Military

The Shaping Effects Of Operational Deep Air Support

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA Aviation

 

 

 

 

                                    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: The Shaping Effects of Operational Deep Air Support

 

Author: LtCol. Anthony W. Valentino, USMC

 

Research Question How does operational Deep Air Support (DAS) shape an enemy force, i.e.,

what effects on an enemy force can the Marine Expeditionary Force commander expect

from a successful DAS effort?

 

Discussion: DAS is the MEF's most potent tool in shaping an enemy surface force in the deep

battle. However, many officers involved in planning and executing a DAS effort in

support of the MEF are not aware of the probable payoffs and limitations of DAS in

preparing an enemy surface force for defeat.

            This paper will answer the research question by critically analyzing several successful

and unsuccessful DAS efforts conducted by U.S.M.C., U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and

Allied air power since the beginning of World War II. This analysis produced a

number of lessons learned which are applicable to today's operational environment

and will continue to be for years to come. Significant conclusions are drawn regarding

the characteristics of an enemy surface force and his lines of communication (LOC)

system which historically have increased its vulnerability to DAS and the

expected impact on an enemy force of a successful DAS effort.

 

Thesis: DAS is the most powerful tool available to the MEF to shape the deep battle. However,

DAS alone cannot be expected to eliminate the need for maneuver and decisive close

battle -- in other words, DAS alone will not operationally defeat an enemy surface

force. DAS shapes an enemy for defeat via its three main effects: l) by significantly

reducing the enemy's combat power prior to or during the close battle; 2) by limiting the

enemy's ability to move and maneuver on the battlefield; 3) by disrupting the enemy's

ability to command and control his forces. DAS creates a weak and immobile enemy -- an

enemy incapable of rapid maneuver in reaction to the MEF's initiatives and incapable of

repelling the MEF's combat power in the close battle.

 

 

                                                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

Introduction                                                                                                       page 1

 

Chapter One-- A Critical Analysis of Past DAS Campaigns                                page 5

 

Chapter Two -- The Vulnerability of Enemy Forces and                                           page 28

                          LOCs to Operational DAS

 

Chapter Three -- The Shaping Effects of Operational DAS                             page 38

 

Chapter Four -- Conclusion                                                                                page 46

 

Notes                                                                                                               page 49

 

Bibliography                                                                                                      page 52

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

 

            "During the day, practically our entire traffic -- on roads, trucks and in open country -- is

            pinned down by powerful fighter-bomber and bomber formations, with the result that the

            movement of our troops on the battlefield is almost completely paralyzed, while the enemy

            can maneuver freely. Every traffic defile in the rear areas is under continual attack and it is

            very difficult to get essential supplies of ammunition and petrol up to the troops."1

                                                                                                                       

General Erwin Rommel

10 June 1944

 

 

            One can sense the frustration and despair in Rommel's statement regarding the massive Allied

 

air interdiction effort supporting Operation OVERLORD. Allied air attacks on the German

 

transportation system in France prior to and during the invasion had effectively shaped the

 

German Army for defeat by paralyzing it. Unable to rapidly move in reaction to the Allied

 

landing, the German Army could not concentrate its forces for an effective counter-attack that

 

would drive the invaders back into the sea.

 

            Today, as in Rommel's day, Deep Air Support (DAS) is the primary source of combat power

 

in the Marine Expeditionary Force's (MEF) effort to shape the deep battle. The ultimate goal of

 

the MEF deep shaping effort is to reduce as much of the enemy's combat power as possible

 

prior to engaging the enemy in the close battle. The greater the reduction of the enemy's combat

 

power in the deep battle, the more efficiently the MEF will be able to achieve decisive victory in

 

the close battle.

 

            Although technology has and will continue to improve the effectiveness of DAS, the lessons

 

learned from past campaigns are applicable to future conflicts. The goal of this paper is to

 

analyze several significant past DAS campaigns to determine how DAS actually shapes an

 

enemy force for defeat. The resulting conclusions provide lessons learned for use by the MEF

 

commander and his staff in the planning and conduct of future DAS campaigns. The main

 

questions the analysis seeks to answer are: 1) What are the characteristics of an enemy force and

 

his lines of communication (LOC) system which make him vulnerable to DAS?; 2) What effects

 

on the enemy can the MEF expect from a successful DAS effort, i.e., how does DAS actually

 

shape the enemy?

 

            As per FMFM 5-42, Marine Corps doctrine defines DAS as air action against enemy targets at

 

such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each mission with fire and

 

movement of friendly forces is not required.  doctrine further divides DAS into two

 

tasks: interdiction and armed reconnaissance. Current USMC doctrine defines interdiction as air

 

attacks aimed at denying the enemy use of a particular area, route, or facility.3  Armed 

 

reconnaissance is a mission with the primary purpose of locating and attacking targets of

 

opportunity.4  Neither  the USMC doctrinal definition of interdiction or armed reconnaissance

 

address a factor of significant importance to the MEF commander -- time. Specifically, how

 

long after a target has been hit will the impact of its destruction be felt in the close battle? Since

 

the close battle is one of the MEF commander's major concerns, the MEF desires the time

 

between the attack on a target and the impact of that target's destruction on the close battle be as

 

short as possible.

 

            This paper will address this shortfall of USMC DAS doctrine by subdividing DAS into two

 

categories based mainly on the time delay between the striking of the target and the effect of the

 

target's elimination on the close battle. These two categories of DAS are: 1) Strategic DAS --

 

strikes on targets that are the sources of the enemy's manpower, material, and/or national will.

 

U.S. Air Force doctrine as expressed in AFM 1-1 refers to this category as strategic attack.5

 

Strategic DAS targets include factories, ports, airfields, power plants, refineries, POL facilities,

 

national leadership, dikes, dams, etc.; 2) Operational DAS -- strikes on the enemy's LOCs

 

leading from his strategic sources to the close battle; on the troops, equipment, and supplies

 

traveling on those LOCs; and on targets in the close battlespace. AFM 1-1 refers to this

 

category as interdiction.6  Operational  DAS targets include portions of the enemy's railroad and

 

road network, bridges, tunnels, waterways, vehicles, troops, supplies, armor, armored personnel

 

carriers (APC), supporting arms, etc.

 

            This paper will primarily address operational DAS due to the timeliness of its effect on the

 

close battle. Because it directly or indirectly targets troops, equipment, and supplies currently

 

heading toward or engaged in the close battle, operational DAS will have the most immediate

 

effect on enemy forces engaging in or preparing to engage in the close battle. Although strategic

 

targets are the source of a nation's combat power and may have more of a theater-wide impact,

 

there is usually a significant time delay between the destruction of a strategic target and its

 

eventual effect on the close battle.

 

            In addition to the categories of DAS, this paper will divide the wide variety of possible

 

operational DAS targets into three major target sets based on the type of target and the intended

 

effect on the enemy of its destruction. The degree of success achieved in attacks on each of these

 

target sets will determine the effectiveness of DAS in shaping the MEF's deep battle. The three

 

target sets are: 1) Force attrition targets -- the troops, weapons, equipment, and command,

 

control, and communication (C3) systems of enemy units; 2) Supply interdiction targets -- enemy

 

supplies enroute to or in the close battlespace; 3) Counter-mobility targets -- elements of the

 

enemy LOCs upon which he moves troops, equipment, and supplies.

 

 

            The campaigns addressed in Chapter One all included major operational DAS efforts directed

 

at one or more of the above target sets. The major characteristics of these past campaigns were

 

quite similar and will, most likely, hold true for future efforts. Effective anti-air warfare support

 

(AAW) established air superiority early and included a potent suppression of enemy air defense

 

(SEAD) effort if required. A massive number of aircraft, sufficient to mount a large-scale DAS

 

effort, were available in theater to support each of the campaigns. Moreover, the aircraft,

 

aircrew, and weapons were capable of hitting and destroying their intended targets. For the most

 

part, the situation on the ground was favorable enough to afford air power the time required to

 

concentrate on effective operational DAS. Finally, despite inter-service and/or Allied haggling

 

over command and control, each DAS effort essentially achieved unity of effort. Thus, each of

 

the generally well-planned and executed DAS efforts addressed should have achieved its

 

maximum possible impact on the enemy. Just how these past efforts actually shaped the enemy

 

is the subject of this paper.

 

 

CHAPTER ONE

 

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PAST DAS CAMPAIGNS

 

Operations STRANGLE/DIADEM(WWII

 

            Operation STRANGLE was the Allied supply interdiction campaign in central Italy during

 

the spring of 1944. To halt the advance north of the Allied offensive, the Germans established

 

the Gustav Line in the mountainous terrain of central Italy with the town and monastery of

 

Monte Cassino as its main strong point. In addition to numerous air attacks, the Allies attempted

 

three major ground efforts to break the Gustav Line at Monte Cassino and failed on each attempt.

 

Even an amphibious landing at Anzio on 22 January 1944 stalled on the beach. The result was a

 

stalemate between evenly matched ground forces. The Allies faced a well-designed and

 

constructed static defense manned by disciplined German troops ordered to hold by Hitler

 

himself. 7

 

            The situation appeared to Mediterranean Allied Air Force (MAAF) planners perfectly suited

 

for a supply interdiction effort (codename STRANGLE) designed to "reduce the enemy's flow

 

of supplies to a level which will make it impractical for him to maintain and operate forces in

 

central Italy" - in other words, to force the enemy to withdraw through supply interdiction alone. 8

 

The primary target of STRANGLE was the form of transportation the Germans most relied

 

upon -- the Italian rail system. MAAF established the planned interdiction belt, running

 

east/west across Italy and centered on Florence, as far north of the Gustav Line as possible to

 

force the Germans to find an alternate means of transporting supplies to the front.9

 

            By the end of the two month operation (19 March through 11 May 1944), Strangle succeeded

 

in inflicting a tremendous amount of damage on the rail system yet failed in its stated objective;

 

the Germans did not withdraw to shorten their supply lines. Despite over 100 rail cuts a day and

 

the stopping of all rail traffic 100 miles north of Rome, the Gustav Line held.10

 

There were two major reasons why Strangle failed despite the massive effort dedicated and

 

the apparent destruction inflicted. First, the Allies significantly overestimated the German Army

 

supply requirements during a static defense. The absence of any serious ground initiative by

 

either side significantly reduced the daily supply consumption rate of the German Army. Allied

 

planners estimated that the German Army required a minimum of 4,000 tons per day to sustain

 

their defense -- an amount equal to approximately seven percent of the total capacity of the

 

Italian rail system. The daily tonnage requirement was a gross overestimation. As a comparison,

 

the German Sixth Army trapped at Stalingrad requested only 500 tons per day. In addition,

 

reducing the capacity of the rail system to below seven percent required a virtual complete

 

shutdown of the entire system -- a requirement almost impossible to meet regardless of the

 

weight of the DAS effort.11 Thus, due to their inflated estimates of German supply requirements

 

and the belief that air alone could shut down the entire rail system, MAAF overestimated its

 

ability to reduce the flow of supplies to the enemy below the minimum required to sustain his

 

static defense and force his withdrawal.

