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Russian Military Perceptions of the Gulf War Air
Campaign 
Dr D Marshall-Hasdell  pard
introduction  
There seems to be little doubt that the experiences of 
the Multi  National Forces (MNF) in the air campaign
during the Gulf War were  examined in detail by
military experts in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). 
After all, the Soviets had provided much of the Iraqi
military hardware  and, therefore, there was at the
very least an obvious interest in  examining its
performance. But the analysis of the Gulf War, as a
purely  Soviet military theoretical exercise, was in
many ways interrupted and  even taken over by events
surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The
need to discuss and develop new military doctrines and
the myriad  of other problems facing the new armed
forces of the FSU placed a  heavy demand on
overstretched military theorists.    
It was to be hoped that the lessons of the Gulf War,
and in particular  those related to the use of air
power, would be incorporated into the  plans for the
future of the armed forces in the new states of the
FSU.  The Russian Federation Armed Forces, as the
dominant player in the new  order of Eastern Europe,
should have been the one most likely to take 
advantage of the experiences of the MNF in the Gulf
War. The aim of this  paper is to identify the extent
to which the Russian Federation Air Force  (RuFAF), as
the predominant successor to the Air Forces of the
FSU,  analysed the air war in the Gulf and also to
examine their  interpretation of the experience in
relation to the importance it has for  the future of
air warfare.   
The paper begins with an examination of the main
influences of the Gulf  War on the future use of air
power. In particular, Russian interpretation  of the
changing nature of air warfare and its influence on
the whole  military strategic situation is analysed,
along with the main factors  that dominated the debate
about the changing strategic scenario. The  second
part of the paper is devoted to a detailed appraisal
of Russian  views relating to the main lessons they
felt could be learnt from the air  campaign. This
includes a study of the impact of advanced
technologies  used in the air campaign that were so
much in evidence throughout the  Gulf War. Other areas
of interest to the Russian analysts are also  covered:
the training of MNF crews; the importance of
Electronic  Warfare (EW); and finally an appraisal of
the role of Command,  Control and Communications (C )
systems.
STRATEGIC CONCERNS  
In March 1992, an article published in Voyennaya Mysl' 
by Air Vice  Marshal Tony Mason stressed the
importance of air power in future  warfare and
introduced the idea to his Russian audience that "air
force  capabilities are of great importance as an
additional tool for achieving  national interests".1 
He used the Gulf War to illustrate his arguments and 
highlighted many of the factors influencing strategic
stability of which Russian analysts  appear to have
taken heed.2 Indeed, the common line, in both Western
and Russian military  assessments of the impact of the
Gulf War air campaign, seemed to stress the need for a 
complete reappraisal of the role and purpose of air
forces in contemporary warfare.  Although the Russians
had the Afghanistan experience to help them evaluate
the  influence of air power, it was recognised that
the future development of the RuFAF could  not rely on
that experience alone.3     
The need for in-depth studies of the Gulf War was
identified by a number of prominent  military people
in Russia, many of whom argued that the growing role
of air power would  be a key player in future warfare;
not least because the air campaign had so obviously 
reduced the likelihood of massive casualties during
land operations. The value of air  forces was seen to
have been increased to the extent that, in certain
conditions, an  enemy's defeat could be achieved
without the need for ground forces to invade enemy 
territory.4 Moreover, it was appreciated that there
was a direct link between the  development of advanced
weapon systems and force levels required to maintain
strategic  stability. This was particularly the case
with air forces because it was argued that any 
lowering of force levels could be more than
compensated for by the increased utilisation  and
deployment of high-tech weapons (HTW). Although this
applies to virtually all  elements of the armed
forces, the Gulf War demonstrated to the Russians that
the use of  HTW and other advanced technologies (e.g.
in electronic warfare (EW), reconnaissance,  C , etc.)
significantly altered the balance of forces.5
Additionally, it was recognised that  cruise missiles
in particular could have strategic, as well as
operational, mission  capabilities. Military
strategists then pointed out the implications for any
military  doctrine - based on the principles of
defensive defence - that was developed against an 
enemy with advanced weapon systems. It was argued that
the Gulf War demonstrated  that "a defence incapable
of creating necessary conditions for launching a
decisive  offensive will not fulfil its mission".6
Certainly passivity in defence spelled disaster and 
would undoubtedly end in defeat.7 Therefore, the only
satisfactory defensive strategy  had to be based on
the ability to mount not only limited
counter-offensive operations but  also major offensive
operations in order to counter the effect of HTWs. The
notion of  active defence had once more gained the
upper hand and the failure of the Iraqis to adapt 
their operational defensive procedures to mobility and
manoeuvre was seen to have been a  major contributory
factor in their defeat.8  
Analysts were especially impressed by the relatively
easy attainment of air supremacy and the influence of
space-based technology, both of which it was felt
deserved considerable attention and in-depth
analysis.9 The ability of the  MNF's air campaign to
paralyse Iraqi C  and to achieve air supremacy with
relative ease  was considered to be the main factor in
the MNF's seizure of the strategic initiative. In 
effect, some commentators suggested that the Iraqis
had conceded strategic and  operational initiative to
the MNF in advance even of the main air campaign. The 
consequence of this action was to allow the Allied
Forces to have the advantage of  complete air
superiority while conducting their combat
operations.10 In particular, it was  widely
appreciated that operational goals could be achieved
without the necessity of  ground force engagements on
enemy territory; as a result the need for large
numbers of  ground troops as part of an offensive
force could now be re-evaluated.11 Some observers 
even went so far as to suggest that the crushing
defeat of the Iraqi Army made it quite  clear that
Soviet military doctrine and the entire model for
military development was  obsolete.12 The need for a
complete reappraisal of the whole strategic stability
issue was  being called for at even the highest
levels. As a result of the impact of air campaign 
during the Gulf War, air power was now considered to
be a key factor in the preservation  of a military
balance and thus to ensure strategic stability across
the whole globe.13  
Not all analysts agreed, however, that the employment
of air power had been the decisive contributor to
victory. Some argued that the air campaign alone could
not have destroyed the Iraqi Army or its military and
nuclear potential.14 In developing  this argument it
was considered that the Iraqis by adopting a static,
positional defence had  contributed to their own
destruction by merely providing targets for precision
guided  weapons (PGW). Only units with a mobile
capability showed any relative survivability in  the
face of an enemy with overwhelming air superiority.
