Military

Why We Go To War - The Haitian Intervention:

A Case Study In U.S. Decisionmaking

 

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues

 

 

 

 

Why We Go to War --

The Haitian Intervention:

A CASE STUDY IN U.S. DECISIONMAKING

 

 

 

 

MMS THESIS

 

 

 

 

                           __________________________

Major John Noel Williams

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY,

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

 

 

 

 

 

IMAGE 1

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Title: Why We Go to War -- The Haitian Intervention A Case Study in U.S.

 Decisionmaking

 

Author: Major John N. Williams, USMC

 

Problem: U.S. foreign policy lacks a clearly articulated and coherent doctrine for determining when and where to use military force.

 

Discussion: The September l994 U.S. intervention in Haiti provides a valuable example of flawed foreign policy decisionmaking. The following case study will examine this decisionmaking process to highlight its pitfalls and suggest remedies for future Presidents. This study will examine first the historical and legal precedents for using force, then the role of the Legislative and Executive branches and the Constitution in the decisionmaking process. Having established this foundation, the study will consider the evolution of the Haitian intervention policy and its determinants. The conclusion will summarize the most relevant extant U.S. doctrine for intervention and provide a recommended set of decisionmaking guidelines for

intervention.

 

Conclusion: The Weinberger Doctrine is still a valid guideline for      decisionmakers.

Much of the current criticism of the Weinberger Doctrine stems from an incomplete reading of the National Press Club speech. Most often, critics who feel the Weinberger Doctrine is inadequate for the post-Cold War world focus on the six enumerated criteria for intervention, without examining the introductory and concluding remarks which provide essential context for a full understanding of the doctrine. Most significantly, Weinberger specifically addresses the need for a range of options from peacekeeping to high intensity conflict. His introductory remarks draw a clear distinction between OOTW operations, where forces are configured only for self-defense, and warfighting operations. His remarks clearly indicate that the criterion of vital national interest does not become operative until full scale military operations are required.

 

In addition to considering the Weinberger Doctrine, decisionmakers should ask the following questions: Is the goal achievable? Is it affordable? Is it a priority? Will the action be curative or merely palliative? Does the action comply with international law and just war doctrine? Finally, the Weinberger Doctrine and the above questions are not prescriptive dogma, but merely guidelines to assist the decisionmaker. There can be no substitute for considered, principled leadership by the President when the nation's security is threatened and her forces must be put in harm's way.

 

I do not say that we ought to prefer the happiness of one particular society to the happiness of mankind; but I say that, by exerting ourselves to promote the happiness of the society with which we are most nearly connected, and with which we are best acquainted, we shall do more to promote the happiness of mankind than by busying ourselves about matters which we do not understand and cannot efficiently control.

-- Thomas Macaulay, speaking in the House of Commons in l845

 

 

 

  Introduction.

 

It is essential for the United States to adopt a coherent foreign policy which incorporates a meaningful doctrine for determining when and where to use military force. The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement of July l994 does not adequately address this vital issue. Neither the current National Security Strategy, nor the preceding Weinberger Doctrine, have played a determining role in the Clinton administration's decisionmaking process. This paper will use the September l994 intervention in Haiti as a case study to analyze the decisionmaking process leading to the employment of U.S. military forces. First, this study will examine both the historical and legal precedents for using military force and the influence of the U.S. Constitution on the Legislative and Executive branches. Second, the case study proper will outline the development of the Clinton administration Haitian policy by delineating the changing policy and its determinants. The case study will close with a discussion of current and past U. S. doctrine for intervention and its relation to the Haiti scenario. Finally, the paper will conclude with a recommended set of decisionmaking guidelines for intervention.

The present post-Cold War period calls for a Realist approach to foreign policy. Realism, Hans Morgenthau's theory of international politics, should be studied, appreciated, and applied by the National Command authorities before committing U.S. forces to intervention abroad. The present international situation should be viewed as a return to more typical times after four decades of nuclear superpower rivalry. The current foreign policy debate is largely characterized by a pervasive angst over the new and uncertain world order. Bismarck would scoff. The present need for a multilateral balance of power and the practice of realpolitik would be familiar to the old Prussian. Pundits in the news media and members of the intellectual elite discuss in serious and dire tones the unique foreign policy challenges faced by the United States. These commentators are simply confused by the truly new global phenomenon -- instantaneous, global, mass communications. Like a computer run awry from an overloaded buffer, the pundits are spewing erroneous data. The most important and influential aspects of human relations have changed little in the history of mankind. Personal interests and by extension, national interests, continue to be

the pervasive driving force in politics and foreign policy. The apparent chaos of the contemporary world is really a misperception by those unable to critically analyze the ubiquitous scenes of violence described in print and graphically portrayed on T.V. The world has always been a tough place, only now our world is lit not by fire, but by klieg light, and the resulting image is harsh, unattractive, and disconcerting.

 

 

The less involved the population and the less serious the strains within states and between them, the more political requirements in themselves will dominate and tend to be decisive. Situations can thus exist in which the political object will almost be the sole determinant.

-- Carl Von Clausewitz in On War

 

 

I.                Historical and Legal Basis for Recourse to War.

 

 

Just-war doctrine has its origins in the writings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. These theological writings were embellished by the seventeenth century Scholastics and merged with two secular sources -- the chivalric code and customary law (jus gentium). This amalgam resulted in Classic Just War Doctrine.1 After a hiatus of roughly 4OO years, discussion of just-war doctrine

was revived in the twentieth century. The resultant doctrine, composed of secular and religious elements, is referred to as Modem Just War Doctrine.2 For  its adherents, the prescriptions identified in just-war doctrine must be adhered to for a war to be just.

The portion of just-war doctrine which addresses justifiable recourse to war is known as jus ad bellum. Jus ad bellum includes the following criteria for justifiable recourse to war: there must be competent authority to order the war for a public purpose; there must be a just cause, and the means must be proportionate to the just cause, with all peaceful alternatives having been exhausted; and the just belligerent must possess right intention.3 Each of these criteria will be examined below.

St. Thomas was one of the first writers to distinguish between head of state and private individual. He argued, "A private individual may not declare war; for he can have recourse to the judgment of a superior to safeguard his rights."4 Today, competent authority is not an issue among nation-states waging conventional war or conducting internationally recognized humanitarian interventions.5 Regardless of form of government, today's states all possess provisions, constitutional or otherwise, which establish criteria for declaring war. If the respective head of state obeys these provisions, the requirement of competent authority will be met. From

_______________________________________________________________________

1 William V. O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War (New

York: Praeger, l98l), p.l3.

2 O'Brien, p.l3.

3 O'Brien, p.l6.

4 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, secunda secundae, No.

l5, Q.4O (Art.1) in A.P. D'Entreves, ed., Aquinas, Selected

Political Writings, Trans. J.G. Dawson (Oxford: Blackwell,

l948),p. l59.

      5 In revolutionary warfare this question becomes less clear

and requires analysis on a case by case basis.

 

 

the American standpoint, the ongoing debate over The War Powers Act, and the interpretation of the Constitution concerning Executive and Legislative Branch powers for committing U.S. forces are germane. It is highly unlikely, however, that either branch would act in such a way as to call into question the President's qualification as a competent authority. During the Vietnam War some argued that the war was illegal without a declaration of war. This argument does not stand in light of Congressional cooperation in the war and the refusal of the courts to declare the war unconstitutional.6

Concerning the second criteria, just cause, St. Thomas succinctly states". that those who are attacked for some offense merit such treatment."7 James  Childress provides a more specific and contemporary version. He states as "serious and weighty" prima facie obligations the following: (l) "to protect the innocent from unjust attack," (2) "to restore rights wrongfully denied," (3) "to re-establish a just order."  has been consistently viewed as just cause for war. As O'Brien states, "Just-war doctrine, following Aristotle and St. Thomas, as well as the later Scholastics, places great importance on the state as a natural institution essential for mans development. Defense of the state is prima facie defense of an essential social institution."9 International law places further strictures on recourse to war which are particularly important to this study.

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The only legally permissible war is a

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      6 O'Brien, p. l7.

      7 Thomas, p. l59.

8 James F. Childress, "Just-War Criteria," in War and Peace:

The Search for New Answers, ed. Thomas A. Shannon (Maryknoll,

N.Y.: Orbis, l98O), p. 4l-45.

