United States Arms Transfers in the Post Cold War
Environment
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues
UNITED STATES ARMS TRANSFERS
IN THE POST COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT
by
Mark Edward Schwan
Major, USMC
Academic Year l994-l995
Thesis submitted to the Faculty
of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Military Studies
April l995
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author
and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Military Government
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: United States Arms Transfers in the Post Cold War
Environment
Author: Major Mark E. Schwan, USMC
Thesis: A complex array of domestic political concerns and
broader foreign policy objectives have long influenced
Washington's approach to arms transfers. Aiding allies and
enhancing U.S. national security during the Cold War, some
of these transfers have worked against U.S. objectives.
Lacking a clearly defined threat in the post-Cold War world,
U.S. efforts to control arms proliferation will likely
flounder unless Washington develops a more pragmatic and
forward-looking arms transfer policy.
Discussion: Throughout U.S. history, arms transfers have
been utilized as a foreign policy tool to maintain U.S.
national interests worldwide. As the leading arms exporter,
U.S. efforts must be directed toward reducing arms
proliferation by limiting the level of weapons technology
transferred. These counterproliferation efforts are
complicated by the "economically disabled" countries around
the world turning to arms sales as the "cash crop" of
choice.
Arms transfers today are driven by a complicated mix of
political and economic factors. Countries with political
influence and economic resources will continue to procure
weapons; conversely, countries without influence and
resources will continue to feel threatened. The end result
is increased regional tension, instability, and continued
arms proliferation.
Conclusion: The U.S. must remain involved in arms transfers
to friendly nations to reduce the worldwide proliferation of
arms and enhance U.S. national security. The U.S. arms
transfer policy in this world of complex political and
economic issues must be pragmatic and forward-looking with
emphasis on responsible control of weapons technology.
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
l. ARMS TRANSFERS IN A CHANGING WORLD l
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ARMS PROLIFERATION 3
The Beginnings, 3
World War II, 5
Post World War II, 8
3. U.S. LAWS AND PRESIDENTIAL DOCTRINE l3
Mutual Security Act of l954, l3
The Eisenhower Doctrine, l4
The Foreign Assistance Act of l96l, l5
The Nixon Doctrine, l7
The Arms Export Control Act of l976, 18
The Carter Doctrine, l9
The Reagan Doctrine, 2l
The Pressler Amendment, 25
4. ARMS TRANSFERS GONE AWRY 26
5. POST COLD WAR 34
6. U.S. ARMS TRANSFER POLICY 38
U.S. Emerges as World Arms Export Leader, 38
Recent Efforts at Non-Proliferation, 44
Current U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, 47
7. THE FUTURE 5l
8. CONCLUSION 58
Bibliography 65
UNITED STATES ARMS TRANSFERS
IN THE POST COLD WAR ENVIRONNENT
CHAPTER l
ARMS TRANSFERS IN A CHANGING WORLD
The world has changed dramatically over the past
decade, mostly as a result of the fall of communism. In
l989 the Berlin Wall came down and in late l99l the Soviet
Union collapsed. For nearly 5O years, the threat of
communism and Soviet aggression drove the United States
foreign and military policy. No longer posing a significant
global threat, they have been replaced by regional threats
brought about by the strategic shift in the environment
"from the unitary and relatively predictable adversary we
knew in the Cold War, to the diverse, ambiguous, and dynamic
threats that we confront today."1
This shift leaves the U.S. in a precarious situation
regarding arms transfers, which have been a vital foreign
policy tool. Washington's goal is to produce an environment
conducive to peaceful coexistence among world nations. The
goal would provide for the legitimate security needs of
nations friendly to the U.S., thereby deterring aggression
and countering arms proliferation to minimize damage,
destruction, and casualties during conflict. Providing
security to friendly nations through arms transfers, coupled
with the domestic economic issues of maintaining the defense
industrial base is creating a dilemma for the U.S.
Prior to taking office, President Clinton pledged that
the threat of weapons technology spreading around the world
and falling into the hands of unstable or hostile regimes
would be a top foreign policy priority.2 Global arms
proliferation is a serious matter. One which the U.S. is
concerned about since the mere presence of weapons within a
region can fuel regional instability. Although the U.S. has
for many years been actively engaged in the overseas arms
market, current rankings place the U.S. in the lead among
arms exporting nations. Recent events such as the demise of
the Soviet Union, the subsequent collapse of the Russian
arms export business, and U.S. success in the Persian Gulf
War have all contributed to make the U.S. the world
leading arms exporter.3
Due to the evolution and development of Third World
countries around the world, the U.S. must remain actively
engaged in the maintenance of regional stability. Faced
with budget cuts, military force reductions, and decreased
overseas presence, the U.S. military strategy is moving
towards a force structure which allows the near simultaneous
fighting of two major regional conflicts (MRC). As a result
of this reduction, the U.S. will be called upon with
increasing frequency to provide friendly countries with arms
so those countries can provide for their own protection
against adventurous neighboring states. Recently, President
Clinton announced that the U.S. will continue to sell major
conventional weapons systems to key U.S. allies and friendly
nations around the globe "using a set of general criteria
that leave the administration enormous flexibility to reward
nations that pursue favored policies and punish those that
do not."4
To better understand where Washington stands today
regarding arms transfers, it is necessary to review U.S.
