The
Influence of Culture on Post Cold War Military Operations: An
Examination
of the Need for Cultural Literacy
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Topical Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:
The Influence of Culture on Post Cold War Military Operations: An
Examination
of the Need for Cultural Literacy
Author:
Major James R.Trahan, United States Marine Corps
Problem:
The American military has an inadequate understanding of the cultural
aspects
of international and inter-cultural military operations. This results in poor
military
efficiency and causes difficulty in resolving conflict with cultural groups
possessing
values alien to American traditions.
Discussion:
With the end of the Cold War, the emergence of a multi-polar,
multi-cultural,
international environment provides new challenges for the American
military
in general and for the United States Marine Corps in specific. The rise of
Operations
Other Than War (OOTW) and coalition warfare requires increased military
contact
with a variety of cultures. The primacy of political and economic
considerations
in
this environment limits the utility of overt force.
Simultaneous to the rise of OOTW and
coalition warfare, information and other
technologies
compress the traditional levels of war. The strategic, operational, and
tactical
levels overlap. The broadcast of the actions of a platoon on patrol in Haiti or
Somalia
can effect national strategy. In this environment, success may depend on
understanding
the values and attitudes that our opponents (and allies) bring to military
operations.
This study seeks to understand
diverse cultures by examining various theories on
the
evolution of human cultures. The study then reviews the role of conflict in
African,
Asian, and Islamic cultures. An analysis of the evolution of American
culture,
with select case studies highlighting lessons derived from inter-cultural
conflict,
facilitates the understanding of our current views. The study then concludes
with
a review of modern developments that require increased efforts to enhance the
understanding
of the cultural aspects of military employment in international conflict.
Recommendations:
1. Increase military cultural
awareness training in all levels of professional
military
education (PME).
2. Increase emphasis on language
training and advanced education in
anthropology,
sociology, political science, and related liberal arts.
3. Develop formal cultural
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
methodologies
for inclusion in staff planning doctrine.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
iv
CHAPTER
1: THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 1
The Premise 2
Subproblems and Hypotheses 2
The Mechanism of Culture 2
Selection and Analysis of Foreign Cultures 3
Analysis of American Culture 3
Modern Trends 3
The Limits of the Study 4
The Need for the Study
4
CHAPTER
2: THE ORIGINS OF CULTURE 5
Culture Defined 5
A Review of Select Theories of
Cultural Origin and Development 7
Cultural Materialism
7
Sociobiology 9
Dialectical Materialism
10
Structuralism 11
Idealism 12
Synthesis 13
CHAPTER
3: CONFLICT IN SELECT CULTURES 15
African Culture
15
Asian Culture
18
Islamic Culture 21
The American Dilemma 26
CHAPTER
4: CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 28
The Development of Western Conflict
Culture 28
The
European Link 28
The
World Wars and the End of an Era 29
Mini-Case
Study: The War with Japan
31
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
The
Cold War Period 33
War on the Periphery 34
Mini-Case
Study: Vietnam 34
The
Post Cold War Era 35
The Return to a Multi-Polar
Multi-Cultural World 36
Mini-Case Study: Somalia 36
Modern
American Cultural Attributes 38
American Values 39
Casualty Tolerance 39
Time and Materialism
40
Information Technology and the Free
Press 41
Political Culture 42
CHAPTER
5: THE NEED FOR CULTURAL LITERACY 43
Modern developments 43
Compression
of the Levels of War 43
The
Rise of OOTW and Coalition Warfare 44
The
Clash of Cultures 44
Efforts
Toward Cultural Literacy 45
Methods of Training 45
Foreign
Area Officer Program 46
CHAPTER
6: CONCLUSIONS 48
Assessment of the Initial Hypotheses
48
The Need for Cultural Literacy 49
Culture for the Commander 50
Notes
53
Bibliography 57
Preface
This study was born out of a desire
to understand the effect of culture on the
outcome
of military operations. I was not positive at the outset that cultural
understanding
was critical to military success but the intercultural experiences of my
career
compelled the intellectual inquiry represented by this paper. In fifteen years
as
an
officer in the United States Marine Corps, I have seen service in five Asian
nations
and
participated in an unexpected war in the Islamic nations of Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait.
Experiences of fellow officers in Africa, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and other
countries
indicate that my perspective is not unique. Additional intercultural
experiences
with numerous foreign military students, at the Infantry Officer Advanced
Course
(Ft. Benning, Georgia) and at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College,
further
increased my suspicion that something was missing in my military education. I
began
to suspect that this missing element was of great importance. This paper is an
effort
to assess the importance of culture to the military. Completely objective
analysis
of
this concept is impossible due to my own uniquely American perspective rooted
in
science
and logic. Nevertheless, the attempt is made in the hope that a spark of
curiosity
will strike the reader and provoke further inquiry.
I
ask that the reader endure the chapter on anthropological theory and use that
information
as intellectual background for the more interesting discussion of specific
cultures
later in the paper. The theoretical concepts introduced are critical to
understanding
the dynamics of the future intercultural experiences a career in the
service
will undoubtedly provide.
CHAPTER l
THE
PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, the
emergence of a multi-polar, multi-cultural
international
environment provides new challenges for America's military forces. The
primacy
of political and economic considerations governs this environment and limits
the
utility of overt force. The rise of Operations Other Than War and of coalition
warfare
requires increased military contact with a variety of cultures very different
from
our own. Not only is contact with radically different groups more frequent but
the
complexity of military missions amidst these cultures is increasing.
The modern era is witnessing an
increase of tribal warfare in Africa,
ethnic/nationalist
strife in the Balkans, and religiously motivated violence in the Middle
East
and beyond. China, a major arms producer and a nuclear power, is booming
economically
and may soon impose her will on regional powers allied to America. In
the
Marine Corps, senior officers speak of the need to understand warrior cultures
and
clan
systems. Domestically, debates rage over the need for cultural diversity as we
struggle
with tensions over race, gender, religion, or sexual preference. What is this
broad
factor called culture? Is it important to military operations? If so, is it
more
important
than it was a few years ago? This study seeks to provide insight to these and
related
questions.
A review of American military
history of the last 50 years reveals possible
problems
in our ability to deal with intercultural conflict. The intellectual journey to
discover
the nature of this problem begins with the following premise.
The Premise
The American military has an
inadequate understanding of the cultural aspects
of
international and inter-cultural conflict. This results in poor military
efficiency and
causes
difficulty in resolving conflict with cultural groups possessing values alien
to
American
traditions.
This study seeks to test this
premise through the exploration of cultural theory,
analysis
of select cultures, and examination of the impact of culture on the American
military
experience. Confirmation of the premise will allow the formulation of
recommendations
for correction of the problem and of recommendations for further
research
as the Marine Corps struggles with the challenges of the Post Cold War Era.
If
the premise proves false, then the study will yield recommendations that avoid
inappropriate
dedication of resources toward cultural education. The development of
the
following subproblems and initial hypotheses provides a methodology for the
inquiry.
Subproblems and Hypotheses
The Mechanism of Culture The first
problem is to define and describe the
term
culture. We will seek to discover the nature of human cultural systems and to
determine
the mechanisms at work in the continuing evolution of human societies. An
initial
review of literature in the fields of anthropology, sociology, and political
science
led
to the hypothesis that human culture follows definable rules. Chapter 2
introduces
prevalent
contemporary theories in an attempt to discover such rules.
Selection and Analysis of Foreign
Cultures. The second subproblem is to
select
and analyze several cultures to demonstrate different attitudes and values that
affect
the place of, and reaction to, conflict and war in these societal groups. To
meet
this
requirement, Chapter 3 explores the hypothesis that African, Asian, and Islamic
cultures
possess unique attitudes toward war that are of significance to the conduct of
American
military operations with or against members of these cultures.
Analysis of American Culture. The
third subproblem is to analyze American
culture
in order to examine and understand factors that affect the conduct of military
operations.
The third hypothesis, therefore, is that such American cultural
characteristics
exist and that historical examples will demonstrate the impact of these
characteristics.
Chapter 4 analyzes the evolution and nature of American culture. This
provides
a background for analysis, via case studies, of the military consequences of
conflict
between the United States and select cultures.
Modern Trends The final subproblem
is to identify and examine modern
developments
and trends that may increase the need for internal and external cultural
understanding.
The final hypothesis is that trends and developments in the aftermath of
the
Bi-Polar Era affect the frequency and methods of American involvement in inter
and
intracultural conflict involving other cultures. To test this hypothesis,
Chapter 5
examines
several such developments and additionally assesses current Marine Corps
efforts
toward cultural literacy.
The Limits of the Study
The study focuses on the broadest
aspects of human culture in an effort to test
the
premise previously presented. The diversity of individual national, ethnic,
linguistic
and other subordinate groups within each broad grouping is acknowledged but
such
detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Analysis of the selected
cultures
in Chapter 3, and of American culture in Chapter 4, is limited to those aspects
that
affect attitudes toward conflict and/or determine the conduct of conflict in
the
respective
cultures.
The Need for the Study
The end of the Cold War changed the
focus of an entire generation. The
Marine
Corps educational focus is in transition as the global commitment of Marine
forces
increases. With the increased utility of Marine forces as a prominent
instrument
of
national policy, we must reassess our military institutions and educational
focus.
This
assessment must occur in a domestic environment that is itself struggling to
refocus
economic, political, and social priorities as the realities of a new
multi-polar
world
emerge. The cultural forces at work in this emerging world are an important
consideration
as we examine our future. This study and others like it are a beginning.