 

            The second reason the German Army did not withdraw was the effectiveness of their

 

counter-measure effort -- the ability to minimize the effects of air attack on the rail system via the

 

rapid repair and bypass of cut rail segments, rationing, movement at night and, most importantly,

 

the diversion of scarce motor vehicles to transport supplies. Despite the apparent effectiveness of

 

DAS, the German counter-measure effort was successful in ensuring the amount of supplies

 

getting through to the Gustav Line was enough to sustain the defense.12

 

            By the end of April, the Allies determined that air power alone would not break the Gustav

 

Line in an acceptable amount of time. The next phase in the attempt to break the Gustav Line --

 

Operation DIADEM -- combined a continued supply air interdiction effort with a ground

 

offensive. As the Allied ground initiative approached in early May, the DAS effort shifted closer

 

to the Gustav Line. The main focus was still supply interdiction, but the target list expanded

 

from rail only to all LOCs (i.e. roads) and vehicles capable of transporting supplies. Additional

 

targets included German operational reserve units in the north and major command and control

 

facilities.13 Based on the results of the Allied ground offensive, the DAS effort in support of

 

DIADEM was very effective. Within two weeks, Allied ground forces had broken the Gustav

 

Line, linked up with the Anzio beachead, and, ten days later, took Rome.14

 

Why did DIADEM apparently succeed where STRANGLE had failed? Despite the increased

 

supply consumption rate resulting from decisive close combat, German records indicated that, for

 

the most part, supply shortages during DIADEM were not critical. Spot shortages did exist but

 

were primarily due to the damage done to the distribution system in the close battle area and not

 

due to STRANGLE's emphasis on attacks on the rail system.15  the Gustav Line did not

 

break due to supply starvation. The greatest contributions of air power to the breaking of the

 

Gustav Line were two secondary or unanticipated effects of operational DAS attacks on supply

 

interdiction targets. The first, and probably most significant, was the German maneuver units'

 

loss of tactical mobility. Due to the blocking of numerous choke points along key LOGs and the

 

attrition of already scarce vehicles used to transport troops, the movement of German units to and

 

within the close battlespace was significantly delayed.16  Gustav Line's primary operational

 

reserve, the Herman Goering Division based at Pisa over 200 miles away, left its base on 23 May

 

yet did not arrive in its assembly area until 27 May. Ordered to move during daylight due to the

 

urgency of the situation, the Division lost sixty-nine of its eighty tanks and thirty percent of its

 

vehicles enroute. It was virtually destroyed attempting to counter-attack the Allied offensive on

 

1 June.17 The shaping effect of DAS also played a key role in the lateral shifting of troops to

 

plug gaps created in the Gustav Line. Forced to move on foot and at night, General Von

 

Senger's XIV Panzer Corps experienced significant delays in moving troops laterally along the

 

defensive line -- delays that allowed Allied forces to exploit gaps in the enemy's lines.18

 

The second unanticipated effect was the general but unintended disruption of the enemy's

 

ability to command and control his forces. Although MAAF did not design the

 

STRANGLE/DIADEM targeting plans to do so, the cumulative effect of the enemy's loss of

 

tactical mobility, the destruction of his forces and communication systems, and spot supply

 

shortages created overwhelming problems in command and control that not even the most

 

flexible command could overcome. DAS disrupted the enemy's plans and schedules and created

 

general confusion and disorganization in the close battlespace that prevented the enemy from

 

successfully countering the Allied ground initiative.19

 

The major lessons learned from STRANGLE/DIADEM were twofold. First, it is extremely

 

difficult to defeat an enemy via a supply interdiction effort alone. It is a tremendous challenge to

 

reduce an enemy's supply throughput below that required to sustain him, especially in a static

 

situation. Secondly, the effects on the enemy of a DAS effort are difficult to predict and will

 

probably not become evident until the enemy is engaged in decisive close combat.

 

 

 

OVERLORD

 

Massive strategic and operational DAS efforts preceded the Allied invasion of Normandy in

 

June of 1944. Prior to the invasion, a classic debate developed regarding the best use of strategic

 

bomber assets -- a debate that continued up to the eve of the invasion. The strategic proponents

 

of the U.S. Strategic Air Force (US STAF) believed that heavy bombers were best used to attack

 

strategic targets in the heart of Germany. However, the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF),

 

the tactical air arm responsible for supporting the invasion, believed that these heavy bomber

 

assets would better support the invasion by attacking tactical targets in France.20 Realizing  the

 

importance of air superiority to the success of the invasion, the Allies main strategic air effort,

 

Operation POINT BLANK, targeted the Luftwaffe and the German aircraft industry. The focus

 

of the operational DAS effort was the French and Belgium rail system used by the German Army

 

to move troops and supplies throughout France. Destruction of the rail system would delay the

 

build-up of enemy combat power in the vicinity of the invasion long enough to allow the Allies

 

to build up sufficient power to repel any counter-attack and, eventually, to break out into the

 

heart of France. The plan called for targeting all elements of the rail system to ensure its

 

paralysis -- bridges, yards, stations, repair shops, switches, locomotives, rolling stock, etc. 21

 

The AEAF, under Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory, estimated that it would take up to three months

 

to achieve its goal and would require the augmentation of tactical air power with heavy bombers

 

from the Allied strategic force. If approved, the request for heavy bombers would divert scarce

 

assets from POINT BLANK and, as expected, a major argument ensued between the AEAF and

 

the strategic proponents -- a disagreement that was settled in favor of the AEAF.22

 

On 10 March 1944, tactical air power from the 9th Air Force began the pre-invasion attack on

 

the rail system. By the end of April, the Allied DAS effort inflicted a tremendous amount of

 

damage, yet due to an exceptional repair effort, the enemy was still able to move a substantial

 

amount of troops and supplies via rail. In reaction, Leigh-Mallory directed all forces to increase

 

the pressure on the rail system and called on strategic bombers from the 8th Air Force to begin

 

full participation. As a result, May was the heaviest month of the pre-invasion DAS effort. The

 

AEAF directed its main effort toward the rail lines servicing Normandy yet distributed the

 

attacks enough to deceive the enemy as to the true landing site.23

 

By 20 May, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) G-2 reported that

 

the rail effort had still not achieved its desired results. Alarmed by the lack of progress, SHAEF

 

prepared plans for a follow-on phase aimed at cutting bridges across the Seine and Loire Rivers

 

in France at critical points. Under this plan, attacks on the Seine bridges would begin just prior

 

to D-Day to ensure the Germans did not have the time to repair them prior to the invasion.

 

Cutting of the Seine bridges would prevent the movement toward Normandy of the enemy's main

 

counter-attack force -- Von Runstedt's 15th Army. Attacks on the Loire bridges would wait until

 

D-Day to prevent revealing that Normandy, and not the Pas de Calais, was the real landing site.24

 

The combination of the rail campaign and the well-timed bridge effort successfully isolated

 

the invasion area long enough to allow a successful landing and build-up of Allied forces prior to

 

any significant close battle with enemy counter-attack forces. By 9 June, over sixty percent of

 

the rail capacity had been cut; by mid-July the estimate was over seventy-five percent. 25 The

 

destruction of the Seine bridges allowed only the ineffective piecemeal commitment to the

 

counter-attack of elements of the German 15th Army. A second counter-attack force, the Panzer

 

Lehr Division, was the subject of an effective force attrition effort. Forced to move in daylight

 

over 150 km from its staging area in Chartres due to the urgent ground situation, Panzer Lehr lost

 

eighty-five armored vehicles, five tanks, and l23 trucks in its movement to contact.26

 

The AEAF also employed operational DAS to soften the Normandy beach defenses. Allied

 

planners were most concerned with the fifty-odd well-fortified coastal gun batteries of the

 

German Atlantic Wall in the vicinity of the landing beaches. To avoid revealing the landing site,

 

the massive air and naval bombardment did not begin until a few days prior to the landing. By

 

D-Day, the AEAF damaged an estimated 21 of the guns. However, post-invasion surveys

 

concluded that, as in the Pacific, the strikes on fixed fortifications did little to attrite enemy beach

 

defenses. The survey concluded that DAS's greatest impact on the beach defenses was to

 

significantly demoralize the guns' crews.27

 

The large-scale three month rail interdiction effort preceding OVERLORD was unable to

 

truly isolate the invasion site -- a task almost impossible to achieve due to the inherent flexibility

 

of the rail system and excellent German repair efforts. However, the rail effort did significantly

 

reduce the enemy's ability to move his forces and, when combined with the well-timed attacks on

 

the Seine and Loire bridges and effective force attrition targeting, was successful in delaying and

 

reducing the combat power of the German counter-attack.

 

 

THE KOREAN WAR

 

Led by over 300 tanks, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) surprise attack on 25 June

 

1950 was a well-planned and executed operation that immediately forced U.S. and Republic of

 

Korea (ROK) forces into a fighting withdrawal toward the Pusan Perimeter. In the months that

 

followed, operational DAS played a vital role in halting the NKPA advance.

 

Fortunately for the Allies, numerous factors were in favor of a successful DAS effort. First,

 

the U.S. possessed total air superiority from the start due to North Korea's mistaken assumption

 

that the U.S. would not interfere in the conflict -- an assumption which led to DPRK forces

 

attacking with inadequate air defense capabilities. Secondly, the Korean terrain was ideally

 

suited for DAS. The mostly mountainous relief of the peninsula restricted vehicular traffic to a

 

sparse road and rail network -- a terrain characteristic that tended to canalize armor and

 

mechanized forces into easily attacked areas. Finally, ineffective NKPA counter-measures

 

further exposed enemy forces to DAS. The requirement to move quickly in pursuit of Allied

 

forces significantly degraded the enemy's ability to conceal, camouflage, and disperse his forces.

