The Survival Of The Fourth Air Force: Challenges To Marine Fighter/Attack
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CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Survival of
the Fourth Air Force: Challenges to Marine Fighter/Attack Aviation
Author: Major John E. Ostrom, United
States Marine Corps
Research Question: This paper examines the
historical precedence and
contemporary
justification for maintaining Marine fighter/attack aviation in this era
of
budgetary austerity.
Discussion: Throughout its history,
Marine aviation has had to confront repeated
allegations
that Marine aviation in general, and Marine fighter/attack aviation in
particular,
is a profitless redundancy within the American military. The "Fourth
Air Force" is a term which refers to the
perception that the United States maintains
four
separate, and therefore redundant, air forces. Marine fighter/attack aviation
usually
receives the dubious distinction of being labeled the fourth air force. This
paper
examines Marine fighter/attack aviation, specifically with reference to the
challenges it has had to face. It traces the history of Marine aviation as a
whole, from its beginnings with the intent of establishing Marine
fighter/attack aviation's purpose and utility to the Marine Corps mission and
the nation. Ultimately, it examines the credibility of maintaining Marine
aviation. The survival of Marine fighter/attack aviation, past, present, and
future, is then the specific issue that this paper discusses, and broader
perspectives are explored as they relate to that survival.
Thesis: This paper
argues that there are not four separate air forces within the U.S.
military,
that Marine fighter/attack aviation is integral to the mission of the Marine
Corps,
and
that Marine fighter/attack aviation is not redundant, but instead is a unique
and vital
element
of American air power.
Introduction
Whenever
America has been at war, questions about redundancy and
duplication within our military services have dissipated in the wake of
a desire to be
victorious with a minimum loss of American life. In peacetime, however,
when it is
always easier to imagine that the next war may never happen, the
financial and moral
price tag of a large, standing military is an undesirable burden. The
American people's
desire to realize a "peace
dividend" after our major wars has often caused mutilation of
our military, but it has always caused us to raise the budget ax and go
in search of
redundancy.
The "Fourth Air
Force" is a term which refers to the perception that the United
States maintains four separate air forces. The term implies redundancy
and waste, so is
most often used in the rhetoric surrounding excessive force structure
costs. The four air
forces referred to are represented by the U.S. Air Force, the Army
rotary wing force,
Navy aviation, and Marine Corps aviation. Of these four, the Marine
Corps normally
receives the dubious distinction as the "Fourth Air Force",
for two reasons. First, the
Marine Corps is the smallest of the four. Second, Marine aviation is
itself a subset of
Naval aviation, which looks suspiciously redundant even within the
Department of the
Navy. Upon closer examination, one would find that it is specifically
the fighter/attack
assets within Marine aviation that are the real target of the Fourth
Air Force arguments,
and it is these assets the Marine Corps is called upon most frequently
to justify.
In order to avoid
confusion, it is useful to distinguish among Naval aviation, Navy
aviation, and Marine aviation. Naval aviation is the overarching
aviation organization of
the Department of the Navy,
under which both Navy and Marine aviation reside as
independent entities. Marine
aviation is not subordinate to Navy aviation, but rather is
an equal partner in Naval aviation.
This distinction is important in examining the development of Marine
aviation. For example, there is a
common mis-perception that all of Marine aircraft are purchased by the Navy.
The truth is that all Navy and Marine aircraft are purchased by the department
of the Navy, and each service chief must independently justify his aviation
requirements to the Secretary and Congress. This is not to suggest that there
is not a deep and abiding relationship between Marine and Navy aviation, only
that the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) does not own Marine aviation.
This paper intends to
examine Marine fighter/attack aviation, specifically with
reference to the challenges it has had to face. Due to the emerging and
divergent aviation technologies of the time, Marine fighter/attack aviation
became a specialization within Marine aviation prior to World War II. To
accomplish this examination, this paper will trace the history of Marine
aviation as a whole, from its beginnings, with the intent of
establishing Marine fighter/attack aviation's purpose and utility to
the Marine Corps mission and the nation. Ultimately, it will examine the
credibility of maintaining Marine aviation. The survival of Marine
fighter/attack aviation, past, present, and future, is then the specific issue
that this paper intends to discuss, and broader perspectives will be explored
as they relate to that survival.
Lastly, this paper argues that there are not four separate air forces within
the U.S. military, that Marine fighter/attack aviation is integral to the
mission of the Marine Corps, and that Marine fighter/attack aviation is not
redundant, but instead is a unique and vital element of American air power.
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
Introduction ii-iii
Table of Contents
iv
Chapter 1: The
Beginnings and World War I, 1912-1918 1 Chapter 2: The Inter-War
Years and World War II, 1919-1945 11
Chapter 3:
Post World War II and Korea, 1945-1953 25
Chapter 4: The
Troubled Coexistence and Vietnam, 1953-1970 35
Chapter 5: Post
Vietnam and The Gulf War, 1970-1991 43
Chapter 6: 1991-1995
and Into The Future 57
Chapter 7: The
Differences of Marine Aviation 65
Chapter
8: The Unending Battle For
Marine Fighter/Attack Aviation 76
Bibliography 84
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CHAPTER 1
The Beginnings
The traditional
mission of the Marine Corps, until the late 19th century, was to provide
shipboard security and light infantry for landing or boarding parties. In 1881,
the Navy began to benefit from the forward thinkers who were causing a
renaissance in Naval doctrine, weaponry, and organization. Among these forward
thinkers was Alfred Thayer Mahan, who advanced the thesis that national power
and prosperity required expansion of foreign commerce. Since American
psychology chaffed at the idea of achieving this through colonization, Mahan's
approach was to advocate the creation of a large merchant fleet protected by an
equally large and technologically advanced Naval fleet. The Navy embraced the
idea of these new ships, but with the recognition that the current "riffraff"
which made up the Navy enlisted force was unsuitable (Navy practice for crewing
its vessels had been to simply scour the docks for able-bodied seamen prior to sailing).
What was now required was that the sailors be highly educated, selfreliant and
American citizens. To most senior Navy officers, the new type of sailor not
only precluded the requirement for Marine guards to oversee the crews, but also
suggested that the Marine presence actually had a negative impact on morale and
development of the new Navy. This popular opinion posed a significant threat to
the Marine's shipboard mission, and therefore to the very survival of the
Corps. Congress might have eventually dissolved the Marine Corps if it hadn't
been for a fortuitous misstep by then President Theodore Roosevelt.1
Sympathetic
to the insistence by a group of senior naval officers that
Marines should be removed from Navy ships, Roosevelt issued an
Executive Order removing the Marines in 1908. Congress, who arguably hadn't
given the Marine
Corps a second thought in recent years, disdained
the president's right to infringe
on what they considered to be Congressional prerogative. Congress
challenged the Executive Order, eventually won, and Marines were placed back
aboard ship. The unintentional result was that the Marine Corps and its
relationship to the Navy
were bought back into the public and Congressional eyes. The Marine Corps
needed a mission that supported the recent changes in the Navy mission.
Ironically, the new Navy ships that threatened the
traditional roles and missions of
the Marine Corps provided the answer.
The new Navy ships were fast and
powerful, but they were also
fuel hungry. It became apparrent that
advance naval
bases" became a likely Marine mission.
As the requirement to perform this
mission began to emerge, some began to see the potential benefit of the emerging
technology known as aviation.2
1912-1918
The
official birth of Marine aviation is 22 May 1912. It was on this date
that the first Marine Aviator, 1st Lieutenant Alfred Austell Cunningham
reported
to the Aviation Training Camp at Annapolis, Maryland. Lt. Cunningham was
ordered to Annapolis for "duty in connection with Aviation", by Major
General
Commandant William P. Biddle.3
By the time Cunningham
received his orders to Annapolis, he had already
established himself as an avid proponent of Marine Aviation, and his
force of
personality would continue to positively impact the growth and survival
of Marine
air until well after World War I (WW I). Cunningham began his Marine career as
an infantry officer. In 1911, he was assigned to the Advance Base
School at the
Philadelphia Navy Yard, and organization that was
charged with developing the
doctrinal, logistical, and tactical solutions too problems associated
with the new
Advance Base mission. Philadelphia was also the hub of civilian aviation
experimentation. Cunningham,
who had always had a keen interest in the subject,
began to see the potential aviation offered to the Advance Base
Mission.4
Cunningham
joined the civilian Aero Club in
Philadelphia. As his
enthusiasm for aviation grew, he deliberately developed close
associations within
the city's social and political elite.
These associations provide a forum for him to
suggest the advantages to the community of locating a Marine air base
there.
Whether Cunningham's efforts directly affected the
Commandant's decision to
develop aviation for the advance base mission cannot be
determined. However,
Cunningham was twice called into the Commandant's
presence to explain his part
in the political pressures the Commandant was receiving from
Philadelphia
favoring Marine aaviation.5
Regardless, Commandant Biddle (possibly to get rid of
him) assigned Cunningham to flight training with Navy at Annapolis
which
established him as the first Marine aviator, and more importantly,
established
Marine aviation's close association with Naval
aviation. This relationship has
remained an integral aspect of Marine aviation's personality and
flexibility ever
since. By the end of 1912
Commandant Biddle reported:
"In view of
the great benefit to the Advance Base Force
that might
result from trained aviators, two officers
and one man
of the Marine Corps have been under
instruction
in aviation at the United States Naval
Academy,
Annapolis, Maryland, and it is hoped that
during the
coming year this number may be
considerably
increased."6
As Marine
aviator number one, Cunningham acted as the de facto head of
Marine aviation throughout its early years. In 1913, he participated as the only
Marine on the "Chambers Board", which the Navy convened to draw up "a
comprehensive plan for the organization of a Naval aeronautical
service".7 In
addition to Navy recommendation, the Chambers Board supported the
creation of
a Marine section of six aircraft as an advance bases group,
shore-based.
Additionally the board recommended that a Marine
officer be appointed as a
member of the staff of the new Director of Naval Aviation.8 The
implementation
of the board's recommendations was slow, but had the effect of
permanently
establishing Marine aviation's part in Naval Aviation as well as its
distinctly unique
mission characteristic (i.e., shore based Naval aviation).
From
1913 to 1917, all three services (Army, Navy, and Marines), were
investigating the tactical possibilities of aviation. The Marines contributed
significantly with their enthusiasm and innovative approach to
aviation, and by
finding opportunities to experiment in fleet exercises. In January
1914, the Marine section of the Naval Flying School embarked aboard the USS
Hancock for
transport to Puerto Rico, where it would join the newly created Advance
Base
Brigade in the annual Atlantic Fleet exercises. The
exercise was designed to test
the Marine Corps ability to occupy an advance base and hold it against
hostile
attack. The aviators operated with the brigade throughout the exercise,
flying
primarily scout and reconnaissance missions. During the exercise, a
Marine
aircraft flown by 1st Lt. B. L. Smith (Marine aviator number 2)
conducted
simulated attack runs on two Navy Battleships from above 5000 feet.
This altitude placed the aircraft above the ship's defensive guns. 1st Lt.
Smith declared that this demonstrated the possibility of using airplanes, armed
with high explosive bombs,
for advance base defense. Smith also recommended in the exercise after
action
report that the new Marine troop transport, then under construction, be
equipped
to carry and launch at least one aircraft, thus foreshadowing the later
evolution of
the Marine air-ground team.9
Despite these
accomplishments, the Marine aviation section was disbanded
upon its return from Puerto Rico, its assets and personnel integrated
with the
Navy. Apparently, there was still considerable pessimism concerning aviation
among the military leadership. In fact, aviation in general did not
enjoy the
popular support of the upper leadership prior to WW I, due in part to
the frailty
and unreliability of the early aircraft. It was only the undying
enthusiasm of those
directly connected to aviation that kept the community moving forward.
Between 1915 and 1916,
Marines practiced and experimented with the Navy,
developing tactics for anti-submarine patrolling, bombing, and
artillery spotting.
Marines participated in the first catapult launches
from Naval ships. In August
1915, an agreement between Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels and
the
Army Signal Corps allowed Marine aviators to begin
training in land planes at the
Signal Corps aviation school (Navy/Marine aircraft to this point being
seaplanes).
Daniels had made this arrangement in the belief that the defense of
advance bases,
and in the case of Marines, possible joint operations with the Army,
required an
aviation force able to operate from either land or water.10 This had
the effect of
establishing Marine Aviation as the service which would cover the seam
between
the Navy's over-water aviation and the Army's over-land aviation. Most
significantly, this special status was apparently agreeable to both the
Navy and the Army.
The Congress played a
curiously uncharacteristic role in the development of
aviation during this period. They did not involve themselves in the
inter service
discussion on aviation roles and missions. Perhaps aviation was so new
that they
had insufficient information to anticipate the potential impact. By
late 1916,
President Woodrow Wilson called for a large scale
expansion of the Army and
Navy, anticipating the possibility of war with Germany. In the Naval
Appropriations Act of 29 August 1916, Congress
provided $3,500,000 for aircraft
and equipment, and authorized a permanent Naval Flying Corps of 150
officers and
350 enlisted above the previous legal personnel
strengths. The Act also provided
for the creation of Naval and Marine Corps Reserve, including an
aviation reserve.
For unknown reasons, the Naval Bureau opposed a permanent flying corps, and
prevented its creation. The reserves, however, grew rapidly.11
By
the end of 1916, U.S. participation in WW I seemed inevitable. By
sending Marines to aviation training since 1912, the Commandant made it
clear that
he intended to include aviation as an element of his Advance Base
Force. With war
approaching, the Commandant announced his intention to establish a
"Marine
Aviation Company for duty with the Advance Base Force," at
"as early a date as
practical." He further envisioned the company would incorporate
both land and
seaplanes.12 On 26 February 1917, Capt. Alfred Cunningham received
orders to
begin organizing an aviation company for the Advance Base Force.
WORLD WAR I
Upon the U.S.
declaration of war with Germany in April 1917, Cunningham
became the driving force behind an effort to build and deploy a Marine
aviation
contingent to fight in France. The Army staked out bombing and ground
attack for
itself, making it clear that it did not want Navy interference in over
land aviation.
In response, the Navy pursued anti-submarine warfare as a mission for
its aviation.
Cunningham saw the anti-submarine mission as a method to gain support
for a
rapid build-up and deployment, but at the same time his reports to the
Commandant expressed concern that Marine aviators should fly in support
of their
fellow Marines on the ground. This caused Commandant Barnett to
successfully
seek authorization to develop a second Marine aviation unit (with land
planes) to
fly reconnaissance and artillery spotting missions for the Marine
Brigade bound for
France.13 Cunningham aggressively pursued the manning and equipping of
this
second unit. Marine aviation became the first American flying unit to
deploy to
combat when on January 9,1918 the First Marine Aviation Company
deployed to
the Azores to conduct anti-submarine patrols.
