American Military Intervention In The Post-Cold War World:
The Bosnian Example
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: American Military Intervention in the Post-Cold
War World: The Bosnian Example
Author: Lieutenant Commander James A. Pelkofski, USN
Research Question: Does American military intervention in
Bosnia provide a model for intervention in the post-Cold
War world?
Discussion: This paper defines intervention, suggests
different scopes of intervention, and distinguishes several
strategic decision-factors that determine the scope of a given
intervention. Theory is then applied to U.S. intervention
policy concerning the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
U.S. policy in Bosnia is traced through its initial
development and evolution into varying scopes of military
intervention of limited extent but definite purpose. The
purpose of U.S. intervention in Bosnia, as defined by what
leaders say and through the actions they take, is to create a
regional conflict cordon to prevent the spread of instability
to areas where vital American interests lie.
Thesis: U.S. intervention policy in Bosnia has pursued the
establishment of a conflict cordon to restrict an otherwise
untenable crisis from affecting vital national interests. This
leads to the conclusion that the Bosnian crisis is a cold
but salient and pragmatic paradigm for American military
intervention in perplexing, emerging post-Cold War world
conflicts.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii
Chapter
I. INTERVENTION AND POLICY 1
II.INTERVENTION IN THEORY 3
Defining Intervention 3
Political Objective 3
Relations Shift 5
Permissive or Non-Permissive 6
Territorial Presence and Force 6
Intervention Defined 7
Scope of Intervention 8
Conciliation 8
Persuasion 10
Coercion 12
Strategic Decision-Factors 13
Political Nature of the Conflict 14
Psychological Nature of the Conflict 15
Stability 16
International Involvement 17
Termination Objectives 18
Theory Applied 19
III. DENIAL AND DISTANCING IN THE YUGOSLAV CIVIL
WAR, 27 JUNE 1991 - 07 APRIL 1992 20
Denial Decision-Factors 22
Stability 22
Political Nature of the Conflict 24
Distancing Decision-Factors 26
International Involvement 27
Political Nature of the Conflict 29
Accepting Intervention 31
IV. CONCILIATION INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA, 07 APRIL
1992 - 16 July 1992 34
Intervention Actions 34
Political Motives 34
Humanitarian Aid 35
Military Delivery and Protection 35
Conciliation Intervention Defined 36
Conciliation Intervention Decision-Factors 36
Stability 37
International Involvement 37
Leadership Gap 39
Political Nature of the Conflict 40
Milosevic 41
Psychological Nature of the Conflict 43
The Right of Vengeance 43
Toward Persuasion Intervention 47
V. PERSUASION INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA, 16 JULY
1992 - SPRING 1995 Intervention Actions 49
Intervention Actions 49
Air Supply of Humanitarian Aid 52
Naval Blockade in the Adriatic 53
"No-Fly Zone" Over Bosnia 54
Use of Air Strikes 57
Ground Activities In and Around
Former-Yugoslavia 59
Persuasion Intervention Defined 61
Persuasion Intervention Decision-Factors 62
Political Nature of the Conflict 62
A Civil War 62
A Post-Cold War Conflict 65
Psychological Nature of the Conflict 66
International Involvement 68
Vance-Owen Plan 69
The United Nations 71
NATO 72
International Restraint 74
Stability 75
Termination Objectives 76
VI. CONFLICT CORDON AND THE ARMS EMBARGO 81
Arguments Against Lift 82
Increased Level of Violence 82
Imperilment of Foreign Troops 84
Ending Humanitarian Relief Efforts 85
Setback to Russian Reform 85
Increased American Involvement 86
Clinton's Argument For Lift 87
Parity 87
Clinton's Dilemma 88
VII. A PARADIGM FOR POST-COLD WAR INTERVENTION 92
A Policy Success 92
A Post-Cold War Intervention Paradigm 94
The Prototypical Post-Cold War Conflict 95
The Conflict Cordon 97
The American Soul 99
REFERENCE LIST 102
CHAPTER I
INTERVENTION AND POLICY
Intervention is a concept that invites varied
interpretation and resists easy definition. During the
Cold War, the malleability of the concept adapted well to
the rules of the confict as determined by the two primary
players--the United States and the Soviet Union. However,
the rules of post-Cold War conflicts have yet to be
written and the roster of players has grown exponentially.
Consequently, adapting the concept of intervention is an
urgent task for political and military decision-makers in
the uncertain post-Cold War world.
This paper defines intervention, suggests different
scopes of intervention, and distinguishes several
strategic decision factors that determine the scope of a
given intervention. Theory is then applied to U.S.
intervention policy concerning the conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The strategic decision-factors provide a framework
within which to further study American military
intervention in the post-Cold War world and, specifically,
in Bosnia. U.S. policy in Bosnia is traced through its
initial development and evolution into varying scopes of
military intervention of limited extent but definite purpose.
The purpose of U.S. intervention in Bosnia, as defined by what
leaders say and through the actions they take, is to create a
regional conflict cordon to prevent the spread of instability
to areas where vital American interests lie. Solving the
existing crisis is desired but not required by the American
intervention. Recognizing that peace is not necessarily a
natural international condition, a cordon permits the conflict
to remain hot but contained--like a fire allowed to burn itself
out--through a combination of diplomatic maneuvering and
military intervention of limited scope.
Therefore, this paper demonstrates that, after a brief period
of denial and distancing, U.S. policy has pursued the
establishment of a conflict cordon to restrict an otherwise
untenable crisis from affecting vital national interests. This
leads to the conclusion that the Bosnian crisis is a cold but
salient and pragmatic paradigm for American military
intervention in perplexing, emerging post-Cold War world
conflicts.
CHAPTER II
INTERVENTION IN THEORY
Defining Intervention
Intervention is a concept open to interpretation.
However, in surveying the literature on the subject,
several salient characteristics of intervention emerge and
combine to form a working definition.
Political Objective
The foremost characteristic of intervention involves its
impact on the politics and policies within the target country.
International law describes intervention as "dictatorial
interference" where one state attempts to affect the "existing
order of things" in the affairs of another state (von Glahn
1981, 160).
Some authors argue that existing order refers to the
requirement to remove or to maintain the present political
authority; thus, the effect on political authority is the
entering argument in determining whether an action is an
intervention (Rosenau 1968, 167; Young 1968, 178). However,
others interpret intervention to include efforts toward
manipulating a state's internal or external
policies (Wriggins 1968, 218).
Advocates of the political authority school of
intervention reason that interventions aimed only at
manipulating or changing behavior and policies fall into
the category of influence and therefore do not equate to
true interventions (Rosenau 1968, 166; Young 1968, 178).
According to Professor Rosenau, for an action to qualify
as an intervention, it must be "authority-oriented."
(1968, 169)
Rosenau adds to his "authority-oriented" criterion the
requirement that the intervention action be "convention-breaking."
(1968, 169) Using these criteria, he contends that intervention
is less likely in a global system of dispersed power and
more likely in a system where power is shared by a limited number
of states because any changes appear more threatening to the overall
balance in the latter system (Rosenau 1969, 168).
However, Rosenau developed his theories in a bipolar
world and and his parameters have been overtaken by the
rapid diffusion of power ongoing in global affairs.
Multiple poles of power and a growing parity in the
ability to influence global events characterize current
international relations, complicating even the most
powerful nation's ability to conduct authority-oriented
interventions. More appropriate to current global
conditions are suggestions that interdependence, and
implicitly multipolarity, increase the amount and scope of
interactions and afford expanded opportunity for
intervention (Young 1968, 182).
Contrary to Rosenau, influence and intervention need not be
mutually exclusive actions. Efforts aimed at influencing
policies, as well as the politicians, qualify as interventions
(Wriggins 1968, 218). Thus, whether initiated toward political
authority or policies, the political objective is a
distinguishing characteristic of intervention.
Relations Shift
Clearly applicable to a current definition of intervention is
Rosenau's convention-breaking requirement. An intervention
represents a significant change in behavior by one state toward
another (Rosenau 1968, 167). Of course, every change in
relations is not an intervention but an intervention does
involve a drastic and definite policy shift by the intervening
power from what had been the status quo. The definite nature of
the policy shift discounts "haphazard and inadvertent
activities" from being categorized as interventions (Young
1968, 178).
A definite change occurs in the actions governing relations
between states but, at some later point in time, another change
must take place. The intervention is the change between phases
of an international relationship (Schwarz 1970, 83) and,
therefore, is "finite and transitory." (Rosenau 1969, 161)
There either occurs a return to previous relations or the
new relationship becomes explicitly or tacitly sanctioned
(Rosenau 1969, 161).
Permissive or Non-Permissive
An item of theoretical contention involves the permissive
nature of interventions. According to Rosenau, an intervention
is a forceful act aimed at affecting some change in a state
against its will (1969, 153-154). Though this is often the
case, Rosenau discounts in his interpretation of intervention
the possibility that an organization with a legitimate claim to
authority may request a power to intervene. Requests for
intervention may range from peacekeeping situations to
providing assistance in forcibly repelling an insurgency or
incursion.
In a broad sense, the insurgency example does aim at
Affecting change against the will of another political entity,
albeit not the government in power. International law equates
a clear invitation by a lawful government to an intervention by right
(von Glahn 1981, 162). Thus, interventions include permissive,
as well as non-permissive, situations.
Territorial Presence and Force
Territorial presence and the use of force are two
related characteristics of intervention. An intervention
involves planned and purposeful actions occurring across
recognized borders (Young 1968, 178). There must be a physical
presence by one state within the territory or territorial sea
of another state.
Though not necessarily a prerequisite, force, either
threatened or implied, is frequently associated with physical
presence and intervention (Rosenau 1968, 168; 1969, 154;
Wriggins 1968,218). Often, the credibility of the threat
or the viability of the use of force is evident in the military
superiority of the intervening state or states over the target
state (Schwarz 1970, 83)--a superiority made obvious through
territorial presence.
Intervention Defined
In summary, intervention is a political process, involving one
or more states, directed at changing the structure of authority
or the internal or external policies of another state. An
intervention represents a definite but temporary shift in
relations undertaken with or without the consent of authorities
in the target state. intervention often includes a physical-
though not necessarily cross-border--presence and likely
involves the threat or actual use of military force; therefore,
for the purposes of this paper, intervention is synonymous with
military intervention.
The following sections discuss definition qualifiers concerning
the scope of intervention (the measure of military involvement) and
the strategic decision-factors affecting that scope.
Scope of Intervention
The scope of intervention refers to the level or extent of
military involvement by the intervening state or states. The
scope represents either a definite limit to military
involvement or merely a stage in an escalating sequence and
ranges from relatively benign interventions involving aid
(conciliation) to combat engagement (persuasion, coercion).
In a conciliation intervention, the military involvement
will not necessarily include force; however, persuasion and coercion
interventions are intentionally threatening thus normally
employ military force. The latter two scopes represent what
Herbert Tillema termed "overt military intervention" (1973, 3).
The following sections distinguish the three scopes of
intervention.
Conciliation
Conciliation interventions aim at winning the hearts
and minds of the target state's political authority, populace, or both.
The conciliation in this type of. intervention normally occurs
in the form of aid. However, while conciliation interventions
may include aid, not all aid (for example, economic aid)
equates to intervention.
Key determinants are whether the aid is based on
external political motives directed toward authority structures
within the target state, and whether a potential use of force
is involved. Neither pure humanitarian aid, such as that
provided in disaster relief, nor the presence of foreign troops
necessarily indicates a conciliation intervention.
However, once a mission adopts political motives toward
authority or toward policies within the target state, aid
becomes part of a conciliation intervention, at least.* Non
combatant evacuations and refugee assistance, ostensibly
humanitarian projects, qualify as conciliation interventions if
the missions take the side of an internal faction in power or
aspiring to power.**
Military involvement is typically benign in conciliation
interventions, although risk is always present. For example,
the military may provide delivery and forceful protection of
humanitarian type aid.
Additionally, the aid may occur in the form of what has been
called "para-combat involvement," including military advice,
training, intelligence, construction, and arms supply (Duner
1985, 16). The very survival of a
_____________________
*In December 1992, President Bush committed U.S.
troops to a humanitarian mission in Somalia that was
largely completed by March of the following year. It was
then, however, that the mission changed, devolving into a
fateful intervention (Wolfowitz 1994, 32).
**The aid and enforced cover provided to the Kurds
in Iraq is described as humanitarian (Lake 1994, 51) but
with - these same Kurds seeking to secede from Iraq, U.S.
involvement is more accurately described as a conciliation
intervention in support of the Kurds.
government may depend on such military aid (Schwarz 1970, 202)
and when this is the case, the aid is part of a conciliation
intervention.
Persuasion
Unlike conciliation interventions, the object of persuasion
interventions is solely political authority, not the populace.
Military involvement is highly visible and overtly threatening
and therefore the risk is greater.
Persuasion interventions typically begin with presence
operations--or "showing the flag"--and more active
demonstrations such as military exercises or maneuvers. What
might also be called "swaggering" (Art 1993, 11), presence and
demonstration intend to convince the target state of the
ability and resolve of the intervening power to expand the
intervention, if necessary. The appearance of U.S. naval forces
off shore is an example of "swaggering."
Persuasion must be "clear and appropriate" and include
political-military actions that allow the target state to read
and react in the manner desired (George 1971, 9-10). For
presence operations and demonstrations to amount to more than
mere signaling requires the actions that reinforce the
persuasion's intent to occur within the target state's
territory or territorial waters. In other words, the operations
and demonstrations must be felt, as well as seen.
Included among such reinforcing actions are harassment
operations, best represented by the in vogue "no-fly zone."*
Also, limited selective strikes, usually by naval or air
assets, upon political-military areas deemed significant or
symbolic provide persuasion emphasis.
Either as a follow-on action or primary operation,
the military enforcement of sanctions is another overt form
of persuasion intervention. Through some means of blockade,
military forces patrol sea, air, and land borders, usually
threatening force against sanction violators.
Finally, included in the scope of persuasion intervention is
peacekeeping--the international oversight of peace accords and
cease-fires. Peacekeeping, as interpreted through Chapter VI of
the UN Charter, occurs at the- -request of the conflicting
parties (Brownlie 1978, 12-13; U.S. Congress, Senate 1993g, 14)
and therefore illustrates a characteristic permissive
intervention. Peacekeeping, as first conceived and normally
applied, falls somewhere between the peaceful methods of
conflict settlement discussed in Chapter VI of the UN Charter
and the enforcement measures provided in Chapter VII of the
____________________
*For example, in August 1992 the U.S. established a no-fly zone
over a portion of Iraq to protect Shiite Muslims from Iraqi air
attacks. This harassment operation displayed its resolve with
the downing of an Iraqi warplane in violation of the no-fly
zone in December 1992 (Dorff, ed. 1993, 236, 238).
charter--peacekeeping has been referred to as Chapter
Six-and-a-half operations (Rostow 1994, 102-104).