Notwithstanding the reservations  about the totality
of air power, it was generally accepted that wars in
the future would  not begin with an invasion by ground
forces, but instead with a pre-emptive air/electronic 
warfare (EW) campaign.15 
LESSONS OF THE GULF WAR
There is much evidence to show that the Russians have
learned a great  deal from the Gulf War experiences of
the MNF. Much of this has, of  course, been gained
from the Western analysis of the military  operations
conducted by the armed forces of the allies making up
the  MNF. Russian interpretations are, therefore, in
the main part directly  taken from second-hand
sources. It has to be accepted that the quality  of
the information they have used will have been somewhat
diluted from  that which the main participants in the
Gulf War have utilised to  formulate their own
lessons. As a consequence, some of the aspects that 
the Russians have highlighted and discussed in detail
would appear,  perhaps, to be rather obvious to the
Western observer. Indeed to the  Western analyst, many
of the operations during the Gulf War merely  served
to confirm many already widely accepted principles:
for example,  the value of PGWs or the use of force
multipliers. For the purposes of  this paper it is the
intention to examine those areas of Gulf War air 
operations which seem to have had the greatest
impression on the  Russian analysts and military
theorists. This section will, therefore,  start by
looking at the impact of advanced technologies, with 
particular emphasis on the air campaign. This will be
followed by a close  look at the training aspects of
MNF military personnel - this is important  not least
because the Russian Armed Forces have been deeply
engrossed  in a detailed study of their own force
structure and training. Finally  the importance of EW
is considered along with the role of C .
THE IMPACT OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES
The Gulf War was in many ways the proving ground, and
in some cases the  testing ground, for a multitude of
advanced weapon systems that the armed forces  of the
West had been incorporating into their inventories for
the previous decade.  The impact of these new
technologies has been largely identified with the air 
campaign. On television screens across the world,
pictures of the new  technological battlefield were
constantly on parade: ranging from the cruise missile 
flying low and fast down the streets of Baghdad to the 
bombs eye' view of a PGW  dropping down the ventilator
shaft of a hardened aircraft shelter. The Russians 
were exposed to this imagery in much the same way as
their Western counterparts.  Moreover, because the air
campaign lasted for so long - from the initial air 
response in August 1990 to the final sortie in
February 1991 - virtually all aspects  of air
operations were given the closest scrutiny by the
ever-hungry Western media.  Therefore, as never
before, the Russians were able to observe at first
hand and from  readily available sources NATO forces
at war. The men, systems, procedures and  machinery of
the main players in the armed forces of the Western
world could now  be analysed from the comfort of an
armchair using the fast forward, play and pause 
buttons on a video recorder. As a result the Russian
military press devoted  considerable time and space to
what their analysts considered to be the main  lessons
of the Gulf War.   
There seems little doubt that the Russians now see the
future of warfare being  intricately and irrevocably
linked to the use of advanced technology and HTWs. 
Commentators stress the domination of such weapons on
the battlefields of the  future and argue that few, if
any, areas will not be affected by the impact of such 
weapons and systems.16 In particular, the air campaign
was considered to represent the classic  example of
offensive air operations, made more effective by Iraqi
passivity and operational errors.  However, there was
a degree of guarded scepticism about the all pervasive
influence of the Gulf War  air campaign. For example,
it was argued that the Gulf War was almost a unique
military operation  and that, for example,  smart'
weapons would be less effective in battles between
more evenly  matched opponents. The views of Lt.
General of Aviation A. Malyukov would seem to
represent this  sceptical view which, whilst accepting
and applauding the achievements of the MNF, implies
that  although there is much for the Russians to learn
from the Gulf War, future wars are not always going 
to be such a one-sided affair.17 For example, senior
Russian commanders were quick to point out that  the
advanced technology on display with the MNF was not
available to the Iraqis and that "no more  than 10-15%
of Iraqi hardware was modern - the rest, including
Soviet equipment, was only of first or  second
generation models".18 There is an implicit suggestion
in much of what the Russian generals  were saying,
that one of the main lessons learnt by the Russian
military is that they must ensure that  the resources
are available for the continuation of their own HTW
programmes. These are powerful  arguments when
consideration is given to the constant fight between
Russian politicians, economists,  industrialists and
servicemen over resource allocation.  
The problems facing air defence systems in the era of
advanced technologies was one of the areas  which
generated considerable debate. This is perhaps not
surprising when consideration is given to  the fact
that Iraq's integrated air defences used Soviet
hardware. More significantly, the Iraqis used  Soviet
procedural models, which themselves had been subject
to internal scrutiny following public  shows of
incompetence - the shooting down of a Korean airliner
and the  Rust affair' are but two  examples. Many
explanations for the failure of Iraq's air defences
were suggested in the pages of  Russian military
journals, most of which highlighted the obvious: for
example, the detailed  intelligence available to the
MNF as a result of many years of study into Soviet AD
systems  (especially the SAM 2, SAM 3 and SAM 6
systems which formed the basis of Iraq's air defence 
network); the pre-emptive destruction of Iraq's C 
system and the neutralisation or grounding of Iraq's 
air interceptor forces.19 Other factors seemed to have
a much more far reaching impact, notably the  absence
of any air defence weapons or detection systems
capable of an effective counter to the most  advanced
of the new technologies on display in the Gulf War. In
particular, concern was generated  about the
operational effectiveness of systems such as the F-117
Stealth bomber, cruise missiles (CM)  and PGWs
(anti-radar missiles and laser/optical guided
bombs).20 Interestingly, articles then began to 
appear which described in a fair amount of detail the
research which was being conducted into  detection
systems to counter  stealth' technology.21 
Additionally, there was the expected pleading from 
the commanders of various arms of the Armed Forces: in
particular, the Head of  Coastal Forces  argued his
case for extensive modernisation of his forces based
on the need to counter the threat of  CMs.22 It is
quite noticeable that articles like this also tended
to be linked to the general notion of  trying to give
an overall impression of the intention to develop the
Armed Forces on defensive lines.  This, of course, was
at the height of the debate about defensive military
strategies following  Gorbachev's public
pronouncements on  defensive defence' and  reasonable
sufficiency'. Therefore, it  was an obvious ploy for
any senior commander wishing to get a larger slice of
the military budget to  show how requests for
modernisation would enhance the defensive posture of
the forces under his  command.23 Whether these
statements were mere posturing for the sake of cash or
an indication of a  more pragmatic approach to the
general defence debate remains open to question.   
