Military

Iran:  The Resurgent Persians Prepare For The Next Conflict

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy

 

 

 

 

IRAN: The Resurgent Persians Prepare for the Next Conflict

 

 

 

                      Lieutenant Commander Douglas S. Randlett

                      United States Navy

                      United States Marine Corps Command and

                      Staff College

                     18 April, 1995

 

 

 

                                   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Title: IRAN: The Resurgent Persians Prepare for the Next Conflict

 

 

Author: Lieutenant Commander Douglas S. Randlett, United States Navy

 

 

Thesis: The Republic of Iran is rapidly rearming its military with advanced air, land, and naval weapons which will produce a powerful offensive capability far beyond the requirements for purely defensive purposes. Such developments ultimately threaten U.S. and allied interests in the strife-prone Persian Gulf region.

 

Background: Two pivotal events have uniquely influenced modern Iranian thought and strategy: the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf crisis. The former decimated Tehran's military, economy and national morale at the hands of a regional hegemon while the latter proved western resolve to intervene militarily on a grand scale to protect strategic interests. Iran has responded with the acquisition of modern aircraft, missiles, C3I systems and new naval platforms to prepare for the next conflict evident through an ongoing Mideast arms race. Additionally, ominous signs reveal the desire of Tehran to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including nuclear technology which could tip the regional power balance and threaten states as far away as Israel. This effort is being hidden by a propaganda campaign from Tehran intended to soften its reputation as an international pariah and terrorist state. Western economies, fully dependent upon Persian Gulf oil, will soon be threatened by an invigorated Iranian military.

 

 

Recommendation: The U.S. must lead the world to scrupulously

monitor Iranian conventional and WMD threats. Early action can

prevent another regional hegemon from developing and threatening

U.S. strategic interests.

 

 

            The Republic of Iran has emerged within the last five years as

a nation highly desirous of inclusion into international politics and

economies as a means to ensure future stability and security in

relations with neighboring states. Two events within the last decade

have profoundly shaped Tehran's current posture - the war with

Iraq (1980-88) where tremendous human and material resources

were depleted and the Persian Gulf War (1990-91) where the U.S.

led coalition proved its determination and capability to decimate

Iraq in a lightening- quick conflict.

            Iran remains poised at the end of this century to play a

significant role in the Persian Gulf. This goal is buttressed on a

massive rearmament program, an attempt to soften international

fears of a "terrorist state" and an effort to rebuild its economy on

diverse domestic industries, principally natural gas and oil

production. How these events unfold may well determine whether

regional strife again occurs in an area marked by intense

international competition and influence over vast oil deposits

necessary for global economic activity.

 

 

U.S. Strategy

 

            A study of Iranian strategic doctrine must be considered in

relation to other regional powers and certainly the West which

uniquely influences the Middle East. A review of U.S policy in the

Middle East provides a background from which Iranian policy has

developed and strategic doctrine is emerging.

            The current U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf is described as "Dual Containment," first announced in July 1993 when the Clinton administration concluded that the leadership of Iran and Iraq will

remain hostile to U.S. aims for the foreseeable future and that a

strategy to ensure that both countries remain equally weak is

essential. This doctrine emerged not exclusively from within

Washington but reflects advice given to Secretary of State Warren Christopher by Middle East leaders during his visit to that region

earlier in the year.

            The concept of building up one nation to balance the other's military and political influence (the U.S. supported Iran against Iraq

in the 70's and Iraq against Khomeini in the 80's), the practice and

failure of the past, is now gone. This concept is a departure from the

last fifteen years and reflects a concern that regional hegemony in

this vital oil-rich region cannot be risked to nations who could

threaten western oil supplies. Following the 1989 death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the election of President Rafsanjani and the subsequent

victory of coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War, the West

anticipated a "Tehran Spring" in 1992. Yet, that year, United

Kingdom Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd lamented that "The hope

that Iran would develop into a moderate, relatively pro-western

power has evaporated."1 The failure of Tehran to seize this

significant opportunity for renewed association with the West

confirmed its desire for continued political isolation and the self-

sufficient Islamic state. This self-imposed restriction places a natural political barrier between it and the West and potentially threatens

strategic relationships, particularly the concern to western

governments for access to cheap and plentiful Mideast oil vital to

fuel petroleum-based industries.

