Military

Military Logistics:  The U.S. Contribution To UN

Peacekeeping

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Logistics

 

 

 

 

            MILITARY LOGISTICS: THE US CONTRIBUTION

                        TO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

 

A Practical Compromise To Aggressive Military Intervention

 

                                                by

 

                                    Thomas L. Pirozzi

                                    Major, U.S. Army

                        Marine Corps Command and Staff College

                                    Academic Year 1995

 

Research Paper submitted to the Faculty of the Marine Corps Command and Staff

            College in partial fulfillment of the Masters of Military Science Program

                                                Quantico, Virginia

 

                                                DATE: 18 April 1995

                                                EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: MILITARY LOGISTICS: THE US CONTRIBUTION TO UN PEACEKEEPING

            OPERATIONS (A Practical Compromise To Aggressive Military Intervention)

 

Author: Major Thomas L. Pirozzi, United States Army

 

Thesis: Limiting US participation in UN Chapter VI (peacekeeping) operations to a

contingent of appropriately equipped and augmented logisticians may be economically,

militarily, and geopolitically advantageous to the United States.

 

Background: The United States can no longer afford to answer every diplomatic challenge with

aggressive military intervention. This is particularly true of regional crises that do not threaten the

national security or vital national interests of the United States. In addition to being impractical,

excessive military force is expensive, detrimental to the ability of our forces to fulfill its conventional

warfighting imperatives, and harmful to American prestige and credibility abroad. Incorporating

lessons learned throughout US and UN operations in Somalia, this study will propose a Logistics

Support Command (LSC) structure that will fulfill the US obligation to provide military assistance to

future UN peacekeeping operations while avoiding the introduction of offensive combat forces.

 

Recommendation: The National Command Authorities, in cooperation with the US

Congress, should institute a policy that limits the size, composition, and role of US

military forces in UN peacekeeping operations. Because ground component forces are not

sufficiently abundant to continue the current operational tempo without causing a

detriment to readiness, a logistics force similar in structure and capability to the United

Nations Logistics Support Command in Somalia, would be a practical compromise. This

would allow the US to contribute to international peacekeeping efforts without assuming

the lead role in a potentially unstable situation, and without significant risk to national

security or credibility.

 

                                    TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

                                                                                                            Page

 

INTRODUCTION 

 

CHAPTER 1 - A Practical Alternative                                        1

 

CHAPTER 2 - The Need for Stated Policy                                    3

 

CHAPTER 3 - Historical Precedent: Somalia                               11

 

CHAPTER 4 - Conclusions                                                                              22

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                  39

 

APPENDIX A - Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter             A-1

 

APPENDIX B - Task Organizations                                                    B-1

 

APPENDIX C - Proposed Command Relationships                            C-1

 

APPENDIX D - Terms of Reference for US Forces Somalia       D-1

 

                                                 INTRODUCTION

 

                                    Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.

                                                                                    -- Former UN Secretary General, Dag Hammerskold

 

 

            The role of the United States military in peacekeeping1 operations is inherently

 

contradictory to its original, and many would argue, primary purpose for existence:

 

warfighting. As former Secretary General Harnmerskold implies, the military is certainly

 

capable of performing the function, though it is an entirely inappropriate use of lethal

 

combat power. While the United States cannot afford to abstain from participation in low

 

threat interventions without risking diminished influence in the United Nations and world

 

community, we can neither afford to squander precious resources. The US can, and

 

should however, assume a less pronounced role in peacekeeping operations; allowing the

 

UN to take the lead, and preserving the "punch" of our military forces for crises that

 

directly threaten national security or US vital national interests. The results of my

 

research suggest that future US contributions to non-vital peacekeeping operations should

 

be principally logistical in nature, and temporary in duration. Realistic goals of US

 

participation are to respond quickly, establish a foundation for theater logistics2 Support

 

then pass responsibility to predetermined UN forces or commercial contractors.3

 

_________________________________

1 Defined as military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major

belligerents; designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing trace and support

diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement. Field Manual (FM) 100-23. Peace Operations.

Washington DC: Department of the Army, December 1994.

2 NOTE: For the purposes of this study, all references to logistics refer to support components as

defined by the United Nations. In addition to traditional combat service support components, these include

engineering, communications and aviation support.

3 The employment of predetermined contractors for providing long term logistics support to UN peace

operations is currently under consideration. Brown & Root contracted services during UN operations

UNITAF and UNOSOM II have been used to justify this proposal. United Nations Logistics Working Group:

Recommendations and Products, United Nations Headquarters, New York, NY, December 1993.

 

            The focus of this study is to provide the framework for an alternative military

 

solution with which the National Command Authorities may exert US influence in United

 

Nations Chapter V14 operations; specifically, circumstances where diplomacy alone is

 

inadequate, and the employment of offensive combat forces improvident. The study will

 

first explore the utility of military logistics as a practical alternative to intervention by

 

force. This includes, but is not limited to the derived benefits of employment, its impact

 

on operational readiness and national security, and the preservation of American prestige

 

and credibility. Next, the discussion will turn to criteria for employment, force

 

composition, and desired end states. Of particular importance are clearly defined,

 

congruent, political and military objectives, as well as provisions to prevent and respond to

 

mission drift. Finally, using the United Nations Logistics Support Command (UNLSC,

 

Somalia) as a model, the study will propose a mutually beneficial command and support

 

between the United Nations, US and coalition contingents; in particular, the

 

necessity for universally acceptable terms of reference, responsibilities of host and member

 

nations, and a command and control structure that will facilitate unencumbered combined

 

operations and quick resolution.

 

_____________________________

4 The United Nations Charter: Chapter VI refers to United Nations missions concerning pacific

settlement of disputes. For the purposes of this study, all references to Chapter VI will equate to

peacekeeping operations unless otherwise specified.

 

 

 

                                                CHAPTER 1

                                    A Practical Alternative

                       

                        Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to advance

            American national interests and pursue our national security objective.  The US

            cannot be the world's policeman.  Nor can we ignore the increase in armed ethnic

            conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states--

            crises that individually and cumulatively may effect US interests.5

 

                                                                                                --Presidential Decision Directive 25

 

            As indicated in the quotation above, and readily apparent in the verbiage of the

 

President's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,6 the Clinton

 

Administration is reliant upon military force to achieve its foreign policy objectives.  I

 

contend that this dependence on force can be more readily attributed its ease of

 

employment, than any philosophical ideal. To understand how the Logistics Support

 

Command concept fits this utilitarian theory, we must first consider the factors that make

 

military force an attractive option for employment.

 

                                                   UTILITY

 

            This study will show that, in a true peacekeeping environment, a logistics oriented

 

force can fulfill many of the political objectives as a firepower intensive force, with fewer

 

negative consequences.  This is particularly evident in circumstances with strong

 

humanitarian overtones.  Some of these benefits are historically obvious:

 

 

________________________

5 Press Release, PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE:  The Clinton Administration's Policy on

Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, New York:  United States Mission to the United Nations.

6The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Washington DC, US

Government Printing Office, July 1994.

 

 

 

            Accessibility: As Commander in Chief of US Forces, the President of the United

 

States has immediate access to a considerable arsenal. Pursuant to the War Powers

 

Resolution, he may commit military forces for as many as 90 days; indefinitely with

 

concurrent resolution from Congress. While it is politically prudent to confer with

 

Congress prior to force commitment, it is not constitutionally mandated. In effect, the

 

President has sufficient executive authority to propel the United States from a state of

 

relative peace to full scale war (or in this case, operations other than war [OOTW]7) . For

 

a short period of time at least, "War Powers" allows the President to circumvent a

 

preclusive, bureaucratic process. Though originally intended to be a restrictive measure, it

 

provides a readily accessible, demonstrative tool with which to impose US will or advance

 

US interests. Because this executive privilege applies equally to all active component

 

forces, the force composition is irrelevant. In other words, a logistics task force is no less

 

accessible or responsive than an offensive, combat oriented task force; particularly when

 

deployed from a contingency force package 1 (CFP1) organization.8

 

            Rapid Response: US presence in a crisis is literally a phone call and a few scant

 

hours away. As a result of reductions in force and a diminished defense budget, a renewed

 

emphasis has been placed on force projection capabilities. In our current readiness

 

posture, the National Command Authorities are capable of launching a formidable military

 

_______________________________

7FM 100-5, chapter 13 identifies the following missions as operations other than war or OOTW:

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), Arms Control, Support to Domestic Civil Authorities,

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, Security Assistance, Nation Assistance, Support to

Counterdrug Operations, Combating Terrorism, Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, Show of Force, Support

for insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies, and Attacks and Raids.

