War In Chechnya:
Implications for Russian Security Policy
War In Chechnya:
Implications for Russian Security Policy
Introduction and Acknowledgements
Mikhail Tsypkin
Associate Professor
Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School
Over a century ago, in 1891, the great Russian historian Vassily Kliuchevsky compared Russia to
" a heavily armed medieval knight. We shall be beaten not by those who would attack us, in a proper knightly fashion, from the front, but by him who would grab our leg from under the horse and turn us upside down: like a cockroach lying on its back, we would, without losing any of our inherent strength, powerlessly move our feet in search of firm ground. Power is action, not a potential; when not connected with discipline, it kills itself. We are the lower organisms in the international zoology: we keep on moving even after losing our head." [1]
The war in Chechnya, a tiny (in comparison to the Russian Federation's population
and human and material resources) ethnic homeland in the North Caucasus,
has put into question Russia's military power and the cohesion of Russia's
political system itself, and dramatically slowed Russia's momentum towards
reform. The five chapters of this collection are based on papers by prominent
Russian specialists on the implications of the Chechen war on Russia's security
policy, presented at a conference held at the Naval Postgraduate School
in Monterey, California on November 7 and 8, 1995.
The Russian participants (in alphabetical order) were:
- Dr. Vladimir Averchev, a member of the State Duma (lower house of parliament) from the YABLOKO party;
- Dr. Sergei Arutyunov, Senior Fellow, Institute of Ethnic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences;
- Major Aleksandr Belkin (Ret.), Deputy Executive Secretary of the Council for Defense and Foreign Policy, a leading non-governmental organization;
- Dr. Pavel Felgenhauer, Defense and Security Editor, Segodnya daily newspaper (Moscow);
- Dr. Col. Vitaly Shlykov (Ret.), formerly with the General Staff, currently a private consultant.
Russia's military involvement in Chechnya has lasted since the fall of 1994,
and the public, both in Russia and the West, is still ignorant of the policy-making
process that resulted in the decision to use military force in December
1994, ostensibly to bring the rebellious Chechen Republic back under the
sovereignty of the Russian Federation. Vladimir Averchev argues in his paper
that the war in Chechnya has resulted from a virtual breakdown of the national
security decision-making mechanisms of the Russian Federation. While the
public and the elites are in general agreement over the Kremlin's ultimate
goal in Chechnya -- to preserve the territorial integrity of the Russian
federation -- Yeltsin's administration made no effort, prior to the initiation
of hostilities, to ensure a broad public or even elite support for use of
force.
The war in Chechnya has also demonstrated that the legislative branch has
very little practical control over the actions of the executive branch in
the area of national security. The parliament, although generally opposed
to the war, has failed to find a legal foundation for stopping the hostilities.
According to Averchev, "[T]he Council of Federation [the upper chamber
of the parliament] was unable to exercise its authority to approve or disapprove
the introduction of the emergency rule in Chechnya and hence the use of
force inside the country because the President simply did not ask for it."
The lower chamber, the State Duma, has failed to exercise the only practical
power it has over the executive -- the budgetary one in the case of Chechnya
-- because of various loopholes in Russia's laws on financing government
operations.
The executive branch has concentrated immense national security decision-making
power in its hands, in a manner reminiscent of its predecessor, the communist
regime. The crucial difference, however, is that the Russian presidency,
unlike the Soviet Politburo, largely lacks the political "transmission
belts" essential for mobilizing societal resources for national security
needs. Yeltsin's administration failed to mobilize not only the public to
support the war in Chechnya, but even the military. As Alexander Belkin
notes in his chapter, the war in Chechnya has aggravated the crisis in civil-military
relations that has been brewing throughout Boris Yeltsin's term in office.
This crisis involved:
"[the] latent struggle for the right to control the military and law-enforcement policies between the president himself (counseled and directed by his security entourage) and other branches of power - the prime minister, Security Council, and parliament. On the level of the military itself, the crisis of civil-military relations was manifested in the desperate desire of the military to establish their own lobby in the parliament in an attempt to affect the national government."
This attempt resulted in a nearly complete failure during the parliamentary
elections in December 1995. And finally, the war in Chechnya aggravated
the relationship between the mass media and the military, because of the
latter's attempts to deceive and censor the former.
Initiated to cover up, as suggested by Pavel Felgenhauer, the blunder of
the security forces' highly visible "covert" operations to overthrow
Dudaev, the military attack on Chechnya stumbled into a blunder itself,
reminiscent of Russian and Soviet defeats in 1914 and 1941, albeit on a
much smaller scale. Poorly trained and hastily organized troops, led by
incompetent commanders, walked into the trap in Grozny: according to Felgenhauer,
by New Year's Day of 1996, the General Staff practically lost control of
its forces in the Chechen capital. The "perfect" plan in the style
of the General Staff Academy -- four armored columns meeting simultaneously
in downtown Grozny -- reminds one of Leo Tolstoy's sarcastic analysis in
War and Peace of the Russians' "perfect" plans for the
battle of Austerlitz: both ended in disaster because the enemy refused to
act in accordance with the plan!