Russian military analysts argued that the extensive
deployment of new, unproved HTW systems  during the
Gulf War, in particular by the Americans, meant that
there was much to study in relation to  this war
experience and it would require examination over a
prolonged period.24 A wide range of  systems were
identified for future examination in addition to the 
number one', high-profile Stealth  bomber: the
guidance, control and navigation systems of CMs and
PGWs; the Patriot anti-missile  system (which
demonstrated the ability to destroy ballistic missiles
in flight), and the integrated  intelligence and
control techniques using both space, air and ground
based systems are but a few  examples highlighted by
Russian analysts. Another important consideration for
future planning was a  need to link the technological
advancement of HTWs with any calculation of an enemy's
combat  potential.25 In other words, some kind of
numerical factor, which would account for the enhanced 
performance of such weapon systems, would have to be
incorporated in any future assessments. This  of
course was not an uncommon practice in the Soviet
military strategists' and theorists' analytical 
programmes. Referring back to previous discussion
about a general strategic rethink, it is interesting
to  note that some commentators recognised a linkage
between PGWs and nuclear weapons. For example,  it was
suggested that in many cases the use of PGWs could
achieve a similar effect to that of a nuclear 
device.26 It was argued that the Gulf War highlighted
the need to control the use and future  development of
PGWs in the same way as nuclear weapons had to be
brought under greater control.  The rationale behind
this argument was based on the potentially disastrous
environmental  consequences of conventional weapon
attacks on targets such as chemical plants, oil wells,
nuclear  power stations, etc. However, these fears
were not simply generated by the Gulf War experience
as  they had been under consideration for many years.
It would seem that this type of linkage, which 
suggested the control of PGWs, was perhaps more the
consequence of perceived - in many cases real - 
shortcomings in the Soviet development of this type of
weapon.   
The logic of the argument really centred on
Shaposhnikov's stated view that as force levels are 
decreased the relative importance of HTWs on strategic
stability is increased.27 Not surprisingly, 
Shaposhnikov and others argued that this fomenter of
strategic imbalance was particularly true of air 
forces; this had clear implications for the future
development of the Soviet Air Forces.28 The Gulf War 
had shown that the West had a specific advantage in
this area; most notably, Shaposhnikov was  impressed
by the high percentage of sorties which were flown at
night. He emphasised the high degree  of mission
effectiveness resulting from the advanced technologies
incorporated in many of NATO's  military aircraft. In
addition, he commended the expertise of Western
aircrew, thus giving tacit  recognition of the general
criticisms which could be laid at the training system
within the Soviet Air  Forces. However, in line with
the pronouncements of most senior commanders,
Shaposhnikov's main  theme was directed at the 
defence sufficiency' debate and the fear of a large
gap opening up between  the world's two largest air
forces. He drew attention to the fact that comparative
analysis between the  two would have to be based on
"expert evaluations and analytical calculations" of
the Gulf War air  campaign: here again we see the
significance of the Soviet numerate methodological
approach.29
THE TRAINING DILEMMA
At the forefront of concerns for Russian analysts of
the Gulf War must be the  dramatic impact of the
superlative performance of not just the aviation
hardware  but perhaps more importantly the men in the
flying machines. Moreover, this  perception of
excellence was not restricted to aircrew but extended
to those  engineers, air controllers, technicians,
etc. in support at first, second and third line.  The
reason for this was clearly seen by the Russians to be
the consequence of a  very effective and highly
advanced training system; something that the Soviet
Air  Forces, in particular, singularly lacked and
which was to become the legacy for the  RuFAF.  
As already mentioned, the high quality of MNF aircrew
and support staff was best  displayed in the ability
to conduct complex missions at night. Although the 
Russians have recognised other enabling factors, not
least the co-ordination of  airspace management and
the use of advanced technologies, it was the high
degree  of training that was seen as a major factor in
the proficient conduct of the air  campaign.
Therefore, although Russian air commanders and
theorists accepted and  indeed demanded improvements
in aviation hardware, it was in the area of training 
that the greatest effort was required. It was argued
that even with the incorporation  of advanced
technologies and the deployment of a new generation of 
aircraft, the  growing gap in combat efficiency with
the West  would continue to increase unless  the
question of training was addressed. Shaposhnikov
argued that "the current  military educational system
has become outdated"; he proclaimed the need for a 
new training programme which would have a qualitative
edge rather than the  traditional emphasis which had
pursued the route to excellence by falsification, 
fudging and formalism.30 Throughout the Gorbachev era
it had been argued that the military  establishment
had been able to put off any major review of the
military educational apparatus. As a  result, the
Russians inherited a multitude of problems: the same
system with the same people running  it and, perhaps
of greatest significance, the same mind-set. And so
despite the efforts of reform-minded critics and the
multitudinous number of demands for the reform of the
training system it  remained virtually intact and
ready for the hand-over to its Russian beneficiaries.
It can be argued that  the Gulf War merely rekindled
an existing debate, but it did so with a far greater
impact on the  military establishment - no longer
could the military leadership devalue the need for
reform nor hide  the desperately poor functioning of
the training system.   
There was of course much criticism in the Soviet and
then Russian military press about the poor 
performance of the Iraqis during the war.31 Important
dynamics such as morale, practical skills and 
professionalism were all identified as being poorly
addressed by the Iraqi Armed Forces. It was  stressed
that basic knowledge of weapon systems and procedures
did not allow the Iraqis to take  advantage of  the
equipment they captured following their invasion if
Kuwait. For example, they were  unable to operate the
Hawk SAM systems let alone incorporate them into their
own air defence  network.32 This level of criticism
was to be expected, particularly as the Soviets'
client state had  performed so ineffectively using
Soviet supplied material. Of more concern must have
been the  realisation that many of these procedural
and educational inadequacies could be linked to the
Soviets'  own training practices. After all the Iraqis
had relied heavily upon the Soviet military not only
for the  materials of war but also for guidance on how
to utilise the weapon systems they had been supplied 
with. Notwithstanding considerations of the poor Iraqi
performance, the Russians appreciated that it  would
not be possible to ignore the quite obviously superior
efficiency of MNF personnel: even a  cursory
examination of the air campaign alone was enough to
demonstrate the importance of advanced  training being
able to work in parallel with advanced technology.
Therefore, attention had to be turned  towards the
evaluation of what distinguished the military training
practices of the Western nations  from those of
Russia.  
The flexibility of training procedures was considered
to be the fundamental difference between the  two
systems. The Russians were impressed by the ability of
MNF aircrew and groundcrew to re-deploy quickly from
their normal training environment and rapidly to
establish a work-up programme  for desert operations.
