (5 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 5 January
1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-003, 13). See also "12,000 Soldiers Involved
in Counteroffensive" (text) PA0501151994 Paris AFP in Spanish,
1037 GMT (5 January 1994). Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report-Latin America, 6 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-004, 15).
106. "Armed Forces Resume Bombing of EZLN Positions," 18 and
"Army Recovers Control of Ocosingo" (text), PA0501232294 Paris
AFP in Spanish, 2100 GMT (5 January 1994). Translation by FBIS,
FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 6 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-004, 17).
107. "Army Expels Rebels from Altamirano; 121 Dead" (text)
PA0501030594 Madrid EFE in Spanish, 0157 GMT (5 January 1994)
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 5
January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-003, 13-14).
108. "Pursuit of Rebels Continues in Altos de Chiapas," 17.
109. "Government Spokesman Details Situation" (text) PA0601130194 Mexico
City XEW Television Network in Spanish, 0435 GMT (6 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 6 January
1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-004, 22) and "Army Recovers Regions Taken by Zapatist
Rebels" (text) PA0501151094 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish, 1132
GMT (5 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 6 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-004, 15).
110. "Boletines de Prensa Emitidos por la Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional," 18-19 and "Spokesman, Human Rights Ombudsman Discuss Events" (text) PA0601034394
Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish, 0124 GMT (6 January 1994) .
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 6 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT
94-004, 21).
111. "Armed Forces Resume Bombing of EZLN Positions," 18-19.
112. "Clashes Continue in Ocosingo" (text) PA0601012894 Mexico City Radio
ACIR Network in Spanish, 0030 GMT (6 January 1994). Translation by FBIS,
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 6 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-004, 20).
113. "National Defense Secretariat Updates Bulletin" (text) PA0501172294
Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish, 1616 GMT (5 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 6 January 1994
(FBIS-LAT-94-001, 16).
114. "Pursuit of Rebels Continues in Altos de Chiapas," 17.
115. "EZLN Seizes Tenejapa, Fighting in Other Towns" (text) PA0701011394
Madrid EFE in Spanish, 2250 GMT (6 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 7 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-005, 8).
116. "Indians Asks [sic] for Advance Warnings on Bombings"
(text) PA0801222394 Hamburg DPA in Spanish, 1459 GMT (8
January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 10 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-006, 18-19) and
"Correction to Army Asked for Advance Warning on Bombings"
(text) PA1001024594. Corrections published to "Indians Asks
[sic] for Advanced Warning on Bombings" in FBIS Daily Report-
Latin America, 10 January 1994. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 12 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-008, 11).
117. "Rebels Said to Retake Municipality" (text) PA1101192494
Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish, 1836 GMT (11 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 12
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-008, 10.
118. "Armed Forces Launch Mortar Attack on Rebels" (text)
PA0601154394 Hamburg DPA in Spanish, 1449 GMT (6 January 1994) .
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 7 January
1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-005, 6).
119. "Pursuit of Rebels Continues in Altos de Chiapas," 17;
"Army Continues Pursuing Rebels in Chiapas" (text), PA0601234894
Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish, 2201 GMT (6 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 7 January
1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-005,. 7-8) ; and "EZLN Seizes Tenejapa,
Fighting in Other Towns," 8.
120. "Indians Asks [sic] for Advanced Warning on Bombings," 18-
19, "Correction to Army Asked for Advance Warning on Bombings,"
11 and "Army Continues Pursuing Rebels in Chiapas,"
7-8.
121. "Indians Asks [sic] for Advance Warning on Bombings," 18-19
and "Correction to Army Asked for Advance Warning on Bombings,"
11.
122. "Pursuit of Rebels Continues in Altos de Chiapas," 17.
123. "Pursuit of Rebels Continues in Altos de Chiapas," 17.
124. "Government Intitiates Operation to Aid Civilians"
(text) PA0701173194 Madrid EFE in Spanish, 1600 GMT (7
January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--
Latin America, 10 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-006, 11-12).
125. "Pursuit of Rebels Continues in Altos de Chiapas," 17;
"Army Resumes Attacks After Reported Assault" (text)
PA0901231894 Paris AFP in Spanish, 2144 GMT (9 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10
January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-006, 19-20) ; and "Continued EZLN
Attacks on Garrison Reported" (text) PA1001015694 Mexico City
NOTIMEX in Spanish, 0106 GMT (10 January 1994). Translation by
FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10 January 1994 (FBIS
LAT-94-006, 20).
126. "Pursuit of Rebels Continues in Altos de Chiapas," 17
and "Army Resumes Attacks After Reported Assault," 19-20.
127. "Army Preparing Large Offensive Against Rebels" (text) PA1001205994
Madrid EFE in Spanish, 1646 GMT (10 January 1994) . Translation by FBIS,
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 11 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-007, 19-20).
128. "Released Hostages Arrive in Las Margaritas" (text) PA1101155894
Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish, 1300 GMT (11 January
1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 12
January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-008, 9) and "EZLN Releases 80 Social Security,
Workers" (text) PA1001210294 Madrid EFE in Spanish, 1828 GMT (10
January 1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America,
11 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-007, 20).
129. "Pursuit of Rebels Continues in Altos de Chiapas," 17.
130. "Army Preparing Large Offensive Against Rebels," 19.
131. "Army Preparing Large Offensive Against Rebels," 19.