 

In addition, the enemy's lack of any significant anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) allowed U.S. strike

 

aircraft to release ordnance at lower altitudes which increased the accuracy of their deliveries.28

 

Due to the urgent nature of the ground situation, DAS concentrated on force attrition and

 

counter-mobility targeting to relieve pressure on the withdrawing Allied units as quickly as

 

possible. DAS targeted armor, mechanized vehicles, trucks, troop concentrations, and significant

 

choke points along the LOCs to slow the enemy's advance and to relieve pressure on the Pusan

 

Perimeter while the Allies built up combat power in the theater. The weight and accuracy of

 

DAS and CAS eventually forced the NKPA to adopt counter-measures such as night movement

 

and dispersal, which further impeded the enemy's tactical mobility and contributed to the stalling

 

of his attack.29

 

During this first phase of the Korean War, operational DAS and CAS were arguably the most

 

significant factors in the stalling of the NKPA offensive. General Walton Walker (Commanding

 

General, 8th Army) summarized the role air power played when he stated "If it had not been for

 

the air support that we received from the 5th Air Force we would not have been able to stay in

 

Korea."30

 

The second phase of the war began in September of l95O with the amphibious assault at

 

Inchon and the break-out of the 8th Army from the Pusan Perimeter. The Allied offensive forced

 

NKPA units in the South to begin a rapid withdrawal north to avoid encirclement. The

 

aggressive pursuit by Allied ground forces required NKPA forces to move both day and night

 

along the limited LOCs, presenting lucrative force attrition targets to Allied air power. The

 

NKPA's withdrawal eventually turned into a rout and the disintegration of the North Korean

 

Army. 31

 

The pending NKPA defeat led to the third phase of the war. On 26 November l 95O, over

 

3OO,OOO Communist Chinese Force (CCF) troops attacked the Allied forces in North Korea,

 

forcing a rapid withdrawal to the South. In an attempt to maintain contact with the retreating

 

Allies, the CCF moved along LOCs during the day and at night with their lights on, presenting

 

excellent force attrition and counter-mobility targets for DAS and CAS. By mid-December, the

 

CCF broke off its pursuit due to excessive casualties.32 An  estimated 30,000 troops were lost due

 

to air power alone.33

 

The stalling of the CCF pursuit led to a static situation along the front. With a less urgent

 

ground situation, air power proponents called for a supply interdiction effort with the goal of

 

forcing the CCF to withdraw to shorten supply lines -- a goal, which if achieved, would make

 

another Allied ground offensive unnecessary. Between the spring of l95l and the cease fire in

 

July of 1953, the Allies conducted three distinct supply interdiction efforts:

 

-STRANGLE I: targeted roads and trucks during the spring/summer of  1951.

 

-STRANGLE II: targeted the rail system from August of 1951 to early 1952.

 

-SATURATE: targeted the rail system from early 1952 to the cease fire but was more

 

           centrally planned and executed. 34

 

The results of these supply interdiction efforts were not encouraging. By December of  1951,

 

5th Air Force Intelligence estimated that due to an effective repair effort the enemy had broken

 

the rail blockade of Pyongyang and was able to transport enough supplies to the front to sustain

 

his forces and build up forward supply dumps. Following this evaluation, the goal of the supply

 

interdiction effort changed from one of forcing the enemy's withdrawal to disrupting his LOCs

 

enough to prevent him from defending against a U.N. offensive or mounting an offensive

 

himself.35 For  whatever reasons, the CCF never did attempt to launch a major offensive to break

 

the stalemate. To what extent the supply interdiction effort contributed to containing the CCF

 

may never be known.

 

Operational DAS played a key role in each phase of the Korean War. The lessons learned

 

from this conflict echoed many of those learned in WWJI. First, the more urgent the situation is

 

on the ground, the more likely that air power will be used to attack force attrition and

 

counter-mobility targets in the vicinity of the close battle (via DAS or CAS) due to the timely

 

effect such attacks will have on that close battle. This will be especially true if the number of

 

strike sorties available is limited as it was in the first phases of the war. Second, an offensive

 

ground initiative forces the enemy to react with maneuver of his own or risk envelopment. The

 

resulting enemy maneuver increases his exposure to DAS. Finally, when the close battle

 

stagnates, the historical tendency is to attempt a supply interdiction effort aimed at compelling

 

the enemy to withdraw -- a goal which supply interdiction alone has not been able to achieve.

 

 

VIETNAM

 

Unlike the previously discussed efforts, U.S. air power faced a situation unfavorable to

 

operational DAS in Vietnam. The nature of the ground combat, the enemy, and his LOCs all

 

limited the effect DAS would have on the war. For the most part, the enemy was a light infantry

 

or guerrilla force with readily available sanctuaries. The limited offensive nature of U.S. and

 

ARVN operations led to sporadic fighting with the enemy determining the frequency of combat.

 

Plus, the primitive LOCs servicing the Communist effort in the South were extremely difficult to

 

interdict.

 

Strategic DAS received the most publicity during the war. Operations ROLLING

 

THUNDER and LINEBACKERS I and II received the most press due to the strategic nature of

 

some of their targets located deep in the North around Hanoi and Haiphong. The military goals

 

of the strategic portion of these operations were to isolate North Vietnam from Soviet and

 

Chinese supply sources, to destroy the North's ability to sustain the war in the South, and to

 

bolster South Vietnamese morale.36  goals, yet those to which U.S. air power devoted

 

the great majority of sorties and bombs, were the interdiction of troops and supplies transported

 

to the South37 and  the force attrition targeting of troop concentrations in the vicinity of the close

 

battle. This discussion will primarily address the operational DAS effort devoted to these

 

secondary goals.

 

The most frequent enemy encountered in the South during the initial stages of the war was the

 

Viet Cong (VC) -- a light infantry guerrilla force which picked the time and place for limited

 

offensive action and then withdrew to available sanctuaries. The North Vietnamese Army was a

 

more conventional force yet still consisted of mostly light infantry units. The light nature of the

 

enemy made him a low consumer of supplies and presented few conventional force attrition,

 

counter-mobility, or supply interdiction targets.

 

The Communists developed exceptionally effective counter-measures against DAS. The

 

enemy routinely adjusted his supply effort to take advantage of frequent poor weather, night, and

 

lulls in the bombing. He used floating spans to give the appearance that a damaged bridge was

 

not undergoing repairs. He diverted a massive amount of manpower to his bypass and repair

 

efforts and continually improved his primary LOC to the South, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, so that

 

by the Easter Offensive of l 972 all major roads heading south were all-weather capable.

 

Additionally, he routinely practiced effective camouflage and dispersion.38

 

The VC fought on the average of one day per month and, thus, required only a small amount

 

of supplies to sustain their forces -- approximately 34 tons (about 8 truckloads) per day from

 

sources outside the South. This low supply requirement could be easily met by even a heavily

 

interdicted LOC system.39 Not  until the Tet Offensive of l 968 did the VC and the NVA attempt

 

a major offensive. Due to the increased consumption rate of supplies and maneuvering of large

 

troop concentrations which made the enemy more vulnerable to air power, DAS was able to play

 

a significant role in stalling and, eventually, reversing the TET offensive.

 

Neither the VC nor NVA depended on a modem transportation system. The major LOC to

 

the South was the Ho Chi Minh Trail -- a well-developed, constantly improved series of trails,

 

roads, and water ways through southern Laos and Cambodia. It consisted of over 200 miles of

 

two lane dirt roads and over 1000 miles of one lane dirt roads with a total capacity of

 

approximately 10,000 trucks at any one time.40

 

The trail was extremely difficult to target due to the density of its route segments and the

 

triple canopy jungle concealing much of its length in southern Laos. It was also very difficult to

 

block due to the primitive nature of the dirt roads, the easily by-passed terrain, the primitive

 

forms of transportation frequently used (bikes and people), and the massive counter-measures

 

effort organized by the Communists.41 Thus,  despite the large-scale DAS effort, the enemy was

 

easily able to transport enough supplies to sustain its forces in the South and build stockpiles for

 

future offensive action.

 

The first major DAS effort of the war was ROLLING THUNDER which officially ran from

 

March of l965 until November of l968. Although the strategic attacks deep into North Vietnam

 

received the most publicity, the great majority of the ROLLING THUNDER effort targeted the

 

LOCs to the South and the Ho Chi Minh Trail in particular. Between l965 and l968, the U.S.

 

dropped over 2.2 million tons of bombs in the South and along the trail while dropping only

 

643,OOO tons in the North.42 Despite  this massive bomb tonnage, the CIA and DIA estimated that

 

ROLLING THUNDER did little damage to the Communist war effort in the South. Infiltration

 

of enemy troops and supplies had doubled each year since 1965.43

 

In preparation for the upcoming Tet Offensive of 1968, the VC attacked and surrounded the

 

26th Marine Regiment occupying the fire support base at Khe Sanh in December of l967. In the

 

nearly three month siege, Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft flew a huge number of tactical air

 

and B-52 sorties against supply interdiction targets along the LOCs supporting the siege and

 

against enemy positions surrounding the base.  B-52s were especially instrumental in destroying

suspected enemy armor staging areas and in hitting enemy troop concentrations.  By the time the

siege was broken in February, the VC had lost over 10,000 troops and suffered a stinging

defeat.44

            The Tet Offensive on 1968 kicked off on 30 January with attacks on 36 of the 44 provincial

capitals in the South.45  Arguably, the enemy's ability to store enough supplies to launch the

offensive was testimony to the failure of ROLLING THUNDER's supply interdiction effort.

However, the massive supply interdiction targeting of the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the battle

and effective force attrition targeting of enemy troop concentrations were key to the short

duration of the offensive.  Although Tet may have been a political victory for the Communists, it

was definite military defeat for the enemy force which suffered and estimated 45,000 killed and

24,000 wounded.46

            In October of 1968, President Johnson ordered the cessation of bombing in North Vietnam.

With the pressure now directly off North Vietnam, attention turned toward an even larger scale

supply interdiction effort on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.  From November of 1968 until April of

1972, the numerous phases of Operation COMMANDO HUNT primarily targeted trucks and

supply caches along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the trail itself.  AC-130 Spectre gunships were

especially effective at targeting trucks at night and racked up impressive kills totals. B-52s were

utilized to crater roads, create landslides, and block the important mountain passes form North

Vietnam that led into the start of the trail in Laos as well as the blast supply caches, truck parks,

and troop concentrations along the trail.  Air power planners employed new technologies in an

effort to increase the effectiveness of DAS.  Operation RANCH HAND attempted to defoliate

the jungle to facilitate target acquisition. A second operation planted seismic and acoustic

 

sensors along the trail to detect movement. 47

 

Despite the weight of the effort and new technology, COMMANDO HUNT did little to slow

 

the flow of supplies to the South. Although the nature of the ground war was transitioning from

 

a pure guerrilla war to a more conventional conflict, air power was never able to isolate the

 

enemy in the South from the source of his supplies. The Ho Chi Minh Trail proved too flexible

 

and enemy counter-measures too effective. Terrain bombing had little effect on the trail's

 

trafficability; cratered segments were easily by-passed or repaired. Despite the great number of

 

trucks destroyed, a lack of vehicles never was a major problem due to the Soviet Union's

 

generosity.48 The  bombing halt in the North allowed unimpeded entrance of troops and supplies

 

into the start of the Trail. 49 Once again, supply interdiction alone did not force the enemy to

 

withdraw.