CHAPTER
2
THE
ORIGINS OF CULTURE
Culture Defined
This chapter will develop a working
definition of the term "culture" to provide a
focal
point for further examination. We will then briefly examine the foremost
contemporary
research methodologies and theories of human cultural development.
This
will help us understand how modem cultures form and how they change.1
Webster defines human culture, our
focus, as "the total pattern of human
behavior
and its products embodied in thought, speech, action, and artifacts and
dependent
upon man's capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding
generations
through the use of tools, language and systems of abstract thought."2
Sociologists
see culture as a combination of beliefs, technology, norms, values and
language
shared by a given group or nation.3 Culture is how a group perceives their
environment,
reacts to that environment, and carries out their way of life. It is the lens
through
which the world is seen.
Man is a social animal evolved to
function as part of a social group. Our brains
require
cultural instruction to serve us in the modem world.
As our central nervous system -- and
most particularly its crowning
curse and glory, the neocortex --
grew up in great part in interaction
with culture, it is incapable of
directing our behavior or organizing our
experience without the guidance
provided by systems of significant
symbols.4
Culture
provides such symbols. To use a computer analogy, we can also think of
culture
as a form of programming or software. The human mind requires a set of
instructions
or programming that allows the individual to function within a group.
Individuals
receive this programming through enculturation as they grow to adulthood
in
a given society. The evidence of cultural attributes, values, and requirements
appears
in the history, language, science, myth, religion, and art of a given group,
nation,
or civilization.5 To continue the
computer analogy, this software is critical if
the
individual is to function within his or her society as it struggles for
survival against
nature
and competing groups. Some of the software, or cultural programming, seems
to
be universal. Other cultural characteristics are unique. Scientific examination
of
human
culture falls within the purview of several scholastic fields. We will examine
the
field of sociology briefly and then concentrate on anthropology to examine the
origins
of human culture.
The Harper Collins Dictionary of
Sociology defines sociology as a term
developed
in the 19th century to describe the "scientific and more particularly, the
positivistic
study of society."6
Positivism, in this context,
asserts that the only true
knowledge
is scientific knowledge. Such knowledge must describe and explain the
process
of observable physical and social phenomena. In modem times, however, the
term
sociology refers to the study of the functioning, organization, development and
types
of human societies, without identifying any particular model of science.7
Sociology,
therefore is a very general discipline which overlaps more concentrated
fields
such as political science and anthropology. Since culture is a characteristic
of
human
groups, sociology tends to deal with the results of culture as it affects a
current
society.
In contrast, anthropology attempts to discover the origins and development of
human
society and culture. Both anthropology and sociology remain "soft sciences
as
opposed
to more concrete disciplines such as mathematics and physics. As
"soft"
sciences,
these fields rely on theory more than proven equations or laws.
Anthropology is generally divided
into two fields, physical anthropology and
cultural
anthropology. To examine the significance of culture in military operations,
we
will rely on a discussion of the foremost theories of cultural anthropology.
This
discussion
will illuminate the origins and development of human culture. Several of
these
theories also appear in sociology literature as Sociologic Theory.8
A Review of Select Theories of
Cultural Origin and Development
The following review presents
several competing cultural theories. There is no
significance
to the order or volume of text allotted to each theoretical option.
Cultural Materialism. This
anthropological approach seeks to explain human
culture
as a response to material factors. Cultural materialism proposes that
environmental
or demographic factors determine and explain social practices and
cultural
characteristics. This theory proposes that the technology and practices
employed
for expanding or limiting the production of food, energy, or other
commodities
in a specific habitat will determine the general character of a human
culture.
This "mode of production", when combined with the "mode of
reproduction"
(techniques
used for expanding, limiting, and maintaining population size), is the most
significant
determinant of the cultural characteristics of a given society.9 Thus, as
humans
interact with their environment and attempt to survive and reproduce, we
develop
social and cultural methodologies to aid in the process.
We must understand several
anthropological terms to grasp materialist theory.
Three
terms form a comprehensive mechanism for examining the various aspects of
human
groups. These terms are infrastructure, structure, and superstructure.
The "mode of production"
and "mode of reproduction" addressed earlier are
together
identified as infrastructure, and form the physical basis of society. The
mental
factors
affecting infrastructure include legends and religion. The domestic and
political
economies
that arise as a result of infrastructure are called structure. Domestic
economy
includes family structure; domestic division of labor; socialization, and
education;
and age and sex roles. Political economy includes political organization;
division
of labor in society, taxation, and tribute; political socialization and
education;
class,
caste, urban, and rural hierarchies; discipline, police/military control;
and
The
mental aspects of structure are kinship, political ideology, ethnic and
national
ideology,
religion, and taboos.10
Superstructure comprises art, music,
dance, literature, advertising; rituals;
sports,
games, hobbies; and theoretical science. The mental components of
superstructure
are symbols, myths, aesthetic standards, philosophies, ideologies,
religion,
and taboos.11 Note that religion
influences all three levels. Materialists
believe
that infrastructure determines structure and that this interaction gives rise
to
superstructure.
Cultural materialists propose that this materialism is universal. They
believe
genetic factors within human groups do not affect aggregate culture either now
or
in history. This view is in opposition to that of sociobiologists.
Sociobiology
attempts to explain human social life and
interaction,
including war, by means of the theoretical principles of Charles Darwin.
This
theory proposes that social behavior and cultural development have a biological
basis.
The basic premise of sociobiologists is that social behavior evolves as an
outcome
of reproductive success among individuals.12 Genetically inherited social
tendencies
that enhance reproductive success survive each successive generation.
Sociobiologists
accept that genetics do not exclusively determine behavior. Human
behavior
is a combination of genetic capability interacting with the influence of
behavioral
experiences. In short, humans have genetic tendencies as well as the ability
to
adapt based on life experience and socialization. However, sociobiologists
believe
genetics
also determine the social adaptability of humans.
The existence of altruism in human
societies seems to challenge this set of
theories.
Self-sacrifice and related socio-cultural tendencies reduce individual
reproductive
potential and seem to argue against a Darwinist theory of culture. The
concept
of "inclusive fitness" explains genetically costly social acts in
terms of the
effect
of such action on genetically related social partners.13 For instance, if an
individual
sacrifices him or herself for a family member, the genotype survives,
although
the individual may perish. Thus sociobiology sees natural selection
continuing
between competing groups. Since genetic commonality is frequently
unknown
beyond the immediate family or tribal group, human cultural commonality
tends
to define the limits of altruistic behavior for the members of a given cultural
group.
If a culture evolves based on its
success in preserving the reproductive
capability
of its members, then it is possible that biology, or at least the social
expression
of biological tendencies, has strong influence on human culture. It is also
possible
that societies are now evolving collectively. This is the viewpoint of
Dialectical
materialists.
Dialectical Materialism. Dialectical
materialism is similar to cultural
materialism
in that both theories see the materialist concept of infrastructure as the
predominant
determinant of social life and culture. The theories of Karl Marx
represent
the foremost expression of dialectic materialism.14 The word dialectic refers
to
the concept of "contradiction" inherent in human social systems.
Dialectical
Materialism
assumes that "contradictions" or pressures within cultural systems
will lead
to
the negation of that cultural system. This results in the repeated breakdown
and
renewal
of society until technology or political sophistication overcomes the
contradictory
pressures.
Marx advocated a dialectical concept
of history based on class struggle within
historical
social systems. Marx saw a fundamental contradiction in capitalism as
follows.
Capitalists must exploit laborers. To compete with other capitalists, this
exploitation
intensifies, impoverishing the laborer. This process effectively destroys
profitable
markets, and results in concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands.
Thus
the capitalist class becomes the negation of the worker class and forms a
dialectic.
Eventually
the worker class revolts. This revolution destroys the capitalist class and in
effect
the worker class negates its own negation demonstrating the dialectic effect.15
The
ideas of class struggle and concentration of wealth, as methods of production
evolve,
are the underpinnings of this materialist approach. Marx saw historical epochs,
such
as the end of feudalism and the rejection of nobility, as evidence of
dialectical
forces
reacting to changes in the mode of production. Technological advances change
man
s relationship with his material environment. As society reacts to such
advances,
dialectic
materialists believe the resultant social system will react to new internal
contradictions
forming a new dialectic. This process gives rise to historical progress,
since
the new opposites are unique and not exact repetitions of previous dialectics.
Marx
believed this process would eventually lead to an end of history in a socialist
utopia.
Dialectical materialism has become
primarily a political tool used to support
world
communist ideology. Communism, as an economic, political, and social
mechanism,
contributed to the culture of many modern nations and continues to
determine
much of Chinese culture. For this and other reasons, the dialectic concept of
class
struggle is important in understanding modern culture.
Structuralism.
French structuralism is a body of thought developed by Claude
Levi-Strauss
that concentrates on the common mental qualities of humans as key
determinants
of sociocultural systems. Structuralists propose that the human mind uses
"structures"
that allow it to comprehend human reality. These structures, in elementary
form,
are present in all human minds. Each culture fills these structures with its
own
ideas
and perceptions. Structuralists believe human society forms a collective
consciousness.
They define this consciousness in terms of a neurologically based
unconscious
mental dialectic (this is not related to dialectic materialism). This dialectic
sets
the limits of human thought. All human thought, therefore, demonstrates similar
structures
of meaning based on pairs of opposed ideas or "structures". These
pairs are
sets
of basic ideas that oppose each other; me/other, life/death, light/dark,
raw/cooked.
