Will The ACE Be Sustainable? T-AVB Issues And Concerns
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Will the ACE be Sustainable? T-AVB Issues and
Concerns
Author: Major Curtis J. Powell, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The value of the Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB)
was amply demonstrated in OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.
Unfortunately, in the afterglow of success, a loss of momentum
has beset this valuable program raising many issues and concerns
regarding the future of large scale Aviation Combat Element
(ACE) sustainment.
Background: The T-AVB is absolutely critical to ACE sustainment
in operations greater than 30 days or those encompassing a heavy
sortie schedule. The increased doctrinal emphasis on rapid,
sustainable forces "from the sea" has further highlighted the
importance of the T-AVBs. While highly successful in the Gulf
War, a stagnation of training, funding, modernization and a lack
of program understanding has created an atmosphere of "benign
neglect" which seriously questions the ability of the T-AVBs to
be ready to deploy in support of a contingency or war. For
example, during the recent FY 96 Budget Review T-AVB
modernization funding was decreased 58%, thereby stretching the
modernization horizon to five years per ship. Considering that
eight of the top ten critical upgrades are for safety/mission
and the scheduled 2008 deactivation of the T-AVBs, this type of
funding profile places the viability of the program in jeopardy.
The paucity of fullscale peacetime exercises, lack of standard
operating procedures, personnel training and critical capability
shortfalls also contribute to questionable future readiness.
Recommendation: Many of the issues and concerns can be solved
simply through additional emphasis and training. A coordinated,
proactive program strategy, coupled with vigorous exercises and
leadership attention can ensure that the T-AVB will meet
expectations in the future.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
BACKGROUND 2
ISSUES AND CONCERNS 5
FUNDING 5
MATERIAL/CAPABILITY DEFICIENCIES 6
READINESS AND TRAINING ISSUES 9
READINESS 9
TRAINING 13
RECOMMENDATIONS 16
FUNDING 16
HELO DECK 16
CARGO BOOMS 17
SELF-DEFENSE. 17
MALS T-AVB TRAINING, MAINTENANCE, SECURITY,
AND SAIL (TMS2) TEAMS 18
MALS SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM (MSP) 19
PUBLISHING AN SOP 19
TRAINING 20
STREAMLINE ACTIVATION CHAIN 21
THE FUTURE 22
CONCLUSION 22
ENDNOTES 25
BIBLIOGRAPHY 28
APPENDICES A-1
APPENDIX A-- GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS A-1
TYPICAL MOBILE FACILITY A-3
MF LOADING OPERATIONS A-4
CARGO BOOM CONFIGURATION A-6
FLIGHT OPERATIONS A-7
APPENDIX B-- ACTIVATION SEQUENCE B-1
APPENDIX C-- TRANSALTS LIST C-1
APPENDIX D-- FY 96 BUDGET REVIEW D-1
APPENDIX E-- THREAT MATRIX E-1
INTRODUCTION
The Marine Corps doctrine of task organization embodies
flexibility of deployment and employment, minimal response times,
and force sustainment. Virtually all marine Air Ground Task
Forces (MAGTFs) employ aviation assets, from a composite squadron
to an entire Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). A critical aspect of
force sustainment is the ability to provide continuous
intermediate-level maintenance support to deployed aircraft once
operations commence. The aircraft employed in the smaller MAGTFs
derive their support from air-capable amphibious ships with minor
augmentation from the parent Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron
(MALS) Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA). In the late
1970s, the Marine Corps determined that a better means of
supporting the number of aircraft employed in the larger MAGTFs
was necessary. This required deploying the MALS in a flexible and
rapid method without generating additional strategic airlift
requirements.
In the early 1980's, the Marine Corps discovered an
ideal method that capitalized on proven civilian
containership technology. Through the conversion of two
Seabridge-class containerships, the Navy & Marine Corps
placed two Aviation Logistics Support Ships (T-AVBs) in
service (see Appendix A for characteristics). These ships
can quickly deploy task-organized intermediate-level
maintenance support, with the bulk of this support housed in
8'x 8'x 201 containers called mobile Facilities (MFs) (see
Appendix A, pg. A-3). The T-AVBs are not merely containerships.
The IMA can operate in these MFs while loaded aboard the T-AVB
or offloaded ashore in a contingency area.
The value of the T-AVBs as a force multiplier was amply
demonstrated in Operations DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM.
Unfortunately, in the afterglow of success, a loss of
momentum has beset this valuable program raising many issues
and concerns regarding the future of large-scale Aviation
Combat Element (ACE) sustainment. The purpose of this paper
is to stimulate debate, highlight concerns and suggest ideas
in the hope of regaining the momentum of the T-AVB program.
BACKGROUND
The Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB) primary mission is
to provide dedicated fast sealift for the movement of a task
organized Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) Intermediate
Maintenance Activity (IMA) to a contingency area to support the
fixed and rotary wing aircraft of the Marine Air-Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) Aviation Combat Element (ACE) in either an
amphibious or Maritime Prepositioning Force operation.