            This dilemma of an isolated Iran, acting independently of the industrialized (Western) world's political system, draws moderate

Arab states in the region, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), to the West's protective umbrella. These six oil-rich kingdoms have invested hundreds of billions of dollars into U.S. and European markets creating a symbiotic relationship that is both financially and strategically relevant. With western economic growth highly

dependent on Mideast oil for most of this century - and with no end

in sight - it appears that the U.S. has assumed a quasi-warden's role

in the region for the foreseeable future.2

Iranian Strategy and Outlook

 

            The present Iranian strategy has been molded significantly by

two major events - the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf crisis.

Both have led to a review of Iranian national needs and

commitments, both regionally and globally, and now is evinced

through dramatic efforts to rebuild their economic and military infrastructures.

            The war with Iraq was a defining experience - over one

million casualties, a decimated economy, acceptance of an unfair

peace settlement for a war they did not start and the loss of a

military capability the former Shah spent billions to develop.

(Between 1975-78, huge defense expenditures consumed 27 percent

of U.S. defense expenditures at the height of the Cold War never

reached these proportions.)3 In spite of advanced U.S. weaponry,

Iranian forces failed to defeat the Iraqis, due largely to the

qualitative and quantitative improvement in Iraqi arms and tactics

and the paucity of U.S. spare parts. Additionally, Iraqi Scud-B

attacks on Iranian cities, air attacks against economic and industrial

targets and chemical attacks against Iranian concentrated troop

formations (WWI tactics) proved extremely effective as weapons of

terror, cutting morale and domestic support for the war. Finally, the significant losses during the 1988 "Tanker War" resulted in

destruction of one-half of Iran's surface warships. As a result of this carnage, in 1989, President Rafsanjani stated that, "Our defense

posture must be strong ... we must emphasize domestic military

industries in order to provide for our common defense needs and not depend on others."4 The military, since then, has become the

benefactor of increased funding through industrial expansion,

technology absorption, expanded energy production and

improvements in infrastructure to create a regional capability

determined not to lose the next conflict and to respond decisively

when strategic needs dictate.

            The rapid and total defeat of Iraq in 1991 was an incredibly fortunate event for Iran (they declared neutrality during the

conflict) by providing a hiatus from their traditional enemy and

allowing them to concentrate on military rearmament efforts. In a

sense, it was a lucky break with excellent timing. The Gulf War also proved America's willingness to intervene against regional

aggression and led to the invigoration of GCC military capabilities following the conflict, both providing a reality check to apparent

Iranian fortuitousness. To some Iran-watchers, the cards are now

stacked against Tehran with prospects of a long-term U.S.

commitment to the region. To the Iranians, however, this unique opportunity (Iraq defeated and under UN supervision and embargo)

has been a long time coming and cannot be lost. Why the optimism?

Most importantly, Iran is at peace and actively participating in world

trade. It is currently among the top five global oil producers with oil reserves estimated at 89 billion barrels (enough for 50 years at

current production levels) and is the third largest producer of

natural gas. These sources alone generate great income. (Although

there is currently a U.S. embargo on imported Iranian oil, a loophole allows U.S. oil corporations to ship and sell over $4 billion per year of Iranian crude to Japanese industry, engineered for specific use of

this product. This represents 25 percent of total annual sales by the National Iranian Oil Company.)5 Additionally, petroleum spin-off industries now produce plastics, industrial compounds and synthetic

fibers therefore providing jobs and enhancing local economic

potential. Further, its population of 60 million is the largest in

southwest and central Asia, eclipsing the combined populations of

Saudi Arabia, Iraq and all Gulf sheikdoms, with a strategic position

vital to Gulf oil supplies and transportation routes. It is also the

religious core for 150 million Shiia Muslims whose culture spreads

into neighboring states. Certainly such resources provide an

economic, cultural and labor infrastructure vital to growth and

enhanced stature in the Gulf region. Ultimately, however, they

ensure the ability to purchase arms and military technology.

