DOD Prepositioning--A Growth Industry
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - DOD
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: DOD PREPOSITIONING A GROWTH INDUSTRY
Author: Major Dennis W. Ray, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: Calls for a "peace dividend" from Congress, and the
American taxpayer, demand changes to strategies, force
structure, and allocation of resources for national
security. Despite declining DOD budgets and the end of the
Cold War, DOD has increased the amount of assets
prepositioned around the world in the interest of national
security.
Background: With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
passing of the Cold War, the United States has been forced
to reexamine the Nation's security strategy. Since the end
of Desert Storm, DOD, the Joint Staff, and the military
services have struggled to develop a comprehensive military
strategy that supports a reduced force structure and
declining fiscal resources. Three major studies have been
conducted to determine how best to size and deploy U.S.
forces in support of national interests. These studies are:
1. The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS),
(1992).
2. The Department of Defense Bottom-Up Review
(BUR), (1993) .
3. The Mobility Requirements Study Bottom UP
Review Update (MRS BURU), (1995).
When it comes to prepositioning, the end of the cold war
has produced no dramatic peace dividend. Prior to the end
of the cold war the U.S. had 11 brigade size sets of
equipment prepositioned. Each study since the collapse of
the Soviet Union has recommended more prepositioning. If
these findings are approved by Congress and funded by the
U.S. taxpayer, the U.S. will have 13 sets of equipment
prepositioned in various places around the world.
COLD WAR POST COLD WAR
7 brigade sets in Europe 5 brigade sets in Europe
1 brigade set in Norway 1 brigade set in Norway
3 brigade sets afloat 1 brigade set in Korea
2 brigade sets in SWA
4 brigade sets afloat
Recommendation: DOD is already struggling to maintain
equipment readiness and to procure the weapon systems of the
future. Now is the time for DOD to reduce expenditures in
prepositioning to finance the future of the nation's
defense.
OUTLINE
I. INTRODUCTION
II. WHY PREPOSITION EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES?
III. UNITED STATES PREPOSITIONING DURING THE COLD WAR
IV. THE MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS STUDY
V. THE DOD BOTTOMUP REVIEW
VI. THE MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS STUDY, BOTTOM UP REVIEW
UPDATE
VII. ANALYSIS
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
DOD PREPOSITIONING PROGRAMSA GROWTH INDUSTRY!
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the passing
of the Cold War, the United States has been forced to
re-examine the Nation's security strategy. The calls for a
cold war "peace dividend" from Congress, and more
importantly the American taxpayer, demand changes to
strategies, force structure, and allocation of resources for
national security. As recently as the November, 1994
election, the American voters spoke and demanded a balanced
budget and reduction of the national debt.
Since the end of Desert Storm, the Department of Defense
(DOD), the Joint Staff, and the military services have
struggled to develop a comprehensive military strategy that
supports a reduced force structure and declining fiscal
resources. Three major studies have been conducted to
determine how best to size and deploy U.S. forces in support
of national interests. These studies are:
1. The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS),
(1992).
2. The Department of Defense Bottom-Up Review
(BUR) , (1993).
3. The Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up
Review Update (MRS BURU), (1995).
The purpose of this paper is to look at these three
studies and show the impact they have had on one small but
important aspect of national security--Prepositioning. As a
baseline for prepositioning requirements, I will start with
the U.S. global prepositioning prior to the collapse of the
Soviet Union and conclude with the proposed prepositioning
requirements of the 21st century.
WHY PREPOSITION EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES?
Prepositioning afloat or ashore is a strategic mobility
multiplier. Having equipment and supplies close to a
potential conflict area allows for the rapid movement of
military forces into a theater. The basic concept for
prepositioning, either at sea or ashore, allows for the bulk
of the combat power of a unit, or units, to be forward
deployed in or close to the theater, while allowing the
personnel to remain at their base or station training and
performing other missions. When a crisis occurs, the unit
deploys via strategic airlift to the theater to linkup with
its equipment and is combat ready much quicker than if the
people and equipment had to flow from the United States via
air and sea.
Another way to look at prepositioning is that
prepositioning provides the bridge between the early
warfighting requirements in a particular theater and the
strategic mobility assets required to move these
requirements. If the strategic mobility assets of the
nation do not meet the arrival requirements of the CINC,
then prepositioning provides the assets without having to
forward deploy combat units.