7 Field Manual (FM) 100-5. Operations. Washington DC: Department of the Army, June 1993, page

13-0. "

8CFP 1 refers to the upper tier of units found on the Time Phased Deployment List (TPFDL) and, as a

rule, denotes rapid deployability and the highest available state of readiness.

 

force in a matter of hours, virtually anywhere in the world. From this perspective, a

 

logistics contingent can be deployed using, many of the same strategic platforms as any

 

other force. Larger scale operations can be augmented by additional strategic airlift, or if

 

necessary, fast sealift and pre positioned ashore and afloat assets. In the event that the

 

NCA and Congress concur with extended operations that exceed active component

 

capabilities, enhanced readiness elements of the Army National Guard are available for

 

deployment within 90 days of notification.9

 

            Proven Reliability: It has been said that perception equals reality. The US

 

Armed Forces have, with few exceptions, earned a worldwide reputation for success. If

 

public opinion polls in the post-Viet Nam Era10 are any indication, American confidence in

 

the professionalism, dedication and loyalty of its armed forces continues to grow as well.

 

Military forces, when employed responsibly and practically, can bolster domestic popular

 

support for an administration's foreign policy. This was evident throughout the Gulf War,

 

in Panama, and in the early stages of Somalia. The fact is, US forces wear their reputation

 

on their proverbial sleeves; bringing to any operation with which they affiliate, the

 

presence, credibility and stability that is commensurate with a military superpower.

 

Troubled nations around the world request US military assistance, by name. Performance

 

speaks for itself, as operations Just Cause, Desert Shield and Storm, Provide Comfort, and

 

Restore Hope (to name a few) serve to reinforce these perceptions. Therefore, when the

 

______________________________

9 Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Washington, DC:

US Government Printing Office, February 1995.

10 From a public confidence perspective, perception equals reality. Although military forces in general,

performed well during the Viet Nam Conflict, the stigma imposed by political failures and media

interpretations caused public confidence to falter during and immediately after this period. This statement

is not intended to be a criticism, but to emphasize that the military option educed quite opposite reactions

when compared to the present.

 

 

National Command Authorities invoke the authority to employ military force, they are

 

sending a message that is intended to elicit a specific response from the prospective

 

audience.

 

            Credibility: Establishing a precedent that casts the US in a non-threatening role,

 

may be mutually beneficial to all concerned. From a United Nations perspective, US

 

participation lends credibility to the mission and provides incentive for other member

 

nations to follow suit. The UN's failed attempt to rally support for Rwanda is a perfect

 

example of what may result from US abstention; other member nations also withheld their

 

support, and with the exception of a unilateral French response, the UN operation was

 

shelved. US participation after all, is tantamount to a guarantee, a coalition partnership

 

with the US provides an opportunity for access to US subsidies, technologies, media,

 

and a host of other perks that are typical of US sponsorship.

 

            There is always a risk, however, that recurrent use of military force may create a

 

stigma of US aggressiveness. It damages US prestige abroad, and may in itself become

 

responsible for creating regional friction. Examples of what is professed to be American

 

imperialism are exploited every day by Islamic extremist groups throughout the Middle

 

East, in an attempt to discredit the US abroad and weaken its influence in the region.

 

Another assumed risk concerns US resolve. A propensity to respond with force, even

 

when in the apparently benign role of peacekeeping observers, has the potential to backfire

 

if it is perceived that the US Government or its people do not have the will to see it

 

through to a reasonable conclusion. One particularly damaging example of weak resolve

 

occurred after Task Force Ranger suffered 18 KIAs and 75 WIAs in Mogadishu, in

 

October 1993. Although undeniably a costly mission, the Rangers executed the mission

 

well, and performed better than could have been expected under the circumstances. The

 

NCA's flinching reaction to media coverage, however, condemned the mission to be

 

recorded in the minds of the international community as an abysmal failure. Incidents such

 

as these only create doubt in the reliability of future US support, but may be avoided by

 

avoiding these precarious circumstances. Implementing a policy that limits US

 

participation in peacekeeping operations to theater level logistics, allows the US to "ante

 

up" a UN obligation without appearing characteristically aggressive. It also attenuates

 

pressures to assume a more dominant role. With a predominantly logistics force, US intent

 

is less likely to be misinterpreted. If a rising threat condition necessitates withdrawal of

 

forces, it will have been so stipulated in the terms of reference, and less vulnerable to

 

subsequent international criticism.

 

            Sustainability and Survivability: Another justification for calling upon the US

 

military to reinforce diplomacy or exert influence abroad is blindingly obvious. In reality,

 

it is the only sizable national asset for which the NCA has complete control, and is capable

 

of operating in remote, austere areas of the world for indefinite periods of time. The

 

military apparatus is self contained, self regulating, and self sustaining. This is

 

particularly pertinent when you consider that the vast majority of world crises in the recent

 

past have occurred in under-developed or third world countries. In the case of Somalia,

 

there was a stifling lack of infrastructure compounded by rampant illiteracy, harsh climate,

 

a diseased and starving population, and an anachronistic culture even by third world

 

standards. Conditions in the former Yugoslavia are not much better, having been reduced

 

to barbarity as well. A military presence, at least initially, is necessary to provide security

 

and stability for concurrent or subsequent humanitarian efforts. When not in our vital

 

national interest, the US contribution to that presence should be logistics.

 

            Impact on Readiness: When contemplating a national policy regarding

 

international peacekeeping, the one issue that repeatedly stands out is operational

 

readiness. Comparing the "Bottoms Up Review" to the current Administration's National

 

Security Strategy, it does not require a mathematician to deduce that we are unrealistic in

 

our expectations. With active component end strength at its lowest levels since post

 

World War II, any diversion of military assets to activities that do not directly threaten the

 

security or vital national interests of the US, detract from operational readiness. While

 

this is true of all Department of Defense assets, the detriment to logisticians is somewhat

 

less than most other ground combat forces. This is particularly evident in categories such

 

as training, and the experience and the self confidence that comes with it.

 

            From a training perspective, ground component forces can only become

 

peacekeeping "specialists" to the detriment of perishable, conventional warfighting skills.

 

Every training hour expended to prepare for the execution of these non-offensive,

 

politically restrictive operations only diminishes their abilities to fulfill their primary

 

imperative: "...to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts."11 Experience is

 

also a concern, since the majority of service members have relatively little civil disturbance

 

or observation experience when first introduced into a peacekeeping environment.

 

Though the learning curve for participants improves over time, long term commitments

 

are subjected to rotation of forces, and the learning curve begins anew.

 

________________

11National Security Strategy, page 5.

 

            Logisticians, on the other hand, perform their wartime functions on a daily basis,

 

whether stateside or deployed. Peacekeeping operations are no different; the scenery

 

changes, but the basic mission stays the same. In some respects logisticians derive some

 

benefit from the opportunity to hone their technical skills under austere, combat-like

 

conditions that may not be otherwise replicated; even by our national training centers.

 

These conditions are also ideal for testing new doctrine and new logistics oriented

 

technologies. For example, Combat Engineers in Somalia had plenty of practice

 

emplacing and removing obstacles, improving roads, air and sea ports and restoring

 

infrastructure in general. Third world countries and immature theaters are ideal training

 

grounds for a host of other critical sustainment skills, such as water purification, storage

 

and transportation, and field medical operations. The United States armed forces are at

 

the forefront of logistics techniques and technology, and can make a significant

 

contribution to any UN peacekeeping operation.

 

 

Why Logisticians?

 

            A traditional peacekeeping environment, as described in FM 100-23, normally

 

develops as a preventive measure to anticipated conflict, or in response to a recent

 

cessation of hostilities. It is a tenuous circumstance which places US and UN personnel in

 

between two or more belligerents on the brink of hostility. By virtue of its composition

 

and vocation, a logistics contingent is less likely to be overtly provocative than a

 

contingent of infantryman; seemingly armed to the teeth and threatening, regardless of the

 

nature of their presence. Constrained US participation preserves US presence and

 

influence in the region, while emphasizing the humanitarian nature of our presence; it is

 

actually a great public relations message to help quell the accusations of imperialist

 

motives or ridicule for so-called American "puppet states." Aside from the training and

 

readiness issues discussed above, reduced US participation provides the opportunity for

 

regional powers with a local, vested interest to assume a lead role. There are, after all,

 

forces around the world that have more experience and are better suited to perform

 

peacekeeping functions than US combat forces. The French, Belgians and Norwegians

 

are just a few that come to mind. Some of the smaller nations even depend on

 

international missions as a source of defense funding and training.