This alone was impressive, but it has to be remembered
that many units were  actually re-deployed from
out-of-theatre locations. The case of VMA-542 - a
Harrier AV-8B squadron  of the United States Marine
Corps - would not be considered in any sense the
extreme example but it  is one which demonstrates the
inherent flexibility to be found in the air forces of
NATO. It is worth  spending some time examining this
particular case by considering the words of the
commanding  officer Lt. Colonel Ted Herman.   
By mid-1990, we had just completed a six and a half
month tour in the Western Pacific which  was part of
our normal deployment programme. During that
deployment we went to Japan,  Korea, Okinawa and the
Philippines in support of our treaties and
requirements over in the  West Pacific (WestPac). In
doing so we had to take a squadron of relatively new
pilots:  roughly three-quarters of them had less than
200 hours in the AV-8B.33 But after six months of 
WestPac flying they were up to a rather high state of
combat readiness and currency.   
Coming home in June we went through the normal
post-deployment rotational woes of losing  people to
change of station orders, going to the training
squadron or going to schools; so the  squadron was
down to two-thirds of the size we had overseas... Our
aeroplanes of mixed  configuration were being
re-worked at the squadron level - being brought back
up to normal  peacetime standards. About half of the
people were on leave and we were moving into new 
spaces.34  
And yet by 19 August 1990, VMA-542 had re-deployed
from USMC Cherry Point to Bahrain, with a full
strength of aircrew and groundcrew, having taken-over
twenty aircraft from other squadrons in order to
operate with like configuration. A true testimony to
the basic flexibility of air  power which has not been
lost on the Russians.   
It is worth returning to Ted Herman to illustrate
another point which must have made a great impression
on Russian analysts of the Gulf War. The trust that
Western commanders at all levels place in their men's
ability to  do the job', is based to a large degree on
the trust they have in the  training system. Ted
Herman put it this way:  
So I'm the father to a Marine Harrier squadron with 20
aeroplanes, and a grand total of around 200 people
consisting of pilots and maintenance men. All you can
do is hope all of the training you have provided is
enough.35  
The performance of units such as VMA-542 supports the
argument that the training their personnel had
undergone was more than enough to produce the required
standard, which allowed for almost total flexibility
to be employed in the air campaign. The essence then,
is in the capability of  the air force to provide
effective, efficient and flexible training programmes,
which at a moment's notice may have to be changed or
modified to cope with a different operating
environment. Without inherent flexibility this cannot
be achieved, except perhaps with a complete
reorganisation,  which would of course take an
unacceptably long time. The Gulf War demonstrated in
explicit detail to the Russians that their existing
training system was not capable of providing this kind
of service. Indeed, they had just come through nearly
ten years of warfare in Afghanistan; ten years  of
combat experience which had for the most part not been
assimilated into normal training practices.36   
Apart from the basic elements of Western military
training procedures, the Russians also  identified
some specific features of MNF operations which clearly
emphasised the importance  of training and
flexibility. The ability to conduct air operations at
night from low level and in  all weathers has already
been mentioned in this paper, but it is worth
returning to this to  illustrate how necessary it is
to have a good  normal' training programme in order to
be able  to adapt procedures to accommodate a
different environment. The Russians appreciated the 
effectiveness of the MNF air forces' training
programmes which gave aircrew the additional  skills
required to operate in the hostile conditions
encountered over Iraq and Kuwait.  Whether these
considerations will influence the review of training
currently in progress in the  Russian Federation Armed
Forces remains a moot question. Based on the
experiences of  Afghanistan and the dominance of
traditional thinking about military education, it fair
to  suggest that even given a certain degree of
willing intent any change will be slow to arrive  and
slow to implement.  
The inadequacies of the old Soviet training system in
the provision of out-of-theatre  operational
requirements can be illustrated not only by the Afghan
experience but also by  other examples.  There is
evidence to suggest that at the height of Soviet
military support for  Egypt preparation for combat in
the desert environment was less than satisfactory.37
Although  some pre-deployment training was conducted
in the Central Asian republics there is criticism  of
the overall purpose of the training programme. For
example, Soviet pilots had to conduct  all air traffic
control using English in an attempt to conceal their
presence in the theatre from  the Israelis and
Americans.38 It was reported that this deception was
easily recognised by the  Israelis and, therefore, the
valuable time spent on excessive secrecy was wasted at
the expense  of training for a likely combat
situation. Critics argued that time would have been
better spent  on developing concepts such as the use
of  aggressor squadrons' - on the same lines as those 
formed by the United States Air Force - so as to
accustom pilots to the realistic combat  conditions of
the Middle East.  
When discussing the merits of the Soviet military
education system and the product that it  produced,
the question of the  Human Factor' had increasingly
come to the fore during the  1980s. With the
introduction of glasnost' the level of criticism from
the grassroots of the  Soviet Armed Forces had created
a new atmosphere in which the demands for reform of
the  system would be debated. Unfortunately for the
quality of the debate, the military  establishment
reacted to criticism by gradually introducing the idea
that the  Human Factor'  could explain all the
problems that the critics identified. However, the
term  Human Factor'  began to mean everything but
nothing. The critical situation relating to aircrew
training  epitomises this notion in that the reason
for poor combat performance was shifted away from  the
responsibility of the individual to a broader, but no
less individualistic, concept based on  the dynamics
of the  Human Factor'.39 Some observers of the Gulf
War perhaps developed the  notion beyond its rather
limited scope of the past by identifying the  Human
Factor' with the  qualitative superiority of MNF
personnel.40 The vital link was made between the
increasing  importance of new technologies and the
quality of military personnel who had to operate the 
associated weapon systems. Both the catalyst and main
ingredient  to ensure the marrying of  these two
concepts was considered to be the quality of training.
The Western allies making up  the MNF had been able to
capitalise on their technological advantage because of
and not in  spite of the qualitative superiority of
its personnel.  
