The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: the Russian Armed Forces Confront
Chechnya
Part One, Section One: From Intervention to the Outskirts of Grozny
(Military-Political Events from 11 December to 31 December)
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
Slavic Military Studies
Vol 8, No 2, June 1995, pp 233-256.
Note: This article is based on open source literature published in the Russian press, and items broadcast on Russian radio and TV. Most, but not all, of the reports are from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). During the intervention, Russian government and Chechen sources accused one another of placing disinformation in the press. This effort does not aim to prove one point of view correct. It's aim is merely to provide a framework and some logic for the events that have occurred and their consequences.
- INTRODUCTION
- RUSSIAN RATIONALE FOR THE INTERVENTION
- THE LEGAL CASE FOR INTERVENTION
- COMMAND AND CONTROL
- THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERVENTION
(Military-Political Events from 11 December to 31 December)
"No territory has the right to leave Russia."
President Yeltsin on Russian TV, 27 December 1994
"Its good to be king."
Comedian Mel Brooks, The History of the World
Russian rationale for the intervention.
"The current situation threatens Russia's vital interests, national security, territorial integrity, social stability and peace, legislators emphasized." 2
The Russian Duma, 8 December 1994
If the past is any indication of the future of Russo-Chechen relations, the current conflict in Chechnya will not resolve the deep and historic causes of dispute. Recurring Chechen resistance against Russian domination is ample testament to the determination of the Chechens to break free. No less apparent is the determination of the Russian government to preserve the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation...the Chechen case is far more significant than the tiny size of Chechnya would suggest. If Russia yields in this instance, other minority republics in the North Caucasus and elsewhere are apt to seize upon the precedent to demand their own independence...hot pursuit of Chechen rebels may well drive them across the frontiers of the Chechen Republic, thereby carrying the war into neighboring republics... 5
Analysts studying the Russian rationale for intervening in Chechnya must consider this historical background. It clarifies how both sides historically legitimize their actions and perceptions of one another's motives.
- elections of the Chechen President were held under conditions of essentially martial law
and only in certain districts of the then existing Chechen-Ingush Republic.
- the present leadership was not recognized either by the former legitimate authorities of
Chechnya or the federal authorities of the Russian Federation or the world community.
- the conclusion is that the regime is unlawful and has violated the fundamental requirements of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, a position first taken in 1991. 9
The Grozny regime has used force to drive Chechen society down the path of crime. The population of Chechnya has, in effect, been forced to fend for itself. The republic's economy has been ruined. Law enforcement has come to a halt. Violence and robbery have become everyday occurrences, while arbitrariness has become the guiding principle of life. 10
The postal service has not functioned in Chechnya for a year and a half. Communication lines are down. The amount in pensions alone that is owed to the republic is 105 billion rubles. All funds earlier paid out for these purposes were used by the Grozny leadership to buy weaponry. 11
The Legal Case for Intervention
"This is not the irony of history, but its vengeance: the Russian president marked the first anniversary of the Russian Constitution with the bombardment of Russian inhabited localities and a tank parade in the republics of the Northern Caucasus."
Stepan Kiselyon, deputy Editor-in-Chief of Moscow News
1. That the Government of the Russian Federation be entrusted in accordance with points "d" and "e" of Article 114 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation with the use of all the means available to the state to guarantee national security, legality, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the preservation of public order, and the fight against crime and with the disarmament of all illegal armed formations.
2. That the present edict goes into effect on the day of its publication.
[signed] B. Yeltsin
Moscow, the Kremlin
9 December 1994 33
As soon as the president's ultimatum was announced, the headquarters for coordinating all action in the republic was secretly set up, headed by V. Chernomyrdin. An Interim Information Center was then created. After the troops went into Chechnya, operational leadership of the military-political operation in the North Caucasus was given to first Vice premier O. Soskovets. 44
The editorial office [Izvestia's] has information to the effect that by early September, long before decisive action against Chechnya began, the experts who had earlier taken part in analyzing and forecasting events in the republic had stopped getting operational information. The question arises-why did the military require total secrecy? The explanation should really be sought in the fact that the military initially decided to assume the role of politicians in the Chechen crisis [underlining not in original]. 49Presidential Council member Smirnyagin expanded on the problem of military supremacy over the operation. He foresaw a danger in the fact that not only the power (security) ministries could assume the function of shaping immediate political tasks but also field commanders, who were starting to operate autonomously. 50 If true, this explanation would offer an explanation as to why fighting and bombing continued after Yeltsin's decree to stop it. This assumes extremely weak command and control over military units which is difficult to fathom in a conflict as centralized as Chechnya.
