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The Influence of Culture on Post Cold War Military Operations: An

The Influence of Culture on Post Cold War Military Operations: An

Examination of the Need for Cultural Literacy

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues

 

 

                                    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: The Influence of Culture on Post Cold War Military Operations: An

Examination of the Need for Cultural Literacy

 

Author: Major James R.Trahan, United States Marine Corps

 

Problem: The American military has an inadequate understanding of the cultural

aspects of international and inter-cultural military operations. This results in poor

military efficiency and causes difficulty in resolving conflict with cultural groups

possessing values alien to American traditions.

 

Discussion: With the end of the Cold War, the emergence of a multi-polar,

multi-cultural, international environment provides new challenges for the American

military in general and for the United States Marine Corps in specific. The rise of

Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and coalition warfare requires increased military

contact with a variety of cultures. The primacy of political and economic considerations

in this environment limits the utility of overt force.

            Simultaneous to the rise of OOTW and coalition warfare, information and other

technologies compress the traditional levels of war. The strategic, operational, and

tactical levels overlap. The broadcast of the actions of a platoon on patrol in Haiti or

Somalia can effect national strategy. In this environment, success may depend on

understanding the values and attitudes that our opponents (and allies) bring to military

operations.

            This study seeks to understand diverse cultures by examining various theories on

the evolution of human cultures. The study then reviews the role of conflict in

African, Asian, and Islamic cultures. An analysis of the evolution of American

culture, with select case studies highlighting lessons derived from inter-cultural

conflict, facilitates the understanding of our current views. The study then concludes

with a review of modern developments that require increased efforts to enhance the

understanding of the cultural aspects of military employment in international conflict.

 

 

Recommendations:

            1. Increase military cultural awareness training in all levels of professional

military education (PME).

            2. Increase emphasis on language training and advanced education in

anthropology, sociology, political science, and related liberal arts.

            3. Develop formal cultural Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

methodologies for inclusion in staff planning doctrine.

 

 

                                                                        TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

Preface                                                                                                                                   iv

 

CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING                                            1

 

            The Premise                                                                                                                              2

 

            Subproblems and Hypotheses                                                                                         2

 

                                    The Mechanism of Culture                                                                       2

 

                                    Selection and Analysis of Foreign Cultures                                         3

 

                                    Analysis of American Culture                                          3

 

                                    Modern Trends                                                                        3

 

            The Limits of the Study                                                                                      4

 

            The Need for the Study                                                                                4         

 

CHAPTER 2: THE ORIGINS OF CULTURE                                                       5

 

            Culture Defined                                                                                                      5

 

            A Review of Select Theories of Cultural Origin and Development               7

 

                                    Cultural Materialism                                                                      7

 

                                    Sociobiology                                                                                 9

 

                                    Dialectical Materialism                                                                  10

 

                                    Structuralism                                                                           11

 

                                    Idealism                                                                                            12

 

            Synthesis                                                                                                                   13

 

CHAPTER 3: CONFLICT IN SELECT CULTURES                                                        15

 

            African Culture                                                                                         15

 

            Asian Culture                                                                                                   18

 

            Islamic Culture                                                                                                 21

 

            The American Dilemma                                                                                            26

 

CHAPTER 4: CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT                                      28

 

            The Development of Western Conflict Culture                                                         28

 

                        The European Link                                                                             28

 

                        The World Wars and the End of an Era                                              29

 

                        Mini-Case Study: The War with Japan                                               31

 

 

 

                                                TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

The Cold War Period                                                                                                        33

                       

            War on the Periphery                                                                                           34

           

Mini-Case Study: Vietnam                                                                                                     34

 

The Post Cold War Era                                                                                                   35

 

            The Return to a Multi-Polar Multi-Cultural World                                         36

 

            Mini-Case Study: Somalia                                                                                        36

 

Modern American Cultural Attributes                                                                     38

 

            American Values                                                                                                 39

 

            Casualty Tolerance                                                                                              39

 

            Time and Materialism                                                                                                    40

 

            Information Technology and the Free Press                                                        41

 

            Political Culture                                                                                                     42

 

CHAPTER 5: THE NEED FOR CULTURAL LITERACY                                             43

 

            Modern developments                                                                                     43

 

                        Compression of the Levels of War                                                       43

 

                        The Rise of OOTW and Coalition Warfare                                                    44

 

                        The Clash of Cultures                                                                            44

 

Efforts Toward Cultural Literacy                                                                                        45

 

            Methods of Training                                                                                              45

 

Foreign Area Officer Program                                                                                         46

 

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS                                                                                   48

 

            Assessment of the Initial Hypotheses                                                                  48

 

            The Need for Cultural Literacy                                                                                  49

 

            Culture for the Commander                                                                                       50

 

Notes                                                                                                                               53

 

Bibliography                                                                                                                     57

 

 

                                                                        Preface

 

            This study was born out of a desire to understand the effect of culture on the

 

outcome of military operations. I was not positive at the outset that cultural

 

understanding was critical to military success but the intercultural experiences of my

 

career compelled the intellectual inquiry represented by this paper. In fifteen years as

 

an officer in the United States Marine Corps, I have seen service in five Asian nations

 

and participated in an unexpected war in the Islamic nations of Saudi Arabia and

 

Kuwait. Experiences of fellow officers in Africa, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and other

 

countries indicate that my perspective is not unique. Additional intercultural

 

experiences with numerous foreign military students, at the Infantry Officer Advanced

 

Course (Ft. Benning, Georgia) and at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College,

 

further increased my suspicion that something was missing in my military education. I

 

began to suspect that this missing element was of great importance. This paper is an

 

effort to assess the importance of culture to the military. Completely objective analysis

 

of this concept is impossible due to my own uniquely American perspective rooted in

 

science and logic. Nevertheless, the attempt is made in the hope that a spark of

 

curiosity will strike the reader and provoke further inquiry.

 

I ask that the reader endure the chapter on anthropological theory and use that

 

information as intellectual background for the more interesting discussion of specific

 

cultures later in the paper. The theoretical concepts introduced are critical to

 

understanding the dynamics of the future intercultural experiences a career in the

 

service will undoubtedly provide.

 

 

 

 

                                                                     CHAPTER l

 

                                                            THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

 

            Introduction

 

            With the end of the Cold War, the emergence of a multi-polar, multi-cultural

 

international environment provides new challenges for America's military forces. The

 

primacy of political and economic considerations governs this environment and limits

 

the utility of overt force. The rise of Operations Other Than War and of coalition

 

warfare requires increased military contact with a variety of cultures very different

 

from our own. Not only is contact with radically different groups more frequent but

 

the complexity of military missions amidst these cultures is increasing.

 

            The modern era is witnessing an increase of tribal warfare in Africa,

 

ethnic/nationalist strife in the Balkans, and religiously motivated violence in the Middle

 

East and beyond. China, a major arms producer and a nuclear power, is booming

 

economically and may soon impose her will on regional powers allied to America. In

 

the Marine Corps, senior officers speak of the need to understand warrior cultures and

 

clan systems. Domestically, debates rage over the need for cultural diversity as we

 

struggle with tensions over race, gender, religion, or sexual preference. What is this

 

broad factor called culture? Is it important to military operations? If so, is it more

 

important than it was a few years ago? This study seeks to provide insight to these and

 

related questions.

 

            A review of American military history of the last 50 years reveals possible

 

problems in our ability to deal with intercultural conflict. The intellectual journey to

 

discover the nature of this problem begins with the following premise.

 

 

            The Premise

 

            The American military has an inadequate understanding of the cultural aspects

 

of international and inter-cultural conflict. This results in poor military efficiency and

 

causes difficulty in resolving conflict with cultural groups possessing values alien to

 

American traditions.

 

            This study seeks to test this premise through the exploration of cultural theory,

 

analysis of select cultures, and examination of the impact of culture on the American

 

military experience. Confirmation of the premise will allow the formulation of

 

recommendations for correction of the problem and of recommendations for further

 

research as the Marine Corps struggles with the challenges of the Post Cold War Era.

 

If the premise proves false, then the study will yield recommendations that avoid

 

inappropriate dedication of resources toward cultural education. The development of

 

the following subproblems and initial hypotheses provides a methodology for the

 

inquiry.

 

            Subproblems and Hypotheses

 

            The Mechanism of Culture The first problem is to define and describe the

 

term culture. We will seek to discover the nature of human cultural systems and to

 

determine the mechanisms at work in the continuing evolution of human societies. An

 

initial review of literature in the fields of anthropology, sociology, and political science

 

led to the hypothesis that human culture follows definable rules. Chapter 2 introduces

 

prevalent contemporary theories in an attempt to discover such rules.

 

            Selection and Analysis of Foreign Cultures. The second subproblem is to

 

select and analyze several cultures to demonstrate different attitudes and values that

 

affect the place of, and reaction to, conflict and war in these societal groups. To meet

 

this requirement, Chapter 3 explores the hypothesis that African, Asian, and Islamic

 

cultures possess unique attitudes toward war that are of significance to the conduct of

 

American military operations with or against members of these cultures.

 

            Analysis of American Culture. The third subproblem is to analyze American

 

culture in order to examine and understand factors that affect the conduct of military

 

operations. The third hypothesis, therefore, is that such American cultural

 

characteristics exist and that historical examples will demonstrate the impact of these

 

characteristics. Chapter 4 analyzes the evolution and nature of American culture. This

 

provides a background for analysis, via case studies, of the military consequences of

 

conflict between the United States and select cultures.

 

            Modern Trends The final subproblem is to identify and examine modern

 

developments and trends that may increase the need for internal and external cultural

 

understanding. The final hypothesis is that trends and developments in the aftermath of

 

the Bi-Polar Era affect the frequency and methods of American involvement in inter

 

and intracultural conflict involving other cultures. To test this hypothesis, Chapter 5

 

examines several such developments and additionally assesses current Marine Corps

 

efforts toward cultural literacy.