Each of the studies examined and made recommendations to
the nation's warfighting requirements and strategic mobility
assets. If the warfighting requirement was valid, and
improvements to strategic mobility could not meet the
requirement, then the studies recommended prepositioning.
UNITED STATES PREPOSITIONING DURING THE COLD WAR
In 1978, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization developed
a long term plan to correct deficiencies for the defense of
Europe against the Warsaw Pact threat. The Prepositioned
Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) was established to
support USAREUR's effort to support NATO's defense plan.
USAREUR's plan was to deploy 10 Army divisions in 10 days.
In the mid 1980s, the U.S. Army had approximately 5 1/3
divisions in Europe.1 The POMCUS concept called for 12
brigade suites of equipment to be prepositioned at or near
its point of anticipated use to reduce reinforcement
reaction time, requiring only personnel and limited
additional equipment be transported into the theater during
the deployment phase. By 1989, seven brigade sized POMCUS
suites had been built.2
In 1981 the Marine Corps entered into the Norway
Prepositioning Program. The program was established to
rapidly reinforce Norway, NATO's northern flank. The Marine
Corps prepositioned a Marine Expeditionary Brigade's suite
of equipment in caves in Norway, and the plan called for the
Marine Corps to deploy via strategic air a Marine Air Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) to fall in on equipment stored in central
Norway. The MAGTF's mission was to defend in either north,
central, or south Norway depending on the warning time and
tactical situation.3
In response to the 1979 Iranian Embassy Crisis, Secretary
of Defense Harold Brown recommended the United States start
prepositioning equipment and supplies afloat in order to
respond to global contingencies. The equipment and supplies
prepositioned at sea were broken into two segments: the
Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) program and the Afloat
Prepositioning Force (APF) program.
The Marine Corps MPS program was, and still is, composed
of 13 ships, civilian-owned and operated under long-term
charter to the Military Sealift Command. These ships were,
and still are, organized into three Maritime Prepositioning
Ships Squadrons (MPSRONs): MPSRON-1, based in the
Atlantic/Mediterranean Sea; MPSRON-2, forward based at Diego
Garcia; and MPSRON-3, forward based in the Guam-Saipan area.
Each MPSRON was, and still is, loaded with the majority of
the equipment and 30 days of combat supplies for a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) sized MAGTF consisting of 17,000
Marines and Sailors.4 The basic concept is to deploy the
MAGTF via strategic air and self deploying organic combat
aircraft to a secure port and airfield to linkup with the
ships. The MAGTF would then offload the equipment and
supplies and within 10 days be combat ready.
The Army and Air Force portion of afloat prepositioning,
the Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF), consisted of two
general cargo vessels at Diego Garcia and one in the
Mediterranean, four lighter aboard-ship (LASH) craft
carrying nearly 300 barges and eight pusher boats, two
tankers at Diego Garcia and two at Subic Bay in the
Philippines. In addition, APF had two special crane ships
and the American Cormorant, a ship that resembles a floating
port, containing two floating cranes, four large tugs and
other equipment. While MPS was designed to provide combat
forces for initial crisis response, the APF supported the
mission of theater and longterm joint logistical support.5
THE MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS STUDY
As a result of the end of the Cold War and the slow build
up of combat power in the Desert Storm, Congress in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991,
tasked the Department of Defense to determine future
mobility requirements for the Armed Forces and to develop an
integrated mobility plan. The collapse of the Soviet Union
dramatically changed the way U.S. security is planned, and
the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) attempted to capture a
new concept for U.S. security planning. The MRS assessed
the international security environment and determined that:6
Although global war is improbable, certain realities
endure: a formidable nuclear arsenal in the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS); continued long-term vital
interests across the Atlantic, the Pacific, and in our
own hemisphere; and the uncertainty of a continually
changing world.
... The most significant change is a major shift in
emphasis from a strategy of global Soviet containment to
one of primarily regional orientation.
Through increased flexibility in planning, training,
and employment, the regional challenges of the future
will be met with a restructured U.S. Force, a smaller force
than today's, which still can protect and promote
U.S. global interests.
Responding to regional crises is one of the key demands
of our new strategy. The regional contingencies we might
face are many and varied and could arise on short notice.
