The
CH-53D Sea Stallion Relic For Retirement Or Viable
Current
Asset
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Aviation
THE CH-53D SEA STALLION
RELIC FOR RETIREMENT
OR
VIABLE CURRENT ASSET
by
David D. Peterson
Major, USMC
CSC Class 1995
Research Paper submitted to the
Faculty
of the United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
April 1995
The
views expressed in this paper are those of the author and
do
not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department
of Defense or the U.S. Government
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:
The CH-53D Sea Stallion: Relic For Retirement or Viable Current Asset
Author:
Major David D. Peterson, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:
For over ten years the Marine Corps has gradually fed a perception that the
CH-53D Sea
Stallion
is a dead end community. Although justifiable in the past, recent changes in
the service
life
and mission of the Sea Stallion community require significant Marine Corps'
review and
modification.
Background:
Forward presence and power projection are two of the fundamental ideas
supporting
the Navy and Marine Corps' "littoral" concept. At the heart of the
Marine Corps'
ability
to support this concept is its Medium Lift Helicopter Transport Community.
Changes in
the
Marine Corps' acquisition schedule of the CH-53E and MV-22 Osprey within the
last ten
years
are having a serious impact on the CH-53D Sea Stallion and Marine Corps' Medium
Lift
Community.
First scheduled for an early 1990's retirement, the Sea Stallion will now
remain on
active
service until well past the year 2000. The 1990's have brought additional
delays in the
CH-53D's
retirement through gradually shrinking Programmed Authorized Allowances (PAA's)
and
a corresponding reduction in its Table of Organization (T/O.) These gradual
reductions have
had
a serious impact on the material condition of the aircraft and the squadron
personnel who fly
and
maintain them. The Marine Corps' 1994 AVPLAN confirmed that the Sea Stallion
community
will consolidate in Hawaii, further reduce to an eight aircraft PAA and will
not
receive
the Osprey until late in the Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) transition.
Significantly,
the
1994 changes do not include scheduled upgrades for the Sea Stallion.
Additionally, although
the
consolidation of the CH-53D community in Hawaii will help in decreasing the
supporting
manpower
requirements of the community and improve the medium lift available for both
1st
MAW
and III MEF, a further cut by the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission
including
Hawaii would have a significant impact on the CH-53D and the Marine Corps'
Medium
Lift Community.
Recommendation:
The ability of the CH-53D to continue supporting the Marine Corps'
Medium
Lift Community for the next ten years is dependent upon changes in the material
condition
of the aircraft and the personnel who maintain and fly it. The aircraft should,
at a
minimum,
have an electrical and hydraulic upgrade. Additionally, the new eight aircraft
T/O
requires
re-evaluation for weakness in pilot, maintenance and administrative support
personnel.
THE CH-53D SEA STALLION
RELIC FOR RETIREMENT
OR
VIABLE CURRENT ASSET
Faced with the realities of the post
Cold War world, each branch of the United States
Armed
Forces faces across the board re-evaluation of its role in the National
Defense. In the
1992
Navy-Marine Corps paper ... FROM THE SEA, the Navy and Marine Corps articulated
their
vision
of the new strategic concept that would carry them into the 21st century. This
new
"littoral"
concept was further updated and expanded by the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of
Naval
Operations,
and Commandant of the Marine Corps in the 1994 paper FORWARD ... FROM THE
SEA.
At the heart of the "littoral" concept presented by these documents
is forward presence
and
power projection. This has served to reinforce the Marine Corps' long range
aviation vision
as
stated by then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.
in 1965:
The primary amphibious assault
capability of the landing force will consist of fully
V/STOL-mobile Marine air-ground
teams, launched and supported from mission
designed amphibious shipping, under
all conditions of weather and visibility. This
will be complemented by a surface
assault capability utilizing high speed surface
craft, either water or air cushion
borne able to project troops, equipment, and
supplies onto the beach beyond the
high water line.1
The Marine Corps' continuing desire
to enhance its evolving mission is evident when
viewing
the advancements it has made toward this clearly insightful and still valid
vision.