Interestingly, senior Russian commanders commenting on
these points did so by linking their  observations to
the  debate of the day'. Although virtually all
aspects of the armed forces have  been under almost
constant discussion over the last few years, the
qualitative debate in relation  to the  Human Factor'
has been dominated by professionalisation. What Gulf
War analysis had  proven was the direct link between
the high quality training received by the mostly
volunteer,  professional armed forces of the MNF and
the combat effectiveness of  HTW systems of all 
kinds. It is also of interest to note that the
financial implications of this situation were being 
addressed by the Russian military establishment, which
now had to face the economic realities  of its
emerging democratic, free-market condition. Important
consideration was given to the  observation that a
volunteer army had been able to deliver high combat
efficiency at a  relatively cheap price in terms of
men and materials: in contrast that is, to the
generally  accepted Russian view that the Soviet
experience in Afghanistan had demonstrated the exact 
opposite - that a conscript army had only been able to
deliver a poor combat efficiency at a  very high
price.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
The massive employment of EW by the MNF during the
Gulf War has made  a deep impression on Russian 
military analysts to the extent that its use has 
given rise to what is considered to be a new
conception of the purpose and  structure of attacks
launched from the air. The use of EW suppression 
capabilities was not a new phenomenon in the conduct
of air operations but  the extensive nature of its
utilisation in support of all aspects of the air 
campaign has generated considerable debate within the
Russian military  community. It was suggested that the
implementation of EW in the early  phases of the air
campaign demonstrated how influential it was in 
overcoming air defences and thus being pivotal in the
ability of the MNF air  forces to gain air
superiority. This of course had a precedent in the
history of  air warfare which Russian analysts have
been quick to point out. They often  identify the
Arab-Israeli Six Day War  in 1967 a prime example of
the use of  massive air suppression effort to
disorganise the Egyptian air defences and  C3 system.
However, they point out that only a relatively small
amount of  EW equipment took part in that campaign,
whereas during the Gulf War it  was an on-going EW
effort on an enormous scale.  
Various aspects have been identified by the Russians
which made the Gulf  War so different from previous
conflicts studied by the Soviets. Firstly, the 
duration of what is called the  electronic-fire' phase
(a total of 38 days  according to Russian analysts)
was well in excess of anything seen before  and was
supported throughout by EW assets. Secondly, large
quantities of the  latest new equipment (e.g. those
classified as belonging to the EW suite)  were
utilised during the air campaign, thus helping to
ensure that a degree of  surprise was achieved. For
example, AEW/AWACS and JSTARS were  considered by the
Russians to have been crucial to the success of the
air  campaign because of their contribution to
airborne early warning, control,  co-ordination and
target reconnaissance. Thirdly, it was the ability to
conduct  close co-ordination of EW with air attacks on
a wide variety of targets that  impressed the
Russians. In other words for the first time it was
appreciated  that EW had become an independent type of
combat operation rather than  offering just a support
role.41 Analysis in depth of this aspect of the air
campaign revealed  to the Russians the many
innovations and improvements which had enhanced the
whole  system of control and co-ordination of the air
forces. They identify the co-ordination of
sea-launched CMs with the deployment of EW assets or
the strikes against SAM sites and radar  locations as
good examples of this new improved look for EW.42
These Suppression of Enemy  Air Defence (SEAD) sorties
effectively paralysed the Iraqi air defences and thus
enabled the  waves of strike aircraft to destroy the
facilities with a far reduced risk of being shot down.
In  the course of the initial phases of the air
campaign Russian analysts accept that the complete 
gamut of targets was successfully engaged including
SAM systems, radars, airfields, command  and control
facilities, and air defence weapons. Following the
initial phases and to complete  the spectrum of
targets for the total destruction of Iraq's air and
ground defence network,  aircraft at airfields,
tactical missiles and their launchers, administrative
and industrial  installations, and Iraqi ground force
groupings were relentlessly attacked. One estimate of
the  overall importance of EW in all this air activity
suggests that a minimum of 50% aircraft losses  could
have been sustained but for its effective
employment.43 The fact that the intensity of the  air
campaign was so high - in some phases Russian analysts
conclude that up to 2,000 or 3,000  sorties were flown
per day - backed up the opinion that the significance
of EW was paramount.  
One of the main problems for Russian military
theorists and generals is that much of their  study of
the EW aspects of the Gulf War is based on supposition
and then built on sand. Of all  the elements of the
air campaign it is the EW component that remains the
most highly  classified, thus ensuring that details
are hard to find in any of the Western analyses of the
Gulf  War. As Air Marshal Mason has observed,  
While not dominated by stealth technology to the point
where high speed and manoeuvrability  are sacrificed,
the permanence and impact of EW is such that stealth
characteristics must be  incorporated.44  
The influence of stealth technology is an integral
part of the development of EW capabilities and
although the Russians perceive themselves to be at the
cutting edge of this technological field, there
remains considerable doubt as to the practical
application. The problem is compounded for  the
Russians because they have to judge the results of the
Gulf War air campaign without access to the secret
audits conducted by the Americans and their allies.   
The frustration is made worse by the fact that the
armed forces of the Russian Federation are going
through the agonies of reorganisation at a time of
great political, social and economic instability, not
only at home but also in its  Near Abroad'.
Considering the enormity of the problems  facing the
armed forces of Western nations in their attempts to
rationalise their future roles and structure in the
post-Cold War era, it is only to be expected that the
Russian situation is much more complex: many would
argue that it is insurmountable. Therefore, it is
unlikely that the  important question of the future
development of EW capabilities for the RuFAF will be
given anything other than a high  academic' priority.
The same of course is true for any of the suggested
improvements to the Russian Armed Forces arising from
examination of the Gulf War: the final  section of
this paper will consider one such expensive facet of
air warfare which the Russians have identified as
essential elements to be incorporated into their
military inventory.
COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C )
The air campaign during the Gulf War demonstrated the
importance of good C  in two dramatically different
ways. Firstly, the  complete neutralisation of the
Iraqi C  network by the allied air offensive was a
direct result of the incapacity of that network to 
operate in a massive EW/strike suppression
environment. Secondly, the neutralisation of that
network was in effect achieved  through the total
capacity of the MNF's C  system. It would seem to
follow from this that the modern battlefield has
become  almost totally dependent on the performance of
each side's C  facilities; in fact it could be argued
that this was indeed the key to  the success of the
allied forces during the Gulf War. Certainly, there
are those in the Russian military who feel that this
was one  of the major factors which ultimately led to
the allied victory: for without command there can be
no control, and both rely on  good communication.   
Initial reactions in the Russian military press talked
a great deal about the failures of the Iraqi C  system
by identifying  inadequate equipment and poor channels
of communication as the main reasons for the loss of
command and control.45 In the  light of their
observations of the Iraqi performance the Russians
considered that the need to  maintain reliable C ,
while at the same time being able to operate under
decentralised  conditions, was the immediate remedy.