Persuasion is implicit, though not always acknowledged,
with the peace-keepers' presence. This presence is deemed
sufficient to deter future hostilities and, if necessary,
to preserve territorial integrity (U.S. Congress, Senate 1993g, 14).
Force is typically limited to self-defense but may be applied to
enforce the peacekeeping mandate (Rostow 1994, 104).
Persuasion becomes explicit if the role of the international
forces calls for peace enforcement--legally sanctioned by invoking
Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Brownlie 1978, 13-16; U.S. Congress,
Senate 1993g, 14). Peace enforcement is an armed intervention prepared
to employ all necessary means to preserve peace (U.S. Congress, Senate
1993g, 14)--provided there exists some basis for peace. One definition
of intervention specifically equates it with "international efforts to
separate combatants and enforce peace." (Damrosch 1993, 1)
Coercion
When there is no basis for peace, peace-making is
the next progressive escalation and is a type of coercion
intervention. Coercion intervention is a stronger form of
persuasion, involving combat operations and possible
escalation to wider scale warfare to compel political or
policy change within the target state. For example,
another form of coercion is an expanded version of-the
limited selective targeting available for persuasion
interventions. In coercion interventions, such targets would
be less limited and possibly require less selectivity.
In a coercion intervention, the belligerents to a conflict
are confronted with enough force to either defeat them or coerce
them to settle the conflict (U.S. Congress, Senate 1993g, 14).*
If war was still a declared act, then coercion intervention
would be a subset of war.
Strategic Decision-Factors
The scope of the intervention is determined, in
broad terms, by the national interest. However, while
frequently cited as policy justification, the national
interest remains conceptually elusive and enigmatic, more
applicable to interpretation than definition. Though critical
to determining the scope of the intervention, the national
interest-however defined--provides only general guidelines.
In specific terms, the scope of the intervention corresponds
To achieving objectives deemed attainable at the outset--or
objectives realistically adjusted during the course of the
intervention. This does not discount
____________________
*Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, describes the Gulf War with Iraq as a peace-making
intervention (U.S. Congress, Senate 1993g, 14).
that calculations on the requisite scope can be wrong;
history validates the frequency of mistaken means for
given objectives. Rather, objectives set limitations on
the scope of the intervention and it is proposed that
these limits result from the impact of strategic
decision-factors on policy development.
Strategic decision-factors refer to the unique
dynamics of the conflict itself. Two decision-factors are
internal to the conflict; three are external; each affects
decision-making by potential intervening states. It is
not suggested that a checklist of strategic
decision-factors exists for determining policy. Rather,
the factors listed below, although not an all inclusive
list, at various times and in different degrees direct
U.S. decision-making toward determining the scope of
intervention.
Political Nature of the Conflict
Political nature (as one of the two decision-factors
internal to the conflict) refers to the political issues
defining the conflict and to the belligerents involved.
Possible political issues that lead to conflict include
ideology, right of self-determination, type of rule, and,
simply, internal political power struggles.
Directly associated with the political issues are
the belligerents, their specific cause, and their
leadership. Of significance on the latter is the
political-military make-up of the leadership, the
legitimacy possessed with their constituencies, and the
effect to which the leadership wield various elements of
power.
For the intervening power, the political nature of
the conflict greatly influences decisions on the scope of
intervention. Resolving the political dispute will
normally require a mix of diplomacy and force; the extent
of the political division between the belligerents, as
well as their relative strength, impacts upon the
diplomatic-military mix. If force dominates the mix, the
intervention will require persuasion or, more likely,
coercion.
Psychological Nature of the Conflict
In the psychological nature of the conflict, the
other internal decision-factor, the intensity of the
belligerents is often driven by emotions stirred by the
nationalistic, ethnic, religious, and moral commitments
underpinning their involvement in the conflict. The depth
of psychological commitment will likely affect prospects
for diplomatic solutions, especially if psychological
passions result in human-rights abuses and other
atrocities.
Deep psychological commitment on the part of some or
all the belligerents can drive the requisite scope of the
intervention beyond a point which the intervening power is
willing to commit. Together or individually, the political and
psychological nature of the conflict often determine whether a
commitment of the intervening power matches the commitment of
the belligerents; if not, the intervention is ill-advised or
should remain limited in scope.
Stability
Stability is the most externally oriented decision-factor,
pertaining to whether the conflict is a threat to other
regions. A conflict confined within borders will attract wider
attention should it threaten, in some way, to spread.
Therefore, the potential for de-stabilizing effects upon
political, economic, and balance of power arrangements impacts
upon decisions by potential intervening powers, as do legal
obligations under international law.*
Intervention to keep a conflict from spreading may
_____________________
*An internal conflict in which an insurgent group is
aided by an external agency or state has already spread
beyond borders, creating the potential for further
instability. In such circumstances, a state has the legal
right to intervene on the side of the target government
based on interpretations of Article 2 (4) of the Charter
of the United Nations (von Glahn 1981, 163).
A broader interpretation of Article 2 by Lloyd
Cutler, former counsel to President Carter extends the
right of intervention to the support of pro-democracy
insurgencies battling a repressive regime, although this
view is not universally accepted in international law
(1985, 105-106). Of course, the catch in either
interpretation is that by intervening the conflict is
spreading and, unless successful, the intervention could
lead to further instability.
be justified by the abatement theory of international law.
According to the abatement theory, a state has a right--perhaps
a duty--to intervene in a conflict within a bordering state
verging on anarchy and unable to restore order, thereby
creating a situation with the potential to spread beyond the
border (von Glahn 1981, 168). Provided the objective of the
intervening state is only to restore order and to obtain no
other gain, the intervention is likely justified under
international law (von Glahn 1981, 168). Such breakdowns of
order, albeit not always on the border, can motivate powers
such as the U.S. to intervene on behalf of stability
(Yarmolinsky 1968, 235).
International Involvement
International involvement includes the belligerents'
allies and adversaries; the United Nations (UN); other
regional and international political, economic, and
military organizations; and the media.
Although each strategic decision-factor influences prospects
for diplomacy, it is often from international involvement that
an acceptable mediator emerges, capable of forging a solution.
Alternatively, it is from international involvement that a
consensus results leading to a legal multinational intervention
(von Glahn 1981, 165). Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter provides
for sanctioned multinational intervention in the cause of
"international peace and security." (Brownlie 1978, 14) 17
The process of international involvement has the potential to
spread exponentially once initiated, drawing others into the
dispute. Rather than hasten an end to a conflict, greater
international involvement may complicate resolution.
Termination Objectives
This decision-factor is external to the conflict but
intimately internal to the state contemplating or conducting
an intervention. Ideally, objectives required for successful
intervention termination and constraints, such as duration,
are defined before commencing the intervention.
The decision to intervene should not be undertaken without
assessing the potential for intervention protraction and
commitment enlargement. As in war, efforts to limit
intervention and involvement while still remaining engaged
tend to trap the participants in an ever-increasing
commitment. The tendency for incremental decision-making,
driven by uncertainty and the hope that lesser actions will
suffice, replaces bold policy implementation that could
otherwise lead to decisive intervention means (Tillema 1973,
31-33).
To avoid such a trap, terms for success should be defined
prior to intervening and attainment of those terms should be
within reason; otherwise, the intervention risks increasing
the violence and prolonging the conflict (Beloff 1968, 207).
Unless the intervention effort is well defined, it merely
exacerbates the situation.
Alternatively, policy, guided by strategic decision-factors
toward the appropriate scope, can design an intervention with
well-defined objectives. Once the objectives are met, the
intervention is terminated.
Theory Applied
Using the definition, scopes, and strategic
decision-factors pertaining to intervention discussed in
this chapter, the following four chapters apply theory to
U.S. policy toward the conflict in Bosnia. The purpose of
the Bosnian case study is not to review the history of the
conflict but to use the conflict as an example of U.S.
intervention policy and to illustrate the impact of
strategic decision-factors in formulating that policy.
Through analysis of public statements, of diplomatic
initiatives, and of military actions, the underlying U.S.
policy on military intervention in Bosnia is revealed.
As the conflict unfolded, U.S. policy, guided by the
influence of several strategic decision-factors, evolved from
a brief period of denying the inevitable breakup of Yugoslavia to
attempts at distancing itself from the conflict to finally
engaging in conciliation then persuasion interventions. The
aim of U.S. intervention is the creation of a regional
conflict cordon designed to prevent the spread of instability
to areas where vital American interests lie.
CHAPTER III
DENIAL AND DISTANCING IN THE YUGOSLAV
CIVIL WAR, 27 JUNE 1991 - 07 APRIL 1992
From before the start of the Yugoslav civil war*
through the early months of the conflict, U.S. policy
seemed to deny what appeared obvious in Europe:
Yugoslavia was breaking up and the process promised to be
bloody. Yet, U.S. efforts were directed toward
maintaining Yugoslav unity.
Initially, American policy ignored appeals by
fledgling Yugoslav states to recognize their claims of
independence. The U.S. considered measures intended to
convince the republics to negotiate productively toward
revising the form while still maintaining the content of
Yugoslavia. Washington threatened to withhold not only
recognition but aid from any republic attempting to secede
(Friedman 1991a, Al).
Washington believed that to recognize republics such
as Slovenia and Croatia would undermine a peaceful, unifying
resolution (U.S. Congress, House 1992c, 5).
____________________
*On 27 June 1991, the Yugoslav Army clashed with
Slovenia's militias, initiating civil war in Yugoslavia
(Dorff, ed. 1992, 200).
However, U.S. policy failed to deter Slovenia and Croatia
who took steps toward independence, precipitating the start
of the Yugoslav civil war (Friedman 1991a, A4). As late as
December 1991, the U.S. applied sanctions to all six Yugoslav
republics, thus still treating Yugoslavia as a single entity
and denying the breakup that had occurred.
The catchwords of U.S. policy for maintaining Yugoslav unity and
achieving long term resolution were negotiation and dialogue
(Binder 1991, A10). During congressional testimony, then
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Ralph Johnson outlined the limits of U.S. actions to include
diplomatic persuasion, support of mediation, and efforts "to
keep doors open for a peaceful resolution." (U.S. Congress 1991a, 7)
Applying military force to resolve Yugoslavia was not an
option because, according to Ralph Johnson but contrary to both
Clausewitz* and American history, it was U.S. policy to "strongly
oppose the use of force, violence, and intimidation to settle
political disputes." Thus, whether achieved by peaceful declaration,
force, or some combination, it was also U.S. policy to deny any
significant change to the structure of Yugoslavia. (U.S.
____________________
*Mr. Johnson's testimony seems to imply that
political processes are unrelated to the use of force
but as Clausewitz wrote "war is simply a continuation of
political intercourse, with the addition of other means."
(Clausewitz 1984, 605)
Congress, Senate 1991b, 4)
It was not until late December 1991, confronted by the
sudden European Community (EC) reversal to recognize Slovenia and
Croatia, that Washington accepted the inevitability of the
breakup and policy moved from denial to an ephemeral attempt at
distancing the U.S. from the conflict. Yugoslavia became
Europe's problem to solve while Washington relegated itself to
interested observer status.
Several strategic decision-factors affected U.S. policy toward
denial and distancing but the driving factor from the outset of
the Yugoslav crisis was stability: how would the crisis impact
Europe, and even the Middle East and Asia. Concerns over
stability first prompted the U.S. to try to maintain
Yugoslavia, then to allow Europe its chance to quell the
crisis, and finally, along with other factors, drove the U.S.
toward intervention. Ultimately, the U.S. found itself unable
to remain detached as the crisis threatened to overwhelm an
unprepared EC and UN.
Denial Decision-Factors
The strategic decision-factors that drove U.S. policy
into denial were stability and perceptions on the political
nature of the conflict.
Stability
The U.S. feared, as stated by Secretary of State
James Baker during a trip to Yugoslavia, that the breakup
"could have some very tragic consequences, not only here
but more broadly in Europe." (Friedman 1991a, Al)
Baker's comment came during an attempt in June 1991
to exert high level U.S. diplomatic influence toward
averting a violent breakup. The Secretary went as far as
to meet individually with the leaders of the six Yugoslav
republics to persuade them to remain united in at least a
loose constitutional arrangement, but his
appeals-demonstrating the limits of U.S. diplomatic clout
in the region--yielded nothing (Zimmerman 1995, 11;
Friedman 1991a, Al).
Europeans shared even greater concerns over stability,
based on the geographic proximity of the conflict. Western
Europe initially agreed on keeping Yugoslavia united to preserve
regional stability and to discourage separatist, nationalist
movements throughout Europe. French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas
summarized the European opinion that the precedence of recognizing
breakaway republics in Yugoslavia "would be applied to other cases"
to the detriment of continental stability (Riding 1991c, A6).
Two specific fears related to instability were expressed in
an August 1991 meeting of EC foreign ministers. First, should
Yugoslavia burst into wide-scale civil war, a mass exodus of
refugees could de-stabilize not only bordering states but all of
Europe. Second, the conflict could involve other states
(Hungary and Albania, for example) who feel compelled to protect
related minorities living in Yugoslavia. (Greenhouse 1991, A3)
The problem was how to obtain stability from an inherently
unstable situation. The U.S. and its European allies agreed
that maintaining stability was the primary objective; in doubt
was the means to secure stability. Denying the implosion
occurring before them was a short-sighted, short-lived
American response.
Political Nature of the Conflict
The political nature of the conflict and,
specifically, the nature of the belligerents and their
leadership drew Washington's attention even as it tried to
turn away. Washington developed an early and indelible
perception of one of the primary belligerents: Serbia.
In the U.S. view, the Serbs were the aggressors and the
main obstacle to ending the conflict.
Ironically, early U.S. hopes for maintaining
Yugoslav unity were aligned with Serbia, albeit for
different reasons. The Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic's
expressed policy was also bent on preserving "the
integrity of our country in order to realize democratic
changes." (Friedman 1991a, A4) But in a foreboding
comment, Milosevic added: "Flexibility has some limits."
(Friedman 1991a, A4) Those limits were anything that
interfered with Serb hegemonic ambitions.
The U.S. maintained that Yugoslavia could be
preserved but not on Serbian terms. In a major address
before the UN Security Council in September 1991,
Secretary of State Baker accused Serbia and its
instrument, the Yugoslav Army (JNA), of bearing "special
and indeed growing responsibility for the grim future
which awaits the peoples of Yugoslavia." (Friedman 1991b,
A6) The Serb objective, according to Baker, is the
creation of a "'Greater Serbia'" and the process of
forcefully forging such an entity was well established in
Croatia and had begun in Bosnia (Friedman 1991b, A6).