132. "Rebels Said to Retake Municipality,", 10.
133. "Defense Secretariat Reports Recapture of Chiapas Towns" (text)
PA1201134494 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish, 1301 GMT (12 January 1994).
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 13 January 1994
(FBIS-LAT-94-009, 15-16) and "EZLN Threatens to Occupy Chiapas Capital
Prior to Cease-Fire Notice" (text) PA1201195394 Madrid EFE in Spanish,
1914 GMT (12 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--
Latin America, 13 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94--009, 13).
134. "Sporadic Clashes Reported Despite. Truce" (text) PA1401173694
Madrid AFE in Spanish, 1620 GMT (14 January 1994). Translation by
FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 18 January 1994
(FBIS-LAT-94-011, 20).
135. Montes, 140.
136. "EZLN Threatens to Occupy Chiapas Capital Prior to
Cease-Fire Notice," 13.
137. "Peace Demonstration Held in Mexico City 12 January,"
16.
138. "Sporadic Clashes Reported Despite Truce," 20.
139. Montes, 140.
140. Montes, 140.
141. "Defense Secretariat Bulletin No. 17" (text)
PA15O1134494 Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish,
0430 GMT (15 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 18 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-011, 20).
142. "Army Intensifies Surveillance in Chiapas" (text)
PA1402000994 Madrid EFE in Spanish, 1813 GMT (13 February 19940.
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 14
February 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-030, 15-16).
143. "Army Holds News Conference, Urges Political Solution,"
18.
144. "EZLN Leader: Rebels Will Respect Truce" (text)
PA1601174594 Paris AFP in Spanish, 1626 GMT (16 January 1994)
Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 18
January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-011, 25) and "Further on Rebels
Respecting Truce" (text) PA1701001894 Madrid AFE in Spanish,
2300 GMT (16 January 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 18 January 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-011, 25-26).
145. "Chamber of Deputies Approves Amnesty for EZLN Rebels,"
PA2101044594 Madrid EFE in Spanish, 0211 GMT (21 January 1994).
Translated by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 21 January
1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-014, 6-7).
146. "EZLN Asks Nongovernment Organizations for 'Peace Cordon'"
(text) PA0602154594 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish, 0618 GMT (6
February 1994). Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 7 February 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-025, 12-13) and "'Security
Cordon' Accepted," 13.
147. "Army Moves Troops out of Chiapas Conflict Areas" (text)
PA0104034294 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish, 0152 GMT (1 April
1994) . Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 1
April 1994 (FBIS-LAT-94-063, 12).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
"12,000 Soldiers Involved in Counteroffensive" (text).
PA0501151994 Paris AFP in Spanish. 1037 GMT, 5 January
1994. Translation by Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 6 January 1994.
FBIS-LAT-94-004, 15.
"Air Force Planes Bomb Hill in Outskirts of Town" (text).
PA0501013694 Paris AFP in Spanish. 0031 GMT, 5 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 5 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 13.
Area Handbook for Mexico. 3rd ed. By James D. Rudolph. Foreign
Area Studies, The American University. DA Pam. No. 550-79.
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"Armed Clash Reported" (text). PA0301013694 Mexico City in
Spanish. 0109 GMT, 3 January 1994. Translation by FEIS.
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic].
FBIS-LAT-94-001, 27.
"Armed Forces Launch Mortar Attack on Rebels" (text).
PA0601154394 Hamburg DPA in Spanish. 1449 GMT, 6 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 7 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-005, 6.
"Armed Forces Reinforce Troops by 6,000" (text). PA0401002994
Paris AFP in Spanish. 2341 GMT, 3 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 4
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-002, 26.
"Armed Forces Resume Bombing of EZLN Positions" (text).
PA0501192694 Madrid EFE in Spanish. 1834 GMT, 5 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 6 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-004, 18-19.
"Armed Forces Retake Town" (text). PA0401041994 Paris AFP in
Spanish. 0345 GMT, 4 January 1994. Translation by FBIS.
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 4 January 1994. FBIS
LAT-94-002, 28-29.
"Army Arrests Labor, Peasant Leaders" (text). PA0601164994
Paris AFP in Spanish. 1502 GMT, 6 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 7
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-005, 6.
"Army Continues Pursuing Rebels in Chiapas" (text).
PA0601234894 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 2201 GMT, 6
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 7 January 1994.FBIS-LAT-94-
005,7-8.
"Army Expels Rebels from Altamirano; 121 Dead" (text).
PA0501030594 Madrid EFE in Spanish. 0157 GMT, 5
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-
-Latin America, 5 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 13-14.
"Army Heeds Cease-Fire" (text). PA1201192794 Hamburg DPA in
Spanish. 1816 GMT, 12 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 13 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-009, 12.
"Army Holds News Conference, Urges Political Solution"
(text). PA2801152294 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish.
0535 GMT, 28 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 31 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-019, 18.
"Army Intensifies Surveillance in Chiapas" (text).
PA1402000994 Madrid EFE in Spanish. 1813 GMT, 13
February 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 14 February 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-
030, 15-16.
"Army Moves Troops out of Chiapas Conflict Areas" (text).
PA0104034294 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 0152 GMT,
1 April 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report-Latin America, 1 April 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-063, 12.
"Army Preparing Large Offensive Against Rebels" (text).