 

 

            The Limits of the Study

 

            The study focuses on the broadest aspects of human culture in an effort to test

 

the premise previously presented. The diversity of individual national, ethnic,

 

linguistic and other subordinate groups within each broad grouping is acknowledged but

 

such detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Analysis of the selected

 

cultures in Chapter 3, and of American culture in Chapter 4, is limited to those aspects

 

that affect attitudes toward conflict and/or determine the conduct of conflict in the

 

respective cultures.

 

 

            The Need for the Study

 

            The end of the Cold War changed the focus of an entire generation. The

 

Marine Corps educational focus is in transition as the global commitment of Marine

 

forces increases. With the increased utility of Marine forces as a prominent instrument

 

of national policy, we must reassess our military institutions and educational focus.

 

This assessment must occur in a domestic environment that is itself struggling to

 

refocus economic, political, and social priorities as the realities of a new multi-polar

 

world emerge. The cultural forces at work in this emerging world are an important

 

consideration as we examine our future. This study and others like it are a beginning.

 

 

 

                                                            CHAPTER 2

 

                                                THE ORIGINS OF CULTURE

 

            Culture Defined

 

            This chapter will develop a working definition of the term "culture" to provide a

 

focal point for further examination. We will then briefly examine the foremost

 

contemporary research methodologies and theories of human cultural development.

 

This will help us understand how modem cultures form and how they change.1

 

            Webster defines human culture, our focus, as "the total pattern of human

 

behavior and its products embodied in thought, speech, action, and artifacts and

 

dependent upon man's capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding

 

generations through the use of tools, language and systems of abstract thought."2

 

Sociologists see culture as a combination of beliefs, technology, norms, values and

 

language shared by a given group or nation.3 Culture is how a group perceives their

 

environment, reacts to that environment, and carries out their way of life. It is the lens

 

through which the world is seen.

 

            Man is a social animal evolved to function as part of a social group. Our brains

 

require cultural instruction to serve us in the modem world.

 

            As our central nervous system -- and most particularly its crowning

            curse and glory, the neocortex -- grew up in great part in interaction

            with culture, it is incapable of directing our behavior or organizing our

            experience without the guidance provided by systems of significant

            symbols.4

 

 

Culture provides such symbols. To use a computer analogy, we can also think of

 

culture as a form of programming or software. The human mind requires a set of

 

instructions or programming that allows the individual to function within a group.

 

Individuals receive this programming through enculturation as they grow to adulthood

 

in a given society. The evidence of cultural attributes, values, and requirements

 

appears in the history, language, science, myth, religion, and art of a given group,

 

nation, or civilization.5  To continue the computer analogy, this software is critical if

 

the individual is to function within his or her society as it struggles for survival against

 

nature and competing groups. Some of the software, or cultural programming, seems

 

to be universal. Other cultural characteristics are unique. Scientific examination of

 

human culture falls within the purview of several scholastic fields. We will examine

 

the field of sociology briefly and then concentrate on anthropology to examine the

 

origins of human culture.

 

            The Harper Collins Dictionary of Sociology defines sociology as a term

 

developed in the 19th century to describe the "scientific and more particularly, the

 

positivistic study of society."6  Positivism,  in this context, asserts that the only true

 

knowledge is scientific knowledge. Such knowledge must describe and explain the

 

process of observable physical and social phenomena. In modem times, however, the

 

term sociology refers to the study of the functioning, organization, development and

 

types of human societies, without identifying any particular model of science.7

 

Sociology, therefore is a very general discipline which overlaps more concentrated

 

fields such as political science and anthropology. Since culture is a characteristic of

 

human groups, sociology tends to deal with the results of culture as it affects a current

 

society. In contrast, anthropology attempts to discover the origins and development of

 

human society and culture. Both anthropology and sociology remain "soft sciences as

 

opposed to more concrete disciplines such as mathematics and physics. As "soft"

 

sciences, these fields rely on theory more than proven equations or laws.

 

            Anthropology is generally divided into two fields, physical anthropology and

 

cultural anthropology. To examine the significance of culture in military operations,

 

we will rely on a discussion of the foremost theories of cultural anthropology. This

 

discussion will illuminate the origins and development of human culture. Several of

 

these theories also appear in sociology literature as Sociologic Theory.8

 

 

            A Review of Select Theories of Cultural Origin and Development

 

            The following review presents several competing cultural theories. There is no

 

significance to the order or volume of text allotted to each theoretical option.

 

            Cultural Materialism. This anthropological approach seeks to explain human

 

culture as a response to material factors. Cultural materialism proposes that

 

environmental or demographic factors determine and explain social practices and

 

cultural characteristics. This theory proposes that the technology and practices

 

employed for expanding or limiting the production of food, energy, or other

 

commodities in a specific habitat will determine the general character of a human

 

culture. This "mode of production", when combined with the "mode of reproduction"

 

(techniques used for expanding, limiting, and maintaining population size), is the most

 

significant determinant of the cultural characteristics of a given society.9  Thus, as

 

humans interact with their environment and attempt to survive and reproduce, we

 

develop social and cultural methodologies to aid in the process.

 

            We must understand several anthropological terms to grasp materialist theory.

 

Three terms form a comprehensive mechanism for examining the various aspects of

 

human groups. These terms are infrastructure, structure, and superstructure.

 

            The "mode of production" and "mode of reproduction" addressed earlier are

 

together identified as infrastructure, and form the physical basis of society. The mental

 

factors affecting infrastructure include legends and religion. The domestic and political

 

economies that arise as a result of infrastructure are called structure. Domestic

 

economy includes family structure; domestic division of labor; socialization, and

 

education; and age and sex roles. Political economy includes political organization;

 

division of labor in society, taxation, and tribute; political socialization and education;

 

class, caste, urban, and rural hierarchies; discipline, police/military control; and 

 

The mental aspects of structure are kinship, political ideology, ethnic and national

 

ideology, religion, and taboos.10 

 

            Superstructure comprises art, music, dance, literature, advertising; rituals;

 

sports, games, hobbies; and theoretical science. The mental components of

 

superstructure are symbols, myths, aesthetic standards, philosophies, ideologies,

 

religion, and taboos.11 Note  that religion influences all three levels. Materialists

 

believe that infrastructure determines structure and that this interaction gives rise to

 

superstructure. Cultural materialists propose that this materialism is universal. They

 

believe genetic factors within human groups do not affect aggregate culture either now

 

or in history. This view is in opposition to that of sociobiologists.

 

             Sociobiology attempts to explain human social life and

 

interaction, including war, by means of the theoretical principles of Charles Darwin.

 

This theory proposes that social behavior and cultural development have a biological

 

basis. The basic premise of sociobiologists is that social behavior evolves as an

 

outcome of reproductive success among individuals.12 Genetically inherited social

 

tendencies that enhance reproductive success survive each successive generation.

 

Sociobiologists accept that genetics do not exclusively determine behavior. Human

 

behavior is a combination of genetic capability interacting with the influence of

 

behavioral experiences. In short, humans have genetic tendencies as well as the ability

 

to adapt based on life experience and socialization. However, sociobiologists believe

 

genetics also determine the social adaptability of humans.

 

            The existence of altruism in human societies seems to challenge this set of

 

theories. Self-sacrifice and related socio-cultural tendencies reduce individual

 

reproductive potential and seem to argue against a Darwinist theory of culture. The

 

concept of "inclusive fitness" explains genetically costly social acts in terms of the

 

effect of such action on genetically related social partners.13 For instance, if an

 

individual sacrifices him or herself for a family member, the genotype survives,

 

although the individual may perish. Thus sociobiology sees natural selection

 

continuing between competing groups. Since genetic commonality is frequently

 

unknown beyond the immediate family or tribal group, human cultural commonality

 

tends to define the limits of altruistic behavior for the members of a given cultural

 

group.

 

            If a culture evolves based on its success in preserving the reproductive

 

capability of its members, then it is possible that biology, or at least the social

 

expression of biological tendencies, has strong influence on human culture. It is also

 

possible that societies are now evolving collectively. This is the viewpoint of

 

Dialectical materialists.

 

            Dialectical Materialism. Dialectical materialism is similar to cultural

 

materialism in that both theories see the materialist concept of infrastructure as the

 

predominant determinant of social life and culture. The theories of Karl Marx

 

represent the foremost expression of dialectic materialism.14 The  word dialectic refers

 

to the concept of "contradiction" inherent in human social systems. Dialectical

 

Materialism assumes that "contradictions" or pressures within cultural systems will lead

 

to the negation of that cultural system. This results in the repeated breakdown and

 

renewal of society until technology or political sophistication overcomes the

 

contradictory pressures.

 

            Marx advocated a dialectical concept of history based on class struggle within

 

historical social systems. Marx saw a fundamental contradiction in capitalism as

 

follows. Capitalists must exploit laborers. To compete with other capitalists, this

 

exploitation intensifies, impoverishing the laborer. This process effectively destroys

 

profitable markets, and results in concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands.

 

Thus the capitalist class becomes the negation of the worker class and forms a dialectic.

 

Eventually the worker class revolts. This revolution destroys the capitalist class and in

 

effect the worker class negates its own negation demonstrating the dialectic effect.15

 

The ideas of class struggle and concentration of wealth, as methods of production

 

evolve, are the underpinnings of this materialist approach. Marx saw historical epochs,

 

such as the end of feudalism and the rejection of nobility, as evidence of dialectical

 

forces reacting to changes in the mode of production. Technological advances change

 

man s relationship with his material environment. As society reacts to such advances,

 

dialectic materialists believe the resultant social system will react to new internal

 

contradictions forming a new dialectic. This process gives rise to historical progress,

 

since the new opposites are unique and not exact repetitions of previous dialectics.