Individual workcenters are housed in Mobile Facility (MFs) vans
and embarked aboard the T-AVB. The T-AVB can be configured in
two ways: (1) with 300 MF vans, of which 186 would be
functional, or (2) with 644 vans in a pure transport (no
repair enroute) configuration.1 In the functional mode, the
MALS is capable of conductiong at-sea repair of aeronautical
components. The T-AVB is also capable of offloading the
MALS at a secure port or instream with the use of
lighterage.
The ships, the SS CURTISS and the SS WRIGHT, are
maintained in Reduced Operating Status 5 (ROS-5) by the
Maritime Administration (MARAD). The SS Wright is
layberthed at Baltimore, MD, and the SS WRIGHT at Port
Hueneme, CA. A civilian, commercial U.S. Merchant Marine
retention crew is stationed aboard each ship to monitor
equipment and conduct vessel maintenance. Upon receipt of a
request for activation, additional civilian crew are hired,
ship systems are brought on-line, and the ship sails to
arrive at the Sea Port of Embarkation (SPOE) for loading
within 120 hours of activation, and arrival into the theater
of operations by D+20 (see Appendix B for details).2
The T-AVB is absolutely critical to ACE sustainment in
operations lasting more than 30 days or those conducting a
heavy schedule of combat sorties. The Fly-In Support
Package (FISP), which accompanies the Fly-In Echelon (FIE)
aircraft, only contains 30 days of organizational-level
(remove and replace) repair parts at combat utilization
rates.3 Consequently, sustained aircraft readiness and
availability is dependant on the arrival of IMA support and
additional spare parts. Considering the scarcity of many
aeronautical components and the transportation lag time when
sourcing replacement assets from CONUS, the in-theater repair
provided by the T-AVB is the only efficient way to maintain an
acceptable level of combat-ready aircraft.
The T-AVB mission has increased in importance through
recent changes in doctrine. The increased doctrinal
emphasis on rapid, sustained forces "from the sea"
highlights the need for a responsive and sustainable ACE.4
Consequently, the role of the T-AVB has grown in importance as
the centerpiece of the ACE expeditionary maintenance capability.
Only through regular exercises will the Marine Corps be able to
achieve the required T-AVB readiness to support this doctrinal
focus and meet the criterion as outlined in the Required
Operational Capabilities and Projected Operational Environment
(ROC/POE) for the T-AVB (OPNAVINST 3501.202A). Mobility
capability 14.5 of the instruction states:
Conduct peacetime activation, mount-out and movement
exercises of selected personnel and equipment to ensure
capability of contingencies involving naval forces
short of a general war.
In order to meet the D+20 arrival timeframe, frequent
exercise of the ship systems incorporating the MALS
logistics capabilities is necessary. Outside of the
difficult OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM loadout,
exercise activity has been static or greatly limited in
scope. Accordingly, the experience level and the number of
MALS Marines throughout the Corps familiar with T-AVB
operations is rapidly declining. A review of the Marine
Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS) yielded no fewer than
five submissions (MCCDC (WF)-2, HQMC (ASL, POR, LPO))
recommending that annual T-AVB exercises be conducted to
prevent the re-occurrence of the same problems. A common
theme to these lessons learned was that T-AVB activation and
loading timelines did not meet expectations. The decline of
the experience base, coupled with delays in ship
modernization/alteration and a lack of program understanding
within marine aviation, has created an atmosphere of "benign
neglect" which seriously questions the ability of the T-AVBS
to be ready to deploy in support of a contingency or war.
ISSUES AND CONCERNS
The significant issues and concerns involving the T-AVB
program can be categorized into three main areas: (1) funding for
modernization, (2) material and capability deficiencies, and (3)
readiness and training issues.
Funding. First, modernization funding is a major concern
considering the fact that many of the critical ship alterations
(TRANSALTS) based on Fleet Operational Need Statements (FONS)
from the Gulf war have not been incorporated. The recently re
prioritized list (see Appendix C) ranges from such items as the
emergency intercom system (#1) to the crash boat cradle (#22),
with a total funding requirement of roughly $3.2 million per
ship.
During the FY 96 budget review process, the Sealift
Modernization (T-FMP) line of the CNO (N42) T-AVB budget was
significantly decreased (58%) from its FY 95 high of $1.652
million to an annual average of $700,000 for the FY 97-01
time frame (see Appendix D).5 This decremented funding level
stretches the modernization period for the needed alterations
into almost five years for each ship! The second highest
alteration priority, the IMA electrical upgrade, is consequently
unfunded due to its high price tag -- $1.4 million/ship. This
electrical upgrade is absolutely critical to the IMA mission.
unless this funding decline is reversed in the near future,
critical upgrades to the T-AVBs will not be accomplished, or if
completed, will be done just in time for their scheduled 2008
deactivation.6
Material/Capability Deficiencies. While the T-AVBs provide
tremendous sustainment capacity to the ACE, the ships have some
material and capability deficiencies that warrant discussion.
Those that have been identified and programmed via a Fleet
Operational Need Statement (FONS), such as shipboard
communications, are excluded from this discussion despite their
importance. Instead, the focus is on those issues which have been
overlooked or require further examination and discussion.