            In order to ease fears during rearmament, Iran has attempted

to change its image as a "terrorist and outlaw state" and has issued diplomatic statements urging accommodation. In 1993, Deputy

Defense Minister Ali Akbar Velyati stated that "Any reliable security

in the region should depend upon regional cooperation,"6 a remark

likely made to placate Arab leaders who have invested heavily in

new arms to counter regional threats. The $40 billion spent by the

GCC states since 1990 on fighter and attack aircraft, C3I systems,

ships and cruise and ballistic missile systems has forced Tehran to

retreat on its traditional anti-Western rhetoric since such words are

now threatening to America's new Arab allies. It is imperative,

therefore, that Iran rearm quickly and decisively, using conciliatory political rhetoric or disinformation as a cover for this process to

prevent alarm from the West and neighboring Arab states. Although Tehran's buildup might be seen by some as purely defensive, the

desire to develop nonconventional weapons is an ominous harbinger

for future military action.

Weapons Acquisition and Military Capabilities

 

            With the inability in the near term to counter modern western armaments at the hands of potential aggressors, Iran's trump cards

to influence regional issues during crises are Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or terrorism. Ironically, as a continuation of the

guise noted above and as an attempt to cultivate a "new perception"

in the international arena, Tehran has endorsed the Middle East nuclear-free zone proposals and an open door policy with the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms that Iran is

abiding by tenets of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

through the nuclear safeguards agreement. Additionally, it is a

signatory of the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol and Biological Warfare Convention. Although it regards the possession of nuclear weapons as unIslamic, Tehran's interest in

these weapons, in spite of public rhetoric, is evident through long-

term attempts to develop WMD capabilities.

            The nuclear capability of Iran is currently unconfirmed, yet

rumor and fears within the international press, watchdog groups and numerous governmental agencies indicate it is progressing toward

this end. Both Robert Gates, former Director of Central Intelligence,

and Israeli military intelligence chief, Uri Saguy, have stated that a

nuclear capability is probable by the end of the decade, if not

stopped.7 This threat has been enhanced immensely since the

dissolution of the Soviet Union, where former Warsaw Pact

technicians and scientists have made themselves available for hire to nations desiring to develop or enhance indigenous weapons

programs. Nuclear material has become available to the highest

bidder on clandestine worldwide arms markets as illustrated by a

TASS news report in October 1994 confirming that Russian counter- intelligence officers had arrested three men for attempting to sell

nearly 150 pounds of industrial- grade uranium to unidentified

persons.8 Fearful of these developments, the Clinton administration

has announced its decision to attempt to slow the global spread of

nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense Perry stated in June 1993

that, "Nearly twenty nations have embarked on efforts to develop

WMD and the danger to our national interests and our allies is

growing."9 (More recent White House statements specifically identify

Iran as a primary culprit.) In spite of these promises, there is little

that can effectively be done to stop proliferation since large payoffs

are at stake and penalties are slight, as shown by the response of the

U.S. to North Korea's (DPRK) apparent violation of the NPT.

            Iran's nuclear program began in the 1970s with Shah Pahlavi

and a $30 billion plan for nuclear power and weapons development. Although technicians began training in the West, the program was

stopped in 1979 by the Islamic Revolution. Following the Iran-Iraq

War, in 1990 Tehran procured Russian assistance into repairing a

reactor at Bushehr to generate electric power. The following year

reports suggested that Iran and Pakistan had agreed to a nuclear cooperation agreement. By 1992, Iran and Russia had signed yet

another memorandum based on nonproliferation and the completion

of power plants at Bushehr and two additional sites. The Russians

also agreed to assist with the development of key nuclear technology including radiological protection, production of radioisotopes and personnel training at the cost of $4.2 billion.10

            The progression from nuclear power plant technology to weapons-grade material production is a sophisticated process and significant financial and scientific effort is required to develop an indigenous capability. Conservative estimates suggest that an

investment of $1.5 billion annually for ten years would be the

minimum requirement in a science where technology transfer and proficiency is slow.11 However, according to Alexei Yablokov,

chairman of the Russian Commission for Ecological Security, the

ability to develop nuclear weapons from energy-producing

plutonium is proven.12 In an effort to curb access to technology, the

U.S., through diplomatic channels, has urged India, Germany and

Brazil not to sign nuclear technology agreements with Tehran,

although compliance must be monitored scrupulously to prevent

violation.