PA1001205994 Madrid EFE in Spanish. 1646 GMT, 10
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 11 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-007, 19-20.
"Army Recovers Control of Ocosingo" (text), PA0501232294
Paris AFP in Spanish. 2100 GMT, 5 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America,
6 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-004, 17.
"Army Recovers Regions Taken by Zapatist Rebels" (text).
PA0501151094 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 1132 GMT, 5
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-
-Latin America, 6 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-004, 15.
"Army Reinforces Chiapas State Capital" (text).
PA0401134994 Madrid EFE. 0703 GMT, 4 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America,
5 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 9.
"Army Reportedly Holds Chiapas Highland Communities" (text).
PA1901030994 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
0044 GMT, 19 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report-Latin America, 19 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-012,
35.
"Army Resumes Attacks After Reported Assault" (text).
PA0901231894 Paris AFP in Spanish. 2144 GMT, 9 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 10 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006, 19-20.
"Army Sets up Checkpoints Around EZLN Stronghold" (text).
PA0305233694 Monterrey El Norte (Foreign Edition) (28
April 1994), 14A. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report
Latin America, 4 May 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-086, 8-9.
"Army Troops Moving Toward Jungle Area Near Chiapas" (text).
PA2904142994 Monterrey El Norte (Foreign Edition) (27
April 1994), 9A. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--
Latin America, 2 May 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-084, 16.
"Attorney General Investigates Possible Executions" (text).
PA0801131294 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish. 0435 GMT, 8 January 1994. Translation by FBIS.
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10 January 1994. FBIS
LAT-94-006, 12.
"Attorney General Files Charges Against 8 Rebels" (text).
PA0701044294 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
0117 GMT, 7 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 7 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-005, 13.
Ayala Sanchez, Diego, Lieutenant Colonel. Mexican Embassy in
Washington, D.C. Telephonic conversation with author, 24
January 1995.
Bailey, John. Professor, Department of Government, Georgetown
University. Discussion attended by author at U.S.
Department of State, 9 September 1988.
"Bishop Agrees to Mediate in Chiapas Conflict" (text).
PA0901045494 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 0334 GMT, 9
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. ' FBIS Daily Report
Latin America, 10 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006, 13.
"Bishop Denies Ties" (text). PA0301204294 Mexico City Radio
ACIR Network in Spanish. 1555 GMT, 2 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 4
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-002, 23.
"Bishop Ruiz 'Understands' Indian Revolt" (text).
BRO501152694 Rome L'UNITA (5 January 1994), 11.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 6
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-004, 17-18.
"Bishop Spotlights Army's Alleged Executions" (text).
PA0501034394 Paris AFP in Spanish. 0235 GMT, 5 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 5 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 15.
"Bishops Conference Communique on Events" (text).
PA0501032294 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
0133 GMT, 5 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 5 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-
003, 14-15.
"Bodies of 2 men Arrested 6 January Discovered" (text).
PA2701234894 Paris AFP in Spanish. 1633 GMT, 26
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report
--Latin America, 28 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-019, 11.
"Boletines de Prensa Emitidos por la Secretaria de la
Defensa Nacional." El Ejercito y la Sociedad Mexicana:
Revista del Ejercito y Fuerza Aerea Mexicanos, no. 88
(January-February 1994): 16-25.
"Bulletin No. 211 (text). PA0301055594 Mexico City XEW
Television Network in Spanish. 0430 GMT, 3 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 3 January 1993 [sic]. FBIS-LAT-94-001, 25.
"Caller Claims EZLN Responsible" (text). PA0801221994 Paris
AFP in Spanish. 2034 GMT, 8 January 1994. Translation
by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006, 15.
"Chamber of Deputies Approves Amnesty for EZLN Rebels"
(text). PA2101044594 Madrid EFE in Spanish. 0211 GMT
(21 January 1994). Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 21 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-014, 6.
"Chiapas Natives Close Churches, Demand Bishop's Departure"
(text). PA1103050094 Mexico City El Financiero (10
March 1994), 60. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 11 March. FBIS-LAT-94-048, 11-12.
Chittick, Thomas. Policy officer at Policy and Plans
Coordination Office, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
U.S. Department of State. Interview by author, 8
September 1988.
"Church Issues Document; Creates Commission" (text).
PA1301171194 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
0030 GMT, 13 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 14 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-010, 9-
10.
"Churchmen Analyze Underlying Cause of Revolt" (text).
BR0301094594 Rome ANSAMAIL Database. 2206 GMT, 2 January
1994. Extracted by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America,
12 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-008-A, 14-15.
"Clashes Continue" (text). PA0401195294 Mexico City Canal 13
Television Azteca Network in Spanish. 1857 GMT, 4 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 5 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 11.
"Clashes Continue in Ocosingo" (text). PA0601012894 Mexico
City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish. 0030 GMT, 6 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report --Latin
America, 6 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-004, 20.
"Communique Outlines Casualties in Fighting" (text).
PA0701041794 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 0244 GMT, 7
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-
Latin America, 7 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-005, 9.
Conger, Lucy. "Mexico: Zapatista Thunder." Current
History , March 1994, 115-120.
"Continued EZLN Attacks on Garrison Reported" (text).
PA1001015694 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 0106 GMT, 10
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 10 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006, 20.