      9 O'Brien, p. 2l-22.

 

 

war of individual or collective self-defense. Article 5l establishes this as a right to be exercised pending Security Council action under Chapter 7.lO According to a strict interpretation of the UN Charter, therefore, the United States does not possess the right to intervene for humanitarian purposes. Recently, an increasing number of scholars contend that intervention for humanitarian purposes is permissible.11 Evidence of this evolving interpretation can be seen in the international acceptance of actions taken by regional or neighboring countries in Uganda, the Central African Republic, Cambodia, and Panama to remove repressive regimes. Vietnam's move into Cambodia was accepted until its self-serving motives became evident, and the initial condemnation of U.S. actions to remove Noreiga quickly subsided. United Nation's approval of humanitarian operations in Somalia and Haiti are the most recent examples of this trend. However, David Hendrickson in the September/October l994 edition of Foreign Affairs, takes the position that humanitarian intervention is not clearly justifiable under international law.

Hendrickson states, "Attempting to extend democracy through trade embargoes violates two fundamental norms of the society of states -- the prohibitions against intervention in the internal affairs of states and against doing harm to the innocent."l2 Hendrickson goes on to explain that while American exceptionalism has been a constant throughout its history, this belief has also existed alongside the belief that we had neither a right nor a duty to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. He states, "The commitment to nonintervention.. .arose from essentially the same logic as the commitment to religious tolerance; both of these norms of Westphalian internationalism were Imported into the American constitutional order."13 This

____________________________________________________________________________

10 O'Brien, p.23.

11 O'Brien p.23

12 David C. Hendrickson, "The Recovery of Internationalism, in

Foreign Affairs, 73, no.5 (September/October l994) p.3O.

13 Hendrickson, p. 3l.

 

 

 

interpretation was strongly influenced by the pragmatic realization that to do otherwise would create an unstable environment of perpetual war. This recognition of state sovereignty is similar to the proscription against assassination enacted during the Carter years. In addition to a desired quid pro quo, this policy recognized the inappropriateness of killing a national leader, regardless of his misdeeds, and in the process, reinforced the concept of state sovereignty. It seems curious that a country which eschews elimination of the most reprehensible heads of state would be willing to commit the lives of U.S. servicemen to invade and overthrow the selfsame country. The norm in international relations since the League of Nations has been that of nonintervention. The use of unilateral force remains controversial and all major texts since the League of Nations have prohibited its use.14 As indicated above, there has been a tendency to make an exception in cases of European decolonization and for humanitarian intervention.15 In this regard, Reisman and Antoniou state that

 

One may infer from the cases such as these that an operational code has developed that tolerates the use of force to quell internal strife, to overthrow colonial or racist regimes, and for certain humanitarian purposes. But the matter continues to be controversial and this uncertainty makes a continuing law of war all the more relevant and urgent.l6

 

Just cause also requires that the means employed be proportional. Proportionality requires a calculation to determine that the good to be achieved from recourse to war will outweigh the evil the war will produce.17 This  calculation must consider the war's effects on belligerents and neutrals and must be weighed considering the estimated probability of success. Inherent in this requirement is the admonition to do as little harm as possible to obtain the desired result. For

 

________________________________________________________________________________

14 W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, The Laws of War,

(New York: Vintage, l994), p.

15 The Laws of War,p.33.

16 The Laws of War,p.34.

l7 O'Brien, p.28.

 

 

 

example, carpet bombing would not be a proportionate response to correct a human

 

rights violation .

 

The final requirement for just cause is that recourse to war must be a last resort. In short, all peaceful means must be exhausted before resorting to war. The imperfections inherent in the international system require that some subjectivity be involved in determining when all peaceful means have been exhausted. It is the obligation of the country contemplating intervention to have made a legitimate attempt to exhaust all political, diplomatic, and economic means before resorting to force.

The third and final component of jus ad bellum is the concept of right intention. O'Brien best summarizes the elements of right intention: (l)"First, right intention limits the belligerent to the pursuit of the avowed just cause." (2)"Second, right intention requires that the just belligerent have always in mind as the ultimate object of war a just and lasting peace." (3)"Third, underlying the other requirements, right intention insists that charity and love exist even among enemies. The third criteria can be interpreted as an admonition to adhere to the recognized laws of war.

Just War Doctrine and international law as embodied in the League of Nations and UN Charter, combine to provide a powerful presumption against recourse to war. To be considered just, states must ensure compliance with the jus ad bellum requirements of competent authority, just cause, and right intention. A strict constructionist approach to international law permits

recourse to war only for self-defense. This body of law and doctrine is evolving and open for debate on many fronts, but it is essential that all U.S. policymakers be aware of and consider its implications when considering intervention.

 18 O'Brien, p.34.

 

 

 

Richard Neustadt describes the relationship between the Legislative and Executive branches as a system, "not of separation of powers but of separated institutions sharing powers."19 This characterization does much to explain the continuing debate on war powers. The Constitution established this separation of powers as a system of checks and balances to ensure that no branch accumulated too much power. The ambiguity inherent in this approach has resulted in varying interpretations by the Executive and Legislative branches regarding war powers. Each branch tends to view itself as dominant. The significance of committing U.S. forces to intervention assures the persistent and energetic nature of this debate.

Article l gives Congress the power to declare war and to raise, fund, and regulate the armed forces. These powers, however, do not include plenary authority to make war.20 Those favoring executive ascendency argue that each power granted to Congress is an exception to the general power of war waging given to the President. Those on the other side of the debate see the authority to declare war as a constraint requiring the President to seek Congressional approval.21 The Constitution grants the President prerogatives of Commander in Chief, executive power of the United States, and the responsibility to see that the laws are faithfully executed. These Presidential powers are general terms and thus open for interpretation.22 The powers conferred on the President, combine such that the "... 'resulting powers'. create a process of political supervision and control over the conduct of military operations thus giving practical

 

________________________________________________________________________

19 Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, and Lawrence J. Korb,

American National Security: Policy and Process, (Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins Univ. Press, l993),p.11O.

      20 Asa A. Clark and Richard N. Pious, "Waging War: Structural

versus Political Efficacy," in National Security and the U.S.

Constitution,ed. George C. Edwards III and Wallace Earl Walker,

(Baltimore Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, l9S8), p.l49.

2l "Waging War," p.l49.

22 "Waging War," p.l5O.

 

 

effect to abstract doctrine."23 In short, the Executive branch has more authority than the Legislative branch in the decisionmaking process leading to military intervention.

The War Powers Resolution, passed in l973, was designed to limit Presidential war making powers. It is a poorly crafted law and widely held to be unconstitutional. Its major flaws are the following: the Purpose and Policy section which defines Presidential prerogatives is not part of the operative law; the Consultation section does not specify who to consult, and provides an escape clause; and the reporting requirements are loosely drawn.24 The unfortunate result of this legislation has been, as General P.X. Kelly and Robert Turner pointed out in the Washington Post, that

 

Congress has used the War Powers Resolution as an insurance policy. Whenever the president sends troops into harm's way, legislators demand that he 'obey the law' by getting their approval. They then demand as a condition of support a public withdrawal date and other assurances that make a successful operation virtually impossible -- knowing that a wise president will be forced to go forward alone. This way, if the mission falls or there are significant U.S. casualties, members of Congress can avoid political accountability.25

 

Since the passage of the resolution, no president has felt constrained to abide by its provisions. Because of its lack of acceptance and its flawed nature, the War Powers Resolution does not figure significantly in the decision to intervene. It does become a matter for consideration once the decision to intervene is made. The division of power and ambiguity created by the Constitution require the President to exercise effective leadership to build a team, to persuade Congress and the public, to anticipate complications, and to take responsibility for his actions.26 Decisive Presidential leadership is essential to prevent the critical decision for

 

____________________________________________________________________________

      23 "Waging War, p.150

      24 "Waging War, p.l5l.

      25 P.X. Kelley and Robert F. Turner, "Out of Harm's Way,"

Washinton Post, 23 October l994, Sec. C2.