If Serbia could be made to compromise, the U.S.
reasoned, the crisis could be resolved. Throughout the EC
peace talks, though, Serbia presented an intransigent
position, avoiding agreements and ignoring ultimatums. By
the end of 1991, a draft settlement to the conflict was
accepted in principle by five of the six republics;
only Serbia eschewed agreement (Carrington 1992, 1-2).
In retrospect, Serbia and the West established a
pattern of behavior evident throughout the Bosnian
conflict. The Serbs exploited the EC's lack of resolve,
recognizing (and ultimately becoming conditioned by)
western Europe's disposition to draw lines then revise
them when challenged.
The pattern was set in June 1991 when a high level
delegation of European foreign ministers reached an
agreement with the civil war belligerents that included a
ceasefire and a basis for further negotiations
(Riding 1991a, A8). Within one day the agreement was
violated and although all sides were culpable, Serbia was
the prime violator (Riding 1991a, A8). This agreement was
eventually salvaged and its modest terms were met but only
after the almost immediate violation, and additional
bloodshed, foretelling the pattern of negotiation
eventually seen in Bosnia.
There are indications that by the end of 1991, the
Serb-led Yugoslav military was prepared to cease
aggression, believing that considerable Western military
intervention was forthcoming (Gompert 1994, 36). Seeing
their suspicions unrealized, Serbia was only further
conditioned to expect no action from the West, despite
declarations and threats to the contrary. Certainly, the
U.S. was unprepared in 1991 to take on the Serbs--or any
other warring Yugoslav faction--with military force, and
supported instead inconsequential diplomatic efforts to
maintain Yugoslav unity.
Distancing Decision-Factors
By mid December 1991, the breakup of Yugoslavia
could be denied no longer and, realizing the difficulty of
the situation, Washington worked to distance the U.S. from
the conflict. The strategic decision-factors affecting
this inclination of U.S. policy were international
involvement and the political nature of the conflict.
International Involvement
The involvement of its European allies had much to
do with U.S. distancing. The U.S. chose policy aloofness
to avoid entanglement in what was becoming an intractable
situation, leaving Yugoslavia to the Europeans to resolve.
Early indications of European effectiveness came
during the EC sponsored peace conference that began in
September. Although the conference started with
hostilities continuing in Yugoslavia, its mediator, Lord
Carrington, hoped that in some way the conference process
would "help create the necessary conditions for stopping
the hostilities." Instead, the fighting intensified.
(Carrington 1992, 1)
European behavior during the recognition debate gave
Washington significant cause to doubt Europe's ability to
resolve Yugoslavia. Germany's declaration to recognize
Slovenia and Croatia cracked what had been Europe's united
front and initiated a fervent diplomatic campaign by
France, Great Britain, and the U.S. to convince Germany to
withhold recognition--particularly since in November the
EC members committed to act together in matters concerning
Yugoslavia (Lewis 1991, A6). France's Foreign Minister
Dumas counseled Germany that recognition would be
prejudicial for Europe as a whole." (Kinzer 1991, 18) The
Bush Administration sent urgent messages to all European
governments urging patience in recognizing breakaway
republics (Lewis 1991, A6). Both the EC and UN
specifically requested that states refrain from granting
recognition to avoid undercutting the ongoing peace process
(Lewis 1991, A6).
After vigorously lobbying Germany to rescind its promise of
recognition because of the impending disaster such recognition
would provoke, the EC abruptly shifted policy--possibly to
regain some semblance of EC unity (Steinberg 1993, 36-38). It
was unanimously agreed that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia
would be granted by 15 January after each republic met a set of
vague principles concerning human rights and respect for
territorial integrity (Tagliabue 1991, A3).
Lord Carrington blames the EC decision in December 1991 to
recognize Slovenia and Croatia for undermining his peace
negotiations, claiming that the prospect of recognition was
critical to keeping all parties engaged in discussion. once
recognition was promised, the incentive to negotiate was
removed and the process "unravelled.11 (Carrington 1992, 1-2)
It was precisely such unraveling that the U.S. preferred to
observe from afar.
Discussions on European military options for
Yugoslavia were conducted with similar disjointed results.
The varying differences of opinion and commitment were
highlighted after the Dutch proposed deploying a European
peacekeeping force in Croatia. Only Italy backed the
proposal without reservation. France backed the proposal
but offered no troops. Germany, prohibited from sending
troops, offered to supply equipment and transportation.
Portugal suggested committing the UN while Great Britain
refused any commitment that included a possible combat role for
its troops. (Riding 1991b, A7)
From following the European vacillations over recognition and
observing the disunity in the EC, the U.S. likely concluded (if
it hadn't already) that Yugoslavia was a European problem. It
was Washington's position that Europe had the greatest stake in
the crisis and possessed far more political and economic
leverage than the U.S. in Yugoslavia. Therefore, the U.S.
preferred a limited role in deference to Europe's influence and
interests. (U.S. Congress 1991a, 8-10)
Moreover, when the U.S. asked the EC whether more active
American engagement was desired, the EC replied that support is
appreciated and appropriate but more active participation is
unnecessary. In the EC's estimation, the U.S. was doing all it
could. (U.S. Congress, House 1991c, 38).
Washington's interpretation was that the U.S. was doing all the
EC wanted, at that time. The EC had relieved the U.S. of
responsibility for resolving the Yugoslav crisis, and the U.S.
was prepared to stand relieved.
Political Nature of the Conflict
The U.S. continued to accuse Serbia of conducting a
war of aggression and aspiring to control all or most of
Yugoslavia. Serbia, according to Washington, was the
catalyst behind Bosnian Serb actions. (U.S. Congress,
House 1992d, 22-24)
Washington's ire toward Serbia was not
unwarranted. Serbia's commitment to the conflict was
exorbitant in human and monetary cost. Upon his
resignation in December 1991, Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante
Markovic claimed that as much as 81 percent of the Serb
controlled Yugoslav federal budget was diverted to Serbia's
war effort (Sudetic 1991b, 3).
However, the Serbs are only part of a problem
stemming from the opposing politics of three intransigent
sides within Bosnia. Based on the apparent irreconcilable
differences between the indigenous Serbs, Muslims, and
Croats, it became clear to Lord Carrington during his
negotiations over Croatia that Bosnia Herzegovina
presented the most daunting dilemma to lasting peace.
States Carrington, "it was obvious that Bosnia was a
tinderbox." (Carrington 1992, 2) None of the three
belligerents were prepared to accept a ruling majority by
any other (Carrington 1992, 1-21 Sudetic 1991a, 18).
Strategies to resolve the conflict were unlikely to
be realized until the West could agree on the political
nature of the conflict. A senior American military,
officer familiar with U.S. policy explained that while the
U.S. characterized the conflict as a Serb aggression,
Europe considered it a civil war with culpability shared
among three belligerents (Jones 1995). This difference in
the political evaluation of the conflict would ultimately
challenge unanimity between America and Europe over
strategies of response (Jones 1995). But in late
1991-early 1992, Washington was content with leaving
Europe to handle the crisis, irrespective of the
conflict's political nature.
Accepting Intervention
Like a patient diagnosed with a serious disease, the
U.S. initial reaction to the crisis in Yugoslavia was
denial--the crisis was transient and the status quo would
persist. In denial, the U.S. exercised its legal
obligation to abstain from intervention (von Glahn 1981,
171).
Eventually, the U.S. placed its faith in Europe to
resolve Yugoslavia and distanced itself from the conflict.
When the Yugoslav crisis persisted, the U.S. accepted the
need to intervene but, unlike the patient fighting for
life, the acceptance came reluctantly and with limitations.
Denial and distancing reflected confusion and
uncertainty in the U.S., as well as in Europe, over the
Yugoslav crisis as it began in Slovenia then moved to
Croatia. Western reactions were slow and indecisive;
moreover, there appeared to be no learning curve for the
West in responding to events in Slovenia and Croatia. Rather,
the U.S. and Western Europe succeeded in fixing perceptions of
Western paralysis in the minds of the belligerents.
Some observers believe the collective inaction by
the U.S. and Western Europe served to prolong and
exacerbate the conflict. Manfred Worner, former Secretary
General of NATO, argued that while a military solution was
nonexistent for Yugoslavia, properly applied limited
military force early in the crisis would have signalled to
the belligerents the futility of pursuing change by
aggression and instead encouraged peaceful resolution
(Bertram 1994, 34). Similarly, NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander, General John Galvin, urged conducting
airstrikes to deter the early fighting in Croatia
(Hedges and others 1994,61).
Eschewing military measures, the U.S. joined Europe
in condemnations, embargoes, and sanctions emasculated by a lack
of military enforcement. However, once the critical strategic
decision-factor of stability indicated potential for adverse
impact on American national interests in regions surrounding
former-Yugoslavia, U.S. acceptance of greater involvement,
including the use of military force, was inevitable.
Spurred by the Bosnian declaration of independence,
the civil war took hold of the republic in March 1992. On
07 April 1992, the U.S. granted recognition to Bosnia and
lifted sanctions from each Yugoslav republic except Serbia
and Montenegro. The U.S. accepted the legitimacy of the
Bosnian government and concluded that Serbia presented an
obstacle to peace. Washington set in motion the
commitment leading toward eventual American intervention.
CHAPTER IV
CONCILIATION INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA,
07 APRIL 1992 - 16 JULY 1992
Intervention Actions
The brief American conciliation intervention in Bosnia
began with the recognition of the republic's independence and
ended with the adoption of measures that moved the U.S. into
a persuasion intervention. The actual period of conciliation
intervention was shorter than a month but the parameters
qualifying the period were set throughout the April - May
1992 time frame. The following subsections discuss the
actions that defined U.S. policy as a conciliation
intervention.
Political Motives
With the recognition of Bosnia and the lifting of
economic sanctions, U.S. policy had shifted from distancing
to assisting the Bosnian leadership and people while
thwarting perceived Serbian ambitions. Washington sought to
strengthen the legitimate government of Bosnia relative to
the Bosnian Serbs by weakening Serbia's ability to assist its
Bosnian counterparts. The U.S. recalled, in May, the
ambassador to Yugoslavia, or what is now called by Serbia and
Montenegro the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Then, in
June, the U.S. took firmer action by following Europe in imposing
economic and trade sanctions on the FRY.
Humanitarian Aid
In joining international efforts to provide humanitarian aid to
Bosnia, the U.S. was complementing diplomatic efforts to improve
the relative strength of the Bosnian government. Ostensibly, the
aid was provided for the innocent victims of the war in Bosnia;
actually, the aid was part of an overall policy to disrupt Serb
efforts at establishing control over Bosnia. As much as the aid
was aimed toward the people of Bosnia, it was aimed toward the
leadership of both Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. One possible
consequence of the aid mission was the hope that the mere presence
of international involvement would discourage Serb designs.
Military Delivery and Protection
By July, the U.S. was a full participant in NATO's Operation
PROVIDE PROMISE.* American policy met the parameters of a
conciliation intervention: the aid was based partly on U.S.
political motives toward strengthening the Bosnian government
while disrupting Serb designs;
_____________________
*PROVIDE PROMISE conducts daylight airlift aid missions to
Sarajevo and night air drops of humanitarian supplies to Bosnia
in support of UN operations; military aircraft, including those of
the U.S., conduct the drop missions (Joulwan 1994, 12).
accompanying the aid delivery were increased threats by the U.S.
over the use of force to guarantee safe passage of the aircraft
and delivery of the supplies.
Conciliation Intervention Defined
In summary, the U.S. became involved in a political process under
the guise of humanitarian aid. Washington chose sides, identifying
the worst belligerent and concentrating efforts on impeding Serb
policies while supporting the Bosnian government and populace.
Compared to denial and distancing, U.S. efforts represented a
shift in policy. Military forces were employed to deliver aid and
were backed by implicit and explicit threats to use harsher means
to ensure aid delivery. The U.S. had embarked on a transitory
conciliation intervention.
Conciliation Intervention Decision-Factors
As stated in the last chapter, stability was the driving decision
factor for U.S. policy throughout the Yugoslav crisis. Concerns
over stability explain why the U.S. intervened in Bosnia; other
decision-factors explain why the intervention drew a limited
commitment and, therefore, a restricted scope. Stability,
international involvement, and the political and psychological
nature of the conflict influenced U.S. decisions toward
conciliation intervention.
Stability
By the spring of 1992, concerns over the conflict spreading
further within and beyond former-Yugoslavia dominated policy
development. Certain areas within former-Yugoslavia were
particularly volatile because of the potential to entangle other
nearby states.
Two areas "critical" to U.S. efforts to contain the conflict are
the Kosovo region in Serbia and the republic of Macedonia (U.S.
Congress 1992a, 2). The spread of hostilities within former
Yugoslavia, and specifically to these regions, could involve not
only other Balkan states but U.S. allies. Fighting in Kosovo, Lord
Owen surmises, would draw Turkey into the conflict and possibly
Albania (1993, 4-5). Conflict in Macedonia could involve Greece
and Bulgaria, both of which have ancient and emotional claims to
the region (Kaplan 1993, 57-58).
At risk is wider scale war, the unity of NATO, and, in general,
the political and economic stability of Europe's southern tier.
The potential impact on U.S. interests in and around Europe
demanded serious American involvement and thus dictated the need
for intervention.
International Involvement
U.S. policy was affected by the involvement of others attempting
to resolve the conflict. No single consortium of states proved
capable of taking on the crisis in Bosnia.
In a fit of wishful thinking, many hoped the UN could
resolve Bosnia. The Bosnian government requested military
intervention from the UN as early as July 1991 (U.S. Congress
1992a, 6, 17). However, the UN reasoned that with no war in
Bosnia at that time, no mission existed justifying deployment
of forces (U.S. Congress 1992a, 7; Zimmerman 1995, 16).
Once the war was officially recognized by the UN, forces
were deployed to protect humanitarian aid. Known as the UN
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), these forces shortly came under
actual fire from artillery and snipers and, eventually,
figurative fire from those UNPROFOR was charged to protect.
The UN came to represent a symbol of the failure of world
resolve, not a sign of hope and protection.*
The two primary international organizations working the
Bosnian conflict, the UN and the EC, had difficulty merely
agreeing on an approach to Bosnia. A parallel approach where
the UN concentrated efforts toward peacekeeping and
humanitarian concerns while the EC worked toward political
solutions proved partially productive in Croatia but failed
in Bosnia. Efforts were uncoordinated and public bickering
between the two organizations detracted from the peace
process. It was not until August 1992 that the EC and UN
combined efforts, beginning with a joint peace conference in
London. Steinberg 1993, 45-47)
The UN-EC coordination problems were only part of the
______________________
*One Bosnian journalist referred to UNPROFOR as a symbol
of "international hypocrisy." UNPROFOR even drew charges of
corruption and bribery from disillusioned Sarajevans.