history with respect to the requirement for arms transfers
and the evolution of its arms transfer policy prior to
determining what type of policy Washington should employ in
the future.
CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ARMS PROLIFERATION
The Beginnings
Looking back to the days when the U.S. was a fledgling
nation, the U.S. could not have enjoyed the degree of
success in the fight for independence from Great Britain had
it not been for the military assistance and arms provided by
France. France, long opposed to Britain's overseas
expansion, was willing to provide whatever assistance the
U.S. needed in the fight for independence. "It was in
France's national interest to have the British engaged in a
protracted American war while the French sought to expand
and reinforce their military and commercial positions in
North America and elsewhere."5
This concern over national interests has been an
underlying theme in all transfers of weapons between
countries throughout history. Countries do not transfer
weapons just for the sake of transferring them. There is
always a national interest which drives the decision to
transfer arms and it may be politically, militarily, or
economically motivated.
President George Washington cautioned Americans against
developing unnecessary political ties with foreign nations
in the quest for commercial expansion. In his farewell
address he stated:
[t]he great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign
nations is, in extending our commercial relations to
have with them as little political connection as
possible . . . Europe has a set of primary interests
which to us have none or a very remote relation . . .
it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by
artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her
politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of
her friendships or enmities.6
President Washington was concerned that political
connections to foreign countries might jeopardize U.S.
foreign commerce and the U.S. would become involved in
foreign conflicts. Despite Washington's warning, the U.S.
has become more involved politically and economically in
foreign affairs which has caused much debate.
During the course of World War I, U.S. participation in
world affairs increased. By l92O, the U.S. became the
dominant world arms supplier, commanding as much as 5O
percent of the trade.7 This increase drew the attention of
many politicians and during the inter-war period, Congress
introduced much legislation attempting to limit U.S.
participation in the arms market.
From the creation of the Munitions Control Board in
l935 (designed to place tighter controls on the transfer of
weapons abroad) to the passage of the Neutrality Act of l937
forbidding the transfer of arms to belligerents in a
declared war (later modified to permit "cash and carry"
sales so as to not penalize the American economy any more
than was necessary), Congress was determined to keep the
U.S. neutral.8 This desire for neutrality would, however,
be short lived as the Allies, severely battered by the Axis
powers, began requesting U.S. military aid prior to l94l.
World War II
The Johnson-Default Act of l934, which forbade loans to
any country in default to the U.S. government on previous
loans, was still in effect at the start of World War II.
This legislation applied to most of the allies from World
War I, Britain and France included, and prevented the U.S.
from supplying the aid necessary to sustain Allied momentum
against the Axis powers. In an attempt to circumvent this
Act and provide the military assistance Britain so
desperately needed, President Roosevelt negotiated the
"Destroyers for Bases" deal in September l94O, whereby the
U.S. would provide the British with 5O timeworn destroyers
in exchange for long-term basing rights at British bases in
the Western Hemisphere.9
Going a step further, President Roosevelt, in his
"Arsenal of Democracy" speech delivered in December l94O,
emphasized the need for U.S. support to the Allies by
stating: "there is far less chance of the U.S. getting into
the war, if we do all we can now to support the nations
defending themselves against attack by the Axis than if we
acquiesce in their defeat, submit tamely to an Axis victory,
and wait our turn to be the object of attack in another war
later on."10 Roosevelt's statement was a renewal of the
conscious effort by Washington to use arms transfers as a
foreign policy tool designed to keep the U.S. at arms length
from direct involvement in any foreign conflict.