First, the T-AVBs are strictly day Visual Flight Rules (VFR)
helicopter capable, unlike the maritime Pre-Positioning
Squadron (MPS) ships and the T-AHs (hospital
ships) which have night capability as well. While Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR) capability may be unwarranted, certainly a
night capable flight deck is necessary. A large portion of
aircraft maintenance is done at night in preparation for the next
day's flight schedule, therefore access to the supply and
maintenance capabilities of the T-AVBs is essential. Intermediate
level maintenance is a 24-hour-a-day operation and, while at sea
in a functional mode, the restriction of daylight hours on the
shuttling of critical aeronautical components from the beach to
the T-AVBs results in unnecessary aircraft readiness degradation.
Many OPLANS assume an average aircraft readiness rate of 90%;
this cannot realistically be achieved with this restricted flight
deck.
Second, the ten 30-ton cargo booms aboard each T-AVB
are old, slow and deteriorating.7 The booms are obviously vital to
the T-AVB mission; however their early 1960's technology, using a
"yard and stay" type system (see Appendix A, pg. A-6), is prone
to breakdown. Since these old booms are virtually extinct in the
commercial containership fleets, spare parts are no longer
manufactured or stocked. Additionally, few merchant sailors are
familiar with this type of boom, resulting in a higher incidence
of damage to both the cargo and the booms. The booms are easily
bent during on/offload operations and replacement parts can only
be obtained through cannibalization of the SS Cape Nome.8
The SS Cape Nome is the third of the four Seabridge-class
ships from which the two T-AVBs were converted. The fourth ship,
with all its potential spare parts, was sold for scrap. The SS
Cape Nome is berthed with the James River Reserve Fleet and rapidly
running out of usable parts.
The third capability deficiency involves self-defense.
While the T-AVB's concept of employment specifies that it
will be used in a "secure" port, the ever-expanding depth of
the battlefield makes the targeting of ports and rear areas
more likely than in past conflicts. Additionally, the now-
defunct Sealift Survivability Program identified the MPS,
T-AHs and T-AVBs as High-Value Targets (HVTs) as part of the
U.S. Strategic Sealift Fleet.9 The critical role the T-AVB
plays in ACE sustainment, coupled with the fact that it
operates many high-value, one-of-a kind test benches and
other assets, makes it a lucrative target. U.S. air
superiority will most likely remain free from direct
challenge by an aggressor air force in the foreseeable
future; however, an attack on vulnerable sustainment (rear)
forces could quickly dilute American airpower. The
targeting of high-value ships, such as the T-AVB, is a
logical means of equalizing the battle for the potential
aggressor. The loss of an in-theater T-AVB would severely
cripple the air operations of the ACE for an extended period
of time.
The T-AVB is a vulnerable ship. During OPERATION
DETERMINED WARRIOR, many of the ship's vulnerabilities were
identified.10 For example, it is extremely easy to board the
ship undetected through large gaps in the stern gate hinge
area and travel the entire length of the ship through a
concealed, man-sized vent plenum. Ship takeover is easily
accomplished through use of the fire-fighting system which
allows for the selective flooding of key compartments with
carbon dioxide. Both the carbon dioxide system control room
and the aft steering compartment are within 50 feet of the
stern gate, making the task of ship takeover quick and easy.
Externally, the Sealift Survivability Program identified the
greatest threats as light manned aircraft and high-speed,
small surface craft (see Appendix E).11 The ship has no
organic weapons and the embarked marines provide only a
moderate amount of small arms firepower to defend against
these threats.
Rear area security, by doctrine, is the responsibility
of the rear area units.12 Consequently, the security of the
T-AVB is the responsibility of the embarked marine Aviation
Logistics Squadron (MALS) in conjunction with the ship's
Master.13 Currently, there is no existing SOP for T-AVB
security and no specific training within the MALS for this
type of operation.
Readiness and Training Issues.
Readiness. T-AVB readiness is the responsibility of
many diverse agencies, but lacks a central coordinating or
quality control agent for the Marine Corps to inspect and ensure
the continued readiness of the ships. The maritime
Administration (MARAD) and the Military Sealift Command (MSC)
are only concerned, by charter, with the major physical plant
readiness. while physical plant readiness is currently high,
this is due in large part to the activation of both ships last
year vice alternating years as programmed.14
The ability to rapidly deploy entails many other
details such as initial outfitting items (galley and
berthing equipment, safety gear, etc.), manuals,
publications, essential equipage, and the general
maintenance of marine spaces and equipment. Each time
the ships are activated, the deploying MALS scrambles to locate
these items and get the "Marine portion" of the ship up to
habitability and safety standards. There has been some
improvement in this area. Last year after both exercises, Marine
Corps accountable items were locked into storage boxes and
placed in specific spaces; however, the T-AVBs still need an
agent, such as a "sponsor MALS" to ensure their readiness from
the Marine Corps perspective.