"Correction to Army Asked for Advance Warning on Bombings"
(text). PA1001024594 Corrections published to "Indians
Asks [sic] for Advanced Warning on Bombings" in FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 10 January 1994. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 12 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-
008, 11.
"Cuban Envoy Denied Havana Supplying Rebels Arms" (text).
PA0601024294 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
0144 GMT, 6 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report-Latin America, 6 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-
004, 21-22.
de la Torre, Rosa Maria and Veronica Golos. "Insurrection:
Mexican Poor Rise Against Hunger, NAFTA," published
electronic version of Revista Farabundo Marti, no. 10, 24
January 1994. Retrieved from INTERNET "Zapatista/
Chiapas" database, University of Texas, Austin and
reprinted by U.S. Army Command Arms Command Foreign
Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
"Declare War on Government" (text). PA0101221094 Paris AFP in
Spanish. 2010 GMT, 1 January 1994. Translation by FBIS.
FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic].
FBIS-LAT-94-001, 19-20.
"Defense Bulletin Notes Increase in Chiapas Crime" (text).
PA2501204494 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish. 0430 GMT, 25 January 1994. Translation by FBIS.
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 26 January 1994. FBIS
LAT-94-017, 8.
"Defense Secretariat Bulletin No. 1" (text). PA0301054994 Mexico
City XEW Television Network in Spanish. 0430 GMT, 3
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 3 January 1993 [sic]. FBIS-LAT-94-001, 25.
"Defense Secretariat Bulletin No. 17" (text). PA1501134494
Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish. 0430 GMT,
15 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report
Latin America, 18 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-011, 20.
"Defense Secretariat Communique" (text). PA0401202594
Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca Network in
Spanish. 1920 GMT, 4 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 5 January 1994.
FBIS-LAT-94-003, 11.
"Defense Secretariat Denies Air Force Bombed in Chiapas"
(text). PA0402141194 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish.
2105 GMT, 2 February 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report-Latin America, 2 February 1994. FBIS-LAT-94
025, 8.
"Defense Secretariat Explains Aircraft Missions in Chiapas"
(text). PA1201131694 Mexico City Canal 13 Television
Azteca Network in Spanish. 1200 GMT, 12 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 13
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-009, 16.
"Defense Secretariat Issues Bulletin Announcing Cease-Fire"
(text). PA1201205194 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish. 2000 GMT, 12 January 1994. Translation by FBIS.
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 13 January 1994. FBIS
LAT-94-009, 11.
"Defense Secretariat Issues Communique" (text). PA1101195694
Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca Network in Spanish.
1300 GMT, 11 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 12 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-008,
10.
"Defense Secretariat Issues Human Rights Bulletin" (text).
PA0903174694 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish. 0435 GMT, 9 March 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 10 March 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-
047, 12.
"Defense Secretariat Reports 'Complete Calm'" (text).
PA1401015694 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
0030 GMT, 14 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 14 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-010,
10.
"Defense Secretariat Reports Rebel Attacks in Ocosingo"
(text). PA3101201094 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 1730
GMT, 31 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 1 February 1994. FBIS-LAT-
94-021, 8.
"Defense Secretariat Reports Recapture of Chiapas Towns"
(text). PA1201134494 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish.
1301 GMT, 12 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 13 January 1994. FBIS
LAT-94-009, 15-16.
"Delivers Message" (text). PA0701040694 Mexico City Radio ACIR
Network in Spanish. 0202 GMT, 7 January 1994. Translation
by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 7 January 1994.
FBIS-LAT-94-005, 11-12.
"Development Secretary in Chiapas for Roundtable" (text).
PA0501000394 Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca
Network in Spanish. 1900 GMT, 5 January 1994. Translation
by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 5 January 1994.
FBIS-LAT-94-003, 15-16.
"Document Profiles Zapatist National Liberation Army" (text).
PA0801143394 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish. 0435 GMT, 8 January 1994. Translation by FBIS.
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 11 January 1994. FBIS
LAT-94-007, 15-16.
Dunn, John. Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the
Analysis of a Political Phenomenon. Cambridge:
University Press, 1972.
"EZLN Accuses Army of Executing Prisoners" (text). PA0601173194
Paris AFP in Spanish. 1447 GMT, 6 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 7 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-
94-005, 6-7.
"EZLN Asks Nongovernment Organizations for 'Peace Cordon'", (text).
PA0602154594 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 0618 GMT, 6 February
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 7 February
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-025, 12-13.
"EZLN Leader: Rebels Will Respect Truce" (text). PA1601174594
Paris AFP in Spanish. 1626 GMT, 16 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 18 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-
94-011, 25.
"EZLN's Marcos Interviewed on Personal History" (text). PA1603000494
Monterrey El Norte (Foreign Edition) (11 March 1994), 1A, 12A.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 16 March 1994.
FBIS-LAT-94-051, 7-10.
"EZLN Publication Carries 'Government Program'" (text). PA0601204994 Paris
AFP in Spanish. 1916 GMT, 6 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 7 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-005, 9.
"EZLN Rebels Plan Long-Term War" (text). PA0401140294 Hamburg DPA in
Spanish. 0838 GMT, 4 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 5 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 9-10.
"EZLN Releases 80 Social Security Workers" (text). PA1001210294 Madrid EFE
in Spanish. 1,828 GMT, 10 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report-Latin America, 11 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-007, 20.