      26 American National Security, p.110.

 

 

intervention from deteriorating into a partisan political squabble. While there is no question that Congress can act to restrain the President through its power of the purse, the historical record demonstrates that the ultimate authority and decision to intervene rests with the President. The recent intervention in Haiti provides a clear example of Presidential power. Despite strong Congressional opposition, President Clinton was undeterred from committing U.S. forces to restore President Aristide.

 

Landing force entered Port-au-Prince and bivouacked for the night at market place in northern part of city. Guard placed at the French Legation. No serious disturbance. .Landing force established in city. Slight resistance during early part of night as advance being made. This resistance easily overcome. No casualties to force. Am proceeding to disarm Haytian soldiers and civilians today.

--from 3l July l9l5 issue of Army and Navy Journal

 

 

III. The Haitian Intervention

 

 

. Chronology

 

The origins of the present intervention are rooted in the nineteen year occupation of Haiti by U.S. Marines from l9l5 to l934. The most prominent reasons for this earlier intervention were to stop human rights abuses, to protect the Chase National Bank, and to eliminate the influence of the substantial German community and thus prevent a hostile power from controlling access to the Panama Canal. Additionally, the British writer David Nicholls, writing in l979, noted that

Also closely connected to the strategic factors was the belief genuinely held by many Americans that they had a divinely ordained duty of 'protection and regulation in regard to all these little states in the neighborhood of the Caribbean,' as President Theodore Roosevelt had put it in l9O4. The United States wanted neighbors who were stable, orderly and prosperous, and was prepared to take steps to ensure that such was the case, both for American strategic and economic interests and also for the good of these countries themselves. There is a strong element of misguided altruism in much United States foreign policy and it is particularly noticeable in the case of the Democratic Party. It is surprising that the Americans could, often with sincerity, believe that they were in duty bound to maintain order and justice in the Caribbean, while they were quite clearly incapable of enforcing it in part of their own country.27

 

Thus, it was on 23 January l9l5 that the cruiser Washington delivered Admiral Caperton USN to the port of Cap Haitien, the same port to be used 79 years later by U.S. Marines. Shortly after taking control of the country, U.S. forces installed a new President. U.S. Marines were the new president's strongest constituency and it was their rifles which assured his place. Having stabilized the political situation, the occupation forces set about establishing technical schools. It was hoped that through education, a middle class would emerge which could sustain a democratic state. In addition to schools, the occupiers built roads, communications systems, and provided for public services. Despite these improvements in infrastructure, Haiti failed to establish a viable political or economic system. Lawrence Harrison, in The Atlantic Monthly, argues persuasively that culture is the reason for this failure. He posits that a combination of influences from African culture, past slavery, and the vodun religion cause Haitians to see themselves and their world in a way which fosters autocratic and corrupt politics, social injustice, and economic stagnation.28 Vodum in particular, he argues, causes the Haitians to focus on the present and past and thus not be concerned with progress. Since events are explained not as a consequence of one's actions, but as the result of capricious spirits, the Judeo-Christian concept of man being responsible for his own destiny is foreign to Haitians. By externalizing both responsibility and guilt, Haitians possess a world view inimical to democracy. As Harrison

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27 David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, l979), p.1

28 Lawrence Harrison, 'Voodoo Politics," in The Atlantic

Monthly," 27l, no.6 (June l993) p.lO5.

 

 

explains, "Widespread nepotism and limited cooperation are the consequences in a country where the extended family largely describes the radius of trust."29 By  not appreciating the cultural differences between Haiti and the United States, our policymakers have played the "ugly American" role once again and embarked on a policy with the same goals as the first failed occupation. In fact, Sidney Mintz, in Foreign Affairs, explains that rather than having beneficial results, "the occupation had the effect of increasing government centralization, and of making it more efficient. By creating a modern army, it changed Haitian politics forever. There is no doubt that U.S. measures in the period 1915-1934, and the care shown the Haitian military since, have been of crucial importance to the perpetuation of traditional power."30 Minz closes by admonishing us to avoid these same mistakes again. As will be evident from the following study, there is little cause for optimism on this point. There are, unfortunately, striking similarities between the policies of eighty years ago and the present.

The most recent chapter in Haiti's troubled history began 7 February l99l with the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former Roman Catholic priest, as Haiti's first popularly elected president. The election, monitored by international observers, including former President Carter, was successfully conducted and made for a promising start. Aristide received a strong mandate with 67 percent of the vote. Eight months later, however, a coup headed by Lt. Gen, Raoul Cedras, seized control of the country. Aristide fled first to Caracas, Venezuela, and then finally to Washington D.C. Initially, on 3 October, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution calling for suspension of economic, financial, and commercial ties to Haiti.

__________________________________________________________________________

29 Sidey Mintz, "Voodoo Politics," in The Atlantic Monthly,

27l, no. 6, (June l993) p.lO6.

3O Sidney Mintz, "Can Haiti Change?" in Foreign Affairs, 74,

no. 1, (January/February l995) p.85.

 

 

 

Additionally, on 8 October, the OAS members voted to impose an embargo on Haiti and freeze the overseas assets of the Haitian government. The first U.S. reaction, by President Bush, was to suspend foreign aid, followed on 4 October by a ban on payments by U.S. companies and a freeze on Haitian assets in the U.S.

Haiti came to the fore in the U.S. media again in May l992 when President Bush ordered the repatriation of thousands of Haitian boat people. The most far-reaching U.S. reaction came on 9 June l992 when presidential candidate Bill Clinton declared he would not use military force in Haiti and would not return the refugees until "some shred of democracy" is restored.31 As will be evident in the analysis, this statement by Candidate Clinton will come back to haunt resident Clinton. Clinton's first taste of real world foreign policy came on l4 January l993 when Bush aides informed the Clinton transition team that a large scale exodus of boat people from Haiti was in the offing. In contradiction to the tenor of his campaign statement, Clinton announced that Haitians would not be given asylum in the United States. This was the first of a series of policy shifts that would continue until the September l994 invasion. On l6 March l993, President Clinton met with President Aristide and subsequently stepped up negotiations for his return. In early June, with negotiations proving fruitless, the U.S. froze the Haitian military leaders' assets. This was followed in late June by implementation of a U.N. oil embargo.

In early July, it appeared that negotiations and sanctions were having some success. Cedras and Aristide signed the Governors Island accord which provided for Aristide's return on 3O October. Included in the accord was a ten-step process for transition to democracy. In response to the Governors Island accord, U.N. and U.S. sanctions and the OAS embargo were

_____________________________________________________________________________

31 Barbara J. Saffir, "Getting Tough'" in Washington Post, 23

December l994, Sec. A4O.

 

 

 

suspended on 27 August. In keeping with the July accord, the Haitian Parliament

 

ratified Prime Minister Malval and his cabinet.

 

October 11, l993, marked a pivotal event for U.S. Haitian policy. The USS Harlan County was dispatched to Port-au-Prince to deliver military trainers as called for by the July accord, A small gang of armed thugs forced the withdraw of the U.S. warship before it could dock. This politically embarrassing event marked the beginning of the Administrations move to intervention. An interagency task force was formed to study military intervention. The Harlan County incident also lead to reimposition of the U.N. embargo and deployment of additional warships to enforce it. By the end of October, the Governors Island accord was no longer operative. December saw the resignation of Prime Minister Malval and his return to Haiti. This began a period of relative stasis which continued until the following spring.

April l2,1994, marked a second major turning point for American policy when the TransAfrica director Randall Robinson began a hunger strike in protest against U.S. policy. Robinson called for tighter economic sanctions and an end to forced repatriation of Haitian refugees. Also at this time, the Congressional Black Caucus and various human rights groups lobbied the Administration to change its policy. On 26 April, the U.S. special envoy to Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo, resigned after his recommendation for compromise with the Haitian coup

leaders drew heavy criticism from Haitian activists. Pezzullo was replaced by former Black Caucus member William H. Gray III. Through Gray's voice, the Administration adopted a much more aggressive stance on Aristide's repatriation. In response to activist protest, the Administration announced a "shipboard asylum" policy which allowed refugees to apply for asylum. On 6 May, the U.N. imposed a full trade embargo on Haiti. By the end of June, the US, had applied the full panoply of sanctions to include a ban on air traffic to Haiti and an

expanded freeze on Haitian assets in the U.S.