The Consequences of the Intervention
The extreme nationalist opposition, having supported the President's actions in Chechnya, at the same time advocate a more consistent and tougher enforcement of order...There is a great danger of these forces shifting their political positions from the state idea (which so far agitates the population in the social, not geographic or political, sense) to the ethnic (or religious) idea of setting Russians against non-Russians, and the Orthodox against the Muslims. 67
Regional. For the long term, the impact of Yeltsin's decision on regional stability is hard to determine. The short term impact is already clear in that Chechnya made requests to foreign governments and was supported with men, material, and other types of assistance, thereby decreasing stability. The conflict could spark an urge to move away from Moscow's authority and democracy, and threatens to undermine peace efforts in other parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It also will cast doubt on Moscow's ability to play a role in settling conflicts between or among Islamic states.
International. There were international consequences for Russia as well. Many countries in the West and in Asia initially stated that the affair was an internal Russian one and there was little apprehension on the part of these governments. Later, however, many countries and organizations, to include the Economic Community and Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, called for a halt to the fighting (especially the bombing of innocent civilians) and directed concern toward protection of basic human rights. Even long time ally and friend Cuba voiced concern, saying that it regretted that negotiations have not worked so far and that it wanted a solution that put an end to the situation running counter to the legitimate interests of Russian people. 75
1. Press reports indicate that the Russian military initially engaged in extremely limited aggressive action. When faced with mobs, one report says, neither smoke pots nor the notorious 'cheremukha' (riot gas) were used. Troops could have acted more resolutely if they wanted, the report added. See Leonid Smirnyagin, "Initial Task Fulfilled Successfully by Troops," Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 December 1994, p 1, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-244, 20 December 1994, p 6. General Lieutenant Stanislav Kavun, Deputy Commander of the MVD's Internal Troops, said his soldiers were constrained by certain restrictions on the active use of weapons, and this led to a number of deaths early in the intervention. See Stanislav Kavun, "Our Aim is to Disarm the Armed Bandits," Rossiyskiye Vesti, 23 December 1994 p 1, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-247, 23 December 1994, p 14.BACK
2. ITAR-TASS 8 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-237, 9 December 1994, p 20.BACK
3. This short historical sketch is based on an article by Robert F. Bauman entitled "Historical Perspective on the Conflict in Chechnya", which Dr. Bauman wrote for the journal Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement. It will appear in the ? issue.BACK
4. This line marked the southern limit of Russian military outposts and settlements.BACK
6. "Chechnya," Moscow News, December 16-22, 1994, No. 50, p 1, 2.BACK
7. Valeriy Vyzhutovich, "Chechnya Will Spurn Kremlin's Representatives," Izvestiya, 20 December 1994, p 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-244, p 19.BACK
8. "Chechnya," Moscow News, December 16-22, 1994, No. 50, p 1, 2.BACK
9. ITAR-TASS 1140 GMT, 27 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-248, 27 December 1994, p 25.BACK
12. Vladimir Klimov, "The Use of Force was the Only Measure Capable of Halting the Orgy of Crime," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 24 December 1994, p 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-248, 27 December 1994 p 36. By 13 December 21 investigating field groups of Russian MVD law enforcement officer , 1000 special purpose troops to police railroads were in Chechnya. See INTERFAX 13 December 1994 as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-240, 14 December 1994, p 15.BACK
13. Ibid., Yeltsin TV address.BACK
14. Moscow TV 12 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-239, 13 December 1994, p 16.BACK
15. Dmitriy Muratov, "The Country's Incumbent leadership will be put on Trial for the Reckless Adventure in Chechnya," Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 14 December 1994 p 1, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-241, 15 December 1994, p 40.BACK
16. Dmitriy Muratov, "Provocations and Casualties are being Planned," Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 3 December 1994, p 1 as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-233, 5 December 1994, p 30.BACK
17. Moscow RIA, 29 November 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-235A, 7 December 1994, p 13.BACK
18. ITAR-TASS 15 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-241, 15 December 1994, p 42.BACK