Cunningham's
deployment of the Second Marine Aviation Company (the
land plane squadron) to France met with significant difficulty, and
once again Cunningham's force of personality played a major role in the
ultimately successful deployment of the unit to combat. The first hurdle was
the Army's refusal to
allow the Marines an over land mission. On his own, Cunningham proposed
to the General Board of the Navy a plan which called for the Second Aviation
Company's deployment to bomb the German submarine pens in France. The Board
approved
the formation of the "Northern Bombing Group" for that
purpose in February
1918, and authorized the formation of four Marine Aviation squadrons.
Continually dodging Army challenges to the deployment of the Marines, and
responding to
multiple variations from the Navy as to the specific missions of his
unit,
Cunningham was finally able to deploy the four
aviation squadrons to France as
the 1st Marine Aviation Force on July 30, 1918.14
The
successful arrival in France did not end the difficulties for the 1st
Marine Aviation Force, for the Marine's aircraft
were mis-directed in shipping and
did not arrive with them in France. Cunningham again demonstrated his
innovative zeal by bargaining with the British. The British had a pilot
shortage,
and the Marines had an aircraft shortage. While the solution was easy,
gaining
approval was not, but Cunningham persisted until Marines were flying
British
aircraft. Additionally, Cunningham was able to trade extra aircraft
engines (which
had arrived from America) for engine-less British aircraft and procured
enough
aircraft to begin the first U.S. flight operations.15
The
First Aviation Force didn't begin operating as a unit until September of
1918, and the armistice was signed on November 11th of that year. In
this short
period of time, they flew primarily strategic and direct support
bombing missions
for French and British troops. The Marines flew the first aerial
re-supply mission
in history, delivering 2,600 pounds of food and supplies to a
surrounded French
regiment. During their portion of the conflict, the Marines had
confirmed 4
German aircraft shot down, with an additional 8
claimed. Two Congressional
Medals of Honor were awarded to Marine aviators in WW I. Through no
fault of
their own, the 1st Marine Aviation Force was never allowed the
opportunity to fly
support mission with the U.S. Marine Brigade on the ground.16
Summary
Marine aviation developed
because of the potential it offered to the newly
acquired Marine Corps expeditionary mission. Additionally, Marine aviation
was established from the outset as an extension of Naval aviation, in much the
same
way that the Marine Corps itself was an extension of the Navy. The
important
distinction was that the Department of the Navy had not created two
independent
air forces, but one air force with a portion designated to cover the
seam between
over water and over land operations. Throughout this early period,
Marines were
at the forefront of aviation development, despite the fact that Marine
aviation was constantly confronted by challenges to its survival. In combat,
Marine aviation had proven its utility to the national interest. However, not
being allowed to directly
support ground Marines would have a lasting effect on the ultimate
acceptance of aviation as part of the Marine Corps.
Chapter I
Notes
1 Lieutenant Colonel
Kenneth J. Clifford, USMCR, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History Of The United
States Marine Corps, 1900-1970,
(Washington
D.C.: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1973), p. 1-5
2
Clifford, p. 1-24
3 Commandant William P. Biddle to Alfred
Austell Cunningham, 16 May 1912, Cunningham
Papers (PC-49) Personal Papers Collection, Marine Corps
Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
4 Graham A. Cosmas and Edward C,
Johnson, Marine
Aviation: The Early Years 1912-1940
(Washington D.C.: History and Museums Division, Marine Corps Headquarters, 1977) p.
1-2
5
Cosmas, p. 3-4
6
Annual Report of the Major General Commandant to
SecNav for Fiscal Year 1912, (Marine Corps Historical Center, Aviation File) p.
12
7
C. L. Lord, The History of Naval Aviation, 1898-1939,
(Marine Corps Historical Center, Aviation File) p. 101
8 Peter B. Mersky, U.S. Marine Corps
Aviation 1912 to the Present (Baltimore Maryland: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America,
1983),
p. 4
9 Cosmas, p. 7
10 Cosmas, p. 9
11 Cosmas, p. 9
12
Cosmas, p. 10. From the Major General Commandant's
Annual Report to the
SecNav for Fiscal Year 1916.
13 Mersky, p. 7
14 Mersky, p. 9
15
Mersky, p. 10
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1919-1940
The end of the first
World War (the "War to end all wars") brought about a
massive demobilization in America. During 1919, all the services were
engaged in
a desperate struggle to persuade Congress to maintain at least their
pre-war
strengths. Still under the leadership of Alfred Cunningham, Marine
aviation
found itself confronted with the possibility that they may not survive
at all.
Cunningham fought for permanent status for Marine aviation, but labored
under
the disadvantage that he had neither permanent bases nor facilities nor
precedent
for peacetime strength and organization.1
In addition to
Cunningham's struggle for Congressional acceptance, he was confronted by a
challenge which has complicated Marine aviation's survival
throughout its history, namely, acceptance within the Marine Corps. In
September
1920, Cunningham published an article in the Marine Corps Gazette. His
words
will sound familiar even to present day Marine aviators.
"One of the greatest handicaps which Marine Corps
Aviation must now overcome is a combination of
doubt as to usefulness, lack
of sympathy, and a feeling
on the part of some line
officers that aviators and
aviation enlisted men are
not real Marines. We look
upon the first two
criticisms complacently, knowing
that we can abundantly prove
our usefulness even to
the most skeptical, and that
when we have done so, we
will receive the sympathy
and hearty support of all
Marine Officers. The last criticism we resent
vehemently as an injustice,
so far as applies to
loyalty, supreme pride in
the Corps, and desire to do
what is assigned to us as
quickly and as well as it can
be done."2
Cunningham went
on in his article, as he did whenever the opportunity
speak on Marine aviation arose, to express his view that the only
purpose of
aviation in any service was in assisting the troops on the ground to
successfully
carry out their operations. He spoke of aviation as a tool to increase
the
probability of success on the ground, and to materially shorten
campaigns. He
judged that the Marine ground officer's unfamiliarity with the
advantages offered
by aviation was a woeful failure on the part of aviation to advertise
its capability.
As stated in chapter one, WW I did not provide an opportunity for
Marine aviation
to support Marine ground troops. Cunningham saw this as the source of
the
perception that aviation was of no use, and also the general lack of
support for the continuance of Marine aviation within the Corps. As the head of
Marine aviation,
he dedicated himself to correcting this perception.3
Cunningham actively
lobbied for Marine aviation wherever he found
skeptics. In an appearance before the General Board of the Navy in
April of 1919,
he proposed the development of what would eventually become the modern
air-
ground team. He specified that the role of Marine aviation was
providing support
for the ground element's advance base mission, and for expeditionary
forces in
seizing and holding assigned objectives. Ultimately the battle for
survival was won
by the end of 1920, with Congress establishing Marine Corps manpower as
one
fifth that of the Navy. Above this, Congress authorized an additional
1,020 Marines
for aviation, and provided for the construction of two aviation
facilities at Quantico, Virginia, and Paris Island, South Carolina.
Additionally, an airfield was planned
for San Diego, California.4
Apart from the
personalities involved in the survival of Marine aviation immediately following
WW 1, another factor in the eventual Congressional and
public support was that Marine Aviation was not idle during this
period. Between
the World Wars, the Maxine aviation, was the only air service to see
combat. WW I
ended in November 1918, and by February 1919, Marine squadrons deployed
to
Santo Domingo. By March 1919, additional squadrons were deployed to
Haiti.
Both operations were in support of Marine Brigades and involved combat.
The
Navy established Marine aviation presence on its advance base at Guam
in 1921.
Also in 1921, Marine units at Guam deployed farther west to China, to
provide
protection for foreigners during the Chinese civil war. In 1927, Marine
aviation
deployed to Nicaragua and developed the first use of dive bombing and
the
employment of air-to-ground communications. Marine aviators were also
involved
in aerial re-supply, transport, and casualty evacuation. In short, the
Marines
remained gainfully employed and in the public eye by being deployed
continuously after the end of WWI.5
Marine aviation
deployments 1919-1935:
Santo
Domingo- 1919-1924
Haiti- 1919-1934
Nicaragua- 1927-1933
China-
1927-1929
To ensure that
Marine aviation reached as many potential supporters as
possible during this period, the Marine Corps embarked upon an
extensive public relations program. Marine aviators participated in national
air races, aerial
surveys, night flying, exhibition flying, and flight training
excursions.6 Aware that
Marine aviation was in danger of being eliminated, Marine Fighting
Squadron Nine organized an aerial exhibition team known as the Rojas Diablos
(Red Devils). Performing in much the same way as the Blue Angels do today, the
Rojas Diablos gained a great deal of favorable publicity and good will for the
Corps and Marine aviation. Fighting Squadron Nine accomplished this on the
traditional Marine
Corps financial shoestring and flying castoff Navy aircraft. At one
point,
innovative mechanics in the squadron actually constructed a new
aircraft out of salvaged parts from others and gave it a fictitious serial
number. This caused a
flap at Marine headquarters, because there was no record of the
acquisition. The
issue in a typically bureaucratic fashion when headquarters made the
decision that
the aircraft simply did not exist. 7
Ironically, an Army
general provided one of the biggest boosts to Naval
aviation (and therefore Marine aviation) in 1921. In March of that year,
Brigadier
General Billy Mitchell proposed that a war prize German battleship be
provided
the Army Air Service to prove that airplanes could sink battleships.
The Navy
feared that Mitchell's determination could lead to the emergence of an
independent
air force, which could in turn, affect Naval appropriations (especially
if Mitchell
proved that battleships were obsolete). Therefore, prudence dictated
that the
Navy and Marine Corps quickly establish a legal basis for its own air
service.
Congress obliged in July of 1921 with an act that created the Naval
Bureau of Aeronautics.8
In 1933, the Marine Corps
was reorganized into the "Fleet Marine Force",
(FMF) structure, which directly heightened the importance and status of
Marine
Aviation. Within Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine aviation was
separated from
the Division of Operations and Training and became an independent
section under
the Commandant. The Director of Aviation Division was created in 1936.
The
Director had the responsibilities of advising the Commandant on all
matters
relating to aviation, and acting as the official Marine liaison to the
Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics. By 1939, the FMF was organized into two Brigades,
the 1st brigade on
the East Coast and the 2nd Brigade on the West. Permanently assigned to
each Brigade was a Marine Aircraft Group.9
During the 1930s, the
Marine Corps focused on the unique requirements of
its amphibious and Advance Base Force missions . Experiences in the
"small wars"
from Haiti to China had demonstrated that greater consideration must be
given to
the early fire support for landing troops. The probability that in such
situations
artillery would not be as available as in conventional warfare caused
Marine
aviation to begin evolving a new tactic referred to as close air
support (CAS) and
the air-to-ground communications that would make it possible. The
methods and procedures that the Marine Corps developed as fundamental to CAS
were
consolidated and reduced to written form in the 1934 edition of the Tentative
Landing Manual and subsequent editions. The
manual considered that the
vulnerability of troops in transports, landing boats, and on the beach,
required a numerical superiority in aircraft of three-to-one over enemy
aviation. The 1938
edition of the manual increased the requisite ratio to four-to-one,
primarily to wipe
the enemy air threat out of the sky, and secondarily to destroy his
beach defenses
and prevent the enemy's reinforcement. Once these missions were
accomplished (which were prioritized to successfully get the troops ashore)
Marine aviation was
to provide CAS until the artillery was ashore and ready to fire. By the
end of the
decade of the thirties, the Commandant reported to the Secretary of the
Navy that "air-ground training was being conducted wherever
possible", and that aviators
were being assigned to the Brigade staffs as liaison officers.10
The General Board of
the Navy approved strongly of the Marine vision for
its aviation and recommended in 1939 that:
"Marine aviation is to be equipped, organized
and trained primarily for
the support of the Fleet Marine
Force in landing operations in support of troop
activities in the field; and
secondarily, as
replacements for
carrier-based naval aircraft."11
The Board's recommendation both acknowledged Marine
aviation as a separate
entity with a unique mission, and ensured its continued subordination
to Naval
aviation as a whole.
As
Alfred Cunningham had noted, Marine ground officers have not always
been cognizant of the requirement for, and the advantages of, Marine
aviation.
When America began to rearm for
the possibility of war with Japan and Germany, Commandant Thomas E. Holcomb was
approached in June 1940 by members of Congress inquiring about the number of
aircraft the Marine Corps would require
in the event of war ("Plan Orange", the contingency plan
which outlined the
intention to defeat Japan by amphibious assaults and island hopping had
existed
since 1907, and continued to develop until the war. In 1921, Commandant
Lejuene
signed 712D-Operation Plan; "Advanced Base Operations in
Micronesia", which
outlined Marine commitments to the contingency. 12). The Commandant's
answer
to the inquiry was "approximately 300." Not only did this
grossly underestimate
the number that would be required, but was actually less aircraft than
the Marine
Corps had at the time of the Congressional inquiry!13 Regardless, in
June 1940 Congress authorized a 10,000 plane program, with the Marine Corps
scheduled to receive 1167 planes. With this number of aircraft inbound, the
Director of Marine Aviation undertook to reorganize the structure, creating 3
aircraft wings. Based
on the 1938 Tentative Landing Manual and recent FMF amphibious training
exercises, the Director emphasized the need for superiority in the number of
fighters, and
created twelve fighter squadrons. He believed this number of squadrons
was
essential to support of amphibious operations "both during a
landing and during
the ensuing defense."14
WORLD WAR II
Marine Aviation's
contribution to the extremely successful conduct of
America's air war in the Pacific was tremendous by
any calculation. While it is
beyond the intended scope of this paper to examine each battle or
campaign
involving Marine aviation, several brought lasting impact to the
character of
Marine aviation and its survival after the war. The first of these
(chronologically)
was the defense of Wake Island. One of the reasons that there were no
aircraft
carriers at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked on December 7 1941,
was
that they were busy reinforcing Wake and Midway Island as likely places
for the commencement of Japanese hostilities. Since both islands were advance
naval
bases, their defense fell primarily to the Marines. Reinforcement of
Wake was not complete when word came of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December
8. The
island was defended only by an advance detail of the First Marine
Defense
Battalion, and twelve F4F-3 aircraft of VMF-211. The
same day (Dec 8), the
Japanese attacked Wake, but were unable to take the island until
December 23
1941, because of the indomitable spirit of the island's
defenders. It was precisely
this heroic, hopeless defense that makes Wake Island so important,
because it gave birth to the Marine Corps' modern image of itself. Although 166
years of Marine
Corps history had preceded it, Wake became a symbol to America as well
as to the Marines. Major Paul Putnam, VMF-211's Commanding Officer, put it best
in the
last message he sent from Wake: "All hands have behaved splendidly
and held up
in a manner of which the Marine Corps may well tell."15
Probably the most
pivotal campaign of WW II, from a Marine perspective,
was Guadalcanal. The decision to take Guadalcanal in August 1942 was
primarily
as a counter to the Japanese capture of Rabaul from which the empire
could
dominate New Guinea, Australia, and the Solomons. Marine aviation
played a
major role in the taking of Guadalcanal, which had the distinction of
being an all
Marine operation from a command and control perspective. This
distinction placed Marine aviation in command of what was to become a joint air
component.16
By
their actions, the Japanese made it clear from the outset that they
intended to retake Guadalcanal at all costs. The battle became an
immense duel
between allied and Japanese aircraft, and between allied aircraft and
Japanese
warships. In support of Guadalcanal, Marine aviation was augmented by
Navy,
Army, and Allied aircraft. The relationship between
these components and their
Marine commander apparently worked extremely well, due in part to there
being
"enough war to go around for everybody."17 The Marine
Operations Officer of the Commander Air Solomons (ComAirSols) at Guadalcanal
planned the mission to
shoot down Admiral Yamamoto on April 18 1943, and selected the Army
P-38
squadron to accomplish the mission without consideration to service
parochialism.18
The
symbiotic relationship between the Marine Corps and the Navy was
greatly enhanced by the events surrounding Guadalcanal. The Marine
Corps was operating the same aircraft types from Guadalcanal as the Navy had
aboard its
carriers. By October 1942, the Navy was down to one carrier in the
Pacific, the Enterprise, having lost the Lexington at Midway and Hornet at
Santa Cruz.