            It is unfortunate, however, in spite of international safeguards

to prevent proliferation, that technology and weapons transfer is

inevitable and will occur, much like conventional weapons

technology from West to East during the Cold War. In 1992, the U.S. Congress's Republican Research Committee Task Force on Terrorism

and Unconventional Warfare declared that Iran had purchased four

nuclear devices from former Soviet Muslim republics for $150

million. Two of these were reportedly Scud-C mountable with 40 kt warheads, although the Russian and Kazakhstan governments and

the U.S. State Department deny the allegation.13 With warheads

possibly available on clandestine world markets, it is likely that this represents the quickest means to achieve a limited nuclear

capability, is far cheaper and very difficult to monitor.

            Iran's chemical weapons capability is well established - it has

large stockpiles of lethal and nonlethal chemical agents and

significant facilities for mass production of phosgene and mustard

gas as well as nerve agents. It began production, with the assistance

of European companies in the mid-80s, to counter huge battlefield

losses from Iraqi chemical attacks. Current delivery systems include artillery and aircraft and possible SSMs (surface-to-surface missiles).

            Since 1988, conventional arms procurement has also been a priority of Tehran's leaders with the realization that WMD would be

a weapon of last choice in a crisis but that a well armed and trained military is essential for participation in a conflict-prone region.

Although the military balance in the region remains tilted against

Iran, it has spent aggressively on modernization in the last six years, totaling approximately $50 billion with a high of $10 billion for 1988 alone. Nations supplying arms to it increased from five in 1980 to 17

by 1985. The Iranians spent $1.5 billion between 1986-90 as China's largest client but in 1992, freed from ties to Iraq, they signed a $5

billion deal with Russia over a three-year period to include advanced fighter aircraft, tanks and supersonic cruise missiles. These

acquisitions, based on regional analysis, will place Iran in the

forefront of conventional quantitative arms capabilities by the end of

1996. The U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, using an evaluative

factor DFP (designated force performance), which measures and

compares a myriad of weapons data and characteristics, concludes

that Iran's air-to-ground strike potential will increase dramatically, possibly overtaking Iraq and Egypt. Additionally, airpower will

increase by 300 percent, the largest increase of all Mideast states,

claiming third place behind Israel and Syria. All factors combined

will allow them to reach equivalency or possibly eclipse Iraq.14

            The Iranian Air and Air Defense Forces have received top

priority in the rearmament schedule. Iran's aircraft inventory is

centered on eight fighter and attack squadrons of older U.S.- supplied aircraft and newer Russian and Chinese topline models including F-4

D/E, F-5 E/F, Mig 29 and Su-24 and 25. The 1992 arms deal with

Russia suggested 12 Tu-22M Backfire bombers were included along

with advanced Mig-27 and 31 air superiority and IL-50 AEW

(airborne early warning) aircraft. Total order of battle with all

acquisitions completed would number approximately 400 airframes.

The Backfire would provide a strategic capability unique to the

Persian Gulf; however, they have yet to be delivered.

            Airpower is crucial to national security and the long coastline

of Iran demands high numbers of advanced aircraft to patrol or

defend territorial airspace. Offensively, strategic targets within

range of Iranian aircraft include the Saudi oil offshore mooring

stations at Juaymah which pump 90 percent of exports. An Iranian

F-4 flying at 200 feet at 480 knots can hit this strategic point 16

minutes following liftoff from Bushehr airfield. Additionally, the key Saudi processing and distribution facilities at Abqaiq and the multi-

billion dollar gas development project, the Master Gas System, are

only minutes inland from these terminals. The Saudi detection

system, although improving continually against this potent threat,

would acquire the F-4 only three minutes from the target area.15

This tactical reality, due largely to the narrow Persian Gulf, will place Saudi strategic facilities at potentially greater risk with more

advanced aircraft and targeting systems. To improve tactics for such

an attack, the Iranian government has reportedly opened the first air university designed to maximize the combat potential of advanced

Mig fighters and to develop a cadre of highly trained pilots.