Another readiness issue is the lack of a Marine Corps-
wide SOP for T-AVB operations. In addition, current doctrinal
publications (NWP 22-10, FMFM 1-5) do not include employment
information on the T-AVB. While there are many
draft SOPS circulating among the Marine Aircraft Wings (MAWS), a
consolidated manual is long overdue. Much like the Marine Corps
Aviation Supply Desktop Procedures (MCO 4400.177x) and the Naval
Aviation Maintenance Program (OPNAVINST 4790.2x), a T-AVB
Operations Manual should be omnipresent in every MALS and
integrated into their training plan. Exacerbating this problem
further is the inaccurate, outdated and, in many cases, missing
T-AVB Information Manual. This Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) document has not been revised since 1986, falling
behind in documenting changes to the ship's physical plant and
operation. The lack of this documentation and an SOP for a
system as vital and complex as the T-AVB is inexcusable.
A vital readiness issue that remains unaddressed is the
use of commercial longshoremen in on/offload operations.
Essentially, the blending of military and civilian longshore
personnel in these complex, high tempo operations does not
work.15 Both marines and ship's crew have expressed concern
over the inflexibility of commercial longshoremen and their
unlikely availability in foreign ports. Even internal
maritime Administration (MARAD) documents cite the problems
longshoremen posed for the Gulf War loadout.16 Not only did
they cause a delay in the ship's departure, they were
unavailable in key ports such as Bahrain and Jubayl that
supported OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The
available longshoremen were allocated to offloading the
higher priority ground ordnance and equipment. The crucial point
is that we are continuing to assume that longshoremen will
satisfactorily handle these tasks, when experience invalidates
this assumption. The time value of the T-AVB would greatly
increase through the incorporation of a self-contained on/offload
capability consisting of a combination of ship's crew and
embarked MALS Marines.17 18 Not only are they intimately familiar
with the MF vans and ship systems, they also have a vested
interest in the speedy and safe handling of these sensitive,
high-value assets. OPERATION DETERMINED WARRIOR and AGILE
PROVIDER proved the concept of self-contained on/offload
capability works.19
The sequence to initiate the activation of the T-AVBs
(Appendix B) is unnecessarily cumbersome and results in
bureaucratic in fighting during the pre-deployment workups.
The MPS ships and the T-AHS (hospital ships) both fall
directly under the cognizance of the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) as the type commander, even during inactive
periods. The T-AVBs, on the other hand, fall under the
maritime Administration (MARAD) until such time as
activation and sea trials are complete. OPCON is then
passed to the respective MSC area commander during
embarkation, the numbered Fleet commander during transit, and
finally the CATF/CMPF upon arrival in the AOR.
Regardless of the efficiency or inefficiency of MARAD, the
additional hurdle of activating the ship through MARAD, vice
directly with MSC, lacks sufficient justification.20 In
addition, activation orders and funding flows would be
substantially streamlined by placing the T-AVBs with their
MPS sister ships directly under MSC control, rather than
have them competing for funds and attention in the common
pool of MARAD ships.
Training. The deficiency in training and experience
with the T-AVB is a serious problem, yet one which can be
greatly ameliorated within a very short time. Marine
aviation, and in particular Marine Aviation Logistics
Squadron (MALS) personnel, must be well-versed in the
employment capabilities and limitations of the T-AVB. The
aviation community is making a critical, but weak,
assumption that the T-AVB will function in the future as
advertised or in the manner that was demonstrated in the
Gulf War. Many of the advantages and workarounds enjoyed
during that conflict may be unavailable the next time. For
example, we may not have the luxury of debarking the supply
packups to the beach, or be able to reconfigure the load two
or more times upon arrival in theater. A secure port may be
unavailable, necessitating either in-stream offload or
complete operational capability offshore. The instream
offload capability has yet to be tested and experienced
seamen are skeptical of its success in anything but calm
seas.21 Only through the proper training and exercise of all
the functions required of a T-AVB in war will the Marine
Corps be able to count on the sustainment it provides.
Only a select few within the aviation logistics
community have the experience and knowledge to successfully
plan the loadout of the T-AVB. Envision a multi-dimensional
puzzle which must satisfy the competing constraints of form,
fit, function, weight/balance and power requirements (to
name a few) and you have an rough idea of the "Rubic's Cube"
process of load planning. This perishable skill is
literally an art and a science. The addition of the T-AVB
Automated Load Planning System (TALPS), essentially an
artificial intelligence/expert system, will be helpful but
still requires significant training when fielded.22 Since
each MALS is capable of deploying aboard the T-AVB, their
key operations and maintenance personnel must be trained and
practiced in this important task.
T-AVB exercises have historically been constrained by
the conflicting goals of realistic training and home-base
readiness requirements. With one set of MF vans per MALS,
it is very difficult to satisfy both goals without a
willingness on the part of the aviation commander to disrupt
the peacetime daily routine. Typically only a select few,
non-critical MF vans are loaded aboard during an exercise.
For example, supply support in the form of Peculiar
Contingency Support Packages (PCSPs) and Common Contingency
Support Packages (CCSPs) is virtually never embarked or
operated in accordance with the concept of employment.23 In
addition, the Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management
Information System (NALCOMIS) has not been employed during
activations. This system is essential to aviation
maintenance/supply communication and documentation.