Such
pairs are the same in any human society and result from the physical capability
of
the
human brain. Structuralists define these basic dialectics and then attempt to
analyze
human
cultures with these defined oppositions. Structuralists believe these pairs
determine
the most basic human practices. Levi-Strauss applies these concepts to
kinship
theories and various cultural practices. He sees evidence of such structures in
the
most basic human practices.16 Although
these theories offer a loose context for
examination
of cultural superstructure, structuralism seems to be almost anti-scientific.
No
objective treatment of structuralist theory seems possible. The possibility
that basic
conceptual
structures, that limit human thought patterns, are common to all humans is
worthy
of consideration in contemplating the military significance of culture.
Idealism. Idealism is a broad term we will use to describe the various
anthropological
strategies that view superstructure as the determinant of human culture.
Various
strategies using the works of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung seek to define
human
activity, social interaction, and culture in terms of mental and psychological
traits.
Jung sees universal "archetypes" or psychological constants as common
to all
cultures.17
As an example, the archetype of the
warrior is common in all human
cultures.
The presence of such universal symbols in dreams, myths, and stories argues
for
a common root to all cultures. This form of idealism resembles structuralism
without
the dialectic pairs. The key to idealist strategies is the predominance of the
mental
and psychological characteristics of human groups in determining cultural
attributes.
Although the application of such theories is often very rational (Freudian
psychology),
the underlying tenets depend on irrational and unprovable human
characteristics.
Idealism borders on mysticism at our current level of understanding.
Synthesis
The objective of this chapter was to
develop an understanding of what culture is
and
how culture develops. Human societies are basically groups which together
produce
the food, shelter, and energy necessary to reproduce and continue in existence.
Each
group struggles against nature and interacts with other groups. The cultural
attributes
of these groups determine the nature of this interaction. This interaction is a
function
of the structure (including political economy) of a given nation or group. The
structure
of a national or cultural group determines when and how this group goes to
war.
Whether societal structure is determined
by infrastructure (cultural
materialism/dialectic
materialism), collective genetic characteristics (sociobiology), or
superstructure
(idealism), it is important to understand, as best we can, how culture
evolves.
Human culture largely determines the actions, value systems, and perceptions
of
its members. Culture can, in fact, define reality for its members. Americans
prefer
to
use science and technology in explaining our world. The structures of other
cultures
often
include complex relationships based on tribe, clan, religion, or race. These
factors
are often difficult for Americans to understand. Members of other cultures,
influenced
by infrastructures, structures, and superstructures, sometimes operate in a
reality
far different from our own. We have examined the theoretical origins and
dynamics
of culture. We can now explore specific human groups to further expand our
understanding
of the significance of culture.
CHAPTER 3
THE ROLE OF CONFLICT IN SELECT CULTURES
Overview
The previous chapter introduced
various theories on how human culture
develops.
The concept of structure provided a place for political economy, including
war,
in the continuum of human culture and societal organization. This chapter will
examine
how several major cultural groups approach conflict. There are fundamental
differences
in the way different cultures view and conduct war. If we do not
understand
these differences we risk inappropriate or inefficient action in future
conflict.
The purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with the
characteristics
of
several major cultural groups which we are likely to encounter in modem
military
operations.
If there are African, Islamic, Asian, or American "ways of war", we
can
only
understand such ways through careful analysis of the aspects of culture that
produce
unique approaches to warfare.
African Culture
This
discussion addresses sub-Saharan African culture. The north African
Arab/Islamic
states are more a sub-set of Islamic culture. To understand warfare in
African
culture, we will examine two factors. First, we will examine the place of
conflict
in traditional African societies. Second we will consider the impact of
external
cultures
and social evolution on African development.
Sub-Saharan Africa developed into
nation states due to the influence of external
cultures.
African politics, prior to the creation of the artificial divisions imposed by
colonial
powers, consisted of interactions between variously organized groups such as
tribes,
clans, and villages. Failure to develop a system of writing or other wide-
ranging
forms of communication served to limit inter-group communication and
prevent
the development of the wide ranging political institutions necessary to develop
a
nation state. Kingdoms and empires, when they aroe, were essentially
conglomerates
of independent groups acting together for a period of time. Within these
conglomerates,
individual groups continued to pursue their own interests. This
fractious
political tradition contributed to the development of a unique culture.
Warfare
was, and is, endemic in sub-Saharan Africa and does not elicit the moral
reactions
found in Western culture.18 Violent conflict was a means of obtaining cattle,
slaves,
women, land and other benefits. African societies also seldom developed
peaceful
means of political succession. War became an acceptable method of
determining
who would be chief.
In addition to the these tangible
benefits of military action, the militarization of
society
and the development of young males into tribal warriors formed a cohesive
mechanism
for tribal society. Violence, and preparation for war, provided structural
principles
for the administration of society.19 In this context, war as a part of civic
culture,
was necessary for the good order of society. Military prowess in such a
society
takes on almost magical qualities. Military success, or the perception of
military
capability, becomes a source of power and esteem. The expectation of
attaining
a satisfactory "end-state" did not control the dimensions of war and
victory as
understood
by Western thought. Instead, war became an end in itself, fully melded
into
the cultural and political systems of Africa. As such, attitudes toward death
and
violence
in war are very different from attitudes in the developed West.
The impact of cultures on each other
in historical interaction is also significant.
Using
the terms introduced in Chapter 1, we can explain how culture reacts to
external
influence.
Exposure to new methods of production and new technology alters
infrastructure.
The imposition of foreign economic and political systems changes
structure.
Superstructure adapts, or is directly altered, as a result of the introduction
of
foreign
religions and philosophies. The history of Africa offers many examples of the
effect
of such intercultural influence. The economic exploitation and colonial efforts
of
Arab
and European cultures heavily influenced African attitudes toward conflict.
Arabs
sought trade routes through the Sahara and on the east coast of Africa. The
Europeans
moved inland from western and central coasts. These foreigners brought
technology,
ideology, and a desire for profit. Foreign powers used Africans as
surrogates
in war, providing leadership, arms, and training.20 the colonial
powers
subsided and their empires fractured leaving new African nation-states formed
with
artificially determined borders. These states are undergoing rapid transition
from
traditional
to modem societal ways. The impact of this process is the disintegration of
traditional
social institutions. As new institutions form and their legitimacy remains in
doubt,
opposing factions vie for power and provide fertile ground for foreign
intervention.
Such intervention further delays the formation of legitimate and lasting
institutions
within the African states. The leaders of these new states may attempt to
use
modem political institutions, but the culture of Africa is still rooted in
ethnic and
tribal
traditions. Thus modem African states often exhibit political attitudes
influenced
by
tribal culture. These states possess a cultural propensity for, and acceptance
of,
violence.
They also have access to modem technological means with which to engage
in
traditional tribal conflict.
In summary, African culture still
sees violence as necessary and often desirable.
Warfare
is part of the traditional flow of society. Western ideas of peace might not
only
seem incongruous, but might also threaten the power structure and societal
order
of
such societies. Be careful when you offer peace to warriors.
Asian Culture
This section will discuss the nature
of conflict behavior in Sinic Asia. Sinic
Asia
includes China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Singapore.21 The
military
traditions
of this region predate the Western industrial revolution by thousands of years.
This
provides these societies with great experience in the "interplay of
warfare and
politics."22
In contrast, the United States has a
short history. Our military viewpoints
stem
from Napoleonic warfare, the American Civil War, and the Industrial Revolution.
Americans
tend to view warfare in a technical manner. Sinic attitudes are very
different
as indicated by the works of Sun Tzu and Mao Tse Tung. Sun Tzu portrays
war
as an integration of psychological and military action. This view of warfare
praises
the general who is victorious without bloodshed, but accepts violence in war as
a
necessary tool of the state.23 Mao,
although heavily influenced by Western and
communist
views, emphasized the political and social aspects of conflict.
In Asian culture, war is an
acceptable means of correcting or restoring social
order.
Peace is a "temporary absence of anarchy and turmoil."24 Historically, peace
existed
only due to the often ruthless actions of strong central leadership. Stability
at
the
hands of such rulers contributed to the formation of, patriarchal,
militaristic, and
fundamentally
"anti-democratic" cultures.24
According to Professor Adda Bozeman,
whose work on the role of culture in
politics
and conflict formed the vanguard of such studies in the l960' s and 70's, these
cultures
do not share our Western view of warfare or violence.
Evidence is totally missing that
recourse to armed force evokes feelings of guilt
and self-recrimination among the
intellectual elites of non-Western societies, or
that the high incidence of organized
or unorganized violence induces doubts
about the appropriateness of ruling
moral or political systems.26
The indication is that conflict and
violence, as well as the accompanying loss of
life,
are normal parts of life in Sinic cultures. Both African and Asian cultures
therefore
share an acceptance of violence that is difficult to understand for Americans.
This
acceptance is a result of cultural factors.