(Dizdarevic 1993, 48-51)
confusing division of international responsibility surrounding
Bosnia. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) emphasized human rights issues (Steinberg 1993, 49). NATO
and the West European Union (WEU) provided for military operations
(Steinberg 1993, 49). Each group carried a unique perspective and
provided a different function on international action in Bosnia.
With a clear division of responsibility, a cogent
combined effort had the potential to influence, if not
impose, a solution. However, there was no central
organization charged with coordinating a unified, and
probably more productive, approach to settling the conflict
in Bosnia.
Nor was any single state capable of unilaterally influencing
conflict resolution, short of an enormous military commitment.
Many states had historic ties to the region,* but these ties
translated to limited influence overall and even raised suspicions
of partiality (Steinberg 1993, 61).
Leadership Gap
It has been argued that the lack of forthcoming American
leadership in Bosnia left others unwilling to request American
help. The perception was unless the U.S.
_____________________
*For example, Russia, France, and Great Britain to
Serbia; Germany to Croatia and Slovenia; and Muslim states,
in general, to former-Yugoslavia's Muslim population
(Steinberg 1993, 61).
voluntarily engaged itself in a crisis, the American
commitment would remain less than total and probably
inadequate (Wolfowitz 1994, 34).*
In Bosnia, there exists no such total commitment by
anyone other than the belligerents. Still, ineffective and
uncoordinated international involvement prompted the U.S. to
intervene on a limited basis now, possibly to avoid being
forced into a worse situation later.
Political Nature of the Conflict
With the international recognition of Slovenia and
Croatia in January and Bosnia in April 1992, the political
nature of the conflict arguably changed from a civil war to a
regional, international war (Dizdarevic 1993, 4). In terms
of fighting within Bosnia, however, nothing changed.
Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs continued to distinguish
themselves in the view of the U.S. as the primary aggressors
in the Bosnian conflict. In the process of imposing economic
and trade sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, the President
declared their actions and policies to represent "an unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States-" (U.S. President
1992a, 3) To avoid delays in imposing sanctions, the
____________________
*Paul Wolfowitz contends that the success of the Gulf
War was in large part due to the total personal commitment by
President Bush to win the war, thereby making it easy for
allies to join the effort, confident of the unfailing
American commitment (1994, 34).
President declared the situation in Bosnia a U.S. national
emergency (U.S. President 1992a, 3). While this action was
probably taken merely to circumvent other procedures and to
expedite the sanction process, the President's statements
represent the extent to which the U.S. viewed Serbia's
culpability for the war.
According to the State Department, Serb behavior
provided the impetus behind U.S. recognition of Bosnia in
April 1992. As discussed in Chapter III, the U.S. withheld
recognition to discourage the hasty disintegration of
Yugoslavia and to avoid undermining international peace
efforts. Later, though, the decision to recognize Bosnia was
made "to forestall further efforts by Serbia to destabilize
the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina." (U.S. Congress,
House 1992e, 6)
Milosevic
Epitomizing Washington's perception of Serbia as the primary
aggressor was and still is the Serb President, Slobodan Milosevic.
To the State Department, he is "a very substantial part of the
problem-" (U.S. Congress, House 1992e, 4)
Milosevic engineered a rise to power, effectively
beginning in 1987, by engaging in demagoguery based on latent
Serbian nationalist sentiments once contained by the same
Yugoslav communist party that claimed Milosevic as a member.
Milosevic captured Serbian attention by ardently articulating
to the population that Serbs were oppressed in Yugoslavia and
even in their own republic.* Milosevic became "the voice of
Serbian nationalism." (Djilas 1993, 82-83)
It has been suggested that Milosevic, himself, is a
cause of the Yugoslav civil war, perhaps starting it but
certainly exploiting and prolonging it.** Playing on
nationalist emotions and utilizing what Aleksa Djilas has
termed the "politics of fear," Milosevic used the war to
unite the Serbs. From as early as mid-1990, Milosevic
resisted political solutions to the disputes developing
throughout Yugoslavia, convincing the Serbs that war was
their only recourse and that he could lead them to victory in
the conflict. (Djilas 1993, 88)
In identifying the Serbs as the aggressors, Washington
failed to accept the European analysis that it took more than
one belligerent to fight this Balkan war. There are, in the
European analysis, three antagonists to the Bosnian conflict:
______________________
*Milosevic specifically played upon the resentment over
two provinces within Serbia: Kosovo and Vojvodina. He
cited, for example, how the Yugoslav constitution limited
Serb autonomy and created conditions, especially in Kosovo,
where native Serbs were a persecuted minority (Djilas 1993,
82-83).
**The impact of Milosevic's message is highlighted by a
vignette in - Robert Kaplan's book Balkan Ghosts. Kaplan
reviews a critical battle in 1389 during which the Serbs,
opposing Turkish designs on Balkan territory, were decimated
and for which the Serb leader at the time, Knez Lazar,
achieved martyrdom. On 28 June 1987, the anniversary of the
battle, Milosevic visited the battlefield and before a crowd
of Serbs he pointed toward Turkey and proclaimed: "They'll
never do this to you again. Never again will anyone defeat
you." The crowd roared and Milosevic's status as leader of
the Serbs soared on the appeal of "racial hatred." (Kaplan
1993, 36-40)
the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. According to Lord Carrington, each
of the three belligerents only desires peace on their own terms
and "no amount of diplomacy can, or will, bring it about."
(Carrington 1992, 3) Disagreement over the political nature of the
conflict was manifested in a disjointed Western approach, with the
U.S. directing efforts solely against the Serbs while the European
allies attempted to stop each belligerent from prosecuting the war
(Jones 1995).
Psychological Nature of the Conflict
As the U.S. contemplated deeper involvement in Bosnia, the
psychological nature of the conflict influenced Washington policy
making. To some, the psychological nature was at the root of the
conflict, providing a primordial and irreconcilable cause. To
others, the psychological nature had an incendiary effect upon
other factors but its significance as a root cause was being
exploited for its obvious emotional impact.
The Right of Vengeance
Those who trace the roots of the present conflict to deep
historical scars point first to the violent past (dating back
several hundred years but especially evident in the last century)
characterizing Serb-Croat relations (Posen 1993, 112; Pfaff 1993,
103). Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia,
describes the Serb-Croat dispute as
"the core hostility in the former Yugoslavia." (1995, 8)
Briefly, the bad blood traces back to when the Serbs and
Croats occupied the frontier of the Ottoman and Hapsburg
Empires and found themselves involved in numerous wars,
frequently fighting against each other. With the decline of
the empires and after World War I, both ethnic groups shared
the new country of Yugoslavia but could not decide how the
country should be organized and run. Mutual suspicions
carried over into World War II when each side wrote some of
the bloodiest history in their ethnic relations. (Posen 1993,
111-112)
The Croats formed the Ustashe resistance and
collaborated with Germany and Italy in the region before and
during WWII as part of their opposition to perceived Serb
designs for control of Yugoslavia (Posen 1993, 112). The
Croats, with the help of Nazi Germany, set up a puppet state
where Croatia and Bosnia exist today and the nationalist
Ustashe spent much of the war fighting, and often massacring,
the Serb resistance, otherwise known as the Chetniks
(Bell-Fialkoff 1993, 116, Posen 1993, 113).
Each nationalist group distinguished itself in the realm
of brutality toward the other. Of the approximately 500,000
Serbs and 200,000 Croats killed during WWII, most were the
victims of their adversary's nationalist, terrorist, often
sadistic counterpart, the Ustashi or the Chetniks (Posen
1993, 112-113). Half of the total Croat deaths may have
occurred after the Croatian army surrendered in May 1945 as
the Serbs exacted a severe revenge (Bell-Fialkoff 1993, 117).
Thus, both the Croats and Serbs claim deep historical
wounds justifying, to many, the right of vengeance. Major
General MacKenzie, former commander of UN Forces in
Sarajevo, describes Bosnia as "World War II, Chapter Two." (U.S.
Congress, House 1993f, 59)
The Muslims were victims of religious persecution by the
largely Serb Orthodox Christian Church during the Middle
Ages. When Muslim Turks conquered Bosnia Herzegovina during
the fifteenth century, the Bosnian Muslims allied themselves
with the conquerors and earned themselves economic and
political prosperity while the Serbs struggled in the
countryside. (Pfaff 1993, 102-103)
Hence, based on their interpretation of history, the
Serbs lay special claim to the right of vengeance or, at
least, some historical justice--suffering from what Aleksa
Djilas terms "historical nihilism."* (1993, 93) However, the
"historical nihilism" of each belligerent obscures the fact
that vendettas credited to the atrocities of the past,
including those of WWII, were absent from Yugoslavia until
about a year before the beginning of the civil war (Owen
1993, 7).
______________________
*The Serbs can recite how their sacrifices in numerous
Balkan wars, dating back to the twelfth century, permitted
the rest of Europe to develop and prosper (Kaplan 1993, 33).
Later sacrifices in both world wars, beyond the losses
suffered by any other Yugoslav nationality, earned the Serbs,
in their estimate, special status that remains denied because
they are the self-proclaimed victim of modern conspiracies
and objects of persecution (Djilas 1993, 93).
A Bosnian journalist in Sarajevo concludes that the war
in Bosnia is not between nationalities, noting that before
the war the city was comprised of eighty thousand Serbs and
thirty thousand Croats and over forty percent of the city's
marriages were mixed (Dizdarevic 1993, 6). Haris
Silajdzic, the Bosnian Foreign Minister, asks rhetorically:
"How come all at once we cannot live together?" (U.S.
Congress 1992a, 5)
Still, U.S. policy makers place significant credence in
the historically rooted analysis of the psychological nature
of the conflict. President Bush characterized Bosnia as a
"Complex, convoluted conflict that grows out of age-old
animosities." In 1992, he concluded that "bringing peace
again to the Balkans will literally take years of work."
(U.S. President 1992b, 1393)
The psychological scars of history undoubtedly incite
emotions and inflame the intensity of the conflict. Each
side manipulates nationalism to unite war efforts (Djilas
1993, 93; Zimmerman 1995, 12). However, Bosnia is more than
just a primordial payback; it is about political conflict.
In determining the appropriate commitment to the
conflict, Washington concluded that the psychological nature
of the conflict imposes limits on the U.S. ability to
influence the outcome. Moreover, the political nature of the
struggles internal and external to Bosnia effectively ordains
the conflict to continue until the belligerents decide, either
on the battlefield or at the negotiating table, that
it is time for peace (U.S. Congress 1991a, 7). For the U.S.,
the political and psychological intractability of Bosnia
provided the rationale for developing a conflict cordon
strategy.
Toward Persuasion Intervention
It became apparent to the U.S. for various reasons that
conciliation intervention was insufficient in Bosnia. First,
despite the use of military transports, it was still unsafe to
deliver humanitarian aid (U.S. Congress 1992a, 7).
Second, although blame was due all three belligerents,
Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs, conditioned by the lack of
Western resolve, were growing bolder. In the opinion of
Haris Silajdzic, Serb arrogance grew steadily each day that
the Serb siege of Sarajevo failed to elicit a firm Western
reaction; the Serbs perceived Western inaction as granting
"carte blanche to terrorist policies." (U.S. Congress 1992a,
13)
Finally, concerns increased over the conflict's
potential to spread but the U.S. was unwilling to act alone
and would act with others in only a limited extent. Although
secretary of State Baker may not have defined the level of
U.S. involvement then as a military intervention, he conceded
the U.S. was ready to consider the use of American military
forces within a multilateral international effort (U.S.
Congress, House 1992e, 3).
Thus, the U.S. treaded lightly into the deeper waters of
intervention. On 30 June 1992, six U.S. warships--including
four amphibious ships carrying a special operations capable
Marine Expeditionary Unit--moved into the Adriatic. Their
presence foreshadowed the highly visible actions undertaken
by the U.S. upon engaging in persuasion intervention in
Bosnia.
CHAPTER V
PERSUASION INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA,
16 JULY 1992 - SPRING 1995,
Intervention Actions
With the arrival of U.S. warships in the Adriatic to
participate in embargo monitoring beginning 16 July 1992
(Dorff, ed. 1993, 226), America embarked on a persuasion
intervention that continues today. The extended period
witnessed a steady but very gradual escalation in
intervention actions, proceeding in what Harvard professor
Adam Yarmolinsky calls "easy stages." (1968, 232) overall,
the force levels involved remain low and persuasion measures
have vacillated only occasionally in intensity. Each of the
strategic decision-factors influence U.S. policy during this
period but, again, stability is Washington's prime concern. The
purpose of the persuasion intervention is to effect a conflict
cordon around Bosnia.
Public discussion of U.S. policy in Bosnia never
mentions a conflict cordon nor is it likely any policy
maker would even admit to such a strategy. But in reviewing policy
statements and analyzing policy action, one can discern
elements of such a U.S. strategy. As stated earlier, such a
policy could be achieved tacitly, and even unintentionally.
A public basis for American policy in Bosnia was
presented by President Bush in early August 1992. The
President listed what he called six steps of an integrated
Bosnian strategy. The first and second steps called for
continuation of humanitarian assistance and support for the
legitimate governments of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia (U.S.
President 1992b, 1393-1394).
The next four steps outlined the basis for persuasion
intervention and highlighted the overriding influence of the
stability decision-factor on U.S. policy. Although not
calling for a conflict cordon, these four steps facilitated
"defusing and containing" the conflict (U.S. President 1992b,
1393-1394).
In step three, efforts to isolate Serbia politically and
economically would continue. The next two steps dealt
specifically with stability. In these steps, the U.S. would
conduct preventative diplomacy to prevent the conflict from
spreading throughout former Yugoslavia. Kosovo, Vojvodina,
Sandzak, and Macedonia were listed as areas of concern.
Additionally, the President stated "we must contain the
conflict and prevent its spilling over into neighboring
states," namely Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and
Greece. (U.S. President 1992b, 1393)
Clearly, President Bush was intent on keeping the
conflict within its present geographic limits but this effort
would not occur unilaterally. The sixth step was to explore
NATO involvement in the conflict, implying that the conflict
was a threat to NATO security, that international efforts
had failed, and that firmer measures were required. (U.S.