Consequently, the experience of MALS automated data
processing personnel in operating aboard the T-AVB, as
designed, is minimal. The T-AVB program suffers from a lack
of full scale operation during peacetime in order to
highlight problems and elevate the operational commander's
awareness of the T-AVB's capabilities and limitations.24 If
the T-AVB were exercised according to the Marine Aviation
Logistics Support Program (MALSP) during major operational
exercises (like AGILE PROVIDER), meaningful exercise data
could be used to evaluate the ship's ability to support and
sustain the ACE according to current Defense Planning
Guidance.25 The aviation logistics community must stop
deceiving itself that T-AVB operations will go as planned
without ever truly testing the system on a regular basis.
We must train as we fight!
T-AVB exercises must include the Combat Service Support
Element (CSSE) in order to educate both aviation and ground
logisticians on the extensive coordination required in this
type of operation. Too often aviation logisticians overlook
the ground support requirements such as the vehicles and
material handling equipment needed to support a T-AVB in
both exercises and contingencies. Conversely, ground
logisticians erroneously assume the T-AVB is self-contained
and will fly parts on and off the ship.26 The Marine Wing
Support Squadron and Port Operations Group (POG)
coordination with the embarked MALS is critical to ensuring
that the T-AVB's product-repaired components--can get to
the ACE.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Funding. The decrement in modernization funding must be
continually challenged and reversed if the T-AVB is to have the
ability to safely and effectively provide support to the ACE.
Eight of the top ten priority ship alterations are directly
related to safety and survivability (see
Appendix E).27 The remaining two items are mission essential
-- the satellite tracking antenna and the IMA electrical upgrade.
Continued aggressive sponsor intervention in the Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) and budget submissions, mid-year
reviews and Navy Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) markups is required. At
the same time, the marine Corps aviation leadership must be
sensitized to this vital issue. Another suggestion might be to
emphasize the association of the T-AVB program with MPS and reap
some of the "halo effect" of MPS funding.
Helo Deck. Despite the modernization funding
shortfall, the addition of a night-capable flight deck must
be explored further. The last available modification cost
estimate for both a night and IFR capable deck modifications
was $126,000/per ship.28 Without IFR capability, the cost of adding
deck edge lighting, etc., should be considerably less. A day
limited ship of this importance is inconsistent with
expeditionary warfare doctrine.
Cargo Booms. The ideal solution to this problem, albeit
expensive, would be to replace the ten booms with four modern
twin-pedestal cargo cranes (Haaglunds), such as those used on the
MPS ships.29 Not only are these cranes more reliable, but are
typically twice as fast as the current T-AVB booms. Another, but
less expensive, alternative would be to contract for the
manufacture of specific high failure rate boom components in
order to build a spares pool. While a poor investment in old,
failing technology, it may be the only feasible solution. Either
way, the boom issue is one which demands action now prior to
exhausting all spares. The bottom line is that without the booms
operational, the T-AVB cannot loadout and deploy.
Self-Defense. Assuming that the Sealift Survivability
Program will not be reestablished, the Marine Corps should
conduct a formal risk assessment of the T-AVBs to confirm
the vulnerabilities uncovered during both the Gulf War and
OPERATION DETERMINED WARRIOR. Additionally, each MALS
should establish the core of a T-AVB security force and
train these Marines in ship defense and clearing skills.
Organic MALS personnel, with the addition of one MOS 0369
(Infantry) Gunnery Sergeant for weapons employment and
tactics coordination, can handle the security needs of the T-AVB.
The security mission does create additional personnel overhead,
but is consistent with doctrine and a worthwhile investment. The
development of an SOP regarding security that will establish the
procedures and coordination required between the ship's crew and
the embarked marines is essential. For example, the Commander of
Troops (COT) and the ship's master must concur and coordinate
weapons use and the various levels of alert.30 To augment the
limited organic firepower of the MALS, the addition of crew
served weapons such as the M-1 (.50 cal) machinegun and the
attachment of a Stinger missile team should greatly increase the
survivability of the T-AVB against the most likely threats.31
MALS T-AVB Training, Maintenance, Security and Sail
(TMS2)Teams. Obviously, not all marines in each MALS can
be experienced in T-AVB operations. The most efficient
means of ensuring deployment readiness in each MALS is to
develop a small cadre of planners, boom operators, security
force personnel, and MF van maintenance experts from which
to train and build from in the event of a contingency.
Formalized as an additional duty under the cognizance of the
MALS S-3, personnel from this cadre would attend
conferences, participate in, observe exercises, and
periodically train aboard the ship. The establishment of
the TMS2 Teams will ensure that each MALS has a base of
experience for T-AVB operations, instead of the few
dedicated Marines scattered throughout the aviation
logistics community.
MALS Sponsorship Program (MSP). Acting as a quality
control agent, each year one MALS (or a pair) should be
tasked with the oversight (sponsorship) of their respective
T-AVB as part of an MSP. During periodic visits during the
year, the oversight MALS would inspect, clean, inventory and
improve marine spaces as well as coordinate with the
civilian retention crew on other readiness issues. The
sponsor MALS TMS2 Team would be responsible for validating
SOPs, updating the T-AVB Information Manual, and
coordinating all exercises during their year. The best way
to gain exposure and training, as well as guard marine Corps
interests in the T-AVBs, is to get each MALS actively
engaged instead of the limited number of "expert MALS" that
currently exist.
