Military

Equipping Air Force Rescue To Do The Rescue Mission

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Aviation

 

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: Equipping Air Force Rescue To Do The Rescue Mission

 

Author: Major Kenneth V. Volmert, United States Air Force

 

Thesis: The United States Air Force needs to equip their rescue helicopters to

allow them to do the rescue mission in the modem day threat environment.

 

Background: History has proven time after time the value of having a combat

search and rescue (CSAR) capability. The military feels this is of such importance

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed each service to perform CSAR in

support of their own operations. To accomplish this mission the rescue force

requires much of the same high technology equipment found in its special

operations units. Currently, the United States Air Force (USAF) employs the HH

60G Pavehawk as its rescue helicopter. The Pavehawk is a modified version of

the Army UH-60A Blackhawk helicopter. The USAF equipped the Pavehawk

with a state of the art navigational system, extended range fuel tanks, upgraded

communications and two mini-guns for self defense. The HH-60G's counter

measure system is the only place the Air Force has not given the helicopter the

proper equipment to do the rescue mission. This deficiency restricts the

Pavehawk's operations to relatively benign environments. Rescue crews must be

able to recover downed aircrew members under varying flight conditions, under a

variety of threat levels. Normally, aviators do not go down in low threat

environments. This requires rescue crews to operate in at least a medium threat

environment. Today the threat to the current HH-60G by small, mobile, surface-to-

air missiles and antiaircraft artillery is quite formidable. This lethality, combined

with weapons proliferation, will increase as a more hostile world waits. In order

for rescue crews to do their job, they need the proper equipment. The Air Force

needs to equip the Pavehawk with a defensive system that allows it to penetrate

hostile defenses to complete its mission. There are defensive systems currently on

the market that the Air Force could adapt and integrate into the Pavehawk. The

key is to procure a system that can detect the threat and counter it, while informing

the pilot. Without this equipment we are likely to see a repeat of Operation Desert

Storm, where Special Operations Forces receive the additional mission of combat

rescue. This can only detract from SOF's primary missions. It is up to the Air

Force to equip the Pavehawk for the rescue mission.

 

Recommendation: The Air Force should procure an integrated defensive system,

capable of protecting the rescue crew from missile and artillery attacks while

enroute to recover a downed aircrew member.

 

EQUIPPING AIR FORCE RESCUE

 

TO DO THE RESCUE MISSION

 

INTRODUCTION

 

History has proven time after time the value of having a combat search and

 

rescue (CSAR) capability. This nation spends a large amount of money to train

 

combat pilots. A combat pilot usually goes through over two years of initial pilot

 

training before being sent to a combat unit. The more time the military invests in a

 

pilot's training, through continuation training and exercises, the more valuable they

 

become to the military. CSAR provides the military a means to recover downed

 

aircrew members and return them to service. There is also a psychological

 

advantage to the aviators in just knowing that they have CSAR forces dedicated to

 

recover them if they are downed behind enemy lines. The military feels this is of

 

such importance that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed each service to

 

perform CSAR in support of their own operations.1

 

Not only does recovery of a downed aircrew member boost morale among

 

pilots, CSAR also aids the war effort by denying the enemy a potential intelligence

 

source as well as a prisoner of war bargaining chip. The American public does not

 

want to see fellow Americans paraded in front of television cameras as prisoners of

 

war. The swift victory of Operation Desert Storm combined with the low number

 

of prisoners has increased this perception. Thus the United States military requires

 

rescue forces not only for fiscal, military, and political reasons, but also for

 

emotional and humanistic reasons.

 

If our country places such a high value on the recovery of downed aircrew

 

members, the United States Air Force (USAF) needs to equip their rescue

 

helicopters to allow them to operate in the modem day threat environment. This

 

paper will examine what equipment improvements the Air Force needs to give Air

 

Force Rescue helicopters the capability to accomplish the rescue mission. For the

 

purpose of this paper, CSAR is the portion of a rescue mission to recover an

 

isolated or distressed person in a denied/hostile environment.