President 1992b, 1393-1394)
President Clinton deviates little from the policy basis
laid by President Bush. Anthony Lake, President Clinton's
National Security Advisor, explains that American involvement
in Bosnia is required to redress a humanitarian tragedy and
to discourage aggression against an independent state. In
addition, Lake emphasizes the proximity of the conflict and,
implicitly, its potential threat to both established and
emerging European democracies. Lake concludes that American
engagement is required because the Bosnian conflict "can all
too easily explode into a wider Balkan conflict." (1993-94,
76)
Clinton would continue U.S. efforts to maintain a
conflict cordon through gradual but limited intervention
escalation. Preventing the conflict from spreading to
neighboring countries was, according to Clinton's Secretary
of State Warren Christopher, in America's "strategic
interest." (1993-94, 56) Absent from Clinton's policy was
any consideration on forcing a settlement in Bosnia because,
as emphasized by Secretary Christopher, "no imposed
settlement would endure." (1993-94, 57)
To implement the Bush strategy (and later the Clinton
strategy), U.S. persuasion intervention consisted of several
highly visible and overtly threatening military operations
whose combined effect, if not stated intent, was to cordon
the conflict within Bosnia. Those operations, discussed
individually in the subsections below, are the air supply of
humanitarian aid, the naval blockade in the Adriatic, the
"no-fly zone" over Bosnia, the use of air strikes, and
various ground activities in and around former-Yugoslavia.
Air Supply of Humanitarian Aid
In October 1992, President Bush introduced a series of
steps that incrementally increased the U.S. intervention
actions, including allotment of a higher number of American
military aircraft to fly relief missions. By the autumn of
1993, Operation PROVIDE PROMISE had surpassed the Berlin
airlift as history's longest sustained airlift (Joulwan 1994,
12); by 1994, eighty percent of the air supply came from U.S.
aircraft (Albright 1993-94, 61).
President Clinton not only further increased the allied
percentage of U.S. aircraft flying relief missions, he
instituted a policy of conducting high altitude air drops of
aid to besieged enclaves, mainly in eastern Bosnia (Burns
1993d, A8).
The relief mission provides only marginal assistance to
the civilian population and garners accusations of bias and
threats of retaliation from the Serbs (Burns 1993d, A8). As
U.S. policy, however, the relief mission illustrates the
steady escalation of U.S. military involvement in Bosnia
since 1991.
Naval Blockade In the Adriatic
Initiated with the unofficial presence of U.S. warships
in the Adriatic in late June - early July, naval presence
became a sanctioned mission later in July. U.S. sea and air
forces joined with NATO and WEU ships to monitor the UN trade
embargo. Additionally, U.S. amphibious ships of the USS Iwo
Jima Amphibious Ready Group and warships from the USS
Saratoga Battle Group, including the carrier, shared time in
the Adriatic providing air control and flight following for
humanitarian flights while standing by to assist in the event
of an aircraft emergency. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1992b, 17,
25)
In this conflict, naval operations provide a low risk
U.S. course of action to enforce sanctions that are intended,
in general, to "end the killing, the terror and the
destruction." (U.S. Congress, House 1992f, 82)
Although the appearance of military forces implies the
threat of employment, no force was initially authorized at
sea. However, in November, the UN Security Council imposed a
naval blockade to be implemented by NATO. American warships,
including two surface ships (as well as a submarine), now
began to challenge, board, and search Adriatic shipping
(Joulwan 1994, 12)--a significant escalation in the naval
mission and the U.S. persuasion intervention.
The blockade doubtlessly achieved some success but the
FRY was not completely deterred from operating its navy or
conducting maritime commerce (U.S. President 1993e, 4). The
Clinton Administration finally ended American involvement in this
portion of the intervention in November 1994 when the U.S.
military was directed to cease enforcement of the arms embargo
against Bosnia. U.S. ships would no longer participate in the
naval portion of the arms embargo nor would American intelligence
agencies continue to share information on arms shipments with its
allies. It was President Clinton's first explicit attempt to
convey his commitment to lift the Bosnian arms embargo. The
embargo remains but without U.S. naval participation. (Kaplan
1994, A8)
"No-Fly Zone" Over Bosnia
As the conflict, and coincidentally the 1992 election year, wore
on, President Bush spoke more aggressively with regard to action
in Bosnia. Driven at least partly by electoral politics, U.S.
policy pushed for stronger enforcement to ensure the safe
delivery of humanitarian supplies to Bosnia and, specifically, to
Sarajevo.
The cornerstone of the President's tougher rhetoric was his
intention to pursue the creation of a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia
with the full participation of U.S. combat aircraft. More than any
of the intervention steps taken to that point, creating a no-fly
zone reflects President Bush's strategy "of containing and
reducing the violence." (U.S. President 1992c, 1845)
With the implementation of the no-fly zone by the UN
Security Council in October 1992, there was an unarguable American
military presence in the conflict and an element of harassment to
encourage compliance and settlement. Now complementing U.S.
warships patrolling off shore would be combat aircraft flying over
land.
Even with the no-fly zone in effect, the persuasion intervention
was still all show. Like the naval activity before the blockade
imposition, no force in the no-fly zone was explicitly authorized.
Frequent violations convinced the U.S. to push its allies for the
use of force to ensure flight ban compliance. Though committed to
limiting military involvement, the U.S. was still intent on
producing results within their limits of participation.
By the end of March 1993, U.S. efforts succeeded and the UN
Security Council voted to extend the ban to all unauthorized
flight and to take all measures necessary to ensure compliance
(Lewis 1993b, All). When the new enforcement operations commenced
in April, 25 American combat aircraft and supporting tankers
bolstered the NATO order of battle. According to then-President
Clinton, any aircraft not complying with the no--fly zone "may be
engaged on the basis of proper authorization by NATO military
authorities and in accordance with the approved rules of
engagement." (U.S. President 1993b, 1)
Similar to the naval sanctions, the no-fly zone has
achieved mixed results. President Clinton claims the action
has been effective, especially in deterring air-to-ground 55
bombing that had been common over Bosnia. The President also
acknowledges that hundreds of violations have occurred, most
involving rotary wing aircraft that are difficult to detect,
track, intercept, and target. In the opinion of the President,
"the violations have been militarily insignificant" and therefore
the rules of engagement have not been changed. (U.S. President
1993g, 1-2)
The no-fly zone may have been conceived as a signal of U.S. and
Western resolve (U.S. Congress, House 1992h, 32). However,
American affinity for signaling is rooted in the Cold War when the
U.S. and Soviet Union played in accordance with tacit but well
understood rules and shared an interest in the same game. In
Bosnia, the U.S. was only approaching full time playing status in
a game Washington was still struggling to understand. Moreover, it
was a game already crowded with three home teams, each desiring
outside involvement only if it catered to their specific
interests. On the playing field of Bosnia, signals are ineffective
because they typically go ignored.*
_____________________
*Some of the suggestions for signaling would be comical if not
involving so tragic a situation. For example, Representative Frank
Wolf of Virginia suggested that the repeal of Most Favored Nations
status from Yugoslavia would send a particularly strong signal:
For someone in a city in Bosnia to know that the Ways and Means
Committee, with a unanimous vote, reported this bill out and it was
voted on in the House and it was a unanimous vote in the House
responded and had made a difference. (U.S. Congress, House 1992h, 27
It is doubtful that any Bosnian, whether victim or aggressor,
would be unduly moved by such knowledge.
If the U.S. and NATO desired to display resolve, rather
than signals no violations would be insignificant or else the
action should be re-titled a 'some-fly zone.'* For even greater
resolve, the naval blockade could have enforced a 'no-sail'
zone but it seems in either sea or air the actions were more
politically, rather than militarily, motivated. However, the
flight ban is sufficient to impede the ability of air forces
to carry the conflict beyond an intensity desired by the U.S..
Thus, in a policy determined to cordon the conflict, the
President is accurate in his assessment concerning the
effectiveness of the operation.
Use of Air Strikes
The no-fly zone was only part of the air power
operations supporting the persuasion intervention in Bosnia.
Selective air strikes were employed but not until later in the
conflict. The Bush Administration avoided strikes, arguing that
using air power to strike Bosnian Serb heavy weapons would only
force a shift of their efforts to possibly decisive infantry
action to overrun Sarajevo (Hedges and others 1994, 61).
The Clinton Administration is more inclined to utilize
air strikes to support policy (Lake 1993-94, 76). In fact,
statements by Clinton Administration officials direct blame
_____________________
*The no-fly zone credibility was enhanced when in
February 1994, American F-16 aircraft shot down four Galeb
fixed-wing aircraft engaged in a bombing mission in the
vicinity of Banja Luka (U.S. President 1994b, 1).
toward the Bush Administration for failing to employ air
strikes as early as 1991 when such actions may have deterred
the spread and prolongation of the conflict (Perry 1994, 2).
However, as the Clinton Administration later discovered,
the NATO allies, with vulnerable forces in country, were less
enamored with the option (Perry 1994, 2). Moreover, not all
within the administration were convinced that air strikes would
accelerate the peace process, recalling the Bush reasoning that
such escalation could invite some unforeseen, undesired effect
(Perry 1994, 2).
Again, after much American prompting (and only after a
widely publicized mortar attack on a crowded Sarajevo market)
did agree to limited and selective use of air power to support
the UN in situations where severe violence could be immediately
stopped or significantly reduced. The strikes would be conducted
neither to favor any one side nor to impose a peace agreement.*
(Perry 1994, 3)
_____________________
*Beginning 9 February 1994, NATO aircraft, including
those from the U.S., would respond to UN requests for strikes
on positions shelling civilian targets in Sarajevo. In
addition, a twenty kilometer ring was designated around
Sarajevo-within which any heavy artillery, mortars, and
rocket launching systems remaining after 20 February would be
subject-to air strikes. (Perry 1994, 3)
Moreover, NATO reserved the right to conduct strikes
outside the twenty kilometer radius if attacks on Sarajevo
were determined to be originating from bases outside the
designated circle. Still further extending the NATO area of
operations, NATO expressed the intention to eliminate any air
defense weapons impeding the flight of NATO aircraft over
Bosnia. (U.S. President 1994a, 2)
On 10 and 11 April, American aircraft assigned to NATO
responded to UNPROFOR and UN High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) identification of Bosnian Serb tank and artillery
positions firing upon civilian targets in Gorazde with air
strikes on the reported positions (U.S. President 1994c, 1).
As an alternative to air strikes, NATO and U.S.
aircraft were employed in November 1994 in an "air presence" mission,
conducting three consecutive nights of low level passes
intended to intimidate Bosnian government and Serb forces
from continuing an outbreak of fighting in the vicinity of
Sarajevo. The mission was intended to prevent a recurrence
of the two year siege of Sarajevo that ended nine months
earlier. (Brand 1994, A13)
The Clinton Administration was united in its
understanding that air power could provide only limited
effect; it could only reduce the level of violence, not
eliminate it. It was a tacit admission that, regardless, the
violence would continue but neither at destabilizing nor
publicly embarrassing levels.
Ground Activities In and Around Former-Yugoslavia
Though not large, there also exists several ground
contingents of U.S. forces in and around former-Yugoslavia.
Observer missions were established in Kosovo, Macedonia, and
along international borders in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania
(including eventual placement of sanction monitors along the
Danube River) (U.S. Congress, House 1992g, 20). Logistic
crews coordinate relief efforts with UN representatives in
Zagreb, Croatia (U.S. Congress, Senate 1992b, 25).
Furthermore, the U.S. provides hospital and other support to
UNPROFOR in Bosnia and, if needed, would provide air and sea
lift to additional UNPROFOR deploying to Bosnia (U.S.
President 1992c, 1845).
The commitment of U.S. forces on the ground in
former-Yugoslavia is still minimal and minor in comparison to
the states supplying UN forces, comprising only about three
percent (Joulwan 1994, 12). However, the numbers are slowly
increasing along with the scope of the U.S. intervention.
Neither the Bush or Clinton Administrations planned to
use American troops to coerce or force a settlement (U.S.
Congress, House 1993i, 15). According to President Clinton's
Secretary of Defense William Perry, deliberations with NATO
in early 1994 concluded that a peace settlement imposed by
military means would be hard to sustain and immensely
difficult to execute (1994, 2). However, the Clinton
Administration was ready as early as 1993 to embark on a
major escalation by assigning up to 20,000 U.S. troops as
part of an international peacekeeping force that would deploy
immediately upon the attainment of a peace settlement (Gordon
1993b, A1; Christopher 1993-94, 57).
The most significant deployment of American troops in
the region is in Macedonia in Operation ABLE SENTRY. There,
the U.S. drew a bold line, clearly communicating to Serbia
U.S. determination to contain the conflict. According to
congressional testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs Stephen Oxman, the warning
issued to Serbia by President Bush and reaffirmed by
President Clinton was extremely strong, leaving Milosevic
without "any doubt as to our intention" to prevent the spread
of hostilities (U.S. Congress 1993e, 7). With a small contingent
of U.S. troops Washington threatened Serbia with a tripwire
disproportionate to the numerical American commitment.
In addition to graphically displaying U.S. resolve, the initial
July 1993 deployment of 300 troops and the April 1994 deployment
of an additional 200 served to assuage European criticism over the
lack of American forces at risk on the ground and to encourage
other governments to supply forces throughout the region (U.S.
President 1994d, 1).
Persuasion Intervention Defined
The U.S. persuasion intervention in Bosnia has consisted of a
series of highly visible, overtly threatening, yet strategically
limited military actions aimed against Serb political authority
and in support of the Bosnian government. These military actions
provide not only presence and demonstration, they included
sanction enforcement as well as ongoing "no-fly" zone harassment
operations that occur within territorial air space of the target
state. Coupled with an ambiguous but not incredible threat to
expand military operations, the intervention serves to contain the
conflict within the borders of Bosnia. Although directed primarily
against the Serbs, U.S. actions provide warning to any party to
maintain the conflict within Bosnia and below a level of violence
likely to incite global outrage.
Persuasion Intervention Decision-Factors
By early 1993, the impact of the various
decision-factors had made a lasting impression on U.S.
policy. Washington was locked into a persuasion intervention
intended to effect a conflict cordon in Bosnia. All five
decision-factors contributed to the limited commitment and
therefore limited scope represented by the persuasion
intervention. Factors that greatly influenced the
intervention were international involvement and termination
objectives but stability remained the critical factor, dictating
why the U.S. intervened in Bosnia.
Political Nature of the Conflict
A Civil War
The European analysis of the conflict deemphasizes the
Serbs and evaluates Bosnia as more a civil war and less an external
aggression (Jones 1995). The belligerents are locked in a power
struggle resembling a three-way zero-sum game where gains by one
side are viewed as losses by the other two. Alliances, such as
that between the Croats and Muslims, are forged out of weakness
with each partner remaining suspicious of the other.