 

Marx believed this process would eventually lead to an end of history in a socialist

 

utopia.

 

            Dialectical materialism has become primarily a political tool used to support

 

world communist ideology. Communism, as an economic, political, and social

 

mechanism, contributed to the culture of many modern nations and continues to

 

determine much of Chinese culture. For this and other reasons, the dialectic concept of

 

class struggle is important in understanding modern culture.

 

             Structuralism. French structuralism is a body of thought developed by Claude

 

Levi-Strauss that concentrates on the common mental qualities of humans as key

 

determinants of sociocultural systems. Structuralists propose that the human mind uses

 

"structures" that allow it to comprehend human reality. These structures, in elementary

 

form, are present in all human minds. Each culture fills these structures with its own

 

ideas and perceptions. Structuralists believe human society forms a collective

 

consciousness. They define this consciousness in terms of a neurologically based

 

unconscious mental dialectic (this is not related to dialectic materialism). This dialectic

 

sets the limits of human thought. All human thought, therefore, demonstrates similar

 

structures of meaning based on pairs of opposed ideas or "structures". These pairs are

 

sets of basic ideas that oppose each other; me/other, life/death, light/dark, raw/cooked.

 

Such pairs are the same in any human society and result from the physical capability of

 

the human brain. Structuralists define these basic dialectics and then attempt to analyze

 

human cultures with these defined oppositions. Structuralists believe these pairs

 

determine the most basic human practices. Levi-Strauss applies these concepts to

 

kinship theories and various cultural practices. He sees evidence of such structures in

 

the most basic human practices.16 Although  these theories offer a loose context for

 

examination of cultural superstructure, structuralism seems to be almost anti-scientific.

 

No objective treatment of structuralist theory seems possible. The possibility that basic

 

conceptual structures, that limit human thought patterns, are common to all humans is

 

worthy of consideration in contemplating the military significance of culture.

 

            Idealism.  Idealism is a broad term we will use to describe the various

 

anthropological strategies that view superstructure as the determinant of human culture.

 

Various strategies using the works of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung seek to define

 

human activity, social interaction, and culture in terms of mental and psychological

 

traits. Jung sees universal "archetypes" or psychological constants as common to all

 

cultures.17 As  an example, the archetype of the warrior is common in all human

 

cultures. The presence of such universal symbols in dreams, myths, and stories argues

 

for a common root to all cultures. This form of idealism resembles structuralism

 

without the dialectic pairs. The key to idealist strategies is the predominance of the

 

mental and psychological characteristics of human groups in determining cultural

 

attributes. Although the application of such theories is often very rational (Freudian

 

psychology), the underlying tenets depend on irrational and unprovable human

 

characteristics. Idealism borders on mysticism at our current level of understanding.

 

 

            Synthesis

 

            The objective of this chapter was to develop an understanding of what culture is

 

and how culture develops. Human societies are basically groups which together

 

produce the food, shelter, and energy necessary to reproduce and continue in existence.

 

Each group struggles against nature and interacts with other groups. The cultural

 

attributes of these groups determine the nature of this interaction. This interaction is a

 

function of the structure (including political economy) of a given nation or group. The

 

structure of a national or cultural group determines when and how this group goes to

 

war.

 

            Whether societal structure is determined by infrastructure (cultural

 

materialism/dialectic materialism), collective genetic characteristics (sociobiology), or

 

superstructure (idealism), it is important to understand, as best we can, how culture

 

evolves. Human culture largely determines the actions, value systems, and perceptions

 

of its members. Culture can, in fact, define reality for its members. Americans prefer

 

to use science and technology in explaining our world. The structures of other cultures

 

often include complex relationships based on tribe, clan, religion, or race. These

 

factors are often difficult for Americans to understand. Members of other cultures,

 

influenced by infrastructures, structures, and superstructures, sometimes operate in a

 

reality far different from our own. We have examined the theoretical origins and

 

dynamics of culture. We can now explore specific human groups to further expand our

 

understanding of the significance of culture.

                                                                                   

                                                                        CHAPTER 3

 

                                    THE ROLE OF CONFLICT IN SELECT CULTURES

 

            Overview

 

            The previous chapter introduced various theories on how human culture

 

develops. The concept of structure provided a place for political economy, including

 

war, in the continuum of human culture and societal organization. This chapter will

 

examine how several major cultural groups approach conflict. There are fundamental

 

differences in the way different cultures view and conduct war. If we do not

 

understand these differences we risk inappropriate or inefficient action in future

 

conflict. The purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with the characteristics

 

of several major cultural groups which we are likely to encounter in modem military

 

operations. If there are African, Islamic, Asian, or American "ways of war", we can

 

only understand such ways through careful analysis of the aspects of culture that

 

produce unique approaches to warfare.

 

            African Culture

 

This discussion addresses sub-Saharan African culture. The north African

 

Arab/Islamic states are more a sub-set of Islamic culture. To understand warfare in

 

African culture, we will examine two factors. First, we will examine the place of

 

conflict in traditional African societies. Second we will consider the impact of external

 

cultures and social evolution on African development.

 

            Sub-Saharan Africa developed into nation states due to the influence of external

 

cultures. African politics, prior to the creation of the artificial divisions imposed by

 

colonial powers, consisted of interactions between variously organized groups such as

 

tribes, clans, and villages. Failure to develop a system of writing or other wide-

 

ranging forms of communication served to limit inter-group communication and

 

prevent the development of the wide ranging political institutions necessary to develop

 

a nation state. Kingdoms and empires, when they aroe, were essentially

 

conglomerates of independent groups acting together for a period of time. Within these

 

conglomerates, individual groups continued to pursue their own interests. This

 

fractious political tradition contributed to the development of a unique culture.

 

Warfare was, and is, endemic in sub-Saharan Africa and does not elicit the moral

 

reactions found in Western culture.18 Violent conflict was a means of obtaining cattle,

 

slaves, women, land and other benefits. African societies also seldom developed

 

peaceful means of political succession. War became an acceptable method of

 

determining who would be chief.

 

            In addition to the these tangible benefits of military action, the militarization of

 

society and the development of young males into tribal warriors formed a cohesive

 

mechanism for tribal society. Violence, and preparation for war, provided structural

 

principles for the administration of society.19 In this context, war as a part of civic

 

culture, was necessary for the good order of society. Military prowess in such a

 

society takes on almost magical qualities. Military success, or the perception of

 

military capability, becomes a source of power and esteem. The expectation of

 

attaining a satisfactory "end-state" did not control the dimensions of war and victory as

 

understood by Western thought. Instead, war became an end in itself, fully melded

 

into the cultural and political systems of Africa. As such, attitudes toward death and

 

violence in war are very different from attitudes in the developed West.

 

            The impact of cultures on each other in historical interaction is also significant.

 

Using the terms introduced in Chapter 1, we can explain how culture reacts to external

 

influence. Exposure to new methods of production and new technology alters

 

infrastructure. The imposition of foreign economic and political systems changes

 

structure. Superstructure adapts, or is directly altered, as a result of the introduction of

 

foreign religions and philosophies. The history of Africa offers many examples of the

 

effect of such intercultural influence. The economic exploitation and colonial efforts of

 

Arab and European cultures heavily influenced African attitudes toward conflict.

 

Arabs sought trade routes through the Sahara and on the east coast of Africa. The

 

Europeans moved inland from western and central coasts. These foreigners brought

 

technology, ideology, and a desire for profit. Foreign powers used Africans as

 

surrogates in war, providing leadership, arms, and training.20  the colonial

 

powers subsided and their empires fractured leaving new African nation-states formed

 

with artificially determined borders. These states are undergoing rapid transition from

 

traditional to modem societal ways. The impact of this process is the disintegration of

 

traditional social institutions. As new institutions form and their legitimacy remains in

 

doubt, opposing factions vie for power and provide fertile ground for foreign

 

intervention. Such intervention further delays the formation of legitimate and lasting

 

institutions within the African states. The leaders of these new states may attempt to

 

use modem political institutions, but the culture of Africa is still rooted in ethnic and

 

tribal traditions. Thus modem African states often exhibit political attitudes influenced

 

by tribal culture. These states possess a cultural propensity for, and acceptance of,

 

violence. They also have access to modem technological means with which to engage

 

in traditional tribal conflict.

 

            In summary, African culture still sees violence as necessary and often desirable.

 

Warfare is part of the traditional flow of society. Western ideas of peace might not

 

only seem incongruous, but might also threaten the power structure and societal order

 

of such societies. Be careful when you offer peace to warriors.

 

 

            Asian Culture

 

            This section will discuss the nature of conflict behavior in Sinic Asia. Sinic

 

Asia includes China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Singapore.21  The  military

 

traditions of this region predate the Western industrial revolution by thousands of years.

 

This provides these societies with great experience in the "interplay of warfare and

 

politics."22 In  contrast, the United States has a short history. Our military viewpoints

 

stem from Napoleonic warfare, the American Civil War, and the Industrial Revolution.

 

Americans tend to view warfare in a technical manner. Sinic attitudes are very

 

different as indicated by the works of Sun Tzu and Mao Tse Tung. Sun Tzu portrays

 

war as an integration of psychological and military action. This view of warfare

 

praises the general who is victorious without bloodshed, but accepts violence in war as

 

a necessary tool of the state.23 Mao,  although heavily influenced by Western and

 

communist views, emphasized the political and social aspects of conflict.

 

            In Asian culture, war is an acceptable means of correcting or restoring social

 

order. Peace is a "temporary absence of anarchy and turmoil."24 Historically,  peace

 

existed only due to the often ruthless actions of strong central leadership. Stability at

 

the hands of such rulers contributed to the formation of, patriarchal, militaristic, and

 

fundamentally "anti-democratic" cultures.24

 

            According to Professor Adda Bozeman, whose work on the role of culture in

 

politics and conflict formed the vanguard of such studies in the l960' s and 70's, these

 

cultures do not share our Western view of warfare or violence.