The experience of combat in Chechnya reveals three salient points. First,
the new Russian state has not developed a mechanism for learning from its
past mistakes: just like the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Russian forces
marched into a guerrilla war hoping that the mere sight of the mass of modern
weapons would suffice to intimidate the "natives." Second, the
tenacity of Russian soldiers has not disappeared altogether: if properly
led (e.g. the troops of Lt. Gen. Rokhlin, nearly encircled in Grozny), they
can put up a good fight even for a dubious cause. Third, military reform
is desperately needed, but the war in Chechnya has cast a doubt on its direction:
in their reconquest of Chechnya, the Russian military had to rely on the
massive application of heavy weapons, not on highly mobile, and relatively
lightly armed, forces, which are viewed as the wave of the future by many
reformers and observers of reform in Russia.
Many in the military establishment, including those not directly responsible
for the failures in Chechnya, refuse to see any linkage between that war
and military reform, writes Vitaly Shlykov. Further, he writes:
"The Russian military leadership rejects the experiences of the Chechen war to the extent that it prohibited their inclusion in the study programs of the Russian military academies and schools. In the MoD's opinion, this conflict is atypical because it's being waged on Russian territory. Instead, the studies of the war in Afghanistan are being strengthened."
Anti-reform political forces ascendant from 1995 to early 1996 in President
Yeltsin's entourage were also skeptical of military reform, so the term
itself disappeared for a time from Yeltsin's speeches. In democratic Russia,
however, the issue of military reform could not be buried just because those
in power were not inclined to discuss it. In October 1995, a movement for
military reform, Honor and Motherland, was established under the leadership
of Lt. Gen. Aleksandr Lebed, who had just retired. His main idea regarding
military reform is that military strength is essential for political and
economic reform in Russia: in his view, Russia can peacefully conduct reforms
only if it is strong enough to deter aggression.
But what about Chechnya itself, and the powder keg of the Caucasus? Before
the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet empire, which had
put a lid on ethnic friction, American analysts tended to ignore the ethnic
dimension of international conflict. Now, with ethnic conflicts seeming
to roar out of control throughout Eurasia, American observers frequently
view them as inevitable. Sergei Arutyunov argues against such fatalism:
"The real causes of the war lay in the desires of the powers in conflict
to dominate larger territories, markets, natural resources and so on."
Thus, it is the policies pursued by Russian and Caucasian elites that have
resulted in the war. A different set of policies can result in cessation
of hostilities and economic development of the region.
Acknowledgements
The conference War In Chechnya: Implications for Russian Security Policy,
was sponsored by the U.S. Department of the Navy and the Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College.
The Editor would like to express his appreciation to Ms. Diana Peternell
for her flawless work in organizing the conference, and for her editorial
assistance.
Participants
Dr. Roy Allison, Director, Russian and Eurasian Program, the Royal Institute
of International Affairs.
Dr. Rob Arnett, Office of the US Army Chief of Staff.
Dr. Sergei Arutyunov, Senior Fellow, Institute of Ethnic Studies, Russian
Academy of Sciences.
Dr. Vladimir Averchev, Member of the Committee on International Affairs,
State Duma of the Russian Federation.
Dr. Debbie Yarsike Ball, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Mr. Alexander Belkin, Council for Defense and Foreign Policies
Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College.
Dr. John Dziak, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. George Fedoroff, Dept. of the Navy.
Dr. Pavel Felgenhauer, Defense and National Security Editor, Segodnya
newspaper.
Mr. Graham Fuller, Senior Social Scientist, Rand Corp.
Dr. Gail Lapidus, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford
University.
Dr. Jacob Kipp, Senior Analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined
Arms Center, Command and General Staff College, US Army.
Mr. George Kolt, National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia, CIA.
Professor Roman Laba, Naval Postgraduate School.
Dr. Ben Lambeth, Senior Social Scientist, Rand Corp.
Prof. John W. R. Lepingwell, University of Illinois at Urbana.
Prof. Jacques Sapir, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
Dr. Vitaliy Shlykov, Col., General Staff (Ret.)
Prof. Ronald Grigor Suny, University of Chicago.
Ambassador Richard Staar, Hoover Institution.
Mr. Timothy Thomas (LTC, US Army, Ret.), Senior Analyst, Foreign Military
Studies Office, Combined Arms Center, Command and General Staff College,
US Army.
Professor Mikhail Tsypkin, Naval Postgraduate School.
Footnotes:
[1] V. O. Kliuchevksiy, "Aforizmy i mysli ob istorii," in Sochineniya
v devyati tomakh, vol. 9 (Moscow: Mysl', 1990) pp. 363, 364.
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