The Bosnian Muslims and Croats fought each other for
over a year during 1993-1994. The U.S. was influential in
forging a peace agreement that created a federation among the
two sides but excluded the Serbs from high level political
representation (Pomfret 1994b, A19). The Bosnian Serbs were
effectively locked out from a two party system that could be
construed as institutionally directed against them (Pomfret
1994b, A19). Moreover, recent evidence indicates strains
between Croats and Muslims threaten to void the federation,
possibly leading to an outbreak of hostility between the
tenuous allies (Randal 1994a, A27).
The steady growth of the Izetbegovic government in
Bosnia, the preeminence of the Muslim Party of
Democratic Action, and the rise of Islam within Bosnian
society and government lend credence to observations that
Bosnia is becoming an Islamic state or, at least, a single
party state. Evidence exists that Islam has replaced Marxism
as a measure of loyalty within the government. The rise of
slam strengthens Serb arguments that the Muslims aspire to
the same level of authoritarian control presumed by the West
for the Bosnian Serbs. (Pomfret 1994b, A19)
Supporting the civil war analysis are the changes that
have apparently occurred in the relationship between Serbia
and the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic has proved himself a
politician whose interests lie more in pragmatism than
nationalism.*
As the conflict continued, Milosevic abandoned
______________________
*Milosevic's appointment of a moderate, American
businessman Milan Panic, to the post of FRY Prime Minister
was viewed by the State Department as an attempt to assuage
Western fears over Serb grand designs and to forestall
imposition of sanctions (U.S. Congress, House 1992g, 26).
inflammatory nationalistic rhetoric and adopted policies
geared ostensibly toward resolving the conflict. Disputes
between Milosevic and Karadzic have emerged as Milosevic has
publicly urged the Bosnian leader to produce concessions and
end the war (Randal 1994b, A29). Irrespective of the
probability that Milosevic's shift is less than it appears
and likely economically motivated to get the West to lift the
sanctions (Randal 1994b, A29), the evidence suggests that a
change in relations between Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs has
occurred, yet the war continues.
Even the three player zero-sum game analysis may
exaggerate the definition of the conflict. Although each
side claims a political body supported by a military arm,
this traditional relationship appears disjointed among the
Bosnian belligerents. General Jones, familiar with the
various political and military leaders, claims that it is the
generals, not the politicians, who control the conflict and
maintain the loyalty of the constituents (1995).
If the generals do control the conflict, they do so with
a precarious command and control structure often unresponsive
to higher orders. The Bosnian Serbs, for example, resemble
more a loose terrorist organization than a cohesive military
force (U.S. Congress 1992a, 14). General Morillon
characterizes each sides' military forces as undisciplined and
often "out of control." (1993, 34)
The difficulty for the West in dealing with the Bosnian
conflict is summarized by General MacKenzie who compares the
three Bosnian belligerents to serial killers: "One has
killed 15. One has killed 10. One has killed 5. Do we
the one that has only killed five?" (U.S. Congress, House
1993f, 42)
As previously described, the U.S. holds Serbia and its
Bosnian counterparts responsible for the war in the belief
that Serbia entertains designs for a "greater Serbia"
encompassing most or all of the former-Yugoslavia. However,
Serbia is apparently not alone in planning such grand
designs. Evidence suggests that Croatia has provided support
to both Croat and Serb forces in Bosnia to combat the
influence and strength of the Muslims (U.S. Congress 1993e
8). Warren Zimmerman submits that both Croatia and Serbia
share designs on Bosnia and an alliance to split the prize is
within reason (1995, 15). Zimmerman has heard Croatia's
President Franjo Tudjman suggest that Bosnia should be
divided between Serbia and Croatia (1995, 15).*
A Post-Cold War Conflict
The Balkan war has been described as a civil war within
Bosnia, a civil war within the borders of former-Yugoslavia,
and an external aggression. In fact, the political nature of
the Bosnian conflict defies traditional definition but may
represent the prototypical conflict for the post-Cold War
_____________________
*The architect of Croatia's designs on Bosnia is Tudjman
who Zimmerman describes as an "ethnic supremacist" vehemently
opposed to Muslims in general and Bosnia's ethnically diverse
society in particular (1995, 15).
world: a war with indistinct boundaries fought by enigmatic
belligerents seeking esoteric objectives based, partly at
least, on ancient animosities and ethnic hatred. For the
U.S." inability to define the conflict, and therefore to
resolve it, provided a rationale for containing the conflict,
less its virulent strain affect other regions.
Psychological Nature of the Conflict
As discussed in the last chapter, each side references
historical vendettas to stir nationalistic emotions even though recent
history demonstrates that Serbs, Croats and Muslims can coexist
(although the control imposed by Tito may have contributed to this
coexistence). Emotions are stirred still further by playing upon
ethnic differences to incite respective constituencies to continue
the conflict. The incentive for the populations of each side to
continue fighting is the latent hatred exploited by the respective
leaders.
According to Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, the
natural condition for each side is to be physically separate from
the other two. The recent intermingling of Serbs, Croats, and
Muslims, claims Karadzic, was artificially imposed by "outside
forces" after World War II. (Burns 1993b, 8)
A return to what Karadzic considers the natural
condition explains efforts at ethnic cleansing or what
Karadzic calls "ethnic shifting." (Burns 1993b, 8) Ethnic
cleansing--the forced removal by one ethnic group of other
ethnic groups inhabiting a region--is most closely associated
with the Serbs* although Muslims are also guilty of
perpetuating the act.
The Serbs are accused of committing ethnic cleansing,
not as a random act, but as a systematic process of
extermination and terror aimed toward ethnically purifying an
area of Croats and Muslims (U.S. Congress 1993a, 166-170).
Assisting such processes is the reported use of rape as an
instrument of ethnic cleansing policy (U.S. Congress
1993c, 43-45).**
U.S. officials familiar with the conflict suggest that
portrayals of atrocities and crimes against humanity are
manipulated by all sides; therefore, many tales are
exaggerations detailed for internal and external consumption
(Jones 1995). Each belligerent is adept at manipulating
______________________
*Serb ethnic cleansing atrocities identified by
independent humanitarian organizations drew global attention.
One organization, Doctors Without Borders, testified before
Congress on the Serb ethnic cleansing of the Kozaric region
from May to October 1992. The Kozaric 'cleansing' included
summary executions of elite citizens;, forced mass deportation
and detention; and frequent violence against women, children,
and the elderly. (U.S. Congress 1993a, 166-170)
**An EC Investigative Mission to Bosnia and Croatia
concluded-that rape, specifically of Muslim women, is
employed on a wide scale as a "weapon of war to force the
population to leave their homes." According to the Mission,
the rapes are often conducted in an extremely sadistic manner
intended to "inflict maximum humiliation." Moreover, the EC
mission-found that many of the resulting pregnancies are
forcibly maintained beyond the window of safe termination "as
an additional form of humiliation and constant reminder of
the abuse done to them." The EC Mission placed the
reasonable estimate of the number of rapes committed in
support of policy at 20,000. (U.S. Congress 1993c, 43-45)
propaganda to rally emotion for the internal struggle and incite
international ire for external support. However, many reports of
organized and random atrocities are true (U.S. Congress, House
1992g, 9); each side is guilty of committing human rights
violations and atrocities (U.S. Congress 1993b, 17).
Clearly, the psychological nature of the conflict provides an
incendiary effect on the belligerents and a potential trap for
those intervening. Emotions drive commitment to higher intensity
for internal parties and plays to external sympathy. The trap is
that a state can react on the basis of emotion, perhaps agitated
by the media, rather than on pragmatic decision-making. Though
occasionally overtaken by emotion, the U.S. has remained
remarkably restrained in dealing with the trap represented by the
psychological nature of the conflict in Bosnia. To its credit,
Washington recognizes the intractability of the political and
psychological causes and has chosen an intervention based on
pragmatism.
International Involvement
The inability to garner a unified international effort provided a
constraint upon the scope to which the U.S. was willing to commit
itself in Bosnia. International involvement actually served to
limit U.S. intervention. Only a combined, unified international
effort has any chance of resolving the Bosnian conflict but such
an effort has been missing thus far.
The first visible joint attempt by the UN and EC--the
August 1992 London peace conference--provided a plan to end
hostilities and created a basis for a comprehensive
settlement (U.S. Congress, Senate 1993h, 50-51). Although
agreed to by all parties, within days each side, particularly
the Serbs, violated nearly every portion of the accord
without penalty from any international party involved in the
agreement (Gompert 1994, 38).
Therein lies the problem posed by international
involvement in Bosnia from the U.S. perspective. The U.S.
was prepared throughout much of the conflict in Bosnia to
escalate intervention to a greater but still limited degree
but refused to do so unilaterally while others involved
hesitated to do so at all (U.S. President 1993a, 483).
Often, the U.S. appeared ready for military escalation only
to be frustrated by the hesitation of others.
Vance-Owen Plan
U.S. frustration over international military restraint
was matched by European frustration over the lack of American
support for the Vance-Owen peace plan.* The plan neither
united Bosnia nor unified the West.
_____________________
*The Vance-Owen plan proposed splitting Bosnia into ten
semi-autonomous provinces united under a central presidency
and a constitutional court. Three provinces would be
predominantly Muslim, three predominantly Serb, three
predominantly Croat, and one mixed. (Binder 1993, 1, 6;
Friedman 1993, All)
Only the Croats endorsed the Vance-Owen plan. The Serbs
initially accepted the plan (Friedman 1993, All) but later
rejected it. The Muslims were unprepared to forfeit the
possibility of militarily defeating the Serbs (Burns 1993a, A3).
The Muslim position was blamed partly on the U.S..
According to Lord Owen, the Muslims were reluctant to approve
the proposal because they believed that Washington still
entertained plans for a major intervention. If not an
intervention, the Muslims at least hoped Washington could
arrange a better settlement (Friedman 1993, All).
The U.S. professed support for the process but
considered the plan infeasible, impractical, and
unenforceable (Sciolino 1993, A9). Although Washington
eventually endorsed Vance-Owen (New York Times 1993, A12),
both the EC and UN felt undermined by the U.S.. Lord Owen
professed bewilderment at Washington's position, stating:
"to the day I go to my grave, I will not understand it."
(Hedges and others 1994, 65) The Clinton Administration
failed in its sensitivity to international feelings but
succeeded in blocking a plan unlikely to yield long lasting
peace.
The problem with international involvement in Bosnia was
the uncertainty displayed by the UN and Europe over what to
do. The U.S. refused to do anything alone or assume
leadership in a situation it deemed within the purview of
Europe.
The United Nations
The UN and, specifically, the Security Council committed to
providing humanitarian assistance while avoiding forceful military
intervention (Morillon 1993, 31). When asked to contrast the UN
stance on supporting military intervention in Bosnia with the
endorsement for the same in Somalia, UN Secretary General Boutros
Ghali provided significant insight into international involvement
overall. He stated that "a military operation in Somalia is more
easy than a military operation in Yugoslavia." (Burns 1993c, A12)
The UN made it more difficult by allowing UNPROFOR to become
hostages of the Bosnian Serbs. An internal State Department report
quoted in the New York Times accused the UN
of bribing Serb militias with as much 23 percent of all
humanitarian relief just to permit UN transit through the country.
In addition, the Serbs are permitted to inspect shipments and
approve or disapprove delivery, even on the basis of the ethnicity
of UNHCR truck drivers. As stated in the report, "it is the Serb
'authorities', not the UN, who decide how and to whom relief will
be distributed." (Gordon 1993a, Al, A6)
UN behavior in Bosnia has manifested into charges of UN
bias toward the Serbs. In November 1994, the commander of UN
forces in the Balkans, Lieutenant General Bertrand de
Lapresle of France, drew accusations of sympathizing with the
Serbs after comments he made during an interview. De
Lapresle appeared to display undue concern for the Serb
position, arguing that before the Serbs should be forced to return
ground to the Muslims "they need argument, they need explanation,"
and they need help convincing their population and military to
accept peace. (Pomfret 1994c, A16)
It may be that de Lapresle is less sympathetic to the Serbs and
more understanding of the precarious control maintained by the
belligerents over their forces and people. However, charges of UN
bias toward the Serbs were only reinforced when UN ground troops
employed unusually decisive measures during a two week span in
October to destroy Bosnian government army bunkers to clear a UN
zone (Pomfret 1994d, A26).
The U.S. has been especially critical of the UN, calling for
tougher actions against the Bosnian Serbs rather than appeasement
or deals over supply delivery. The UN defends itself from charges
of bias, claiming actions perceived as favoritism are undertaken
in the greater cause of providing humanitarian relief. However,
the UN has proven itself more willing to engage in compromise with
the belligerents than to impose conditions upon them.
NATO
NATO stepped up to assist the UN but with only minimal impact and
much division. The combined NATO-WEU naval embargo (Operation
SHARP GUARD) effectively enforces sanctions at sea but this
operation is offset by overland violations. The no-fly zone
hinders belligerent air activity but still suffers through
numerous flight ban violations.
NATO support for UN "safe areas" has been sporadic.*
Simply declaring areas safe' was insufficient; the six areas
were surrounded by hostile Serb forces in the midst of
territory effectively conquered by the Serbs. International
forces were neither prepared to command nor control the safe
areas and the defense offered was shallow and ineffective.
Therefore, it was easy for the Serbs to violate the areas and,
based on Serb behavior throughout the conflict, such violations
should have been expected. (Betts 1994, 33) Yet, NATO credits
its February 1994 threat to bomb Serb positions as directly
responsible for lifting the siege of Sarajevo and permitting
the people there "a chance to lead their lives in more security."
(Worner 1994, 22)
NATO blames the UN for limiting military options. For
example, NATO has urged stronger action against the Serbs only
to be frustrated by UN reluctance to invite further confrontations
with Serb militias (Pomfret 1994c, A16). Part of NATO's frustration
stems from what some argue is excessive control by the UN over the
application of air power. The April 1994 air strikes conducted by U.S.
aircraft under NATO command had to be requested by UNPROFOR and then
approved by a UN special representative (U.S. President 1994c, 1).
However, at other times the NATO allies appear to
________________________
*In May 1993, the UN declared six regions within Bosnia
"safe areas" and dispatched fifty monitors to each location
(Hedges and others 1994, 66).
contradict their own criticism of UN limitations.
Ironically, in strategic disagreements with the U.S., the
European allies find themselves aligned with the UN.
Although the U.S. has pressed more vigorously for air strikes
against the Serbs (U.S. President 1994e, 857), the Europeans
counter that it would be their peacekeepers placed at risk
(Gompert 1994, 39). The U.S. argues that such restraint
merely permits the Serbs considerable influence in alliance
military decisions, essentially creating a Serb strategic
veto (Gompert 1994, 39).