Meeting
the requirements of its changing roles and missions, complicated by decreasing
budgets
and
significant draw downs, the Marine Corps is justifiably cognizant of its cost
effective image
as
it rapidly approaches the 21st century. This image forces the Marine Corps to
delicately
balance
the cost of new system acquisitions such as its Medium Lift Replacement (MLR),
MV-22
Osprey, and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) with the timely
programmed
retirement of such key systems as the CH-46E and CH-53D. This subtle balancing
of
its budget allows the Marine Corps to continue providing over 15% of the
nation's defense for
less
than 6% of the defense budget2. With
high expectations for the future, yet a steadily
decreasing
budget, the Marine Corps must not only consider how to do less with less
(defense
provided/budget available), or even the same with less, but how to do more with
less.
The impact of this dilemma is of
particular importance to Marine Transport Helicopter
Aviation
and the assets it provides to the completion of the Marine Corps' mission.
Factors such
as
the significant age of its medium lift community, continued delays in acquiring
a medium lift
replacement,
increased operational requirements such as the fielding of the 3 1st Marine
Expeditionary
Unit (MEU), scheduled base closures and the likelihood and potential impact of
the
unscheduled grounding of its aging medium lift assets have compounded the
Marine Corps'
problem,
forcing a re-evaluation of its entire medium lift plan for the next fifteen
years.
One of the key core issues the
Marine Corps must resolve in this delicate budget
balancing
act is the continued utilization of the CH-53D Sea Stallion and how it fits
into the
evolving
medium lift puzzle. Previously scheduled for retirement from the active duty
fleet in
the
early 1990's3, the Sea Stallion is now forecast to remain in active duty
service until well
beyond
the end of the century. This extended service is the result of the Marine
Corps'
re-evaluation
of both medium and heavy lift helicopter mission requirements as well as a
series
of
forecast delays in fielding the MM MV-22 Osprey.
For over ten years the Marine Corps
has slowly extended the life of its entire medium lift
helicopter
fleet. The life extension of the CH-53D Sea Stallion first occurred within the
heavy
lift
community and is now continuing as part of the medium lift community. While the
Marine
Corps'
fife extension of the CH-53D community is lift driven, there are two separate
philosophical
interpretations to the continued utilization of the Sea Stallion community past
its
early
1990's scheduled retirement. The first is one in which the Sea Stallion plays
an upgraded
viable
and active enhanced medium lift role in the current and future Marine Corps'
helicopter
transport
aviation community. The second traps the CH-53D community as a cost
saving/effective
stop gap fill-in in a politically correct budgetary quagmire for overworked
medium
and heavy lift aircraft. Either one of these philosophies helps the Marine
Corps by
keeping
the Sea Stallion community flying until the Osprey arrives in the fleet.
However, only
one
philosophy provides the type of quality enhanced medium lift asset the Marine
Corps and its
Marines
deserve to have in their medium lift inventory.
It is important to gain an
understanding of which philosophical road the Marine Corps
has
chosen to follow and its effect on the Sea Stallion community as seen through
the Marine
Corps'
"Master Aviation Plan." To do so, it is first necessary to have a
general understanding of
the
overall Marine Corps' Medium and Heavy Lift Transport Helicopter Communities
and how
the
CH-53D fits into that picture.
The first CH-46A Sea Knight entered
the Marine Corps' aircraft inventory in the early
1960's
as a medium lift troop transport platform. The CH-53A appeared about five years
after
the
CH-46A in September 1966, with a much improved lift capability to fill the
Marine Corps'
heavy
lift requirement. Since their introduction these two helicopters have evolved
with newer
models
[currently the CH-46E and CH-53D (the CH-53E is a separate community)] and
airframe
modifications
that have greatly enhanced their capabilities. (The CH-53A remained in the
active
Marine
Corps inventory in mixed squadrons with the CH-53D's until the early 1990's and
is not
separately
discussed here.)
The evolution of Marine Helicopter
Transport Aviation continued in 1981, when the
Marine
Corps activated HMH-464 as its first CH-53E Super Sea Stallion squadron. The
Super
Stallion's
mission is to replace the Sea Stallion's heavy lift requirements and
additionally fill the
void
in super heavy lift, created by the Marine Corps' purchase of the M-198
howitzer and other
heavy
equipment that the CH-53D was incapable of lifting externally. This aircraft
had a
problem
free introduction to the fleet and initially was to replace seven of the eight
active
CH-53D aircraft squadrons by FY924. (HMH-363, the eighth CH-53D squadron, was
to
deactivate
in the mid to late 1980's.)