U.S. forces therefore must be able to respond rapidly to
deter and, if necessary, to fight unilaterally or as part
of an international coalition.
With this new strategy, the study analyzed logistic and
warfighting aspects of potential regional crises set in 1999
using various regional scenarios. Over 90 separate war
games were conducted and analyzed to examine the effects of
variations in the critical factors.7 These critical factors
included U.S. strategic orientation, speed in reacting to
intelligence indications of aggression, and capability of
allied forces and support. The war games were based on
regional contingencies in the Persian Gulf, Korean
Peninsula, Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Western
Hemisphere. In addition, other war games were conducted
under a scenario of two concurrent regional contingencies
beginning sequentially. The analysis of the war games
indicated that in both Korea and the Persian Gulf additional
mobility assets were required to deliver a heavier force
more rapidly thereby reducing early risk.
As a result of the war games and the analysis, the
Mobility Requirements Study recommended the following
changes to the strategic mobility assets of the U.S.: 8
a. To acquire additional sealift capacity equal to 20
Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/roll-off Ships (LMSRs). In
addition, to lease two container ships for
prepositioning.
b. To deploy (by FY 1997) an afloat prepositioned
package of approximately 2 million sqft of Army combat
and combat support equipment. This package will be
carried on nine LMSRs in the prepositioning
configuration. To provide an adequate capability to
respond in force within the first two weeks to any
regional crisis.
c. To add (by FY 1998) 3 million sqft of surge sealift
capability for the rapid deployment of heavy Army
divisions and support from the United States. This
capability will be provided by 11 of the LMSRs in high
readiness.
d. To expand (by FY 1999) the Ready Reserve Force
(RRF) from the current 96 ships to 142 ships and to
increase the readiness of the fleet.
e. To continue the C-17 program to improve the airlift
component of strategic mobility.
THE DOD BOTTOM-UP REVIEW
In March 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed a
comprehensive review of the nation's defense strategy, force
structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations.
The Secretary believed that a DOD wide review was needed
from "the bottom up" because of the dramatic changes that
had occurred in the world as a result of the end of the Cold
War. "Thus, the underlying premise of the Bottom-Up Review
(BUR) was that we needed to reassess all of our defense
concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up."9
Four broad classes of potential military operations were
used in the BUR to evaluate the adequacy of future force
structure alternatives: Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs),
smaller-scale conflicts (i.e. peace enforcement or
intervention operations), overseas presence, and deterrence
of attacks with weapons of mass destruction.
The BUR determined the United States must field forces
sufficient to fight and win two major regional conflicts
occurring nearly simultaneously. Building on the scenarios
developed for the MRS, the BUR selected two scenarios for
planning and assessment--Persian Gulf and Korea. In each
scenario, the BUR examined the performance of projected U.S.
forces in relation to critical parameters including warning
time, the threat, terrain, weather, duration of hostilities,
and combat intensity. The scenarios assumed a similar enemy
operation: an armor-heavy, combined-arms offensive against
the outnumbered forces of a neighboring state. U.S. forces
had to deploy to the region quickly, halt the invasion, and
defeat the aggressor.10
In order for the nation to fight and win two near
simultaneous MRCs the BUR recommended:11
a. Continue the program to purchase and deploy the
C-17 airlifter or purchase other airlifters to replace
our aging C-141 transport aircraft.
b. Store a brigade set of heavy Army equipment afloat;
the ships carrying this materiel would be positioned in
areas from which they could be sent on short notice
either to the Persian Gulf or to Northeast Asia.
c. Increase the capacity of our surge sealift fleet to
transport forces and equipment rapidly form the U.S. to
distant regions by purchasing additional roll-on/roll-off
ships.
d. Improve the readiness and responsiveness of the
Ready Reserve Force (RRF through a variety of
enhancements).
The BUR also made recommendations concerning overseas
presence: 12
EUROPE: Continue to provide leadership in a
reinvigorated NATO. Retain about 100,000 troops in
Europe. These forces will include about two and one-
third wings of Air Force fighters and substantial
elements of two Army divisions, along with a corps
headquarters and other supporting elements. Preposition
the additional equipment to bring these in-place
divisions to full strength, along with the equipment of
one additional division that would deploy to the region
in the event of a conflict.