The U.S. remains critical of NATO for what is perceived
as an inadequate response to an international aggression.
The NATO allies argue that the response is measured according
to the difficult problem of dealing with a civil war. The
repercussions of the Yugoslav conflict are likely to resound
within NATO beyond the time and space constraints of the
conflict itself. As Manfred Worner stated: "NATO will not survive a
second Yugoslavia." (Bertram 1994, 35)
International Restraint
International involvement forces the U.S. to restrain
its impulses toward military options and to limit its
intervention. It is conceivable that the limits placed on
the U.S. by the UN and NATO create a 'dilemma' welcomed by
Washington. As stated by President Clinton, the U.S. is
limited not only by what it can do "but by what our allies
are willing to do." (U.S. President 1993a, 483) But by
talking tough the U.S. could appear ready to lead the charge
knowing that concerns over troops on the ground would restrict
acceptable American military options. Any American military
involvement would remain necessarily limited.
At the same time, America has to take actions designed to protect
its vital interests which included the stability of Europe, the
Middle East, and Asia. Therefore, U.S. intervention has to be
sufficient to ensure this stability. As stated by George Kenney, a
former State Department Yugoslav desk officer, America "must keep
Europe from falling apart in spite of itself." (U.S. Congress,
Senate 1993h, 78)
Stability
American concerns over maintaining stability was the critical
factor that led to U.S. intervention in Bosnia. Although the
conflict cordon works to protect areas within the former
Yugoslavia, it is the area beyond Yugoslavia that most concerns
the U.S..
In President Clinton's National Security Strategy, his primary
policy goal concerning Bosnia is preventing the spread of the
conflict into a wider European war (White House 1994, 21). As
pointed out by Senator Richard Lugar, it is imperative for the
U.S. to prevent Europe from unraveling "for the third time in this
century." (1994, 25)
In general, concerns over stability deal with
maintaining the political and economic viability of Europe's
southern tier. Specific concerns include hostilities
spilling over to bordering areas, other states choosing to join
the conflict, and the mass exodus of refugees throughout Europe.
Two additional, somewhat esoteric, objectives are included in the
overall factor of maintaining stability. The first involves
concerns over the creation of a potentially radical Muslim state
in southern Europe (U.S. Congress 1993b, 18). Those concerned with
this possibility point to the growing predominance of Islam within
Bosnia and the support of the Bosnian Muslims by Iran during the
conflict as confirming evidence (U.S. Congress, House 1992g, 28
29). One could argue that to prevent the creation of such a state
requires a Serb victory which implies that a Serb victory is in
Western interests.
The second esoteric objective is that stability, buttressed by
effective Western intervention, would discourage other aggressor
states and nationalistic extremists from emulating the Bosnian
belligerents in other regions (U.S. Congress 1993e, 4). As pointed
out by Senator Lugar, it is a dangerous precedent in today's
uncertain world to allow anyone to view the lessons of a conflict
as anything goes" or "lands seized today are likely to be lands
kept tomorrow." (1994, 24)
Termination Objectives
Termination objectives, if identified prior to or early
into an intervention, can guide decision-makers toward
employing a sufficient scope. Applying the successful
lessons from the Gulf War, President Bush was steadfast that
before any significant American involvement in Bosnia he
would ensure that the mission was well defined, that the
military could assure him the mission could be successfully
completed, and that the endstate was understood in advance
(U.S. President 1992d, 1916). Objectives would be realistic
and oriented toward a defined enemy (U.S. Congress, Senate
1992b, 18).
The Bush Administration reasoned that to force an end to
the fighting required a large military commitment fulfilling
the role of an occupation force. It was envisioned such a
force would be-subjected to a guerrilla war of endless
duration. It was a mission destined to fail even if
initially successful; irrespective of when the mission ended,
the war would eventually resume. Administration officials
compared Bosnia to Lebanon but on a larger scale with more
weapons available to all sides. (U.S. Congress, Senate
1992b, 18)
In testimony before Congress, Lieutenant General
McCaffrey, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, explained that Bosnia was not a "normal wartime"
situation; both the 'enemy' and targets were ill-defined and
difficult to locate (U.S. Congress, Senate 1992b, 26).
Even if located, traditional military targets were
likely in close proximity to civilian areas. if U.S.
military operations targeted a specific group,
differentiation of the enemy and their weapons would pose a
severe problem.* The U.S. possessed no ground intelligence
capability in country, much of the fighting occurred at
night, and the indigenous forces each possessed "a reasonably
high-threat air defense." (U.S. Congress, Senate 1992b, 31-32)
In General McCaffrey's estimation, it would require
approximately 400,000 ground troops to conduct an effective
intervention designed to stop the fighting (U.S. Congress,
Senate 1992b, 38).** Thus, stopping the fighting was not a
termination objective for U.S. intervention.
In July 1993 President Clinton appeared ready to deploy
troops to break the siege of Sarajevo. However, Pentagon
force estimates of 80,000 troops required to conduct the
operation quenched Clinton's urgency (Hedges and others 1994,
66).
A significant U.S. commitment of ground forces would
certainly fail to meet what Michael Mandelbaum calls the
"preferred American pattern of intervention." (1994, 12)
____________________
*Among the estimated 200,000 people carrying weapons in
Bosnia were five major armed organizations, each credited
with poor command and control ability over significant
numbers of troops. General McCaffrey briefed Congress on the
following force totals (all figures approximations): the
Bosnian Serb Army (35,000), Bosnian Serb irregulars (35,000),
Bosnian Croat forces (35,000), Bosnian Muslim Defense Force
(50,000), and Croatian Defense Force (15,000 troops in
Bosnia). (U.S. Congress, Senate 1992b, 26)
**According to General McCaffrey, just to secure a 30
kilometer circle around Sarajevo airport and the 200 mile
route from Split to Sarajevo would require 60,000-120,000
troops (U.S. Congress, Senate 1992b, 40).
Rather than a quick, cheap surgical intervention that America has
become accustomed to, Mandelbaum equates the type of commitment
required by Bosnia to psychiatry--a treatment with no discernible
end or cure (1994, 12). There exists in Bosnia circumstances
almost certain to lead to intervention protraction and commitment
enlargement. Thus, after initially promising a more significant
American response to Bosnia (Hedges and others 1994, 65),
President Clinton soon recognized the costs of a coercion-type
intervention and settled for the limits of lesser actions.
Therefore, Clinton adopted President Bush's criteria and escalated
American involvement in a measured, limited manner to pursue the
fundamental U.S. interest in Bosnia of containing the conflict
(U.S. President 1993d, 921)
There were distinct limits on what the U.S. would do and could do
in an intervention in Bosnia. The common policy achieved between
the two Administrations covering the conflict was one aimed at
maintaining regional stability by containing the conflict through
limited intervention. The American intervention, whether by design
or happenstance, created a conflict cordon around Bosnia and U.S.
disengagement will likely only occur when events in Bosnia pose no
threat to the surrounding region.
Spring 1995 is given as a broad end-date for the U.S. persuasion
intervention in Bosnia. It is during this time-frame that the
Clinton Administration will resume deliberations over taking
concerted or unilateral action to
lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian government. It is pure
speculation to say whether lifting the arms embargo will
significantly alter U.S. involvement in Bosnia but scenarios
can be envisioned where the level of violence becomes so
great with the influx of heavy weapons to all factions that a
choice must be made to either escalate the intervention or
withdraw.
Speculation aside, if Washington succeeds in its
campaign to lift the arms embargo, the U.S. will have
affected a significant shift in policy and one completely
inconsistent with the conflict cordon strategy. The
following chapter elaborates on the implications for the
conflict cordon strategy if the arms embargo is lifted.
CHAPTER VI
CONFLICT CORDON AND THE ARMS EMBARGO
U.S. policy is fairly consistent in its pursuit of a Bosnian
conflict cordon with one notable exception: sporadic efforts
toward lifting the arms embargo. To remove what constraints
remain to the flow of arms into Bosnia risks collapsing the
conflict cordon. Rather than capping the level and containing
the reach of the violence, lifting the arms embargo
substantially undermines a critical control over the violence
and could make the persuasion intervention obsolete. The U.S.
would be faced with either escalating to a coercion
intervention or disengaging from a situation threatening the
Balkans and beyond; neither option is beneficial to U.S.
national security interests.
The Bush Administration was firmly committed to the embargo and
opposed arming any one side in the conflict (U.S. Congress,
House 1992g, 28). It was only after significant pressure from
Muslim states and right before leaving office that President
Bush changed to a position favoring lifting the embargo
(Gompert 1994, 38).
President Clinton professes to have "always been in
favor of some kind of lifting of the arms embargo" (U.S.
President 1993c, 861) but has thus far restrained his
preference in deference to the considerable concerns of others
involved in the conflict.
Arguments Against Lift
Both the UN and NATO oppose lifting the arms embargo. Both
argue that lifting the embargo would result in an inevitable
increase in the level of violence, the imperilment of foreign
troops in country, an end to humanitarian relief efforts, and a
setback to Russian reform. For the U.S., lifting the embargo
would have the reverse effect of increasing, rather than
decreasing, American involvement.
Increased Level of Violence
Freely arming each belligerent is an action destined to
escalate and prolong the conflict. Major General MacKenzie
testified before Congress that the opposing forces thrive on
heavy weapons and would make full use of any and all available.
According to General MacKenzie, the Bosnian belligerents,
preference for heavy weapons traces back to "the Soviet
mentality of never send a man where a round can go first." This
preference for heavy weapons and disdain for close combat is
likely to create more civilian casualties and greater
collateral damage. (U.S. Congress, House 1993f, 42)
In retrospect, many significant diplomatic and
military intiatives toward resolving the conflict have been
preceded by increased Serb offensive activity; moves to lift
the embargo would be no exception. Any inclination by the
Bosnian Serbs to negotiate will likely be obviated with the
lifting of the arms embargo; any restraint by Serbia toward
supporting the Bosnian Serbs will likely dissipate. Lieutenant
General Philippe Morillon, former commander of UN forces in
Bosnia, suggests that lifting the arms embargo is tantamount to
siding with the Muslims. General Morillon was told by Bosnian
Serb leaders that they would never relinquish the advantage in
heavy weapons which the Serbs feel compensates for their
numeric inferiority in personnel. Should the embargo be lifted,
the Serbs will react fiercely, possibly engaging in a massive,
unrestrained preemptive attack to defeat the Muslims before
that opportunity is foreclosed. (Morillon 1993, 5-6)
One could argue that if the Serbs could achieve success through
an unrestrained offensive, they would have already attempted
one (if they have not tried already). However, if pushed to
desperation, should such an offensive be attempted, the
resulting carnage would surpass any level previously seen in
the conflict.
A Serb offensive is only one escalation scenario.
The Muslims appear to be utilizing the delay in the
lifting of the embargo to improve their strategic position
through a guerilla warfare style offensive (Pomfret 1994a,
A31).* By pressing a battlefield advantage now, the
Muslims could be positioning themselves to decisively
exploit that advantage upon receipt of heavy weapons
received after the lifting of the embargo. With such an
exploitation would necessarily follow an increased level
of violence.
More weapons translates to greater means to fight for each
side. Since neither side is likely to peacefully accept the
dominance of any other, more weapons will simply intensify the
civil war. Moreover, should the intensification lead to greater
chaos in Bosnia, the country could be ripe for exploitation by
both Serbia and Croatia, each of which has expressed designs on
the country.
Imperilment of Foreign Troops
Serb reaction will not necessarily be limited to the Muslims
and Croats. If the Serbs perceive the lifting of the embargo as
an action directed solely against them (and it's likely they
will), retaliation against UN and NATO forces in country is
probable. During the UN debate over
_____________________
*Three events precipitated the Muslim offensive. First, the
government forces received an influx of arms despite the
embargo. Second, Serbia complied, at least partially, with
their pledge to cease supplying arms to the Bosnian Serbs. In
August 1994, Slobodan Milosevic responded to the Bosnian Serb
rejection of the Contact Group's peace plan by pledging to seal
FRY's border with Bosnia and cut-off supplies to the Bosnian
Serbs. Finally, Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic largely
halted Serb offensive activity in June, perhaps satisfied the
war was won. (Pomfret 1994a, A31, A34)
stricter enforcement measures for the flight ban, both Boutros
Ghali and General Lars-Eric Wahlgren (then commander of UN
peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia) expressed opposition to
stricter measures citing probable Serb retaliation against UN
troops and interruption of aid convoys (Lewis 1993a, A8).
Ending Humanitarian Relief Efforts
If UN and NATO troops become targets for retaliation or if the
level of surrounding violence grows too intense, the associated
result would be an end to the aid mission to Bosnia. Whatever
modifying influence the UN maintains on the ground would cease
and the lift could precipitate a total UN withdrawal (Pomfret
1994c, A16). Lieutenant General Rose has stated that lifting
the embargo would provoke the departure of the entire UN force
in Bosnia and, therefore, the end of humanitarian relief
deliveries (Randal 1994a, A27).
Despite criticism over their role and activity within Bosnia,
the UN forces provide some measure of restraint to the violence
and some relief to the population; a withdrawal would
effectively terminate all restraint and relief.
Setback to Russian Reform
Russia is an historical ally of Serbia (Devroy 1994,
A1) and, as such, has presented an obstacle to many
international initiatives against the Serbs. The Russians are
among the few who support lifting the sanctions against Serbia
and are among the many who oppose lifting the arms embargo
against Bosnia (Devroy 1994, Al).
The U.S. and the West have proven remarkably
understanding of the Russian position on Yugoslavia, not
for any sensitivity to the Serbs but out of a desire to
avoid strengthening conservative and radical conservative
elements within Russia and consequently undermining the
reforms of Boris Yeltsin. In March 1993, for example, the
UN Security Council postponed, temporarily, the
authorization to NATO for stricter enforcement of the
no-fly zone specifically over concerns that such a move
would weaken Yeltsin in his power struggle with conservative,
pro-Serb elements in the Russian government (Lewis 1993c, A3).
To mollify accusations by opposing conservative elements of
abandoning the Serbs in the event of a strong western move to
lift the embargo, President Yeltsin could feel compelled to
abandon previous support of the peace process and instead ship
arms to the Serbs (Devroy 1994, A15), further exacerbating what
is likely to become an explosion of violence.
Increased American Involvement
Merely lifting the embargo may inadequately serve
U.S. policy if that policy is based on arming the Muslims.
As Ambassador Zimmerman explains, "it would not be enough just
to lift the arms embargo." As part of U.S. lift policy,
Zimmerman identifies the need to ensure the Muslims receive the
weapons--something likely to be militarily opposed by Serb
forces--and the need to train the Bosnians to use the weapons.