 

On 30 March l972, the NVA began the major conventional invasion of the South referred to

 

as the Easter Offensive -- a three pronged attack spearheaded by 200 tanks and over l 20,000

 

NVA troops.50  With  the attack initiated at the end of the rainy season, bad weather initially

 

limited DAS to only those platforms capable of all-weather attack: the B-52 and A-6. B-52s

 

were most effective in a force attrition role and were especially so in attacking large enemy troop

 

concentrations preparing to attack Quang Tri, Kontum, and Saigon. Clearing weather allowed

 

tactical air power with precision guided munitions -- primarily laser-guided bombs (LGB) -- to

 

attack counter-mobility targets. Air Force F-4s destroyed 48 bridges in Quang Tri province in

 

just three days to slow the NVA advance. 51

 

The operational DAS conducted in the South during April of l 972 had little immediate effect

 

on reversing the invasion due to the pre-invasion build-up of troops and supplies. DAS was not

 

able to prevent a major initial set-back, but it did assist in preventing the collapse of the northern

 

front. 52

 

When it became obvious in May that strikes in the South alone would not repel the invasion,

 

President Nixon decided to resume bombing of the North with Operation LINEBACKER I.

 

LINEBACKER I's objective was to attack the main critical vulnerability of the North's invasion

 

-- the large logistical base and system required to support such a huge conventional attack. The

 

plan called for air power to accomplish this objective by destroying war-related resources

 

stockpiled in the North, by reducing the importation of military hardware by the North, and by

 

continuing attack on the enemy LOCs to its invasion forces.53

 

Like ROLLING THUNDER, the strategic portion of LINEBACKER I received the most

 

press despite the great percentage of sorties directed toward operational DAS and CAS in the

 

South. Major strategic targets in the North included the mining of Haiphong Harbor and strikes

 

on LOCs to and from China, POL facilities, power plants, supply caches, truck parks and other

 

ports.54 The  combined effect of strategic strikes and operational DAS took its toll on the enemy.

 

By June, the NVA offensive had stalled. During the next few months, ARVN ground forces

 

were able to regain most of the previously lost territory, and, by October, the North Vietnamese

 

agreed to resume peace talks. Unfortunately, the North elected to use the bombing halt following

 

LINEBACKER Ito, once again, create difficulties at the Paris peace talks. By December, the

 

situation deteriorated to a point that President Nixon chose to order the massive B-52 raids on

 

North Vietnam's military-industrial complex known as LINEBACKER TI that would eventually

 

compel the Communists to sign the l 973 Peace Accord in January.55

 

The Vietnam War was a true test of air power's ability to inflict significant damage on an

 

enemy under less than optimum conditions. The combination of a low supply consuming

 

guerrilla fighter, a paucity of conventional DAS targets, the enemy's excellent talent for

 

counter-measures, a primitive but effective system of LOCs, and the limited nature of the ground

 

combat presented a formidable challenge to DAS. However, the most significant problem may

 

have been the limited and operationally defensive nature of the U.S.IARVN. The absence of any

 

significant ground offensive maneuver and the limiting of the ground war to the South seldom

 

pressured the enemy to concentrate forces and/or maneuver in a defensive reaction -- both

 

responses which would have substantially increased his vulnerability to DAS. The limited

 

offensive nature of the U.S. and ARVN ground forces allowed the enemy to choose the time,

 

place, and intensity of the engagement. Only on rare occasions did the enemy elect to mount

 

large-scale attacks -- attacks such as the siege of Khe Sanh, and the Tet and Easter Offensives

 

that were stalled and virtually destroyed by operational DAS.

 

 

DESERT STORM

 

The war with Iraq was the first opportunity for post-Vietnam air power to demonstrate its

 

ability to shape the enemy in a major conventional conflict. In January of l 99 l, DIA estimated

 

that up to 43 Iraqi divisions (540,000 troops), 4,200 tanks, 2,800 APC and 3,l00 artillery

 

pieces were in the Kuwaiti theater.56 Post-war  analysis later revealed that the estimated number

 

of divisions was correct, but the number of troops and pieces of equipment were significantly

 

over estimated. Fortunately for the Coalition, the time required was available to mount a

 

significant air effort aimed at attriting a large percentage of this powerful enemy force prior to

 

commencing the ground war.

 

CENTCOM developed a four phased campaign plan to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait:

 

Phase One: the strategic effort to incapacitate Iraqi leadership and key military

 

      capabilities.

 

Phase Two: the effort to establish air supremacy (including SEAD) over Kuwait.

 

Phase Three: battlespace preparation via the attrition of the Iraqi Army in Kuwait.

 

Phase Four: support for the ground war.57

 

The initial plan developed by a Pentagon planning cell, INSTANT THUNDER, was a single

 

phase plan directed at key strategic targets such as the Iraqi leadership's command and control

 

systems, airfields, power plants, oil production, rail system, weapons of mass destruction, ports,

 

and the Republican Guard. However, the joint force air component commander (JFACC) for

 

CENTCOM, Lieutenant General Charles A. Homer, USAF, felt that INSTANT THUNDER

 

neglected Iraqi forces in Kuwait. To correct this problem, he selected Brigadier General Buster

 

Glosson, USAF, to head the Black Hole -- a planning cell in theater -- to improve the plan.

 

Eventually, Instant Thunder would become only phase one of the four phase plan.58

 

Phase three was the main operational DAS phase of the campaign directed toward the force

 

attrition targeting of the Iraqi Army front line units and their operational reserves -- the

 

Republican Guard. Phase three also included a supply interdiction and counter-mobility effort

 

targeting the major rail and road networks from Iraq servicing the Kuwaiti theater. The CINC's

 

combat analysis group determined that fifty percent attrition of tanks, APCs, and artillery would

 

be required to permit a successful offensive by a single corps to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait.59

 

Due to the large number of Coalition aircraft available, the first three phases of the air war

 

began simultaneously. As in Vietnam, the strategic portion of the air plan (phase one) received

 

the most media attention, but the vast majority of sorties were flown against phase three and four

 

targets -- Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait and the supply lines to those forces.60 Phase one strikes

 

consumed about fifteen percent of the sorties, phase two about fourteen percent, and phase three

 

and four about fifty-six percent.61

 

As mentioned earlier, CENTCOM measured the effectiveness of the force attrition targeting

 

of Iraqi units in Kuwait in terms of the percentage of tanks, APCs, and artillery destroyed. The

 

goal of fifty percent was difficult to achieve due to reduced accuracy caused by medium to high

 

altitude release of ordnance, weather, and the scarcity of PGMs for use in Kuwait. Initially,

 

phase one strategic targets absorbed the great majority of PGMs. Attrition rates increased as the

 

ground war approached and the sorties dedicated to phase three targets increased.62  In February,

 

the CINC shifted the main effort to the Kuwaiti theater and started targeting breach sites,

 

artillery, and fire trenches. Decreased release altitudes and an increase in the use of PGMs

 

increased attrition, but air power was still not able to achieve the fifty percent goal.63

 

The Iraqi defense remained static with one major exception. On 29 January, several

 

battalion-size Iraqi units mounted a series of attacks into Saudi Arabia, the most significant being

 

the attack on the undefended town of Al Khafgi. Coalition ground forces supported by CAS

 

offered stiff resistance. On 30 January, two Iraqi divisions were detected marshaling for a

 

follow-on attack and became the target for heavy Coalition DAS attacks which destroyed any

 

enemy hope to exploit their earlier success. On the evening of 30 January, Saudi and Qatari

 

armored units launched a counter-attack and by mid-day on 3l January destroyed the remaining

 

Iraqi units in the town and had taken several hundred prisoners.64 According  to CENTCOM, the

 

attrition of Iraqi equipment increased four-fold during the period of the Al Khafgi attack. After

 

this tactical defeat, the Iraqi Army in Kuwait attempted no further offensive action.65

 

Although the fifty percent goal proved difficult to measure and attain, phase three force

 

attrition targeting was effective in significantly reducing the combat power of enemy forces in

 

the Kuwaiti theater. Post-war analysis estimated that the actual number of Iraqi troops in theater

 

at the war's start was about 336,000.66 By the start of the ground war on 24 February,

 

approximately twenty-five to thirty percent had deserted and casualties had accounted for only

 

another ten percent. Most of the Iraqis who deserted did so due to a lack of food and water and

 

not due to equipment destruction. Enemy prisoner of war (EPW) debriefs indicated a sense of

 

futility due to the length of the air war. 67 The loss of equipment was not a decisive factor; the

 

Iraqis did not run out of tanks, artillery, or APCs. In fact, much of the equipment encountered

 

during the ground war was found abandoned and not destroyed.68

 

As in Vietnam, B-52s were especially effective in force attrition targeting. B-52s were

 

responsible for dropping over thirty percent of the bomb tonnage hitting phase three targets

 

including breach sites, ammunition dumps, troop concentrations, and headquarters. Due to their

 

tremendous destruction potential and shock effect, ground commanders highly desired B-52

 

support.69

 

Force attrition targeting continued its effectiveness during phase four. The initial operational

 

DAS effort during the ground war targeted the enemy heavy reserve divisions located just

 

beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) and included the Republican Guard.70 A

 

Push CAS system was put into effect to ensure the priority went to CAS if needed by the ground

 

forces. Under this system, tactical strike aircraft designated for CAS missions checked in with

 

CAS controlling agencies upon entering the Kuwaiti theater at frequent intervals. If not needed

 

for CAS, these aircraft proceeded to pre-briefed alternate targets.71 However, classic CAS was

 

not a major factor due to the rapid and relatively unchallenged advance of Coalition forces. Due

 

to the infrequent nature of strong enemy resistance, the attacks on Iraqi heavy reserve forces

 

prevented their use for any task except self-defense and appeared to be the most effective use of

 

air power during the ground war.72

 

The final stage of the war from the evening of 25 February until the cease fire on 28 February

 

witnessed the use of force attrition and counter-mobility targeting in the pursuit and destruction

 

of the withdrawing Iraqi Army. Fearing an early withdrawal, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf,

 

USA, (CINCENT) earlier directed that bridges be attacked during phase one not only to stop the

 

supply flow but to cut off the Republican Guard's escape routes.73 During  the final days of the