The face of the Marine Corps medium
and heavy lift communities changed dramatically
in
1984. Marine Corps Bulletin 3125 (MCBul 3125) titled, "The Marine Aviation
Master Plan
(AVPLAN)
for Fiscal Years 1984 - 1994," commenced a significant series of changes
in the
acquisition
of the Super Stallion. This plan reflected a FY93 projection of five, sixteen
aircraft
Program
Authorized Allowance (PAA) CH-53E squadrons rather than fielding the originally
planned
eight squadrons'. The AVPLANs that followed the 1984 plan reflected a variety
of
decreases
and increases in both the Sea Stallion and Super Stallion squadron sizes. The
PAA's
of
the CH-53E squadron's first changed to twelve aircraft and eventually
stabilized in the 1989
AVPLAN
that reflects the current six squadron, sixteen aircraft PAA. These six
squadrons
include
two on the east coast at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River (HMH-461 and
HMH-464)
and four on the west coast at MCAS Tustin (HMH-361, HMH-462, HMH-465 and
HMH-466).
As will be seen later, this series of changes had a major influence on the
remaining
CH-53D
community.
The same 1984 AVPLAN that so
dramatically affected the CH-53D and CH-53E
communities
was also the first plan to reflect the MLR JVX (the predecessor to the MV-22.)
This
plan showed only CH46E squadrons (the CH-53D squadrons were still heavy lift at
the
time)
receiving the MLR starting in FY92. The MLR plan significantly changed by the
1988
AVPLAN
that was the same plan which reflected the FY91 CH-53D and CH-53E squadron PAA
reduction
to twelve aircraft. Unlike the CH-53E, the CH-53D squadrons would continue to
reflect
a FY91 reduced PAA of twelve aircraft, although they remained in the heavy lift
plan, in
preparation
for the MLR transition they were now projected to receive. This 1988 plan
showed
two
of the three remaining CH-53D squadrons (a revived HMH-363 and HMH-362) among
the
first
squadrons to receive the MV-22 (changed from JVX) in FY94. HMH-463, the third
remaining
CH-53D squadron, was to transition to the Osprey during FY97. The commencement
of
the MV-22 acquisition had by this time changed to FY93. This too had an immense
impact
on
the CH-53D community.
The 1992 AVPLAN continued
preparation of the CH-53D community for the MLR
transition
by reflecting, for the first time, the three remaining Sea Stallion squadrons
as medium
lift
assets. Under this plan HMH-362 was the second Marine Corps tactical Squadron
scheduled
to
receive the MV-22, now delayed until FY98. This plan continued to reflect a
widely
separated
CH-53D community that included tactical active duty squadrons on the east coast
at
MCAS
New River (HMH-362), the west coast at MCAS Tustin (HMH-363) and in Hawaii at
MCAS
Kaneohe Bay (HMH463). HMT-302 became the sole composite CH-53D/CH-53E
training
squadron located at MCAS Tustin.
The
1994 AVPLAN reflects the latest round of significant changes to the CH-53D and
Marine
Corps' Transport Helicopter Aviation Communities. These changes include a
FY95/96
reduction
in the CH-53D squadron PAA to eight aircraft. Associated with the reduced PAA,
the
plan
reflected the 1994 activation of a now CH-53D squadron, HMH-366, in Marine
Corps Air
Facility
(MCAF) (changed from MCAS in 1994) Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. This plan also reflects
the
consolidation of the CH-53D community by relocating the remaining two Sea Stallion
squadrons
(HMH-362 and HMH-363) to Hawaii by the summer of 1996. In conjunction with
this
CH-53D consolidation, HMT-301 is to reactivate in Hawaii as the CH-53D training
squadron
in July 1995. The follow-on to this CH-53D community consolidation is the
scheduled
commencement
of a Sea Stallion Unit Deployment Program (UDP) rotation to Okinawa in
support
of the First Marine Aircraft Wing and III MEF during late 1995 or early 1996.