Guadalcanal became the Navy's "zero speed
carrier" in the theater, and the Navy
sent carrier aircraft to Guadalcanal to use the common maintenance
facilities
there. Thus, the Navy kept a ready supply of carrier replacements at
Guadalcanal
and assigned them to fight alongside the Marines in "Cactus"
operations.19
Guadalcanal
has been the cause of heated discussions between ground and
aviation Marines ever since WW II. The discussion revolves around
whether it was
a case where the ground d Marine supported aviation, instead of
aviation supporting
the ground Marine. It is inescapable that at Guadalcanal the ground
force's task
was to take and hold Henderson airfield, so that aviation could
prosecute the attack
against the Japanese Navy and Air Force. The counter to that
observation is that
aviation's attacks on Japanese troop transports during the operation
sunk ships
carrying more than a division of soldiers to the island.20 Therefore,
Japanese
soldiers never got to Guadalcanal to face the Marines on the ground,
thus aviation
was still supporting the ground troops. Whether aviation supported the
ground, or
the ground supported aviation is a distinction that is not particularly
useful unless
one concedes that all Marines are in the business of achieving victory
for the
commander. Once that concession is made, the possibility that the roles
may
occasionally be reversed seems acceptable. However, Guadalcanal's
apparent
aviation role reversal did have negative effects, because the Marines
neglected to
keep their carrier qualification current during the land-based island
hopping
campaign.
The
assault on Tarawa commenced November 20, 1943. This had a
significant effect on the relationship between Marine aviation and the
ground
Marines. The Marine divisions were the spearhead of the operation, but
the island hopping strategy placed the operation beyond the reach of land based
Marine
aviation. Marine aircraft were still carrier capable; however, aviator
carrier skills
had atrophied or were non-existent. The Navy claimed to have no deck
space to
give Marines in any case. The net effect was that Marine aviation was
essentially "benched"from supporting ground Marines for most of 1944,
and spent that time relegated primarily to the rear area suppression of
bypassed islands still held by
the Japanese. The lesson from the Guadalcanal experience was that Marine
aviation should maintain its carrier readiness and close air support
focus, even
during times in which it is tasked to do other missions.21
In July 1944,
Commandant Vandergrift made an extensive inspection trip of
the Pacific. On his return to Pearl Harbor, Vandergrift met with
Admiral Nimitz
and several other Navy and Marine flag officers. The consensus reached
at the
meeting was that significant changes were required to ensure the
employment of
Marine aviation for the balance of the war. Additionally,
the meeting revalidated
the primary role of Marine aviation as the support for Marine ground
forces.
Ultimately Nimitz and Vandergrift agreed to embark
six Marine aircraft groups
(each group composed of one fighter and one torpedo-bomber squadrons),
one
each aboard six escort carriers. Training and embarkation was completed
in time
for the first of these carriers to arrive off Okinawa in May 1945, with
a second
escort carrier arriving in June. Ten VMF squadrons equipped with the
F-4U
Corsair additionally embarked aboard fast carriers
(Essex class) during 1944. The
Navy chose to make deck space available for these Marine Corsairs
because the aircraft's superior speed gave them a greater ability to counter
the increasing
Kamikaze threat.22
With Marine aviation
reoriented towards support of ground forces,
participation in the Philippine and Okinawa campaigns was assured. In
the
Philippines, Marine aviation was employed for ground
support, but in an unusual
way. General MacArther ordered the Army 1st Cavalry Division to make a
dash
for Manila to free Allied prisoners at Santo Domingo prison. Probably
because the
Army Air Corps oriented toward strategic bombing, the Marines were
tasked with providing continuous air alert cover for the 1st Cavalry division.
The dash took 66
hours with Marine aviation protecting the 1st Cavalry's flanks all the
way.23
The Okinawa campaign
was significant to Marine aviation for two reasons.
First, it was the largest amphibious operation of
the Pacific war, and one which
reunited Marine aviation and Marine ground forces on a scale heretofore
unknown. Second, records indicate that during the Okinawa campaign, a young
Marine
named James L. Day (later Major General) was strafed by enemy aircraft.
This
event had a curious effect on the future of Marine fighter aviation.
From one
perspective, the fact that no Marine has been attacked from the air
since Okinawa,
even in conflicts where the enemy possessed the capability to do so,
speaks well of fighter aviation's effectiveness in providing air superiority
and thereby reducing the
battlefield to two dimensions. From another perspective, the fact that
no Marine
has been strafed in the last fifty years has made it difficult for some
to appreciate
the magnitude of that contribution. In other words, challenges to the
usefulness of
fighter aviation tended to increase over the years as the memory of
what it was like
to be strafed faded.24
During WW II, 38
Marine squadrons saw combat against the Japanese.
While it is
difficult to quantify Marine aviation's contribution to ground support
during the war, in aerial combat, the 38 squadrons accounted for 2,354
Japanese aircraft shot down. Additionally, 11 Congressional Medals of Honor
were awarded
to Marine aviators.
Summary
Between the
World Wars, Marine aviation successfully countered
challenges to its existence originating from both within and outside
the Marine
Corps. This was accomplished by actively seeking public support,
continuing the development of aviation's potential, and ultimately by proving
its utility in the low intensity conflicts of the era. During WW II, Marine
aviation proved to be the vital
link between America's sea based and shore based air power, providing a
critical degree of flexibility between the application of either. The WW II
experience
reaffirmed Marine aviation's essential connection to Naval aviation in
the forward
basing of air power as well as the interrelationship between Marine
aviation and
ground forces. From the standpoint of redundancy, Marine aviation
proved to be a critical and unique component of the victory in the Pacific, and
therefore was not redundant.
Chapter 2
Notes
1 Cosmas, p. 27
2 Major Alfred A. Cunningham, U.S.M.C.,
"Value of Aviation To The Marine
Corps", Marine Corps Gazette,
vol. V No. 3, (September 1920), p. 222
3 Cunningham, Marine Corps
Gazette, Sept. 1920, p. 222-228
4 Cosmas, p. 27-31
5 Marine Corps Historical Reference
Series Number 18, (Washington, D.C:
Military Reference Collection, Marine
Corps Aviation Files, Marine Corps
Historical Center,) p. 4-5
6 Clifford, USMCR, p. 38-39
7 Christy, Joe, revised and updated by
Leroy Cook, American Aviation: An
Illustrated History, 2nd Edition,
(Blue Ridge Summit, PA: McGraw-Hill,
Inc., 1994) p.171
8 Christy, p. 61-62
9 Clifford, p. 58
10 Clifford, p. 58-59; Cosmas, p. 64-65
11 Robert Sherrod, History of Marine
Aviation in World War II (Washington
D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1952),
p.31-32
12 Clifford, p. 63-65
13 Major General John P.
Condon, interview by the author, November 1994.
14 Captain Edna L. Smith, MCWR, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (AIR):
Essays In History Of Naval Air
Operations, Volume V., Aviation Organization
In The United States Marine Corps,
1912-1945, (Washington D.C.: Naval
Aviation History Unit, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, 1962), p. 17-18
15 Mersky, p. 30-33; Major General John P.
Condon, edited by John M. Elliot, U.S.
Marine Corps Aviation,(Washington
D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. 11 -
12
16 Condon, U.S. Marine
Corps Aviation, p.14-15
Chapter 2
Notes
(cont.)
17 Condon, interview by the author,
November 1994. General Condon was the Operations
Officer of the "Cactus Air Force" at Guadalcanal during WW II.
18 Condon, interview by the author.
General Condon was the Marine officer who planned
and sent the Army P-38 aircraft to intercept and shoot down Admiral Yamamoto.
19 Mersky, p. 48; Condon, interview by the
author; Lieutenant General Keith Smith, Smith,
interview by the author, 13 January 1995.
20 Morison, Samuel E. History of U.S. Naval Operations in
World War II, Vol 5:
"The Struggle For
Guadalcanal August 1942-February 1943." (Boston MA, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1949),
P. 371-373
21 Condon, U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, p.
20; Mersky, p. 97.
22 Condon, U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, p.
20-21; Mersky, p. 96-98; E.L. Smith, p. 29-33.
23 Condon, U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, p.
21-22.
24
Major General James L. Day,
interview by the author, 10 February 1995. Maj Gen
Day retired in 1987 after 43 years of active service. He was throughout his career, and remains today, and
avid proponent of Marine aviation.
CLICK
HERE TO VIEW IMAGE
1945-1950
Although the
period between WW II and Korea was short, it had immense
impact on the future of Marine aviation. The political forces at work
during this
period embraced the overarching desire for massive demobilization
following WW
II. During the same time, technology had leapt forward sufficiently to
warrant a reassessment of all the services' war fighting methods. While these
discussions and decisions were occurring at the highest levels, Marine aviation
was tasked
continuously in much the same way it had been after WW I. The end of
World War
II saw the first use of Marine aviation units in the role of occupation
forces after
Japan's surrender in August 1945. A month later (September 1945) the
conflict
between the Nationalist and Communist Chinese caused sufficient concern
within
the U.S. government that the First Marine Aircraft Wing was deployed to
China to provide security patrols, and to make U.S. presence visible to both
sides. Elements
of the First Marine Aircraft Wing were to remain deployed in China
until 1949,
where its final contribution to the situation was providing cover for
the evacuation
of U.S. personnel and equipment when communist victory became
apparent.1
Despite being
gainfully employed between the wars, Marine aviation did
not escape the "disarmament fever" raging in America. At the
end of WW II,
Marine fighter/attack squadrons numbered 103. Within 10 months of the
Japanese surrender, this number was reduced to 27 squadrons. By July 1950,
Marine fighter/attack squadrons were reduced to 16 squadrons (3 more than on
December
7 1941).2
The advent of the
atomic bomb during WW II, and a realistic assessment
that our future adversaries would also possess an atomic capability,
challenged the
doctrines of all the services. The Marine Corps saw the challenge of
the bomb as potentially catastrophic to its amphibious assault doctrine,
because massed
amphibious shipping and landing craft were extremely vulnerable to
nuclear
attack. Several military leaders of the day openly stated that
amphibious assault
was impossible in a nuclear war. The Navy and Marine Corps maintained
that the
bomb did not preclude amphibious operations, but did affect the
techniques and equipment required.3
In the summer of 1946,
the U.S. Government set up a series of tests in the
Bikini Lagoon in the Marshall Islands (Operation Crossroads). The
objective of the tests was to examine the effects of nuclear weapons on naval
shipping. The senior Marine present at the tests was Lieutenant General Roy S.
Geiger (Marine aviator number 5, C.G., First Marine Aircraft Wing at
Guadalcanal, and current FMFPAC
C.G.). Geiger's report on Operation Crossroads to the Commandant was
truly
historic, and of immense impact to the future of the Marine Corps:
"Under the assumption that atomic bombs can be
produced in large
quantities, that they can be used in
mass attacks against an
enemy objective, and that our
probable future enemy will
be in possession of this
weapon, it is my opinion
that a complete review and
study of our concept of
amphibious operations will
have to be made. It is quite
evident that a small
number of atomic bombs could
destroy an
expeditionary force as now
organized, embarked,
and landed. Such a force
might not fare so badly on the
high seas, if properly
dispersed. It is my opinion that
future amphibious operations
will be undertaken by
much smaller expeditionary
forces, which will be
highly trained and lightly
equipped, and transported
by air or submarine, and
movement accomplished
with a greater degree of
surprise and speed than has
been heretofore
visualized."4
To the Navy, the nuclear
challenge to amphibious operations required the
fleet to be widely dispersed instead of massed. The Marine Corps agreed
with ship dispersal, while at the same time acknowledging that ship dispersal
exacerbated
the difficulties of rapid movement to shore in sufficient numbers to
ensure victory.
Both the Navy and Marine Corps agreed that once close contact with the
enemy
was achieved, the threat of nuclear exchange dissipated. Several
possible
solutions were evaluated, with the ultimate decision being the
development of the helicopter for assault support and a concept which became
known as "vertical envelopment."5
The effect of these far reaching changes in
the Marine's amphibious mission on Marine fighter/attack aviation was twofold.
First, the "lightly equipped" forces
that Geiger had recommended placed an even higher premium on the combat
power provided to the ground forces by aviation. Second, the
"vertical
envelopment" concept began forming the notion of Vertical Short
Takeoff Or
Landing (VSTOL) capabilities for fixed wing aircraft in the minds of
the Marine leadership.
The development of jet aircraft by the U.S.
during this period nearly left the Marine Corps behind. With zealous budget cuts
from Congress challenging
manpower, equipment, supply, and even the survival of the Corps, Marine
fixed
wing aviation found active support for its requirements being consumed
by the
desire to develop the helicopter. As with Cunningham in the early days,
the force
of
personality in individuals helped bring jet aviation to the Marine Corps. While
a
number of Marine aviators favored jet aircraft procurement, two
stand out, Major
Marion Carl and Colonel John P. Condon. Both
Marines played significant roles in
the effort to procure and deploy the first
jet aircraft in the Marine Corps.6
Political activity, with regard to service
roles and missions, was significant
during the period between the wars. The National Security Act of 1947 created
a
national military establishment under the Secretary of Defense. For the
Marine
Corps, the Act established the Corps as an equal to the Navy under the
Department of the Navy. Specifically, the Marine Corps was defined to,
"include
combat and service forces and such aviation that may be organic
therein."