Zimmerman concludes that to lift the embargo for any useful
impact would require a greater U.S. military commitment and
still would guarantee no victory against the Serbs. (U.S.
Congress, House 1994, 16-17)
Clinton's Argument for Lift
Not surprisingly, the predominantly Muslim Bosnian
government appeals for the lifting of the arms embargo.
The embargo, they claim, amounts to an international freeze
of Serbian military superiority and has actually assisted
Serb conduct of ethnic cleansing and other atrocities. The
Bosnian government argues that if the West is unprepared to
intervene more decisively in Bosnia then at least permit the
Muslims to defend themselves against the Serbs. (U.S. Congress,
Senate 1993h, 52)
Parity
As early as March 1993, the Clinton Administration
discernibly shifted toward the Bosnian government's
argument. The Administration's rationale was based on
redressing the disparity in heavy weapons between the
Bosnian Serb and Muslim forces and creating pressure on
the Serbs for a negotiated settlement (U.S. Congress
1993e, 15; Holmes 1993, A13). It is and has been the
President's belief that the embargo "unfairly and
unintentionally penalized the victims in this conflict."
(U.S. President 1994f, 1663)
Clinton attempted to convince the allies to
participate in a "lift and strike" strategy where the
embargo would be removed and air strikes (possibly massive
in number) would be conducted until receipt of weapons by
government forces had begun (Hedges and others 1994, 65).
For reasons previously stated, the European allies
declined this option.
Clinton's Dilemma
In effect, NATO and the UN have exercised a 'veto'
over U.S. military initiatives in Bosnia, mainly for the
reason of protecting troops in country. However, the veto
has also protected the U.S. from itself, providing a
restraint to the escalation of American military
intervention and permitting the conflict cordon to remain
intact.
President Clinton has acknowledged allied fears that
lifting the embargo would seriously endanger troops on the
ground (New York Times 1993, A12). In fact, President
Clinton has identified several reasons against a
unilateral lift of the embargo including ending the
negotiating process, straining relations with allies,
upsetting NATO cohesiveness, and damaging ties with Russia
(U.S. President 1994f, 1663).
Most significantly, the President acknowledges that
a unilateral lift would "greatly increase American
responsibility for the outcome of the conflict" and
increase "the likelihood of greater U.S. military
involvement in Bosnia." (U.S. President 1994f, 1663)
However, the President's reasons apply whether the lift is
accomplished unilaterally or in international concert--the
only change is increasing the number of parties sharing
culpability for further destabilizing the conflict.
Yet, in August 1994, the Clinton Administration
accelerated its campaign to lift the embargo. The
President informed Congress that unless the Bosnian
Serbs accepted a peace agreement proposed by the-"Contact
Group"* by 15 October, he would formally request the UN
Security Council lift the arms embargo--a move he expected
would directly benefit the Bosnian government. The President
was so adamant that he intended "to consult with the Congress
thereafter regarding unilateral termination of the arms
embargo" if the UN Security Council balked. (U.S. President
1994f, 1663-1664)
President Clinton's efforts to lift the embargo were
frozen when President Izetbegovic and the Bosnian
_____________________
*U.S., Great Britain, Russian, and France proposed a
partition plan on 06 July tentatively Accepted by all
parties except the Bosnian Serbs (Lippman 1994, A29).
government agreed in September to a six month delay in
requesting a lift of the embargo to provide more time for peace
negotiations (Goshko 1994, A27). Izetbegovic's acquiescence
reportedly came after Great Britain and France threatened to
remove their peacekeeping forces from Bosnia (Goshko 1994,
A27).
The delay not withstanding, the Clinton Administration
continues to press for an exact date, possibly during the
spring of 1995, to lift the embargo on behalf of the Bosnian
government if the Serbs fail to accept the Contact Group's
peace proposal (Williams 1994, A30). Aside from appeasing hawks
in Congress, the President appears genuinely committed to
pursuing the embargo lift. He calls the period during the
summer of 1993 when the U.S. and NATO were publicly debating
lifting the arms embargo while conducting air strikes as "the
closest we ever were to settling" Bosnia (U.S. President 1993f,
1405). According to President Clinton, when this plan failed,
"things began to deteriorate again instead of move toward
peace." (U.S. President 1993f, 1405)
The President's dilemma is that the war will further
deteriorate if he succeeds in his commitment to lift the
embargo, putting him in a lose-lose situation of either
escalating U.S. involvement or precipitating U.S.
disengagement. It would appear less politically and
militarily costly for the President to repeal his
commitment to lift the embargo. Moreover, to lift is to
effectively rescind the intentional or accidental U.S.
policy of placing a conflict cordon around Bosnia--a policy
that up to now has successfully contained the conflict.
CHAPTER VII
A PARADIGM FOR POST-COLD WAR INTERVENTION
This paper proposes that U.S. intervention policy in
Bosnia, whether intentionally or through some combination of
action and reaction, has developed a conflict cordon to prevent
the spread of instability to other regions within and beyond the
borders of former-Yugoslavia.
A Policy Success
Contrary to criticism over policy vacillation and ineffective
global leadership, two U.S. presidential administrations waded
through events involving one of the most contentious conflicts
in history (one that literally spans decades, if not
centuries) and developed-intentionally or otherwise--a
consistent scheme of intervention that has thus far succeeded
in protecting significant American national security interests
surrounding the conflict. U.S. intervention in Bosnia
represents a policy success.
Secretary of Defense William Perry all but announced
a U.S. conflict cordon policy when he listed the
components of American policy in Bosnia to include
"limiting the violence in the area," "limiting the spread
of violence,," "mitigating the effect of the violence," and
assisting attempts "to stop the violence." (1994, 1)
True to Secretary Perry's components, American participation
in the humanitarian aid mission moderates the effect of
violence within Bosnia; other military actions seal the
violence within Bosnian borders. Although the seal over the
violence was never hermetic*, it was sufficient to reduce the
level of violence within Bosnia. This reduction did more than
provide some relief to the Bosnian population; it restrained
the violence to a level of intensity unlikely to be felt in
other regions. Despite criticism over the effectiveness of
military action in Bosnia, the no-fly zone, the naval
blockade, the limited ground involvement, and the aid mission
were successful because through presence and occasional
employment, military forces deterred the spread of violence,
keeping the conflict within Bosnia while preventing mass
starvation (Jones 1995).
The preventative scope of a persuasion intervention was all
the U.S. needed to erect the conflict cordon of Bosnia. The
costs of a coercion intervention would have exceeded the level
of direct U.S. interest in the conflict and surpassed the
means necessary to secure American
_____________________
* A Machiavellian viewpoint would suggest that the
conflict cordon is also designed to keep the war simmering at
a controlled level to preclude either a Serb or Muslim victory.
Although expressed in low tones and absent from any public
policy, Europeans appear wary of the establishment of an
Islamic state in Europe, should the Muslims prevail.
objectives of regional stability. A coercion intervention
is necessary to confront crises that directly affect
significant national security interests; a persuasion
intervention is ideal for conflicts on the periphery of
the national interest that threaten, yet only indirectly
impact upon, significant national interests. The
persuasion intervention is "proportional" to, in Secretary
Perry's words, American interests of "preventing the war
and its consequences from spreading beyond Bosnia." (1995,
15)
A Post-Cold War Intervention Paradigm
The Bosnian conflict cordon represents an
inadvertent development of a paradigm for intervention in
the post-Cold War world. This paradigm is applicable to
two of three key dangers to U.S. national security
interests identified by President Clinton in his national
security strategy: threats to the stability of states and
regional aggression* (White House 1994, 10).
Threats to stability and regional aggression are
likely to abound in the post-Cold War world and policy
makers will need to prioritize, based on the national
interest, when to intervene. The type of national
interest calculus required to determine when to intervene
____________________
*Weapons of mass destruction is the third danger
identified by President Clinton (White House 1994, 10) for
which the conflict cordon paradigm remains inapplicable.
is beyond the scope of this paper, however, the conflict cordon
strategy suggests how to intervene given a certain type of
crisis.
In addition to the national interest, it has been proposed that
the availability of military force is a "principle practical
determinant" for a decision to intervene (Yarmolinsky 1968,
233). With defense resources shrinking, that availability
becomes far less, creating the need to maximize limited
resources to preserve national security interests during a
period of increasing turmoil and instability. The conflict
cordon provides one method of protecting national security
interests with limited military resources.
The Prototypical Post-Cold War Conflict
The war in Bosnia is the prototypical post-Cold War conflict,
complete with representative decision-factors that dictate
intervention options. The political nature of the war defies
classic definition--at once both a civil war and a war of
external aggression, fought by several ethnic belligerents
harboring ancient vendettas. Formerly united, the Bosnian
belligerents appear averse to compromise, placing diplomatic
settlement seemingly beyond reach.
The psychological nature of the conflict fuels
hostilities as it cuts deep into the belligerents'
collective cultural souls. According to General Jones,
although each side professes disdain for the war, none of the
fighting factions "have lost the support of the people."
(1995) The West, continues General Jones, continuously
underestimates the Bosnians' "enthusiasm for fighting."
(1995) Such deep commitment to a cause may be suppressed, as
it was by Tito, but never exorcised from the collective
cultural souls.
International involvement is characterized by disunity of
effort with many good-natured endeavors failing over a lack of
coordination and the inability to devise a viable solution.
Many states have interests in the region but few interests are
critical enough to warrant substantial combined or unilateral
efforts. Even allies fail to find common ground.
The only shared interest is that instability spread no farther
than the Bosnian borders. Maintaining stability around Bosnia
keeps the major regional and global powers engaged in the
conflict.
Termination objectives for ending the war require an unlikely
commitment of combined combat power to overwhelm belligerents
that are incapable of overwhelming each other but willing to
fight indefinitely. Rather than end the wart termination
objectives become limited to diplomatic solutions while
military options are entrusted to contain the conflict.
The Conflict Cordon
If the predictions are accurate that Bosnia is representative
of post-Cold War conflict, then the conflict cordon is ideally
suited for the application of limited military resources. As
demonstrated in Bosnia, a no-fly zone, a naval blockade,
selective combat strikes, and limited ground forces can cordon
even a particularly savage conflict. However, strong
diplomatic transmission by the intervening power of its
strategic commitment and of its intent to use force, if
necessary, is an absolute prerequisite for the success of the
strategy.
The forces needed to conduct a conflict cordon
strategy are those capable of rapidly projecting power (or
potential power) and sustaining that projection over an
extended period. Aircraft for a no-fly zone and warships
for a naval blockade are essential elements. Because
basing for aircraft may be unavailable, aircraft carriers
will remain a post-Cold War strategic staple. Striking
power, including carrier-based air, long range bombers,
and cruise missiles, lend strength and credibility to the
framework of the conflict cordon. Weapons employed must
be of sufficient accuracy and lethality to destroy
intended targets while minimizing collateral damage. The
need to place forces on the ground is scenario-dependent
but the availability of a rapidly deployable force to
conduct limited, short-duration operations--a special
operations capable Marine Expeditionary Unit, for
example--remains critical to a conflict cordon.
Therefore, naval forces are ideally suited for creating and
sustaining a conflict cordon--even for a non-littoral crisis.
The rapid arrival of naval forces early in a crisis can lay the
foundation for the conflict cordon. However, joint and,
possibly, combined operations are required for long-term
success.
Military training will require continued attention to operations
other than war, including the delivery of humanitarian aid and
civil control, but the conflict cordon is a hostile--not
humanitarian--strategy. It employs forces to deter the spread of
conflict and to enforce, if necessary, the conflict's
containment. Therefore, operating hours and exercise budgets for
military forces remain ever crucial. Aircraft must stay
proficient over land and sea and must be able to deliver
ordinance on target in areas where collateral damage is
unacceptable. Ships must remain capable of creating and
enforcing a tight blockade while conducting accurate fire
missions against ground targets. Ground forces must retain the
ability to fight lethal battles in built-up areas.
As always, the only forces America can afford are
those that can still fight effectively in the national
interest. The conflict cordon provides the option to
protect the national interest by avoiding direct
involvement to resolve instability. Rather, intervention
is designed to preclude that instability from adversely
affecting national security interests proximate to the
conflict.
The conflict cordon is flexible, leaving open the option for
escalation. However, the strategy precludes potentially
decisive results of a coercion-type intervention early in a
crisis. While early and decisive intervention is ideally
preferred, this is difficult when sufficient knowledge remains
unavailable as a crisis unfolds. It is often hindsight that
provides justification to those arguing that more should have
been done sooner.
The conflict cordon is not risk free for the forces involved
and the costs of a prolonged military commitment will strain
budgets while restricting the availability of military assets
for other missions. It is, however, less risky than more
aggressive actions and is a viable option for employing
military forces to contain a conflict that might otherwise
threaten significant national security interests.
The American Soul
Michael Mandelbaum proposes that U.S. intervention in the post
Cold War world will be driven by "sympathy" (rather than
strategic considerations or pragmatic policies) elicited by
the media over the plight of the world's oppressed and
unfortunate (1994, 16).* Few Americans could fail to
be moved by Bosnian journalist Zlatko Dizdarevic's account
of a boy who witnessed the murder of his parents:
Today it is hard to fight back the tears, in these
eyes that have almost run dry, after the news of what
has happened to an eleven-year-old: Standing in a
line for water in the vicinity of Pivara (a brewery in
town), both his father and mother were killed by
sniper fire. As I write, half the personnel of the
hospital is engaged in the battle to save the life of
his sister, a girl of seventeen.
After the shooting, this boy started to fetch and
pour water over the bodies of his dead parents. He
didn't want to stop even when his sister, seriously
wounded, told him: "Stop, Berin, stop, they're dead."
1993, 169)
The American public is a sympathetic group whose powerful
emotion is a resource requiring careful utilization by
Washington. Unbeatable is the leader who can energize the
emotions of the American public for a fighting cause. However,
the irony presented by the conflict cordon is that it enlists
only a partial American commitment, neglecting to redress
wrongs in favor of containing them; emotion is contrary to
success in such a strategy.
The conflict cordon is relatively economical, operationally
executable, and strategically flexible but
_____________________
*The media certainly exercises a strong influence over public
opinion and U.S. policy. As a group, the media is worthy of
ranking among the most influential international actors.
However, detailed discussion of the effect of the media on U.S.
policy is beyond the scope of this paper.
it requires the acceptance by the American public that
continued hostilities and possibly atrocities are
sanctioned within the policy. It is a pragmatic policy
designed to protect U.S. national security interests
without overextending American resources in the volatile
post-Cold War world. However, it is also a policy that
will burden the American conscience and possibly scar the
American soul.
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