 

July l994 was marked by rapid escalation of rhetoric on both sides. Cedras expelled human rights monitors and the U.N. adopted a resolution authorizing the use of "all necessary means" to restore democracy. A multinational coalition was also established for this purpose. On 19 August, Clinton approved a timetable for the invasion of Haiti, followed on the 26th by formal agreement on an invasion. To ensure multinational involvement, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott met with the leaders of four Caribbean nations to solicit their participation. In a last ditch effort to avoid the invasion scheduled for l9 September, a delegation headed by former President Carter was sent to Port-au-Prince on l7 September to negotiate with the Haitian leaders. Following intense negotiations, the Carter delegation arranged for the coup readers to step down by l5 October. The three year road to intervention ended on l9 September l994 with the unopposed landing of a U.S. occupation force.

 . Analysis

The three years between the ouster of Aristide and his return to Haiti in September l994 were marked by a continuing escalation of U.S. policy which lead inexorably to intervention. U.S. policy was driven by reactions to external events. The President became a victim of the actions of his subordinates and was left with the choice between a damaging loss of credibility or military intervention. The following analysis will provide a critical examination of the

decisionmaking process which culminated in the l9 September 1994 invasion of Haiti.

The origins of the Clinton Administration's policy on Haiti began during the presidential campaign in l992. Clinton decided to use Haiti to gain the moral high ground and distinguish himself from President Bush. He reacted negatively to Bush's policy of returning Haitian boat people. Clinton called this policy "appalling."32 However, in January l993, seven days before his inauguration, President-elect Clinton announced that he would continue the Bush policy after being confronted with estimates of hundreds of thousands of potential Haitian refugees. This was the first of a number of policy inconsistencies which cumulatively lead to a credibility gap that ultimately had to be filled by armed intervention. To ameliorate the effects of this policy shift, Clinton stepped up negotiations and sanctions to effect Aristide's return.

As indicated in the chronology, the next major turning point was the turning back of the USS Harlan County. The approximately 2OO U.S. and Canadian troops aboard were to be part of a combined police and military contingent authorized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 867 of September l993. Since these forces were operating under authority from Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, they were unable to use force except in self-defense, and were thus obliged to back out.33 After this event, the Washington Post reported, "Everyone agrees that Clinton was unaware of the details of the Harlan County mission until it turned into a crisis."34 Clearly a contingency plan should have been available for such an eventuality. In response to the crisis, National Security Advisor Tony Lake began plans for intervention. "The resulting war plan outlined the nucleus of the invasion Clinton would authorize 11 months later."35 While  developing the plan, Lake become an early advocate for the intervention approach.

The major State Department player was Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, whom Secretary of State Warren Christopher had delegated to handle Haiti. Aside from continuing to

________________________________________________________________________________

32 Ann Devroy and R. Jeffrey Smith, "A Split Administration

Debated Invasion Risks," Washington Post, 25 September l994, Sec.

Al.

33 Richard N. Haas, Intervention (Washington DC: Carnegie

Endowment, l994),p. 48.

34 "Debate on Risks Split Administration." Sec. A4O.

35 "Debate on Risks Split Administration." Sec. A4O.

 

 

 

espouse the policy of returning Aristide to office, the State Department was peripheral to the developing policy originating from the NSC. The next major crisis after the Harlan County episode marginalized the State Department even further.

In early March, Special U.S. Envoy to Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo; Walter Slocombe, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense; and Mark Schneider, Assistant Administrator at the Agency for International Development all testified before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Western Hemisphere affairs that the Administration did not intend to seek a U.N. trade embargo against Haiti until Aristide named a new prime minister to represent him in Haiti. Pezzullo indicated the situation was at an impasse because Aristide rejected the proposal since it did not set a date for his return and had the potential to dilute his power upon return. In his testimony, Pezzullo stated that "President Aristide has made a point that he sees sanctions as a means that by themselves could force the military out. We never saw it that way. We see sanctions as insufficient absent a political initiative that could open the way for a political-diplomatic solution."36 This position was strongly criticized by Democratic Congressmen and representatives of private humanitarian organizations. Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Conn) stated

I hope the administration will see the hearing as a constructive suggestion to get its thinking back on the right track. Aristide has lived up to everything we asked him to do. I would hate to see the United States pushing a U.N. resolution blaming him for the continued failure to restore Haitian democracy.37

 

Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) called the policy 'embarrassing and shameful," while Representative Charles Rangel @-NY) speaking for the Congressional Black Caucus, stated his opposition to the policy and added, "I hope and pray that this president doesn't know what's going

 

__________________________________________________________________________

36 John Goshko, "Haiti Policy at Impasse," Washington Post, 9

March l994, Sec. Al5.

37 "Haiti Policy at Impasse," A15.

 

 

 

on."38 Representative Joseph Kennedy II called for the threat of military intervention to make Haiti's leaders "recognize that the United States is willing to put its troops on the line."39 Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Slocombe responded that, "The United States has no desire to use military force in Haiti and no plans to do so."40 It would appear at this point that Representative Rangel's wish came true. The President was disengaged from the issue, as was his primary advisor on foreign policy, Warren Christopher. The juggernaut for intervention was being formed among liberal Democratic Congressmen and the National Security Advisor Tony Lake. As evidenced by statements in the foregoing testimony, the State Department and Defense Department, the two agencies most responsible for foreign intervention, were pursuing completely opposite tracks. Lacking guidance or intent from the President, it is no wonder the ensuing policy development was disjointed and confused.

In April l994, a series of events took place which caused a policy crisis among opposing camps within the Administration and placed the U.S. on a collision course with intervention. The first event was the hunger strike by Randall Robinson. Media coverage of Robinson's protest combined with increasingly vocal protest from the Congressional Black Caucus and other human rights organizations. This included a newspaper advertisement accusing the administration of contributing to the repression in Haiti through refusal to seek more stringent U.N. economic sanctions and the policy of returning the boat people.41 The week before this advertisement, Aristide sent a letter to President Clinton renouncing the forcible return of refugees. The

 

_______________________________________________________________________________

38 "Haiti Policy at Impasse," A15. 

39 "Haiti Policy at Impasse," Al5.

40 "Haiti Policy at Impasse," Al5.

41 John N. Goshko, :"Groups Call U.S. Haitian Policy a

'Disaster' Report Harshest to Date on Failure to Restore Aristide

to Power," Washington Post, 10 April l994, Sec. A26.

 

 

 

Administration responded to these criticisms by abandoning the policy presented

 

the preceding month by Pezzullo and pushing for increased sanctions. Douglas

 

Farah of the Washington Post Foreign Service wrote

 

With domestic pressure among some of Clinton's most loyal backers building for a policy change, and Aristide publicly branding the Clinton Administration 'racist,' the administration last week unveiled its new effort, again targeting the military rather than trying to wring new concessions from Aristide.42

 

The schism between the State and Defense Departments on one hand and the NSC and close Clinton advisors on the other is best exemplified by the policy review Lake ordered to take place outside normal channels. The NSC conducted this review and solicited comments from only a few top policymakers.43 The result of this review was the adoption of an activist policy which relied on the threat or use of force to obtain the return of Aristide. On 8 May, Pezzullo was replaced by former Black Caucus member William Gray. This marked a clear symbolic and substantive change in U.S. policy. In fact, just a few days before this personnel change, Clinton issued his first threat to use force.44 Robert Novak, writing on 2 May discussed Clinton's move toward and interventionist approach despite State and Defense Department opposition. In regard to the refugee issue, Novak wrote, "To accept them will lose both Florida and the immigration issue for Democrats. To turn them back will alienate the Congressional Black Caucus, which is vital to Clinton. That is why war talk is being heard in Washington."45 In the same article a State Department official was quoted as saying military intervention was not an option.

____________________________________________________________________________

42 Douglas Farah, "Aristide's Backers: Latest Plan Falls

Short," Washington Post, 2 May l994, Sec. Al.

      43 "Debate on Risks Split Administration,"p.A4O.

44 "Debate on Risks Split Administration,"p.A4O.

      45 Robert D. Novak, "Collision Course on Haiti," Washington

Post, 2 May l994, Sec. Al9.