 

The commander of Central Command (CINCCENT) gave the rescue

 

mission to the Special Operation Command, Central (SOCCENT) during

 

Operation Desert Storm. The aircraft flown by SOCCENT had to contend with a

 

highly sophisticated Iraqi air defense system. The Iraqi air defense system downed

 

38 coalition aircraft.2  Iraqi  infrared missiles alone claimed one AH-64 Apache,

 

five AV-8B Harriers, and 14 other U.S. aircraft.3 Even SOCCENT's aircraft were

 

not immune to the lethality of the Iraqi air defense system. SOCCENT lost one of

 

its AC-130 Spector gun-ships to an Iraqi missile. This threat environment would

 

have been even more difficult for the less equipped, Air Force rescue aircraft to do

 

the mission. Currently, the USAF employs the HH-60G Pavehawk as its rescue

 

helicopter. The Pavehawk is a modified version of the Army UH-60A Blackhawk

 

helicopter. The major modifications include air refueling probe, extended range

 

auxiliary fuel tanks, improved communication and navigational equipment, two

 

7.62 mm mini-guns and an external hoist.

 

The mission of Air Force CSAR is to recover downed aircrew members

 

from behind enemy lines and return them to friendly control. To accomplish this

 

mission rescue forces require much of the same high technology equipment found

 

in its special operations units. This equipment includes night vision devices,

 

accurate navigation equipment, self defense weapons, and defensive

 

countermeasure.4

 

The Air Force equips rescue crews with state of the art night vision goggles

 

and is fielding an infrared (IR) system to increase their ability to work in limited

 

visibility situations. This brings the rescue helicopters close to the capability of

 

Special Operation Force (SOF) units. The only major difference is the terrain

 

following/terrain avoidance (TFTA) radar fitted to the Air Force Special

 

Operations Command (AFSOC) helicopters, which gives them a true, all-weather

 

capability. To enhance Rescue's ability to operate in limited visibility, the Air

 

Force equipped the Pavehawk with sophisticated navigational equipment.

 

The Air Force has equipped the Pavehawk with an integrated navigation

 

system. This system consists of a global positioning system (GPS), an internal

 

navigational system (INS), and a doppler navigational system. These systems

 

constantly communicate with each other to keep the aircraft's position updated.

 

The Pavehawks navigational system will continue to function even as individual

 

navigation sub-systems quit. Once the rescue helicopter has navigated to the

 

downed aircrew member's location, it needs to be able to protected itself

 

For self protection the Air Force has replaced the two M-60 (7.62 mm

 

machine gun) with two GAU-2Bs (7.62 mm mini-gun). The increased fire rate of

 

the GAU-2B provides the aircraft with the ability to suppress enemy small arms

 

fire long enough to complete the pickup. The helicopter's defensive weapons

 

provide cover for the aircraft when in a hover and are of little help to the aircraft

 

when it is in route to the survivor's location. The Pavehawk crew must rely on

 

counter measure systems for enroute protection.

 

The HH-60G's countermeasure system is the only place the Air Force has

 

not given the helicopter the proper equipment to do the rescue mission. This

 

deficiency restricts the Pavehawk's operations to relatively benign environments.

 

This deficiency is a major factor on restricting the employment of the limited

 

rescue assets. The proliferation and sophistication of shoulder launched, surface-

 

to-air missiles (SAMs) has increased exponentially since the Vietnam War. The

 

ability of radar guided missiles to detect and engage helicopters have also

 

increased. For rescue to do the job effectively, the Air Force needs to equip the

 

aircraft with a defensive suite that will allow them to operate in an increased threat

 

environment.

 

Air Force rescue has a proud heritage. The main problem is the Air Forces

 

attention toward rescue ebbs and flows depending on whether the country is at war

 

or peace. Retired Air Force General Duane Cassidy summed it up nicely.

 

 

The Air Rescue Service was established in 1946. . .and has

served the USAF proudly since its inception. Rescue's worth

has been proven time and again--996 combat saves in Korea

and 2,780 in Southeast Asia.... Since then, our rescue resources

have slowly declined to the point that we have only limited

capability... .We will continue to press forward on several fronts

to ensure that the USAF has an effective rescue capability. Our

goal is to again be able to say with confidence. "These things

we do that others may live."5

 

 

To help better understand the way the Air Force has equipped its rescue

 

aircraft I will start with a brief history of air rescue and how we got to the current

 

rescue aircraft we have today. Then I will discuss the threat and survivability as

 

they apply to rescue helicopters. Third, I will discuss what we can do to increase

 

the success of rescue missions in the threat environment they will face in the

 

future.

 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

 

The United States first used rescue helicopters in China during WW II. The

 

8th Emergency Rescue Squadron (ERS), equipped with Sikorsky R-6 helicopters,

 

was the first organization specifically designed for air-rescue operations. The 8th

 

ERS recovered 43 airmen out of 100 attempts.  the helicopter entered

 

into service too late to become a large factor for the overall rescue efforts of

 

WW II, it did demonstrate its versatility for land rescue operations.