Further that: "The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and
equipped to
provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting
air
components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of
advance naval
bases and for conduct of such land operations as may be essential to
the
prosecution of such naval campaigns." The Act additionally tasked
the Marine
Corps to develop amphibious doctrine and to coordinate that doctrine
with the
other services.7 The overarching significance of the Act was that the
Marine Corps,
and its aviation, had its existence codified in law. The stipulation
that the Marine
Corps would be the lead service for amphibious warfare established
Congress'
authority over that role.
Executive Order 9877, Functions of the Armed Forces, was
signed by
President Truman on the same day as the National Security Act. It
essentially
repeated the role of the Marine Corps as defined by the Act, but added
"to provide,
as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for
service in
foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies
and interests
of the United States." This addition is significant because it
states that Marine
activity is not restricted to the support of Naval campaigns. Since
provisions for
Marine security detachments and embassy security guards already existed
in Congressional law, it is possible that President Truman was attempting to
establish the Marine Corps as a "911 Force".8 Unfortunately,
this official
recognition did not last long in the face of objections from the other
services.
In an effort to resolve the disputes created by the National
Security Act and
Executive Order 9877, the first Secretary of Defense,
James Forrestal, convened a
meeting of the service chiefs in Key West, Florida 11-14 March 1948. The
outcome
of the meeting, alternately titled The Key West Agreement or the Functions of
the
Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was essentially
a watered down
compromise, giving each service more or less what they wanted. Two
significant stipulations did characterize the agreement. First, service
responsibilities were
defined in primary and collateral functions. The collateral function
distinction
allowed for the possibility that each service may be required to
augment the
primary function of another service whenever the situation warranted
(as in war
with the Soviet Union). While the agreement stipulated that collateral
functions
were not to be used as a justification for increased funding, they did
institutionalize redundancy between the services. Second, wording of the
agreement did not
entirely eliminate the possibility that the Marine Corps might be used
as a "911
Force", but admonished that under no circumstances was the Marine
Corps to
become a "second land army."9 Politicians and military
leaders have been trying to define exactly what that admonishment meant ever
since.
President Truman, upon receiving the
recommendations of the Key West Agreement, rescinded Executive Order 9877, and
issued Executive Order 9950. The new Executive Order essentially rubber stamped
Key West, and with regard to the Marine Corps, reiterated the "second land
army" admonition. However, Truman's
Order did task the Marine Corps with providing "land combat and
service forces
and such aviation as may be organic therein", which once again
recognized the separation between the purpose of Navy and Marine Aviation.
Additionally, the Executive Order specified, as one of the collateral functions
of Navy/Marine
aviation, "To be prepared to participate in the over-all air
effort as directed by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff."10
KOREAN WAR
The Korean War saw the first
use of both jet aircraft and helicopters by the
Marine Corps. More importantly, the war was a
much needed shot in the arm for
Marine aviation. The Marine Corps quickly
deployed to the conflict as a true
Marine Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF), and did
so at a time when America found
it difficult to put together any credible
force from the shambles created by the WW
II demobilization. The Marines had been
careful to remember the lesson of
Guadalcanal, and did not let their carrier
training atrophy during the inter-war
years. As a result, while some Marine
squadrons were based ashore, Marine squadrons flew from carriers continuously
throughout the conflict, most notably in
the support of the rapidly deployed First
Marine Division in the defense of the
Pusan Perimeter and in support of the Inchon
landing. Marine aviation strove to maintain its focus on close air support
throughout the conflict. During the Korean conflict, Marine aviation refined
the tactical air control party (TACP), which vastly improved the effectiveness
of CAS sorties they controlled. The significant accomplishments and
contributions in Korea of Navy/Marine aviation and the 5th
Air Force are too numerous to list here, and are beyond the scope of
this paper. However, what should be mentioned is that no ground forces were
ever attacked
by enemy aviation, many battles were pre-determined by aviation's
strategic
shaping of the deep battlefield, and in many cases close air support
provided
the margin for victory in the close battle. The Marine aviation had the
distinction of
the being the first aviation element to arrive, and the last to leave
the conflict.11
With the Korean War already underway, and the
attendant painful process
of rearming a military which was woefully unprepared, the 82nd Congress
enacted
Public Law 416 on 28 June 1952. This action
of Congress was taken in an effort to
never again allow U.S. military forces to fall to such a dreadful state
of
preparedness. Two provisions in the Law applied directly to the Marine
Corps.
First, the strength of the Marine Corps should be not less than three
combat
divisions and three air wings. Second, the Commandant should have
co-equal
status with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.12 The implications
were that
Congress wanted to achieve service unification, while insuring that the
Marine
Corps would not be discarded in the process.
Having acknowledged the air campaign in Korea
as ultimately successful,
the conduct of the air war produced a
significant challenge to the Marine
philosophy in the employment of air. With
General MacArthur's support, the 5th
Air Force exercised overall control of air
assets during the war through the establishment of a Joint Operations Center
(JOC). To the Marine leadership, the
light infantry posture and rapid movement of
the Marine ground forces clearly
placed a premium on the availability and
response time of aircraft in close air
support. However, whenever the 1st Marine Air
Wing (1st MAW) made proposals
to the 5th Air Force aimed at improving wing
support to the 1st Marine Division,
they ran head-on into both the Air Force's
strategic philosophy about shaping of
the deep battlefield, and their official
position that there was no reason to prioritize
the air support for one division when there
were ten other divisions on the main
line. From 1951 to 1953, there were various
agreements between 1st MAW and 5th
Air Force regarding the support of the 1st
Marine Division; however, these never
really satisfied the Marine Corps.13 Some
Korea veterans even hold 5th Air Force responsible for unnecessary casualties
in Marine ground forces. Ultimately, the
Korean experience was to be the catalyst for Marine paranoia with
regard to the centralized control of air.
Summary
The most significant aspect
of the post-WW II and Korean War period was
the recognition by Congress of the Marine Corps as a core capability
within the
U.S. military. Ignoring ongoing inter-service rivalry over aviation,
Congress
specifically guaranteed the survival of Marine aviation. The confidence
that
Congress demonstrated with regard to the Marine Corps and its aviation
was
almost certainly the result of the demonstrated requirement for small
unit
interventions between the wars and the readiness of the Marine Corps in
the event
of a national crisis that required rapid, large scale military
involvement.
Additionally, Marine aviation during this period remained at the
forefront of
aviation technology and aggressively pursued emerging aviation
disciplines such as vertical lift, jet propulsion, and air-to-ground
communications. Every effort by
Marine fighter/attack aviation focused on support of the ground forces
and
integration with Navy carrier aviation. The result was an extremely
flexible and
uniquely capable aviation asset to the nation during the Korean War.
Chapter 3
Notes
1 Mersky, p. 120-121;
Condon, U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, p. 21-22
2 Condon, U.S. Marine Corps
Aviation, p. 23
3 Clifford, p. 71;
Condon, U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, p. 23; Mersky, p. 123-124
4
Roy S. Geiger personal papers (Marine Corps Historical
Center, Personal
Papers Collection, PC 311); Clifford p. 71
5 Clifford, p. 72-78
6 Mersky, p. 121-123
7
John M. Collins, CRS Report for Congress: Roles and
Functions of U.S. Combat Forces; Past, Present, and Prospects, (Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress, January 21, 1993), Annex B
"National Security act of 1947. (USMC Roles and Missions Coordination
Office, HQMC, Roles and Missions Historical file Vol 1).
8
8 Collins, Annex C, Executive
Order 9877
9
The Henry L. Stimson Center, Key West Revisited: Roles and
Missions of the US Armed Forces in the Twenty-first Century, (Report
No. 8, March 1993),
10
(USMC Roles and Missions Coordination Office, HQMC,
Roles and Missions Historical file Vol 1). P. 1-2; Collins, Annex D, Key West
Agreement and Executive Order 9950, p. 81-88
10 Collins, Annex D, Key West
Agreement and Executive Order 9950, p. 85-86
11 Condon, U.S. Marine Corps
Aviation, p. 23-32; Mersky, p.129-191; Brief History of Marine Aviation, (Marine
Corps Research Center, Aviation Files)
12 Clifford, p. 81
13
Condon, interview by author, November 1994. General
Condon was the commander of Marine Aircraft Group-Thirty Three, (MAG-33), in
the Korean
War.
CLICK HERE TO VIEW IMAGE
1953-1965
The end of the Korean War
brought about the inevitable calls for cost-
cutting and demobilization. This time, however, the Marine Corps seemed
to enjoy
some measure of protection. This protection was probably due to Public Law 416,
Marine performance during the war, and the Marine
Corps' now permanent
presence in the Pacific as a hedge against further North Korean
aggression. Apart
from its presence in the Pacific, Marine aviation again found gainful
employment
between wars easy to find. In August 1958, units of the First Marine
Aircraft Wing
in the Far East were put on alert status because of renewed hostilities
between
Taiwan and Communist China. Marines flew 24-hour combat air patrol
(CAP)
missions during September and October, primarily to protect vital
air-transport
connection to the island. Also during 1958 the 2nd Provisional Marine
Brigade was
deployed when trouble broke out in Beirut, Lebanon. No Marine fixed
wing
aviation assets would have participated had they not been aboard the
carrier
Forrestal, another example of the
necessity for continued Marine deployment on
carriers. In the early 1960s Marine aviation participated in the Cuban
missile
crisis, flying the reconnaissance version of the F-8 Crusader on low
level photo
missions over Cuba.1
The major Congressional
contribution in the structure of the military after
Korea was embodied in the Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958. The
reorganization was undertaken because the Eisenhower administration
desired to
increase the efficiency of the military and to eliminate inter-service
rivalry. During
1957, Congressional and public policy study groups
noted the Defense
Department's many problems, including the contention that DoD suffered
from
duplication and triplication, promoting waste and retarding
modernization. An
additional study group sponsored by the Rockefeller Fund concluded
that three
major defects existed in the DoD structure: service roles and missions
had become
competitive, rather than complementary; Joint Chiefs of Staff
organization and
responsibilities precluded coherent strategic direction; and the
Secretary of
Defense, burdened with arbitrating-inter-service
disputes, was unable to initiate
and direct military policy development. The ultimate effect of the Reorganization
Act of 1958 was to greatly increase the
powers of the Secretary of Defense, at the
expense of the service secretaries. The effect of this legislation on
the survival of
Marine fighter/attack aviation was indirect, yet
significant. The Act allowed
individual members of the JCS or service secretaries to present
directly to
Congress any recommendation they deemed appropriate.
In other words, if the
Commandant was so inclined, he could go directly to Congress to fight
for Marine
aviation.2
Technological developments
other than in fixed wing aviation benefited the
general welfare of the Marine Corps. During the latter half of the
fifties massive
improvements were made to Marine helicopter evolution, the Marine Corps
procured the versatile C-130 cargo aircraft, and the Navy supported the
amphibious mission with the development of amphibious shipping in the
form of
the helicopter-carrier. The development of the helicopter by the Marine
Corps
also had an interesting political benefit in the selection of the
Marine Corps to
provide helicopter transportation to the President. Since the Marine
Corps had
pursued these upgrades and new procurements with a eye towards
austerity, many
observers believed that the Marine Corps entered the conflict in
Vietnam leaner,
trimmer, and better prepared than any time since WW II.3
Technological development in
Marine fighter/attack aviation progressed
remarkably well during the period between Korea and Vietnam, given the
austere
budget conditions and the Marine Corps' prioritization of helicopter
development.
The reason Marine fixed-wing aviation continued to
advance was more than just
the desire and effort of its advocates. Marine aviation has always
reaped the fruits
of Navy development and procurement of aircraft, and the second half of
the
decade of the fifties is a prime example. This era was known as the
"Golden Age of
Aviation". The Navy and Air Force were in a
heated race to develop advanced
aircraft, and both services found that Congressional fears regarding
the Soviet
threat predisposed them to fund even the most far-fetched aircraft
proposals. The
Marine Corps benefited in its fighter/attack
community somewhat vicariously, as
the Navy shuffled aircraft to Marine aviation. The Navy, in turn,
generally
benefited from Marine acquisition of Navy aircraft, because the
satisfaction of
combined Navy/Marine requirements tended to make a superior and more
versatile
aircraft (e.g., the F-4 Phantom's air-to-ground capability was the
result of Marine
requirements placed on the aircraft).4
As discussed in Chapter 3,
the Marine Corps' vision of amphibious
operations in the nuclear age called for not only the development of
the
helicopter, but also VSTOL capable fighter/attack aircraft to provide
support. By
1960, the technology required for VSTOL fixed wing
aircraft was making the
transition from theory to reality in the form of a British aircraft
known as the
Krestal. The Krestal was destined to
evolve into the AV-8 Harrier, and this aircraft
piqued the interest of the Marine leadership. So serious was the Marine
Corps
about the concept that in 1965 Commandant Wallace M. Greene Jr.
envisioned:
"The primary amphibious
assault capability of the landing force will consist of fully V/STOL-mobile
Marine air-ground teams, launched and supported from mission designed
amphibious shipping, under all conditions of weather and visibility. This will
be complemented by a surface assault capability utilizing high speed surface
craft, either water or air cushion borne able to project troops, equipment, and
supplies onto the beach beyond the high water line."5
The orientation of Marine fixed-wing aviation
towards VSTOL was to have far
reaching impact on the survival of Maxine fighter/attack aviation, and
will be
discussed in-depth in the following chapters.
VIETNAM
Marine fighter/attack
involvement in Vietnam was extensive. Of the 27
fighter/attack squadrons the Marine Corps possessed throughout the
conflict, more
than 40% remained deployed to the war on a rotational basis from 1965
to 1970.
Although Marine fighters flew a significant number of combat air patrol
(CAP)
sorties, there was almost no involvement of Marine pilots in actual
aerial combat
(except for those flying exchange tours with the Air
Force or Navy). Marine
fighter/attack aviation instead flew primarily CAS or interdiction
missions. To
many, this was exactly what Marine fixedwing was supposed to be doing,
and
certainly what the situation in Vietnam dictated, especially when
considering the
increased dependence placed on CAS by light infantry rapidly deployed
by
helicopter.6 The lack of participation in air combat, however, was to
fuel discussion
about the need for the Marine fighters after the war.