19. INTERFAX 12 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-239, 13 December 1994, p 18.BACK
20. This aim stretched beyond the region in question to other contested areas of the former USSR. For example, Vladimir Zhirinovsky appealed to Yeltsin on 28 November to confirm that "the Black Sea Fleet belongs to Russia, that Sevastopol is a Russian city, and to state, finally, that the Crimea is part and parcel of the Russian Federation." See FBIS-SOV-94-235A, 7 December 1994, p 6.BACK
21. In a 13 December 1994 RFE/RL release, Julia Wishnevsky reported that Yeltsin put before the upper house, the Federal Assembly, these three rhetorical questions: (1) Should the Russian Federation negotiate the status of Chechnya as a part of Russia, and is the parliament ready to introduce into the constitution an amendment on the right of Chechnya to secede, in view of the possible domino effect this would have on other secession-minded republics within the Russian Federation? (2) Should Russia talk to Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev? (Yeltsin reminded parliamentarians that such a provision would necessitate the State Duma to formally recognize the 1991 election of Dudayev as president.) (3) Citing a 25 March 1994 State Duma statement on the Chechen problem, which stated the necessity of free elections as a precondition for talks with the Chechen leadership, Yeltsin asked the deputies how they would organize free elections in Chechnya considering the current situation. Sovset, 13 December 1994.BACK
22. The Russian government has been insisting for months that oil from nearby Azerbaijan's planned $7.4-billion oil project in the landlocked Caspian Sea should be routed through a pipeline to Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiysk for export to the West. Russia's problem is that the pipeline goes right through the middle of Chechnya. While experts differ on how great a role the pipeline played in Russia's decision to invade the oil-rich republic, they agree that it is now a major strategic prize. CIS news, item 1219K, 19 December 1994.BACK
23. Stepan Kiselyov, Azer Mursaliyev, "Who Stands to Gain from the Invasion?", Moscow News, December 23-29 December 1994, No. 51, p 2.BACK
24. Vadim Markushin, "Russia must secure its own flanks, Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff again voices concern...", Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 December 1994 p 3, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-236, 8 December 1994, p 15.BACK
25. At a conference in December 1994 Grachev noted that the military budget of 40.6 trillion rubles covers defense needs by only one-third. One day of peacekeeping in Abkhazia costs 2 billion rubles, in Tajikistan one day of the 201st's presence costs 15 billion rules, one day of joint games under NATO's Partnership for Peace program costs 1 billion rubles (for a battalion), and downsizing the officer corps by 200,000 men costs 11-12 million rubles for a colonel, 8-9 million for a major, and 6-7 million for a captain (20 monthly salary payments). The operation in Chechnya adds to this debt daily. See Victor Yershov, "The Defense Minister has it in for Everyone," Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 9 December 1994 pp 1, 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-238, 12 December 1994 p 34. BACK
26. Ibid., Kiselyov and Mursaliyev.BACK
28. Vladimir Socor, RFE/RL 16 December 1994, from Sovset 16 December 1994.BACK
29. Moscow RIA, 29 November 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-235A, 7 December 1994, p 15.BACK
30. Public opinion was very much against the Russian intervention. A poll from 17 December noted that 73% blamed the Russian Federation Government for the present crisis situation, 66% blamed the reformers, mafia, and breakup of the USSR, and 64% blamed Yeltsin for everything. The poll was conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences. One in nine were prepared to place the military at the head of the country, and over one-half count on a strong leader capable of "instilling order in the country."BACK
31. Author's discussion with a Russian general in June, 1994 and cited in Krasnaya Zvesda, 13 July 1994 p 2. The Russian general noted that Russian criteria was the same as U.S. criteria for using force in a peacekeeping operation except that "we ask to be invited into a country and you do not. We will not intervene in a peacekeeping operation without the consent of both sides."BACK
32. "Appeal of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin to the Citizens of Russia," Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 December 1994 p 1, as reported in JPRS-UMA-94-055, 21 December 1994, p 31.BACK
33. "Edict of the President of the Russian Federation on Measures to Stop the Actions of Illegal Armed Formations in the Territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Zone of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict," Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 December 1994, p 1, as reported in JPRS-UMA-94-055, 21 December 1994, p 31.BACK