 

After WW II, in l945, the Army formed the Air Rescue Service (ARS).

 

ARS was responsible for land search and rescue operations. When the Air Force

 

became a separate service, in 1947, ARS moved with them.

 

The Korean War saw the first large scale use of helicopters to evacuate

 

casualties from the battle field, rescue downed aircrew members from behind

 

enemy lines, and recover downed aviators at sea. As rescue helicopters flew more

 

frequently over hostile territory, it became clear they were vulnerable to enemy air

 

defenses and small arms fire. To counter this increasing threat, the U.S. Air Force

 

and Navy began to integrate fixed-wing aircraft into rescue operations. The two

 

services usually put together ad-hoc fixed-wing and helicopter teams after a pilot

 

was downed. Rescue helicopters would link-up with a fighter/attack aircraft,

 

which was usually a wingman or another aircraft returning from a mission, and

 

attempt to recover the downed pilot. Because of its ad-hoc nature, poor command

 

and control, and lack of standardized procedures, this tactic had limited success in

 

countering the threat.

 

In the years between the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the Air Force

 

reduced its CSAR capabilities. The Air Force equipped Air Rescue Service

 

detachments with light-weight, small, limited range HH-43 helicopters. The focus

 

of rescue also shifted to supporting the nation's growing space program. In 1958,

 

the Air Force even changed the doctrinal concept behind CSAR.

 

ARS will be organized, manned, equipped, trained, and

deployed to support peacetime air operations. No special units

or specially designated aircraft will be provided for the sole

purpose of wartime search and rescue. Wartime rescue

operations will be dictated by the capabilities of equipment

used for peacetime search and rescue (SAR).7

 

This let the Air Force drop all requirements to equip rescue helicopters to operate

 

in a hostile war time environment.

 

The opening days of the Vietnam War, once again, found the USAF

 

unprepared to conduct CSAR. During the war, the USAF purchased three

 

different helicopters to replace its fleet of HH-43 Padro, which Kaman designed to

 

do local base rescue. The Padro lacked the operational capabilities to conduct long

 

range combat rescue missions. As the war progressed, and the new aircraft

 

entered service, the USAF developed new doctrine and tactics. The USAF initially

 

procured the UH-1 Huey to replace the HH-43 for short range rescue. The USAF

 

then procured the CH-3, originally designed by Sikorsky as a Navy anti-submarine

 

helicopter. The CH-3, equipped with a hoist, had about twice the range of the UH-

 

1. Even with the added range, the CH-3 still needed modifications to conduct

 

CSAR. With the modification of an in-flight refueling probe, the USAF converted

 

the CH-3 to the HH-3 Jolly Green Giant. The HH-3 was able to refuel from a HC-

 

130, which extended its range and loiter time.

 

Now only the degree of enemy threat limited rescue crews in recovering

 

downed aircrew members.8 To give CSAR the ability to penetrate enemy

 

defenses, the USAF procured the HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant. It had the same

 

range as the HH-3 but was 50 nautical miles an hour (Kts) faster. Sikorsky also

 

increased the HH-53 survivability by making all critical components capable of

 

withstanding the impact of a 7.62 mm round. Sikorsky also equipped the HH-53

 

with a pair of 7.62 mm miniguns, capable of firing 4,000 rounds per minute, and

 

an infrared countermeasure (IRCM) flare dispenser to defeat the Soviet designed

 

SA-7 surface-to-air missile.  Force rescue forces (now redesignated Aerospace

 

Rescue and Recovery Service [ARRS] continued to lose aircraft to enemy ground

 

fire. Their answer was to again look at integrating fixed-wing armed escort

 

aircraft with rescue helicopters."10 The combination of the A-1 Skyraider and the

 

helicopter made a good team. Skyraiders would provide escort and cover during

 

rescue operations. The loiter time, weapons load, and survivability of the Skyraider

 

made it extremely adept at rescue escort. The USAF refined, published, and

 

integrated the operation of rescue escort into the rescue scheme. These tactics

 

were a good counter to the ground threat of the time, which was primarily enemy

 

small arms fire and mortars.

 

The years between the Vietnam War and the Gulf war saw again the decline

 

of rescue forces in the Air Force. Although the Vietnam war showed clear

 

evidence of the increasing lethality of the battle field, the USAF expended only

 

minimum effort into increasing the survivability of rescue aircraft. The only

 

change came after the failed Iran-hostage rescue attempt in 1980. With political

 

pressure, the USAF modified ten of its HH-53 aircraft with sophisticated all-

 

weather equipment, improved defensive capability, and improved navigation

 

equipment. But in 1987 ARRS lost those modified aircraft to the newly formed

 

Air Force Special Operations Command. This left the ARRS with Vietnam era

 

HH-3 and UH-1 helicopters.