 

            Evidence is totally missing that recourse to armed force evokes feelings of guilt

            and self-recrimination among the intellectual elites of non-Western societies, or

            that the high incidence of organized or unorganized violence induces doubts

            about the appropriateness of ruling moral or political systems.26

 

            The indication is that conflict and violence, as well as the accompanying loss of

 

life, are normal parts of life in Sinic cultures. Both African and Asian cultures

 

therefore share an acceptance of violence that is difficult to understand for Americans.

 

This acceptance is a result of cultural factors.

 

            Authoritative religions, ideologies, philosophies, and other regulatory

            codes sanction the principle of "rule by the rod." They also make full

            allowance for the paramouncy of violence in life, ... and the essentialness

            of war for the security and well-being of society. Peace, by contrast, is

            at best a metaphhysical reference.27

 

            This viewpoint allows governments to use violence as a legitimate foreign

 

policy or domestic tool. Such applications of force do not provoke the massive

 

political upheaval common in the West under similar circumstances. Cultural tolerance

 

of war developed over many centuries and remains an enabling factor for the current

 

leaders of China and Vietnam in particular. For the present, Taiwan, Singapore, and

 

Japan remain aligned with the West. Successful economic competition and the impact

 

of Western culture suppress Sinic cultural tendencies toward violence. Further

 

examination of China and Vietnam will facilitate our understanding of Asian cultural

 

approaches to warfare.

 

            China has historically been a regional power preoccupied with interior concerns.

 

Historically, Chinese conflict has been internal as indicated by the Warring States

 

period, the dynastic periods, Mao's peoples republic, and the Tianamen Square

 

debacle.28 External conflict often occurs when threats or disputes concerning national

 

borders occur. The Chinese entered the Korean conflict when Allied forces threatened

 

their border areas. Similarly, China provided troops to North Vietnam in the second

 

Vietnam War. In both cases, Chinese involvement seemed to support the desire to

 

maintain buffer states and the integrity of their borders. In l979, China invaded

 

Vietnam to punish Hanoi for its actions in Cambodia. Although this action was costly,

 

it is yet another example of an over "2000 year tradition of using force for political and

 

territorial purposes."29

 

            As military professionals attempting to grasp the significance of cultural

 

differences in contemporary military operations, we must review our track record in

 

 Sinic Asia. We have fought against Asian cultures in World War II, the Korean

 

Conflict, and Vietnam. We defeated Japan in a conflict that approached Clausewitz 

 

theoretical "absolute war".30 In such high intensity conflict, military mass and

 

unconstrained violence subordinate cultural factors. The Korean Conflict remains

 

unresolved with an uncertain future, although China's apparent goal of a secure border

 

with a friendly buffer state remains a reality. Our war in Vietnam was a loss we have

 

not yet come to terms with.

 

            Our experience in Asia indicates that Asian ideas of war radically differ from

 

ours. The long history of Sinic civilization gives Asian cultures a tendency to view

 

time on a long-term scale relative to the West. This ideally prepares these societies for

 

protracted or recurrent conflict, something the West has less and less tolerance for.

 

 

            Islamic Culture

 

            Chapter 1 of this study introduced the tripartite concept of infrastructure,

 

structure, and superstructure as a means of understanding human societies and culture.

 

In modern Islamic cultures, we find societies where religion and religiously derived law

 

are perhaps the greatest influence on all three of these levels.

 

            As one of the great religions of the world, Islam has a unique characteristic that

 

accounts for its pervasive influence in all aspects of society. Islam is the only major

 

religion whose principle founder, Mohammed, was both a religious and secular ruler.

 

The founders of Christianity and Buddhism were spiritual leaders who began religions

 

that then influenced states and cultures. In the rule of Mohammed, we find the church

 

and state completely unified and indivisible. This lack of separation is in stark contrast

 

to Western Christian culture. In the West, separation between the spiritual and secular

 

worlds is inherent in the Christian tradition, although various secular rulers have

 

attempted to command the power of the church. One of the underlying principles of

 

American democracy is the importance of the separation of church and state. In Islam,

 

the Christian phrase "Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to

 

God the things that are God's."31, seems incongruous since everything is God's and the

 

secular world is an expression of His will.

 

            Modern Islam includes two major denominations, Sunni and Shi'a. The major

 

concepts discussed in this section are relevant to both denominations. Jihad, or

 

"striving in the way of the one God," is the major Islamic idea of war.32 This  idea has

 

broader and more pervasive implications than the American concept of war.

 

Historically this concept helped to consolidate the populace, giving the Islamic state

 

legitimacy. It also provides a religious justification for external conquest. This

 

striving in the way of God took on two separate aspects. The first concerns the need to

 

defend the congregation of believers from sin through study of correct belief and action

 

as dictated by the Sharia (Islamic Law) and the Koran. This aspect serves to encourage

 

internal peace and moral order. The second aspect of the concept of jihad concerns the

 

tendency to expand the Islamic way of life through external conflict. The Islamic

 

viewpoint sees the world divided into two spheres. The first, dar al-Islam (the abode

 

of peace), includes all places where Sharia or Islamic law and social/moral order exist.

 

The second, dar al-harb (the abode of war), was everywhere else. Thus the Islamic

 

view of peace consists of a temporary truce between the two spheres. International

 

relations for Islamic nations become difficult since the Islamic concept of dar al-Islam

 

is  transnational, and continually in a state of territorial flux." Jihad is

 

therefore the mechanism by which dar al-Islam absorbs dar al-harb by conversion or

 

violence.33 

 

            With primarily Sunni concepts guiding the spread of Islam in the middle ages,

 

the place of warfare became further culturally defined. The leader, or Caliph, was the

 

executor of God's will for his people and it was his prerogative to declare jihad.

 

Generally, such a declaration required a definable enemy and conditions where the

 

conversion of unbelievers was possible. During the high tide of Islam, Islamic armies

 

fulfilled the responsibility of believers to conduct jihad. With the decline of Islam at

 

the hands of Christian powers, the principle of external jihad became inactive.34 Where 

 

Islam bordered dar al-harb, Islamic law came to allow the existence of temporary

 

cessation of hostility (peace). This concept is dar al-sulk. This further clouded the

 

concept of jihad since it allowed a cessation of the conflict between dar al-islam and

 

dar al-harb.35

 

            The development of dar al-sulk allowed the advent of colonial exploitation by

 

the external powers of Western culture. This eventually led to the creation of the

 

secular states of the Islamic world. These states by definition are illegitimate from the

 

classical Islamic point of view.  in the Sunni Islamic culture, jihad as an

 

offensive strategy is in suspense. Sunni rulers of modern Islamic states struggle to

 

resolve the conflict between modem technology, and the institutions of the modem

 

nation state, with the historical imperatives of Islam and the Sharia.

 

            It is worth noting that Sunni religious leaders see war between Islamic nations

 

or groups as a kind of social aberration, since Muslims cannot conduct jihad against

 

other Muslims. Such conflict is not jihad, it is simply harb, or ordinary war outside of

 

religious implications. This view, combined with the idea of dar al-sulh, has led to the

 

possibility of coalition with non-Islamic powers against Islamic powers. This occurred

 

in the Persian Gulf War of l99O-9l. This view also allows the modernization of Sunni

 

states, which results in the modification of religious interpretation. The vast majority

 

of Muslims are Sunni following the orthodox interpretation of the teachings of the

 

Prophet. Now that we have examined the broad historical concept of jihad as it evolved

 

among the Sunni, we must examine the Shiite viewpoint.

 

            Shiites believe that governance of Islam passed from Ali, the fourth successor to

 

Mohammed, through a line of twelve Imams. Imams are spiritual leaders. The Imams

 

of Iran represent mainstream Shi'ism today with minorities in various other Arab

 

nations.37 Classical  Shiites see Sunni Muslims as unbelievers. Shiites see jihad as their

 

quest for justice against all unbelievers. This will one day require Shiites to wage war

 

on all dissenters, including the Sunni. Jihad will be the mechanism by which the

 

disunited Muslim world is reintegrated, first by the subjugation of the Sunnis and other

 

people of the Book (Christians and Jews), and then by the conquest of all other

 

non-believers.

 

            The classical Shiite view of jihad originated in the concept of walaya or

 

"obedience to the hidden imam". This hidden imam is "imminent in the world, yet

 

unseen."  traditionally believe this Hidden Imam would one day reenter the

 

world scene, activating jihad, and restarting the progress of Islamic history. This

 

traditional belief evolved into the modem Shiite viewpoint that jihad was necessary and

 

praiseworthy even in the absence of the hidden Imam. This viewpoint led to the

 

present day belief that the conduct of jihad against non-believers is the obligation and

 

responsibility of individual true-believing (Shiite) Muslims. Thus the faithful can

 

violate treaties which prevent jihad, target non-Shi'a Muslims, ignore cease fires, and

 

adopt all practices and strategies in pursuit of God's will. It is in this context that

 

Shiite clerics are able to motivate and direct true believers to conduct anything from

 

terrorism to human wave assaults in fundamentalist ecstasy.39

 

            Liberal Sunni theorists and clergy portray jihad as a "jihad of the heart" in

 

which the battle occurs internally. This facilitates relations with the West and allows

 

Islamic nations access to modernization. Conservatives oppose this view and believe

 

jihad is a mechanism of protest against the offenses of the modem state system. These

 

conservatives fall into various groups. Two of these groups are significant in our

 

examination of Islamic culture. The first group seeks to revitalize traditional Islamic

 

practices and return to strict Islamic law under the Sharia. This viewpoint argues for

 

the resurgence of fundamentalist government and opposes any outside force that

 

interferes with the re-establishment of Islamic society, but it does not necessarily view

 

outside nations or groups as illegitimate. They believe the state should advance the

 

cause of Islam and are willing to participate as political parties in democratic systems to

 

effect the transition from secularism to new Islamic states. Political parties in Egypt

 

(Muslim Brothers), Tunisia (En-Nahda), and various groups in Algeria represent this

 

group.40

 

            A more radical viewpoint in modem Islam advocates a more dangerous concept

 

of jihad. This group includes Hizbullah in the Shiite world, and the Takfir wa Hijra

 

and Jihad organizations in the Sunni world. These groups believe in strict

 

fundamentalism and withdrawal from non-Islamic society. They do not recognize the

 

nation-state and are essentially at war against all institutions and peoples who are not in

 

accord with their strict definition of Islam.41

 

            Our examination of Islamic culture explored the concept of jihad and the

 

various ways in which modem Islam perceives this concept. This view of war, as part

 

of a continual struggle against evil and an obligation of the faithful, creates great

 

difficulties for the military strategist of the West. Correct understanding and analysis

 

of both Islamic enemies and Islamic allies will prove essential to success in future

 

military operations.