Vietnam was the combat
proving ground for the Marine concept of
expeditionary air fields (EAF). Maxine connection to Navy carrier
aviation had
demonstrated the advantages of rapidly deployable airfields in WW II
and Korea,
and those combat experiences had additionally forced recognition that
many areas
of the world did not have adequate airfields ashore. Normal
construction of an
airfield was too time consuming for many of the operations that the
Marine Corps
envisioned. The solution to the issue seemed to be an "instant
airfield", and the
idea gained support within the Marine Corps during the late fifties.
The result was
the "Short Airfield for Tactical Support" (SATS). The SATS
concept evolved by
1965 into the utilization of interlocking sheets of
aluminum matting to create a
short runway, and included arresting gear and catapult hardware. Additionally,
a
tactical airfield fuel dispensing system (TAFDS) composed of
collapsible fuel
bladders and fuel pumping gear would be deployed with the SATS. The
entire set
up could be erected in 72-96 hours.7
The desired deployment of
additional aviation assets to Vietnam was
constrained by the fact that South Vietnam had only 3 airfields
suitable for jet
aircraft and for several reasons no new construction was envisioned for
the
immediate future. The answer to the problem was the deployment of the
Marine
Corps SATS field to Chu Lai, South Vietnam. The SATS was
never designed for
long duration use, however the SATS at Chu Lai remained in service for
5 years,
and supported continuous operation throughout this period.8 SATS
evolved into
the expeditionary airfield (EAF) after Vietnam and remains as one of
the unique
capabilities of Marine aviation today.
A challenge to MAGTF command
and control doctrine occurred during
Vietnam, which was reminiscent of Korea. In Late 1967, the build-up
began for
the battle of Khe Sanh. General Westmoreland directed massive air
support for
the operation, and he, together with the commander of the 7th Air
Force, believed
that the most effective use of the available air resources would be
made if they
were managed by a single commander. Early in 1968, Westmoreland issued
a
directive implementing this "single manager" concept, and
identifying that manager
as the commander of the 7th Air Force. The Marine Corps, fearful of the
impact to
its MAGTF employment philosophy, objected strongly to the single
management
concept. Ultimately CINCPAC decided to proceed with the single manager
concept. Today we would refer to this individual as the joint forces
air component
commander (JFACC). What is significant about this event, apart from the
fact that
it remains essentially the system by which we conduct joint air
operations today, is
that once the decision was made, all the services made it work. The
Marine Corps
did get the air support it required, and in some cases, got it with
better efficiency.
Ultimately, after Vietnam the paranoia which drove
the dispute was put to rest in
some measure by a general agreement among the services that the service
components retained operational control over their assets, while the
single
manager exercised tactical control.9 Arguably, this agreement left many
issues
unresolved and left Marine paranoia largely intact.
Summary
Following the Korean War,
the Marine Corps in general survived by the
reputation it had established and the confidence it had inspired in the
American
people. Congress in particular
demonstrated a greater appreciation for the
Marines' dedication towards austerity and
reliability. Marine aviation in particular
enjoyed a period of remarkable growth, due in part to the cold war
threat posed by
the Soviet Union. As new technology development caused increased
specialization
in the capabilities of Navy/Marine fighter/attack aircraft, the Marine
Corps
consistently insisted on ground support capabilities in Naval aircraft.
The joint
requirements of the two services created better aircraft with
multi-mission
orientation. In turn, modification in the Marine amphibious mission
placed even
greater reliance on its fighter/attack aviation. The Marine experience
in Vietnam
illustrated the maturation of its philosophy and equipment for
expeditionary
orientation, and for the Marine air-ground team.
Chapter 4
Notes
1
Mersky, U.S. Marine Corps Aviation 1912 to the Present, p.
195-199; Condon,
U.S. Marine Corps Aviation, p. 32-33
2
Richard I Wolf, DoD Reorganization Act of 1958, (Obtained
from USMC Roles and Missions Coordination Office, HQMC, Roles and Missions
Historical file, Vol
II)
3
Mersky, p. 202
4
Mersky, p. 193-202
5
Clifford, P.111-113. The quoted statement of Commandant
Greene is excerpted
from A Long Range Marine Corps Concept, 9 June 1965 (HD, HQMC).
6
Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon, USMC,
"Marine Aviation in Vietnam,1962-1970", The Marines In Vietnam 1954-1973, (Washington,
D.C.: Headquarters And Museums Division) HQMC, 1985) p. 264-293
7 McCutcheon, The Marines In Vietnam 1954-1973, p.266-267;Senator
John H.
Glenn Jr., Forged in Steel: U.S. Marine Corps
Aviation, (Charlottesville,
VA: Howell Press, 1987) p. 17
8 McCutcheon, p.266-268
9 McCutcheon, p.274-275
CLICK HERE TO VIEW IMAGE
1970-1980
The post-Vietnam era was accompanied by the
usual "demobilization fever,"
with an added twist. Vietnam had soured the American people and its
Congress
against the military, giving the search for redundancy and waste an
unusual
vehemence. The Marine Corps found itself struggling for survival. At
the same time,
Marine aviation experienced direct attacks on those elements that
appeared
most redundant. The "single manager" concept which had been
applied to air
operations in Vietnam, had Congress and the Air Force conjecturing that
a single
manager could become a "single owner."l If the Marine Corps often had to justify
its fighter/attack aviation to Congress prior to Vietnam, it had to
justify it
continuously after.2 The argument came down to whether service roles
should be
a division of "things" (e.g., tanks, planes, and ships), or a
division of labor (e.g.,
functions and missions). The Air Force argued the former, implying that
all
aircraft should reside in their service. The Marine Corps argued that
service
equipment had to be based on mission requirements. The Air Force
argument was
a little like suggesting that one service should own all the rifles.3
Ultimately, the justification of Marine
aviation to Congress was, of course,
successful, yet budgetary austerity was to make the decade of the
seventies
extremely turbulent and challenging for the modernization and
organization of the
Marine fighter/attack community. The controversies centered around
three
aircraft; the AV-8 Harrier, the F-14 Tomcat, and the F/A-18 Hornet. These
three
aircraft, and the decisions made concerning them, were to have lasting
a impact on
the survival of Marine aviation.4
The Marine Corps embraced the fledgling VSTOL
concept and the
procurement of the Harrier without the support of the other
services, in much the
same way they had embraced the fledgling helicopter concept after WW
II. The
Marine Corps had vigorously supported the evolution of the helicopter,
foreseeing
the potential benefits to speed and maneuver in the deployment of
amphibious
forces. However, even as the Marines procured and evolved the
helicopter, they
knew the aircraft was ultimately limited in speed and would therefore
eventually
be obsolete. The obvious follow-on to rotor technology was VSTOL
fixed-wing.5
The AV-8, as the first operational VSTOL
aircraft, was pursued and
purchased with its known limitations: payload, range, sub-sonic speed,
and engine
exhaust located near the structural support of the wing (the location
of the
exhaust made the aircraft more susceptible to catastrophic damage by
heat seeking
missiles). The plan for the AV-8, from the outset, was to evolve and improve
the
aircraft quickly. The intention was that 10 to 15 years after the
inauguration of the
AV-8A, the aircraft would evolve into essentially a VSTOL F/A-18.6
Indeed, the
AV-8 has evolved significantly since the first aircraft entered service
with the
Marine Corps in February 1971; however, it has not evolved as planned,
and
remains an aircraft with many of the same limitations it was known to
have from
the outset.
There are several reasons for the stagnation
in fixed-wing VSTOL evolution.
From the beginning, the Harrier found critics and enemies. The
aircraft was a
British design and Congress generally opposed foreign procurement.
Senator
Stuart Symington in particular opposed the Harrier because money to
procure the
aircraft would have to come from funds designated for the purchase of
new
McDonnell Douglas F-4 aircraft (McDonnell Douglas is home based in
Symington's
state). Within the Department of Defense, the Harrier had opponents as
well, the
main opponents being Robert McNamara's Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Systems Analysis), Dr. Alain C. Entoven, and Entoven's assistant
Russell Murray.
Both men objected to the Harrier for cost effectiveness
considerations, and Murray
in particular opposed the aircraft saying, "It is a small, single
engined aircraft of
British lineage. The Harrier is a relatively undistinguished
aircraft in all respects
save one-its ability to use very short runways ... at some sacrifice in
range and
payload." Murray would eventually strongly recommend the purchase
of the F/A-
over the AV-8, citing the Harrier's limited air-to-air combat
capability in addition
to his other objections.7 The enemies of the Harrier succeeded in
canceling funding
or the aircraft nine times during the seventies.8 The funding was
successfully re-
acquired in each case, due to the staunch supporters of both the
aircraft and the
VSTOL concept within the Marine Corps. Chief among these effective
advocates
were Generals Keith McCutcheon and Thomas Miller. General Miller,
specifically,
traveled extensively in support of the Harrier, and was the individual
most
responsible for the aircraft's ultimate acceptance. He played an
important role in
establishing the agreement which licensed McDonnell Douglas to produce
the
aircraft, which satisfied many who opposed the project based on foreign
procurement.9
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the
evolution of the VSTOL concept in
general, and the Harrier specifically, was that the Marine
Corps was forced to
sponsor the project alone. To the Marine Corps, the obvious advantages
in tactical
proximity to the battlefield afforded by VSTOL outweighed the
limitations of the
initial aircraft design. The Air Force and Navy did not agree and
refused to support
the Harrier.
While it is not entirely surprising that the Air Force believed that
the
technology was contrary to their requirements, the Navy's refusal to
participate
represents a significant departure from the symbiotic relationship that
existed
between the Navy and Marine Corps. Guadalcanal had shown the advantages
in
combat of the Navy and the Marine Corps flying the same aircraft. In
peacetime,
the individual requirements of the two services employing the same
equipment
produced a more flexible and capable aircraft. Then Brigadier General
Philip D.
Shutler (Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation), tried to make this point
to the Navy
leadership; however, the argument was stillborn because the Harrier was
unsuitable for what the Navy viewed as its primary mission during that
era. The
Navy's attention was on the Soviet threat to the fleet and the sea lines
of
communication. What was required in this environment was a high speed,
long
range, interceptor/fighter. What was required was the Grumman F-14
Tomcat.10
The Navy decision not to participate in the
AV-8 program probably doomed
the aircraft to a stunted growth. It is ironic, then, that the Navy
insisted on Marine
Corps participation in the F-14 Tomcat during the same period. By 1970,
the F-4
Phantom (which was being flow in various configurations by the USAF,
USN, and
the USMC), had proven to be a great aircraft. However, its potential
for
modernization and growth was already an identified limitation. The Air
Force, who
disliked dealing with the impositions of carrier criteria in the design
of aircraft
(primarily cost and weight penalties), opted out of the common aircraft
arena, and
planned to replace its F-4s with the F-15. The Navy selected the F-14
to replace
the F-4, and needed Marine Corps participation primarily to keep the
spiraling
costs down (the 70 aircraft the Marine Corps required would lower the
unit cost of
the Tomcat several million dollars each). The Marine Corps initially
succumbed to
the pressure and prepared to accept the aircraft. As an example of the
benefits of
mixing the different requirements of both services in the possession of
the same
aircraft, the Marine Corps planned to develop the already great fighter
capability
of the Tomcat into an equally great bomber. During the period in which
the
Marine Corps was accepting F-14 aircraft and training personnel,
Commandant
Wilson received advice that the Tomcat was too expensive and too
difficult to
support in field conditions to suit Marine needs. With the support of
Secretary of
Defense Schlesinger, the Commandant announced withdrawal of the Marine
Corps
from the Tomcat program in July 1975.11 (The advice given to the
Commandant
may not have been entirely accurate, in that the support requirements
were not
unlike, and in many cases, entirely common with those required by the
Grumman
A-6 aircraft the Marine Corps was already flying).12 The result was
that the Navy
was left as the sole developer for the Tomcat in much the same way
as the Marine
Corps was for the Harrier. In a similar fashion, the Tomcat's growth
became
stunted. Today, both aircraft are behind where they need to be. More
importantly,
the decisions concerning these two aircraft resulted in substantial
inter-operability
problems between Navy and Marine aviation, and led to divergent rather
than
cooperative effort.13
A common present-day perception is that the
Marine Corps traded the 600
million dollars budgeted for Marine Tomcat procurement for a promise that the
first deliveries of the F/A-18 Hornet would go to the Marine Corps.
Source
documents of the period indicates that this was not the case. Rather,
the
indications are that the Marine Corps gave up the F-14 without any
guarantees for
a replacement for the Phantom. What does seem to be true on the day
that the
Marine Corps stepped away from the F-14 (2 July 1975), is that there
was not
widespread support for the F-18 in the military leadership. The YF-17 Cobra
(prototype F-18), had been the loser in a fly-off between it and the
F16. The
result of that fly-off was that the F-16 would be purchased by the Air
Force and
several foreign countries, and that the YF-17 had no market. Within the
Marine
Corps, advocates of the F18 were out numbered by those who viewed the
aircraft
critically and believed its procurement would divert resources away
from the
Harrier. Given these indications,
plus the lack of support for the aircraft by
several highly placed individuals (eventually including Navy Secretary
John
Lehman after 1981), one could conclude that the F-18's procurement was
the result
of political considerations. It is ironic then that the F/A-1 8 would
prove to be the
premier multi-role aircraft of the decade.14
In 1978 Senator Goldwater asked the services,
"Why do we have four air
forces?" Lieutenant General Thomas Miller testified on behalf of
the Marine Corps
that there are not four air forces, but two, one sea-based and one
land-based.
Furthermore, General Miller testified that according to the best
calculations,
Marine fixed-wing aviation costs generally less and certainly no more
than the
other service's aviation. Lastly, General Miller pointed out that while
the overall
size of the services might change, no savings would be realized by
changing roles
and functions. Senator Goldwater conceded the argument that there were
only
two air forces and that major realignment of functions would be
counter-
1980-1990
Despite the turmoil surrounding Marine
fighter/attack modernization during
the seventies, the Marine Corps
fared remarkably well and the eighties saw
extensive improvements. The aging F-4 was replaced by the F/A-18 single
seat
aircraft, the A-6 was replaced by the F/A-18D two seat aircraft, and
both the AV-8A
and the A-4M were replaced by the greatly improved AV-8B. By the end of
the
decade, the Marine Corps had successfully pared its fighter/attack
community from
four different aircraft, (F-4, A-6, A-4, and AV-8), to two (F/A-18 and
AV-8). The
result of the consolidation was primarily an immense cost savings in
aviation
logistics and maintenance, while concurrently gaining in overall
capability through modernization.