Authoritative religions, ideologies,
philosophies, and other regulatory
codes sanction the principle of
"rule by the rod." They also make full
allowance for the paramouncy of
violence in life, ... and the essentialness
of war for the security and
well-being of society. Peace, by contrast, is
at best a metaphhysical reference.27
This viewpoint allows governments to
use violence as a legitimate foreign
policy
or domestic tool. Such applications of force do not provoke the massive
political
upheaval common in the West under similar circumstances. Cultural tolerance
of
war developed over many centuries and remains an enabling factor for the
current
leaders
of China and Vietnam in particular. For the present, Taiwan, Singapore, and
Japan
remain aligned with the West. Successful economic competition and the impact
of
Western culture suppress Sinic cultural tendencies toward violence. Further
examination
of China and Vietnam will facilitate our understanding of Asian cultural
approaches
to warfare.
China has historically been a
regional power preoccupied with interior concerns.
Historically,
Chinese conflict has been internal as indicated by the Warring States
period,
the dynastic periods, Mao's peoples republic, and the Tianamen Square
debacle.28
External conflict often occurs when threats or disputes concerning national
borders
occur. The Chinese entered the Korean conflict when Allied forces threatened
their
border areas. Similarly, China provided troops to North Vietnam in the second
Vietnam
War. In both cases, Chinese involvement seemed to support the desire to
maintain
buffer states and the integrity of their borders. In l979, China invaded
Vietnam
to punish Hanoi for its actions in Cambodia. Although this action was costly,
it
is yet another example of an over "2000 year tradition of using force for
political and
territorial
purposes."29
As military professionals attempting
to grasp the significance of cultural
differences
in contemporary military operations, we must review our track record in
Sinic Asia. We have fought against Asian
cultures in World War II, the Korean
Conflict,
and Vietnam. We defeated Japan in a conflict that approached Clausewitz
theoretical
"absolute war".30 In such high intensity conflict, military mass and
unconstrained
violence subordinate cultural factors. The Korean Conflict remains
unresolved
with an uncertain future, although China's apparent goal of a secure border
with
a friendly buffer state remains a reality. Our war in Vietnam was a loss we
have
not
yet come to terms with.
Our experience in Asia indicates
that Asian ideas of war radically differ from
ours.
The long history of Sinic civilization gives Asian cultures a tendency to view
time
on a long-term scale relative to the West. This ideally prepares these
societies for
protracted
or recurrent conflict, something the West has less and less tolerance for.
Islamic Culture
Chapter 1 of this study introduced
the tripartite concept of infrastructure,
structure,
and superstructure as a means of understanding human societies and culture.
In
modern Islamic cultures, we find societies where religion and religiously
derived law
are
perhaps the greatest influence on all three of these levels.
As one of the great religions of the
world, Islam has a unique characteristic that
accounts
for its pervasive influence in all aspects of society. Islam is the only major
religion
whose principle founder, Mohammed, was both a religious and secular ruler.
The
founders of Christianity and Buddhism were spiritual leaders who began
religions
that
then influenced states and cultures. In the rule of Mohammed, we find the
church
and
state completely unified and indivisible. This lack of separation is in stark
contrast
to
Western Christian culture. In the West, separation between the spiritual and
secular
worlds
is inherent in the Christian tradition, although various secular rulers have
attempted
to command the power of the church. One of the underlying principles of
American
democracy is the importance of the separation of church and state. In Islam,
the
Christian phrase "Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and
to
God
the things that are God's."31, seems incongruous since everything is God's
and the
secular
world is an expression of His will.
Modern Islam includes two major
denominations, Sunni and Shi'a. The major
concepts
discussed in this section are relevant to both denominations. Jihad, or
"striving
in the way of the one God," is the major Islamic idea of war.32 This idea has
broader
and more pervasive implications than the American concept of war.
Historically
this concept helped to consolidate the populace, giving the Islamic state
legitimacy.
It also provides a religious justification for external conquest. This
striving
in the way of God took on two separate aspects. The first concerns the need to
defend
the congregation of believers from sin through study of correct belief and
action
as
dictated by the Sharia (Islamic Law) and the Koran. This aspect serves to
encourage
internal
peace and moral order. The second aspect of the concept of jihad concerns the
tendency
to expand the Islamic way of life through external conflict. The Islamic
viewpoint
sees the world divided into two spheres. The first, dar al-Islam (the abode
of
peace), includes all places where Sharia or Islamic law and social/moral order
exist.
The
second, dar al-harb (the abode of war), was everywhere else. Thus the Islamic
view
of peace consists of a temporary truce between the two spheres. International
relations
for Islamic nations become difficult since the Islamic concept of dar al-Islam
is transnational, and continually in a state of
territorial flux." Jihad is
therefore
the mechanism by which dar al-Islam absorbs dar al-harb by conversion or
violence.33
With primarily Sunni concepts
guiding the spread of Islam in the middle ages,
the
place of warfare became further culturally defined. The leader, or Caliph, was
the
executor
of God's will for his people and it was his prerogative to declare jihad.
Generally,
such a declaration required a definable enemy and conditions where the
conversion
of unbelievers was possible. During the high tide of Islam, Islamic armies
fulfilled
the responsibility of believers to conduct jihad. With the decline of Islam at
the
hands of Christian powers, the principle of external jihad became inactive.34
Where
Islam
bordered dar al-harb, Islamic law came to allow the existence of temporary
cessation
of hostility (peace). This concept is dar al-sulk. This further clouded the
concept
of jihad since it allowed a cessation of the conflict between dar al-islam and
dar
al-harb.35
The development of dar al-sulk
allowed the advent of colonial exploitation by
the
external powers of Western culture. This eventually led to the creation of the
secular
states of the Islamic world. These states by definition are illegitimate from
the
classical
Islamic point of view. in the Sunni
Islamic culture, jihad as an
offensive
strategy is in suspense. Sunni rulers of modern Islamic states struggle to
resolve
the conflict between modem technology, and the institutions of the modem
nation
state, with the historical imperatives of Islam and the Sharia.
It is worth noting that Sunni
religious leaders see war between Islamic nations
or
groups as a kind of social aberration, since Muslims cannot conduct jihad
against
other
Muslims. Such conflict is not jihad, it is simply harb, or ordinary war outside
of
religious
implications. This view, combined with the idea of dar al-sulh, has led to the
possibility
of coalition with non-Islamic powers against Islamic powers. This occurred
in
the Persian Gulf War of l99O-9l. This view also allows the modernization of
Sunni
states,
which results in the modification of religious interpretation. The vast
majority
of
Muslims are Sunni following the orthodox interpretation of the teachings of the
Prophet.
Now that we have examined the broad historical concept of jihad as it evolved
among
the Sunni, we must examine the Shiite viewpoint.
Shiites believe that governance of
Islam passed from Ali, the fourth successor to
Mohammed,
through a line of twelve Imams. Imams are spiritual leaders. The Imams
of
Iran represent mainstream Shi'ism today with minorities in various other Arab
nations.37
Classical Shiites see Sunni Muslims as
unbelievers. Shiites see jihad as their
quest
for justice against all unbelievers. This will one day require Shiites to wage
war
on
all dissenters, including the Sunni. Jihad will be the mechanism by which the
disunited
Muslim world is reintegrated, first by the subjugation of the Sunnis and other
people
of the Book (Christians and Jews), and then by the conquest of all other
non-believers.
The classical Shiite view of jihad
originated in the concept of walaya or
"obedience
to the hidden imam". This hidden imam is "imminent in the world, yet
unseen." traditionally believe this Hidden Imam would
one day reenter the
world
scene, activating jihad, and restarting the progress of Islamic history. This
traditional
belief evolved into the modem Shiite viewpoint that jihad was necessary and
praiseworthy
even in the absence of the hidden Imam. This viewpoint led to the
present
day belief that the conduct of jihad against non-believers is the obligation
and
responsibility
of individual true-believing (Shiite) Muslims. Thus the faithful can
violate
treaties which prevent jihad, target non-Shi'a Muslims, ignore cease fires, and
adopt
all practices and strategies in pursuit of God's will. It is in this context
that
Shiite
clerics are able to motivate and direct true believers to conduct anything from
terrorism
to human wave assaults in fundamentalist ecstasy.39
Liberal Sunni theorists and clergy
portray jihad as a "jihad of the heart" in
which
the battle occurs internally. This facilitates relations with the West and
allows
Islamic
nations access to modernization. Conservatives oppose this view and believe
jihad
is a mechanism of protest against the offenses of the modem state system. These
conservatives
fall into various groups. Two of these groups are significant in our
examination
of Islamic culture. The first group seeks to revitalize traditional Islamic
practices
and return to strict Islamic law under the Sharia. This viewpoint argues for
the
resurgence of fundamentalist government and opposes any outside force that
interferes
with the re-establishment of Islamic society, but it does not necessarily view
outside
nations or groups as illegitimate. They believe the state should advance the
cause
of Islam and are willing to participate as political parties in democratic
systems to
effect
the transition from secularism to new Islamic states. Political parties in
Egypt
(Muslim
Brothers), Tunisia (En-Nahda), and various groups in Algeria represent this
group.40
A more radical viewpoint in modem
Islam advocates a more dangerous concept
of
jihad. This group includes Hizbullah in the Shiite world, and the Takfir wa
Hijra
and
Jihad organizations in the Sunni world. These groups believe in strict
fundamentalism
and withdrawal from non-Islamic society. They do not recognize the
nation-state
and are essentially at war against all institutions and peoples who are not in
accord
with their strict definition of Islam.41
Our examination of Islamic culture
explored the concept of jihad and the
various
ways in which modem Islam perceives this concept. This view of war, as part
of
a continual struggle against evil and an obligation of the faithful, creates
great
difficulties
for the military strategist of the West. Correct understanding and analysis
of
both Islamic enemies and Islamic allies will prove essential to success in
future
military
operations.