            The focus of the Iranian Navy is to counter the growing GCC

and U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf and strive to control the straits

of Hormuz, in a crisis, by interdicting shipping for one-third of the

world's oil supply. Silkworm SSMs are emplaced on the islands of

Qeshm and Abu Musa, critically located in or near the Straits, that

1could threaten worldwide oil shipments. The 1600-mile coastline

makes it imperative that capable platforms be purchased and

integrated into a fleet which is centered around three destroyers and

five frigates at Bandar Abbas naval base. Iran has taken delivery on

5 of 10 68-ton Chinese HOUDONG guided-missile patrol boats.

Equipped with the best Chinese SSMs, these high speed craft will

enhance Iranian surface warfare capabilities and if integrated with

AEW aircraft, would credibly enhance the potential threat to all

Persian Gulf shipping. Additionally, the Iranian navy received

(under close U.S. observation and tracking) the first two of three Kilo class Russian diesel submarines (renamed the Tareq class) which will eventually be homeported at Chah Bahar. This acquisition alarmed

GCC nations which quickly responded by ordering high technology European anti-submarine warfare detection and prosecution systems. Although Iranian crews continue training in Russia, fully

independent submarine operations by them will not occur in the

near future. The ability to operate in the shallow gulf waters will

fully test their tactical and seafaring skills and likely take years to

develop. The biggest threat to the Tareq submarines and crews will

likely be problems similar to other third world navies, largely poor maintenance and limited underway time which saps combat

effectiveness. In addition to anti-surface capabilities, the Kilo

submarine offers the capabilities for covert minelaying which could

play havoc with international shipping in either the gulf itself, the

Straits of Hormuz or in the Straits of Bab el Mandeb (Red Sea).

Although the arrival of submarines into this region has introduced a unique and potentially lethal capability, the Iranians will take years

to develop the skills necessary to pose a credible threat.

            Essential to a credible response during the next Persian Gulf

crisis will be the Iranian possession of ballistic missiles, due to the

fact that Iraq, Pakistan, Israel and Saudi Arabia have similarly

armed themselves. The political effect of Iraqi Scuds during the

Persian Gulf War was immense and may have played a role in

Tehran's aggressive plans to build their own force. Current

inventory includes 100 Korean HY-2 and 200 Chinese C-801 short

range ballistic missiles (SRBM). The 1994 acquisition of the North Korean Scud-D has introduced a medium-range threat (360 miles) to

the region, but most worrisome is the reported deal with North Korea

to provide financial assistance for the development of the NODONG-1 missile with a range of 600 miles. This would open a pandora's box

of scenarios involving not only Arab states and Turkey but the

targeting of America's strongest ally in the region, Israel.

 

Scenarios of Confrontation

 

            The billions of rearmament dollars spent by Tehran confirms a commitment to military resurgence which ensures the survival of the Islamic state and the ability to act decisively when necessary. What

are the likely scenarios for the use of this power? With the relative

demise of Iraq, Iran will be poised in the near term to act as a major regional player and influence the geopolitical and strategic

environment as never before. Secondly, based on its long term anti-

Zionist rhetoric and the likely acquisition of long range ballistic

missiles, Iran could target Israel. Thirdly, Tehran has not been

persuaded into an accommodation with the West, in spite of

moderated rhetoric meant to mitigate its image. It still views

western culture as satanic whose values are anathema and a threat

to their fundamentalist Muslim beliefs. Finally, Iran and the GCC

nations, all OPEC members, fully depend on oil revenues for their livelihood. Iran is unlikely in the near term to risk interrupting this

"spigot of wealth" until their economic and military recovery is more complete.

            Iran's feud with Iraq did not conclude with the latter's defeat

in 1991 - Iraq remains their key focus in terms of regional

hegemony and national defense priorities. Of the 19 Mideast

interstate conflicts since 1947, nearly 70 percent have not involved

Israel, which suggests continued inter-Arab and Persian-Arab strife

is likely.16 Iran's growing military strength will be enhanced by

continued UN sanctions that continue to erode Saddam's remaining military strength. Iran would like to see a domestically fractured

and militarily weak neighbor confined to settling domestic and

internal problems (Kurds, Shiia and deprived citizens) and not

focused on external issues. With renewed military prowess,

particularly in air power as discussed previously, Iran could seize

upon a strategic opportunity and attack Iraqi military and industrial centers, further debilitating Baghdad's military capabilities. Tehran

might see such a window of opportunity as unique to redress the

eight year war and reduce Iraq's potential for future aggression.