The F/A-18 had re-established, to a degree,
the connection to carrier
aviation, because the Navy operated the Hornet as well. In 1986, two
Marine
Hornet squadrons deployed aboard
the USS Coral Sea and participated in the
strikes on Libya.16 However, the relationship between Marine and Navy
aviation
remained strained and Marine fighter/attack carrier deployment, and
even Marine
aircrew carrier training, continued piecemeal throughout the decade.17
The most significant legislation during the
eighties was the Goldwater
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Apart
from vastly
increasing the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Goldwater
Nichols directly affected military
aviation. The Act consolidated command and
control of the Armed Forces through the unified and specified combatant
commands, (CINCs). This meant that when America fights, it intends to
fight with joint/combined forces under the ultimate command and control of a
joint forces
commander (JFC). To aviation, this implied that air assets would be
consolidated in
a joint forces air component command (JFACC). While this potentially
challenged
the Marines MAGTF concept, it had the secondary effect of indicating
that from a
budgetary perspective, assets would survive only if they could
participate over the
broad joint/combined playing field. In other words, Marine aviation had
better be
able to play joint, or not play at all.18
Marine concern about what Goldwater-Nichols
meant to the MAGTF's
aviation assets led to the JCS issuance of the 1986 Omnibus
Agreement for
Command and Control of USMC TACAIR in Sustained
Operations Ashore, which
states:
"The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
commander will retain operational control of his
organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF
air combat element is the support of the MAGTF
ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF
air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF
mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties
available to the JFC, for tasking through his air
component commander, for air defense, long-range
interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties
in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will
be provided to the JFC for tasking through the air
component commander for the support of other
components of the joint force, or of the joint force as a
whole."19
What is significant about the Omnibus Agreement is that it
acknowledges the
unique nature of Marine aviation as integral to the MAGTF. It codifies
the
understanding that the most effective use of the MAGTF is accomplished
by
allowing it to control its air. However, the agreement specifically
states that the
MAGTF operates in support of the JFC's objectives
and that therefore, the JFC can
take the MAGTF's sorties. This was an entirely agreeable compromise
which was
to be fully tested in Southwest Asia.
The Gulf War
Marine fighter/attack performance in the Gulf War
was exemplary, both as
a member of the joint forces air component and as a member of the MAGTF
air
combat element (ACE). With Desert Shield commencing in August 1990,
Marine
F/A-18s deployed to Southwest Asia (SWA), and
immediately began providing
Combat Air Patrol (CAP) coverage overhead U.S. Navy ships and Marine
ground
elements building up in southeast Saudi Arabia. More significantly, the
F/A-18s
provided from August 1990 until the commencement of hostilities in
January 1991,
the primary airborne defense of the most forward deployed U.S. Navy
surface
elements in the northern Gulf. Navy fighter coverage was limited by the
requirement to place the carriers well south primarily because of the
Iraqi and
Iranian anti-surface weapons capability (Iranian
intentions were not known).20
The Marines aviation forces in the conflict
were under the command of
Major General Royal Moore, Commanding General, 3rd
Marine Air Wing. All
sorties flown outside the established Marine Area of Operations (AO)
were tasked
by Central Command's (CENTCOM) JFACC. All sorties within the AO were
tasked
by MARCENT (the Marine component of Central Command). From the
onset of hostilities on 17 January 1991, to the commencement of the
ground war on
24 February, a large portion of the Marine F/A-18,
A-6, and EA-6B sorties were
given to the JFACC. MARCENT tasked the remaining AV-813 sorties
during this
same period. As the date for commencement of ground operations (G-Day)
approached, the emphasis shifted gradually to MARCENT for tasking, and
by G-
nearly 100 percent of the Marine's air assets were in support of
MARCENT.21
The JFACC concept proved to have both
advantages and limitations in SWA.
From the perspective of control and coordination of
large numbers of air assets to
ensure they acted in concert with the objectives of the JFC, the JFACC
proved
essential and effective. The JFACC successfully synchronized the
efforts of more
than 2700 coalition aircraft, representing 12 separate national or
service
components, into what has been deemed the most successful air campaign
in
history. A significant limitation of the concept, however, was the time
consuming
process of building a single day's air tasking order (ATO). The ATO
process,
primarily because of the number of assets it was trying to coordinated,
invariably
took in excess of 72 hours to produce, and had to reflect the decisions
surrounding
target selection, intelligence, and bomb damage assessment. Once the
ATO was
published, it was extremely difficult to add sorties. The obvious
limitation was that
many enemy targets of special interest to the ground commander were
fleeting in
nature, and required a quick response time that the ATO planning cycle
was
incapable of accommodating. This limitation was partially solved with
work-
arounds. In the case of
MARCENT, General Moore added enormous numbers of
sorties to the ATO at the beginning of the ATO planning cycle, fully
intending to
cancel these extra sorties if quick reaction targets didn't materialize
just prior to
schedule aircraft launch times.22 This is an example of "gaming
the system", but
also indicates that the JFACC's control of aircraft still requires
evolution.
It is often misunderstood that Marine
aviation deploys as part of a MAGTF,
but even more often misunderstood that Marine aviation itself deploys
as an
extremely effective and integrated team. Marine fighter/attack aviation
not only
deployed to SWA as part of a MAGTF, but also as an asset within the six
functions
of Marine aviation. Just as the Marine Corps is more effective when
deployed with
its aviation, so is Marine aviation more effective when it is allowed
to remain
integrated within the other functions of Marine aviation. The six
functions are:
Anti-Air Warfare
Offensive Air Support
Assault Support
Electronic Warfare
Tactical Air Reconnaissance
Control of Aircraft and Missiles
An example of this misunderstanding occurred during
Desert Storm
General Moore was approached by the JFACC and asked
to relinquish control of
his EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft. General Moore responded that he
would
support the JFACC's requirement for Electronic Warfare support, but
that Marine
fighter/attack aircraft would not go north (into Iraq) without them.23
The MAGTF's Expeditionary
Airfield (EAF) capability reappeared during
Desert Storm. EAF equipment is always deployed aboard the Marine Corps
Maritime Prepositioning Shipping (MPS) and arrived
in SWA to be immediately
used in the augmentation of existing airfields. Additionally, EAF
equipment was
utilized to construct three helicopter airfields at Lonesome Dove, 145
miles out in
the desert (to provide forward basing of helicopter assets). Over the
course of the
conflict, Marines and Navy Seabees laid in excess of three million
square feet of
EAF matting.24
Much has been said concerning the effectiveness of the air war in Desert
Storm. Marine
aviation's contribution was significant. In all, Marine aviation in
Desert Shield/Storm flew over 18,000 sorties and delivered more than 29
million
tons of ordnance.
Summary
Along with the Marine Corps' habitual predilection towards austerity,
Marine fighter/attack aviation survived the
turbulent twenty years leading up to
the Gulf War by consolidating into extremely capable multi-role
aircraft. This
predilection and consolidation combination proved extremely useful in
deflecting
Congressional inquiries aimed at the four air force
perception. Maintenance of
Marine aviation's connection to carrier aviation again proved vital in
keeping
gainfully employed between the wars. The Marine Corps successfully
pursued the
question of control of its aviation assets to resolution in the 1986 Omnibus
Agreement. In short, the twenty years
between wars was well spent by Marine
aviation, preparing it for the challenge presented by the Gulf War.
Marine fighter/attack
aviation's participation in the Gulf War proved
significant to the success of American effort. The Marine's extremely
capable and flexible fighter/attack assets were heavily relied upon by the Navy
and Air Force,
as well as the Marine ground forces, and was not redundant to the other
aviation
assets available. The Gulf War additionally provided the opportunity
for Marine
aviation to demonstrate the advantages of its forward basing concept
and
equipment.
Chapter 5
Notes
1
Mersky, p. 289
2 Lieutenant General Thomas H. Miller USMC
(Ret), interview by author, 10
January 1995; Lieutenant General Philip D. Shutler, USMC (Ret),
interview
by author, 11 January 1995; Lieutenant General Keith A. Smith, USMC
(Ret),
interview by author, 13 January 1995; General John R. Dailey, USMC
(Ret),
interview by author, 25 and 30 January 1995. All four general officers
served
as Deputy Chief of Staffs for Aviation (DCS Air).
3 Major Jon T Hoffman, USMCR, "The
Roles and Missions Debate," Marine
Corps Gazette (December 1994): p. 16-17
4 Mersky, p. 289-298
5
Lieutenant General Thomas H. Miller USMC (Ret),
interview by author, 10
January 1995. General Miller was the
first American to fly the AV-8.
6 LtGen Miller, interview by
author
7 Mersky, p. 291-292
8 Dailey, interview by author
9 Mersky, p. 289-291
10 LtGen Shutler, interview by author; Mersky, p. 289-296
11 Mersky, p. 295-296
12 LtGen Shutler, interview by author
13 Gen Dailey, LtGen Shutler, LtGen
Smith, LtGen Miller, interviews by author.
All four generals agree that
interdependence between the two services under
the umbrella of Naval aviation is of
great benefit and must be maintained.
Statements as to the present day
capabilities/limitations of the F-14 and the AV-
8 are the opinions of the author.
14 Mersky, p. 296-298; Dailey,
interview by author; Miller, interview by author
15
LtGen Miller, interview by author; LtGen Shutler, On Roles, Missions,
Functions and Processes, (LtGen Shutler's Personal
Files) p. 5-6
16 Mersky, p. 299-300
Chapter 5
Notes (cont.)
17 Gen Dailey, interview by author
18
John M. Collins, CRS Report for Congress, p. 5-7 and annex F; Major
Dwight R. Motz, "JFACC: The Joint Air
Control "Cold War" Continues...",
Marine Corps Gazette:(Marine Corps Association,
Vol 77, Number 1, January,
1993) p. 66-67
19 Motz, p. 68
20
Charles J Quilter II, Colonel USMCR, "U.S.
Marines in the Persian Gulf,
1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and
Desert
Storm", Meeting the Threat from the Air, (Washington, D.C.,
History and
Museums Division, HQMC, 1993) p. 19
21
Charles J Quilter II, Colonel USMCR, "U.S.
Marines in the Persian Gulf,
1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and
Desert
Storm", D-Day: The Air Campaign Begins,
(Washington, D.C., History and
Museums Division, HQMC, 1993) p. 49-52
22 Major Charles D.
Melson, "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: Anthology and
Annotated Bibliography", Marine Air: There When Needed, interview with Lieutenant General
Royal N. Moore, Jr. USMC, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums
Division, HQMC, 1992) p. 111 -112; Motz, JFACC: The Joint Air Control "Cold War"
Continues
... p. 70-71
23 Melson, p. 124-125
24
Melson, p. 122; Chief Warrant Officer Wyles,
interview by author 10 January
1995. CWO Wyles is the EAF project Officer at MAWTS-1, MCAS Yuma AZ.
CLICK HERE TO VIEW IMAGE
1991-1995
The end of the Gulf War came
concurrently with a national realization that
the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners had disintegrated,
effectively
removing the threat which had
justified military force structure since WW II. To
many in the American political leadership the federal deficit and
domestic issues
were the priority. The combination of these events exacerbated the
usual post-war "demobilization fever", and reopened the arguments
about duplication and waste.
All the armed services found themselves facing a
massive draw-down and felt their
very survival at risk. The services attempted to protect themselves by
throwing
accusations of redundancy at each other. Despite its performance in
combat,
Marine fighter/attack aviation found itself at the
center of the survival controversy
once again.
Apart from the federal
deficit problem and the rhetoric concerning a "peace
dividend" arising at the end of the Cold War, the military
services found the threat
they had used to justify force structure reduced to amorphous,
generally regional
scenarios. These coincidental sweeping changes in the global threat
environment
and the dramatic reductions in resources available to the DoD
occasioned a review
of service roles, missions, and functions, and resulted in the
Bottom-Up-Review
(BUR), immediately following Desert Storm.1 Ironically, the Marine
Corps seemed
to epitomize what was required, being a small, lean, and flexible quick
reaction
force, ideally suited to regional contingencies. The threat to the
Marine Corps and
its aviation became a determination by the other services that they
could do
anything the Marines could do. This determination, plus the fact that
the Marine
Corps was not designed to fight long duration wars
or major regional contingencies
(MRCs), without help, seemed to imply that it was the Marine Corps
which was
redundant.
In July 1992, Senator Sam
Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, made a speech on the Senate floor which enumerated
several
areas within the U.S. military where he believed duplication existed
and that the
post-Desert Storm BUR had not addressed. While not endorsing specific
reductions
in forces, Senator Nunn listed examples that were possibly duplicative.
Among
these examples were the light infantry divisions fielded by both the
Army and
Marine Corps and the power projection tactical air
elements of the Air Force, Navy
and Marines.2 The implications of Senator Nunn's power projection
suggestion to
Marine fighter/attack aviation are obvious, and just
as potentially threatening is
the suggestion concerning light infantry divisions. Unlike the
fighter/attack assets
of the other services, Marine aviation is tied directly to its Marine
divisions. A cut in
Marine divisions would be accompanied by a corresponding cut in Marine
aviation.
More significant than Senator Nunn's specific
suggestions is what his speech
revealed about the Congressional viewpoint on future service
development.
In his February 1993
triennial report to Congress, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, responded to Senator Nunn's speech.
General
Powell expressed strong support for maintaining the
seemingly redundant
capabilities among the services. He argued "redundant" was
often an incorrect
categorization and that "complementary" or
"overlapping" was more appropriate.
The complementary capabilities translated to
flexibility for the commander in
tailoring his forces to his specific situation. General Powell did
recommend further
study of more far reaching changes. Among those recommendations were
the
possibility of reducing Army forces for rapid response, and the Army
supplying
some heavy artillery to the Marine Corps.3
Congress did not think that
General Powell's recommendations went far
enough. The simple fact was the planned BUR defense structure might not
be
affordable. Consequently, Congress requested the General Accounting
Office
(GAO) to review Chairman Powell's triennial report,
and its bill authorizing
defense spending for 1994, the Congress established an independent
commission to
study the military service's roles and missions. Additionally, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) was asked to conduct a study of
potential cost savings in
Reducing the duplication of capabilities within the military services.
The
GAO evaluation of the Chairman's report produced recommendations
which directly affect Marine fighter/attack aviation. First, the GAO examined
whether the Navy could take over the functions of Marine tactical air,
and they
concluded Marine aviation was better suited to the MAGTF mission. Second, GAO
studied the light infantry issue and concluded that both the Army and
the Marine
Corps should retain those forces. The GAO report did make the overall
assessment that the Chairman's report was flawed by insufficient
analysis of
service duplication, and recommended further study.4 The GAO's report was based
on cost, without adequate consideration of the impact on
capability, Ultimately,
Congress did not accept and act on this report.5
The CBO
recommendations that affected Marine
aviation concluded the
most cost affective course was to:
1)
Reduce the number of Army light infantry
division and rely more heavily on Marine
expeditionary forces.
2)
Reduce Navy aircraft in support of Marine
Operations.