 

 

 

The reasons for this policy shift and personnel shakeup were driven solely by the political response to strong pressure from the Administration's strongest constituencies. It is manifestly improper, as Representative Joe Kennedy advocated, to "place our troops on the line" to send signals which are driven by the need to assuage a political constituency. This type of decisionmaking process is inherently reactive in nature and leads to inconsistent policy development, which in turn, results in a lack of credibility. As an advisor to Aristide stated, "The real problem is a lack of credibility. The Clinton administration has lost credibility not only with the Haitian people but with the military. They no longer think the Clinton administration is serious about anything they say or do."46 It is instructive that this interpretation was shared by most pundits in Washington and abroad. Steven Schaaf in Die Woche stated, "Increasingly, his undoing is that he makes his foreign policy decisions contingent on domestic policy considerations."47 An editorial in a prominent German paper opined that "Clinton's misfortune is that the whole world believes it knows his indecisiveness, including the Haitian generals. Clinton's long hesitation has grown into a crisis of credibility for American foreign policy."48 Thus did the flawed decisionmaking regarding one of the poorest and smallest countries in the world damage the national security of the world's only superpower. No more eloquent argument can be made for reasoned, rational foreign policy based on national interests. The potential dangers are enormous, and while the first to suffer will be America's military, all citizens should be concerned. John F. Kennedy's lack of credibility in the eyes of Nikita Khrushchev contributed significantly, if not decisively, to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The world is still a tremendously dangerous place and

 

 

_______________________________________________________________________________

46 "Aristide's Backers: Latest Plan Falls Short,"p.A1.

47 William Drozdiak, "For Europe, Haiti Confirms U.S.

Hesitation," Washington Post, l7 September l994, Sec. Al2.

      48 "For Europe, Haiti Confirms U.S. Hesitation,"p.Al2.

 

 

 

demands a foreign policy based on national interests not partisan political demands, Concerning the United States international reputation, Chester Crocker questioned why other countries should acquiesce to U.S. leadership when it has an administration "which paints itself into a Haitian corner that may have no respectable exit short of a full-scale military occupation."49 Crocker continues,

 

And they are right to protest when delicate and dangerous problems are handled so as to create the impression of disorganization and weakness (North Korea) or when U.S. led initiatives turn out to be nothing but bluff, leading to national humiliation and a hasty redefinition of mission (Haiti, Somalia). The foreign policy of the United States is not something to be handled as if it were just another White House trial balloon on health care.50

 

As of early May, the U.S. policy called for increased U.N. sanctions. This was the same policy the administration had rejected in January. The administration had threatened stiffer sanctions by l5 January if the Haitian leaders did not comply with the Governors Island accord, but concern over malnutrition forced a reappraisal of this position. With the Governors Island

accord dead, the sanctions were no longer coupled with a workable political solution as they would have been in January. Regarding this situation, Pezzullo stated that the administration "will thus substitute a tactic for a strategy, turning a mere means into an end."51 Pezzullo concludes,

 

The administration's inability to stay the course on something as fundamental as building a political coalition in a parliamentary democracy does not provide much hope that it will be able to stay any course. It has now adopted a policy line -- sanctions without any political track -- that has no prospect of returning democracy or Aristide to Haiti. It is clear that with the administration's decision not to push Aristide on the political front, political negotiations for his restoration

 

___________________________________________________________________________

49 Chester Crocker, "Peacekeeping We Can Fight for Beyond

Bluffs and Trial Balloons, Rules of Constructive Involvement,"

Washington Post, Sec. C1.

50 "Peacekeeping: We Can Fight for Beyond Bluffs and Trial

Balloons"p.C1.

5l Lawrence A. Pezzullo, "Our Haiti Fiasco," Washington Post, 5

May l994, Sec. A23.

 

 

 

are now dead. If the U.S. administration is serious about returning Aristide now, it will have to do so on the backs of U.S. soldiers. By abandoning the track of multilateral negotiations, which was forcing the Haitians to take political responsibility for effecting change in their country, we have taken on full responsibility for Haiti's future."52

 

On 2l May, when the tougher sanctions took effect, administration officials and Aristide himself indicated that these latest sanctions would be insufficient to restore Haitian democracy. Having staked its policy on increased sanctions to effect Aristide's return, the administration was committed to escalation if, as many in the administration already believed, the sanctions ere

inadequate. Apparently, becoming convinced that sanctions would be insufficient, policymakers presented five arguments for an invasion: "that U.S. values and post-Cold War global strategy demand that we 'restore democracy' to Haiti; that U.S. credibility is unacceptably harmed by thugs who 'thumb their noses at us; that restoring President Aristide is the only way to reduce the number of refugees heading our way; that removing the current military leaders will reduce drug trafficking to the United States; that only such an all out effort can dispel charges of a racist policy."53  Jessica Mathews most cogently argued

 

What is noteworthy about this list is that only the first argument addresses Haiti's problems; the rest address our own. Making foreign policy with an eye to domestic opinion is one thing. Making foreign policy to resolve domestic concerns with only an occasional eye to the actual problems abroad is quite another, and unlikely to end successfully.54

 

Mathews concludes that the threat to U.S. credibility "...lies in the

 

possibility that we will start something we cannot finish out of little more

 

than frustration, or become hopelessly tangled

 

________________________________________________________________________________

52 "Our Haiti Fiasco," p.A23.

53 Jessica Mathews, "Haiti's Problem -- Or Ours?," in

Washington Post, 24 May l994, Sec. A2l.

      54 "Haiti's Problem -- Or Ours?,"p.A21.

 

 

 

in a policy riddled with internal contradictions because it is principally

 

designed to meet domestic imperatives."55

 

Throughout the summer, the interventionists, who now included not only the National Security Advisor and his assistant Sandy Berger, but also Vice President Gore, and Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, continued to discuss the military option.56 The Pentagon, however, continued its consistent position against military intervention. To close this rift, the Pentagon held an informal lunch designed to allow top military planners to voice their concerns to Deputy Secretary of State Talbott. Talbott argued that Haiti's proximity to the U.S. and the nature of its human rights violations made it a vital national interest, Pentagon officials continued to voice concerns about the practicality of accomplishing the objective of restoring democracy. Throughout July, the interventionists expressed frustration over the lack of results from sanctions

and pushed for a deadline. At the advice of Pentagon officials, the President declined to establish a deadline, but on 26 August he signed a finding authorizing covert contacts with the Haitian leaders to attempt to facilitate their departure. When this covert effort failed to produce results, the diplomatic delegation headed by former President Carter was sent to Port-au-Prince for last minute negotiations. Military plans for a forcible entry were already set in motion when the team arrived in Haiti. The purpose of the Carter delegation was similar to that of the covert action -- to facilitate the departure of the military leaders. At the last minute, with airborne troops already enroute, the negotiators successfully arranged for the transfer of power back to Aristide by l5 October. Thus a forced entry invasion was avoided by the closest possible margin. The next day,

 

____________________________________________________________________________

      55 "Haiti's Problem -- Or Ours?,"p.A2l.

      56 "Debate on Risks Split Administration,"p.A40.  

      57 "Debate on Risks Split Asministration,"p.A4O.

 

 

 

l9 September l994, U.S. forces entered Haiti to begin the occupation necessary

 

to accomplish their nation-building mission.

 

How should the decisionmaking process leading to the Haiti occupation be judged? President Clinton did comply with just war doctrine. He met the criteria of competent authority and just cause with right intention. The Carter mission obviated the need for a forced entry and thereby complied with the requirement of last resort. By seeking U.N. approval for the operation, Clinton defused most possible arguments concerning compliance with international law. As was indicated above, international law has in the past strictly limited the use of force to self defense. The U.N. authorized action in Haiti adds another chapter to the evolving doctrine which is moving toward approval of humanitarian operations as a legitimate justification for use of force. This matter is still evolving and the presumption against the use of force except for self-defense is

still strong. Of interest to this argument will be the developments now transpiring in Russia's near abroad. It would be unfortunate if U.S. actions in Haiti were used as a justification for increased Russian expansion or involvement around its borders. Clearly, the precedent set by Haiti gave

some encouragement to the repression now going on in Chechnya. It seems likely that the muted U.S. response to the Chechen tragedy can, at least in part, be attributed to a quid pro quo for Russian silence during the Haiti invasion. Again, it is instructive to note the far-reaching consequences of foreign policy decisions, no matter how insignificant the country involved.