The 1994
AVPLAN
also reflects all CH-46E Sea Knight squadrons moving from Hawaii to SOCAL
(Southern
California) or Okinawa by July, 1996. Finally, the 1994 plan further slides the
projected
introduction of the MV-22 Osprey to the tactical fleet beginning in the year
2001.
Significantly,
this plan removed the CH-53D community from the early transition to the MV-22.
Figures
I through 3 reflect the current Marine Corps active medium and heavy lift plan,
for
FY94
through FY03.
The subtle changes of the CH-53D to
a twelve aircraft PAA in 1988 and to the medium
lift
community in 1992 were in preparation for the transition to the MV-22 and
dramatically
enhanced
the Marine Corps' medium lift capabilities. While the CH-53D is now a
"medium lift"
asset,
its squadrons retain their HMH (heavy lift) designations providing a heavy to
medium lift
crossover
capability through the Sea Stallion's ability to meet a majority of the Marine
Corps'
heavy
lift requirements in addition to the medium lift mission. A comparison of the
major
differences
in the medium lift community (CH-46E/CH-53D) is relevant in terms of the
enhanced
capabilities that the Sea Stallion provides.
It is important to note that the
CH-46E Sea Knight is a capable medium lift platform
more
suitable for some medium lift missions than the CH-53D due to the large number
of Sea
Knights
available, smaller physical size of the aircraft and other considerations.
However, the
CH-53D
provides a significantly enhanced overall medium lift package unmatched by the
CH-46E
community. The CH-53D is capable of providing more than twice the internal or
external
lift capability of the Sea Knight. Additionally, Sea Stallions equipped with
external
auxiliary
fuel tanks (the vast majority of CH-53D's), can remain aloft more than three
tunes the
Click
here to view image [1-3]
non-bullfrog
(no extended range fuel tanks) Sea Knights and almost twice as long as the
CH-46E
bullfrog
(modified with external extended range fuel tanks.) The trade-off for both
aircraft is
that
more fuel carried means less operational lift available. This is more
significant with the
CH-46E
because of the considerably lower lift capacity it starts with. The bottom line
is that the
CH-53D
retains a greater capability to provide a faster buildup of combat power in a
landing
zone.
All trade-offs between these two
aircraft are not in favor of the CH-53D. There are some
significant
areas where the CH-46E has the advantage. A major consideration is the cost of
the
aircraft. The greater size and complexity of the Sea Stallion means that the
average
maintenance man-hours required per flight hour is significantly higher for the
CH-53D
than
the CH-46E. From November 1993 to November 1994 the average man hours per
flight
hour
were 18.65 for the CH-46E and 28.95 for the CH-53D. This heavier maintenance
requirement
is why CH-53D squadrons are larger, in Marines per aircraft, than comparably
sized
(in
numbers of aircraft) CH-46E squadrons. Second, the CH-46E has continued to
receive upgrade
packages
enhancing its capabilities while the CH-53D has received only a few
modifications.
One
of the key issues to be addressed in determining which philosophical road the
Marine
Corps is following for the CH-53D community concerns aircraft upgrades and
modifications.
However, before addressing this issue it is necessary to have a general
understanding
of the aircraft aging process. The CH-46E and CH-53D have both had their
capabilities
degraded due to normal airframe wear and tear since their introduction. This
degradation
occurs over the life expectancy of each airframe and is minimized by an
extensive
maintenance
program that includes Scheduled Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) which
periodically
provides for more detailed maintenance requirements and some upgrades. Service
Life
Extension Programs (SLEPs) are also available and although expensive, provide
invaluable and
necessary
upgrades to the aircraft. Additionally, the incorporation of more stringent
aircraft
limitations
such as decreased times between required maintenance inspections, decreased
authorized
lift capacities and reduced authorized airspeeds are also used to minimize
aircraft
degradation,
All of these factors combined continue to make the aircraft safe to fly.
However,
as
an airframe continues to age it gradually tends to become more inefficient to
operate due to an
imbalance
in reduced aircraft capabilities and increased maintenance and operational
costs such
as
man hours per flight hour and the dollar cost of repairs and operations. This
is what makes
the
planned acquisition of replacement aircraft, such as the Osprey, so important.