NORTHEAST ASIA: Retain close to 100,000 troops,
consisting of two brigades, and one wing of U.S. Air
Force combat aircraft in Korea. Preposition one Army
Brigade-size suite of equipment in Korea.
SOUTHWEST ASIA: The absence of large-scale U.S.
military presence in the region will require the U.S. to
rely on periodic deployments of forces, rather than
routine stationing of forces on the ground. Preposition
one Army brigade-size suite of equipment in Kuwait.
Preposition a second brigade suite elsewhere on the
Arabian peninsula.
The remainder of the BUR recommendations dealt with other
regions of the world but had no impact on overall DOD
prepositioning.
THE MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS STUDY, BOTTOM-UP REVIEW UPDATE
As a result of the MRS and the BUR, in late 1993 the
Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Joint Staff to
conduct a third study called the Mobility Requirements
Study, Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS BURU). Representatives
of the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
CINCs, and military services were tasked to participate.
The purpose of the study was to examine strategic sealift,
land and afloat prepositioning, CONUS infrastructure
recommendations, and to define the strategic airlift
requirement.
The study process was similar to that used in the MRS and
the BUR. Four scenarios were used for the study, they were:
MRC East, MRC West, near simultaneous East-West, and near
simultaneous West-East. Each scenario was analyzed in three
warfighting phases: halting, build-up, and counterattack.
The objective of the halting phase was to stop the enemy's
attack and required the rapid deployment of forces
sufficient to defend against a short-warning attack and
minimize the loss of territory and critical facilities. The
warfighting and mobility analysis were conducted for all
phases of the four scenarios. The force structure and
mobility resources programmed for FY 2001 were found to be
adequate to maintain moderate risk in all scenarios except
for the halting phase of MRC-East as a single and as the
second of two nearly simultaneous MRCs.
The MRS BURU was approved and signed by Secretary
of Defense William Perry on 30 March 1995. Unlike the MRS or
the BUR the findings and recommendations in the MRS BURU are
classified. The study did recommend additional analysis on
increasing the Army Afloat Prepositioning Program.
ANALYSIS
Since 1991, the United States military has conducted
three major studies to determine the best way to fight
future regional contingencies, and to meet the strategic
mobility requirements of the nation. In each study DOD used
basically the same scenarios. The base line study (MRS)
recommended, in addition to forces already planned, that to
win a single MRC in SWA or Korea the U.S. needed to be able
to close one Army heavy brigade in less then 15 days. The
answer to this mobility dilemma was to preposition a single
Army heavy brigade afloat. The BUR recommended that in
order to fight and win two near simultaneous MRCs the nation
needed to preposition two Army brigade sets in SWA and one
Army brigade set in Korea. The BUR also validated the
requirement for the Army heavy brigade afloat program. The
MRS BURU concluded that in order to fight and win two MRCs
the nation must preposition two Army brigade sets in SWA and
one Army brigade set in Korea. The MRS BURU also
recommended further analysis regarding increasing the Army
afloat prepositioning program. In all three studies MPS was
evaluated, but no study recommended changes to the USMC MPS
program. Each study incrementally increased prepositioning
assets.
Has the relative combat power in SWA changed so
dramatically that it now takes three Army brigades
(two land prepo and one afloat prepo) and up to two USMC
brigades to provide the combat power required to halt the
threat? The United States Army plans to flow the following
forces in to SWA by C+15:
-Two Mechanized Infantry Brigades (equipment from land
prepositioning) by C+10.
-One Light Infantry Division (via strategic air) by C+12.
-One Mechanized Infantry Brigade (equipment from afloat
prepositioning) by C+15.13
(JCS Publication One defines C-Day as "The unnamed day on
which a deployment operation is to commence ..."). Add to
that impressive force list, other critical joint forces such
as carrier aviation, Marine Corps MPF (two brigades), and
Air Force fighter wings and you have a potent combat punch
in less then three weeks. The United States will now be
capable of delivering three additional brigades worth of
ground combat power in the first 15 days than was possible
in Desert Storm. It is also capable of delivering two
additional combat brigades in the first 15 days than the MRS
required for its moderate risk, moderate cost solution.
How much has the threat changed in SWA since pre-Desert
Storm? Has Iraq's military power increased relative to that
of the United States and the other countries in the region?