One can make a strong case that Clinton complied with both the just war doctrine and international law. Did he comply with the U.S. Constitution and the laws of the United States? Again, the answer is yes. The only area of possible dispute would be with the War Powers Resolution. As discussed earlier, however, this poorly written law has not been acknowledged as binding by any President and is of questionable constitutionality. Majorities of both Houses of Congress opposed the intervention, but few would claim that Clinton violated the law.

While President Clinton did not violate just war doctrine, international or U.S. law, he did violate his own and previously accepted criteria for intervention. Neither the Clinton National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, nor other Clinton administration pronouncements establishing criteria for intervention were followed. The Weinberger Doctrine and the Powell Doctrine were, likewise, not operative. The next section will examine the extant

doctrine and guidelines for intervention and compare and contrast this with the decisionmaking criteria used for the Haiti invasion.

 

 

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish by that task the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something alien to its nature.

-- Clausewitz, On War

 

 

IV. Doctrine/Guidelines for Intervention

 

From Casper Weinberger's speech to the National Press Club in November l984 to President Clinton's address to the nation in September l994, there have been numerous attempts to establish a U.S. doctrine for determining when to resort to military force. The following will be an analysis of the most authoritative of these attempts.

The Weinberger Doctrine was first outlined by the Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger in a speech on 28 November l984. In this speech he described six criteria that should be met before committing U.S. military forces.58 Three  of the criteria dealt with determining when

 

____________________________________________________________________

58 Intervention, Appendix C

 

 

 

to resort to force, while the other three addressed how to use force. According to this doctrine, force would be used only in situations involving U.S. vital interests or those of our allies, when there was a reasonable assurance of support from Congress and the American people, and when all other means had been exhausted. Most critics of these conditions say it is a prescription for never using force -- a type of neo-isolationism. This is not the case. In the preamble of his speech, Weinberger addressed this criticism directly. He discussed the subjectivity involved in determining vital national interests and described when concerns of our allies would also qualify as being vital to the national interest. Weinberger clearly recognized the leadership role of the United States and the concomitant need to remain engaged in world affairs. He also appreciated

the difficulty of anticipating the future, and thus the need for flexibility in policy development. A balanced interpretation of Weinberger's intent finds a close complementarity and consistency with just-war doctrine. The Weinberger doctrine makes a presumption against the use of force. Only if clearly overwhelming circumstances dictate should force be used. It argues that the political, economic, and diplomatic components of national power should be exhausted before contemplating intervention. In the same words as just-war doctrine, Weinberger argues that military force must be a last resort and used only for a legitimate or just cause. The requirement for public and legislative support is in consonance with the requirement of competent authority in the jus ad bellum. It is also essential to note the words "some reasonable assurance." The Weinberger doctrine recognized, and addressed directly, the need for the President to act unilaterally when timeliness or secrecy were required. This criterion is really a call for Presidential leadership. He felt that if the President acted in good faith and exercised proper judgment, the American people would support commitment of military forces. 

If military force is to be used, the Weinberger Doctrine calls for entering with a clear intention of winning and with adequate forces to accomplish clearly articulated political and military objectives. In addition, given the dynamic nature of intervention, the situation must be continually reassessed to ensure the composition of forces is proper and adequate to accomplish the objectives. These admonitions appear obvious, but have been violated frequently in the past, with Vietnam being the most poignant example. In operations other than war (OOTW), the requirement for clearly articulated goals is more problematic, but no less essential, Having studied Clausewitz, Weinberger certainly understood that doctrine is not meant to be prescriptive,

but is rather, a guide and tool for the decisionmaker. It would seem most of the critics of this doctrine view it as a cookbook containing an inviolate recipe to be followed when preparing an intervention. Weinberger, on the other hand, recognized that judgment and leadership were essential ingredients in the decisionmaking process. The Weinberger doctrine remains relevant eleven years after its pronouncement. Despite the demise of the Cold War, it is still one of the best guides for the decisionmaker faced with the possibility of using military force.

In the spring of l986, Senator Gary Hart presented a list of criteria similar to Weinberger but included additional guidelines for force employment. Hart's considerations, like Weinberger argued for a restrained and considered approach to intervention decisionmaking. These policies can be viewed partly as the legacy of Vietnam and the Beirut tragedy.

Following the Persian Gulf War, General Colin Powell established six questions to be addressed when considering the use of military force.59 These  questions are similar to Weinberger criteria. Powell focused somewhat more on the mechanics of the decisionmaking

 

____________________________________________________________________________

59 Intervention, Appendix E

 

 

 

process. He called for a careful analysis of the risks and costs involved and the likely progression of events following intervention. He emphasized the requirement for military actions to be consistent with the political objective (another Clausewitz student). He expressed discomfort with policies aimed at limited involvement rather than at achieving a specific outcome.60 Powell also strongly advocated the use of overwhelming force to assure victory.*

A critic to the Weinberger/Powell approach emerged in the Fall of l992. Then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Les Aspin, claimed their criteria constituted an "all or nothing" school that would strictly limit the use of military force for foreign policy purposes.61 As Haas indicated, "He leaned toward what he described as a 'limited objectives' school, one that supports more expansive use of military force by the United States for political purposes."62 Aspin did not worry, as Powell did, about escalation or entanglement. Aspin's argument was that with the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States had gained the latitude simply to walk away if an intervention went awry. This myopic interpretation required a complete dismissal of historical precedent. This policy was especially flawed coming from Aspin, who as Chairman of the HASC, and later as Secretary of Defense, was an advocate for reduced military spending. A strategy calling for increased engagement and intervention, coupled with a policy advocating defense cuts, is a classic example of a disconnect between means and ends, Napoleon, Hitler, and Saddam Hussein, to mention but a few, have met their fate by pursuing objectives beyond the means available to them. Aspin believed that technological advances in weaponry changed the calculus and would provide greater latitude to the United States at a lower cost in blood or

 

____________________________________________________________________________

6O Intervention, p.15.

6l Intervention, p.l5.

62 Intervention, p.15. 

   *For OOTW a better way to express this might be for clearly

adequate and appropriate forces vice overwhelming force.

 

 

 

money.* The efficacy of advanced weaponry, as interpreted by Aspin, is

 

reasonable only if one also accepts his belief that escalation is not a concern.

 

The very real need to maintain U.S. consistency in foreign affairs militates against Aspin's argument that dismisses escalation and entanglement. One can only imagine the impact on U.S. world leadership if it was to engage in a limited way throughout the world and then walk away whenever the going got tough. Not only would this approach not accomplish the task at hand, but it would completely discredit the United States. Can Aspin really believe that smart weapons, used in a limited way, could evaporate centuries old enmity in a Bosnia or Rwanda? Consistency and determination are the sine qua non for effective foreign policy.

In a speech delivered at West Point on 5 January l993, President Bush indicated that national interests are not an absolute guide in determining when to use force. He outlined the following requirements for military intervention: force should only be used when the stakes warrant it, when it can be effective, when it can be limited in scope and duration, and when the potential gains outweigh the costs. Bush said that in every case, a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan, and realistic criteria for withdrawal were essential. He also indicated that multilateral support was desirable but not essential.  speech was very similar in scope to the policy approach recommended by Powell.

In April l993 Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Foreign Relations. During his testimony he provided four prerequisites for using force: clear objectives, probable success, likelihood of popular and Congressional support, and a clear exit strategy.64 This amalgam of past statements by Weinberger, Bush, and

 

__________________________________________________________________________

63 Intervention, Appendix F.

   *Technology solutions are even more problematic in OOTW.

64 Warren Christopher, testimony in Commerce, Justice, and

 

 

 

Powell was presented at a time when the Clinton administration was arguing

 

against intervention in Bosnia.

 

In September 1993, President Clinton presented a speech to the U.N. General Assembly on U.S. peacekeeping policy.65 In this speech he argued against a too activist approach by the U.N. He stated that the U.N. cannot become involved in all the world's disputes. He indicated that the American people would not support an overreaching U.N. In this speech, he also reiterated the following five questions previously posed by U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright: Is there a real threat to international peace and security? Does the proposed mission have clear objectives and can its scope be clearly defined? Is a cease-fire plan in place? Are the financial resources needed to accomplish the mission available? Can an end point to U.N. participation be identified?66 In May l994, the Administration issued a policy statement on multilateral peace operations which amplified the above by prescribing seventeen criteria to be met before the U.S. would participate in peacekeeping operations likely to involve combat.67

The l994 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement provides the most authoritative document on the Clinton Administration policy on the use of military force.68 This document states that U.S. forces will be used to respond to "key danger -- those posed by weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression, and threats to the stability of states."69 Four basic principles for determining when to use military force are identified. The policy states that

 

______________________________________________________________________________

State, the Judiciary, and Related Appropriations, FY94: Hearing

(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, l993),

p323-84.