The American Dilemma
This chapter examined three major
cultural groups with developed concepts of
war
and violence that differ significantly from that of Western culture. America
has
had
difficulty in military conflicts, and operations other than war, against
members of
these
cultures. These difficulties arose not only due to imperfect analysis of our
opponents,
but also as a result of our own cultural characteristics. American culture
sees
war as a last resort and as a failure of other mechanisms of interstate relations.
Our
tendency to value democracy and the primacy of the individual in society leads
to
situations
where we are hesitant to use military force. When we apply force, we desire
war
to be quick and casualties few. The following chapter will examine how our
views
developed.
CHAPTER
4
AMERICAN
CULTURE AND CONFLICT
The Development of Western Conflict
Culture
The European Link. This chapter will
analyze the rise and development of
American
conflict culture. The history of modem warfare, technology, and economics
is
predominantly a history of European conflict. American attitudes toward
conflict
formed
as a result of our links to European traditions. Europe and her former colonies
dominated
the evolution of warfare in the last 300 years. As a result, much of the
conflict
of the modem era occurred between antagonists of common cultural make-up.42
A
brief examination of the evolution of the cultural attitudes developed during
this
period
will enhance our understanding of modem American culture.
Historically, the geography of
Europe prevented concentration of power and
prevented
conquest by external powers. This geography encouraged the development
of
decentralized power with various political entities forming a patchwork of
states that
resisted
centralized control. Christianity provided a culturally unifying force. Market
relations
developed and competition resulting in interstate conflict followed. European
nations
possessed similar technology, religion, and economic systems. These nations
shared
related cultures but still competed with each other for dominance and wealth.
This
competition of closely located independent states led to rapid advances in
technology
fueled by regional arms races and economic competition.43
A
period of intra-European religious conflict began as a result of the religious
Counter-Reformation
and culminated in the Thirty Year's War.44
Warfare was
unlimited
due to the non-negotiable nature of religious conflict. The ravages of
marauding
armies and the economic devastation of this first half of the l7th century
deeply
affected the place of warfare in European society. Culturally, Europeans began
to
desire limitations to war as a result of the devastation of the Thirty Years
War. This
period
also exhausted European propensity to fight over religion. War had left a
negative
impression on the cultural memory of the people. By l789 this memory faded
and
total war returned with the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon.
The Napoleonic era brought the
terrors of war back to Europe. The total nature
of
war reduced the need to understand cultural differences between Europeans.
Bonds
of
commerce, religion, relatively common technology, and similar forms of
government
(with the exception of the French Republic) reduced the cultural
differences
between the competing states of Europe. Despite Napoleon's defeat,
conflict
continued in a new age of limited war. Revolutions occurred throughout
Europe,
as Feudalism gave way to new forms of government, but no new general
conflict
erupted. A paradigm of restraint evolved in reaction to the devastation of
total
war.
This history of almost constant conflict, combined with economic success and
technological
development, produced a Europe on the forefront of martial capability.
Despite
avoidance of general warfare, militarism became an accepted part of the
European
culture of this time. This led to a return to total war in World War I.
The World Wars and the End of an
Era. In World War I, military science
and
destructive capability transcended the economic ability of Western states to
support
such
conflict. Europe economically exhausted itself and war subsided. Nations
concentrated
on recovering from the effects of World War I, but the causes of conflict
remained
unresolved. War resumed with the outbreak of World War II. Leaders
incited
and united their people by promoting moral causes for war. War efforts in
technology
eventually produced nuclear weapons. Allied victory destroyed traditional
power
centers and left a power vacuum resulting in a global bi-polar conflict held in
check
by the threat of nuclear weapons.
Thus American attitudes toward war
evolved as a result of inter-European
conflict.
Cycles of unlimited war, followed by cycles of limited conflict, recurred.
Each
cycle reduced the willingness of the people to engage in armed conflict due to
fear
of the economic and human devastation technology brought to the battlefield.
The
development
of democratic governments and the necessity of mobilizing whole
populations
required political leaders to use moral and nationalist rhetoric to rally the
people.
With such internal focus, there was less need to study culture as it relates to
human
conflict.
Clausewitz recognized the linkage
between politics, the military, and the
people,
but he did not seem to realize the cultural determinants of those linkages.45
"War
is not the continuation of policy by other means."46 It is a part of human
culture
that
serves different purposes in different cultures.
The differences between Englishman,
American, Frenchman and German, are
slight
when compared to the differences between American culture and Asian or
Islamic
thought. Awareness of the military, and political, utility of culture atrophied
over
the centuries. This atrophy was due to the European preoccupation with fighting
against
similar cultures. When this was not the case, Westerners were more likely to
lose
control of the conflict if not lose the conflict altogether. Our civil war
solidified
the
Jominian concepts of technical war and the United States evolved as an
extension of
Europe
through World War IL. It is in World War II that we have our first major
modem
experience with war against another culture.
Mini-Case Study: The War with Japan.
The war with Japan was a conflict
between
different cultures as well as a conflict between opposing powers. Cultural
attitudes,
combined with economic potential, define a nation's armed forces, its war
making
potential, and its ability to apply force. A nation is also part of a culture
in the
sense
that it shares a consciousness of common tradition. This tradition includes the
sharing
of religious values, art, literature, common customs, ways of life, and symbols
that
impart meaning to those belonging to a specific culture.47 Although Japan was a
member
of the modem community of nations in a diplomatic and technological sense,
Japanese
culture was, and is, significantly different from that of the West.
Between the eighth century BC and
the second century AD, constant internal
conflict
heavily influenced Japanese culture. This period emphasized military traditions
and
frequent warfare. Warlords came to power and eventually established a series of
dictatorships
(shogunates) lasting from the twelfth to the nineteenth centuries. In the
nineteen
and early twentieth centuries, colonization of Taiwan. Korea and Manchuria
were
the beginnings of Japanese aggression which led to World War II.48
The Japanese, with a strong feudal
background, warrior values, and ethnic
homogeneity,
developed a strong sense of racial and ethnic destiny. The military
warrior
tradition and the Samurai code largely dictated their cultural value system.
These
factors led to their attempts at expansion and the formation of a "Greater
East
Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere" and eventually to their defeat in World War II.
The question of cultural differences
in this conflict affected the strategic and
tactical
levels of war. At the strategic level, American leaders responded to Japanese
conquest,
mistreatment of the Chinese, and aggression at Pearl Harbor by demonizing
and
de-humanizing the Japanese. Rhetoric took on a racial quality. The President
vowed
"Japanese will only be spoken in hell" after the war. This occurred
despite the
existence
of a significant Japanese American population.49 Due to strong cultural ties
with
Europe, many Americans saw Germans as a combination of good Germans and
"Nazis"
distinguishing the enemy as a group separate from their parent culture. The
Japanese
enemy and his culture, in contrast, seemed indistinguishable. All things
Japanese
were evil or negative. The ease with which the nation embraced such racism
indicated
a clash between cultures.
Japanese tolerance for casualties
and the cultural tendency to accept death in
battle
further convinced Westerners that Japanese were somehow less than human.
Japanese
concepts of honor led to the poor treatment of prisoners of war (POW), who
they
saw as men without honor. The cultural toleration and use of torture by the
Japanese
further inflamed Western sensitivities. It is likely that many lives were lost
unnecessarily
on both sides. A June l945 report by the U.S. Office of War
Information
(OWI) stated that 84% of Japanese prisoners interviewed expected to be
killed
or tortured if captured. It was OWI's opinion that this perception was typical
and
that fear of the consequences of surrender was a greater factor than Bushido
beliefs
in
the resistance to surrender among the Japanese. The Allies were generally
unwilling
to
take prisoners partially as a result of culturally based perceptions and
prejudice.50
Sociobiologists see the competition
between cultures as a continuation of a
Darwinistic
struggle in which the fittest survive. The degree of intensity in conflict
between
different cultures seems affected by the level of cultural commonality. Thus
Americans,
many of whom had German relatives or contacts, could never perceive all
Germans
as the enemy. The Japanese, on the other hand, presented a racially and
culturally
alien foe against whom it was easier to wage unrestricted warfare.
The modern military leader must
strive to understand the cultural and biological
roots
of racism if we are to control such forces. As demonstrated in the Pacific War,
our
own cultural characteristics are capable of influencing our ability to
efficiently
conduct
military operations. Total, attrition oriented, and unyielding combat led to
victory
in the war against Japan. We can only speculate on the possibility that
cultural
education
might have provided more efficient strategies.
The Cold War Period
The Cold War, that period of
simmering bi-polar tension between the Soviet
Union
and the West led by the United States, lasted from the conclusion of World War
IL
until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in l989. Generally, the opposing
sides
avoided
major confrontation. The preponderance of the major Allies, represented by
the
NATO countries, shared common European traditions and culture. The world
prepared
for total war while diplomats acted aggressively to prevent conflict. The
result
of this bi-polar tension was a 45 year period of relative peace characterized
by
superpower
hegemony and balance of power politics.
It appears that when war is, or
threatens to be, total in nature, cultural
considerations
are less significant. The "total war" threat of nuclear weapons
preoccupied
Western military tradition and provided little incentive for the military
consideration
of culture or cultural science.