3)
Eliminate two to five carrier air wings and rely
more on the air Force for power projection.
4)
Terminate Air Force responsibilities for close air
Support (CAS) and transfer that responsibility to
the Army, (Marines retain responsibility for
MAGTF CAS).
The CBO discussed each of these recommendations with
regard to various levels of
adoptions and combinations of recommendations.6
Indications are that the
Marine Corps has done extremely well, thus far, in
discussions at the Congressional level. However, that assessment is
premature
since both the report of the independent commission established by
Congress and
Congress' own ultimate decision on service roles and
missions are still forthcoming
in 1995. Meanwhile, positioning and debate continue within the
services.
Within the Department of the
Navy (DON) the challenge for Marine
fighter/attack aviation revolves around the downsizing effect on the
Navy and the
shortfall downsizing created in deployable carrier squadrons. Defense
Planning
Guidance (DPG) currently requires the Navy to
maintain eleven active carriers and
one operational reserve. Thirty F/A-18 squadrons, on a rotational
basis, are
required to man the planned ten Carrier Air Wings (CVWs). The Navy has
only
twenty-two F/A-18 squadrons. In June 1993 the Marine Corps signed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that provided three
F/A-18 squadrons for
long term carrier integration and an additional two squadrons for
periodic integration.
The Navy began looking seriously at total long term
integration of all 16 Marine
F/A-1 8 squadrons. On 30 July 1993, Commandant Mundy briefed the Chief
of
Naval Operations (CNO) that "further integration beyond the MOA is
not feasible."
This had been determined after close scrutiny of
Marine responsibilities in support
of contingency plans and the amount of time which Marine personnel
already
spend deployed.7
FUTURE FIGHTER/ATTACK PLANS
The Navy plans to replace
its F/A-18C model aircraft with the F/A-18E. The
Marine Corps currently supports the Navy's upgrade.
However, the Corps does
not plan to procure the aircraft. The are several reasons for this.
First, Marine
Corps attention and resources are currently focused
on the procurement of the V-
22 tilt-rotor aircraft as the much needed replacement for the aging
medium lift
helicopter fleet (recall the "interim measure" concept that
the Marine Corps had of
the helicopter from the outset, which was discussed in chapter 5).
Second, the F/A-
is expected to cost more than 100 million dollars per aircraft and will
be a
conventional take off and landing (CTOL) aircraft, which is contrary to
the Marine's
all VSTOL plans. Third, the Marine acquisition of the F/A1 8E could
challenge
procurement of a VSTOL replacement for the AV-8B.8
The replacement of both the
AV-8B and the F/A-18 by a single aircraft is the
priority for future development of fighter/attack aviation within the
Marine Corps.9
The replacement was originally conceived to be the
Advanced Vertical or Short
Take Off and Landing (ASTOVL) aircraft with an anticipated introduction
date of
approximately 2005. However, historical analysis of the cost trends in
tactical
aircraft procurement indicates that the next generation of tactical
aircraft will
simply be unaffordable if pursued individually by the military
services.
Congressional language directed the Marine Corps to
combine its ASTOVL
requirements with the other service's future fighter/attack plans which
have since
coalesced into the joint advanced strike technology (JAST) program.10
The JAST concept seeks to
satisfy the individual fighter/attack requirements
of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, by producing a single
aircraft which is
"modularized". Modularization would
potentially allow each service to
individualize the aircraft to meet its requirements by adding or
subtracting
components and devices from the basic aircraft. The overall intention
is that the
aircraft would remain essentially common, allowing for greatly reduced
costs and
improved logistic support. Several concepts have been submitted by
defense
contractors and are under consideration.11
Summary
All the nation's military
services are threatened by the current budgetary
environment, and are challenged to define their requirements against
threats that
defy delineation. The Marine Corps, due to its habitual austerity, will
probably
fare well in the current roles and missions review. Marine
fighter/attack aviation
in particular has demonstrated cost effectiveness, technological
farsightedness, and
a unique qualification to adapt to future conventional or
unconventional air power
requirements. It is those aspects of Marine aviation which are truly
different from
other services' aviation that most effectively counter accusations of
redundancy.
While the differences of Marine aviation have
heretofore been alluded to, they
warrant closer examination.
Chapter 6
Notes
1
John Birkler, CNA/RAND, Roles and Functions of Land- and
Sea-Based Air Forces:
What Are
the Issues in the Changed Security Environment?, PM-304-CRMAF,
September 1994, Prepared for the
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed
Forces, (USMC Roles and Missions
Coordination Office, HQMC, Roles and
Missions Aviation File)
2
Floor Speech by Senator Sam Nunn July 2,1992, The Defense
Department Must
Thoroughly Overhaul The Services Roles and Missions, (USMC Roles and
Missions
Coordination Office, HQMC, Roles and Missions Historical File Vol I).
3
Statement of Robert D. Reischauer, Director
Congressional Budget Office on Options for Re-configuring Service Roles and Mission,
before the Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, March 98
1994, (USMC Roles and Missions Coordination Office, HQMC, Roles and Missions
Historical File Vol II), P. 2-3
4 GAO Report to the Honorable
John W. Warner, U.S. Senate, Roles and Functions: of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Report, July 1993, (Obtained
from
USMC Roles and Missions Coordination Office, HQMC, Roles and Missions
Historical File Vol I), P. 19-28
5 LtGen Shutler, On Roles,
Missions, Functions and Processes, p. 6-7
6 Statement of Robert D. Reischauer, Options for
Reconfiguring Service Roles and
Mission, p.
4-24
7 Memorandum of Agreement: Periodic
Integration of USMC Aviation Units with USN
Carrier Air Wing (CVW), dtd 24 February
1992; Memorandum of Agreement:
Integration of USMC Aviation Units With
USN Carrier Air Wings (CVW), dtd 2 June
1993, (Obtained from USMC Roles and
Missions Division, Headquarters Marine
Corps, Roles and Missions Aviation File)
8 Colonel (BGen select) Michael Hough, USMC,
Director Aviation Procurement and
Weapons (APW) Branch, HQMC, interview by
author 13 December 1994.
9
Gen Dailey, interview by author, General Dailey
indicated that the long range
plans for Marine fighter/attack aviation
is to replace both the F/A-18 and the
AV-8 with a single VSTOL aircraft.
10
Major Eric Van Camp, JAST Project Officer, Aviation
Plans and Weapons (APW)
Branch, HQMC, interview by author 27
January 1995.
11
Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program briefing
slides (APW JAST Project Officer
Files, APW, HQMC)
CLICK HERE TO VIEW IMAGE
The Tangible Differences of Marine
Aviation
There are several tangible
differences between Marine aviation and
the aviation of other services. These differences have been and
continue to be
critical to the survival of Marine aviation. These differences must be
considered
and clearly articulated to Congress and the American people if Marine
aviation is
to survive, because it is the uniqueness of Marine aviation that most
eloquently
counters accusations of redundancy.
Element of a Combined Arms Package
As discussed in earlier
chapters, Marine aviation is a fully integrated
member of the MAGTF. The MAGTF concept is the Marine interpretation of
the
requirement to "Provide a force of combined arms" in order to
comply with
Congressional law [Title 10, Section 5063 (a)]. Repeated
often enough to be
considered a cliche, every Marine pilot trains first as an infantry
officer, and is
required to periodically requalify in basic infantry skills (e.g.,
annual rifle/pistol
requalification). The intention of this requirement is to continuously
re-enforce the
Marine aviator's connection to the infantry throughout his education
and growth.
This is more than just a semi-religious mindset. It reflects the unique
requirements
of amphibious warfare. As LtGen Shutler commented, "Conduct of war
in a littoral
theater, particularly during the creation of a lodgment, demands
interactive
processes from design through transportation to target designation and
attack."1 It
must be remembered that the amphibious mission orientation of the
Marine Corps
dictates that its ground forces be "light infantry" in order
to facilitate rapid
movement. For this reason, the Marine Corps has elected not to encumber
itself
vast amounts of armor and artillery, relying instead on aviation to
provide the
bulk of its fire power. Without its aviation, the Marine Corps is not a
MAGTF. If
the Marine Corps is not a MAGTF, then it is a comparatively poorly
equipped
army, and therefore, a likely redundancy target.
While Marine aviation trains and deploys as
part of the MAGTF package,
Marine aviation itself comes as a package.
Marine aviation performs six functions:
anti-air warfare, offensive air support,
assault support, electronic warfare, tactical
air reconnaissance, and control of aircraft
and missiles. This package trains and
deploys together as well. To reinforce the
positive aspects of this aviation team,
Marine Aviation Weapons and Training
Squadron-One (MAWTS-1) conducts a
biannual graduate level school known as
Weapons Tactics Instructor Course
(WTI). The students from the course are
selected to represent the six functions of
Marine aviation and perform in their
specialties during chalkboard and flight
instruction incorporating all six functions.
This type of training, combining the
various aviation occupational specialties,
reinforces the concept of "train like you
plan to fight."
Expeditionary Basing Concept
Marine aviation is the only
service with the inherent capability to deploy
rapidly, from land bases or naval shipping,
to unimproved forward basing sites.
Part of this capability is represented by the
Expeditionary Airfield (EAF)
equipment aboard Marine MPS shipping. It
should be noted, however, that the
Marine Corps does not desire to build
airfields from scratch out of EAF materials if
other options exist. The current priority in
available options for establishment of
Marine aviation ashore is:
1) Host nation support
2) Captured airfields
3) Operate from roads and highways
4) Build an EAF from scratch
EAF materials are deployed primarily to augment the top three
priorities as
indicated above.2
Marine aviation's forward
basing concept is also derived from the
requirement, under law, to provide a "force of combined
arms". Marine aviation's
interpretation of this requirement is to move aviation as close to the
ground combat
element as possible. This allows for an increase in available sorties
(moving an
airfield half the distance to a target doubles the productivity of the
force), a
decrease in response time, and interface directly with the ground
commander. The
EAF is only part of Marine aviation's forward basing
concept. In addition to the
EAF assets for runway and air facilities, Marine squadrons also deploy
with
aviation command and control facilities, aircraft maintenance
facilities, and logistics
distribution facilities. All of this equipment is helicopter
transportable and
therefore moveable by truck, aircraft, or ship. Once ashore, these
Marine basing
assets remain "moveable" (a carrier is "mobile", an
EAF is "moveable"), and can
continually "move to the sound of guns".3 It is here Marine
aviation departs from
Navy carrier aviation. The Navy does not have the
capability to support its aircraft
ashore. The Navy is unlikely to move large numbers of its carrier air
assets ashore
for extended periods in any case, since those air assets constitute the
bulk of the
battle group's air defense. However, in those cases where the Marine
Corps and
the Navy operate the same aircraft type, Marine logistics and
maintenance support
facilities can host Navy aircraft ashore for limited periods of time.
Obviously, the VSTOL
capabilities resident in the AV-8B are an extension of
the Marine Corps' forward basing concept. The Harrier is the only VSTOL
fighter/attack aircraft in the U.S. inventory, and it has the unique
ability to fly from
amphibious shipping (it doesn't require a large deck carrier) and
deploy forward to
extremely small airfields.
Land-Sea "Swing Force"
The expeditionary basing
capability of Marine aviation creates what is
probably the most significant difference of Marine Corps aviation,
namely its
unique status as a land-sea swing force. Within the national spectrum
of tactical
aviation assets, approximately fifty-five percent reside in the Air
Force and forty-
five percent in Naval aviation. Within Naval aviation, the assets
roughly work out to
two thirds Navy and one third Marine. Therefore, approximately fifteen
percent
of the nation's tactical air assets have Marines painted on the side.
From a
Congressional standpoint, Marine aviation is a
"swing force" capable of
substantially augmenting either sea-based aviation from thirty to
forty-five percent
of the nation's assets, or land-based aviation from fifty-five to
seventy percent as
the situation requires.4 This can be graphically represented as
follows:
CLICK HERE TO VIEW IMAGE
This capability is
significant because it is foreseeable that the nation could be
confronted by scenarios that preclude land-based aviation, or
alternately, sea-
based aviation. Land-based aviation could be prevented from operations
close
enough to the battle space to be effective by the lack of host nation
support.
Additionally, land-based aviation operates from
fixed facilities, the location of
which is usually known to the enemy. The enemy is likely to consider
any fixed
facility a priority target. Sea-based aviation could be prevented from
operating
close enough to the battle space by an enemy possessing a credible
anti-shipping
capability (missiles, mines, submarines). 5 Therefore, Marine aviation
provides
more than a substantial augmentation to either sea-based or land-based
aviation.
Furthermore, its moveable EAF equipment potentially
offers some capability in
situations that preclude anything else.
Cost
Due to the current
challenges to the Marine Corps in the wake of the roles
and mission debate, much has been said recently concerning the cost of
the Marine
Corps as compared to other services. The figures
vacillate somewhat from source
to source, but the Marine Corps generally claims to cost approximately
six percent
of the DoD budget (including Marine aviation), for about sixteen
percent of DoD's
force.6 In other words, the Marine Corps is a great deal. The problem
is that there
is widespread disagreement outside the Marine Corps as to the accuracy
of these
figures. The figures are arguably an apples to oranges argument in any
case, since
cost effectiveness is scenario dependent. It has been suggested that the
six percent
for sixteen percent statistic is a particularly dangerous number for
the Marine
Corps to marry itself to.7 The
statistic may be difficult to prove and, in effect,
throws the gauntlet down to other services and agencies to come up with
their own
statistics or interpret the Marine Corps statistics for the
justification of things the
Marine Corps did not mean to imply. For example, if
the six percent figure reflects
that Marine Corps personnel readily accept a lower quality of life,
then the statistic
could be used to blunt attempts to improve that quality. Additionally,
the six
percent figure supposedly incorporates aviation costs, but may not
include all the
expenses absorbed by the Navy, such as aircraft developmental costs.
What
probably can be safely said about the cost of the Marine Corps,
including its fixed-
wing aviation, is that it generally costs less and certainly no more
than other
services. Consider, for example, the Marine Corps' more heavily
weighted junior
enlisted rank structure. The Marine Corps has a higher percentage of
personnel
the E-5 and below paygrade.8
There is another statistic
currently being put forth by the Marine Corps
which speaks to a difference in Marine aviation. While this statistic
is not directly a
cost issue, it is one of value. The Marine Corps currently states that
Marine
aviation constitutes eighty-nine to ninety percent of the MAGTF's fire
power. This
statistic speaks to the rapidly deployable, light infantry
configuration of the Marine
ground force, and how heavily dependent that configuration is on
aviation.
Further, the statistic is probably derived by
assessing the ratios in pure tonnage of
ordnance that the MAGTF delivers down-range. From this limited
perspective,
eighty-nine to ninety percent in favor of aviation does not seem
unreasonable.