 

 

                                                            CHAPTER 2

                                                The Need For Stated Policy

 

            Peacekeeping is a politically volatile occupation, and should therefore be handled

 

with extreme caution. A policy miscalculation could tip the scales in either direction, and

 

result in catastrophic mission failure and an indeterminate amount of physical and political

 

damage. If the United States is to successfully institute a policy regarding United Nations

 

peacekeeping operations, the National Command Authorities must take decisive steps to

 

define the conditions under which US forces will participate in UN peacekeeping missions,

 

what may be reasonably expected of them, as well as the US Government reaction to

 

failed compliance.

 

            One of the most important prerequisites for US intervention in a peacekeeping

 

mission should be the general consensus by all participants (to include potential or former

 

belligerents) of what the peacekeeping mission entails. Chapter VI, Article 33 of the UN

 

Charter is intentionally vague in its definition of a "pacific settlement." It simply provides

 

guidance to "seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,

 

judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of

 

their own choice."12 This purposely allows nonrestrictive incentive for peaceful settlement

 

of a dispute prior to UN intervention, while reserving maximum flexibility for a UN

 

Security Council response. It does not, however, sufficiently characterize a pacific

 

settlement in terms that suggest a specific military response. It is therefore the collective

 

responsibility of the Departments of Defense and State to establish definitive criteria that

 

___________________________

12 See Appendix A for a complete reproduction of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.

 

will serve to qualify a peacekeeping operation worthy of the introduction of US military

 

assets. Upon US agreement to intercede, all parties must have a common understanding

 

of the US role, its general intent, and the limitations that will be placed upon its

 

participating forces. An example of how failure to clarify intent can hinder an operation is

 

evident in separate statements made by President Bush and Secretary General Boutros

 

Boutros-Ghali prior to the first US Marine arriving in Mogadishu. In a press conference

 

on 4 December 1992, President Bush stated:

 

            "We will create a secure environment in the hardest-hit parts of Somalia, so that

            food can move from ships, overland to the people in the countryside ... Our mission

            is humanitarian,...We do not plan to dictate political outcome."13

 

In notable contrast, the Secretary General made a much more ambitious statement to the

 

Somali people on 8 December:

 

            "[UNITAF Forces will] feed the starving, protect the defenseless, and prepare the

            way for political, economic and social reconstruction."14

 

These statements were later reconciled at the operational level by the Combined Joint

 

Task Force (CJTF) Commander's intent statement as published in the operations order:

 

            "Create an environment in which the UN and non-governmental organizations

            could assume full responsibility for the security and operations of the Somalia

            humanitarian relief effort. "

 

____________________________

13 Hunter, WHITE PAPER: An Analysis of the Application of the "Principles of Military Operations 

Other Than War (MOOTW)" in Somalia, The Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, February

1994, page 2. 14 Ibid., page 2.

14 Ibid., page 3.

 

Much of this flagrant miscommunication and confusion can be eliminated, or at least

 

minimized, by establishing an official US policy that specifies US Government conditions,

 

and governs US forces activity in future peacekeeping operations.

 

Preconditions for Employment

 

            The NCA must stand vigilant behind the terms and conditions under which it will

 

agree to commit a Logistics Support Command to a UN peacekeeping force. This is

 

particularly essential when participation is not within our vital national interest. A clear

 

understanding of misleading terminology such as Chapter VI 1/2 and "multidimensional"

 

or "aggravated" peacekeeping" is necessary to eliminate from contention, those

 

operations that clearly exceed the intent and capability of the force package recommended

 

in this study. Other requisite criteria for US involvement are necessary to achieve mission

 

success:

 

______________________

15 NOTE: The Pentagon defines traditional peacekeeping as "[d]eployment of a UN, regional

organization, or coalition presence in the field with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally

involving UN regional organization, or coalition military forces, and/or police and civilians. Non-combat

military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all

major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of a existing truce agreement

in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute." As indicated, this is a

traditional, and I would argue, accurate portrayal of peacekeeping operations as intended in Chapter VI of

the UN Charter. This is clearly not a combat operation.

            In contrast, the definition given for Aggravated peacekeeping goes beyond "pacific settlement of

a dispute," toward what sounds suspiciously like a white washed peace enforcement operation. They are

defined as "[m]ilitary operations undertaken with the nominal consent of all major belligerent parties, but

which are complicated by subsequent intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, poor command and

control of belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy. In such conditions,

peacekeeping forces are normally authorized to use force in self-defense, and in defense of the missions

they are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an existing truce

agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement, or supporting or safeguarding

humanitarian relief efforts." This verbal compromise is the root cause of confusion. "Aggravated

peacekeeping" clearly exceeds the intentions and capabilities of a Chapter VI force. It is a combat

mission, and should be so designated and resourced. John G. Roos, The Perils Of Peacekeeping:

Talleying The Costs In Blood, Coin, Prestige And Readiness. Washington DC: Armed Forces Journal

(International), December 1993, page 14.

 

            a. Traditional Peacekeeping Missions Only - Legitimate candidates for US

 

peacekeeping support are those missions for which all belligerents have either requested or

 

given consent to UN intervention in the dispute. Consent is defined as general acceptance

 

of the terms and provisions of Chapter VI. Under these circumstances, combat has been

 

preempted or curtailed, and the general threat condition is relatively stable. Examples of

 

current peacekeeping operations that meet this criteria are the Multinational Force and

 

Observer Mission (MFO) in the Sinai, and the UN mission in Cambodia.

 

 

            b. An International Force - All participating nations will deploy under the

 

flag of the United Nations, and will have agreed to predetermined terms of reference prior

 

to deployment. This will include, but is not limited to, parent government responsibilities,

 

command relationships, and service support agreements. A terms of reference document

 

existed for UNOSOM II, Somalia, though many member nations elected to selectively

 

comply with their agreed upon responsibilities.

 

 

            c. Unity of Command - All US force components will deploy and remain

 

under direct command of the Commander US Forces (COMUSFOR), and subsequently

 

under the operational or tactical control of the UN commander (OPCON/TACON). The

 

presiding CINC (Commander-in-Chief)will retain the lowest level authority for

 

redesignation of command/support relationships. The COMUSFOR/COMUNLSC will

 

never be relegated below the status of major subordinate commander under the

 

Commander United Nations Forces, regardless of modification to UN command structure.

 

As a general rule, the local state department representative or special envoy will not

 

exercise direct authority over the COMUSFOR for operational or tactical influence.

 

Though direct coordination should be encouraged, all directive interaction will be

 

coordinated through the presiding CINC.

 

            d. Common Supply System - For the sake of simplicity and expeditious

 

support, the UN will agree before hand, to process all support transactions through the

 

US supply system until a long term contractor can be established. Arrangements should

 

be made to guarantee reimbursement after the fact.

 

            e. Resourcing - United Nations agrees to assume all operational costs

 

directly associated with the mission or as so stipulated in the agreed upon terms of

 

reference. Failure to establish reimbursement criteria and inconsistencies in cost

 

accounting procedures for Somalia resulted in the US assumption of large sums of

 

unprogrammed expenditures that, to date, have not been reimbursed by the UN. 16

 

            f. Duration - The United States will agree to participate for a limited

 

duration, or until a previously agreed upon transition state has been attained; whereby

 

UNLSC (US) will establish a logistics foundation for theater level logistics in anticipation

 

of another member nation or ideally, a long term UN contractor (such as Brown & Root

 

in Somalia) to assume full control and responsibility for the mission. Even successful

 

peacekeeping operations such as the Sinai and Cambodia mentioned above, tend to drag

 

on indefinitely. As a world superpower, demand for US support is prohibitive, while our

 

resources are limited. Without some method for regulating US involvement, we are in

 

danger of becoming the host to a bevy of what Leslie Gelb calls "permanent wards." 17

 

_________________________________

16 NOTE: The collateral effects of unprogrammed expenditures on the readiness and quality of life for

active component forces is staggering, since large portions of the payment has been historically drawn

from operations and maintenance accounts.

17 Leslie H. Gelb, Quelling the Teacup Wars: The New World's Constant Challenge. New York: Foreign

Affairs, November/December 1994, page 6.

 

This is an important condition of US involvement and must be presented explicitly and

 

carefully so as not to malign US resolve.

 

            g. In the event that threat conditions deteriorate beyond the organic

 

security capabilities of the support command, or one or more of the belligerents initiate

 

hostilities, the situation is no longer a peacekeeping mission. The US reaction to such a

 

turn of events will be to immediately cease operations and withdraw to a predetermined

 

safe or neutral zone in the region until control has been reaffirmed, or the CINC orders a

 

redeployment of forces. Decisions to escalate US involvement will be made at the NCA

 

level, and concurrent to an increased US presence. Under no circumstances will the LSC

 

engage in direct conflict unless warranted for self defense. Standard peacekeeping rules of

 

engagement apply.