Notwithstanding this notion, it was pointed out that
the  Iraqi Air Defence Command (IADC) did not take
appropriate action to ensure the  survivability of its
assets and it singularly failed to adapt its methods
of  combat employment.  In other words, as far as the
Russians were concerned it was the fact that the IADC
just sat  back and watched its own destruction, whilst
making no attempt to change from a centralised  system
or to vary its defence postures, that was the crucial
issue.46 Whilst we can again identify  this criticism
with an obvious desire of the Russian military to see
the failures of Soviet  supplied equipment and
procedures to be as a direct result of Iraqi
inefficiency, it does give  an indication of an
underlying acceptance that something was fundamentally
wrong with the  C  system.    
Perhaps one of the most illuminating aspects of the
Gulf War which impressed the Russians  most in the
field of C  was the successful demonstration of
space-based assets. Although  nothing new to the
Russian observer, the use of the space-based component
in land/air  operations was shown to be a crucial
factor in the MNF victory. In particular, the use of 
satellites, space-based communications and Navstar in
support of recce, navigation and  communications was
seen to have been not only impressive but also
essential on the modern  battlefield.47 This was
particularly important in the achievement of surprise,
which remains one  of the prime considerations for the
development of Russian military art. Space systems 
ensured that the quantity and quality of recce and
intelligence information was of the highest  order,
thus enabling the MNF to have exhaustive information
on the disposition of Iraqi  forces. MNF commanders
were able to capitalise of this because of the
advanced C   capabilities they had deployed; as a
result they were able to "stun them [the Iraqis] with 
surprise and paralyse any action they took".48   
The air campaign also highlighted the importance of
good C  because without it the  complexity of air
operations could not have been achieved. Airspace
management would have  presented an almost
insurmountable problem without the sophisticated C 
systems made  available during the Gulf War. The
Russians have certainly identified this as an
important  lesson and appear to have placed much 
emphasis on the role of AWACS: in particular, the 
co-ordination of various air assets - air-to-air
refuelling tankers, air defence aircraft, ground 
attack aircraft, etc. - was judged to have been best
served by AWACS.  It has been suggested  that AWACS
took on the basic load of airspace control and
management so that the complex  nature of the
integrated air strikes would run smoothly.49  However,
the majority of  observations appear to be
concentrated on technological considerations, but
whilst this is  undoubtedly a crucial element there
are other equally and mutually important aspects which 
have not received so much critical attention. For
example, little mention is made of the vital  role
that planning played during the air campaign; neither
is much time devoted to  examination of the structural
and procedural elements of the MNF airspace management 
process. Whilst the fundamentals of airspace
management such as vertical and lateral  separation of
aircraft were given consideration, the success of the
air campaign relied equally  upon the planning of
available airspace. It was here perhaps that the
sophistication of MNF  C  came into its own because it
created a management system that was able to analyse,
assess,  resolve and disseminate information
efficiently and to great effect.    
However, a vital component of this system was the high
quality of the personnel operating  the systems and in
particular, the flexibility that was required in order
to work closely within a  multi-force environment. For
the Russians this will be a major problem because
despite their  undoubted desire to develop an advanced
C  capability, there are fundamental structural and 
procedural failings inherent in their existing system
which would not necessarily be resolved  simply by the
introduction of technology. Moreover, it is arguable
that the quality of training  in the Russian Armed
Forces is well below the level that would be necessary
to operate such  an advanced management system.
Evidence from the Russian military press would seem to 
suggest that the Russians believe that all their C 
problems can be resolved by  throwing  technology at
them'.
CONCLUSION
In general it can be concluded that Russian observers
have drawn  many of the same lessons from the Gulf War
as their Western  counterparts. However, it must be
pointed out that the Russians have  not had the
benefit of first hand experience or had access to
detailed  analysis of the Gulf War. Notwithstanding
these limitations, it is fair  to say that Russian
military analysts have reached some important 
conclusions about the future of warfare based on their
studies of  MNF operations in the Middle East. Many of
these conclusions are  directly related to the air
campaign and, therefore, should have a  great impact
on the future development of the RuFAF. The use of the 
auxiliary verb  should' is a deliberate act in order
to highlight the  fundamental paradox encountered in
studying the Russian military,  particularly in
relation to their appreciation and perceptions 
concerning  the future of warfare. The main problem is
that there is a  huge difference between their
objectives for the future and the means  with which to
accomplish those objectives. The reality of modern day 
Russia, with all its social, political and economic
problems, means that  the dreams of military analysts
may never be realised. However, it must  not be
forgotten that current defence budget constraints
could  easily be reversed should the political climate
dramatically change in  favour of the military. Given
the extreme instability in Russia today it is 
feasible to suggest there is a possibility that the
Armed Forces will be  able to demand, and get, the
economic resources necessary to develop  a new
generation of weapon systems; thereby being in a
position to  implement the lessons they have learnt
from their observations of the  Gulf War.  
In summary, the first point that needs reiterating is
the impact that  advanced technology has had on the
military strategic balance. The  Russians appreciate
that the balance of force has been significantly 
altered by the emergence of HTWs and other
technological advances;  for example, as seen in EW, C 
and recce/intelligence complexes. In  particular, they
have identified the Gulf War air campaign with the 
need for a complete reappraisal of the role and
purpose of their own  air forces. There is a general
acceptance that in the future air power  will be a key
factor in the preservation of the military balance and 
hence strategic stability. This will give commanders
of the RuFAF  considerable clout when it comes to
bargaining for limited resources.  Indeed, there is
every likelihood that unless the RuFAF is able to 
refurbish with fifth generation weapon systems it will
find itself  playing in a different ball-game to the
one that the Western  powers will be playing.  
A second consideration, which is central to the air
power debate,  is directly linked to the notion that
active defence has regained  the upper-hand: this is
alongside a realisation that operational  goals can
now be achieved without ground forces engaging on 
enemy territory until victory is virtually guaranteed.
This image  of future warfare has significant
implications for ground force  structuring because
large numbers of ground troops are not a  necessity
for successful offensive operations. That is not to
say  that the Russians do not have some reservations
about these ideas  because, as they have pointed out,
the MNF encountered a unique  set of circumstances
which, it is argued, are unlikely to be repeated  in
many future conflicts. However, despite these
reservations it is  accepted that in future wars any
invasion is likely to be prefaced  by a pre-emptive
air/electronic (EW) campaign.  