 

 

            The American Dilemma

 

            This chapter examined three major cultural groups with developed concepts of

 

war and violence that differ significantly from that of Western culture. America has

 

had difficulty in military conflicts, and operations other than war, against members of

 

these cultures. These difficulties arose not only due to imperfect analysis of our

 

opponents, but also as a result of our own cultural characteristics. American culture

 

sees war as a last resort and as a failure of other mechanisms of interstate relations.

 

Our tendency to value democracy and the primacy of the individual in society leads to

 

situations where we are hesitant to use military force. When we apply force, we desire

 

war to be quick and casualties few. The following chapter will examine how our views

 

developed.

 

                                                CHAPTER 4

           

                        AMERICAN CULTURE AND CONFLICT

 

            The Development of Western Conflict Culture

 

            The European Link. This chapter will analyze the rise and development of

 

American conflict culture. The history of modem warfare, technology, and economics

 

is predominantly a history of European conflict. American attitudes toward conflict

 

formed as a result of our links to European traditions. Europe and her former colonies

 

dominated the evolution of warfare in the last 300 years. As a result, much of the

 

conflict of the modem era occurred between antagonists of common cultural make-up.42

 

A brief examination of the evolution of the cultural attitudes developed during this

 

period will enhance our understanding of modem American culture.

 

            Historically, the geography of Europe prevented concentration of power and

 

prevented conquest by external powers. This geography encouraged the development

 

of decentralized power with various political entities forming a patchwork of states that

 

resisted centralized control. Christianity provided a culturally unifying force. Market

 

relations developed and competition resulting in interstate conflict followed. European

 

nations possessed similar technology, religion, and economic systems. These nations

 

shared related cultures but still competed with each other for dominance and wealth.

 

This competition of closely located independent states led to rapid advances in

 

technology fueled by regional arms races and economic competition.43

 

            A period of intra-European religious conflict began as a result of the religious

 

Counter-Reformation and culminated in the Thirty Year's War.44  Warfare was

 

unlimited due to the non-negotiable nature of religious conflict. The ravages of

 

marauding armies and the economic devastation of this first half of the l7th century

 

deeply affected the place of warfare in European society. Culturally, Europeans began

 

to desire limitations to war as a result of the devastation of the Thirty Years War. This

 

period also exhausted European propensity to fight over religion. War had left a

 

negative impression on the cultural memory of the people. By l789 this memory faded

 

and total war returned with the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon.

 

            The Napoleonic era brought the terrors of war back to Europe. The total nature

 

of war reduced the need to understand cultural differences between Europeans. Bonds

 

of commerce, religion, relatively common technology, and similar forms of

 

government (with the exception of the French Republic) reduced the cultural

 

differences between the competing states of Europe. Despite Napoleon's defeat,

 

conflict continued in a new age of limited war. Revolutions occurred throughout

 

Europe, as Feudalism gave way to new forms of government, but no new general

 

conflict erupted. A paradigm of restraint evolved in reaction to the devastation of total

 

war. This history of almost constant conflict, combined with economic success and

 

technological development, produced a Europe on the forefront of martial capability.

 

Despite avoidance of general warfare, militarism became an accepted part of the

 

European culture of this time. This led to a return to total war in World War I.

 

            The World Wars and the End of an Era. In World War I, military science

 

and destructive capability transcended the economic ability of Western states to support

 

such conflict. Europe economically exhausted itself and war subsided. Nations

 

concentrated on recovering from the effects of World War I, but the causes of conflict

 

remained unresolved. War resumed with the outbreak of World War II. Leaders

 

incited and united their people by promoting moral causes for war. War efforts in

 

technology eventually produced nuclear weapons. Allied victory destroyed traditional

 

power centers and left a power vacuum resulting in a global bi-polar conflict held in

 

check by the threat of nuclear weapons.

 

            Thus American attitudes toward war evolved as a result of inter-European

 

conflict. Cycles of unlimited war, followed by cycles of limited conflict, recurred.

 

Each cycle reduced the willingness of the people to engage in armed conflict due to

 

fear of the economic and human devastation technology brought to the battlefield. The

 

development of democratic governments and the necessity of mobilizing whole

 

populations required political leaders to use moral and nationalist rhetoric to rally the

 

people. With such internal focus, there was less need to study culture as it relates to

 

human conflict.

 

            Clausewitz recognized the linkage between politics, the military, and the

 

people, but he did not seem to realize the cultural determinants of those linkages.45

 

"War is not the continuation of policy by other means."46 It is a part of human culture

 

that serves different purposes in different cultures.

 

            The differences between Englishman, American, Frenchman and German, are

 

slight when compared to the differences between American culture and Asian or

 

Islamic thought. Awareness of the military, and political, utility of culture atrophied

 

over the centuries. This atrophy was due to the European preoccupation with fighting

 

against similar cultures. When this was not the case, Westerners were more likely to

 

lose control of the conflict if not lose the conflict altogether. Our civil war solidified

 

the Jominian concepts of technical war and the United States evolved as an extension of

 

Europe through World War IL. It is in World War II that we have our first major

 

modem experience with war against another culture.

 

 

            Mini-Case Study: The War with Japan. The war with Japan was a conflict

 

between different cultures as well as a conflict between opposing powers. Cultural

 

attitudes, combined with economic potential, define a nation's armed forces, its war

 

making potential, and its ability to apply force. A nation is also part of a culture in the

 

sense that it shares a consciousness of common tradition. This tradition includes the

 

sharing of religious values, art, literature, common customs, ways of life, and symbols

 

that impart meaning to those belonging to a specific culture.47 Although  Japan was a

 

member of the modem community of nations in a diplomatic and technological sense,

 

Japanese culture was, and is, significantly different from that of the West.

 

            Between the eighth century BC and the second century AD, constant internal

 

conflict heavily influenced Japanese culture. This period emphasized military traditions

 

and frequent warfare. Warlords came to power and eventually established a series of

 

dictatorships (shogunates) lasting from the twelfth to the nineteenth centuries. In the

 

nineteen and early twentieth centuries, colonization of Taiwan. Korea and Manchuria

 

were the beginnings of Japanese aggression which led to World War II.48

 

            The Japanese, with a strong feudal background, warrior values, and ethnic

 

homogeneity, developed a strong sense of racial and ethnic destiny. The military

 

warrior tradition and the Samurai code largely dictated their cultural value system.

 

These factors led to their attempts at expansion and the formation of a "Greater East

 

Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and eventually to their defeat in World War II.

 

            The question of cultural differences in this conflict affected the strategic and

 

tactical levels of war. At the strategic level, American leaders responded to Japanese

 

conquest, mistreatment of the Chinese, and aggression at Pearl Harbor by demonizing

 

and de-humanizing the Japanese. Rhetoric took on a racial quality. The President

 

vowed "Japanese will only be spoken in hell" after the war. This occurred despite the

 

existence of a significant Japanese American population.49 Due  to strong cultural ties

 

with Europe, many Americans saw Germans as a combination of good Germans and

 

"Nazis" distinguishing the enemy as a group separate from their parent culture. The

 

Japanese enemy and his culture, in contrast, seemed indistinguishable. All things

 

Japanese were evil or negative. The ease with which the nation embraced such racism

 

indicated a clash between cultures.

 

            Japanese tolerance for casualties and the cultural tendency to accept death in

 

battle further convinced Westerners that Japanese were somehow less than human.

 

Japanese concepts of honor led to the poor treatment of prisoners of war (POW), who

 

they saw as men without honor. The cultural toleration and use of torture by the

 

Japanese further inflamed Western sensitivities. It is likely that many lives were lost

 

unnecessarily on both sides. A June l945 report by the U.S. Office of War

 

Information (OWI) stated that 84% of Japanese prisoners interviewed expected to be

 

killed or tortured if captured. It was OWI's opinion that this perception was typical

 

and that fear of the consequences of surrender was a greater factor than Bushido beliefs

 

in the resistance to surrender among the Japanese. The Allies were generally unwilling

 

to take prisoners partially as a result of culturally based perceptions and prejudice.50

 

            Sociobiologists see the competition between cultures as a continuation of a

 

Darwinistic struggle in which the fittest survive. The degree of intensity in conflict

 

between different cultures seems affected by the level of cultural commonality. Thus

 

Americans, many of whom had German relatives or contacts, could never perceive all

 

Germans as the enemy. The Japanese, on the other hand, presented a racially and

 

culturally alien foe against whom it was easier to wage unrestricted warfare.