"EZLN Seizes Tenejapa, Fighting in Other Towns" (text). PA0701011394 Madrid
EFE in Spanish. 2250 GMT, 6 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report --Latin America, 7 January 1994. FBlS-LAT-94-005, 8.
"EZLN Threatens to Occupy Chiapas Capital Prior to Cease Fire Notice" (text).
PA1201195394 Madrid EFE in Spanish. 1914 GMT, 12 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 13 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-009, 13.
"EZLN Using Hostages as 'Human Shields'" (text). PA0801022294
Madrid EFE in Spanish. 0033 GMT, 8 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006, 14-15.
Estevez, Dolia. "Chiapas: An Intelligence Fiasco or
Coverup?" Covert Action Quarterly, no., 48 (Spring
1994): 44-48.
"Ex-Clandestine People's Party Dissociates Self from Rebels"
(text). PA0301233194 Madrid EFE in Spanish. 2137 GMT, 3
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--
Latin America, 4 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-002, 25.
"'Exclusive' Interview with Rebel Leader 'Marcos'" (text).
PY0501221794 Buenos Aires PAGINA/12 (5 January 1994),
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 6
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-004, 19-20.
"Fact Sheet: Human Rights in Mexico," Dispatch 5,
Supplement no. 3 (May 1994): 16-17.
"Fighting in Ocosingo; 'Tense Calm' in Other Towns" (text).
PA0701012194 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
0030 GMT, 7 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 7 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-005, 8-
9.
"Fighting Near Capital Denied" (text). PA0401201294 Mexico City
Canal 13 Television Azteca Network in Spanish. 1907 GMT, 4
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--
Latin America, 5 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 11.
Flota, Enrique. "Chiapas and the Crisis of Mexican
'Democracy'." Envio 13, no. 154 (May 1994): 29-35.
"Former Chiapas Governor Kidnaped" (text). PA0301065994
Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 0633 GMT, 3 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 3 January 1993 [sic]. FBIS-LAT-94-001, 27.
"Free San Cristobal Inmates" (text). PA0201223394 Madrid EFE in
Spanish. 2152 GMT, 2 January 1994. Translation by FBIS.
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic].
FBIS-LAT-94-001, 24.
"Further on Rebel Group" (text). PA0101200694 Paris AFP in
Spanish. 1908 GMT, 1 January 1994. Translation by FBIS.
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993
[sic]. FBIS-LAT-94-001, 19.
"Further on Rebels' 5-Point Dialogue Proposal" (text).
PA1101150094 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
1338 GMT, 11 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report-Latin America, 12 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94
008, 8-9.
"Further on Rebels Respecting Truce" (text). PA1701001894
Madrid AFE in Spanish. 2300 GMT, 16 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 18
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-011, 25-26.
"Government Admits 'Significant, Underdevelopment" (text).
PA0401024694 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
2348 GMT, 3 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report-Latin America, 4 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-
002, 26-27.
"Government Bulletin on Crisis" (text). PA0301061494 Mexico
City XEW Television Network in Spanish. 0501 GMT, 3
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 3 January 1993 [sic]. FBIS-LAT-94-001, 25-26.
"Government Denies Guatemalan Participation" (text).
PA0501050894 Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca
Network in Spanish. 0430 GMT, 5 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 5
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 14.
"Government Intitiates Operation to Aid Civilians" (text).
PA0701173194 Madrid EFE in Spanish. 1600 GMT, 7
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report
Latin America, 10 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006, 11-12.
"Government Proposes Framework for Talks with Rebels"
(text). PA0501144394 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish.
1335 GMT, 5 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report-Latin America, 6 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-
001, 16.
"Government Reports 'Greater Calm' in Chiapas" (text).
PA0401013694 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
2300 GMT, 3 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report-Latin America, 4 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-
002, 26.
"Government Spokesman Details Situation" (text).
PA0601130194 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish. 0435 GMT, 6 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 6 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-004, 22.
"Government Vows 'Immediate Attention' to Any Rebels Proposal"
(text). PA1501152094 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 1201
GMT, 15 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report-Latin America, 18 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-011,
25.
"Government Withdraws Troops from Within Chiapas Towns" (text).
PA2101035094 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
0144 GMT, 21 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report-Latin America, 21 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-014, 6.
"Groups Protest Chiapas Crisis, NAFTA 7 Jan" (text).
PA0801160094 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish. 1300 GMT, 8 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 10 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006, 14.
"Guatemala Institutes 'Strict' Border Security" (text).
PA0301200094 Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca
Network in Spanish. 1927 GMT, 3 January 1994. Translation
by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 4 January 1994.
FBIS-LAT-94-002, 24.
"Guatemalan Charged for Chiapas Attacks" (text). PA0901172294
Mexico City Radio Mil Network in Spanish. 1400 GMT, 9
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report
Latin America, 10 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006, 19.
"Guatemalan National Admits Active Role in Events" (text).
PA0601134694 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 1130 GMT, 6
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 6 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-004, 22-23.
Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. Mass Political Violence: A
Cross-National Causal Analysis. New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1973.
"Human Rights Commission Ask for Shelters" (text).
PA0801125594 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish. 0435 GMT, 8 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 10 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006, 11.
"Human Rights Commission Begins Violations Review" (text).
PA0701145994 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
1332 GMT, 7 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report Latin America, 10 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006,
11.