34. Stepan Kiselyov,"Red Letter Day on the Calendar," Moscow News, December 16-22, 1994, No. 50, p 2. Zorkin was the head of the Constitutional Court and Khasbulatov the Speaker of Parliament.BACK
35. Moscow TV 11 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-238, 12 December 1994, p 23.BACK
36. Moscow Russian TV 12 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-239, 13 December 1994 p 16.BACK
38. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 20 December 1994 p 1, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-246, 22 December 1994, p 23.BACK
39. L'Unita 12 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-238, 12 December 1994 p 17.BACK
40. ITAR-TASS 12 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-239, 13 December 1994, p 30.BACK
41. Russian TV 0500 GMT 13 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-239, 13 December 1994, p 31.BACK
42. INTERFAX 1810 GMT 12 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-239, 13 December 1994, p 28.BACK
43. Valeriy Yakov, "How Many More Children Must Die in Chechnya for Moscow to heed Kovalev's Voice?", Izvestiya, 23 December 1994 p 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-247, 23 December 1994, p 12.BACK
44. Vasiliy Kononenko, "Civilian Control of Operation Eroding," Izvestiya, 15 December 1994, p 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-240, 14 December 1994, p 17.BACK
45. Gleb Cherkasov, "Duma Ad Hoc Headquarters Confident in Russian Troops' Fighting Spirit and Denies Rumors of Massive Desertions," Segodnya, 22 December 1994, p 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-246, p 29.BACK
46. Aleksandra Lugovskaya, "Operations Center formed in Government," Rossiyskiye Vesti, 14 December 1994, p 1 as translated in FBIS-SOV-94-240, pp 15, 16.BACK
47. INTERFAX, 7 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-236, 8 December 1994, p 23.BACK
48. Vladimir Yemelyanenko, "New Vice Premier Stakes His Position on the Use of Force in the Caucasus," Moscow News, No. 50 December 16-22 1994, p 4.BACK
49. Vasiliy Kononenko, "Civilian Control of Operation Eroding," Izvestiya, 15 December 1994, p 2 as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-240, 14 December 1994, p 17.BACK
51. Galina Starovoitova, "Reforms Fail Test in Chechnya," Moscow News, December 23-29, 1994, No. 51, p 1, 2.BACK
52. INTERFAX 5 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-234, 6 December 1994, p 39.BACK
53. Aleksandr Pelts, "Conflict Zone: Troops Ready to Act Decisively, but Talks Preferable," Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 December 1994 p 4, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-236, 8 December 1994, p 22.BACK
54. Sergey Bogdanov, "Chechnya: Despite Moscow's Assurances, Things are Moving Toward Real War," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 December 1994, p 2 as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-241, 15 December 1994, p 52.BACK
55. CIS news, item 1222A, 22 December 1994.BACK
56. ITAR-TASS 1310 22 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-246, 22 December 1994, p 13.BACK
57. ITAR-TASS 1556 GMT 22 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-247, 23 December 1994, p 11.BACK
58. ITAR-TASS 1443 GMT 21 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-246, 22 December 1994, p 13.BACK
59. CIS news, item 1217 E, 17 December 1994.BACK
60. Julia Wishnevsky, RFE/RL, Sovset, 13 December 1994, and Vladimir Socor, RFE/RL, "Four Men in a Boat", Sovset, 20 December, 1994.BACK
61. Vladimir Lysenko, "An Authoritarian Regime is Inevitable," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 December 1994, pp 1, 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-247, 23 December 1994, p 7, 8.BACK
62. CIS news, 1222C, 22 December 1994.BACK
63. INTERFAX 1410 GMT, 23 December 1994 , as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-248, 27 December 1994 p 13.BACK
64.Vladimir Prokhvatilov, "Cost of the War," Komsomolskaya Pravda, 27 December 1994 (no page given), as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-248, 27 December 1994, p 20. BACK
65. CIS news, 1223G, 23 December 1994.BACK
66. Ostankino TV 29 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-251, 30 December 1994, p 11, 12.BACK
69. ITAR-TASS 23 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-247, 23 December 1994, p 19, 20.BACK
70. Vladimir Socor, "Spillover Effect in Caucasus," Sovset, RFE/RL, 15 December 1994.BACK
71. The term refers to followers of Stephen Bandera, an anti-Soviet partisan during World War II. In Soviet times, the term was used to anathematize Ukrainians who fought for Ukraine independence.BACK
72. INTERFAX 1625 GMT 23 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-248, 27 December 1994, p 8.BACK
73. CIS news, item 1219F, 19 December 1994.BACK
74. ITAR-TASS 1425 GMT 26 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-248, 27 December 1994, p 7.BACK
75. ITAR-TASS 29 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-251, 30 December 1994, p 4.BACK
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