Another cause for increased delivery of combat power is
warning times. Warning times can significantly drive force
requirements and closure profiles. Were the warning times
assumed by the MRS too optimistic or has the U.S.
intelligence capabilities dramatically decreased with
regards to indications and warnings since the MRS was
published?
Each study appears to have accepted the recommendations of
the previous study and simply added additional requirements.
If the SWA requirement is now for two brigades of land
prepositioning and an Army heavy brigade afloat, plus any
USMC MPF brigade contributions, then the MRS must have been
seriously flawed. Have the capabilities of potential foes
(i.e. Iraq or North Korea) dramatically increased in the
last four years? Is either Iraq or North Korea stronger
militarily now then it was during the MRS analysis, or did
the MRS used flawed data? Additionally, Secretary of
Defense William Perry was quoted by the Associated Press on
20 March 1995, as saying "There should be three brigade sets
prepositioned in SWA."14 Does this now mean that in order
to fight and win the SWA MRC, the requirement is one heavy
brigade afloat and three brigade sets prepositioned in SWA?
Is the extra brigade additive, or does it replace the afloat
brigade with a less expensive land prepositioned brigade?
If the brigade is additive then the MRS, BUR and MRS BURU
are incorrect with regards to combat power required for the
SWA MRC. If the brigade is not additive then it should
replace the Army afloat brigade.
Assuming the MRS BURU is correct, in order to fight and
win just the SWA MRC the U.S. needs to preposition two
brigades ashore and one brigade afloat. Does the U.S. have
the strategic airlift required to deliver these forces by
C+15? Strategic airlift is critical in supporting the
implementation of any prepositioning program. Equipment and
personnel must be flown into the theater in order for
prepositioned equipment to be employed. In SWA the U.S.
would need to flow the personnel for three Army brigades, at
least one Marine MPF brigade, and the personnel and
equipment for one light division all in the first 15 days of
the conflict. Prepositioning is not the only draw on
strategic airlift. At the same time the USA and USMC are
closing the personnel to support the prepositioned brigades,
the USAF would also be trying to flow personnel and
equipment into the theater to support their early arriving
requirements. The question becomes--Will enough airlift be
available to employ four brigades worth of prepositioned
equipment and one light division by C+15? If the airlift
was not available and units had to be prioritized and arrive
after C+15, should the U.S. pay to preposition more forces
than it could deliver in that time frame? If to fight and
win the SWA MRC the U.S. needs all those brigade sets
prepositioned and is willing to fund them, then the U.S.
must buy enough strategic airlift to support the
requirement.
By simply cutting the Army brigade afloat, DOD could save
almost $1.1 billion in start up costs and annual operating
cost of approximately $60 million per year.15 By cutting
this one prepositioning program would the United States lose
its ability to fight and win two near simultaneous MRCs?
The loss of one brigade will not be the difference, it will
change the calculus of the two MRC scenario, but it would
not mean defeat. Will the loss of one afloat brigade affect
the outcome of a single MRC, or can less expensive land
based prepositioning replace the requirement?
The main argument for the Army afloat brigade is that it
can rapidly deploy to any scenario, a luxury that land
prepositioning does not allow. With four brigade sets
currently afloat (3 USMC and 1 Army), the U.S. is capable of
responding rapidly with up to four brigade sets anywhere in
the world. By losing one set all the U.S. loses is some
redundancy. While comparing the Army and USMC brigades is
much like comparing apples and oranges, both provide a
potent combat punch capable of opening a lodgement to allow
additional U.S. forces to deploy into a theater.
CONCLUSIONS
When it comes to prepositioning, the end of the cold war
has produced no dramatic peace dividend. Prior to the end
of the cold war the U.S. had 11 brigade size sets of
equipment globally prepositioned:
7 brigade sets in Europe
1 brigade set in Norway
3 brigade sets afloat (USMC MPF)
Each study since the collapse of the Soviet Union has
recommended more prepositioning. If these findings are
approved by Congress and funded by the U.S. taxpayer, the
U.S. will have 13 sets of equipment prepositioned in various
places around the world:
5 brigade sets in Europe
1 brigade set in Norway
1 brigade set in Korea
2 brigade sets in SWA
4 brigade sets afloat (1 Army and 3 USMC)
What is the vital national interest requiring the U.S. to spend in excess of a billion dollars on additional prepositioning? In reality this money does not go to the defense of the United States, but to the defense of other nations.