War on the Periphery. The exception
to this trend occurred on the periphery
where
surrogate states fought conflicts of low to medium intensity. These conflicts
included
Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. The superpowers supported opposing sides
in
these conflicts. In the Korean conflict, failure to understand Chinese border
sensitivity
led to an effective draw in the as yet undecided conflict. Vietnam and
Afghanistan
held more painful lessons for the superpowers. The lack of success in
such
limited conflicts involving alien cultures provides a compelling argument for
renewed
consideration of the military significance of culture.
Mini-Study: Vietnam. Vietnamese
history is one of constant struggle
against
foreign invaders and occupation forces. Vietnam saw recurrent invasions by
Chinese,
Mongols, and French colonists. In the twentieth century China, Japan,
France,
and the United States militarily occupied the country. Constantly buffeted by
outside
forces, and prone to civil war when such pressure subsided, a unique culture
evolved.
The impact of continual waves of outside forces was the formation of a
culture
that reflects hostility, suspicion, and xenophobia. Guerrilla warfare became a
national
method of war. The Vietnamese also practiced conventional war in the l400's
against
the Chams and Khmers and subsequently against the French and Americans in
l95l,
l954, l972, and l975.51 Add to this history an Asian focus on the group as
more
important than the individual, which de-emphasizes the significance of
individual
casualties,
and you have a formidable foe. The Vietnamese culture is a subset of Simc
Asian
culture. As such, military strategy is not time focused and generally follows
the
characteristics
of Sinic culture outlined in Chapter l.
The United States attempted to
defeat the North Vietnamese by raw power.
Their
culture could absorb such punishment and has proven resistant to foreign
domination
throughout history. The United States was unwilling to unleash total war
due
to fear of global escalation. Western Culture could not sustain indefinite
casualties
in
a peripheral conflict of long duration. The result is now history. The Vietnam
conflict
ended in defeat for the U.S.. There is no evidence that more sophisticated
analysis
of cultural factors would have altered the outcome, but perhaps such analysis
would
have prevented U.S. involvement in the first place.
The tendency to ignore the
significance of cultural characteristics in conflict was
not
only a Western failing. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan provided a lesson
in
the
strengths and pain threshold of Afghani Muslim culture.
The Post Cold War Era
In l989, the Soviet Union collapsed
and the bi-polar balance of power gave way
to
a world with only one superpower. The political and conflict patterns of the
past
entered
a period of rapid evolution. This era has only just begun but the implications
are
significant to our future success.
The Return to a Multi-Polar
Multi-Cultural World. The United States, as
the
only remaining superpower, possesses neither the desire nor the economic and
technical
capability to fill the vacuum created by the Soviet decline. The world is again
multi-polar.
Conflict seems the norm with ethnic/nationalist strife in Bosnia, genocide
in
Rwanda, and violent anarchy in Africa. The sources of power and causes of
conflict
are
diverse.
In the view of Robert Kaplan,
economic scarcity, overpopulation, and disease
are
eroding the social fabric of the planet. He sees a return to tribalism and an
increase
in
violence, crime, and refugees.52 This dynamic may also be evidence of the
return of
inter
and intra-cultural competitions as the last vestiges of the colonial and
bi-polar eras
erode.
The emerging chaos and anarchy provide unique challenges for United States
Military
forces. Failure to understand aspects of culture have already cost us dearly in
post
cold war intervention.
Mini-Case
Study: Somalia. A critical component of Somali culture is the clan
system.
The targeting of General Mohammed Aideed by U.S. Army forces was a
mistake.
Greater cultural intelligence and understanding can prevent such errors in the
future.
The Somali clan system is patrilineal with clan membership based on the male
line.
Clans acquire women from other clans and marry off their daughters to acquire
cattle
or political concessions. There are strict incest taboos against intra-clan
marriage.
The children of a marriage belong to their father's clan but the mother
retains
her original clan affiliation This culture tolerates polygamy and marriage is a
means
of cementing political relationships between various clans and sub-clans. The
highest
political power resides in the headman or clan elder. There are also sub-clans
with
respective heads. There are traditions of clan defense in which it is the duty
of all
members
to protect the whole. An attack against a member of the clan illicits a group
reaction,
particularly when that attack comes from outside the clan. The implications
of
this structure are significant.
When United States Forces intervened
in the Somali civil conflict, they
attempted
to avoid taking sides. As long as U.S. Forces acted in neutral fashion or at
least
took similar action against both sides in the Somali conflict, there was no
communal
reaction against the U.S.. As complications arose in the attempted
disarming
of Somali warriors, the U.S. determined it wise to target Mohammed
Aideed,
a sub-clan leader. To members of the Somali clan system, this was a direct
attack
on Aideed sub-clan, clan, and all
politically allied clans. Somali culture
required
clan members to rally to his defense.53
As a result, Aideed evaded
capture,
violence
accelerated, and the U.S. sought withdrawal.
Another difficulty lies in the
expression of the warrior archetype in Somali
culture.
The following statement attributed to an unknown Somali Warrior captures the
attitude
of this culture.
I will fight the foreigners. If
there are no foreigners, I will fight other
Clans. If there are no other Clans,
I will fight other sub-Clans. If there
are no other sub-Clans, I will fight
my brother.54
American forces attempted to disarm such men
and establish peace. Such efforts were
in
direct opposition to Somali cultural values. Greater cultural intelligence may
not
have
altered the overall course of this intervention but it may have saved lives,
both
Somali
and U.S..
The Somali intervention was the
first Cable News Network (CNN) war. Media
coverage
incited America to action. Americans acted out of a desire to save the
starving
people, particularly children, whose images we saw on television in our living
rooms.
Our cultural value of human life demanded we aid the weak and destroy the
warlords
who starved and oppressed their own people. The U.S. used military power
with
the intent of helping the Somali people. Instead, our methods alienated Somali
males
(warriors) and provoked clan defensive traditions which complicated our mission
and
resulted in American casualties. Well meaning American cultural values got us
into
the conflict. Our failure to understand Somali culture got us out.
Modern American Cultural Attributes
Several American cultural
characteristics affect our ability to conduct military
operations
in the Modem era. These characteristics constitute cultural limitations (and
sometimes
strengths) on our use of force and affect when and how we go to war.
American Values. American culture
has a tendency to assume our cultural
values
are universal values. Among these values are democracy, human rights, peace,
and
the importance of the individual. We regard violence, oppression of the weak,
and
human
suffering as universal evils. Our founding fathers built this nation on the
precept
of freedom and the principle that all men are created equal. Our Christian
tradition
further strengthens our belief that violence and war are negative and
reinforces
the
primacy of the individual in politics and law. This country is a result of a
struggle
against
oppressive government. Since our values created the strongest, most
prosperous
nation in the world, we often assume that other cultures will embrace our
views.
The examples of Vietnam and Somalia demonstrate that these values, however
noble,
are not always common to other cultures and do not constitute reality in many
parts
of the world.
Asian culture, as demonstrated in
Vietnam, may not always respond to the idea
of
democratic government. This concept may even threaten Asian cultural traditions
and
existing power structures. In Somalia, clan loyalties, conflict traditions, and
the
importance
of the warrior archetype were at odds with well meaning efforts to alleviate
human
suffering and establish peace. As a result, many of the Somali people supported
the
warlords in their efforts against U.N. forces. This led to the withdrawal of
the
U.N..
The human suffering of the Somali people will undoubtedly increase as
humanitarian
aid becomes more difficult and clan warfare resumes in accordance with
the
demands of their culture. It is not the purpose of this work to debate the
worth of
our
values verses those of other cultures. It is the intent to distinguish these
values and
understand
how they affect the conduct of military operations.
Casualty Tolerance. American
hesitance to sustain casualties, routed in our
value
of the individual, contributed to failure in Vietnam and Somalia. The fact that
many
North Vietnamese were willing to die for their cause, combined with Asian
cultural
tolerance of casualties in war, gave the enemy a significant advantage in
Vietnam.
Again in Somalia, the death of American soldiers contributed to public
perceptions
of failure and hastened our desire to withdraw without accomplishing our
goals.
Finally, the ability of Islamic culture to produce suicide bombers capable of
killing
hundreds of "infidel" peacekeepers led to an American failure in
Lebanon. Not
since
World War IL has our culture been willing to sustain high casualties. However,
when
the cause is just and the stakes high, we demonstrate remarkable resilience. In
lesser
undertakings, our cultural tolerance of casualties is low.
Time and Materialism. The American
preoccupation with time reached its
current
state as a result of the Industrial Revolution. We live in a reality measured
in
lock
step seconds, minutes, hours, and days. Scientific division of labor with
mutually
supporting
industry, transportation, services and recreation linked to a defined work
week
characterize our society. This compels us to organize our lives and perception
of
reality
in measured increments. The business phrase "time is money" provides insight
into
the linkage with materialism. Money is our ultimate gauge of material value.
Therefore
if we expend material effort (money), we expect progress and we expect
such
progress in a predictable and discernible period of time. The Post Cold War
world
will require military efforts of long duration and progress may not be easy to
measure.
The expenditure of American treasure and lives in Vietnam without tangible
result
encouraged a feeling of endless conflict with no apparent progress. The U.S.
concept
of progress requires measurable success. The lack of a scale with which to
measure
this success led to "body counts" in an effort to provide discernible
progress
reports.
Similar dynamics concerning an inability to discern a return on our investment
occurred
in Somalia and influenced our withdrawal from Lebanon.