            The prospect of war between Israel and Iran will increase dramatically with the acquisition of long range strike weapons, either

the NODONG-1 SSM or the Backfire bomber. Tensions between

Tehran and Tel Aviv have existed for years -from the support of

Shiite extremist groups in Lebanon to Hamas revolutionary activities

in the Gaza - Tehran has evinced a virulent anti-Israeli theme. In

1990, President Rafsanjani called for a "Pan-Islamic army for the annihilation of Israel."17 Israel sees such statements and the long

term terrorist threat from extremist groups for what they are - a

concerted effort by Iran to destabilize Israel politically. All Arab

states and Iran, however, are also well aware of Israel's military

prowess, its possession of nuclear weapons and its special

relationship with the United States -which combine to create a

regional superpower. With this in mind, only equivalent weapons

with conventional and non-conventional payloads could threaten Tel

Aviv. The arrival of the NODONG or Backfire into Iran, however,

could force a preemptive strike by the Israeli Air Force on airfields, missile launch and storage areas and command and control facilities

to negate the threat. (A similar Israeli strike occurred in 1981

against an Iraqi nuclear power plant.) This scenario could escalate

into a wider Arab-Israeli conflict if Syria, Jordan and Egypt saw themselves as potential targets due to their own indigenous missile development programs. Additionally, if radical Islamic groups

(Jihad, Hezballah or Hamas) were to successfully target Israeli

officials, military-industrial centers or critical religious sites and a

definite link could be made to Tehran, Israel could act autonomously

and retaliate directly, much as the U.S. did in 1993 following the discovery of Iraqi attempts to assassinate President Bush.

            The ability of Tehran to effectively engage western nations militarily is severely limited. Although terrorism remains a potent,

short term threat, Iran's current inability to conduct long range

strike operations far beyond its borders minimizes the possibility of

any direct harm to western cities, population or industries. Feuds

between Washington and Tehran have existed since 1979 over a

variety of sociocultural, economic, political and geostrategic issues.

Iran adamantly resists America's presence in the Persian Gulf region

due to lingering fears that such a presence might be used to reassert American political or military influence inside Iran. In spite of this,

it has not automatically opposed U.S. policies elsewhere in the region, likely seen as a counterbalance to Saddam. Hussein. Tehran's leaders

are likely to play a wait-and-see game with the U.S., supporting

terrorism (World Trade Center) or acting conciliatory (assisting with

the release of western hostages in Lebanon) when political advantage

is theirs to take. Overall, a major change in the U.S.-Iranian

relationship is unlikely to occur in the near future; fringe events will continue but direct conflict will be avoided at all costs. This is

essential to permit the full growth in military potential of Iranian

forces until they are ready to respond to an issue of their own

choosing.

            Finally, the likelihood of confrontation with GCC states, although possible, is minimal in the near term, due primarily to economic

factors. Without oil revenues, Iran's economy would flounder and terminate all improvements made to date in various sectors of its economy. Such an event is high risk and military revitalization

would come to an abrupt halt, or slow appreciably, thereby forfeiting gains. Iran is well aware of U.S. resolve in this region, and mutual

defense treaties ensure our commitment to defend GCC nations and

the oil supplies we are now fully dependent upon. Although Iran's

capture of the Abu Musa island from the United Arab Emirates in

1992 did nothing to quell regional fears of a hegemonic policy from Tehran, this may be seen as a unique incident due to long term

claims on the island. The issue has not been contested by the GCC

and appears at this time not to be contentious. Until Iran has

recovered economically and militarily, it will not likely risk cutting

the lifeline of oil exports to the world.