 

            The modern military leader must strive to understand the cultural and biological

 

roots of racism if we are to control such forces. As demonstrated in the Pacific War,

 

our own cultural characteristics are capable of influencing our ability to efficiently

 

conduct military operations. Total, attrition oriented, and unyielding combat led to

 

victory in the war against Japan. We can only speculate on the possibility that cultural

 

education might have provided more efficient strategies.

 

            The Cold War Period

 

            The Cold War, that period of simmering bi-polar tension between the Soviet

 

Union and the West led by the United States, lasted from the conclusion of World War

 

IL until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in l989. Generally, the opposing sides

 

avoided major confrontation. The preponderance of the major Allies, represented by

 

the NATO countries, shared common European traditions and culture. The world

 

prepared for total war while diplomats acted aggressively to prevent conflict. The

 

result of this bi-polar tension was a 45 year period of relative peace characterized by

 

superpower hegemony and balance of power politics.

 

            It appears that when war is, or threatens to be, total in nature, cultural

 

considerations are less significant. The "total war" threat of nuclear weapons

 

preoccupied Western military tradition and provided little incentive for the military

 

consideration of culture or cultural science.

 

 

            War on the Periphery. The exception to this trend occurred on the periphery

 

where surrogate states fought conflicts of low to medium intensity. These conflicts

 

included Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. The superpowers supported opposing sides

 

in these conflicts. In the Korean conflict, failure to understand Chinese border

 

sensitivity led to an effective draw in the as yet undecided conflict. Vietnam and

 

Afghanistan held more painful lessons for the superpowers. The lack of success in

 

such limited conflicts involving alien cultures provides a compelling argument for

 

renewed consideration of the military significance of culture.

 

 

            Mini-Study: Vietnam. Vietnamese history is one of constant struggle

 

against foreign invaders and occupation forces. Vietnam saw recurrent invasions by

 

Chinese, Mongols, and French colonists. In the twentieth century China, Japan,

 

France, and the United States militarily occupied the country. Constantly buffeted by

 

outside forces, and prone to civil war when such pressure subsided, a unique culture

 

evolved. The impact of continual waves of outside forces was the formation of a

 

culture that reflects hostility, suspicion, and xenophobia. Guerrilla warfare became a

 

national method of war. The Vietnamese also practiced conventional war in the l400's

 

against the Chams and Khmers and subsequently against the French and Americans in

 

l95l, l954, l972, and l975.51 Add to this history an Asian focus on the group as

 

more important than the individual, which de-emphasizes the significance of individual

 

casualties, and you have a formidable foe. The Vietnamese culture is a subset of Simc

 

Asian culture. As such, military strategy is not time focused and generally follows the

 

characteristics of Sinic culture outlined in Chapter l.

 

            The United States attempted to defeat the North Vietnamese by raw power.

 

Their culture could absorb such punishment and has proven resistant to foreign

 

domination throughout history. The United States was unwilling to unleash total war

 

due to fear of global escalation. Western Culture could not sustain indefinite casualties

 

in a peripheral conflict of long duration. The result is now history. The Vietnam

 

conflict ended in defeat for the U.S.. There is no evidence that more sophisticated

 

analysis of cultural factors would have altered the outcome, but perhaps such analysis

 

would have prevented U.S. involvement in the first place.

 

            The tendency to ignore the significance of cultural characteristics in conflict was

 

not only a Western failing. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan provided a lesson in

 

the strengths and pain threshold of Afghani Muslim culture.

 

 

            The Post Cold War Era

 

            In l989, the Soviet Union collapsed and the bi-polar balance of power gave way

 

to a world with only one superpower. The political and conflict patterns of the past

 

entered a period of rapid evolution. This era has only just begun but the implications

 

are significant to our future success.

 

            The Return to a Multi-Polar Multi-Cultural World. The United States, as

 

the only remaining superpower, possesses neither the desire nor the economic and

 

technical capability to fill the vacuum created by the Soviet decline. The world is again

 

multi-polar. Conflict seems the norm with ethnic/nationalist strife in Bosnia, genocide

 

in Rwanda, and violent anarchy in Africa. The sources of power and causes of conflict

 

are diverse.

 

            In the view of Robert Kaplan, economic scarcity, overpopulation, and disease

 

are eroding the social fabric of the planet. He sees a return to tribalism and an increase

 

in violence, crime, and refugees.52 This dynamic may also be evidence of the return of

 

inter and intra-cultural competitions as the last vestiges of the colonial and bi-polar eras

 

erode. The emerging chaos and anarchy provide unique challenges for United States

 

Military forces. Failure to understand aspects of culture have already cost us dearly in

 

post cold war intervention.

 

 

            Mini-Case Study: Somalia. A critical component of Somali culture is the clan

 

system. The targeting of General Mohammed Aideed by U.S. Army forces was a

 

mistake. Greater cultural intelligence and understanding can prevent such errors in the

 

future. The Somali clan system is patrilineal with clan membership based on the male

 

line. Clans acquire women from other clans and marry off their daughters to acquire

 

cattle or political concessions. There are strict incest taboos against intra-clan

 

marriage. The children of a marriage belong to their father's clan but the mother

 

retains her original clan affiliation This culture tolerates polygamy and marriage is a

 

means of cementing political relationships between various clans and sub-clans. The

 

highest political power resides in the headman or clan elder. There are also sub-clans

 

with respective heads. There are traditions of clan defense in which it is the duty of all

 

members to protect the whole. An attack against a member of the clan illicits a group

 

reaction, particularly when that attack comes from outside the clan. The implications

 

of this structure are significant.

 

            When United States Forces intervened in the Somali civil conflict, they

 

attempted to avoid taking sides. As long as U.S. Forces acted in neutral fashion or at

 

least took similar action against both sides in the Somali conflict, there was no

 

communal reaction against the U.S.. As complications arose in the attempted

 

disarming of Somali warriors, the U.S. determined it wise to target Mohammed

 

Aideed, a sub-clan leader. To members of the Somali clan system, this was a direct

 

attack on Aideed  sub-clan, clan, and all politically allied clans. Somali culture

 

required clan members to rally to his defense.53  As  a result, Aideed evaded capture,

 

violence accelerated, and the U.S. sought withdrawal.

 

            Another difficulty lies in the expression of the warrior archetype in Somali

 

culture. The following statement attributed to an unknown Somali Warrior captures the

 

attitude of this culture.

 

            I will fight the foreigners. If there are no foreigners, I will fight other

            Clans. If there are no other Clans, I will fight other sub-Clans. If there

            are no other sub-Clans, I will fight my brother.54

 

 American forces attempted to disarm such men and establish peace. Such efforts were

 

in direct opposition to Somali cultural values. Greater cultural intelligence may not

 

have altered the overall course of this intervention but it may have saved lives, both

 

Somali and U.S..

 

            The Somali intervention was the first Cable News Network (CNN) war. Media

 

coverage incited America to action. Americans acted out of a desire to save the

 

starving people, particularly children, whose images we saw on television in our living

 

rooms. Our cultural value of human life demanded we aid the weak and destroy the

 

warlords who starved and oppressed their own people. The U.S. used military power

 

with the intent of helping the Somali people. Instead, our methods alienated Somali

 

males (warriors) and provoked clan defensive traditions which complicated our mission

 

and resulted in American casualties. Well meaning American cultural values got us

 

into the conflict. Our failure to understand Somali culture got us out.

 

 

            Modern American Cultural Attributes

 

            Several American cultural characteristics affect our ability to conduct military

 

operations in the Modem era. These characteristics constitute cultural limitations (and

 

sometimes strengths) on our use of force and affect when and how we go to war.

 

            American Values. American culture has a tendency to assume our cultural

 

values are universal values. Among these values are democracy, human rights, peace,

 

and the importance of the individual. We regard violence, oppression of the weak, and

 

human suffering as universal evils. Our founding fathers built this nation on the

 

precept of freedom and the principle that all men are created equal. Our Christian

 

tradition further strengthens our belief that violence and war are negative and reinforces

 

the primacy of the individual in politics and law. This country is a result of a struggle

 

against oppressive government. Since our values created the strongest, most

 

prosperous nation in the world, we often assume that other cultures will embrace our

 

views. The examples of Vietnam and Somalia demonstrate that these values, however

 

noble, are not always common to other cultures and do not constitute reality in many

 

parts of the world.

 

            Asian culture, as demonstrated in Vietnam, may not always respond to the idea

 

of democratic government. This concept may even threaten Asian cultural traditions

 

and existing power structures. In Somalia, clan loyalties, conflict traditions, and the

 

importance of the warrior archetype were at odds with well meaning efforts to alleviate

 

human suffering and establish peace. As a result, many of the Somali people supported

 

the warlords in their efforts against U.N. forces. This led to the withdrawal of the

 

U.N.. The human suffering of the Somali people will undoubtedly increase as

 

humanitarian aid becomes more difficult and clan warfare resumes in accordance with

 

the demands of their culture. It is not the purpose of this work to debate the worth of

 

our values verses those of other cultures. It is the intent to distinguish these values and

 

understand how they affect the conduct of military operations.

 

            Casualty Tolerance. American hesitance to sustain casualties, routed in our

 

value of the individual, contributed to failure in Vietnam and Somalia. The fact that

 

many North Vietnamese were willing to die for their cause, combined with Asian

 

cultural tolerance of casualties in war, gave the enemy a significant advantage in

 

Vietnam. Again in Somalia, the death of American soldiers contributed to public

 

perceptions of failure and hastened our desire to withdraw without accomplishing our

 

goals. Finally, the ability of Islamic culture to produce suicide bombers capable of

 

killing hundreds of "infidel" peacekeepers led to an American failure in Lebanon. Not

 

since World War IL has our culture been willing to sustain high casualties. However,

 

when the cause is just and the stakes high, we demonstrate remarkable resilience. In

 

lesser undertakings, our cultural tolerance of casualties is low.