The more primitive societies of the
third world do not share our materialism and
often
view time experientially vice scientifically. Experiential time sees the
present and
immediate
future as a "now" period, the theoretical future as nonexistent, and
the past
as
a mythic conglomerate. This conglomerate serves as a context and foundation for
the
present but does not directly affect the "now". Thus "a farmer
sowing seed in his
field
can think of their growth and harvest because these developments are inherent
in
the
present. More long-term or abstract future events, however, are thought of as
ones
which
will occur in the present or past of the community experiencing
them...".55
Detailed
explanation of this concept is outside the scope of this work, but it is
important
to note that cultures which view time in this way do not relate to a linear
concept
of time and instead experience time on a more individual basis. They do not
view
the future as a necessary concept in the conduct of the present. Such is the
case
in
much of Africa and Asia. To American cultural adherents, it often appears such
cultures
have great endurance and patience.56
Information Technology and the Free
Press. The capability of the modern
media
allows the instantaneous communication of events to the developed world.
Images
of desperate jungle combat, the devastation of the Beirut barracks, starving
Somali
children, or the dead body of an American soldier in Mogadishu, quickly arrive
in
American living rooms. These images provide real time information to the
American
people. The resulting perceptions, formed through the filter of cultural
values,
influence the willingness of the American people to support military
involvement
and affect world interpretation of our national will. In our democracy,
political
leaders react to the perceptions of the voting public. The media influenced
public
perception of the Vietnam conflict and thus created political turmoil which in
turn
affected the military conduct of the war. The same dynamic contributed to the
decisions
to intervene in, and later to withdraw from, Somalia. The power of this flow
of
information in a democracy can determine national action and directly affect
the
conduct
of military operations. This flow of information can be a galvanizing influence
consolidating
American will, but it can also lead to false interpretations and debilitate
our
ability to conduct operations. It is in this later sense that information flow
can
provide
a weapon to our adversaries and constitute a critical obstacle to success.
Political Culture. The final
cultural characteristic we will discuss concerns
American
political culture. Any human or economic loss in a military operation
provides
an opportunity for opposition to the actions of the political party in power.
Thus
creative interpretation of military success or failure, often through the
media,
creates
an opportunity for political gain. This is unavoidable in an open, democratic
society.
This situation does, however, increase the importance of political
considerations
relative to military reality and therefore constrains the conduct of
military
operations.
CHAPTER
5
THE NEED FOR CULTURAL LITERACY
Modern developments
Various developments due to
technology, economics, and the evolving use of
military
forces by America increase the importance of cultural literacy. This section
examines
these trends.
Compression of the Levels of War.
Technology, instantaneous global
communication,
and multi-polar modem politics have together compressed the
traditional
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. High tech weapons
including
Precision Guided Munitions and enhanced rocket systems ranging over 100
kilometers
cross the traditional tactical/operational boundary. Limited conflict is the
norm
and military forces are more than ever an extension of national and
international
politics.
The political nature of limited conflict combined with the compression of the
levels
of war due to the effect of information technology require reexamination of
traditional
military theory. If we are to succeed in military exploits in the information
age,
the education of company grade officers and non-commissioned officers must
include
subtleties of politics and international relations that were historically the
province
of generals. The actions of a squad leader on a street corner in Haiti can now
affect
the operational and strategic spheres as the entire world reacts to broadcast
images
and interprets such information through the lens of culture.
The Rise of OOTW and Coalition
Warfare. Economic scarcity and the desire
of
the American people to realize a "peace dividend" precipitated a
massive drawdown
in
military forces and capability. Future efforts will require great efficiency in
the
execution
of military operations. Simultaneous to the drawdown of military forces,
military
roles are expanding in Operations Other Than War. These include
peacekeeping,
disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. Future operations will
require
operations as part of coalition forces made up of various cultures. This
increase
in
exposure to radically different cultures requires a reexamination of cultural
education
in
our military.
The Clash of Cultures. According to
Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington,
the
next pattern of conflict will predominantly occur "... between
civilizations -
whether
of differing nations or groups of nations."57 Civilization in this context
are
major
cultural groups which he identifies as Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic,
Hindu,
Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-American and possibly African. Professor Huntington
hypothesizes
that modern conflict has evolved in phases from wars between princes, to
wars
between nations, to wars between ideology. He admits that these phases identify
primarily
Western conflict. For Professor Huntington, the next phase will be war
between
civilizations.58 This premise seems
unlikely. The various cultures of the
world
are scarcely united entities. Many find fault with Prof. Huntington's broad
assumptions
citing fractious nature of major cultures. As many, if not more, historical
and
contemporary conflicts have occurred within major cultural groups as between
such
groups.59
60 Further, conflicts occurring in the
world today are often within major
cultural
groups (Rwanda, Somali clan warfare). Regardless of whether Prof.
Huntington's
predictions or those of his adversaries prevail, recent history indicates
forces
of different cultures are likely to engage in conflict with or against each
other.
These
forces may participate in coalitions with other cultural groups to respond to
intra-cultural
conflict, as in Desert Storm or Somalia. We may see intervention in
ethnic
conflict or tribal war such as in Bosnia or Rwanda. In any case, all
indications
are
that cultural literacy will be an essential tool for the military professional
of the
future.
Efforts Toward Cultural Literacy
The United States has expended
considerable effort in the development of
cultural
literacy over the years. These efforts are evident in the training of Foreign
Area
Officers (described below), and in the inclusion of inter-cultural
communication
material
in concert with instruction for Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Such instruction
appears
in the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff
College
curriculums.
Methods of Training. The two general
methods of training for cultural literacy
are
area training programs and cultural self-awareness programs. The intention of
area
training
programs is to prepare Americans for overseas assignments. Designers of area
study
programs recognize difficulties in training for cultural awareness. These
difficulties
are usually due to the ethnocentric and abstract nature of such training. The
student
learns the values and practices of a society but often cannot relate them to
specific
behaviors of host nationals.61 The experiences of Military Advisors further
indicate
the inadequacy of this approach to training alone.62
An alternative is Cultural
Self-Awareness Training. This method seeks to teach
an
individual the impact of his or her own culture on values, behavior, and
cognitive
processes.
This method can also fail as individuals sometimes master the theoretical
components
of their culture but cannot recognize the effect of these factors on one's
cognition
and behavior.63
Foreign Area Officer Program. The
Marine Corps Foreign Area Officer
Program
trains "selected officers in the languages, military forces, culture,
history,
sociology,
economics, politics, and geography of selected areas of the world.64 This
program
also seeks to identify officers who already possess such knowledge due to
outside
education or heritage. Once trained and identified, the program seeks to assign
these
foreign area experts to high-level staffs in operations, planning, or
intelligence
billets,
or duty with the Defense Attaché System. This program, if expanded, could
function
as the core of a revitalized cultural literacy program. As currently executed,
there
are three drawbacks to the program. First, the program does not require an
academic
background in related liberal arts (sociology, anthropology, etc.) to enhance
the
language and area study provided by the program. Second, the program narrowly
focuses
on limited geographical regions. Conflict in the next decade is not likely to
limit
itself to those areas. Third, the program trains only a few officers per year
and
their
training is normally in place of other Professional Military Education. This
means
that there are too few FAG graduates and they do not normally attend school
with
their peers. The FAG expertise is lost to the greater officer community. In
spite
of
the limitations noted, this program provides great promise.
CHAPTER
6
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Assessment of the Initial Hypotheses
The first hypothesis asserted that
culture follows discernible rules. This idea
proved
only partially correct. Modern anthropology provides competing theories that
describe
human culture but cannot always fully predict human behavior. The study was
able
to provide a definition of culture but could not completely capture a set of
finite
rules
for use by military professionals. The first subproblem, therefore, is only
partially
solved.
The second hypothesis, that African,
Asian, and Islamic cultures possess unique
attitudes
toward war that are of significance to the conduct of American military
operations,
proved true. The analysis of these cultures in Chapter 3 and the case
studies
of Chapter 4 support this conclusion.
The third hypothesis, that American
cultural characteristics exist and that
historical
examples demonstrate the impact of these characteristics in conflict with other
cultures,
proved true. The analysis of American culture and the case studies of Chapter
4
support this conclusion.
The
final hypothesis, that technological, political, and economic developments
in
the aftermath of the Bi-Polar Era indicate an increased American involvement in
inter
and intracultural conflict, is proven. The examination of trends in Chapter 5
supports
this conclusion.
The Need for Cultural Literacy
The governmental, and intellectual
elites of the United States have not met the
challenge
of understanding the multifaceted nature of modem warfare, and how it
varies
by region and by culture on the political or military level.65 This is evident in
our
experiences in Vietnam and Somalia. Further, the Marine Corps educational
system
tends to relegate cultural education to the field of Low Intensity Conflict.
The
findings
of this study indicate that understanding culture is of critical importance to
the
success
and efficiency of military operations. This is not a new development. Culture
has
always been important.
The Marine Corps has a long history
of involvement in small wars against alien
cultures.
The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of l94O contains meaningful insight
in
the chapter on Psychology where it states:
A knowledge of the character of the
people and a command of their
language are great assets. Political
methods and motives which govern
the actions of foreign people and
their political parties, incomprehensible
at best to the average North
American, are practically beyond the
understanding of persons who do not
speak their language. If not
already familiar with the language,
all officers upon assignment to
expeditionary duty should study and
acquire a working knowledge of
it.66
The Marine Corps was not the first
line of national defense during the Cold War
period.
Our educational focus concentrated on the possibility of war against the Soviet
Union.