Evaluation of the CH-53D's history
is revealing when related to its transition from the
heavy
to medium lift role and the aircraft degradation process. When the Marine Corps
made
the
decision to replace its entire CH-53D community with CH-53E's, it justifiably
began to think
of
the long term retirement for the remaining Sea Stallion community. As the Super
Stallion
began
its introduction to the fleet in 1981, the Sea Stallion community was in the
midst of a
previously
approved upgrade program with the elastomeric rotor head and auxiliary fuel
tanks.
From
that point on, the influence of its programmed retirement weighed heavily
against the
CH-53D
as upgrades are not generally considered for communities slated for retirement
unless
they
concern a matter of safety. While upgrades were generally not considered for
the Sea
Stallions,
they were considered and approved for the CH-53E, an aircraft which would
provide
Marine
Corps heavy lift for many more years, and the CH-46E which would remain in
service
until
the end of the delayed MR transition. When the Marine Corps decided to stop its
purchase
of CH-53E's, at six squadrons, the CH-53D's were programmed to be among the
first
squadrons
to receive the MV-22. This further reinforced the logical reasoning that
retirement
was
just around the comer for the Sea Stallion community and upgrades would not be
an
economically
sound or a politically correct prospect for the Marine Corps. Although some
modifications
were approved, they tended to be cost effective safety issues such as the crash
worthy
seats incorporated in the mid 1980's.
The Marine Corps' rational decision
to discontinue upgrading the CH-53D community as
a
logical cost saving means while phasing the Sea Stallions out and the MV-22's
in has continued
for
over ten years. Unfortunately, this trend has not been altered in the last few
years with
changes
in the AVPLAN as the life span of the Sea Stallion dramatically increased to 20
10
and
beyond. The obvious disparity between aircraft upgrades has most recently been
reinforced by
the
1994 AVPLAN where the CH-46E is projected to receive the:
... block upgrade, incorporating
extended range fuel tanks, improved navigation
and emergency flotation is in
progress and will be completed during FY94.
The Dynamic Component Upgrade
Program (DCUP), a Night Vision Goggle
NVG) compatible cockpit and a
Heads-Up Display HUD will be incorporated
commencing in FY95.....The NVG
compatible cockpit/HUD improvements
will begin during FY95.6
Additionally,
limitations in the CH-46E caused by rotor-head, aft transmission and syncshaft
problems
are scheduled to be resolved commencing in late 1995 and early 1996.
The 1994 AVPLAN also provides for a
plan for the CH-53E to complete the installation
of
a Helicopter Night Vision System (HNVS) by the end of FY94 and also begin the
incorporation
of a Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) during FY95. Incorporation of the
NVG
cockpit will also be completed by the end of FY94.
The only modification discussed in
the 1994 AVPLAN for the CH-53D is the completion of
a
previously approved NVG cockpit.
The second point to be made concerns
perceptions of an aircraft community that is
approaching
retirement. With the downsizing of the CH-53D community and its considerably
delayed
transition to the Osprey, there was a subtle exodus of pilots and maintenance
personnel
to
other communities, primarily the CH-53E. Since the CH-53D has been viewed as a
dying
community
for years, mid to senior range company grade officers and many mid grade
enlisted
personnel,
unsure of their futures, sought to transition into other more stable
communities in
order
to begin the establishment of critical MOS credibility to salvage their
careers. This
coupled
with a continuously shrinking table of organization (T/0) which accompanied PAA
reductions
to twelve and then eight aircraft has created a shortage within the Sea
Stallion
community
of key experienced personnel in critical MOS's. This is evident in the lack of
senior
company
grade and junior field grade pilots returning to the fleet creating a wide
experience gap.
This
problem is also evident in the administrative support areas where the reduced
T/0s do not
consider
that a great amount of the administrative work remains constant despite
reductions in
squadron
size. Reductions in the officer corps also do not reflect the increase in the
required
number
of collateral duties required of each officer that have remained constant or
have
increased.