Publish an SOP. Consolidate the various draft SOPs and
the Navy publications into an FMFM on T-AVB Operations.
This document must be scrubbed for compatibility with Marine
Corps and Navy doctrine and be reviewed by each Marine
Aircraft Wing (MAW). Additionally, the publication would be
updated, as necessary, after each exercise and validated by
the sponsor MALS annually. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
(HQMC) should task the sponsor MALS to accomplish this
validation.
Training. The importance of realistic training of each
MALS with the T-AVB cannot be overemphasized. When the MAWs
participate in a major or joint exercise, the Training
Exercise and Employment Plan (TEEP) should reflect the
employment of the T-AVB as the source of ACE sustainment.
At the same time, educate Navy and Marine leadership on the
potent logistics capabilities inherent in the T-AVB, with
emphasis on its interoperability with other sustainment
forces in theater. Utilization will not only increase
experience and exposure, but also help justify funding
support for the program.
The extent of participation by the host MALS in
exercises must increase so that the T-AVB is the source of
sustainment for the ACE and not "gamed" through repeated
trips ashore for repaired parts. Load what is needed and
operate as if there was no facility ashore from which to
draw assets. Exercise the offload of the Intermediate
Maintenace Activity (IMA) via lighterage. Supply should
embark the appropriate material for support (PCSPs and
CCSPs) and embark the communication and documentation
systems, NALCOMIS. Aviation supply personnel must become
comfortable with T-AVB operations and employ their full
capabilities in support of the IMA. All MALS workcenters
should be housed and operating in MF vans, even at home
base, so that they are ready to simply shut the doors and
deploy. Too often they retreat to the comfort of a
warehouse or hangar. In addition, develop a self-contained
on/offload capability with MALS marines as boom operators.
T-AVB training without the ship can be accomplished
through use of the Combined Arms Staff Trainer (CAST). This
CAST is a facility for tactical wargaming containing rooms,
communication equipment, and "gameboards" to accommodate
most scenarios. The sequencing of loading, unloading and
CSSE interface can easily be made into a scenario for MALS
and Port Operations Group (POG) personnel to practice. The
CAST was used for the rehearsal of OPERATION DETERMINED
WARRIOR with great success.32 The coordination of cargo
booms, ground assets and the loading sequence can be
effectively gamed with scale mock-ups and ship drawings.
Finally, each MALS TMS2 Team should undergo a MCCRESS-
type evaluation of loading out their unit aboard the T-AVB. This
could involve some loading aboard the ship or strictly be a CAST
evaluation. The evaluation aboard ship could include such events
as a boom operator proficiency test, the generation of a viable
load plan and security force drills. An evaluated event of this
type, every other year for example, is the only true incentive
to drive a realistic T-AVB training program. The MALS must be
ready to deploy and know how to efficiently and effectively
employ their capabilities -- a contingency focus.
Streamline Activation Chain. The T-AVBs belong
directly under the Military Sealift Command (MSC), just like
the MPS and T-AHs. Having ADCON remain with one agency during
both inactive and active periods facilitates readiness.
Additionally, the T-AVB activation would be faster and smoother
with one less bureaucracy involved. To further streamline the
process, each MARFOR should have an "emergency breakout book",
which would contain pre-formatted letters, orders and funding
documents. Only essential appropriation sub-heads and dates would
have to be filled in. This would take much of the mystery out of
the who, what, when and where of activation.
The Future. The T-AVBs are scheduled, according to CNO (Code
N422C) to be stricken in 2008. There has been no design work or
formal analysis done to develop the follow-on T-AVB. Given the
length of the POM process, engineering work and construction
time, HQMC (ASL) should begin as soon as possible on an initial
concept which incorporates the latest in containership
technology. The follow-on T-AVB may not have to be new from the
keel up. The conversion of a variety of ships, such as a Roll
On/Roll Off (RO/RO) ship, may work well. The new plant should be
diesel-electric vice steam for greater reliability and less
breakout time.33 Finally, the current T-AVBs could be re-engined
and re-craned--a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)--if found to
be more economical.
CONCLUSION
Airpower provides the majority of the heavy firepower
of the MEF, playing a pivotal role in virtually all battlefield
activities. This tremendous capability, however, can only remain
viable past 30 days in a contingency or combat environment with
the support of the T-AVB. Potent, rapid, and mobile logistics is
not only a force multiplier, but is wholly compatible with the
flexible force concept engendered in the "From the Sea..."
doctrine. The T-AVB provides flexibility and speed; it can
transport the Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) to the
theater, repair components enroute/at sea, offload ashore to
operate, and even retrograde and move in support of the scheme
of maneuver. The vulnerability of the IMA would be much greater
if flown in or delivered by commercial containership to the
theater, simply because of the IMA's immobility. The T-AVB
provides mobility and uninterrupted support while on the move --
something few logistics systems can accomplish.