 

            It is important that all of these preconditions are stated and understood by all

 

parties prior to deployment of US forces. US participation should be contingent upon

 

them, and any violations resultant in termination of the agreement. Establishing a

 

peacekeeping policy sets the ground rules, whereby UN acceptance of a US force is the

 

equivalent of consent to all preconditions.

 

 

Force Composition

 

            The composition and size of a prospective Logistics Support Command will vary

 

in response to mission requirements. In general, force component considerations will

 

depend on the theater of operations and its available infrastructure. For example,

 

peacekeeping operations on a relatively small island nation may be best supported by a

 

predominantly Naval contingent; while operations that cover wide expanses of land mass

 

would be best supported by a predominantly Army/Air Force effort. In all cases, current

 

joint doctrine will dictate operational and support relationships between US forces. The

 

background for these proposals are based upon UN logistics lessons learned throughout

 

operations Restore and Continue Hope, Somalia, and will be discussed in detail in chapter

 

three of this report.

 

            Because US participation will be predicated upon major subordinate command

 

status within the UN structure (see appendix B), the designated commander of the

 

logistics command should be a general/flag officer with rank commensurate to the size and

 

function of the force. It also stands to reason that the designated commander be

 

representative of the predominant service component.

 

            The preponderance of the Logistics Support Command should be comprised of US

 

forces, unless the magnitude of the mission determines this to be impractical. When

 

coalition forces are present, the terms of reference should govern responsibilities and

 

support relationships. All coalition elements that are designated for inclusion in the LSC

 

will do so in an attached or OPCON status; reporting will occur through the LSC

 

Commander to the UN Commander. Coalition augmentees that have not subscribed to

 

the general terms of reference should not be accepted as LSC participants.

 

            The following is a proposed minimum essential list of components necessary to

 

support a generic peacekeeping operation:

 

            a. LSC Headquarters - To provide theater level command and control of

 

all general support (3rd echelon) logistics elements within the UN force structure.

 

Preferably taken from a standing Corps Support Command (COSCOM), Area Support

 

Group (ASG) or Corps Support Group (CSG)18 to minimize initial confusion and facilitate

 

command and control. Members of the 13th COSCOM staff performed this function well

 

for the CJTF right up until the transition to UNOSOM II; in contrast, the UNLSC was

 

dependent upon an ad hoc "pocket staff' to fill the void left by the COSCOM staff for

 

nearly two months after the transition.

 

            b. Materiel Management Center - To provide theater level logistics

 

management expertise and oversight. It should be equipped with automation and

 

personnel commensurate to the size of the force (i.e. a division MMC for a division

 

sized  component force etc.) The MMC should be capable of both ground and aviation

 

support, and have a dedicated cell for host nation contracting. Centralized management of

 

logistics is critical to effective support operations.19

 

            c. Supply Support Elements - Capable of receipt, storage and distribution

 

of all common item supplies to include: combat rations, bulk petroleum and water.

 

Responsibility for force peculiar supplies (i.e. end items, repair parts, odd caliber

 

munitions, clothing and sundry items) resides with the parent government.

 

            d. Field Service Elements - Capable of providing theater level general

 

support for water purification, graves registration, aerial resupply and laundry/bath to all.

 

_____________________________

18 NOTE: This is dependent upon the expected size of the total LSC contingent.

19 NOTE: In one particular instance, the force nearly ran itself dry, as fuel consumption exceeded

forecasts by nearly double. An investigation into the situation revealed that the fuel consumption factors

were being forecasted in gallons, but requisitions filled in liters. Another disjointed transaction occurred

between a UN contracting officer and force commander, when countless tons of "barbed wire" arrived

without the barbs. These and other mishaps could have been prevented by centralizing materiel

management.

 

            e. Transportation Elements - Includes theater level traffic management and

 

movement control, port and airfield management. Capable of transporting bulk cargo

 

(wet and dry), as well as personnel when necessary (i.e. in support of refugee relocation

 

etc.)

 

            f. Ground Equipment and Aviation Maintenance Elements - Capable of, as

 

a minimum, second and third echelon (DS/GS) maintenance, and repair parts management

 

for US forces, general support recovery and evacuation for all UN forces.

 

            g. Medical Support Element - Capacity to provide level three and backup

 

levels one and two medical support to UN forces; all levels of support to US personnel.

 

Should include as a minimum: medical clearing personnel, field hospital (with surgical

 

capabilities), preventive medicine (vet), ground and air evacuation, dental, and medical

 

supplies.

 

            h. Finance, Legal and Administration Elements - This includes, but is not

 

limited to payroll support, class "A" contracting services, postal support and legal

 

assistance (i.e. claims adjudication with host nation, contract validation, UCMJ etc.).

 

            i. Engineer Element - Capable of heavy construction for mobility,

 

countermobility and survivability, as well as port and infrastructure improvement.

 

            j. Communication Element - Capable of establishing and maintaining

 

communication links within the LSC as well as between major command elements.

 

Responsible for internal LSC SOI and net management.

 

            k. Command Aviation Detachment - Composition dependent upon mission

 

requirements and size of the force. Should include C2 aircraft and possibly cargo rotary

 

assets. Must include its own unit level maintenance and repair parts.

 

            l. Public and Civil Affairs Elements - Essential for information

 

management and interface with the indigenous population. Functions too critical to

 

depend on external UN sources. At a minimum, the LSC should be capable of providing

 

liaison to UN command headquarters.

 

            m. Security Force - This is one element that was noticeably absent from

 

the UNLSC, Somalia. Both the CJTF and UN support commands had military police,

 

though for Operation Continue Hope, not in sufficient strength to provide adequate

 

security without diverting assets from the logistics mission. To be effective, the force

 

should consist of a minimum of military police for rear area security and traffic control, as

 

well as a dedicated combat force should be attached to the LSC for the express purpose of

 

self protection. It should be directly subordinate to the LSC commander, and not subject

 

to diversion as a quick reaction force or for any other UN purpose. This concept was

 

used successfully by the German Corps Support Battalion at Belet Uen during UNOSOM

 

II. Their task organization included two infantry companies dedicated solely to providing

 

security to the battalion. It was highly successful in responding to immediate local threats,

 

while preserving service support manpower for the logistics mission. Ironically, the 10th

 

Mountain Division had nearly eleven hundred infantryman in theater, and under the

 

conditional TACON of the COMUSFORSOM. These forces, however, were designated

 

as the theater QRF, and expressly forbidden by the Terms of Reference Agreement to

 

provide "routine security" or act as "convoy escorts" for US or any other force in theater.

 

            n. Situation or Regional Specific Support - Any other forces necessary to

 

facilitate mission success. For example, a chemical company when potential belligerents

 

have access to or have previously employed weapons of mass destruction.

 

Preconditions for Transition to UN Control

 

            As specified previously in this report, US participation is contingent upon the

 

eventual transition to UN assumption of the support mission. Again, the terms of

 

transition should be predetermined, mutually acceptable, and clearly defined. Had this

 

occurred early in the UNITAF mission, the transition to UN control may have been

 

accomplished earlier than 4 May 1993 as originally planned. The terms of the transition

 

should be expressed as either a target date, window, or state of progress. When a state of

 

progress is determined, it must be reasonably attainable and clearly identifiable.

 

 

                                                CHAPTER 3

                        Historical Precedent: Somalia

 

            The first real test of the LSC concept as a subordinate element of the UN occurred

 

during Operation Continue Hope, Somalia. The concept of logistics, though it achieved

 

limited success, was fundamentally flawed from the beginning; not because of poor

 

execution by the LSC, but because the operational requirements of the force clearly

 

exceeded its capabilities to provide support, and became worse as the mission progressed.

 

From its inception, the UNLSC was classified as a Chapter VII peace enforcement force,

 

based upon the United Nations Security Council Resolution that authorized its

 

employment. It was a peace enforcement force in name only. As the mission progressed

 

and the threat worsened, the structure of the UNLSC was gradually reduced, as political

 

leaders succumbed to external pressures to limit the number of US forces in theater. The

 

remainder of this chapter will analyze the chronology of events that resulted in the

 

evolution of the UNLSC. The study will focus on why certain aspects of the concept

 

were determined to be inadequate for its intended peace enforcement mission, yet easily

 

adaptable to future peacekeeping operations.