A final factor to be considered is
the non-availability of certain replacement parts
separately
or in conjunction with newly discovered airframe problems. The potential
grounding
of
medium lift assets increases with each passing year due to both of these
problems. The
potential
for this type of problem was reinforced in late 1994 when significant problems
were
discovered
in the Sea Stallion rotor head system. If this problem had not been resolved,
the
potential
existed for a long term (12 to 24 month) grounding of the CH-53D due to the
lack of
existing
available replacement parts and the extensive lead time required to have those
parts
manufactured.
The problems associated with this type of unprecedented grounding would
be
immense.
Another potential problem for the
CH-53D community deals with its consolidation in
Hawaii.
As part of its fair share, the Marine Corps offered MCAS Kaneohe Bay to the Base
Realignment
and Closure (BRAC)Commission fully expecting it to be accepted by the
commission
and closed. After the politicians had weighed in and the political dust had
settled,
Kaneohe
was slated to remain open. To complicate matters, this evolution occurred
during the
middle
of the Marine Corps' downsizing from 196,000 to a 174,000 Marine force. As part
of the,
solution,
the Marine Corps downsized Kaneohe Bay from an Air Station to a Marine Corps
Air
Facility
(MCAF). This simple reduction allowed an across the board reduction of base
support
requirements
and personnel. This was followed by the deactivation of MAG-24, MALS-24 and
MWSS-174
during September 1994. Simultaneously, MAG-36 was reorganized to establish 1st
MAW,
Aviation Support Element, Kaneohe, and Marine Aviation Logistics Support
Element.
As
previously discussed, HMH-366 was activated in Hawaii as a fourth tactical
CH-53D
squadron,
with a PAA of eight aircraft, joining HMH463 at Kaneohe Bay. The FY94 AVPLAN
reflects
the remaining two CH-53D squadrons moving to Hawaii and consolidating the
community
by July, 1996.
Moving the CH-53D community to
Hawaii helps the Marine Corps' resolve the problem
of
how to keep Kaneohe Bay open. It keeps the prerequisite number of units/troops
in Hawaii
to
fend off the political forces that kept the base off the BRAC closure list.
This consolidation
primarily
supports elements of the 3rd Marine Regiment and sets up a Unit Deployment
Program
(UDP)
for the CH-53D community to Okinawa.
Aside from resolving the political
issues involved with keeping Kaneohe Bay open, a
major
realignment of medium lift helicopter assets is taking place within the Marine
Corps. This
realignment
will support an increased forward presence and power projection that the Marine
Corps
has sought to undertake in association with the rethinking of its roles and
missions
through
the establishment of the 3 1 A NEU and a greater III MEF presence in Okinawa.
In order
to
support tins NEU, the Marine Corps will make a permanent change of station
(PCS) move of a
second
CH46 squadron (HMM-265) to Okinawa in July 1995. MAG-36 will continue to be
augmented
by a twelve aircraft UDP CH-53E squadron from the west coast that will provide
a
four
aircraft detachment to support the 31st MEU. With the new MEU's drain on its
medium
and
heavy lift assets, III MEF has sought additional lift support. The solution to
this problem
was
the movement of the CH-53D community to Hawaii, creation of a fourth CH-53D
tactical
squadron
and entry of the Sea Stallion community into the UDP program. This plan is well
underway
as the 1st MAW Aviation Support Element Kaneohe Bay reported to the Commanding
General,
1st MAW on 31 January, 1995, that it expected to be ready to begin the UDP
rotation
by
1 October, 19957.
On initial evaluation, this plan
seems to be advantageous to the Marine Corps. It
consolidates
all Marine CH-53D assets in one location thereby enhancing the supply system
and
consolidating/reducing limited manpower requirements. However, on closer
examination this
consolidation
of the entire Sea Stallion community has several drawbacks.
First, Hawaii is a dead end for a
consolidated CH-53D community. Although training
opportunities
exist, no MEU(SOC) training is available and other opportunities such as
shipboard
qualifications are limited. The ability of the CH-53D's to participate in
Weapons
Tactics
Instruction (WTI) courses and Combined Arms Exercises (CAXs), while not
impossible,
will
become extremely difficult to support. Although deployments to Okinawa and
supporting
exercises
in Korea and elsewhere are important missions, there is no other duty location
available
but Hawaii. This means that professionally, there is no other duty location
from which
to
draw experienced personnel. Although Hawaii is often thought of as
"paradise", that does
little
to enhance limited training opportunities for aircrews.