The success of the T-AVB in the Gulf War proved the
concept was correct; however, there were many workarounds
and extraordinary efforts that made it possible.34 In the
warm afterglow of success, many programs suffer from a loss
of momentum. The T-AVB is no exception. It's time to fix
the problems and validate the lessons learned from that
conflict. Is the aviation logistics community, in
conjunction with marine aviation leadership, ready to step
up and save the program from this benign neglect? Or are we
willing to assume that the T-AVB will be ready, work as
advertised in modes yet untested, and not place our Marines at
risk? The T-AVB is far from just another containership; its
operation is complex, dangerous and involves a number of
perishable skills. Without proper funding, training, and
aggressive sponsorship, the program will wither from apathy.
marine aviation must come to the realization that the T-AVB is as
essential to the air campaign as MPS equipment is to the Ground
Combat Element (GCE) and CSSE.
The sky is not falling. Many of the issues and concerns
expressed in this paper can be solved simply through additional
attention and training. A coordinated, proactive program
strategy, coupled with vigorous exercises and leadership
attention can ensure that the T-AVB will meet expectations in the
future. To be smug over past success and make sweeping
assumptions is an invitation to disaster.
Logistics is not glorious - but then neither would be
the impact of not having adequate, sustained air support.
ENDNOTES
1. Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC Code ASL-36)
Information Paper ASL 36/TAVBPPP, subject: "Aviation
Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB) Program," 25 May 1993.
2. CMC (ASL-36), "Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB)
Program"
3. Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-1, Organization and
Function of Marine Aviation (Washington, DC: Department of
the Navy, October 1991), 2-12.
4. Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare,
(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, March 1994), 67.
5. Michael J. Krebsbach, LCDR, USN, "CNO (N422C) FY 96
Budget Review," brief presented at MCAS Cherry Point, NC, 19
September 1994.
6. Krebsbach brief.
7. William J. Abernathy, Master Mariner (U.S.). Interview
by author, 3 February 1995. Captain Abernathy was Master of
the SS CURTISS during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
and has also commanded the SS WRIGHT. He has deployed with
both ships in every exercise since the Gulf War.
8. Abernathy interview.
9. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting Requirements
Branch, Security Analysis for MPS and T-AVB Ships, August
1991, 2.
10. Joseph F. Buranosky, LtCol, USMC and Curtis J. Powell,
Maj, USMC, "Operation DETERMINED WARRIOR: A Winning
Opportunity for Training", Marine Corps Gazette, December
1994, 71.
11. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Security Analysis for
MPS and T-AVB Ships, 17.
12. William F. Stringer, Major, USMC, "MET Rear Area
Operations," lecture presented at the U.S. Marine Corps
Command and Staff College, 19 January 1995.
13. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Security Analysis for
MPS and T-AVB Ships, 9.
14. Abernathy interview.
15. Abernathy interview.
16. Leonard Walsh, General Engineer, Maritime Administration
memorandum to file, subject: "INFORMATION: T-AVB CURTISS DESERT
SHIELD Activation Report," 6 September 1990.
17. Abernathy interview.
18. Buranosky and Powell, 71.
19. R. G. Cox, Major, USMC and B. Anderson, Major, USMC
"After Action Reports from Operation DETERMINED WARRIOR and
AGILE PROVIDER," brief presented at T-AVB TRANSALT/Planning
Conference, MCAS Cherry Point, NC, 19 September 1994.
20. A reliable source who wishes to remain anonymous.
21. Abernathy interview.
22. Steven S. Choate, Captain, USMC, TALPS Project Officer at
the Naval Aviation Maintenance Office (NAMO 414-1) Patuxent
River, MD, telephone interview by author, 10 February 1995.
23. James Sasser, Major, USMC, CMC (Code ASL-36) T-AVB Program
Officer, telephone interview by author, 18 January 1995.
24. Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC Code ASL) message to
COMMARFORPAC and COMMARFORPAC, subject: "T-AVB Exercise,"
240002Z Jan 1995.
25. CMC (Code ASL) message 240002Z Jan 1995.
26. Abernathy interview.
27. James Sasser, Major, USMC, "T-AVB TRANSALT/Planning
Conference," draft memorandum, 20 January 1995, enclosure (3).
28. Michael P. Flowers, Major, USMC, "T-AVB
TRANSALT/Planning Conference," memorandum, 1 November 1994,
enclosure (4).
29. Abernathy interview.
30. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Security Analysis for
MPS and T-AVB Ships, 10.
31. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Security Analysis for
MPS and T-AVB Ships, 20.
32. Buranosky and Powell, 70.
33. Abernathy interview.
34. Abernathy interview.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abernathy, William J. Master Mariner (U.S.). Master of SS
CURTISS during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
and each T-AVB exercise since. Interview by author 3
February 1995.
Buranosky, Joseph F. LtCol., USMC, and Maj. Curtis J.
Powell, USMC. "Operation DETERMINED WARRIOR: A Winning
Opportunity for Training," Marine Corps Gazette,
December 1994, 67-72.
Chief of Naval Operations. Draft Instruction 3501.202A.