 

war, operational DAS interdicted major chokepoints on the remaining enemy escape routes into

 

Iraq, stalled the lead elements of enemy columns, and decimated the vehicles in those columns.74

 

The supply interdiction effort concentrated on targeting the four major highways and one

 

railroad serving the Kuwaiti theater. The enemy's LOC network included 126 highway bridges

 

and seven railroad bridges south of Baghdad. By 28 February, all but two of the highway routes

 

were closed and the two remaining routes' capacity significantly reduced. The single rail route --

 

the Iraqi's primary mode of transporting armor and self-propelled artillery -- had also been

 

shutdown.75 The supply interdiction effort in the Kuwaiti theater targeted truck convoys due to

 

the lack of natural chokepoints along the desert LOCs. EPW reports indicated that air power

 

destroyed half the trucks in theater, and that many more had broken down due to a lack of spare

 

parts.76

 

The supply interdiction effort produced mixed results. Generally, front line EPW's appeared

 

malnourished and under-supplied. However, this observation varied between units; some

 

appeared well-fed and even had hot meals. The Republican Guard appeared especially well

 

supported. As observed after STRANGLE/DIADEM in the Italian campaign, it appeared that

 

supplies were available but that the damaged distribution system was ineffective. Supply

 

interdiction was able to reduce the throughput of supplies but not below the minimum level

 

required to sustain an enemy in a static defense. Supply problems did not become critical until

 

the ground war started.77

 

Desert Storm presented an optimum set of conditions for DAS to prove its value in shaping the

 

enemy. The Iraqi Army was a large, conventional mechanized force which, for the most part,

 

remained in a static defense in open desert terrain that made an effective counter-measures effort

 

difficult. The lack of offensive action on the part of the enemy gave the Coalition air effort the

 

time required to mass its air power, plan, and execute an effective air effort.

 

The Coalition's overwhelming air power achieved air superiority almost immediately and air

 

supremacy within the first two weeks. Coalition air power's ability to neutralize the Iraqi

 

integrated air defense system (IADS), its massive sortie generation capability, and its accurate

 

delivery platforms allowed the CINC to apply pressure where needed to shape the enemy --

 

mainly via force attrition targeting -- for the future ground battle.

 

The Iraqi Army in Kuwait was at the tail end of a long, sparse, and easily-cut LOC system.

 

Although the Coalition was not able to completely isolate the Kuwaiti theater from its supply

 

source, the reduction in throughput and degradation of the distribution system within theater

 

certainly contributed to the enemy's problems.

 

Despite these optimum conditions, a coalition ground offensive was required to remove the

 

Iraqi Army from Kuwait The massive pre-ground war force attrition, counter-mobility, and

 

supply interdiction efforts combined with strategic attacks could not force the enemy to

 

withdraw. The effects of DAS did not become evident until the Coalition ground offensive put

 

further pressure on the enemy. DAS blinded and paralyzed the Iraqi Army and left it unable to

 

react to the Coalition ground offensive.

 

Perhaps the most important effect of DAS on the enemy was psychological -- the destruction

 

of his morale. The consistently accurate and seemingly endless bombing destroyed his will to

 

fight and led to a swift 100 hour ground war that ended in the defeat of the Iraqi Army in Kuwait.

 

 

CHAPTER TWO

 

THE VULNERABILITY OF ENEMY FORCES

 

AND LOC'S TO OPERATIONAL DAS

 

History indicates that there are certain characteristics of an enemy ground force and its LOC

 

system that make them more vulnerable to air attack and, thus, increase the potential for

 

operational DAS to successfully shape the enemy. This chapter will address those characteristics

 

of the enemy and his LOCs which have historically proven to increase the enemy's vulnerability

 

to operational DAS. During the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) process, these

 

characteristics should serve as indicators to the MEF of the potential for the success or failure of

 

a DAS effort and its possible shaping payoffs.

 

 

ENEMY FORCE

 

The nature of the enemy force plays a major role in its vulnerability to operational DAS.

 

Generally speaking, any characteristic of the enemy force that results in the exposure of critical

 

elements of that force to air attack increases the enemy's vulnerability to DAS. As a general

 

rule, the more mechanized an enemy force, i.e., the more it relies on vehicles for movement, the

 

more vulnerable it will be to DAS. Compared to light infantry or guerrilla forces, mechanized

 

forces will prove to be much more lucrative force attrition targets due to the need for these forces

 

to move and maneuver for maximum effectiveness. Mechanized forces on the move, especially

 

over long distances, will be difficult to conceal and disperse and easily canalized by terrain into

 

predictable, exposed routes. In addition, mechanized forces present a wide variety of targets

 

which, when compared to light infantry, are relatively easy to acquire and hit. Such targets as

 

tanks, APCs, self-propelled artillery, and trucks present excellent targets for tactical air power,

 

especially if PGM-capable.

 

Historical examples of successful force attrition targeting of a maneuvering force can be

 

found in each of the DAS efforts discussed in Chapter One. Specific examples include the

 

near-destruction of the Herman Goering Division in its reinforcing movement to the Gustav Line

 

during STRANGLE/DIADEM, the attrition of North Korean forces in their push toward and

 

withdrawal from the Pusan Perimeter, and the repulse of the Iraqi attack on Al Khafgi. In each

 

case, force attrition targeting significantly reduced in strength a mechanized force during an

 

operational or tactical movement.

 

Mechanized, maneuver oriented forces are also more vulnerable to counter-mobility targeting.

 

The rapid movement required by these units to seize the offensive initiative or as a defensive

 

reaction is dependent upon a trafficable, high capacity LOC. Effective targeting of choke points

 

along the LOC will, at a minimum, delay the movement of these forces. The resulting delay

 

interferes with enemy operational and tactical plans and provides additional time and maneuver

 

space for friendly forces.

 

Examples of the impact of counter-mobility targeting on mechanized forces are abundant.

 

During STRANGLE/DIADEM, the targeting of the route system running parallel to the Gustav

 

Line slowed Von Senger's XlV Panzer Corps's movement of forces laterally to plug gaps in the

 

German defensive line. A second example is the destruction of the Seine and Loire bridges

 

during OVERLORD. The destruction of these bridges significantly delayed the armored

 

counter-attack upon which the German plan for repelling the invasion so heavily depended.

 

When compared to light infantry, highly mechanized maneuver units require a large supply

 

effort to sustain their forces and, thus, are highly dependent upon a sophisticated logistics

 

system. Such a system is usually dependent upon vehicular transport of supplies and a trafficable

 

route system. The high consumption rates and sophisticated supply system make mechanized

 

forces appear to be highly susceptible to supply interdiction. Unfortunately, past supply

 

interdiction efforts have fallen well short of their desired goal of immobilizing maneuver units

 

via supply starvation. As evidenced by the results of STRANGLE during the Italian campaign,

 

usually only spot shortages occurred which did not become a major factor until pressure applied

 

by a ground initiative forced the enemy to maneuver. 78

 

Infantry forces present a much more difficult problem for DAS. Individual troops are

 

generally easily concealed and/or dispersed targets presenting a difficult acquisition problem for

 

air power. Once located, they are most vulnerable to area type weapons -- cluster bomb units

 

(CBU) and general purpose (GP) bombs delivered in large quantities on enemy troop

 

concentrations.

 

Infantry forces are generally not dependent on vehicles for movement. Therefore, compared

 

to mechanized forces, counter-mobility targeting will have a lesser effect on infantry forces.

 

However, as with mechanized forces, infantry will be more vulnerable when on the move and

 

canalized. Infantry forces also tend to have lower supply consumption rates and a less complex

 

logistics system. Correspondingly, supply interdiction efforts will have a lesser effect on

 

infantry.

 

To have a significant effect, DAS efforts must strike infantry when concentrated in

 

vulnerable, unfortified positions (such as during deployment movements, in assembly areas, in

 

attack formations, and bivouac sites) and with a large amount of area weapons. B-29s in Korea

 

and B-52s in Vietnam and Desert Storm dropping large quantities of GP bombs proved very

 

effective in attriting enemy troop concentrations. Enemy infantry supporting arms, such as

 

artillery and rocket launchers, may present more lucrative DAS targets than the infantry

 

themselves due to the destruction of the enemy infantry's main source of firepower. For

 

example, although many air planners believed that air power was more effective in attacking

 

strategic and other operational targets, the targeting of Iraqi artillery was a top priority of

 

Coalition ground commanders during Desert Storm because of its long range and ability to fire

 

chemical weapons. Two days before the commencing of the ground war, air planners, in

 

response to a request from VII Corps, shifted their targeting emphasis from the enemy reserve

 

forces to enemy artillery units in the VII Corps' zone of action. Thirty-six hours later, enemy

 

artillery proved ineffective during VII Corp's breaching operation on G-Day. 79

 

The guerrilla force presents the worst case scenario for DAS. Guerrillas present the same

 

targeting problems associated with an infantry force but are even lighter, less concentrated, and

 

less dependent on supporting arms. Due to their ability to pick the time and place of combat,

 

their very low supply requirements, and the existence of protective sanctuaries, guerrilla forces

 

are fleeting DAS targets at best. Although a vast number of sorties were devoted to attacks on

 

the enemy in South Vietnam, DAS had very little effect on the VC prior to Tet in l968. The VC

 

fought as a guerrilla farce and presented a difficult if not impossible DAS targeting problem.

 

However, the VC's large-scale attacks during the Tet Offensive made them much more

 

vulnerable to DAS. As a result, air power in the operational DAS role was a key factor in the

 

VC's defeat.

 

Regardless of the type of enemy, DAS planners can rest assured that the enemy will develop

 

counter-measures to reduce the effect of the DAS effort. The enemy's ability to mount an

 

effective counter-measures effort will play a major role in the effectiveness of DAS. The more

 

ingenious and motivated the enemy, the more likely he will be to mount an effective

 

counter-measures effort.

 

The majority of enemy counter-measures will be passive in nature and will fall into one or

 

more of the following categories:

 

l. Concealment, camouflage, dispersal, and/or fortification of potential targets.

 

2. Deception (primarily in the form of decoy targets).

 

3. The movement of troops, equipment, and supplies during lull periods in the DAS effort.

 

    Lull periods usually occur at night, during bad weather, bombing halts, and/or as the

 

    result of predictable flight schedules.

 

4. Repair or by-pass of damaged route segments and new route construction.

 

5. The forward prepositioning of surplus supplies, equipment, and troops.

 

The primary active counter-measure is the employment of an air defense system consisting of

 

fighters, surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and/or AAA. The more robust the enemy's air defense

 

system, the more effective it will be in limiting the effectiveness of DAS. During the North

 

Korean push south toward Pusan, NKPA forces did not expect a U.S. air response and,

 

accordingly, had little air defense capability. The lack of air defense allowed U.S.