 

Recognizing the limitations of range, speed, and supportability inherent in

 

the HH-3 and UH-1, the USAF looked to replace it with a modified version of the

 

H-60. Sikorsky built the basic Blackhawk with many enhanced survivability

 

features. They had ballistically hardened all the main components against 7.62 mm

 

rounds, reduced the IR signature of the engines exhaust, and added the four-bladed

 

main and tail rotors to reduce its acoustical signature. The Air Force's version was

 

the HH-60D Night Hawk, which it modified with externally mounted fuel tanks, a

 

pair of mini-guns, TFTA radar (for all weather capability), an in-flight air refueling

 

probe, and upgraded navigation and communications capability. This aircraft was

 

a step in the right direction and allowed the rescue crew to operate at night, and in

 

bad weather, to hide from enemy visual detection. However, the Air Force

 

canceled the Night Hawk after rising costs pushed the price tag of each aircraft

 

over 21 million dollars.11 Still without a helicopter to meet the needs of the rescue

 

force, the Air Force turned to modifying the basic UH-60 with off-the-shelf

 

technology to keep the cost down.

 

After the cancellation of the Night Hawk program, the Air Force began to

 

modify its UH-60 Blackhawks into HH-60G Pavehawks. This modification

 

attempted to keep much of the improvements of the Night Hawk while, at the same

 

time, holding the price down. Instead of modifying the UH-60 with external fuel

 

tanks, designers modified the aircraft with the existing Army internal auxiliary

 

tanks. The Air Force discarded the TFTA radar, the most costly portion of the

 

Night Hawk modification, to keep the total cost of the modification down. It was

 

able to accomplish the navigation and communication upgrade, but it was not the

 

completely integrated communication and navigation system found in the

 

Nighthawk. The Pavehawk would use the same original communication radios of

 

the Blackhawk with the addition of a high frequency radio and wiring provision

 

for a satellite communication radio. Although the Pavehawk did not get all the

 

high technology equipment the Night Hawk had, it did use the "1553 Data Bus"

 

architecture. This architecture would allow for future expansion and integration of

 

its avionics. Although all of these systems helped increase the aircraft's capability

 

to get to the downed aircrew member by increasing its ability to fly precisely at

 

night, none addressed penetrating an increasingly hostile threat environment.

 

SURVIVABILITY AND THREAT

 

Rescue crews must be able to recover downed aircrew members under

 

varying flight conditions, under a variety of threat levels. Normally, aviators do

 

not go down in low threat environments. This requires rescue crews to operate in

 

at least a medium threat environment. Before proceeding further, it is helpful to

 

create a common frame of reference for discussing threat levels.

 

There are three threat levels: low, medium, and high. These levels are very

 

general in nature. Often the distinction between different levels is unclear. Air

 

defense systems that present a low or medium threat level for one type of aircraft

 

may present a high threat level for another type of aircraft. A medium threat level

 

during the daylight hours may be a low threat at night. To help in the

 

understanding of differing threat levels, one should apply the following criteria. A

 

low threat level allows operations to continue without prohibitive interference. A

 

medium threat level allows acceptable exposure time of friendly aircraft to enemy

 

defenses. A high threat level exists when the enemy has an air defense system that

 

includes integrated fire control systems and electronic warfare capabilities.12 It is

 

easy to see that what is a low/medium threat to a fighter at 600 Kts might be a

 

medium/high threat to a helicopter at 120 Kts. The Pavehawk must have the

 

survivability equipment to allow the crew to operate in a threat environment more

 

hostile than its current level of low threat.

 

Helicopter survivability, as defined by Robert Ball in his classic

book on the subject, is the "capability of an aircraft to avoid

and/or withstand a man-made hostile environment." Two

factors dictate survivability; susceptibility, the vehicle's ability

to avoid being hit; and vulnerability, the vehicle's ability to

withstand damage, given that it is hit.13

 

Through the use of tactics and aircraft survivability equipment, rescue

 

aircrews can increase their ability to survive in higher threat environments. With

 

tactics like terrain masking (using terrain or obstacles to hide the aircraft), and

 

night operations, the crew can decrease the susceptibility to detection and

 

engagement.