This scepticism about Gulf War lessons and the impact
of  technology is found in the evaluations of some
prominent Russian  military commentators. It is
significant that some senior Russian  commanders
consider the Gulf War to have been a  one-off' 
experience and that future conflicts will not be such
one-sided  affairs. Again it is possible to argue that
these opinions are  expressed with the deliberate
purpose of identifying the Russian  Armed Forces as
being on a par with their Western counterparts.  The
importance of engaging in a HTW programme, with its 
associated demands for resources, is inextricably
linked to the  lessons of the Gulf War. By arguing
that the Iraqis were  outclassed in the technological
aspects of the conflict it is clear  that the Russians
wish to ensure that they are not placed in the  same
humble category. More importantly, they argue that
because  the uniqueness of the Gulf War is directly
linked to the  technological imbalance, they must
ensure that their own armed  forces are equipped with
fifth generation weapon systems:  otherwise it follows
that the Russian Armed Forces would be  unable to
guarantee the security of the homeland.   
An alternative to pursuing qualitative parity, which
would  almost certainly be at a greater cost than the
Russian economy  could endure, would be to ensure that
some form of international  restriction was placed on
the development and deployment of  HTWs. The fact that
Russian military commentators have  suggested the need
to put HTWs under the same sort of controls as 
nuclear weapons indicates an acceptance that they may
never  achieve the qualitative edge enjoyed by the
Gulf War partners.  There is logic in the argument
that the Russians may gain as much  by encouraging
arms control and limitation as they can from  trying
to compete in the technological arms race. This would
be a  course of action not unfamililiar to that
encountered in the  Gorbachev era.  
It is in the area of training that perhaps the
Russians have learned  the most from the Gulf War. The
efficient, highly-motivated,  professional military
personnel of the MNF greatly impressed the  Russians,
who regard the superior training of the Western allies
as  one of the main dynamics of their success. Of more
concern to the  Russians is the perception of a
growing gap in combat efficiency  with the West; made
wider by the increasing demands on training  that are
the consequence of introducing HTWs into the
inventory.  The inadequacies of the Russian military
training system have been  highlighted and the way
forward is obvious to even the most  blinkered Russian
general, but the question remains whether or  not they
are able to make the changes that are necessary. Apart 
from the traditional resentment that has always been
generated  when changes to established training
routines are suggested, there  lingers in the
background  the extra burden of cost that would be 
necessary if the training system were to be up-dated.
To put this in  perspective, it is apparent that the
Western powers are finding it  hard enough to
re-organise the training environment, and they are 
doing so from a sound foundation and a tradition of
excellence in  this field. The Russians have no such
framework from which to  develop the type of training
system which will be required in order  to compete
with the West in the 21st century. Indeed, it is not
just a  question of being able to compete, because
without efficient  training procedures it will be
pointless even to acquire fifth  generation weapon
systems. The bond between high quality training  and
new technology is well recognised by the Russians but
the  instruments of change may be not only beyond
their grasp but also  beyond their capacity to
exploit.  
In their examination of EW and C  the Russians have
identified  other areas of warfare which have been
brought to prominence by  the Gulf War; the air
campaign, in particular, exemplified these  areas. The
emergence of EW as a distinctive aspect of warfare, 
which should now be considered as an independent
combat  operation, will have significant impact on the
future structure of  the RuFAF. Again, the dominance
of high technology in this area  must be a matter of
concern to the Russians, because without  advanced EW
capabilities the operational effectiveness of air 
forces is severely reduced: in their own assessments,
the Russians  considered that the EW resources of the
MNF reduced aircraft  losses by 50%. In similar vein,
the importance of good C  was  exemplified by the
Iraqi experiences during the air campaign. It has  not
been lost on Russian commentators that much of the
Iraqi C   equipment, and the procedures for operating
it, had come from the  Soviet Union. Therefore, the
need to advance C  into the space  domain in order to
provide better recce, navigation and  communications
is well understood. Furthermore, the air campaign 
demonstrated to the Russians how important it is to
have systems  such as AWACS to provide control during
the likely intensive air  operations of the future.
One aspect which they are perhaps not so  aware of is
the importance of sophisticated air management 
procedures, which are so vital for planning complex
air operations.  This is another area of future
warfare that will require huge  investment in both men
and materials if the Russians are to achieve  the
level of expertise that they so obviously desire.   
At this point and by way of conclusion, it is perhaps
worth  observing that for a number of Russian military
analysts the  answer to many, if not all, of their
problems - not least C  - is to  simply throw
technology at them. Whilst this resolution has many 
laudable qualities it is by no means the ultimate
solution to the  problems facing the Russian Armed
Forces as they prepare for the  21st century. For this
is to underestimate the complexity of the  problem and
to overestimate the importance of the technological 
lessons of the Gulf War without appreciating enabling
factors  such as, for example, the quality of
personnel. Indeed, this  highlights the main problem
which the Russians face when  attempting to interpret
and subsequently implement the lessons  they have
gleaned from the Gulf War: that is the problem of 
overcoming the dominant mindset which drove the Soviet
Armed  Forces and which has been inherited by the
Russians. Although  there is evidence of an
appreciation of the need for a genuine shift  towards
improving the training system, it remains unclear
whether  the Russians really understand the
fundamental link between  technological advance and
training. Finally, of course, there  remains the
largest and potentially most crippling problem for the 
Russians to overcome: before they are able even to
consider the  future developments that they have
identified from their  observations of the Gulf War,
there is the question of resources.  The high-tech
modern battlefield comes at an enormous cost - a  cost
that to many Russians outside the military will be
viewed as an  unacceptable burden on an already
devastated economy. 
ENDNOTES
1 Air Vice Marshal R. A. Mason, "Air Forces and
European Security", Voyennaya  Mysl', March 1992, p.6. 
2 Mason explores these points in greater detail in the
excellent introduction to  John Godden's Shield and
Storm, (London: Brassey's, 1994), pp.1-13.  
3 Lt. General of Aviation A. F. Borsuk, "Combat
Training: Prospects for the Future",  Aviatsiya i
kosmonavtika, July 1991, p.2.  
4 Major General I. N. Vorob'yev, "Lessons of the
Persian Gulf War", Voyennaya  Mysl', May 1992, p.67.  
5I nterview with Colonel General Shaposhnikov by
Colonel V.P. Chigak, "The Air  Force and National
Security", Voyennaya Mysl', June 1991, pp.8-14. Also,
Colonel V.  Krysanov, "Features of the Development of
Forms of Military Action", Voyennaya  Mysl', February
1992, p.42.   