 

fighter-bombers to release ordnance at low altitude resulting in a high percentage of accurate

 

deliveries and a very effective force attrition effort. Learning a costly lesson, CCF and NKPA

 

forces significantly increased their air defense capability via the addition of a substantial amount

 

of AAA pieces to their maneuver units -- effective weapons which forced higher, less accurate

 

ordnance releases and the diversion of a large percentage of sorties to SEAD.80

 

The North Vietnamese were experts at the art of effective counter-measures. Ingenious,

 

industrious, and dedicated, the North Vietnamese diverted a massive amount of readily available

 

manpower (mostly under-employed civilians including women to serve as labor troops) and

 

equipment to the repair and by-pass effort sustaining their main supply route to the South -- the

 

Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Communists dedicated over 3OO,OOO people to the road repair and

 

improvement effort alone.81 They took advantage of every bombing lull to move supplies and

 

troops south and successfully prepositioned enough supplies forward to support their guerrilla

 

actions and the initial stages of their conventional offensives. The North also developed a

 

sophisticated Soviet-style IADS in the North and, as the war progressed, moved AAA and SA-7

 

man-portable missiles along the trail.82  The Communists' passive and active counter-measures

 

prevented the massive U.S. DAS effort from reducing the flow of troops, equipment, and

 

supplies below the minimum level required to support their forces in the South.

 

The final factor relating to the nature of the enemy force is difficult at best to measure --

 

morale. Generally speaking, the higher the enemy's morale, the more difficult it will be to reach

 

the desired effects of DAS. The specific question that one must ask is to what degree is the

 

enemy able to withstand bombardment and still be able to fight when called upon to do so. The

 

answer is dependent upon numerous factors -- many with effects difficult to predict. A partial

 

list of factors that tend to decrease the enemy's vulnerability to DAS includes:

 

l. A firm commitment to his nation's cause.

 

2. Confidence in his military and political leadership.

 

            3. A high degree of training.

 

4. Previous combat experience.

 

5. A robust logistics system capable of supplying the necessities (food, water, shelter).

 

6. The ability to employ effective counter-measures.

 

7. Continuous and effective C3.

 

8. The belief that victory is near.

 

An enemy force possessing most or all of these characteristics is more likely to withstand air

 

attack and still remain an effective fighting unit. However, the other variable which requires

 

addressing is the length, weight, and accuracy of the attack. Even the most disciplined unit will

 

cease to be effective if the air attack is long enough, the amount of ordnance dropped is great

 

enough, and the deliveries are accurate enough.

 

The length and weight of the DAS effort required to break enemy morale may be impossible

 

to determine. The effects of the intense air phase of Desert Storm on the enemy did not become

 

obvious until the start of the ground war. Almost all of the EPW who surrendered without a

 

fight were from heavily bombed front line units and complained of a lack of food and water.

 

Despite suffering similar attacks, the more thoroughly trained and better supplied Republican

 

Guards appeared less affected and were at least able to mount a token defense before

 

withdrawing.83

 

 

THE ENEMY LOCs

 

The nature of the LOCs upon which the enemy moves his troops, equipment, and supplies

 

determines the vulnerability of that route system to DAS. In general, a highly vulnerable LOC

 

will be one consisting of easily acquirable targets at significant choke points whose destruction

 

will significantly reduce the LOCs throughput.

 

Terrain and vegetation are key factors in determining the nature of a route system. During the

 

terrain analysis phase of the IPB, DAS planners should pay particular attention to the potential

 

canalizing effects of the terrain. Factors such as mountains, rivers, swamps, and urban areas

 

produce no-go or slow-go terrain which tends to canalize enemy mobility corridors. Canalizing

 

factors produce choke points which, if successfully blocked, significantly delay enemy force and

 

supply movement. The lack of canalizing factors, such as in desert or flat, trafficable terrain,

 

offers the enemy a wide choice of avenues of approach and LOCs with few significant choke

 

points. Vegetation also plays a key role -- primarily in terms of the target acquisition problems

 

and canalizing effects associated with heavily wooded or jungle foliage.

 

A long, sparse LOC system with significant choke points, easily cut segments, and low

 

throughput capacity is the type most vulnerable to DAS. The best case for DAS is a route system

 

consisting of a long, single LOC with few, if any, branches. As the number of main routes or

 

branches increases, so do the enemy options for movement. The more options the enemy has to

 

move his troops and supplies, the more difficult the task for DAS to successfully interdict.

 

Analysis of past DAS efforts revealed that uninterdicted segments of a route system can usually

 

meet enemy supply requirements.84 Thus,  any hope of isolating an enemy force from the LOCs

 

supplying him will re4uire the blocking of each major segment and branch of its route system --a

 

task nearly impossible to achieve.

 

Significant, easily blocked choke points and route segments increase the vulnerability of the

 

LOC. Choke points such as bridges, tunnels, mountain passes, road and rail intersections will

 

significantly reduce throughput if successfully targeted. Although these choke points appear to

 

be excellent DAS targets, most have proven difficult in the past to permanently block. PGMs

 

have solved many of the past problems of cutting these choke points, but enemy

 

counter-measures, particularly repair and by-pass efforts, have limited the impact of these attacks

 

on reducing throughput.

 

Generally, a route system dependent upon modem forms of transportation will be highly

 

vulnerable to DAS. Modem highways, rail, and water LOCs usually consist of numerous easily

 

cut segments and are dependent upon vehicles, trains, and boats to transport troops and supplies

 

-- all excellent DAS targets. Individual segments of the system are less resilient than more

 

primitive systems due to the difficulty and time required to repair or by-pass critical elements

 

such as bridges, paved roads, or rails. On the other hand, although individual segments of a

 

modem system are easily cut and difficult to repair/by-pass, the diversity of most modem LOC

 

systems presents a challenge to DAS. The dense network of main routes and branches of most

 

modem systems offers the enemy numerous route options for throughput.

 

Historically, DAS planners have spent much time and effort analyzing the enemy route

 

system in an attempt to determine the one element of the system that is its critical vulnerability.

 

In theory, the successful elimination of that element -- whether it be trucks, rolling stock, fuel,

 

etc.-- should cripple the system at a relatively inexpensive cost in terms of sorties when

 

compared to the effort required to attack all elements of the system. Unfortunately, identification

 

of this critical vulnerability has proven to be a difficult task and, even if correctly identified, next

 

to impossible to reduce to below the level required to cripple the LOC system.85 As an example,

 

during COMMANDO HUNT in Vietnam, DAS planners determined that the critical

 

vulnerability of the Ho Chi Minh Trail system was its dependence on trucking. However, despite

 

the destruction of a huge number of trucks, the Communist effort in the South was never

 

seriously hindered by a lack of supplies.86

 

DAS planners have also routinely underestimated the effort required to significantly degrade

 

throughput capacity. Most systems appear to consist of easily cut segments. Unfortunately,

 

most enemy LOC systems have proven sufficiently flexible and resilient enough to continue to

 

supply the enemy's close battle with troops and supplies. In the words of General Homer, the

 

JFACC during Desert Storm, "Anybody that does a campaign against transportation systems

 

better beware. It looks deceivingly easy. It is a tough nut to crack."87

 

 

CHAPTER THREE

 

THE SHAPING EFFECTS OF OPERATIONAL DAS

 

The MEF operational DAS effort will most likely concentrate on the three categories of

 

targeting which will have the greatest and quickest impact on shaping the enemy -- force

 

attrition, supply interdiction, and counter-mobility targeting. Based on historical lessons learned

 

and a thorough analysis of the enemy and his LOCs, DAS planners should be able to anticipate

 

the general effects of the MEF DAS effort and how it will shape the enemy. A successful

 

operational DAS effort will have three main shaping effects on an enemy surface force: 1) a

 

significant reduction in the enemy's combat power; 2) the limiting of the enemy's ability to move

 

and maneuver; 3) a general disruption in the enemy's ability to command and control his forces.

 

 

SHAPING EFFECTSOF FORCE ATTRITION TARGETING

 

The goal of force attrition targeting is simple -- to destroy as much of the enemy force as

 

possible prior to that force engaging the MEF GCE in close combat. The primary payoff is a

 

reduction in the enemy's combat power. Force attrition shaping occurs via the destruction of a

 

significant percentage of the enemy force's troops, equipment, and weapons in the deep

 

battlespace and results in a physically, materially, and psychologically weakened enemy who

 

elects either to avoid close battle or to do engage with significantly reduced combat strength.

 

Force attrition shaping is most effective versus a conventional motorized/mechanized force

 

relying on movement and maneuver for deployment or against a static defense conducted by an

 

enemy incapable of effective counter-measures.

 

The key to effective force attrition targeting lies in the locating of concentrated enemy forces

 

and then hitting those forces with massive firepower. Since the MEF lacks organic heavy

 

bomber assets capable of supplying the massive firepower required (such as the B-52 or B-1), it

 

must rely on its ability to mass available organic DAS assets quickly and/or rely on joint assets

 

to significantly attrite enemy surface forces in a timely manner. Piecemeal attacks are usually

 

ineffective unless the attacker has the luxury of a substantial amount of time to slowly attrite a

 

static enemy.

 

The goal of the attacker is the destruction of a significant percentage of the enemy force to

 

ensure a substantial reduction in the enemy's combat power. What percentage is difficult, if not

 

impossible, to determine. Air power planners have struggled with this question for years. It is

 

purely an arbitrary educated guess that is also difficult to measure once the DAS effort is

 

executed. Suffice it to say that any force attrition effort should attempt to destroy as much of the

 

enemy force as possible with the assets and time available to do so.

 

The most important and hardest to measure impact of force attrition targeting may be its effect

 

on enemy morale. The force attrition effort may actually only destroy a small percentage of the

 

enemy yet still substantially weaken him psychologically. Prior to the ground war in Desert

 

Storm, the Iraqis suffered only an estimated ten percent casualty rate despite the weight of the air

 

effort. Yet despite this relatively acceptable casualty rate, over twenty-five percent deserted prior

 

to the ground war,88  huge number surrendered at the start of the ground war (over 8,000 on

 

G-Day),89 and  those remaining were unable to mount an effective defense. A sustained effort

 

effective in destroying a significant percentage of the enemy force will most certainly

 

psychologically weaken the enemy and play a major role in shaping him for defeat.