Human Rights Watch/America. "Human Rights and the Chiapas
Rebellion." Current History, March 1994, 121-123.
Ierardi, Anthony R. and E. Casey Wardynski. "The Zapatista
Rebellion in Chiapas." Military Review 74, no. 10
(October 1994): 64-75.
"Indian Peasants Flee Communities Due to Rebels" (text).
PA0401214694 Paris AFP in Spanish. 2056, GMT, 4 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 5 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 12.
"Indians Asks [sic] for Advance Warnings on Bombings" (text).
PA0801222394 Hamburg DPA in Spanish. 1459 GMT, 8 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 10 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006, 18-19.
"Indians Say Army Burned Warehouse 'Full of Bodies"' (text).
PA1501224494 Paris AFP in Spanish. 2135 GMT, 15 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 18 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-011, 23-24.
"Judge Advocate General Investigates Complaints Against Army"
(text). PA0402195694 Mexico City Canal 13 Television
Azteca in Spanish. 1300 GMT, 4 February 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 7
February 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-025, 8.
Kilroy, Richard J. Observations on the Mexican Insurgency,
Chiapas, and the Mexican Military. Monograph. U.S.
Army Combined Arms Command Foreign Military Studies
Office. Fort Leavenworth, KS: April 1994.
Klepak, Hal. "Rebellion Spoils Mexico's Aim for New
Respectability." Jane's Defence Weekly 21, no. 4
(January 1994): 17.
"Leave San Cristobal" (text). PA0201185794 Mexico City
Radio ACIR Network in Spanish. 1631 GMT, 2 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 3
January 1993 [sic]. FBIS-LAT-94-001, 23-24.
"Links Between Rebels, Clerics Noted" (text). PA0201162294
Paris AFP in Spanish. 1145 GMT, 2 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 3
January 1993 [sic]. FBIS-LAT-94-001, 20-21.
Manwaring, Max G. and Court Prisk. Editors., El Salvador at
War: An oral History of Conflict from the 1979 Insurrection
to the Present. Washington, DC: National Defense
Press, 1988.
"Marcos Claims Only Fraction of His Forces in San Cristobal" (text).
BR0701144494 Turin LA STAMPA (7 January 1991), 12. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 14 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94
010-A, 15.
"Marcos Urges Civilian Commitment to Peace" (text). PA0403211494 Madrid
EFE Spanish. 1902 GMT, 4 March 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 7 March 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-044, 11-14.
"Mayors Report People Leaving Towns to Join Rebels" (text). PA0901004994
Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 0117 GMT, 8 January 1994. Translation
by FBIS. EBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 10 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94
Ejercito -y la Sociedad Mexicana: Revista del Ejercito y Fuerza Aerea
Mexicanos, no. 88 (January-February 1994): 5-15.
"Mexico: Beyond the Talks; Farmers to Get Debt Relief."
Latin American Weekly Report, 17 March 1994, 110.
"Mexico: Direct Talks Are About to Begin." Latin American
Weekly Report, 17 February 1994, 62.
"Mexico: Fine-Tuning the Picture." Latin American Weekly
Report, 20 January 1994, 14.
"Mexico: How Much of a Surprise?" Latin American Weekly
Report, 20 January 1994, 15.
"Mexico: Identifying the Rebels." Latin American Weekly
Report, 27 January 1994, 27.
"Mexico: Indians Take up Arms in Chiapas." Latin American Weekly
Report, 13 January 1994, 2-3.
"Mexico: Just Who Are the Zapatistas?" Latin American
Weekly Report, 20 January 1994, 15.
"Mexico: Municipal Protests Engulf Chiapas." Latin
American Weekly Report, 24 February 1994, 75.
"Mexico: One Month on and Still No Talks.'" Latin American
Weekly Report, 27 January 1994, 40-41.
"Mexico: Organized Reaction Begins to Emerge." Latin
American Weekly Report, 24 March 1994, 122.
"Mexico: Outcome May Not Emerge from Talks." Latin
American Weekly Report, 3 March 1994, 95.
"Mexico: Political Fall-out as Rebellion Continues." Latin
American Weekly Report, 20 January 1994, 14-15.
"Mexico: The Rebels." Latin American Weekly Report, 13
January 1994, 2-3.
"Mexico: Salinas Tries Persuasion Tack." Latin American
Weekly Report, 27 January 1994, 27.
"Mexico: Shadows over the New Man." Latin American Weekly
Report, 7 April 1994, 146.
"Mexico: Two Prongs to Official Policy?" Latin American
Weekly Report, 27 January 1994, 28.
"Mexico: Zapatistas." Latin American Weekly Report, 7
April 1994, 146.
"Mexico: Zapatistas Still Want Salinas out." Latin
American Weekly Report, 10 March 1994, 98.
Meyer, Michael C. and William L. Sherman. The Course of
Mexican History. New York: Oxford University Press,
1979.
"Military Rejects Human Rights Charges" (text).
PA1601045194 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 0357 GMT,
16 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--
Latin America, 18 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-011, 24.
Millon, Robert P. Zapata: The Ideology of a Peasant
Revolutionary. New York: International Publishers,
1969.
Montes, Julio. "The Mexican Revolution -- 1994 Style."
Jane's Intelligence Review 6, no. 3 (March 1994):
138-140.
Morin, Jose Luis. "An Indigenous People's Struggle for
Justice." Covert Action Quarterly , no. 48 (Spring
1994): 38-43.