 

TACTICS

 

Rescue crews must be proficient at lox level flight. The objective of low

 

level flight is to keep the helicopter masked using the vegetation and terrain to

 

degrade visual, optical, or electronic detection.14 Low level flight can place the

 

helicopter anywhere from a couple hundred feet above the ground to an altitude

 

that places the body of the helicopter below the top of the trees.15 By combining

 

low level flight with the cover of darkness, crews can further degrade the threat's

 

ability to engage with weapons that use visual means to identity' their target.

 

By using night vision devices the rescue crew can operate more effectively

 

at night. The cover of darkness changes the threat created by soldiers with rifles

 

and other optically guided weapons, from a medium to high threat category during

 

the day, into a low to medium range, at night. A drawback to night flying is the

 

limitations imposed by the current night vision goggles (NVGs). Current NVGs

 

restricts the pilot's viewing angles, lacks depth perception and reduces their visual

 

acuity from 20/20 to no better than 20/45. To increase the crew's ability to operate

 

at night and overcome some of the limitations, these aircraft require a forward

 

looking infrared (FLIR) system. Instead of using ambient light, like the NVGs, the

 

FLIR system uses minute differences in temperature to produce a picture. This

 

enables the crew to see when the ambient light level degrades the NVGs to the

 

point of being ineffective. The FLIR system also allows the crew to see through

 

minor atmospheric obstructions, like fog and smoke.

 

Currently in Kuwait, the USAF requires rescue units to equip their

 

helicopters with a FLIR to perform rescue missions at night. The FLIR increases

 

the crew's ability to fly at lower altitudes and higher speeds during low illumination

 

or over terrain with low definition. A FLIR system with a telephoto capability

 

would also enable the crew to identify objects at much further distances, thus

 

allowing them to avoid possible threats. Once detected by the threat, the rescue

 

crew must rely on the survivability of the helicopter systems to survive.

 

The major threats to the rescue helicopter are small-arms, anti-aircraft

 

artillery (AAA), IR SAMs, and radar SAMs. As noted earlier, the Vietnam War

 

introduced the world to the employment of sophisticated weapons to counter the

 

increasing use of helicopters and low-level aircraft flying over the battlefield.

 

Rescue helicopters first saw the use of incorporated survivability features with the

 

interdiction of the HH-53 and its ballistic tolerance. The Army even went as far as

 

adding exhaust suppressors to their UH-1 and AH-1 to reduce the infrared

 

signature. The Army found out that their initial attempts at lowering the IR

 

signature were very costly in terms of the amount of power lost by the engine.

 

COUNTERING IR THREATS

 

Sikorsky built the HH-60 with engine exhaust suppressors and the ALQ-

 

144 IR jammer. This system works well against first generation IR SAMs such as

 

the Soviet built SA-7. Although these may seem to be adequate to the casual

 

observer, IR seeker-head technology has quickly overcome them. During the Gulf

 

War Iraqi forces shot down an AH-64 Apache with an SA-16 IR SAM, over

 

southern Iraq. This Soviet built missile, fired by an Iraqi soldier, was able to defeat

 

the ALQ-144 IR jammer of the Apache.16 The seeker-heads of new IR missiles are

 

more sensitive and sophisticated than the older versions, allowing them to work in

 

a different IR band than the jammer.  To combat this, the Pavehawk must either

 

reduce its IR signature or get a more capable IR jammer.

 

Currently the IR suppressors on the Pavehawk work well against first

 

generation IR missiles, but missile technology is currently two generations ahead.

 

Most countries now possess IR missiles with improved seeker-head design, which

 

negates the IR suppressor on the Pavehawk. This leaves the Pavehawk vulnerable

 

to attack. The Air Force must look for ways to lower the IR signature of the

 

engines.

 

To meet modern suppression standards, Lycoming engineers

estimate plume radiation must be reduced by an order of

magnitude, and hot metal signature has to be cut by two order

of magnitude. That means cooling a 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit

tailpipe to near-ambient temperature with only outside air.17

 

Currently there are no cost efficient modifications that the USAF can do to the

 

General Electric/Sikorsky bolt-on IR suppressor system on the Pavehawk. The

 

current trend in suppressor technology uses high aspect ratio slots, developed for

 

the RAH-66 Comanche. This technology integrates the suppressor into the body of

 

the aircraft.

 

The Comanche team claims the General Dynamics Stinger

seeker is unable to lock on to the new scout helicopter, and the

net signature is so low, the baseline Comanche needs no IR

jammer... . Sikorsky adapted a similar arrangement to the

conceptual S-92 Growth Hawk,.... successful demonstrations of

the high aspect ratio slots could eliminate the need for jammers

altogether.18

 

The problem with this solution is that the manufacturer must build it into the

 

aircraft during production. Thus the Air Force can only look for limited

 

improvements to its current suppressor to limit the ability for IR guided weapons to

 

lock on and track.