Now, the Marine Corps is the force of choice. This era indicates a return to
the
small wars of the past. Every Marine Officer, in the space of a twenty year
career
will
see service with or against members of other cultures. This service may include
combat,
assignment to staff or embassy positions abroad, or U.N. duty. Current
cultural
education efforts are inadequate. An increase in strategic cultural training in
all
levels of professional military education (PME) would provide a broader basis
of
education
to meet the challenges of future military operations. The Marine Corps must
also
increase the availability of, and emphasis on, language training and advanced
education
in anthropology, sociology, political science, and related liberal arts. It is
no
longer
enough to have a limited number of narrowly focused foreign area officers. We
must
encourage and reward off duty education in the cultural sciences and language.
The
recruitment and retention of Marines who possess such skills should also
increase.
Culture for the Commander
Culture is important to current and
future commanders. At all levels, proper
understanding
and analysis will mean less loss of life and less wasteful expenditure of
American
resources. Such understanding will facilitate mission success. The selection
of
military objectives, the conduct of troops on liberty, the treatment and
control of
non-combatants,
the role of the sexes, and the intricacy of command relationships
differs
from one culture to the next. Commanders must understand the cultural
reactions
that result from these and other activities. We must avoid arousing
unnecessary
animosities. We must also use our enemies' cultural vulnerabilities against
him,
creating offense when offense is intended. Defeat is often a psychological
condition
and psychology is rooted in culture.
Thus this study offers two major
lessons. The first is that commanders must
tailor
the conduct of military operations to the culture of the players involved,
whether
allies
or enemies. With an understanding of the mechanisms of culture, we can analyze
the
specific actions and attributes of others in a new light and discover pitfalls
and
opportunities
that are not immediately apparent to those who view the world only
through
the lens of the American cultural perspective. For example, if we assign
American
military women to work alongside men at bases in Saudi Arabia, we must
understand
the effect this action will have on the host culture. The offense such
assignment
can cause to conservative Muslims, and the problems it may cause to the
Saudi
government, should not be a surprise and cannot be trivialized.
We do not know with surety what
cultures commanders will face in the near
future.
Therefore, our education should not only target specific cultures but must be
broad
in nature to arm the commander with a rich appreciation for culture in general.
We
must develop formal cultural Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
methodologies
for inclusion in staff planning doctrine. This could follow the steps of
current
IPB methodology with modification to consider the cultural "terrain" and
cultural
"threat templating". This methodology would allow us to identify
culturally
related
centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities of future enemies and allies.
Until
such a formal methodology is available,
commanders must individually integrate
cultural
considerations in all aspects of operations and planning. We cannot afford the
expense
or the casualties that a lack of cultural understanding, such as in Somalia,
will
surely
provide.
The second lesson concerns the
analysis of our own culture. Such analysis
provides
the commander with a more enlightened assessment of the costs and benefits
of
different courses of action. To not assign women, in the Saudi scenario above,
is an
affront
to our culture, which demands equality of the sexes. This issue, and others
like
it,
will cause cultural reactions whichever choice is made. Future commanders must
not
make such choices in a vacuum.
Analysis of our culture provides
understanding of the strengths and limitations
we
bring to battle. Commanders must deal with political and economic constraints
as
well
as the effects of American social debates (homosexual policy, women in
combat).
67 These factors are part of our culture. Awareness of cultural systems and
the
mechanisms that determine societal values can help us identify and escape our
cultural
paradigms.
This study does not provide specific
answers for future commanders, but
perhaps
it will help them to ask the right questions. I, for one, intend to integrate
this
knowledge
into future decisions to avoid the costs of cultural arrogance and ignorance.
Expansion
of cultural literacy is necessary to increase the effectiveness of the United
States
Marine Corps. Cultural literacy will prove critical to military efficiency if
not to
military
success in the Post Cold War world.
NOTES
1 Trahan, James R., "Cultural
Obstacles to American Success in Low Intensity
Conflict,"
an unpublished work submitted to Dr. Paul Belbutowski as an elective
course
paper at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Although a shorter
paper
of narrower focus, the definition of culture, and the analysis of American
culture
are
the same as is integrated in Chapter 3 and 4. March, l994.
2
Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, unabridged, under the word
"culture."
3 Christopher B. Doob, Sociology: An
Introduction (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and
Winston, l985), 5l.
4 Cliford Geertz, The Interpretation of
Cultures (New York: Basic Books Inc.,
l973),
49.
5 Ernst Cassirir, Essay on Man (New
Haven: Yale University Press, l944), 81.
6 David Jary and Julia Jary, The
HarperCollins Dictionary of Sociology (New
York:
Harper Collins Publishers, l99l), 47l.
7 Jary, 373.
8
Jary, 47O.
9 Marvin Harris, Cultural Materialism:
The Struggle for a Science of Culture
(New
York: Random House, l979), 52-55.
10 Harris, 53-54.
11 Harris, 54-55.
l2 Doob, 103.
13 Jary, 468.
14 Karl Marx, Capital. Trans. Samuel Moore
and Edward Aveling. Ed. Friedrich
Engels
(Chicago: William Benton, l952).
15 Harris, l43-l47.
16
Claude Levi-Strauss, The Raw and
the Cooked. Trans. John and Doreen
Weightman
(New York: Harper & Row, l969).
17 Carl G. Jung, Man and His Symbols, (New
York: Laurel), 97-100.
18 Adda B. Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence
& Statecraft (New York: Brassey's
(US),
Inc., l963), S9.
19 Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence
& Statecraft, 61.
20
Karl P. Magyar, "Culture and
Conflict in Africa's History: The Transition to
the
Modern Era," The International
Dimension of Culture and Conflict, ed. Adda B.
Bozeman,
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, April l99l), 31.
2l Lawrence B. Grinter, "Cultural
and Historical Influences on Conflict Behavior
in
Sinic Asia," in The International Dimension of Culture and Conflict, ed.
Adda B.
Bozeman
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, April l99l), 17.
22 Grinter, 18.
23
Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York:
Oxford University Press, l963).
24 Grinter,
18.
25
Grinter, 18.
26
Adda B. Bozeman, "War and the
Clash of Ideas," Orbis, Spring l976, 65, as
quoted
in Grinter, l 8.
27 Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence
& Statecraft, 9.
28
Grinter, 18.
29 Grinter, 20.
30 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. & tr.
by M. Howard and P. Paret,
(Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, l976), 579-58O.
31 Jesus Christ, as quoted in the Holy Bible,
Matthew 22:21, revised standard
version,
2d ed. (New York: American Bible Society, l971).
32 Lewis B.Ware, "An Islamic Concept of
Conflict in Its Historical Context",in
The
International Dimension of Culture and Conflict, ed. Adda B. Bozeman (Maxwell
Air
Force Base, AL: Air University Press, April 1991), 9.
33 Ware, 10-11.
34 Ware, 10.
35 Ware, ll-l2.
36
Ware, l2.
37 Ware, 9.
38
Ware, l2.
39 Ware, l2.
4O
Ware, l3-l4.
4l
Ware, l3.
42
Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of
Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Summer
l993,
23.
43 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall Of the
Great Powers (New York: Vintage
Books,
l987), l7.
44 Charles Blitzer, The Age of Kings (New
York: Time Inc., l967), 3O-42.
Clausewitz,
89.
46
John Keegan, A History of Warfare
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, l993), 3.
47 Akira Iriye, Power and Culture. The
Japanese-American War; 1941-I 94S
(Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, l98l), vu.
48 Grinter, 2O.
49 John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and
Power in the Pacific War, (New
York:
Pantheon, l986), 33-73.
50 Dower, 37.
51 Grinter, 2O.
52 Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming
Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, February
l994,
44-76.
53 Dr. Brana-Shute, "Cross-Cultural
Communications," Lecture presented at the
Amphibious
Warfare School, Quantico, VA, 3O March l994. Videocassette.
54 Thomas A. Belote, "Overview of
Sub-Saharan Africa," Lecture presented at
the
Marine Corps Command and Staff College as part of the elective course
Intelligence
in Low Intensity Conflict, 27 March l994.
55 The Encyclopedia of Religion, Under the
topic "sacred time," 54O.
56
The Encyclopedia of Religion, Under
the topic "sacred time," 54O.
57 Huntington, "The Clash of
Civilizations?," 22-49.
58 Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?,"
23.
59 Chandra Muzaffar, "The West's
Hidden Agenda," World Press Review,
February
l994, 25-26.
60 Suddeutsche Zeitung, "A Clash
Between Civilizations-or within Them?" In
World
Press Review, February, l994, 24-25.
61
Alfred J.Kraemer, Development of a
Cultural Self-Awareness Approach to
Instruction
in Intercultural Communication, (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources
Research
Organization, l973), 5.
62 George M. Guthrie, U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Bureau of
Standards,
Institute for Applied Technology, "Conflicts of Culture and the Military
Advisor"
(Institute for Defense Analyses. November l966).
63 Kraemer, 5.
64 Marine Corps Order l52O. 11C, Foreign
Area Officer (FAO) Program.
65
Bozeman, Strategic
Intelligence and Statecraft, 74.
66 United States Marine Corps Small Wars
Manual (Washington: U.S.
Government
Printing Office, l94O), 26.
67 Rali M. Dobberstein, "The
Military's Changing Sociological Concerns," in
Challenge
and Response, ed. Dr. Karl P. Magyar (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air
University
Press, August, l994), l35
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