Subject: "Required Operational Capabilities and
Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE) for the
Aviation Logistics Support Ship (TAVB)." May 1993.
Choate, Steven S. Capt., USMC, TALPS Project Officer at the
Naval Aviation maintenance office (NAMO 414-1) Patuxent
River, MD. Telephone interview by author, 10 February
1995.
Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC Code ASL). Message to
COMMARFORPAC and COMMARFORLANT. Subject: "T-AVB
Exercise." 240002Z Jan 1995.
Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC Code ASL-36).
Information Paper. ASL-36/TAVBPPP. Subject: "Aviation
Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB) Program." 25 May 1993.
Cox, R. G. Maj., USMC and Maj. B. Anderson, USMC. "After
Action Reports from operation DETERMINED WARRIOR and
AGILE PROVIDER." Briefing presented at the T-AVB
TRANSALT/Planning Conference, MCAS Cherry Point, NC, 19
September 1994.
Department of the Navy. Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM)
4-1: Combat Service Support. Washington, DC: GPO,
1993. PCN 139 000273 00.
Department of the Navy. Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM)
5-1: Organization and Function of Marine Aviation.
Washington, DC: GPO, 1991. PCN 139 000354 00.
Department of the Navy. Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP)
1: Naval Warfare. Washington, DC: GPO, 1994. SN
070OLP0000100.
Department of the Navy. T-AVB Information Manual.
Washington, DC: Naval Sea Systems Command, 1986.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(con't)
Flowers, Michael P., Maj., USMC. Memorandum. Subject:
"T-AVB TRANSALT/Planning Conference." 1 November 1994.
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting Requirements
Branch. Security Analysis for MPS and T-AVB Ships.
Study. August 1991.
Krebsbach, Michael J. LCDR., USN. "CNO (N422C) FY 96 Budget
Review." Briefing presented at the T-AVB
RANSALT/Planning Conference, MCAS Cherry Point, NC, 19
September 1994.
Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS), database.
Lessons learned numbers: 92718 73574, 42431-89765,
52350-79696, and 30576-61990. Quantico, VA.
Downloaded 3 February 1995.
Naval Surface Warfare Development Group. Draft TACMEMO OH
5-82. Subject: "Aviation Logistics Ship (T-AVB)
Employment." February 1994.
Sasser, James, Maj., USMC, T-AVB, Program Officer (CMC Code
ASL-36). Telephone interview by author, 18 January 1995.
Sasser, James, Maj., USMC, T-AVB Program Officer (CMC Code
ASL-36). Draft memorandum. Subject: "T-AVB
TRANSALT/Planning Conference." 20 January 1995.
Sims, William H. Initial Activation of West Coast T-AVB.
CNA Research Memorandum 90-3. Alexandria, VA: The
Center for Naval Analyses, April 1990.
Stringer, William F. Maj., USMC. "MET Rear Area
Operations." Lecture presented at the U.S. Marine
Corps Command and Staff College, MCB Quantico, VA, 19
January 1995.
Third Marine Aircraft Wing. Draft Wing Order P3125.1.
Subject: "Third Marine Aircraft Wing (3D MAW) Aviation
Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB) Standard Operating
Procedures (Short Title: T-AVB SOP)." 7 October 1992.
Walsh, Leonard, General Engineer, Maritime Administration.
Memorandum to file. Subject: "INFORMATION: T-AVB
CURTISS DESERT SHIELD Activation Report." 6 September
1990.
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APPENDIX B
T-AVB ACTIVATION SEQUENCE
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
JCS provides force options to the National Command
Authorities for direction and guidance. Among these options
is the MAGTF ACE Commander's request (via the MEF) for the
T-AVB.
The Unified Commanders, based on JCS guidance, are
responsible for the planning and employment of forces within
their Area of Responsibility (AOR). The Fleet Commander-in
Chief (FLTCINC) Naval Component Commander exercises
operational control (OPCON) of the T-AVB and initiates the
activation process.
The Commander, Military Sealift Command (COMSC) is the
type commander for the T-AVB. Upon receipt of the
activation order via the chain of command addressed above,
COMSC orders the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to activate
the vessel.
MARAD uses the retention crew (civilian U. S. Merchant
Marine) and local shipyard to reactivate ship systems in
preparation to get underway. The T-AVB readiness status,
ROS-5, means that once systems are brought on-line, the ship
sails to conduct sea trials and must arrive at the Sea Port
of Embarkation (SPOE) within 5 days.
Change of operational control (CHOP) from MARAD to MSC
occurs upon successful completion of sea trials. MARAD
continues to crew and operate the T-AVB, receiving orders
from the respective MSC Area Commander.
After the embarkation phase and during transit, OPCON of
the T-AVB shifts to the appropriate numbered Fleet Commander
even though the T-AVB can steam independently. ADCON is
retained by the MSC Area Commander.
The T-AVB, upon arrival in the AOR, CHOPs to the
Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), MAGTF Commander, or
Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force (CMPF), as
applicable.
Source: OH 5-82 COMNAVSURFWARDBVGRU TACMEM0, "Aviation Logistics
Support Ship T-AVB) Employment" (Draft)
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