 

Another IR source is the reflected energy from the helicopter fuselage. One

 

way to lower the IR signature of the fuselage is by using low-IR paint on the

 

helicopter's surface. "Low-IR finishes are formulated to absorb ambient infra-red

 

energy and re-radiate at different wavelengths."19  using this paint the rescue

 

helicopter will be harder to hit at angles that do not permit the weapon to use the

 

engines as the primary heat source.

 

If the USAF can only go so far in reducing the IR signature of the

 

helicopter, they must turn their attention to other measures to defeat the advances

 

in seeker-head technology. Companies can design IR jammers that will work

 

against most of the current seeker-heads. The problem is that no single jammer

 

can cover all the different IR bands at once. Also, all the current IR jammers act as

 

a beacon for today's sophisticated IR SAMs. The more sophisticated IR seek-heads

 

can pick up and use the constant energy radiated by the jammer as a homing

 

source. The answer to this problem lies in integrating a missile detection system

 

with the directional IR jammer on the aircraft. Because there are no directional IR

 

jammers capable of covering all the IR bands, the Air Force needs to look into a

 

laser based IRCM system or into using dispensable IR decoys (flares).

 

Although there is no laser based IRCM currently on the market, some

 

companies are looking into the development of such a system. An aircraft

 

defensive system based on a laser IRCM would degrade attacking missiles through

 

deceptive jamming or damage due to impulse, optical sparking, or thermal effects.

 

The use of a laser to render the seeker-head ineffective is still in the development

 

stages and would take an integrated detection and tracking system to be employed

 

effectively. The work currently under way looks into the feasibility of using low

 

power laser energy to detect and track airborne threats.20 Once the system detects

 

and tracks the missile, the plan is to use a more powerful laser to blind the seeker-

 

head. Once developed, this system addresses the current deficiencies of not being

 

a beacon to an LR missile, and it may have applications against other weapons that

 

use lasers to guide them to the target. The laser IRCM is still in the early

 

development stage and probably will not be ready for production until some time

 

after 2010, leaving the Air Force to look elsewhere for a solution to the IRCM

 

problem.

 

Currently there are a number of IRCM systems that use expendable counter

 

measures to defeat an IR missile threat. If the Pavehawk uses a flare type

 

countermeasure system, the problem then comes in dispensing the flare in time to

 

counter the missile. Since a normal engagement would only give the pilot a few

 

precious seconds, the problem of shortening the time from detection, identification,

 

reaction, and employment is critical. Most of the current IR SAMs, such as the

 

SA-14 and SA-16, can travel at over twice the speed of sound or over 1,520 mph at

 

sea level.21 This gives the pilot less than 5 seconds to complete the

 

countermeasure employment.22 If  the pilot has to manually launch the flares, he

 

must first detect the missile, which normally will be coming in from the side or

 

rear. This means that one of the side facing scanners has to detect it and then

 

inform the pilot of the missile, then the pilot must process the information and take

 

the proper action. In the best case scenario the scanner sees a missile launch at

 

maximum range; by the time he has informed the pilot the missile will have closed

 

half the distance to the helicopter and by the time the pilot initiates action the

 

missile will be within a second of impact. There is little we can do to increase the

 

speed of communication between the crew members. So just placing flare

 

dispensers on the helicopter accomplishes little. What Pavehawk needs is a system

 

that can detect missiles in flight and dispense the countermeasure while informing

 

the pilot of the threat.

 

Such systems currently exist, the AAR-47, AAR-44, and the ALQ-156. The

 

AAR systems detect the IR signature of the missile using a passive detection

 

system. "The passive system promises increased detection range, accurate

 

direction of arrival information, and low false alarm rate."23 The ALQ system

 

detects missiles in flight by using radar technology. Each system has advantages

 

and disadvantages. The AAR system does not emit energy from the helicopter,

 

thus does not increase its electronic signature while the ALQ does. However the

 

AAR system has a problem with false missile detection caused by confusing other

 

IR sources as missiles. Which ever system the Air Force selects must not only

 

detect the missile, but also, automatically dispense a flare. To be done properly the

 

counter measure system must directionally dispense the flare to draw the missile

 

away from the aircraft.