 

In addition to Desert Storm, there are numerous historical examples of force attrition

 

targeting's effectiveness in reducing the enemy's combat power. Attacks on the Herman Goering

 

Division during STRANGLE/DIADEM (WWII), the Panzer Lehr Division at Normandy, and

 

DPRK forces in their push toward Pusan all are examples of DAS ability to significantly

 

reduce the combat power of an enemy force prior to that force engaging in close battle. At Con

 

Thien and Khe Sanh, concentrations of enemy troops and equipment assembling for attack were

 

hit with a massive bomb tonnage which resulted in the breaking of a siege and large numbers of

 

enemy casualties and equipment destroyed.90

 

 

THE SHAPING EFFECTS OF SUPPLY INTERDICTION

 

Supply interdiction was the traditional goal of many previous DAS efforts. Proponents of

 

supply interdiction believed that DAS could reduce the flow of supplies below the level required

 

to support an enemy force and, thus, lead to his withdrawal or defeat. Supply interdiction has

 

proven to be a popular use of air power in a static situation where there is no significant offensive

 

maneuver by either opponent. Unfortunately, the results of supply interdiction efforts have fallen

 

well short of their goals. There are no historical examples of an enemy suffering an operational

 

or tactical defeat due to supply interdiction atone. This lack of success is due to the inability of

 

DAS to reduce enemy supply throughput below the minimum level required to cause the enemy's

 

catastrophic collapse. Supply interdiction has proven effective in creating spot shortages that

 

would play a role in subsequent ground operations, but it has never been able to defeat an enemy

 

on its own.

 

The failure of supply interdiction to live up to its expectations is due to two primary reasons:

 

a tendency for DAS planners to overestimate enemy supply requirements and to underestimate

 

the flexibility of the enemy's LOC system.91 Historically, DAS planners have expended a huge

 

amount of effort attempting to determine minimum enemy supply requirements and the air power

 

effort required to reduce the throughput of supplies below that level. The tendency has been to

 

overestimate the amount of supplies the enemy needs to sustain his operations; a tendency which

 

led to underestimating the air effort required to reduce the enemy's throughput below the

 

minimum needed to sustain him. This is especially true when the enemy is in a static defense

 

where his lack of maneuver results in very low consumption rates or against a low-consuming

 

guerrilla force.

 

The second problem was the tendency to underestimate the flexibility of the enemy LOC

 

system. Due to the inherent diversity of most route systems and effective enemy

 

counter-measures, the effort required to significantly reduce the throughput of the enemy's LOCs

 

far exceeded the capabilities of air power. Regardless of the weight of the effort, air power could

 

not reduce the throughput of supplies below that required to sustain the enemy. The minimum

 

throughput required to sustain the enemy was quite easily supplied by even a small percentage of

 

uninterdicted LOCs.92 Thus,  to isolate the enemy from his source of supplies required the cutting

 

of virtually his entire LOC system. For example, the German force manning the Gustav Line

 

only required an estimated two percent of the total supply capacity of its route system.93 To 

 

reduce the throughput of supplies by ninety-eight percent would require the near-total shutdown

 

of the entire route system -- a goal extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve even with

 

today's technology.

 

Despite its inability to achieve anticipated results, supply interdiction has and will play an

 

important role in shaping the enemy. Similar to the effects of force attrition targeting, supply

 

interdiction significantly contributes to the shaping effort by reducing the enemy's combat power

 

either prior to or during the close battle. However, the spot shortages and distribution problems

 

created by supply interdiction will not become a factor until friendly ground action causes the

 

enemy to maneuver and engage in close combat -- both factors which increase the enemy's

 

consumption rate and place additional pressure on his already taxed supply system. Historically,

 

even an enemy subjected to an extended supply interdiction effort has been able to store enough

 

supplies to support the initial stages of the close battle. However, the effects of supply

 

interdiction become apparent when the enemy attempts to sustain his ground initiative -- whether

 

it be offensive or defensive. After using up his stored supplies, the enemy's logistics systems

 

were unable to sustain his offensive initiative or defensive reactions -- a factor which eventually

 

contributed to his defeat.

 

 

THE SHAPING EFFECTS OF COUNTER-MOBILITY TARGETING

 

The delay of enemy force movement and maneuver via an effective counter-mobility targeting

 

effort played a significant role in most past DAS campaigns. During STRANGLE/DIADEM,

 

counter-mobility targeting successfully delayed German reinforcement efforts and the lateral

 

shifting of troops to plug gaps in the Gustav Line. By targeting the Seine and Loire bridges

 

during Overlord, the Allies successfully delayed the German counter-attack long enough to build

 

up combat power ashore. In Korea, counter-mobility targeting significantly slowed enemy

 

advances and withdrawals. In each case, by targeting critical choke points and route segments, a

 

 dedicated counter-mobility effort delayed enemy force movements long enough to allow friendly

 

forces to improve their position relative to the enemy prior to engaging in close battle, to take

 

advantage of gaps in the enemy's defense, and/or decisively engage an enemy force prior to its

 

reinforcement. Also, it is important to note that in almost all cases, the delayed enemy force

 

became the subject of follow-on force attrition attacks which significantly reduced the enemy's

 

combat power prior to the close battle.

 

As in past campaigns, the MEF can use his counter-mobility DAS effort to geographically

 

shape his enemy in preparation for the close battle. By significantly delaying his opponent's

 

movement and maneuver, the MEF enables his GCE to attack or defend on terrain of his

 

choosing. To do so, however, the counter-mobility effort must be coordinated with the GCE

 

scheme of maneuver to ensure the GCE takes advantage of the time and terrain made available

 

by the delay of enemy movement. Counter-mobility targeting also shapes by limiting the combat

 

power of the enemy force. By the delay and attrition of enemy reinforcing and counter-attacking

 

units, the MEF significantly improves the potential for his GCE to engage and defeat an enemy

 

unit before it can be reinforced.

 

As observed at Normandy, the timing of the counter-mobility effort is of great importance.94

 

Counter-mobility attacks timed to provide the GCE the greatest opportunity to take advantage of

 

the resulting delay in enemy movement are the most effective. The MEF must execute

 

counter-mobility strikes early enough to ensure critical targets are hit yet not so early that the

 

enemy has the opportunity to repair or bypass the targeted choke point prior to the GCE

 

executing its maneuver.

 

Counter-mobility targeting may be the most efficient use of DAS in a situation where the

 

MEF's air power is limited and/or when the time available to conduct DAS is insufficient to reap

 

the benefits of a force attrition and/or supply interdiction effort. Successful force attrition and

 

supply interdiction efforts normally require a large number of sorties and a substantial amount of

 

time to achieve their desired effects. However, the cutting of a few significant choke points in a

 

counter-mobility effort requires significantly fewer sorties and less time.

 

 

THE UNANTICIPATED SHAPING EFFECTS OF OPERATIONAL DAS

 

In addition to the previously discussed effects of force attrition, supply interdiction, and

 

counter-mobility targeting, there are two significant, difficult to predict, and often unanticipated

 

shaping effects of a successful DAS campaign. The first is the effect of enemy counter-measures

 

on the enemy himself. Counter-measures developed by the enemy to reduce the effectiveness of

 

DAS also have a degrading impact on the enemy's combat effectiveness. A counter-measures

 

effort usually requires a tremendous amount of manpower, equipment, supplies, and time to be

 

effective. As the Germans observed during STRANGLE, the diversion of such a large amount of

 

resources and man-days may be a significant drain on the enemy's combat potential.95

 

Enemy counter-measures also tend to slow or delay the movement of enemy forces.

 

Historically, one of the first enemy responses to effective DAS is to move at night which, even if

 

uninterdicted, substantially slows his movement. To paraphrase General Von Senger, whose

 

XIV Panzer Corps was the subject of Allied DAS during STRANGLE/DIADEM, being forced to

 

move at night is like being a chess player who is allowed one move per every three of his

 

opponent.96

 

The second unanticipated result of DAS is a general disruption in the enemy's ability to

 

command and control his forces.97 C3  systems will usually be specifically targeted as an element

 

of force attrition targeting but even if they are not, an effective force attrition, supply interdiction,

 

and/or counter-mobility effort will create major command and control problems for even the

 

most flexible commands. The destruction of a large percentage of troops and equipment

 

combined with severe limitations on the enemy's maneuver will disrupt his plans and create

 

general confusion and disorganization in the enemy's close and rear areas.98 The resulting

 

disruption of the enemy's ability to command and control his forces will amplify the effects of

 

the DAS effort and further weaken the enemy.

 

CHAPTER FOUR

 

CONCLUSION

 

Historically, the shaping effects of operational DAS were difficult to predict during the

 

planning stage and just as difficult to evaluate during execution. Air power planners in the past

 

tended to be too optimistic about the effects of DAS. Many believed that the enemy would suffer

 

an operational defeat via DAS alone. During the execution of a DAS effort, the difficulty in

 

determining accurate damage assessment combined with the challenge to the intelligence

 

community of determining the actual effects of DAS made it tough to accurately evaluate DAS's

 

impact on the enemy. Even during Desert Storm, with state of the art technology and

 

overwhelming air power available, Coalition military leadership was unsure of the actual effect

 

DAS was having on Iraqi forces in theater as evidenced by the controversy over the fifty percent

 

attrition goal established by CENTCOM. The shear weight and apparent accuracy of the

 

Coalition effort certainly was degrading Iraqi combat power, but to what extent was purely a

 

matter of conjecture.

 

The uncertainty regarding the effects of DAS will continue in future conflicts. Therefore, it is

 

vital that the MEF commander have a clear understanding of the role DAS plays in the shaping

 

effort. He cannot afford to be overoptimistic by believing DAS, alone, will defeat his opponent.

 

Neither can he be too pessimistic and easily discouraged because he does not see immediate

 

results from his DAS effort. Historically, it has been difficult to determine the effect DAS is

 

having while the battle rages. Only after the fighting has ceased and the battle analysis

 

completed did the true value of DAS in successfully shaping the enemy become clear.

 

The key conclusion to be drawn from this paper is that the three primary shaping effects of

 

DAS -- the reduction of the enemy's combat power, the limiting of his movement and maneuver,

 

and the disruption of his ability to command and control -- will not become apparent until the

 

MEF engages in offensive maneuver and/or in close combat. Never in the past has air power

 

alone eliminated the need for the GCE to engage in close battle to achieve decisive victory. Only

 

when the GCE maneuvers offensively and/or engages in close battle will the MEF see how DAS

 

has successfully shaped his enemy.