65 Intervention, Appendix G.

66 Intervention, p.17.

67 Intervention, p.17.

68 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement

(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, l994)

      69 National Security Strategy, p.1O.

 

 

 

national interests will dictate the pace and extent of engagement. In the case of vital and survival interests, the U.S. will act decisively, and unilaterally, if necessary. In matters of lesser concern, the determination to intervene will be in those areas that most effect U.S. interests, for example, "where there is potential to generate substantial refugee flows into our nation..."70 The strategy also indicates a preference for multilateral intervention whenever possible without compromising national interests. It also presents several questions: "Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of success? What types of U.S. military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use of military force carefully matched to our political objectives? Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives? Do we have timelines and milestones that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?"71 Finally, it establishes the need to measure the cost and benefits to determine the priority of the possible intervention. For example, "We will be more inclined to act where there is reason to believe that our action will bring lasting improvement."72

The last policy statement before the Haitian intervention was made in President Clinton's address to the nation on l5 September l994. Aside from listing numerous atrocities committed by the coup leaders, the President addressed a number of specific points bearing on our reasons for intervening. He clearly attempted to be consistent with the National Security Strategy published just two months earlier. Clinton provided the following justifications for intervention: It is in our national interest, Haiti is near our borders, there is a clear limited and achievable goal, we should not allow dictators to break their word with us, we must stop atrocities, and restoring democracy encourages stability and prosperity in our region. In the President's words, "When

 

________________________________________________________________________

7O National Security Strategy, p.10.

      71 National Security Strategy, p.10.

72 National Security Strategy, p.10.

 

 

 

brutality occurs close to our shores it affects our national security and we have a responsibility to act." He also made the point that military force was being used only as a last resort. Additionally, he noted that the operation would be multinational and supported by the nations of the world. Finally, he said, "Our mission in Haiti, as it was in Panama and Grenada, will be limited and specific. ...Our soldiers will not be involved in rebuilding Haiti or its economy."

 

One point and one only yields an integrated view of all phenomena; and only by holding to that point of view can one avoid inconsistency.

-- Clausewitz, On War

 

 

V. Doctrine Applied

 

 

The preceding section examined the most relevant and authoritative U.S. doctrine and guidelines for the use of military force. This section will analyze the applicability of this doctrine to the Haitian intervention. Specifically, was the doctrine complied with, and did it have a determining influence on the decisionmaking process.

As in the National Security Strategy, Clinton's address stressed that America's national interests were at stake. He did not characterize these interests as vital, however. He also stated that all other means had been exhausted before deciding to use force, Further, he outlined a proposed timeline when force levels would be reduced and U.N. forces would assume a peacekeeping role. However, the Clinton speech failed in a number of significant ways to comply with the National Security Policy. The most obvious deviation was the lack of Congressional or popular support. More significantly, however, was the unrealistic appraisal of the mission, The goal of restoring democracy to a country which has no experience with that institution requires nothing less than a nation-building mission. Nation-building is the most intrusive, costly, and time-consuming of all peacekeeping operations. Announcing a timeline does not ensure that a mission will be short or cheap. Such an expansive mission without popular support is a prescription for disaster. A President can afford to use military force without Congressional or popular support only if the intervention will be short and cheap, or if he has a reasonable chance of swaying opinion through leadership. Given the minor interests involved in Haiti, neither of these eventualities were likely. As Haas indicated, when interests are modest ".any such intervention must be extremely short or, if this is not possible, designed so that the risks and costs are modest."73 A cost benefit analysis, as called for in the National Security Strategy, was not adequately considered. If an honest appraisal had been conducted which looked beyond the initial invasion, it would have been impossible to justify the costs required to accomplish a nation-building mission. If the mission had been to restore Aristide, rather than the much more expansive goal of re-establishing democracy, the mission would have been much more manageable. Of course, this was not to be the case. One can conclude that while Clinton complied with certain particulars of his National Security Strategy, he did not abide by its spirit or intent. The criteria the administration established in the strategy were meant to be a brake against impetuous interventions and to provide some strong presumptions against intervention. What caused the President to decide as he did?

Obviously, the answer can not be found in the previously described international law, jus ad bellum, U.S. strategy, or intervention doctrine. Herein lies the utility of a case study, vice simply a theoretical, pedantic discussion of policy statements and doctrine. It is in the execution of policy that logic and reason are subsumed by the imperfections of the political world. Haiti

 

______________________________________________________________________

73 Intervention,p.72.

 

 

 

provides ample evidence of this. Early Clinton administration policy was reactive and ad hoc. When a crisis or potential crisis arose, a stopgap measure was adopted to mollify the situation. The intent seemed to be to Band-Aid Haiti as best as possible to allow the President to focus on the domestic agenda. The various policy changes concerning the handling of Haitian refugees provide the best set of examples for this reactive approach. No coherent strategy was adopted to avoid this haphazard decisionmaking. The President's focus on health care reform, and the domestic agenda in general, also meant he was not adequately engaged in supervising the developing administration policy. This became particularly significant in May l994 when William Gray replaced Lawrence Pezzullo as special representative to Haiti. Gray, in combination with the hawkish senior members of the NSC, began espousing a much more aggressive and bellicose Haitian policy. The threats, sword rattling, and ultimatums became so pronounced that the administration lost much of its room to maneuver. After these statements, stepping back without returning Aristide would have seriously damaged U.S. credibility. Thus, without realizing it, the President was committed to an intervention. This fact alone is worth much consideration. In this case, Haiti posed no real threat to U.S. vital interests and the initial costs of military intervention were bearable. However, the possible ramifications for other less benign situations are truly frightening, Richard Haas, speaking in Foreign Affairs, neatly summed up the Haiti decisionmaking process:

 

.It was an essentially unilateral undertaking on behalf of goals that were largely Wilsonian -- i.e., to restore a constitutionally elected (if not quite democratic) government to power and to protect people being abused. One has to be wary of making to much of this example, however, as domestic politics -- the need to stem immigration, satisfy a small but powerful congressional constituency, and buttress the sagging credibility of the president -- dominated decision-making.

 

__________________________________________________________________________

      74 Richard N. Haas, "Paradigm Lost," in Foreign Affairs, 74,

no.1 (January/February l995): p55.

 

 

 

The above quotation neatly encapsulates the essence of the decisionmaking process, but this writer disagrees with the disclaimer that the Haitian example might not be a good model because the process was corrupted by domestic politics. On the contrary, it is precisely for this reason that the Haitian example is particularly useful. Domestic politics will always play a role in

the decisionmaking process. Clearly, Clausewitz's "fog and friction" enter into play even before the decision is made to intervene. Any study which relies solely on doctrine and theory without taking into account the political element will miss one of the strongest determinants in the decisionmaking process. It is not quantifiable, and is frequently illogical, but it is real nonetheless.