6 Major General Yu V. Lebedev, Lt.General I.S. Lyutov
and Colonel V.A.  Nazarenko, "The Persian Gulf War:
Lessons and Conclusions", Voyennaya Mysl', 
November/December 1991, p.110.  
7 Vorob'yev, p.74. See also, Shaposhnikov, p.8.  
8See, Major General A.V. Zlubin and Lt. General A.N.
Chernikov, "Activeness in  Operational Level Defence",
Voyennaya Mysl, March 1992, pp.19-25.  
9 Interview with Lt. General S. Bogdanov by Lt.
Colonel A. Dokuchayev, "Lessons  From Desert Storm",
Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 May 1991, p.2.  
10 Lt. Colonel A.Ya Manachinskiy, Lt. Colonel V.N.
Chumak and Colonel Ye K.  Pronkin, "Operation Desert
Storm: Results and Consequences", Voyennaya Mysl', 
January 1992, pp.89-93.  
11 Vorob'yev, p.68.  
12 See, Colonel A. Tsalko, "Soviet Military on Gulf
War Lessons", Novosti, 5 March  1991, p.18.  
13 Colonel General A.I. Malyukov, "Great Changes -
Severe Tests", Aviatsiya i  kosmonavtika, August 1991,
pp.2-3.  
14 Lebedev, et al, p.110.  
15 See, for example, Colonel V.L. Yerokhin, "On
Developing a Concept for Military  Reform", Voyennaya
Mysl', November 1991, p.36.  
16 See, for example, Colonel V. Krysanov, "Features of
the Development of Forms of  Military Action",
Voyennaya Mysl, February 1992, pp.42-44 or L.
Malyshev, "Precision  Weapons - One Alternative to
Nuclear weapons?", Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika, March 
1992, pp.10-11.   
17 Interview with Lt. General of Aviation A. Malyukov
by Captain S. Sidorov,  "Airpower Determined the
Outcome", Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 March 1991, p.3.   
18 Dokuchayev, p.2.  
19 Manachinsky et al, p.94.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Lt. Colonel Yu  Radkovets and Major L. Mel'nik,
"Innovations in Radar Locating",  Vestnik
protivovozdushnoy oborony, April 1992, pp.33-34 and
also in the same journal  January 1992.  
22 Lt. General I. Skuratov, "Tomahawk: The Threat From
The Sea", Morskoy sbornik,  June 1991, p.33. Although
this author is at times stating the obvious and
placing far  too much emphasis on the Navy's
responsibility to combat these weapon  systems  (only
to be expected in times when fighting one's own corner
for the limited  resources available), his general
points about modernisation to counter HTWs are  worthy
of note.   
23 The importance of the significant influence of
Soviet numerate methodology for  planning combat
operations cannot be overestimated. For a detailed
examination of  this crucially important subject the
excellent work of C.W. Blandy is strongly 
recommended; C.W. Blandy, Calculating Combat Outcomes,
Soviet Studies Research  Centre Research Paper 
no.AA24, ( RMA Sandhurst: SSRC, February 1993).  
24 Manachinskiy et al, p.93.  
25 Vorob'yev, p.69.  
26 See, L. Malyshev, "Precision Guided Weapons - One
Alternative to Nuclear  Weapons?", Aviatsiya i
kosmonavtika, March 1992, pp.10-11.  
27 Interview with Colonel General Shaposhnikov by
Colonel V.P. Chigak, "The Air  Force and National
Security", Voyennaya Mysl', June 1991, pp.8-14.   
28 Ibid., but see also, Zlubin and Chernikov, p.23.  
29 Ibid., p.11. These concerns were raised by many
others; see for example, Vorob'yev,  p.68; 
Manachinsky et al.  
30 For a detailed study of the Soviet training system
see for example, D.J. Marshall-Hasdell, Soviet
Military Reform: The Training System, Conflict Studies
Research  Centre Research Paper no.C85, (RMA
Sandhurst: CSRC, June 1984).  
31 Manachinskiy et al, p.91.  
32 Ibid. Interestingly, parallels can be drawn with
other armed forces that have a  less than effective
training system. A similar situation arose during the
Falklands  War with Argentinian military personnel not
having the ability to integrate newly  acquired
weapons into the AD system defending Port Stanley.   
33 By way of comparison, the number of hours flown 
annually by Soviet pilots has  been variously
described. Notwithstanding the different figures it is
clear that  Soviet aviators, in particular fast-jet
pilots, fly on average only a quarter  the  number of
hours flown by their American counterparts. Even
Soviet analysts gave  the conservative estimate that
the hours flown were less than 50% of the amount 
necessary for the safe conduct of flying operations.
See for example, Borsuk, p.2.  
34 Lt. Colonel Ted Herman quoted in John Godden,
Shield and Storm, (Brassey's:  London, 1994), p.21.  
35 Ibid.  
36 For a detailed  examination of the Afghan War
experience and training in the  Soviet Armed Forces
see, D.J. Marshall-Hasdell, Soviet Military Reform and
the  Afghan Experience - Military Lessons, Soviet
Studies Research Centre Research  Paper no.P12, (SSRC:
RMA Sandhurst, 1993).  
37 The reminisces of  Major V. Kolesov, a Soviet
fighter pilot who served in Egypt  during the 1970s,
can be found in Major B. Kononenko, "Ready to Fight
But Ready  for Battle?", Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika,
November 1990, p.4.  
38 Ibid.  
39 For a detailed examination of this theory see, D.J.
Marshall-Hasdell, The Reform  of Flight Safety in the
Soviet Air Force, Soviet Studies Research Centre
Research  Paper no.B.50, (RMA Sandhurst: SSRC,
February 1993), pp. 15-33.   
40 Lebedev, Lyutov and Nazarenko, p.109.  
41 Manachinskiy et al., p.91. Also the views of Lt.
General V.G. Reznichenko,  "Preparation and Conduct of
Army Operations", Voyennaya Mysl', January 1991, p.19. 
42 See, for example, Vorob'yev, p.70-72.  
43 M. Alexsandrov and S. Vladimirov, "Could the Air
Defence of Iraq Have  Survived?", Vestnik
protivovozdushnoy oborony, April 1992, pp.49-51.  
44 Godden, p.12.  
45 Chigak, p.8.  
46 Manachinskiy, et al., p.92.  
47 Colonel V V Krysanov, "Features of the Development
of Forms of Military  Actions", Voyennaya Mysl',
February 1992, p.42.  
48 Vorob'yev, p.72.  
49 Chigak, pp.8-10.  
.



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