"National Defense Secretariat Updates Bulletin" (text).
PA0501172294 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
1616 GMT, 5 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report-Latin America, 6 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-
94-001,16.
"Normalcy Returning to Chiapas After Amnesty 11 (text).
PA1701160094 Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca
Network in Spanish. 1300 GMT, 17 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America,
18 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-011, 27-28.
O'Neill, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism. Washington,
D.C.: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1990.
"Occupy Guatemalan Border Towns" (text). PA0301004294
Madrid EFE in Spanish. 0000 GMT, 3 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 3 January 1993 [sic]. FBIS-LAT-94-001, 24-25.
"Official Cites Identity of Rebel Leaders" (text). PA0801165794
Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish. 1300 GMT,
8 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 10 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-
006, 17-18.
"Official on Chiapas Incidents" (text). PA0301060694 Mexico
City XEW Television Network AFP in Spanish. 0456 GMT,
3 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 3 January 1931 [sic]. FBIS-LAT-
94-001, 26.
"Officials Confirm Low Surveillance at Border" (text).
PA0901183594 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish. 1600 GMT, 9 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 11 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-007, 16.
"PRI Candidate Colosio Comments" (text). PA0301014794
Mexico City ACIR Network in Spanish. 0057 GMT, 3
January 1993 [sic]. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic]. FBIS-LAT-
94-001, 26-27.
"PROCESO Director Declines to Mediate; Menchu Accepts"
(text). PA0901214794 Paris AFP in Spanish. 1929 GMT,
9 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 10 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-
006, 13-14.
"PROCUP Claims Responsibility for Explosion" (text).
PA0901024694 Paris AFP in Spanish. 0107 GMT, 9 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America,
10 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006, 16.
"Peace Demonstration Held in Mexico City 12 January" (text).
PA1301015694 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
0045 GMT, 13 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 13 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-009,
16.
"Peasant Organizations Reject Violence" (text). PA0401033594
Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish. 0127 GMT, 4
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--
Latin America, 4 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-002, 28.
"Poverty in Chiapas Seen as Major Source of Strife" (text).
PA1001201794 Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca
Network in Spanish. 1300 GMT, 10 January 1994. Translation
by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 11 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-007, 19.
"President's Statement" (text). PA1201210694 Mexico City XEW
Television Network in Spanish. 2002 GMT, 12 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report --Latin America, 13
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-009, 11-12.
"Pursuit of Rebels Continues in Altos de Chiapas" (text).
PA1001145294 Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca
Network in Spanish. 1300 GMT, 10 January 1994. Translation
by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 11 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-007, 17.
"Radio ACIR Roundup on Chiapas Situation" (text). PA0401143294
Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish. 12.59 GMT, 4
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-
Latin America, 5 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 10.
"Radio Reports Situation" (text). PA020117QO94 Mexico City ACIR
Network in Spanish. 1512 GMT, 2 January 1994. Translation
by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993
[sic]. FBIS-LAT-94-001, 21-22.
Ramirez, Ignacio. "El Ejercito: Su Estructura Estrategica y Su
Doctrina de Guerra," Proceso, 14 February 1994, 7-13.
Translation by LTC Geoffrey B. Demarest, U.S. Army
Combined Arms Command Foreign Military Studies Office,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
"Rebel Attacks Expected in 'Next 24 Hours'" (text).
PA1901200694 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
1927 GMT, 19 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America. 21 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-014, 5.
"Rebel Leader Blames U.S." (text). BR0301124794 Rome L'Unita in
Italian (4 January 1994), 3. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic]. FBIS-
LAT-94-001, 22-23.
"Rebel News Conference" (text). PA0201041594 Paris AFP in
Spanish. 2353 GMT, 1 January 1994. Translation by FBIS.
FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic].
FBIS-LAT-94-001, 20.
"Rebels Close off 3 Towns; Declare War on Army" (text).
PA0101185894 Madrid EFE in Spanish. 1806 GMT, 1 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 3 January 1993 [sic]. FBIS-LAT-94-001, 19.
"Rebels Maintaining Presence in at Least Five Towns" (text).
PA0401021294 Paris AFP in Spanish. 0108 GMT, 4 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 4 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-002, 27.
"Rebels Occupy Town Near Guatemalan Border" (text).
PA0501201094 Madrid EFE in Spanish. 1849 GMT, 5 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 6 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-004, 16-17.
"Rebels Oppose NAFTA" (text). PA0201171194 Paris AFP in Spanish.
1555 GMT, 2 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report--Latin America, 3 January 1993 [sic]. FBIS-LAT-94-
001, 22.
"Rebels Said to Partially Retreat" (text). PA0401221794 Paris
AFP in Spanish. 2047 GMT, 4 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 5 January 1994.
FBIS-LAT-94-003, 12-13.
"Rebels Said to Reject Talks with Government" (text).
PA0301223894 Paris AFP in Spanish. 2115 GMT, 3 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 4 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-002, 24-25.
"Rebels Said to Retake Municipality" (text). PA1101192494
Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 1836 GMT, 11 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 12 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-941-008, 10.
"Rebels Steal 1.5 Tonnes of Explosives from Pemex" (text).
PA0501175994 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish. 0430 GMT, 5 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 6 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-004, 15.