 

            Time and Materialism. The American preoccupation with time reached its

 

current state as a result of the Industrial Revolution. We live in a reality measured in

 

lock step seconds, minutes, hours, and days. Scientific division of labor with mutually

 

supporting industry, transportation, services and recreation linked to a defined work

 

week characterize our society. This compels us to organize our lives and perception of

 

reality in measured increments. The business phrase "time is money" provides insight

 

into the linkage with materialism. Money is our ultimate gauge of material value.

 

Therefore if we expend material effort (money), we expect progress and we expect

 

such progress in a predictable and discernible period of time. The Post Cold War

 

world will require military efforts of long duration and progress may not be easy to

 

measure. The expenditure of American treasure and lives in Vietnam without tangible

 

result encouraged a feeling of endless conflict with no apparent progress. The U.S.

 

concept of progress requires measurable success. The lack of a scale with which to

 

measure this success led to "body counts" in an effort to provide discernible progress

 

reports. Similar dynamics concerning an inability to discern a return on our investment

 

occurred in Somalia and influenced our withdrawal from Lebanon.

 

            The more primitive societies of the third world do not share our materialism and

 

often view time experientially vice scientifically. Experiential time sees the present and

 

immediate future as a "now" period, the theoretical future as nonexistent, and the past

 

as a mythic conglomerate. This conglomerate serves as a context and foundation for

 

the present but does not directly affect the "now". Thus "a farmer sowing seed in his

 

field can think of their growth and harvest because these developments are inherent in

 

the present. More long-term or abstract future events, however, are thought of as ones

 

which will occur in the present or past of the community experiencing them...".55

 

Detailed explanation of this concept is outside the scope of this work, but it is

 

important to note that cultures which view time in this way do not relate to a linear

 

concept of time and instead experience time on a more individual basis. They do not

 

view the future as a necessary concept in the conduct of the present. Such is the case

 

in much of Africa and Asia. To American cultural adherents, it often appears such

 

cultures have great endurance and patience.56

 

            Information Technology and the Free Press. The capability of the modern

 

media allows the instantaneous communication of events to the developed world.

 

Images of desperate jungle combat, the devastation of the Beirut barracks, starving

 

Somali children, or the dead body of an American soldier in Mogadishu, quickly arrive

 

in American living rooms. These images provide real time information to the

 

American people. The resulting perceptions, formed through the filter of cultural

 

values, influence the willingness of the American people to support military

 

involvement and affect world interpretation of our national will. In our democracy,

 

political leaders react to the perceptions of the voting public. The media influenced

 

public perception of the Vietnam conflict and thus created political turmoil which in

 

turn affected the military conduct of the war. The same dynamic contributed to the

 

decisions to intervene in, and later to withdraw from, Somalia. The power of this flow

 

of information in a democracy can determine national action and directly affect the

 

conduct of military operations. This flow of information can be a galvanizing influence

 

consolidating American will, but it can also lead to false interpretations and debilitate

 

our ability to conduct operations. It is in this later sense that information flow can

 

provide a weapon to our adversaries and constitute a critical obstacle to success.

 

            Political Culture. The final cultural characteristic we will discuss concerns

 

American political culture. Any human or economic loss in a military operation

 

provides an opportunity for opposition to the actions of the political party in power.

 

Thus creative interpretation of military success or failure, often through the media,

 

creates an opportunity for political gain. This is unavoidable in an open, democratic

 

society. This situation does, however, increase the importance of political

 

considerations relative to military reality and therefore constrains the conduct of

 

military operations.

 

 

                                                            CHAPTER 5

           

                                    THE NEED FOR CULTURAL LITERACY

 

 

            Modern developments

           

            Various developments due to technology, economics, and the evolving use of

 

military forces by America increase the importance of cultural literacy. This section

 

examines these trends.

 

 

            Compression of the Levels of War. Technology, instantaneous global

 

communication, and multi-polar modem politics have together compressed the

 

traditional strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. High tech weapons

 

including Precision Guided Munitions and enhanced rocket systems ranging over 100

 

kilometers cross the traditional tactical/operational boundary. Limited conflict is the

 

norm and military forces are more than ever an extension of national and international

 

politics. The political nature of limited conflict combined with the compression of the

 

levels of war due to the effect of information technology require reexamination of

 

traditional military theory. If we are to succeed in military exploits in the information

 

age, the education of company grade officers and non-commissioned officers must

 

include subtleties of politics and international relations that were historically the

 

province of generals. The actions of a squad leader on a street corner in Haiti can now

 

affect the operational and strategic spheres as the entire world reacts to broadcast

 

images and interprets such information through the lens of culture.

 

            The Rise of OOTW and Coalition Warfare. Economic scarcity and the desire

 

of the American people to realize a "peace dividend" precipitated a massive drawdown

 

in military forces and capability. Future efforts will require great efficiency in the

 

execution of military operations. Simultaneous to the drawdown of military forces,

 

military roles are expanding in Operations Other Than War. These include

 

peacekeeping, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. Future operations will

 

require operations as part of coalition forces made up of various cultures. This increase

 

in exposure to radically different cultures requires a reexamination of cultural education

 

in our military.

 

            The Clash of Cultures. According to Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington,

 

the next pattern of conflict will predominantly occur "... between civilizations -

 

whether of differing nations or groups of nations."57 Civilization in this context are

 

major cultural groups which he identifies as Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic,

 

Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-American and possibly African. Professor Huntington

 

hypothesizes that modern conflict has evolved in phases from wars between princes, to

 

wars between nations, to wars between ideology. He admits that these phases identify

 

primarily Western conflict. For Professor Huntington, the next phase will be war

 

between civilizations.58  This premise seems unlikely. The various cultures of the

 

world are scarcely united entities. Many find fault with Prof. Huntington's broad

 

assumptions citing fractious nature of major cultures. As many, if not more, historical

 

and contemporary conflicts have occurred within major cultural groups as between such

 

groups.59 60  Further, conflicts occurring in the world today are often within major

 

cultural groups (Rwanda, Somali clan warfare). Regardless of whether Prof.

 

Huntington's predictions or those of his adversaries prevail, recent history indicates

 

forces of different cultures are likely to engage in conflict with or against each other.

 

These forces may participate in coalitions with other cultural groups to respond to

 

intra-cultural conflict, as in Desert Storm or Somalia. We may see intervention in

 

ethnic conflict or tribal war such as in Bosnia or Rwanda. In any case, all indications

 

are that cultural literacy will be an essential tool for the military professional of the

 

future.

 

            Efforts Toward Cultural Literacy

 

            The United States has expended considerable effort in the development of

 

cultural literacy over the years. These efforts are evident in the training of Foreign

 

Area Officers (described below), and in the inclusion of inter-cultural communication

 

material in concert with instruction for Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Such instruction

 

appears in the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff

 

College curriculums.

 

 

            Methods of Training. The two general methods of training for cultural literacy

 

are area training programs and cultural self-awareness programs. The intention of area

 

training programs is to prepare Americans for overseas assignments. Designers of area

 

study programs recognize difficulties in training for cultural awareness. These

 

difficulties are usually due to the ethnocentric and abstract nature of such training. The

 

student learns the values and practices of a society but often cannot relate them to

 

specific behaviors of host nationals.61 The experiences of Military Advisors further

 

indicate the inadequacy of this approach to training alone.62

 

            An alternative is Cultural Self-Awareness Training. This method seeks to teach

 

an individual the impact of his or her own culture on values, behavior, and cognitive

 

processes. This method can also fail as individuals sometimes master the theoretical

 

components of their culture but cannot recognize the effect of these factors on one's

 

cognition and behavior.63

 

            Foreign Area Officer Program. The Marine Corps Foreign Area Officer

 

Program trains "selected officers in the languages, military forces, culture, history,

 

sociology, economics, politics, and geography of selected areas of the world.64  This

 

program also seeks to identify officers who already possess such knowledge due to

 

outside education or heritage. Once trained and identified, the program seeks to assign

 

these foreign area experts to high-level staffs in operations, planning, or intelligence

 

billets, or duty with the Defense Attaché System. This program, if expanded, could

 

function as the core of a revitalized cultural literacy program. As currently executed,

 

there are three drawbacks to the program. First, the program does not require an

 

academic background in related liberal arts (sociology, anthropology, etc.) to enhance

 

the language and area study provided by the program. Second, the program narrowly

 

focuses on limited geographical regions. Conflict in the next decade is not likely to

 

limit itself to those areas. Third, the program trains only a few officers per year and

 

their training is normally in place of other Professional Military Education. This

 

means that there are too few FAG graduates and they do not normally attend school

 

with their peers. The FAG expertise is lost to the greater officer community. In spite

 

of the limitations noted, this program provides great promise.

 

 

 

                                                            CHAPTER 6

 

                                    CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 

            Assessment of the Initial Hypotheses

 

            The first hypothesis asserted that culture follows discernible rules. This idea

 

proved only partially correct. Modern anthropology provides competing theories that

 

describe human culture but cannot always fully predict human behavior. The study was

 

able to provide a definition of culture but could not completely capture a set of finite

 

rules for use by military professionals. The first subproblem, therefore, is only

 

partially solved.

 

            The second hypothesis, that African, Asian, and Islamic cultures possess unique

 

attitudes toward war that are of significance to the conduct of American military

 

operations, proved true. The analysis of these cultures in Chapter 3 and the case

 

studies of Chapter 4 support this conclusion.

 

            The third hypothesis, that American cultural characteristics exist and that

 

historical examples demonstrate the impact of these characteristics in conflict with other

 

cultures, proved true. The analysis of American culture and the case studies of Chapter

 

4 support this conclusion.