 

 

                                    AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

 

 

            Background: In April of 1992, the United Nations passed Security Council

 

Resolution 751 authorizing intervention in the Somali civil war. Shortly thereafter, a fifty

 

person observer team was dispatched to assist non-governmental organizations with

 

humanitarian aid to the starving, strife ridden population and to facilitate an end to

 

hostilities. United Nations Operations Somalia or UNOSOM20 was unsuccessful,

 

however, because the team was incapable of providing a secure environment in which to

 

facilitate humanitarian aid and ensure the safety of its participants.21 In frustration, the

 

United Nations requested assistance from its member nations, and in August, President

 

Bush responded by committing US Forces to Operation Provide Relief UNOSOM I is an

 

excellent example of what can occur (or be prevented from occurring) when attempting to

 

execute a peacekeeping mission under peace enforcement conditions. This lesson will

 

resurface during the analysis of UNOSOM II.

 

Operation Provide Relief

 

            Initiated on 15 August 1992, Operation Provide Relief was a United Nations

 

attempt to overcome the difficulties encountered by UNOSOM. It was a unilateral US

 

effort, executed by CENTCOM, with a mission to "Provide military assistance in support

 

of emergency humanitarian relief to Kenya and Somalia." There were three principal

 

objectives:

 

            "...deploy a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) to assess relief

            requirements in Kenya and Somalia, activate a Joint Task Force to conduct an

            emergency airlift of food and supplies, and deploy airlift forces to Mombassa and

            Wajir, Kenya to provide daily relief sorties into Somalia during daylight hours to

            locations which provide a permissive and safe environment.22"

 

_________________________

20 Initiated in April 1992 as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 751, this operation was later

dubbed UNOSOM I to distinguish it from the subsequent UN effort.

21 The original United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 751) authorized the use of a

peacekeeping force to provide a secure environment for Nongovernmental Organizations providing

humanitarian aid. The very nature of the force precluded this, however, because its primary mission was

to observe and respond with force only in self defense.

22 COL Kenneth Allard, USA, Lessons Learned Somalia: A First Look (Final Draft), Institute for

National Strategy Studies, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington DC, 1995, page 7.

 

 

US involvement was limited to the airlift assets listed in Table 1, which were responsible

 

for the delivery of nearly 28,000 metric tons of relief supplies over a six month period.

 

The operation was a success, and ended upon the commencement of Operation Restore

 

Hope on 9 December 1992.23

 

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Table 1. US Sorties Flown in Support of Operation Provide Relief

 

Operation Restore Hope

 

            Continuous reports of unabated famine confirmed by doleful images of a starving

 

population, swept the media and prompted the United States Government to commit

 

additional resources to the burgeoning problems in Somalia. On 3 December 1992 24 the

 

United Nations Security Council passed Resolution (UNSCR) 794, authorizing US Forces

 

to enter Somalia as the principal element of a Unified Task Force, or UNITAF. At its

 

peak strength, the US led coalition force consisted of approximately 40,000 personnel

 

from 23 nations. UNITAF, though primarily a humanitarian effort, was empowered with

 

the authority to enforce peace in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the

 

United Nations Charter. Its mission, as interpreted by CINCCENT was:

 

            To secure major airfields, seaports key installations and relief distribution sites;

            to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, security of convoys, and

_________________________

23 Ibid., page 7-8.

24 Note: While all sources agree that the end date for the UNITAF mission was 4 May, I discovered

numerous conflicting dates to mark the commencement of US participation in UNITAF; the dates

generally range from I through 9 December. I have chosen to use 3 December 1992 because this is

the date on which UNSCR 794 was passed, and JCS issued its first warning order for the operation. The US

Marines did not actually arrive ashore until 9 December.

 

            security of relief organization operations; to assist UN/NGOs in providing

            humanitarian relief under UN auspices.25

 

Dubbed "Operation Restore Hope," this event was historically significant as the first

 

occasion in which the United Nations26 had sanctioned or actively participated in the

 

armed intervention of a sovereign nation without invitation from at least one of the

 

belligerents.

 

             Concept of Support: The first combat service support forces arrived with the

 

follow on echelons of the US Marine Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF). They consisted

 

primarily of forward elements of the I at FSSG (Force Service Support Group). US Army

 

and Coalition Forces began to flow into theater and continued until mid January 1993,

 

when the Joint Task Force Support Command (JTFSQ reached its peak strength, and

 

assumed the logistics mission (see Appendix B for a detailed distribution of forces). In

 

1993, the Joint Task Force Support Command consisted of just over 5,200 US

 

personnel; this would be reduced by more than half before the transition to UNOSOM II

 

was completed in May 1993.27

 

            Mission: The mission of the Joint Task Force Support Command was:

 

            "[To] provide logistics and medical support for US Forces, and as directed or

            required, coalition forces, deployed in support of 'Operation Restore Hope;'

            provide common item support and or inter-service support, inland distribution of

            POL [petroleum, oil and lubricants] and dry cargo, and common user port

            operations as directed by CJTF."28

___________________________

25 Paraphrased from "US Forces in Somalia" briefing at the US Army War College.

26 Note: All references to the United Nations, unless otherwise stated, were taken from unedited source

materials, AARs and interview transcripts located at the Army Peacekeeping Institute. These documents

had not been approved or affirmed by the Department of Defense at the time of this writing, and therefore

may not be quoted directly. All information is unclassified.

27 Based upon reports available at the US Army Peacekeeping Institute.

28 Operations Restore/Continue Hope Logistics Summary (Briefing Transcript), Commander, United

Nations Logistics Support Command, 1994.

 

The JTFSC provided combat service support to outlying elements of the task force

 

through supply point distribution from four remote logistics support bases, an airport and

 

sea port, within six humanitarian relief sectors (HRS) throughout southern Somalia. Table

 

2 provides a snapshot. of the magnitude of logistics support provided during the first two

 

months of the operation alone. As ponderous as these figures appear, they do not reflect

 

general supplies and construction materiel, munitions, medical supplies or repair parts.

 

Throughout this period, the support bases also provided bulk transportation,

 

terminal operations, field services29 and maintenance support.

 

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Each logistics base was intended to store up to ten days of common supplies. In addition

 

to the main ports and logistics bases, the JTFSC also provided general support to "area

 

support centers" in Oddur, Belet Uen, Gialalassi, and Bardera. The logistics bases were

 

operated by combat service support elements from US and Coalition forces, and

 

____________________

29 Ibid., page 8-55.  This included laundry, bath and medical services as well.

 

commercial contractors. The long term objective was to eventually replace all military

 

combat service support operations with contract support.

 

            Considering the size and dispersion of the logistics operation, the robust, TOE

 

 and pre-assembled staff of the 13th Corps Support Command (COSCOM)

 

provided effective command and control. This was in stark contrast to the ad hoc "pocket

 

staff' assembled for the United Nations Logistics Support Command during UNOSOM II.

 

Of particular note, was the command relationship between the Commander, JTFSC and

 

the Commander, CJTF/UNITAF. In spite of the fact that JTFSC was comprised of

 

predominantly Army personnel and units, it was not a subordinate element of

 

the component commander (ARFOR). Rather, it operated as a separate subordinate

 

command under the operational control of the combined joint task force. This was

 

justified by its support responsibility to all component and coalition forces and though

 

previously considered unorthodox, proved to be effective.30 This would become a

 

precedent for subsequent UNLSC command relationships within the UNOSOM II

 

structure.

 

            UNITAF's mission was accomplished in a four phased operation with the

 

following operational objectives:

 

            "Establish a lodgment; secure relief sites and convoy routes; expand security in

            relief sectors and provide for the transfer of [task force] functions to UN

            control. " 31

Measured by these criteria, the UNITAF mission was a complete success.

____________________________

30 Based upon the comments of COL L. Outlaw, USMC, during a presentation to the Peacekeeping

Course, Marine Corps University, 13 March 1995.

31 Ibid., page 3.

 

            Infrastructure: Experiences in Somalia are particularly useful for modifying

 

current doctrine to counter the effects of operating in an austere environment; particularly

 

because of the likelihood of having to execute future missions in a third world country.

 

Although military logisticians are trained and organized to provide simultaneous support

 

and self protection, compensation for adverse environmental conditions and the added

 

burden of providing humanitarian assistance presents strong justification for augmentation;

 

the most critical of which is having a separate and dedicated security force.

 

            Initial prospects for establishing a logistics framework in Somalia were bleak

 

without an established infrastructure. In fact, there were barely 13,500 miles of road

 

network covering nearly 400,000 square miles of land mass.32 Of the potential MSRs

 

(Main Supply Routes) only 32 % were considered to be "improved" surfaces," and were

 

extremely vulnerable to adverse weather conditions. This was particularly true during the

 

rainy seasons, from March through May and August through December, which were

 

characterized by torrential rains, a wide variance in temperatures, poor visibility and high

 

winds. Ground transportation of supplies was exceedingly difficult, and was exacerbated

 

by the threat of ambush, banditry and road blocks from any of the numerous warlord

 

factions positioned along isolated stretches of roadway. There were no redundant

 

overland alternatives available to the support command, because there is no rail system,

 

_____________________________

32 The World Factbook 1994, Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency Office of Public and Agency

Information, 1994.