 

The shaping effects of operational DAS play a key role in Marine Corps maneuver warfare

 

doctrine. An enemy ground force whose movement on the battlefield is limited and whose

 

ability to command and control its forces is severely disrupted is incapable of the rapid reaction

 

and maneuver required to effectively counter the MEF's maneuver. Such an enemy force is

 

easily out-maneuvered by the MEF and quickly finds itself in an untenable position. Finally,

 

when close battle is joined, the physically, materially, and psychologically weakened enemy will

 

be unable to sustain an effective defense against the MEF's overwhelming combat power.

 

Operational DAS is the most potent tool the MEF has available to shape its enemy in the deep

 

battle. Air power advocates have traditionally been overoptimistic regarding DAS's ability to

 

decisively defeat an enemy. However, operational DAS has historically played the major role in

 

preparing the enemy for defeat in the close battle. In past conflicts, the U.S. and its allies have

 

had the luxury of air superiority and the ability to mount a massive DAS effort. In each major

 

conventional conflict, DAS has seriously degraded enemy combat power before it could be

 

brought to bear against friendly forces on the battlefield. Even in the two conflicts that many

 

consider to be examples of the failure of air power, Korea and Vietnam, DAS frequently forced

 

the enemy to pay a heavy physical, financial, and psychological toll. In both Korea and Vietnam,

 

DAS did shape the enemy for defeat. But, the absence of aggressive Allied ground offensive

 

operations in Korea after 1951 and throughout the Vietnam conflict resulted in missed

 

opportunities to exploit an enemy weakened by operational DAS.

 

The MEF must realize that the main limitation of DAS is that it, alone, will not cause the

 

operational defeat of an enemy. However, operational DAS is the MEF's most effective shaping

 

tool -- a tool whose purpose is to create a weak and paralyzed enemy that can be decisively

 

defeated in close battle by the GCE in the most expeditious and efficient manner possible.

 

 

 

1          B.H. Liddell Hart, ed., (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), 476-477.

2          Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-42, Deep Air Support (Washington DC: Dept. of

the Navy, March l993), E-4.

3          Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-1 , Organization and Function of Marine Aviation

(Washington DC: Dept. of the Navy, March l993), 2-3.

4          FMFM 5-42, E-3.

5          Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Vol. II, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the U.S. Air Force

(Washington DC: Dept. of the Air Force, March 1992), 105.

6          AFM 1-1, 105.

7            F.M.Sallagar, Operation Strangle,(Italy, Spring 1944): A Case Study of Tactical Air

Interdiction, A Rand Report, no. R-851-PR (Santa Monica, Ca: The Rand Corporation,1972),

13-15.

8            Sallagar, 18.

9            Sallagar, 26, 27.

10            Sallagar, 37-39.

11            Sallagar, 27-3l.

I2            Sallagar, 33-43.

l3             Sallagar, 62-69.

l4          John A. Warden Ill, The Air Campaign (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University

Press, 1988), 89.

15            Sallagar, 4S.

16            Sallagar, 39-S8.

17            Sallagar, 72-74.

18         Price T. Bingham, "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the Operational Art."

Parameters (March, 1989), 19,20.

19            Sallagar, 69, 70.

20         Gordon A. Harrison, Attack (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of

Military History, 1993), 218.

21         Wesley F. Craven and James L Cates, Army Air Force in WWII. Vol. Ill, Europe:

Argument to V-E Day, January 1944-May 1945  (Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press,

1951), 73.

22    Craven and Cates, 74.

23         Craven and Cates, 153-154.

24    Craven and Cates, 158-159.

25    Craven and Cates, 160.

26         Bingham, 21.

27         Craven and Cates, 167-17O.

28         Edmund Dews and Felix Kozaczka, Air Interdiction: Lessons from Past Campaigns, A

Rand Note, no. N-1743-PA&E (Santa Monica, Ca: The Rand Corporation, 1981), 62.

29         Robert Frank Futrell, United States Air Force  in Korea DC: of

Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1983), 85-98.

3O    Dews and Kozaczka, 61.

31         Futrell, 163-175, 207-214.

32         Bingham, 26.

 33            Warden, 85.

34         Dews and Kozaczka, 56.

35         Dews and Kozaczka, 56,57.

36         Earl H. Tilford, What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell AFB,

Al: Air University Press, 1991), 105.

37         Tilford, 233.

38         William W. Momyer, Power in Three Wars D.C.: U.S. Government

Printing Office, l978), 175-190.

39         Tilford, 11l2.

40         Tilford, 174.

41            Momyer, 174.

42         Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power (New York: Free Press, 1989), 129.

43         Tilford, 134.

44            Momyer, 303-310.

45         Tilford, 149.

46         Momyer, 311-318.

47         Tilford, 173-178.

48         Tilford, 181-183.

49         Tilford, 2l 8.

50         Clodfelter, 152.

51         Tilford, 225,226.

52         Tilford,226.

53         Drew Middleton, Air War:Vietnam (New York: Arno Press, 1978), 251.

54         Tilford, 233-235.

55         W. Hayes Parks, "LINEBACKER and the Laws of War." Air University Review

(January-February, l983), 17.

56    Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen,  Gulf War Air Power Survey - Summary Report

(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 8.

57            Department of Defense. Conduct of  the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: GPO,

1992), 118.

58         Keaney and Cohen, 36-38.

Scwarzkopf, H. Norman, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 318.

60         Barry D. Watts and Thomas A. Keaney,  Gulf War Air Power Survey: Effects and

Effectiveness. Vol.II (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 160.

61         Keaney and Cohen, 64, 65.

62         Keaney and Cohen, 102-105.

63         Keaney and Cohen, 21l -22.

64         Department of Defense, 174- 175.

65         Keaney and Cohen, 109,110.

66         Watts and Keaney, 168.

67         Keaney and Cohen, 107,108.

68         Keaney and Cohen,116, 117.

69         Keaney and Cohen, 15.

70         Keaney and Cohen, 112.

71         James A. Winnefield, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, A League of Airmen (Santa

Monica, Ca: RAND, 1994), 1 74.

72         Keaney and Cohen, 116.

73         Watts and Keaney, 161.

74         Keaney and Cohen, 112-115.

75         Keaney and Cohen, 92-97.

76         Watts and Keaney, 199.

77         Keaney and Cohen, 98.

78            Sallagar, vii.

79            Department of Defense, 193.

80         Dews and Kozaczka, 40.

81            Momyer, 190.

82         Tilford, 227.

83         Keaney and Cohen, 107.

84         Dews and Kozaczka, IX.

85         Dews and Kozaczka, 35, 36.

86         Tilford, 173-183.

87         Keaney and Cohen, 95.

88         Keaney and Cohen, 107.

89            Department of Defense, 194.

90         Bernard C. Nalty.  Air Power and the Fight for KheSanh (Washington DC: Office of Air

Force History, l973), 83.

91         Dews and Kozaczka, vii.

92         Dews and Kozaczka, IX.

93         Dews and Kozaczka, 35.

94         Dews and Kozaczka, 5.

95            Sallagar, 60.

96            Warden, 90.

97         Dews and Kozaczka, 4.

98   Sallagar, 58.

 

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Warden, John A. The Air Campaign. Washington, DC: National Defense

            University Press, 1988.

 

Watts, Barry D. and Thomas Keaney. Gulf War Air Power Survey: Effects and

Effectiveness. Volume II. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing

            Office, l993.

 

PERIODICALS

 

Bingham, Price T., "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the

            Opertional Art." Parameters Vol 19, no.1, (March 1989) : 16-30.

 

Hallion, Richard P. "Battlefield Air Support, A Retrospective

            Assessment." Airpower Journal Vol.4,no.1, (Spring 1990) : 8-28.

 

Kirtland, Michael A. "Planning Air Operations: Lessons from

            Operation STRANGLE in the Korean War." Airpower Journal Vol.6, no.2,

            (Summer 1992), 37-46.

 

Kropf, Roger F. "The U.S. Air Force in Korea." Airpower Journal Vol. 4,

no.1 (Spring 1990) 30-45.

 

Pape, Robert A. "Coercisve Air Power in the Vietnam War."

            International Security Vol. 15,no.2 (Fall 1990) , 105-l37.

 

Parks, W. Hayes. "LINEBACKER and the Law of War." Air University

Review, Vol.34, no.2 (January - February 1983) : 2-17.

 

 

RAND NOTES AND PUBLICATIONS

 

Dews, Edmund and Felix Kozaczka. Air Interdiction: Lessons from Past Campaigns.

            N-1743-PA&E. Santa Monica, Ca: The Rand Corp., Sept. 1981.

 

Higgins, J . W. Military Movements and Supply Lines as Comparative Interdiction Targets.

            RM-6308-PR. Santa Monica, Ca: The Rand Corp., July, 1970.

 

Sallager, F.M. Operation "STRANGLE" (Italy, Spring 1944): A Case Study of Tactical

            Air Interdiction. R-851-PR. Santa Monica, Ca: The Rand Corp.,

            Feb. 1972.

 

Winnefield, James A., Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson. A

            League of Airmen. Santa Monica, Ca: The Rand Corp., 1994.

 

UNPBLISHED PAPERS

 

Abernathy, LtCol. John B., USAF, and LtCol. Roger H. Jaquith,

            USAF. Research Report. Air Power Doctrine Study: Air Interdiction. Maxwell

            AFB, Al: Air War College, April l976.

 

Busico, Maj. Roger P., USAF. Battlefield Air Interdiction: Air Power for the Future.

            MMS Thesis. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and

            General Staff College, June 1988.

 

Ganyard, Maj. Stephen T., USMC. The Myth of Strategic Air Power. MMS

            Thesis. Quantico Va: USMC Command and Staff College, May

            1994.

 

Hayes, LtCol. Donald F., USAF. Air Interdiction: A Fresh Look. Research

Report. Maxwell AFB: Air War College, May 1988.

 

Jenkins, Col. Frank R., USAF. Development of Interdiction Doctrine and Strategy

in the U.S. Air Force: Post WWII. Research Report. Maxwell AFB, Al:

            Air War College, April 1977.

 

Mathews, Maj. Edward H., USA. Delay of the Second Echelon; a Realistic Approach.

            Research Report. Newport, RI: Naval War College, April 1987.

 

Smith, Maj. Robert L., USA. Battlefield Air Interdiction and the Deep Attack.

            Research Report. Newport, RI: Naval War College, March 1986.

 

U.S GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

 

Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Vol. Il. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the U.S.

            Air Force. Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, March

            1992.

 

Department of Defense. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War -Final Report to Congress.

            Washington, DC: GPO, 1983.

 

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1. Warfighting. Washington, DC:

            March 1989.

 

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-1. Organization and Functions of Marine

            Aviation. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Navy, March 1993.

 

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-42. Deep Air Support. Washington,

            DC: Dept. of the Navy, March 1993.