 

            The final hypothesis, that technological, political, and economic developments

 

in the aftermath of the Bi-Polar Era indicate an increased American involvement in

 

inter and intracultural conflict, is proven. The examination of trends in Chapter 5

 

supports this conclusion.

 

            The Need for Cultural Literacy

 

            The governmental, and intellectual elites of the United States have not met the

 

challenge of understanding the multifaceted nature of modem warfare, and how it

 

varies by region and by culture on the political or military level.65  This is evident in

 

our experiences in Vietnam and Somalia. Further, the Marine Corps educational

 

system tends to relegate cultural education to the field of Low Intensity Conflict. The

 

findings of this study indicate that understanding culture is of critical importance to the

 

success and efficiency of military operations. This is not a new development. Culture

 

has always been important.

 

            The Marine Corps has a long history of involvement in small wars against alien

 

cultures. The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of l94O contains meaningful insight

 

in the chapter on Psychology where it states:

 

 

            A knowledge of the character of the people and a command of their

            language are great assets. Political methods and motives which govern

            the actions of foreign people and their political parties, incomprehensible

            at best to the average North American, are practically beyond the

            understanding of persons who do not speak their language. If not

            already familiar with the language, all officers upon assignment to

            expeditionary duty should study and acquire a working knowledge of

            it.66

 

 

            The Marine Corps was not the first line of national defense during the Cold War

 

period. Our educational focus concentrated on the possibility of war against the Soviet

 

Union. Now, the Marine Corps is the force of choice. This era indicates a return to

 

the small wars of the past. Every Marine Officer, in the space of a twenty year career

 

will see service with or against members of other cultures. This service may include

 

combat, assignment to staff or embassy positions abroad, or U.N. duty. Current

 

cultural education efforts are inadequate. An increase in strategic cultural training in

 

all levels of professional military education (PME) would provide a broader basis of

 

education to meet the challenges of future military operations. The Marine Corps must

 

also increase the availability of, and emphasis on, language training and advanced

 

education in anthropology, sociology, political science, and related liberal arts. It is no

 

longer enough to have a limited number of narrowly focused foreign area officers. We

 

must encourage and reward off duty education in the cultural sciences and language.

 

The recruitment and retention of Marines who possess such skills should also increase.

 

 

            Culture for the Commander

 

            Culture is important to current and future commanders. At all levels, proper

 

understanding and analysis will mean less loss of life and less wasteful expenditure of

 

American resources. Such understanding will facilitate mission success. The selection

 

of military objectives, the conduct of troops on liberty, the treatment and control of

 

non-combatants, the role of the sexes, and the intricacy of command relationships

 

differs from one culture to the next. Commanders must understand the cultural

 

reactions that result from these and other activities. We must avoid arousing

 

unnecessary animosities. We must also use our enemies' cultural vulnerabilities against

 

him, creating offense when offense is intended. Defeat is often a psychological

 

condition and psychology is rooted in culture.

 

            Thus this study offers two major lessons. The first is that commanders must

 

tailor the conduct of military operations to the culture of the players involved, whether

 

allies or enemies. With an understanding of the mechanisms of culture, we can analyze

 

the specific actions and attributes of others in a new light and discover pitfalls and

 

opportunities that are not immediately apparent to those who view the world only

 

through the lens of the American cultural perspective. For example, if we assign

 

American military women to work alongside men at bases in Saudi Arabia, we must

 

understand the effect this action will have on the host culture. The offense such

 

assignment can cause to conservative Muslims, and the problems it may cause to the

 

Saudi government, should not be a surprise and cannot be trivialized.

 

            We do not know with surety what cultures commanders will face in the near

 

future. Therefore, our education should not only target specific cultures but must be

 

broad in nature to arm the commander with a rich appreciation for culture in general.

 

We must develop formal cultural Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

 

methodologies for inclusion in staff planning doctrine. This could follow the steps of

 

current IPB methodology with modification to consider the cultural "terrain" and

 

cultural "threat templating". This methodology would allow us to identify culturally

 

related centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities of future enemies and allies. Until

 

 such a formal methodology is available, commanders must individually integrate

 

cultural considerations in all aspects of operations and planning. We cannot afford the

 

expense or the casualties that a lack of cultural understanding, such as in Somalia, will

 

surely provide.

 

            The second lesson concerns the analysis of our own culture. Such analysis

 

provides the commander with a more enlightened assessment of the costs and benefits

 

of different courses of action. To not assign women, in the Saudi scenario above, is an

 

affront to our culture, which demands equality of the sexes. This issue, and others like

 

it, will cause cultural reactions whichever choice is made. Future commanders must

 

not make such choices in a vacuum.

 

            Analysis of our culture provides understanding of the strengths and limitations

 

we bring to battle. Commanders must deal with political and economic constraints as

 

well as the effects of American social debates (homosexual policy, women in

 

combat). 67 These factors are part of our culture. Awareness of cultural systems and

 

the mechanisms that determine societal values can help us identify and escape our

 

cultural paradigms.

 

            This study does not provide specific answers for future commanders, but

 

perhaps it will help them to ask the right questions. I, for one, intend to integrate this

 

knowledge into future decisions to avoid the costs of cultural arrogance and ignorance.

 

Expansion of cultural literacy is necessary to increase the effectiveness of the United

 

States Marine Corps. Cultural literacy will prove critical to military efficiency if not to

 

military success in the Post Cold War world.

 

 

                                                            NOTES

 

1          Trahan, James R., "Cultural Obstacles to American Success in Low Intensity

Conflict," an unpublished work submitted to Dr. Paul Belbutowski as an elective

course paper at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Although a shorter

paper of narrower focus, the definition of culture, and the analysis of American culture

are the same as is integrated in Chapter 3 and 4. March, l994.

 

2             Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, under the word

"culture."

 

3            Christopher B. Doob, Sociology: An Introduction (New York: Holt, Rinehart

and Winston, l985), 5l.

 

4          Cliford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books Inc.,

l973), 49.

 

5          Ernst Cassirir, Essay on Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, l944), 81.

 

6          David Jary and Julia Jary, The HarperCollins Dictionary of Sociology (New

York: Harper Collins Publishers, l99l), 47l.

 

7          Jary, 373.

 

8          Jary, 47O.

 

9          Marvin Harris, Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture

(New York: Random House, l979), 52-55.

 

10    Harris, 53-54.

 

11    Harris, 54-55.

 

l2    Doob, 103.

 

13    Jary, 468.

 

14    Karl Marx, Capital. Trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. Ed. Friedrich

Engels (Chicago: William Benton, l952).

 

15        Harris, l43-l47.

 

16        Claude Levi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked. Trans. John and Doreen

Weightman (New York: Harper & Row, l969).

 

17        Carl G. Jung, Man and His Symbols, (New York: Laurel), 97-100.

 

18        Adda B. Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence & Statecraft (New York: Brassey's

(US), Inc., l963), S9.

 

19            Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence & Statecraft, 61.

 

20        Karl P. Magyar, "Culture and Conflict in Africa's History: The Transition to

the Modern Era,"  The International Dimension of Culture and Conflict, ed. Adda B.

Bozeman, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, April l99l), 31.

 

2l            Lawrence B. Grinter, "Cultural and Historical Influences on Conflict Behavior

in Sinic Asia," in The International Dimension of Culture and Conflict, ed. Adda B.

Bozeman (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, April l99l), 17.

 

22    Grinter, 18.

 

23        Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York: Oxford University Press, l963).

 

24        Grinter, 18.

 

25        Grinter, 18.

 

26        Adda B. Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," Orbis, Spring l976, 65, as

quoted in Grinter, l 8.

 

27            Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence & Statecraft, 9.

 

28        Grinter, 18.

 

29        Grinter, 20.

 

30    Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. & tr. by M. Howard and P. Paret,

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, l976), 579-58O.

 

31        Jesus Christ, as quoted in the Holy Bible, Matthew 22:21, revised standard

version, 2d ed. (New York: American Bible Society, l971).

 

32    Lewis B.Ware, "An Islamic Concept of Conflict in Its Historical Context",in

The International Dimension of Culture and Conflict, ed. Adda B. Bozeman (Maxwell

Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, April 1991), 9.

 

33        Ware, 10-11.

 

34        Ware, 10.

 

35        Ware, ll-l2.

 

36        Ware, l2.

 

37        Ware, 9.

 

38        Ware, l2.

 

39        Ware, l2.

 

4O       Ware, l3-l4.

 

4l         Ware, l3.

 

42        Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Summer

l993, 23.

 

43        Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall Of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage

Books, l987), l7.

 

44        Charles Blitzer, The Age of Kings (New York: Time Inc., l967), 3O-42.

Clausewitz, 89.

 

46        John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, l993), 3.

 

47        Akira Iriye, Power and Culture. The Japanese-American War; 1941-I 94S

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, l98l), vu.

 

48        Grinter, 2O.

 

49        John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, (New

York: Pantheon, l986), 33-73.

 

50        Dower, 37.

 

51        Grinter, 2O.

 

52        Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, February

l994, 44-76.

 

53        Dr. Brana-Shute, "Cross-Cultural Communications," Lecture presented at the

Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, VA, 3O March l994. Videocassette.

 

54        Thomas A. Belote, "Overview of Sub-Saharan Africa," Lecture presented at

the Marine Corps Command and Staff College as part of the elective course

Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflict, 27 March l994.

 

55        The Encyclopedia of Religion, Under the topic "sacred time," 54O.

 

56        The Encyclopedia of Religion, Under the topic "sacred time," 54O.

 

57            Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," 22-49.

 

58            Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," 23.

 

59            Chandra Muzaffar, "The West's Hidden Agenda," World Press Review,

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60            Suddeutsche Zeitung, "A Clash Between Civilizations-or within Them?" In

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62        George M. Guthrie, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Bureau of

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63            Kraemer, 5.

 

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