33 Some "improved" roads had asphalt surfaces, though most were covered with crushed stone, coral or

gravel. Operations Restore/Continue Hope Logistics Summary (Brief), Commander, United

Nations Logistics Support Command, 1994.

 

and inland waterways are too narrow and shallow to be a reliable method of

 

transportation.34

 

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Another factor that restricted logistics operations, was the scarcity of large capacity ports.

 

In spite of an 1,800 mile coastline, Somalia has only two seaports in the general area of

 

operations capable of handling sufficient throughput supplies to be utilized as a sea port of

 

debarkation:

 

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Transportation by air was also severely restricted, because the few C-141 and C-5A

 

capable airfields were either marginally serviceable or unserviceable without extensive

 

repair. Maintaining the airfields became more difficult as the mission progressed into

 

__________________________

34 The Webi Shabelle and Juba rivers were the only two perennial, inland waterways available to the task

force. They were narrow (60 - 240 feet wide) and shallow (between 4 and 8 feet deep) with quicksand

bottoms. Restore/Continue Hope Logistics Summary.

 

 

UNOSOM II, and over tasked engineer assets were diverted to security and humanitarian

 

projects. Even when fully operational, the shortage of hardened facilities limited the

 

maximum on ground (MOG) capacity, and consequently the air flow. Outdated

 

technology, poor physical security, and an absence of adequate lighting further restricted

 

the air flow by limiting safe flight operations to daylight hours. The following airfields

 

were available to the force upon arrival:

 

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            Host Nation Support: Already one of the world's poorest economies, Somalia's

 

economic structure completely collapsed as a result of hostilities. With an industrial

 

growth of 0% since 1992, an average inflation rate of 210% per year and few natural

 

resources, 16 Somalia offers little for commercial growth. It is therefore, not surprising that

 

local economy provided minimal supplemental support for sustainment operations.

 

What few agricultural benefits were reaped from the barren terrain, were impeded by

 

banditry and lack of infrastructure to effectively distribute crop yields and livestock. Even

 

fuel and fresh water are scarce commodities. UNITAF Forces were almost exclusively

 

dependent upon the resident combat service support units for logistics support. It would

 

_________________________

35 There were 5 additional airfields throughout the area of operations that, with considerable,

could be utilized by C-130s.

36 The World Factbook 1994, pages 361-363.

 

 

be a considerable stretch by modern military standards, to even call Somalia an immature

 

theater, since the prospects for maturity in the reasonable future were slim. Initial logistics

 

operations in Somalia serve as an example of the necessity for capabilities in an austere

 

theater, that are uniquely military.

 

Operation Continue Hope

 

            Almost immediately upon reaching peak strength in January 1993, the unified task

 

force began its transition to UNOSOM II. This transformation began figuratively in early

 

March with the arrival of Lieutenant General Bir, the UN appointed, incoming

 

commander; physically with the subsequent reduction and recomposition of the force.

 

Ostensibly, the intent of the transformation was to gradually relinquish control of the

 

operation to the United Nations, and bring the US into compliance with the 27 March 93

 

Addis Ababa Agreement to reduce the number of forces in theater (the actual reduction

 

was from nearly 28,000 to approximately 4,000). Ironically, the mission of this

 

lesser force expanded rather than diminished.

 

            The Mission: A review of the CENTCOM mission statement raises questions

 

about the CINC's intended purpose for US Forces under UNOSOM II:

 

            "When directed, UNOSOM II Force Command conducts military operations to

            consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure environment for the advancement of

            humanitarian aid, economic assistance, and political reconciliation in

            Somalia."37

_____________________________

37 Somalia: A First Look, page 9.

 

The verbiage clearly infers an escalation from the UNITAF mission to one more offensive

 

in nature. The force composition however, implies an entirely different role; one that is

 

predominantly logistical in nature.

 

            Major General Montgomery, the Commander of US Forces Somalia

 

(COMUSFORSOM) and Deputy UNOSOM II Commander, insisted on having a general

 

officer appointed to command the UNLSC. He correctly assimilated the US role in

 

UNOSOM II to a logistically focused operation. His intent was to "give UNOSOM II a

 

significant logistical capability with a quick reaction force."38 In fact, 2,500 of the

 

approximately 4,000 remaining US personnel39 were assigned to the UNLSC; the

 

remainder were members of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF), and under the tactical

 

control of COMUSFORSOM. In an interview with Brigadier General Williams, he also

 

confirmed MG Montgomery's insistence on appointing him, a logistician, as Deputy

 

COMUSFORSOM.40 We can therefore conclude that both US commanders on the

 

ground had correctly assessed the situation. Why then, did the requirements continue to

 

grow beyond the organic capabilities of the UNLSC without a substantial increase in force

 

structure?

 

            The Structure: As mentioned earlier, the UNLSC at full strength consisted of

 

approximately 2,500 personnel. Unlike its predecessor, however, it was not built upon an

 

existing TO&E organization. It had no equipment, but depended upon the few vehicles

 

___________________________

38 Based on comments from a currently unreleased UNOSOM II AAR.

39The remaining personnel, approximately 1150 soldiers from the Army's 10th Mountain Division,

comprised the coalition's quick reaction force (QRF). This figure does not include the 450 personnel

assigned to Task Force Ranger, which did not arrive until August 1993, to assist in the capture of

Mohammed Farah Aideed.

40 BG Norman E. Williams, Interview conducted by the Combined Arms Assessment Team with the

Commander, Logistics Support Command and Deputy Commander, US Forces, Somalia (Verbatim

Transcript). Mogadishu, Somalia: 24 October 1993, page 2.

 

and radios that the 13th COSCOM left behind from the UNITAF mission. Without

 

TO&E authorization for personnel, it was grossly understaffed, relying on worldwide

 

acquisitions to flesh out what became known as the "pocket staff' (so designated because

 

it was created ad hoc). The only command and control overlap was incumbent upon the

 

ten person rear detachment remaining from the 13th COSCOM. In fact, the support

 

command was in operation for 45 days before it had reached its peak strength of 49

 

personnel (this included the entire primary and special staff).41 The composition of the

 

UNLSC was determined by its stated mission, and the parameters of support as

 

collectively specified in USCINCCENT OPORD 002, the COMUSFORSOM's

 

operational concept, and the United Nations Terms of Reference (TOR) 42, which was

 

signed by all participating nations. In spite of this, the UNOSOM II Commander expected

 

more from the UNLSC than it was physically capable of providing. Contradictory

 

guidance from the US State Department and CENTCOM only exacerbated the dilemma:

 

            "...don't grow in your mission; stay to the Terms of Reference, but don't

 

let the UN fail.43

 

The UNLSC was essentially charged with the success of UNOSOM II, though clearly not

 

resourced to do so. US commanders in future multilateral UN missions must ensure that

 

divergent and ambiguous guidance is clarified as soon as possible. Force planners must

 

also recognize that the fog of war and mission drift apply to peacekeeping missions as

 

much as any other; informed, proactive force building will minimize the negative effects of this phenomenon.

 

__________________________

41 Ibid., Williams, page 2.

42 A complete copy of the Terms of Reference for US Forces Somalia, United Nations Operation in

Somalia Force Command can be found in Appendix D of this study.

43 Ibid., Williams, page 3.

 

            Concept of Support: The official mission of the United Nations Logistics

 

Support Command was to:

 

            "Provide command, control and management of theater level logistics in Somalia

            UNOSOM II forces deployed in support of UN Resolution 814. Provide

            selected common item support/common user service support and inland

            distribution as required to support operations in southern Somalia as directed by

            the Commander, US Forces Somalia."44

 

 

Based upon the Terms of Reference, this equated to theater level support to coalition

 

forces on selected supplies and services. Specifically, the receipt, storage, issue and

 

management of combat rations, bulk water (including production/purification of potable

 

water) and petroleum. It also included sea and airport operations in Mogadishu, and

 

limited dry cargo transportation. With these exceptions, coalition forces were directed to

 

arrive logistically self sustaining, expecting supplemental assistance from UN contractors.

 

            In contrast to UNITAF, the UNLSC was not supposed to operate the remote area

 

support bases or perform equipment maintenance for any of the coalition forces. As

 

UNITAF began to stand down, the UN had a plan to incrementally shift these

 

responsibilities to third party commercial contractors. In reality, however, the UNOSOM

 

II mission expanded northward to include bases in Galcayo and Hobyo; effectively

 

spreading the UNLSC even thinner.