 

COUNTERING RADAR THREATS

 

There is very little the Air Force can do to lower the radar cross section of

 

the Pavehawk. A largest part of the helicopter's radar cross section comes from the

 

shape of the fuselage and the material used to construct it. However, one way for

 

the Air Force to lower the radar cross section is to procure different rotor blades.

 

Currently the "Wide Cord Blade" is under developmental testing by Sikorsky. This

 

blade design does away with the titanium spar found in the current blade. By

 

replacing the titanium spar with a composite spar, Sikorsky reduces the radar cross

 

section of the rotor blades. Depending on the angle of the main rotors to the radar

 

site, the main rotors may produce the largest radar signal return. By reducing this

 

return, the helicopter would be able to operate closer to known radar sites while

 

being undetected. This reduction in radar cross section will not make the

 

helicopter invisible. There are still enough other sources to produce a radar return.

 

This being the case, the Air Force must still look into countering radar threats.

 

Since we cannot make the Pavehawk completely invisible to radar, the Air

 

Force must concentrate its efforts on a better warning and countermeasure system.

 

To reduce the risk of radar associated threats, the Pavehawk crew will need more

 

than the current APR-39A (v)1 radar warning receiver (RWR). Although the

 

APR-39A will classify and display threats in a 360 degree arch around the aircraft,

 

it does not tell the pilot how far the threat is from the helicopter. This requires the

 

pilot to determine if the threat radar system is detecting his aircraft or just radiating

 

energy in his direction. To use the Pavehawk's limited supply of chaff effectively,

 

the pilot needs this information. Depending on the settings of the chaff dispenser,

 

the crew will only be able to use the chaff 6 to 10 times before depleting the chaff

 

If the pilot dispenses chaff at a time when the radar was not in a good position to

 

detect the helicopter, he/she could inadvertently give the helicopter's position

 

away.

 

What the Air Force needs is an RWR that not only alerts the pilot to radar

 

scanning but also locates the source. Such a system would need to integrate with

 

the aircraft's navigational system and a library of known threat locations. This

 

would allow the pilot to use make the best use of the terrain to circumnavigate the

 

threat.

 

Once a radar guided missile engages the Pavehawk, its chaff is of limited

 

use. Most of the modem radar systems have good chaff rejection capability,

 

leaving the Pavehawk with the only option of placing terrain between the radar and

 

the helicopter. To increase its chances against a radar guided threat, the Pavehawk

 

needs to use a radar jammer in conjunction with chaff to defeat the threat. Radar

 

jamming technology is nothing new to the Air Force. They have procured

 

numerous jamming system, to do everything from barrage jamming to systems that

 

give false returns. The Air Force currently has many aircraft capable of jamming

 

enemy radar. The Air Force has a radar jamming systems on the special operations

 

MH-53J Pavelow helicopter. The Army made a recent decision to equip their MH

 

60K and MH-47E special operations helicopters with radar jammers.

 

The Air Force should integrate any existing or future defensive system.

 

Integration of future systems is a strong point for the Pavehawk. The Pavehawk

 

can integrate all of these new systems using the current 1553 data bus (integrated

 

avionics subsystem). The 1553 data bus allows different components to

 

communicate with one another. It serves much the same purpose as a main frame

 

computer does in a computer network. By integrating a missile detector with the

 

RWR, the aircraft can determine wether it is radar guided or IR. If we also

 

integrate the dispensable decoys (chaff and flares) and jammers (IR and radar), the

 

aircraft can choose the correct defensive measure. This would give the Pavehawk

 

the ability to employ autonomous countermeasures while informing the pilot. This

 

has a two fold effect. It reduces the pilot's work load by his not having to worry

 

about dispensing countermeasures and allowing him to concentrate on taking

 

evasive action.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The Air Force has done a good job of rebuilding its rescue capability after

 

neglecting it following the Vietnam War. They have equipped rescue crews to

 

operate at night, over long distances, with the precision needed to locate and

 

recover a downed aircrew member. However, the Air Force has left a gap in

 

Rescue's ability to conduct the rescue mission in the threat environment they will

 

face. Today the threat to the current HH-60G by small, mobile, surface-to-air

 

missiles and antiaircraft artillery is quite formidable. This lethality, combined with

 

weapons proliferation, will increase as a more hostile world waits. In order for

 

rescue crews to do their job, they need the proper equipment.