The three studies examined in this paper have attempted
to provide the United States taxpayer with the best trained
most capable fighting force in the world. Without a doubt
the implementation of the combined recommendations of the
these studies would enable the U.S. to fight and win two
near simultaneous major regional conflicts. But the real
question becomes one of cost. How much will the American
taxpayer pay to ensure that we can defend countries far from
our shores?
Is it a vital national interest to be able to deploy U.S.
U.S. combat forces around the globe in 15 days to halt
aggression? Or is it time for our friends and allies to
increase their defense spending to halt aggression in their
countries and that of their neighbors, and rely on the U.S.
to support them as required. DOD is already struggling to
maintain equipment readiness and to procure the weapon
systems of the future. Now is the time for DOD to reduce
expenditures in prepositioning to finance the future of the
nation's defense.
NOTES
1. LTCOL Martz, Action Officer at DC/S Operations, Department of
the Army, telephone interview by author 6 February 1995.
UNITS
1st Armored Division (3 Brigades)
3rd Infantry Division (3 Brigades)
3rd Armored Division (3 Brigades)
8th Infantry Division (3 Brigades)
2nd Armored Division (Fwd) (1 Brigade)
1st Infantry Division (Fwd) (1 Brigade)
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (1 Brigade)
2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (1 Brigade)
TOTAL 5 1/3 Brigades
2. Department of Defense, Inspector General, U.S. Army, Europe
Prepositioning Requirements for War Reserve Materiel, Audit
Report No 94-189, September 12, 1994, pg 2-3.
3. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (POE-15), Norway
Prepositioning Program, Point Paper, 16 March 1994.
4. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (POE-15), Maritime
Prepositioning Program, Information Paper, 13 July 1993.
5. Vernon A. Guidry, "The Promise of Prepositioning," Military
Logistics Forum, Volume 3, No 2, (September 1986) pg 53.
6. Department of Defense, Mobility Requirements Study (MRS),
Volume 1, January 1992, II-1.
7. DOD, MRS, ES-3.
8. DOD, MRS, ES 5-6.
9. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (BUR),
(Washington, DC: Oct 1993), iii.
10. DOD, BUR, pg 13-15.
11. DOD, BUR, pg 20-21.
12. DOD, BUR, pg 23-25.
13. Department of the Army, DC/S Operations (War Plans
Division), Information Briefing--Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA).
14. Charles Aldinger, "Saudis Agree to Increased Readiness"
Washington Times, 20 March 1995, Sec. Al.
15. Ms. Kim Richards, Action Officer, DC/S Logistics, Department
of the Army, telephone interview by author, 9 March 1995.
LMSRs - $270 million per ship (4 x 270M = $1.08 Billion)
Maintenance facility - $ 42 million
Annual operating costs:
LMSR $25,000/ship/day (4 x $25,000 x 365 = $36.5
Million)
Container ships $32,200/ship/day
(2 x 32,200 x 365=$23.5 Million)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aldinger, Charles, "Saudis Agree to Increased Readiness."
Washington Times, 20 March 1995, Sec A-1.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strategy of
the United States of America. Washington DC: Government
Printing Office, February 1995.
Department of Defense. Mobility Requirements Study Volume I.
Washington DC: Government Printing Office, January 1992.
Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General. U.S.
Army, Europe Prepositioning Requirements for War Reserve_
Materiel. Washington DC: Government Printing Office,
September 1994.
Department of Defense. Report on the Bottom-Up Review.
Washington DC: Government Printing Office, October 1993.
Guidry, Vernon A. Jr. "The Promise of Prepositioning." Military
Logistics Forum 3.2 (1986): 49-53.
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. "Maritime Prepositioning Force."
1993 Top-Level School Reference Papers. Washington DC:
Special Projects Directorate, July 1993. Tab (C).
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Norway Prepositioning Program."
1993 Top-Level School Reference Papers. Washington DC:
Special Projects Directorate, July 1993. Tab (C).
Martz, LtCol USA. Action Officer, Department of the Army, Deputy
Chief of Staff, Operations. Telephone interview by author,
6 February 1995.
Richards, Kim. Action Officer, Department of the Army, Deputy
Chief of Staff, Logistics. Telephone interview by author,
9 March 1995.
U.S. President. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement. Washington DC: Government Printing Office,
July 1994.
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