 

Conclusion

 

            Iran has learned two critical lessons in the last decade - a

strong military is absolutely vital to deter regional aggression and confrontation with the West over vital geostrategic issues can be

costly. These will be the foundational themes as Tehran continues its aggressive rearmament plan for the remainder of this decade while simultaneously moderating political rhetoric and appealing to both

the West and regional states for conciliation and understanding. By

early next century, however, Iran will be poised to act unilaterally to enforce national or Islamic policies with a vast array of modern conventional and nonconventional weapons. Unless the West

scrupulously monitors and limits these transfers to Iran, it may be

forced to fight a million radical Shiia ready to die in the ultimate

Jihad.

                                                         NOTES

 

 

1.            Tom Maasland, "Iran: Threat for Real," Newsweek, January 25,                         1993, 43.

 

2.            Alan Tonelson, "Still Mired," Foreign Affairs, (Spring 93), 45.

 

3.            Yezid Sayigh, Arab Military Industry - Capability, Performance                         and Impact, (Newark, MacMillan Publishing, 1992), 260.

 

4.            Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Rearmament - How Great a Threat?,"                         Janes Intelligence Review, (July 1994); p. 311.

 

5.            Tom Brokaw, "Iranian Oil Profits," NBC Nightly News, 31                         January 1995.

 

6.            Maasland, 44.

 

7.            Rathmell, 320.

 

8.            "For Your Eyes Only - An Open Intel Summary of Current                                     Military Affairs," (Issue No. 356, 19 November 1994).

 

9.            St. Louis Dispatch, 13 June 1993, Sec. 1B.

 

10.            Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran's National Strategy - Striving

            for Regional Parity or Survival," Janes International Defense

            Review, (April 1994); 65.

 

11.            Ibid.

 

                                                        NOTES (Continued)

 

12.              Kenneth Timmerman, "Iran's Nuclear Menace," The New

Republic, 24 April 1995, 18.

 

13.            James Wyllie, "Iran - Quest for Security and Influence," Janes                         Intelligence Review; (July 1993), 210.

 

14.            Edward Atkeson, A Military Assessment of the Middle East,                         1991-96, (Carlisle, Pa., U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute,                         1992), 45-53.

 

15.            Tony Cordesman, The Gulf and the West - Strategic Relations

            and Military Realities, (Boulder, Co.; Westview Press, 1988), 253.

 

16.            Atkeson, 5.

 

17.            David Dolan, Holy War for the Promised Land, (London; Hodder                         & Stoughton, 1991), 219.

 

                                                      BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

Atkeson, Edward, "A Military Assessment of the Middle East, 1991-

    96." Carlisle, PA: The U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

 

 

Brokaw, Tom, "Iranian Oil Profits," NBC Nightly News, 31 January

    1995.

 

 

Cordesman, Tony, The Gulf and the West - Strategic Relations and

    Military Realities. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988.

 

 

DeLonis, Andre, "The Coastal Missile Threat in the Middle East."

    Janes Intelligence Review, (January 1994).

 

 

Dolan, David, Holy War for the Promised Land. London: Hodder and

    Stoughton, 1991.

 

 

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, "Iran's National Strategy - Striving for

    Regional Parity or Survival?" Janes International Defense Review,

    Volume No. 27 (April 1994).

 

 

For Your Eyes Only - An Open Intelligence Summary of Current

    Military Affairs. Issue No. 356, 14 November 1994.

 

 

Maasland, Tom, "Iran: Threat for Real." Newsweek, 25 January 1993.

 

 

Rathmell, James, "Iran's Rearmament - How Great a Threat?" Janes

    Intelligence Review, (July 1994).

 

 

Sayigh, Yezid, Arab Military Industry - Capability Performance and

    Impact. Newark: MacMillan Publishing, 1992.

 

                                      BIBLIOGRAPHY (Continued)

 

 

Timmerman, Kenneth, "Iran's Nuclear Menace." The New Republic, 24

    April 1995.

 

 

Tonelson, Alan, "Still Mired." Foreign Affairs (Spring 93).

 

 

Willie, James, "Iran - Quest for Security and Influence." Janes

    Intelligence Review, (July 1993).

 

 

_________, "Iran - The Edge of the Precipice." Janes Intelligence

    Review, (April 1994).