 

The Air Force needs to equip the Pavehawk with a defensive system that

 

allows it to penetrate hostile defenses to complete its mission. The HH-60G will

 

allow the Air Force to upgrade the aircraft with little modification to the existing

 

airframe. Through the use of the Pavehawk's state of the art navigational system

 

and the 1553 data bus, the Air Force can upgrade the defensive capability without

 

a major modification to the airframe. Without this equipment we are likely to see a

 

repeat of Operation Desert Storm, where Special Operations Forces receive the

 

additional mission of combat rescue. This can only detract from SOF's primary

 

missions. It is up to the Air Force to equip the Pavehawk for the rescue mission.

 

The Air Force would not send a F-15 into a dog fight without equipping it to defeat

 

the threat, would they?

 

NOTES

 

1 Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue,

(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 July 1994), I-1.

 

2 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, (Washington D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1992), 533.

 

3 Frank Colucci, "Suppressed to Survive," Defense Helicopter, July-September

1992, 41.

 

4 Russell D. Carmody, Maj, USA, "Theater Combat Search and Rescue,"

(Graduate Research Project, Army Command and Staff College, 1993), 2.

 

5 Edward B. Westermann, Capt, USAF, "Air Rescue Service-A Direction for

the Twenty-first Century," Air Power Journal, Fall 1990, 60.

 

6 Earl H. Tilford. "Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975,"

(Washington: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1980), 7.

 

7 Westermann, 62.

 

8 Joe Callahan, Capt. USAF, "Requirements of the HH-60G Search and Rescue

Helicopter" (Graduate Research Project, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University,

1994), 13.

 

9 Ibid, 14.

 

10 Tilford, 62.

 

11 Benjamin F. Schemmer, "No USAF Combat Rescue Aircraft in Gulf; It Took

72 Hours to Launch One Rescue," Armed Forces Journal International, July

1991, 37.

 

12 Fleet Marine Forces Manual (FMFM) 5-40, Offensive Air Support's role in the

MAGTF. (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy), 2-2.

 

13 Harold K. Reddick Jr., "Helicopter Battlefield Survivability," U.S. Army

Aviation Digest, November/December 1994, 24.

 

14 Air Mobility Command (AMC) Regulation 55-54, AMC Helicopter

Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 15 July 1992), 56.

 

15 Helicopter flight that places the fusalage below the tree line is commonly

referred to as Nap Of The Earth (NOE). Although the Air Force does not do a lot

of NOE, the Army uses it quite extensively.

 

16 Frank Colucci, 4l.

 

17 Ibid.,42.

 

18 Ibid.,45.

 

19 Ibid.,45.

 

20 Department of the Air Force, Concept Definition Sheet, March 1995, C-60-I.

 

21 The unclassified speed and employment ranges were taken from the North

Korean Handbook published by the DOD.

 

22 Given that the speed of sound is 1220 km/hr at sea level and the maximum

effective range of a SA-14 or SA-16 is 6 km, and is given one second to accelerate

to maximum speed, the missile can travel 6 km in 5.06 seconds.

 

23 "Missile Detector," Defense Helicopter, December 1991-February 1992, 28.

 

BIBIOGRAPHY

 

Air Mobility Command (AMC) Regulation 55-54. AMC Helicopter Operations.

Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force. 15 July 1992.

 

Callahan, Joe. Capt. USAF. "Requirements of the HH-60G Search and Rescue

Helicopter." Graduate Research Project. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.

1994.

 

Carmody, Russell D. Maj, USA. "Theater Combat Search and Rescue." Graduate

Research Project. Army Command and Staff College. 1993.

 

Colucci, Frank. "Suppressed to Survive." Defense Helicopter. July-September 1992,

40-45.

 

Department of the Air Force. Concept Definition Sheet. March 1995. C-6O.

 

Department of Defense. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. Washington D.C.:

Government Printing Office. 1992.

 

Fleet Marine Forces Manual (FMFM) 5-40. Offensive Air Support's role in the MAGTF.

Washington, DC: Department of the Navy.

 

"Missile Detector." Defense Helicopter. December 1991-February 1992. 28.

 

Joint Publication 3-50.2. Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue. Washington,

DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff l2 July l994.

 

Reddick, Harold K. Jr. "Helicopter Battlefield Survivability." U.S. Army Aviation

Digest. November/December 1994. 24-26.

 

Schemmer, Benjamin F. "No USAF Combat Rescue Aircraft in Gulf, It Took 72 Hours

to Launch One Rescue." Armed Forces Journal International. July 1991. 37-38.

 

Tilford, Earl H. "Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975." Washington DC:

Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force. 1980.

 

Westermann, Edward B. Capt , USAF. "Air Rescue Service-A Direction for the Twenty

first Century." Air Power Journal. Fall 1990. 60-71.