 

            Terms of Reference: For any multilateral action to be effective, ground rules

 

must be established early in the operation; preferably prior to commencement. This will

 

help to minimize miscommunications resulting from language and terminology barriers,

 

and is particularly important when US forces are not the lead element in the operation.

 

Though multilateral terms of reference existed prior to the commencement of Operation

 

___________________________

44 Ibid., Williams, page 3.

 

Continue Hope, many of the coalition forces assigned to UNOSOM II either selectively

 

complied with, or in some cases, totally disregarded national responsibilities. In fact, of

 

the 21 participating nations, only the French and Belgian forces were in full compliance

 

with all facets of the original agreement. Saddled with the responsibility to "not let the

 

UN fail," the UNLSC assumed support responsibilities well in excess of their capabilities;

 

often to the detriment of their intended mission. Specific examples of how divergent

 

intentions and compliance failures impeded logistics support for UNOSOM II provide

 

some excellent lessons on how to prepare for future operations:

 

            a. Chapter What? - Although US forces were operating under Chapter VII

 

of the UN Charter, this was not true of most other participants who were restrained by the

 

self imposed Chapter VI limitations of their parent governments. If the force is to be truly

 

multilateral, it is of critical import that all participants are singing from the same sheet of

 

music. An extremely capable German Corps Support Battalion sat, grossly underutilized,

 

at the logistics base at Belet Uen while the UNLSC was spread thinner by the day. The

 

unit was desperately needed in Baidoa, but because the German government considered

 

the area to be too dangerous for a Chapter VI force, they were restricted from assisting

 

the UNLSC in that area. Similar restrictions were placed upon Irish and Korean forces as

 

well.

 

            In another instance, the Pakistani force requested bulldozer support to clear

 

roadblocks along 21 October Road. The Pakistanis refused to utilize their own assets to

 

clear the road because of the increased local threat. BG Williams initially supported the

 

unprogrammed commitments until several US bull dozer operators were wounded

 

attempting to clear the roadblocks. When he withdrew support, however, he was quickly

 

overruled by the UN Commander. The entire operation was a considerable drain on not

 

only engineer assets, but the additional assets necessary to provide security while they

 

performed the task. A task which repeatedly proved futile I might add, since the

 

Pakistanis refused to occupy or cover the cleared obstacles; time and again the engineers

 

cleared an entire length of road, only to find that the Somali's were rebuilding the

 

obstacles behind them as they worked.

 

            Other examples of multilateral friction occurred when entire forces appeared at the

 

UNLSC doorstep demanding supplies that were clearly not within the terms of the support

 

agreement, items such as Kevlar vests, M79 grenade launchers and countless tons of

 

barrier materials. Many forces were not even capable of providing security for their own

 

ammunition. This forced the UNLSC to expand its munitions storage areas, diverting yet

 

additional forces to mundane security missions when they should have been providing

 

logistics support. These are just a few of the many difficulties that must be overcome, if

 

the LSC concept is to be executed successfully in future multilateral peacekeeping

 

missions.

 

            If there is a single lesson to be learned from all of this, there are unavoidable

 

difficulties that are characteristic of most multilateral operations. These include language

 

and cultural barriers, metric versus standard measures, as well as varying levels of

 

commitment and expertise. A comprehensive terms of reference agreement that is

 

universally accepted and enforced can be a very effective way to maximize assets and

 

minimize friction between component forces.

 

                                                      CHAPTER 4

                                                     Conclusions

 

                        The main strategic challenge for the United States is to develop plans for

                        multilateral action to stem civil wars without drowning in them, and to do

                        what it reasonably can to give victims of these wars a chance to live in

                        peace without making them permanent wards.

                                    --Leslie H. Gelb, President of the Council on Foreign Relations

 

 

            With a national debt of 4.7 trillion dollars and growing exponentially each year, the

 

so-called budget crisis is at the forefront of American consciousness, and consequently at

 

the top of the Executive and Legislative Branches' "to do" list. The National Command

 

Authorities can no longer justify the costs of a global democratic stability at the expense of

 

the American taxpayer. The fiscal impact of the Somalia operation at the time of this

 

writing, exceeded 1.55 billion dollars,45 and the "to date" costs of the Haiti Operation

 

in excess of 1.2 billion dollars.46 Efforts to reduce the national debt have cut right to the

 

heart of defense spending and reduced force structure to its lowest levels since post-World

 

War II. Engagement and enlargement is steadily bleeding the US economy dry.

 

            If we, as a nation, feel morally obligated to intercede in so irresolute a practice as

 

peacekeeping, then we must do so with realistic, short term objectives that will preclude

 

degenerative missions such as Somalia. The United States can no longer afford to answer

 

every diplomatic challenge with aggressive military intervention. This is particularly true

 

of regional crises that do not threaten the national security or vital national interests of the

 

United States. In addition to being impractical, excessive military force is expensive,

 

___________________________

45 This figure is exclusive of the US portion of the stipend paid to the United Nations each year, which

amounts to 37% of its overall budget.

46 COL Mark Walsh, USA (RET), US Army Peacekeeping Institute, US Army War College.

 

 

detrimental to the ability of our forces to fulfill its conventional warfighting imperatives,

 

and harmful to American prestige and credibility abroad.

 

            The National Command Authorities, in cooperation with the US Congress, must

 

act responsibly, by implementing a policy that limits the size, composition, and role of

 

US military forces in UN peacekeeping operations. Because ground component forces are not

 

sufficiently abundant to continue the current operational tempo without causing a

 

detriment to readiness, a logistics force similar in structure and capability to the United

 

Nations Logistics Support Command in Somalia, may be the practical compromise that we

 

are searching for. It would allow the US to contribute to international peacekeeping

 

efforts without assuming the lead role in a potentially unstable situation, and without

 

significant risk to national security or credibility. In effect, helping to stem the problem

 

without drowning in it.

 

                                                BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

BOOKS:

 

Kissinger, Henry A., DIPLO&MCY New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

 

Lederer, William J. and Eugene Burdick. The Ugly American. New York: Ballentine,

Books (reprinted) 1983.

 

Pagonis, LTG William G. and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountains: Lessons in

Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War. Boston, Massachusetts- Harvard Business

School Press, 1992.

 

Slavin, Dr. Stephen L., Introduction to Economics (Second Edition). Boston: Richard D.

Irwin Inc., 1991.

 

Von Clauswitz, Carl (translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret), On War. Princeton,

New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

 

Reisman, W. Michael and Chris T. Antoniou, The Laws of War: A Comprehensive

Collection of Primary Documents on International Laws Governing Armed Conflict:

New York: Vintage Books, 1994.

 

PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS:

 

Betts, Richard k., Ae Delusion of Impartial Intervention. New York: Foreign Affairs,

November/December 1994.

 

Dubik, COL James M., USA, War In All Its Forms. Washington DC: Armed Forces

Journal (International), April 1994.

 

Gelb, Leslie H., Quelling the Teacup Wars: The New World's Constant Challenge. New

York: Foreign Affairs, November/December 1994.

 

Haass, Richard N., Paradigm Lost: From Containment to Confusion. New York:

Foreign Affairs, January/February 1995.

 

Kennan, George F., On American Principles. New York: Foreign Affairs, March/April

1995.

 

Lake, Anthony (National, Security Advisor to President Clinton), The Limits of

Peacekeeping, The New York Times, Sunday, February 6, 1994.

 

Roos, John G., The Perils Of Peacekeeping: Talleying The Costs In Blood, Coin,

Prestige And Readiness. Washington DC: Armed Forces Journal (International),

December 1993.

 

Roskin, Michael G., National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy. The US Army War

College: Parameters, Winter 1994-95.

 

Schlesinger, James, Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy. New York: Foreign

Affairs, January 1993.

 

Smith, Tony, In Defense of Intervention. New York: Foreign Affairs,

November/December 1994.

 

Stedman, Stephen J., The New Interventionists. New York: Foreign Affairs, January

1993.

 

Steele, Dennis, Army Units Deploy to Assist Starving, War Torn Somalia, Army

Magazine, February 1993.

 

US GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS:

 

The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,

Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, July 1994.

 

Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR:

Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report (3 December 1992 - 4 May 1993), Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993.

 

Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR:

US Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II (Final Draft), Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, October 1994.

 

Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR:

Logistics in a Peace Enforcement Environment, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

November 1993.

 

Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL), OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: Peace

Operations, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, November 1993.

 

The Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, United

States Mission to the United Nations, New York, NY, May 1994.

 

Magruder, Carter B., Recurring Logistic Problems As I Have Observed Them,

Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 1991.

 

Nash, BG William L., Special Edition Newsletter: Somalia, Fort Leavenworth, KS:

Center for Army Lessons Learned, January 1993.

 

Perry, William J. (Secretary of Defense), Annual Report to the President and the

Congress. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1995.