"Rebels up Close en Route to Ocosingo" (text). PA0401151594
Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca Network in
Spanish. 1300 GMT, 4 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 5 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 10.
Reed, Nelson. The Caste War of Yucatan. Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1964.
"Rejects Government Dialogue Conditions" (text).
PA1101024094 Paris AFP in Spanish. 0201 GMT, 11
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. F8IS Daily Report--
Latin America, 11 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-007, 20-21.
"Released Hostages Arrive in Las Margaritas" (text).
PA1101155894 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish. 1300 GMT, 11 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 12 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-008, 9.
Riding, Alan. Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the
Mexicans. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985.
"Rights Activists Turned Back Near San Cristobal" (text).
PA1001150594 Mexico City Canal 13 Television Azteca
Network in Spanish. 1300 GMT, 10 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America,
11 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-007, 17.
Rubin, Dana. "Mayan Holiday." Texas Monthly , May 1993, 64-74.
Ruiz, Ramon E. The Great Rebellion: Mexico 1905-1924. New
York: W.W. Norton, 1980.
"Said to Withdraw" (text). PA0401031994 Madrid EFE in
Spanish. 0111 GMT, 4 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 4 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-002, 27-28.
"Salinas Asks Ombudsman to Ensure Human Rights" (text).
PA0601015994 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
0041 GMT, 6 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 6 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-
94-004, 20.
"Salinas Calls for Justice in Rural Areas" (text).
PA0601202194 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
1919 GMT, 6 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report--Latin America, 7 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-
94-005, 9-10.
"Salinas on Crisis; Scores Rebels" (text). PA0601214594
Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish. 2025
GMT, 6 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report Latin America, 7 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-005,
10-11.
"Salvadoran, Honduran Presidents to Visit 7 January" (text).
PA0501044094 Paris AFP in Spanish. 0346 GMT, 5 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin
America, 5 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94--003, 15.
Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional. Problematica en Chiapas.
Mexico City: Government of Mexico, undated.
Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto y Secretaria de
Desarollo Urbano y Comunicaciones. "Carta Geografica
del Estado de Chiapas." Map. Mexico City: Government of
Mexico, 1994.
"'Security Cordon' Accepted" (text). PA0702003594 Mexico
City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 2141 GMT, 7 February 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report--Latin America, 7
February 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-025, 13-14.
"Security Heightened in Mexico City" (text). PA0301140694
Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish. 1300 GMT, 3
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 3 January 1993 [sic]. FBIS-LAT-94-001, 27.
"'Sources' Disclose Increased Clashes" (text). PA0401173394
Madrid EFE in Spanish. 1627 GMT, 4 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 5
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 11.
"Spokesman, Human Rights Ombudsman Discuss Events" (text).
PA0601034394 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
0124 GMT, 6 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS
Daily Report-Latin America, 6 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-
004, 21.
"Sporadic Clashes Reported Despite Truce" (text).
PA1401173694 Madrid AFE in Spanish. 1620 GMT, 14
January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 18 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-011, 20.
The Statesman's Yearbook: Statistical and Historical Annual
of the States of the World for the Year 1994-1995.
131st ed. Under "Mexico."
Stevenson, J.I.S. The 1994 Zapatista Rebellion in Southern
Mexico: An Analysis and Assessment. Monograph. U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College. Fort
Leavenworth, KS: 1994.
"Strict Security Measures for Cleanup Operation" (text).
PA0601200594 Paris AFP in Spanish. 1859 GMT, 6 January
1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin
America, 7 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-005, 6.
"Stricter Security Measures for Mexico City" (text).
PA0801141394 Mexico City XEW Television Network in
Spanish. 0435 GMT, 8 January 1994. Translation by
FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 10 January
1994. FBIS-LAT-94-006, 15.
"'Tense' Situation in San Cristobal Reported" (text).
PA0301170194 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
1518 GMT, 3 January 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report-Latin America, 4 January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-002, 22
23.
"Tension Grows in Chiapas; Peasant Leader Killed" (text).
PA1003024394 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish.
0000 GMT, 10 March 1994. Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily
Report-Latin America, 10 March 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-047, 12.
"Town Under Civilian, Military Control" (text). PA0501021994
Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish. 0132 GMT, 5 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 5
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-003, 13.
"Trends: Taking Another Look at Poverty in Mexico." Latin
American Weekly Report, 27 January 1994,
"Two Hundred Said Killed, 500 Wounded" (text). PA0401062394
Madrid EFE in Spanish. 0539 GMT, 4 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 4
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-002, 29.
"Vatican Offers to Mediate" (text). PA0301181694 Mexico City
ACIR Network in Spanish. 1633 GMT, 3 January 1994.
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 4
January 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-002, 23.
"Views Future of Peace Negotiations" (text). PA0503043694
Mexico City La Jornada (4 March 1994), 3, 12
Translation by FBIS. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America,
7 March 1994. FBIS-LAT-94-044, 11.
Virtuoso, Jose. "Insurrection in Chiapas....Revolution in
Mexico?" Envio 13, no.153 (April 1994); 30-35.
Watson, Alexander F. "Chiapas: Implications for U.S.-
Mexico Relations." Dispatch 5, no. 7 (14 February
1994): 83-87.
Wilkinson, Paul. Terrorism and the Liberal State. New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977.
Wolf, Eric. Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. New
York: Harper and Row, 1969.
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