Second, by removing the CH-53D from
the east and west coasts a valuable asset has been
removed
from I and II MEF's. This is a critical issue when a mission is not suitable
for the
CH46E,
and CH-53E assets are not available. The absence of HMH-362 will be of
particular
impact
to FMFLANT and II MEF as there is currently no replacement squadron slated to
take its
place.
The "Ugly Angels" of 362 are intimately integrated into the II MEF
and 2nd MAW
Tactical
Employment and Exercise Plan (TEEP) including regular EastPac deployments.
Although
I MEF and 3rd MAWs utilization of HMH-363 has not been as heavy, the "Red
Lions"
were
the natural choice to fill the mission requirements during Operation
"RESTORE HOPE" in
Somalia,
Africa The CH-46E did not have the lift capability or range to have flown that
mission
and
utilizing more than the four CH-53E's that did deploy would have strained UDP
and
WestPac
commitments. Placing two of the Hawaii CH-46E squadrons on the west coast will
not
replace
the capabilities lost with the Sea Stallion. This is the reason that General
Fraterangelo,
called
HMH-363 his "911 squadron."
Finally, although Kaneohe Bay was a
survivor of the latest BRAC cuts, there are surely
more
cuts to come. There is no guarantee that the base will survive additional cuts
despite the
political
clout that was able to save it during the last round. Although that possibility
may seem
remote,
any additional move of the CH-53D community would have to be made as a complete
community
because of the reduced supporting establishments created to move all Sea
Stallions
to
Hawaii. In effect the Marine Corps, due to manpower reductions, has trapped
itself and
the
CH-53D community in one location that will be extremely difficult to move from.
In
returning to the initial question concerning the Marine Corps' philosophy in
dealing
with
the CH-53D, some conclusions may be drawn. The Marine Corps has made logical
decisions
concerning the continued utilization, upgrade and manning of the Sea Stallion
community
based upon initial estimates of its replacement by the CH-53E and the MV-22.
When
those estimates were revised, as in the changed acquisition plan for the last
three CH-53E
squadrons,
and delayed in the case of the Osprey, the life of the CH-53D was continuously
extended.
The problem was and still is that much needed upgrades to further enhance the
proven
capabilities
of the CH-53D community have not been provided. It would appear that this is
not
philosophy
but merely driven by the continuing evolution of the Marine Corps' draw-downs
and
re-evaluation
of its rolls and missions. However, the fact remains that the Marine Corps has
vastly
reduced the capability of one of its most valuable transport platforms.
Although the
Marine
Corps has significantly improved its 1st MAW lift capabilities in both Hawaii
and
Okinawa,
it has done so at the expense of I MEF and II MET capabilities. By not
programming
upgrades,
by reducing the squadron size and by moving all of its Sea Stallion assets to
Hawaii,
the
Marine Corps has risked having a major part of its medium lift capability
dramatically
degraded.
There are several solutions that may
be of great benefit to the Marine Corps.
First, the CH-53D is projected to
remain in the active fleet for at least another ten years.
While
it is difficult for any service to ask for upgrade funding for an aircraft it
is in the process
of
acquiring a replacement for, the CH-53D needs to be funded for upgraded
capabilities
comparable
with the CH-46E and CH-53E. (As previously shown funding for the CH-46E SLEP
has
shown that this type of funding is possible.) These upgrades may be most
economically
accomplished
through an enhanced SDLM program. This program should include, as a
minimum,
areas where the aircraft has had a history of documented degradation such as
electrical
rewiring and hydraulic systems. Additional items worthy of consideration
include
crashworthy
troop seats, advanced crashworthy aircrew survival systems (ACASS) and a NVG
Heads
Up Display (HUD).
Second, there is no reason for the
CH-53D to remain a closed community. The relatively
minor
differences between the CH-53D and CH-53E aircraft should not preclude their
consolidation
into a single CH-53D/EMOS for pilots just as the process has begun for the
enlisted
ranks. This consolidation will serve to revitalize the C-11-53D ranks and keep
them from
stagnating
in Hawaii with no other available duty stations. It will also serve to open up
a dual
pipeline
for junior personnel as the transition to the MV-22 grows closer.