 

Prados, Alfred B., Somalia: Current Developments, Drawdowns, and Implications,

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, October 1994.

 

Weinberger, Casper W., The Uses of Military Power (Text of Remarks by Secretary of

Defense Casper W. Weinberger to the National Press Club, November 28, 1984).

Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 1994.

 

The World Factbook 1994, Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency Office of Public

and Agency Information, 1994.

 

MANUALS AND PAMPHLETS, MILITARY UNCLASSIFIED

 

AFSC PUB 1. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide. Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff

College, 1993.

 

Command and General Staff College Course Manual A-493, Logistics in Operations

Other Than War, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1994.

 

Field Manual (FM) 10- 1. Quartermaster Principles. Washington DC: Department of the

Army, August 1994.

 

Field Manual (FM) 100-5. Operations. Washington DC: Department of the Army, June

1993.

 

Field Manual (FM) 100- 19/FMFM 7- 10. Domestic Support Operations. Washington

DC: Department of the Army, July 1993.

 

Field Manual (FM) 100-20. Operations Other Than War (Initial Draft). Washington

DC: Department of the Army, September 1994.

 

Field Manual (FM) 100-23. Peace Operations. Washington DC: Department of the

Army, December 1994.

 

Field Manual (FM) 100-XX (Final Draft). Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian

Assistance Operations. Langley Air Force Base: Air Land Sea Application Center, US

Atlantic Command, March 1994.

 

Joint Pub 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff,

September 1993.

 

Joint Pub 3-10. Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations. Washington DC Joint Chiefs

of Staff, February 1993.

 

Joint Pub 3-07.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures For Peacekeeping

Operations. Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 1994.

 

Joint Pub 4-01.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.

Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1994.

 

US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-56, Planners' 

Guide for Military Operations Other Than War, Fort Monroe, VA: US Army TRADOC,

1 September 1993.

 

UNPUBLISBED INTERVIEWS:

 

Butler, LTC Samuel. Former U-3 Operations Officer for Operation UNOSOM II and

Current Subject Matter Expert on Peace Enforcement Operations, Peacekeeping Institute,

US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Interviewed by author, 17 February 1995.

 

PUBLISBED INTERVIEWS:

 

Williams, BG Norman E., Interview conducted by the Combined Arms Assessment Team

with the Commander, Logistics Support Command and Deputy Commander, US Forces,

Somalia (Verbatim Transcript). Mogadishu, Somalia: 24 October 1993.

 

FILMS:

 

Fortunato, CPT Steven M., UNOSOM II The Hope Continues, Pentagon, Washington,

DC: HQ USAF TV Center, 11th Communications Squadron, 1994.

 

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS AND LECTURES:

 

Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, BRIEFING: Military Operations

Other Than War, Washington, DC, 1994.

 

Lessons Learned Briefing Summary, Peace Enforcement Operations in Somalia:

Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army

Lessons Learned, 1994.

 

Combined Arms Assessment Team Briefing, Operation Continue Hope: Logistics

Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1994.

 

Basic Somalia Briefing for Adaptation and Use in Staff Talks and Subject Matter Expert

Exchange Conferences, US Support to UN Operations in Somalia Lessons Learned

Briefing Narrative, Pentagon, Washington DC - Headquarters Department of the Army,

October 1994.

 

Harrison, LTC James R., MINUTES: Operations Other Than War Working Group Video

Teleconference, Fort Lee, VA: Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM),

December 1994.

 

United Nations Logistics Support Command Briefing, May 1994.

 

Operations Restore/Continue Hope Logistics Summary (Brief), Commander, United

Nations Logistics Support Command, 1994.

 

Naval War College, BRIEFING: Naval Logistics 2003, Newport Rhode Island: January

1995 Wardlaw, MAJ Vincent 0., MINUTES: Operations Other Than War Working Group

Conference, Fort Lee, VA: Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), January

1995.

 

Weinberger, Casper W., The Use of Military Power: Text of Remarks by Secretary of

Defense Casper W Weinberger to the National Press Club, November 28, 1984.

 

THESES AND OTHER UNPUBLISHED PAPERS:

 

Allard, COL Kenneth, USA, Lessons Learned Somalia: A First Look (Final Draft),

Institute for National Strategy Studies, National Defense University, Fort McNair,

Washington DC, 1995.

 

Hunter, WHITE PAPER: An Analysis of the Application of the "Principles of Military

Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) " in Somalia, The Army/Air Force Center for

Low Intensity Conflict, February 1994.

 

Roth, COL Dale E., WHITE PAPER: The Application o Peace Enforcement Operations

at Brigade and Battalion, Fort Benning, GA: US Army Infantry School, 1994.

 

Rothman, COL Harry E., Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post-Cold War

World. A Perspective From the Joint Staff, Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Strategic Studies

Institute, US Army War College, February 1992.

 

Grimm, LTC Charles, Logistics Support of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, A

Course Text Produced by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research,

Programme [sic] of Correspondence Instruction In Peacekeeping Operations, New York,

NY, 1994.

 

Samatar, Dr. Said S., Professor of African History, Rutgers University, Somalia: A

Nation in Turmoil, A Minority Rights Group Report, United Kingdom, 1991.

 

United Nations Logistics Working Group: Recommendations and Products, United

Nations Headquarters, New York, NY, December 1993.

 

United Nations UNOSOM II After Action Report (First Draft), Magadishu, Somalia:

United Nations Headquarters, 1994. At the time of this writing, this document had not

been approved for release by the Department of State. This document was used solely to

verify information found in numerous primary and secondary sources, and was not

referenced or quoted directly at any time in this paper.

 

United Nations Studies: Compiled Notes on Somalia (UNOSOM), United Kingdom

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, April 1993.

 

COMUSFOR After Action Review (First Draft): At the time of this writing, this

document had not been approved for release by the Department of Defense. This

document was used solely to verify information found in numerous primary and secondary

sources, and was not referenced or quoted directly at any time in this paper.

 

Press Release, PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE The Clinton Administration's

Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, New York: United States Mission

to the United Nations.

 

REFERENCE PAPER: The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, New York:

Nations Department of Public Information, April 1993.

 

Roberson, LTC Tommy H., Supporting Peacemaking Operations in Somalia, Fort

Leavenworth, KS: 1993.

 

Terms of Reference for US Forces Somalia, United Nations Operation in Somalia Force

Command. United Nations Headquarters, New York: May 1993.

 

United States Forces After Action Report (First Draft), Magadishu, Somalia: JTF

Headquarters, 1994.

 

Williams, BG Norman E., Personal Diary covering the time period 23 May through 22

October 1993, Mogadishu, Somalia: 1993.

 

LETTERS AND MEMORANDA:

 

Team Chief, Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAT). Memorandum to the Director,

Center for Army Lessons Learned. Subject: "Somalia Logistics Combined Arms

Assessment Team (LOG CAT) Initial Impressions Report." 30 October 1992.

 

Letter Of Agreement Between The Department Of Defense And The United Nations

Organization Concerning The Provisions Of Assistance On A Reimbursable Basis In

Support Of The United Nations Operation In Somalia. Washington DC: Signed on 4 and

6 May 1993 (Respectively).

 

ON-LINE DATA BASES:

 

Officer's Bookcase: Military Terms and Acronyms (CD-ROM), Quanta Press Inc., ST.

Paul, MN, 1992.

 

Joint Electronics Library on CD-ROM: Approved Joint Publications Selected Service,

Publications and Research Papers (Volume 2, No. 1), OC Inc. for J-7, The Joint Staff,

1994.

 

 

                                                            Appendix A

 

                                    CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

                        Chapter VI. Pacific Settlement of Disputes

 

                                                            Article 33

 

            1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the

maintenance of international peace and security, shall, firs of all, see a solution by

negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to

regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

            2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to

settle their dispute by such means.

 

                                                            Article 34

 

            The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might

lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute , in order to determine whether the

continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of

international peace and security.

 

                                                            Article 35

 

            1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature

referred to in Article 34, to the attention to the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

            2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security

Council or to the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for

the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

            3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of the matters brought to

its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.47

 

                                                            Article 36

 

            1. The Security Council may, at any stage or a dispute of the nature referred to in

Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods 

of adjustment.

            2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the

settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

            3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also

take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the

parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute

of the Court.

____________________________

47 Refers to Chapter IV, functions and powers of the UN General Assembly and Security Council.

 

Appendix A

 

 

                 Chapter VI. Pacific Settlement of Disputes

                                                  (Continued)

 

                                                            Article 37

 

            1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to

settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council,

            2. In the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact

likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide

whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it

may consider appropriate.

 

                                                            Article 38

 

            Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may,

if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a

view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

 

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