In summary, the Haitian decisionmaking process was flawed in the following ways: The President was not adequately engaged and allowed subordinates to paint him into a policy corner; the President failed to provide the requisite leadership to establish popular support for the mission; from the first days of the Administration, Haitian policy was confused, improvised and reactive; the nation-building mission chosen was too expansive and costly given the long term

costs and poor chances for success; and most significantly, domestic political considerations played an inordinate role in dictating the decision to intervene. Even the most cursory examination of past Haitian interventions would have demonstrated the magnitude of the proposed task. Despite administration statements to the contrary, Haiti has no tradition of democracy. Writing in l988, Richard Morse stated that the American occupation from l9l5 to l934 was "aimed to stabilize Haitian politics; develop a technically trained middle class; create an efficient constabulary (the Garde d'Haiti); regularize financial operations; modernize public utilities, health services, and transportation; improve agricultural education; and invite foreign investment."75 The unintended results of this occupation are ironic in the extreme. The developed

 

______________________________________________________________________

75 Richard M. Morse, Haiti's Future: Views of Twelve Haitian

 

 

 

middle class became the oppressors of the masses, and the military became the predominant force in Haitian politics. The U.S. trained Haitian military became a tool for internal suppression while American fiscal policies increased customs and import duties, thereby impoverishing the peasants and encouraging the destructive urbanization which destroyed secondary towns and lead to the

present squalor of Port-au-Prince. With such disastrous results, the current occupation is all the more incomprehensible. The Haitian journalist, Pierre-Raymond Dumas, explains

 

The logic of war prevails over political logic. Engaging in politics in Haiti has always been considered a dangerous, morbid, and even criminal activity. In Haiti, the subjects of revolution and democracy have always been ridiculed. A rejection of democracy is implied by the very idea of armed revolution (in the sense of a coup, an invasion, or an upheaval) led by one group against the class that exercises political authority. The situation of constant war raises the fundamental issue of the relationship between power and the collective will. The roots of authoritarianism and of state control in our society show that democratic interplay has been limited to a group of men who belong to coalitions and who see politics only as a springboard to power. Generally, the 'people' have not participated spontaneously in the political debate... From this perspective, the idea of democratization has had little bearing on solutions to the conflicts and crises that are rending Haitian society.76

 

Given the above, it is obvious that domestic political logic and not

 

constructive foreign policy logic was responsible for the Haitian intervention.

 

The era before l9l4 was forged by the Royal Navy and the pound sterling and free trade. The essence of the task for the new era is to strike a balance between realpolitik and moralism.

--Robert L. Bartley, Foreign Affairs Sept/Oct 93

 

VI. Conclusion.

________________________________________________________________________________

Leaders, (Washington: Wilson Center Press, l988),p.7.

76 Pierre-Raymond Dumas, "Legitimizing Politics," in Haiti's

Future, ed. Richard M. Morse, (Washington: Wilson Center Press,

l988) ,p.13-14.

 

 

 

Much can be learned from the mistakes made by the Clinton administration leading up to the intervention in Haiti. As just discussed, political considerations dominated the process and were the primary determining factor shaping policy. Given the pervasive nature of politics in governmental decisionmaking, can a logical and workable system be developed to facilitate

presidential decisionmaking? The conclusion to this study will argue that this is possible. Drawing from existing theory, law, and doctrine, one can synthesize a corpus of information that can provide the President with powerful decisionmaking tools and allow for a rigorous analysis of the situation before determining to use military force.

The first requirement in developing this decisionmaking doctrine is the establishment of a strategy. The current strategy is inadequate. In September l993, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake stated, "The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement, the enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies."77 As Haas pointed out, "This statement falls short as a practicable doctrine, which, as containment did, must

define both interests and intentions."78 It is essential that a workable strategy be established. The concept of engagement and enlargement is simply too amorphous to be of much practical value. Furthermore, the concept of encouraging the growth of democracy as a basic tenet of U.S. foreign policy is seriously flawed. It is amazing that such an ideologically motivated, neo-imperialistic policy has not garnered more commentary. It says to the rest of the world that the United States knows best, and that non-democracies are imperfect and will be targeted for change. This proposition is a politically correct way of stating an earlier ideological statement to the effect -- "we will bury you." If the United States aggressively engages and enlarges, thereby

 

________________________________________________________________________

77 "Paradigm Lost," p.44.

78 "Paradigm Lost," p.44.

 

 

 

increasing its relative power in the various regions of the world, countries in

 

those respective regions will view these actions as imperialistic and

 

potentially threatening. On this point, Michael Roskin explains

 

If you are expanding your power -- even for the noblest causes, to save the world or to save country X -- other nations, even friendly ones, still see it as imperialism. Once we have sufficient power to stabilize conflicts, prevent aggression, and stop nuclear proliferation, we will have accumulated so much power that we are de facto king of the world. For some curious reason, other nations resent this....79

 

Rather, the focus of U.S. foreign policy should be on encouraging stability among nations. Engagement and enlargement, on the other hand, focus on the internal arrangements within nations. This focus is too intrusive and beyond the capabilities of the finite resources available. Robert Art argues against making the spread of democracy a primary policy goal. He explains that not only is this goal of dubious efficacy, but that it "can become a license for indiscriminate and unending U.S. military interventions in the internal affairs of others. Democracies are best produced, rather, by stalemating aggressor states, by providing a stable international framework that facilitates economic development and the emergence of a middle class within states, and by using economic and other types of leverage to encourage internal liberalization."80  The essence of this debate is really about whether Realism or Wilsonianism will predominate in America's foreign policy.

Jeane Kirkpatrick clarifies this issue in the following:

 

The isolationism versus internationalism debate is in reality the debate among the various types of internationalism [Realism,  Wilsonianism]; that which aims frankly to serve the national interest, as conventionally conceived (to protect its territory,

 

_______________________________________________________________________

79 Michael G. Roskin, "National Interest: From Abstraction to

Strategy," in Parameters, 24, no.4, (Carlisle: U.S. Army War

College, l994),p. l2.

80 Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense," in America's Strategy

in a Changing World, (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, l992),p.105.

 

 

wealth and access to necessary goods; to defend its nationals); that which aims to preserve and defend democracy; and a brand of 'disinterested globalism' which looks at the world and asks what needs to be done -- with little explicit concern for the national interest.81

 

Given the restraints imposed by the budget deficit, the United States cannot afford a Wilsonian approach to world affairs. It will be necessary to abide by one of Morgenthau's prime tenets, that of setting priorities based upon an assessment of national interests. William Hyland, writing in l99l, recognized that, "On occasion there will have to be compromises on issues such as free trade, the crusade for democracy, human rights and the rule of law.... Much like the policy of containment, a prolonged pragmatism may be necessary to finally realize those laudable goals."82 Hyland's analysis points to the most significant flaw in the engagement and enlargement strategy -- the disparity between ends and means. However laudable a strategy's goals may be, if the strategy cannot be executed, it is of no value. Again, a workable strategy is essential.

It is beyond the scope of this study to recommend a comprehensive strategy, but any strategy must clearly articulate the goals to be accomplished with a clear view of what is possible. Means, therefore, must always be taken into account. An unsupportable strategy will do nothing in practical terms but damage U.S. credibility. The old saw "never point an empty gun," applies even at the national strategic level.

Once a workable strategy is articulated, it is then possible to establish certain criteria which should be considered before determining whether to intervene. The Weinberger Doctrine is still valid and should continue to be used. This doctrine emphasizes the need to determine vital national interests, to have some assurance of popular support, and to intervene only as a last

 

________________________________________________________________________________

81 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "A Normal Country in a Normal Time,"

in America's Purpose, (San Francisco: ICS Press, l99l)

82 William G. Hyland, "The Case for Pragmatism," in Foreign

Affairs, 7l, no.1 (America and the World 9l/92), p.45.

 

 

 

resort. These criteria are in consonance with international law and make

 

abundant sense given the present fiscal constraints.

 

In addition to considering the Weinberger Doctrine, the President should ask the following questions: Is the goal achievable? Is it affordable? Is it a priority? Will the action be curative or merely palliative? Does the action comply with international law and just war doctrine? After addressing these questions, should the President decide to intervene, it is essential that he provide solid and unequivocal leadership to ensure Congressional and public support. By following these decisionmaking guidelines, American foreign policy should remain consistent while ensuring the national interest. A well-formulated strategy coupled with reasonable criteria for intervention will minimize the effects of domestic politics. A void left by inadequate leadership or flawed policy will quickly be filled by special interest groups or the media. The Haitian example just studied provides ample evidence of this fact. A vital interest was created in Haiti, not by the Haitians, but by the administration, whose shifting strategy and bellicose statements ultimately placed America's

credibility on the line and forced the President to intervene to rescue that credibility. It is essential that the President make a well-reasoned decision to intervene based on the best interests of the United States. The best way to ensure this outcome and minimize the influence of domestic politics is to articulate and abide by a workable strategy. Should the need to intervene arise, the guidelines recommended by this study will assist in making a decision consistent with America's interests. Ultimately, however, the decision is the President's to make, and no strategy, doctrine, or set of guidelines can provide the definitive answer to that most important question--whether to send America's forces into harm's way.

 

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