However, the statistic could be considered
misleading, or even adversarial, to other
services and Marine ground forces because tonnage of ordnance delivered
does not
account for effectiveness. While the combat fire power of aviation has
often been
extremely effective, there are scenarios where the use of aviation may
be stymied
by an enemy who refuses to present traditional targets (e.g., guerrilla
warfare,
limited conflicts in urban environments, weapons of mass destruction,
etc.). The
statistic does not take into account these possibilities.
Multi-Role Platform Emphasis
All Marine fighter/attack
aircraft are multi-mission platforms, which
provides critical value in terms of flexibility and cost effectiveness.
Each aircraft
has been intentionally designed to perform many of the different
missions that the
MAGTF may require, and the F/A-18 can even shift
between attack and fighter
roles on the same mission. This offers increased flexibility and
enhances the
"swing force" aspect of Marine aviation.
Additionally, the multi-role capability of
Marine aircraft allows for fewer types of aircraft (i.e., taxpayer
benefit).9
The Intangible Differences of Marine
Aviation
There are some aspects of the Marine Corps,
and therefore Marine aviation,
that are intangible and difficult to quantify. These aspects are easily
ignored or
discounted by Marine aviation adversaries. However, any attempt to
truly evaluate
the value of Marine aviation requires that the intangibles be
considered.
The Marine Aviator
Despite what some "real" Marines
believe, Marine aviators are Marines.
Anyone familiar with military aviation would have to
acknowledge that for those
who simply wish to fly, the other services offer quicker and easier
paths to the
cockpit than does the Marine Corps. Since the entry level requirements
for all the
services' aviation are identical (physical, educational, aptitude),
there must be a
reason that some select the more circuitous Marine route. The only
theory that
holds any water concerning this phenomena is that Marine aviators must
desire to
wear the title "Marine" more than they desire wings. The
effect is that the majority
of Marine aviators consider themselves to be ground Marines whose
assigned
weapon is an airplane. This begins to explain Marine aviation's undying
commitment to ground support.
As discussed earlier, there
is a perception from the ground Marine Corps
Marine aviators are not really Marines. This challenge is, in part, a
reflection
of the fact that Marine aviation fights from garrison. Fixed-wing
aviation requires
prepared airfields (even the AV-8 requires significant preparation for
forward
basing), thus, the living conditions of Marine aircrew are usually
comparably
better than that of the ground Marine. The typical observation by the
Marine
ground side is that the Marine aviator flies to combat in the clean,
air-conditioned
comfort of his cockpit, accomplishes his mission, and flies back to
base, where he
will have all the advantages an established infrastructure can provide.
Marine
aviators are aware of this advantage, and appreciate hardships that the
ground
Marines must endure. At the same time, most Marine
aviators realize that they are
powerless to alter the hardships for the ground Marine, except by a
dedication to
helping make victory in combat as quick and decisive as possible.
Close Air Support
The question concerning
whether Marine CAS is better than anybody else's
CAS has fueled a heated argument among the services,
especially during the
current roles and mission debate. The Air Force in particular has gone
on record
stating that anyone can do CAS, and Marine CAS is no better. Marine
aviation has
been quick to respond with quantifiable reasons why Marine CAS is
better (e.g.,
aviators as Forward Air Controllers, training requirements, etc.). The
truth is that
the Air Force is completely capable of performing CAS missions as well
as
Marines. However, the question has never been one of
"can"; it has been, and
remains one of "will". Historically, neither the Air Force
nor the Navy have shown
much dedication to CAS, and the Air Force in particular has seen
strategic bombing
as more its primary role in life than CAS. The Marine Corps believes
that CAS is
not something you do when required, it is something you trained to as
the center
piece, all other functions of aviation usually being subordinate.
Experienced
Marine aviators have observed that CAS skills are
extremely perishable. To
perform the mission effectively requires a commitment to frequent
training with
the ground combat forces. History provides few examples of such a
commitment
by the Air Force or Navy.
Cost
Cost has already been
discussed as a "tangible". It also has some intangible
connotations. A recurring challenge for Marine aviation within the
Marine Corps is
the differences in the operating costs between aviation and ground
units. The
annual peacetime operating costs of a Marine division are less than the
operating
costs of a single Marine squadron.10 The recurring challenge from the
ground
Marine Corps is: are these seemingly exorbitant
costs justifiable? The intangible
aspect of this question resides in the inability to quantify to ground
Marines exactly
how much Marine aviation affects the ultimate success in combat of the
Marine
Corps. To any Marine who has ever been on the
receiving end of an enemy's
aviation combat power or on the front line during the conduct of Marine
close air
support, this is not an intangible and the cost is money well spent.11
Summary
Marine aviation is clearly
different from the other services' aviation. More
importantly, the differences in Marine aviation are distinctly
advantageous in the
application of American air power because of the greatly increased
flexibility and
cost effectiveness provided by these differences. Marine aviation, as a
component
of American air power, makes that air power greater than the sum of its
parts.
However, Marine aviation remains numerically
inferior to the other services'
aviation, and will therefore continue to face challenges to its
survival. The Marine
Corps must remain alert to these challenges and be prepared to defend
itself.
Chapter 7
Notes
1 Lieutenant General Philip D. Shutler,
USMC (Ret), On Roles, Missions,
Functions and Processes, (LtGen Shutler's personal
files), p. 5
2
CWO Wyles, MAWTS-1 EAF Project Officer, interview by
author, 5 January
1995
3
Lieutenant General Shutler letter to Congressman Les
Aspin, dated 10 July
1992, (LtGen Shutler's personal files), p. 2-3
4
LtGen Shutler, interview by author; LtGen Shutler
letter to Congressman
Les Aspin, dated 10 July 1992, (LtGen Shutler's personal files), p. 2
5
Colonel Robert S. Melton, USMC, "The
Value of Marine Aviation," Marine
Corps Gazette (December 1994): p. 30-31
6
Major Tracy Warren, HQMC Roles and Missions
Coordination Office, interview
by author, 13 December 1994
7
LtGen Shutler, interview by author; LtGen Smith
interview by author. Both
agree that accurate statistics concerning the cost comparison of the
different services are difficult to fix because of the complexity and
variables
involved. They agreed also that stating a statistic, in effect,
presents a target.
8 LtGen Smith, interview by author
9 Melton, p. 31
10 General Dailey, interview by author, 25
and 30 January 1995
11 Major General Day, interview by author,
21 February 1995. MGen Day was the
last Marine on active duty ever to
be strafed by enemy air (Okinawa, WW II).
CLICK HERE TO VIEW IMAGE
Marine
aviation is a vital element of American air power, and therefore
should continue to be maintained. Because of its relatively small size
and
residence within Naval aviation, Marine aviation will continue to face
challenges to
its survival. Marine fighter/attack aviation will continue to bear the
brunt of these
challenges because of its perceived vulnerability in redundancy
arguments. As it
has been from the beginning, the survival of Marine aviation depends
upon timely,
coherent, and well articulated defense as each new challenge begins to
emerge. It
is clear that to successfully defend Marine aviation, the defender must
have a
comprehensive understanding of Marine aviation's precedence in history.
It is also
clear that the defender must keep abreast of the current, continuing,
and
envisioned future challenges. Lastly, the defender should consider
those mistakes
Marine aviation has made which have endangered its survival, and those
it is likely
to make.
Continuing Challenges
Marine fighter/attack aviation will continue to be
challenged by the Navy
and Air Force claiming that Marine fighter attack aviation is redundant
to their
capabilities. However, any suggestion that they could absorb the
functions of
Marine aviation is a risky proposition. For them to suggest that they
could do it
with their existing assets would imply that there currently is a fair
amount of
waste in their programs. To suggest that they could do it if given the
Marines
assets begs the question: At what benefit? Can those functions be
performed more
inexpensively or more effectively? Neither the Navy nor the Air Force
is in a
position to take on the commitments that Marine aviation currently
satisfy, since
both already have consuming commitments to national security. The only
thing
left is to suggest that the functions of Marine aviation are not
required. This is not
only ludicrous but also would render no benefit to the other services
since
Congress is not likely to eliminate Marine aviation on that basis and
then recreate
the "unnecessary" capability in another service. Recall the
implication in Senator
Nunn's speech that Congress is looking for way to cut costs, not move
them
around.
Congressional inquiries into the survival of
Marine aviation are likely to
due to Congress' inherently short memory and unending pressure to cut
expenditures. After WW II, Congress recognized the enormous impact of
aviation
on war by passing legislation that specifically included aviation
forces in all four
services. Korea further convinced Congress that amphibious operations
and
littoral warfare were not obsolete, and accordingly they enacted
legislation (1952)
to ensure a minimum strength in the Marine Corps of 3 division and 3
air wings.
This legislation was specifically designed to prevent budgetary
pressure and
interdepartmental struggles from devouring the Marine Corps and its
aviation. It
is ironic, yet certain, that the Marine Corps will have to continually
remind
Congress of the wisdom of that legislation.
Current Challenges
Although the Congressional
decisions on service roles and missions are not
due until the end of 1995, it would appear
that Marine aviation, as an organization,
will be a survivor. What the Marine Corps
must be wary of is the "piecemeal"
approach to Marine aviation assets and
functions. As of February 1995, the U.S.
Air Force has elected to retire its EF-111
electronic warfare assets. For the
immediate future the Air Force has covered
the EW gap they created by signing a
memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the
Department of the Navy. The
agreement essentially promises to provide
EA-6B aircraft in direct support of Air
Force missions.1 The obvious question is who,
within the DON, will be tasked with
the additional requirement? Arguably, any
limited air asset that is committed to
inter-service requirements should reside in the Marine Corps because of
its
inherent capability to deliver and sustain that asset wherever and
whenever it is
required. However, this could not be reasonably accomplished without a
force
structure augmentation (personnel strengths, budget, aircraft), to
accommodate
the additional commitment. It
should be noted that force structure augmentation
would be required by any service selected to host a "nationalized"
asset, and would
often also require the creation of capabilities that they do not
inherently possess
(i.e., the Navy would need to create the shore-based logistics and
support
capabilities if they took on the EA-6B commitment). The challenge will
be the
inevitable face-off with the Navy, who will almost certainly suggest
that all EA-6B
assets, along with their logistics/maintenance support, reside in the
Navy.
Future Challenges
The major challenge to the
future of Marine fighter/attack aviation is the
selection of the replacement aircraft for the AV-8 and F/A-18. The
Marine Corps
must insure that it doesn't further sever the ties between it and the
Navy in
procuring this replacement. The Marine tie to Navy aviation transcends
consideration of traditions. The Navy is largely responsible for our
ability to "move
to the sound of guns." The stunted growths of both the AV-8 and
F-14 have
adequately demonstrated the undesirable effects of either service
attempting to
develop an aircraft without the other. Additionally, budget constraints
will almost
certainly deprive both services of a follow-on fighter/attack aircraft
if we cannot
agree on a common approach. The Marine Corps should be willing to
compromise
somewhat in the final design to accommodate Navy requirements, and the
Navy
must realize that the large deck carrier/conventional take-off aircraft
mentality
may not be the only answer to future mission requirements. The Marine
Corps
should also exercise caution so as not to step too far away from the
F/A-18 E/F in
pursuing its future requirements. In today's budgetary environment, the
joint
advanced strike technology aircraft may never happen.
Mistakes Marine Aviation Has Made
Expeditionary Basing
Between 1989 and 1991,
Marine Air Weapons Training Squadron-One
(MAWTS-1) in Yuma Arizona, planned and coordinated an effort to have
its
Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) students operate from Interstate
Highway 8.
Highway 8 is a concrete highway which runs along the northern border of
Yuma's
main training range (R2301). The intent of the effort was to
demonstrate and train
to the Marine Corps' advertised capability that its aviation can
operate from roads
and highways when required in support of the expeditionary basing
concept. The
coordination effort involved gaining the support of the Arizona
government,
evaluation of the highway's capability to support the F/A-18's weight,
and utilized
metal reinforcement plating and the EAF short field arresting gear.
Once these
problems were worked out in detail, the plan was submitted to HQMC for
approval. HQMC denied approval of the training based on safety
concerns.2
The Marine Corps denial of this training plan
constitutes both a
contradiction and a missed opportunity. The Marine Corps' expeditionary
basing
concept is one of the truly unique aspects of Marine aviation. It can
and should
have a positive impact on Marine aviation's survival. However, the
Marine Corps
cannot make the argument that some aspects of its expeditionary basing
concept
are not safe enough in training, but are safe enough to attempt for the
first time in
combat. The Marine Corps should have insisted on the resolution of any
safety
concerns and proceeded with the training. If those concerns were
aircraft specific
(i.e., the Marine Corps' expeditionary basing concept does not include
all its
aircraft), then it should openly admit that limitation and accept the
impact to the
survival of that aircraft.
The missed opportunity in this scenario was
one of favorable publicity. The
survival of the Marine Corps generally, and Marine aviation
specifically, have not
transcended the historic benefits of public support. Operating
fixed-wing aircraft
from American interstate highways almost certainly would have received
national
media attention, and would have demonstrated the unique aspects of not
only what
Marine aviation can do, but also what it will do. The
Marine Corps' future is not
sufficiently secure to afford missing opportunities like this.
The lessons of Guadalcanal, regarding the
benefits of Marine aviation's
association with Navy carrier aviation, should not be forgotten. Marine
carrier
capability remains an essential element of its expeditionary basing
concept. Yet,
the Marine Corps still occasionally allows its carrier capabilities to
lapse. In the
recent past, situations were allowed to exist where Marine aircraft
were not
receiving carrier modification updates (e.g., F-4 and A-4 aircraft in
the late
seventies and early eighties). Even more recently, Marine F/A-18
students were
allowed to bypass the normally required Carrier training before being
transferred
to their operational squadrons. This was done ostensibly to speed the
training
process for both Marine and Navy aviators, (Navy benefited because bypassing
Marine carrier training opened deck space for Navy students. Both of
these are
situations examples of mistakes not unlike those that kept Marine
aviation
benched in WW II after Guadalcanal.
Summary
The challenges to Marine
fighter/attack aviation have been, and continue to
be surmountable. The Marine Corps must anticipate these challenges and
be
prepared to counter them with coherent, well articulated arguments.
Marine
fighter/attack aviation remains vital to the mission of the Marine
Corps and
essential to the effective application of American air power wherever
and
whenever it is required.
Chapter 8
Notes
1
Lieutenant Colonel David H. Peeler USMC, Aviation
Plans and Policy Branch
HQMC, interview by author, 24 February 1995.
2 LtCol Richard Packard, MMOA HQMC,
interview by author, 5 January 1995.
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