NOTES
1.
Clifford, Kenneth J., Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR. Progress and Purpose: A
developmental
History
Of The United States Marine Corps 1900 - 1970. Washington, D. C.: History and
Museums
Division. Headquarters United States Marine Corps. 1973. p. 113.
2.
General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, "Views of the
Commandant
of
the Marine Corps," lecture presented to the United States Marine Corps
University, Command
and
Staff College, Marine Corps Base Quantico, Quantico, Virginia, 9 September
1994.
3.
Marine Corps Bulletin 3125, "Marine Aviation Master Plan (AVPLAN) for
Fiscal Years 1983
-
1993", 28 January 1983.
4.
Ibid., p 7.
5.
Marine Corps Bulletin 3125, "The Marine Aviation Master Plan (AVPLAN) for
Fiscal Years
1984
- 1994", p 8.
6.
Marine Corps Bulletin 3125, "The Marine Aviation Plan For Fiscal Years
1994 - 2003", 16
May
1994, p 6.
7.
First MAW Aviation Support Element Kaneohe Bay Hawaii, Message Date Time Group
31163OZ
Jan 95.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Draft
Aviation Master Plan, Aviation Plans, Programs, Joint Matters and Budget
(APP-3)/dmg,
19
February 1982.
Department
of the Navy, FORWARD ... FROM THE SEA. 1994.
Headquarters
Marine Corps, Aviation Plans, Programs, Joint Matters and Budget (APP-33),
"Status
of Pacific Laydown Medium Lift Plan!', 9 Jan 1995.
Kane,
Joel, Major, USMC. Heavy Helicopter Coordinator at Aviation Weapons Systems
Requirements
Branch (APW), Headquarters Marine Corps. Interview by author, 3 February
and
10 March 1995.
Marine
Corps Bulletin 3125, "Marine Aviation Master Plan (AVPLAN) for Fiscal
Years 1984-
1994",
17 October 1983.
Marine
Corps Bulletin 3125, "Marine Aviation Master Plan (AVPLAN) for Fiscal
Years 1987-
1996",
April 1987.
Marine
Corps Bulletin 3125, "Marine Aviation Master Plan (AVPLAN) for Fiscal
Years 1988-
1997",
8 February 1988.
Marine
Corps Bulletin 3125, "The Marine Aviation Plan (AVPLAN) for Fiscal Years
1989-
1998",
13 October 1989.
Marine
Corps Bulletin 3125, "The Marine Aviation Master Plan for Fiscal Years
1992 - 2001",
30
April 1992.
Oconner,
Mark, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC. Commanding Officer Heavy Marine Helicopter
Squadron
362. Interview by author, 6 March 1995.
Rawlins,
Eugene W., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC. Marines and Helicopters 1946 - 1962.
Washington,
D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1976.
Redman,
Mike, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC. Executive Officer Heavy Marine Helicopter
Squadron
362. Interview by author, 9 February 1995.
Shelton,
Raymond S., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC. "Marine Versatile Helicopter
Squadron 363
(HMV
363). Marine Corps Gazette, 78 no 2 (Feb '94): p38-39.
Taylor,
Jim, Major, USMC. Aviation Logistics Support Branch (ASL), Headquarters Marine
Corps.
Interview by author, 3 February 1995.
Todsen,
Peter B., Lieutenant Colonel. Commanding Officer Heavy Marine Helicopter
Squadron
463.
Interview by author, 2 February and 6 March 1995.
White,
Mike, Major, USMC. Assistant Program Manager for Systems Engineering, CH-53D
(53
Class
Desk) at Naval Aviation Systems Command (NAVAIR). Interview by author, 9 March
1995.
Willison,
Gary, Major, USMC. Landing Forces Aviation Plans Officer at Headquarters Marine
Corps
Aviation Plans, Programs, Joint Matters and Budget (APP). Interview by author,
3
February
1995.
Wragg,
David, Helicopters at War, United Kingdom: St. Martin's Press, 1983.
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