The U.S. Congress, in keeping with Roosevelt's "Arsenal
for Democracy" speech, provided relief from the provisions
of the Neutrality Act of l937 (as amended) by enacting the
Lend-Lease Act on March II, l94l. This Act contained
provisions wherein the U.S. would provide arms, food, and
other aid to its Allies including Russia and China as they
were drawn into the war. Congress expected loaned material
to be repaid by the Allies either in dollars or in the form
of reverse lend-lease which provided material to the U.S. in
payment for goods received. During the course of this
program which lasted until 2 September l945, over $2l
billion was provided to Britain alone, yet only $65O million
was repaid. For all of the tens of billions of dollars
furnished under the Lend-Lease program, only $1O billion
total was ever reimbursed to the U.S. for material
contributed.11
Although only a small percentage of total monetary aid
supplied was ever repaid, one must look beyond the dollar
figure to see what the U.S. gained from the program. At the
conclusion of World War I, President Wilson was unable to
convince Congress to ratify the League of Nations. Congress
instead adopted an isolationist attitude that resulted in
the decline of the U.S. military preparedness and industrial
production base. With the lend-lease program in effect
prior to U.S. entrance into World War II, large-scale
British and French orders served to mobilize our industrial
force early on. "Orders placed by the British and the
French for aircraft, ships, and explosives did far more to
pave the way for [U.S.] rearmament than anything the
President or the Chiefs of Staff could have done before the
Spring of l94O."l2
Post World War II
At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union emerged as
a global power and threat to the U.S. and Western European
nations. The Soviet threat consisted of their ability to
maintain large, well-equipped armies and their desire to
spread communism. To counter this threat, post World War II
Europe, devastated both economically and physically, looked
to the U.S. for security assistance.
The strong U.S. economy, superior industrial output,
and technological advantage, allowed the U.S. to become
Europe major military weapons supplier. The most frequent
form of supply was that of direct military sales or gifts of
complete weapon systems to Western Europe, whose efforts
were focused more toward the reconstruction of domestic
economies and the industrial reorientation than to future
military equipment development and production.13
One of the first post World War II requests for
security assistance aid came from Greece and Turkey in
response to Soviet-backed adventurism. From this request
emerged the "Truman Doctrine," the first major commitment of
U.S. military and economic aid to friendly countries since
the end of World War II. President Truman made it clear
that the U.S. would not allow aggressor nations to prey on
weaker free nations when he stated:
I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressure.
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work
out their own destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily
through economic and financial aid which is essential
to economic stability and orderly political
processes.l4
Delivered before a joint session of Congress in l947,
President Truman's response to the situation facing Greece
and Turkey heightened world awareness of Soviet intentions
and provided the driving force behind efforts to contain
communism. "The doctrine set forth the themes justifying
American foreign involvement and initiated military and
economic aid programs to nations resisting communist
aggression."15
The majority of aid provided to the European countries
was grant aid in the form of excess U.S. war materials
created not only by the draw down in forces, but also by
what the factories had in production at the conclusion of
the war. This aid, along with aid provided under the
Marshall Plan, "marked the emergence of the United States as
a world power bent on establishing stability in the
international community and willing to expend major
resources and adopt an activist role in seeing that U.S.
interests abroad were maintained."16 As European economies
improved to the point where they could assume a greater role
in providing for their own self-defense, the amount of grant
aid was reduced.
The U.S. political, economic, and military
contributions directed toward European economic recovery,
protection against Soviet expansion, and the formation of
NATO after World War II illustrates the extensive and
relatively sudden U.S. engagement in world affairs. The
recipients of U.S. aid included not only Western European
allies and Latin American countries but also South Korea,
the Philippines, Taiwan, and some Middle Eastern
countries.17
In Europe, the l949 North Atlantic Treaty provided
the framework for what is known today as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). Born with the purpose of
establishing a collective self defense, Article V of the
Treaty provides that an attack against a member nation will
be considered an attack against all member nations and that
all member nations will unite against the aggressor to
restore and maintain security of the North Atlantic area.18
The U.S. has always given priority to requests of
member nations for arms, ahead of non-member nations. In
fact, until l965, approximately 56 percent of all American
arms transferred went to NATO members.19 This has evolved
to the point that today, the U.S. has entered into several
cooperative production agreements with NATO allies and
others. Among the weapons systems under cooperative
production agreements are: the Stinger anti-aircraft
missile (Germany, Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,
and Turkey), the Patriot missile and air defense capability
(Japan and Italy), and the AIM-9L air-to-air missile (Japan,
Germany, Norway, Italy, and Taiwan).2O
Once NATO was in place, European allies and other
friendly countries began to acquire weapons that would
provide them with the degree of security they deemed
necessary. As a producer of quality weapons, the U.S. was
ready, willing, and able to help provide for their security
needs. The U.S. operated under the premise of supplying
weapons to contain communism and Soviet aggression. If the
Soviet Union was isolated and the spread of communism
halted, many believed that communism would eventually
collapse.
Providing weapons to friendly countries for their
security needs marked the beginning of a concerted effort by
the U.S. to actively seek out buyers for American
manufactured weapon systems. Besides the leap in technology
since the end of World War II, the U. S. realized the
potential for significant economic gain by transferring
American built weapons to foreign nations.
In the l95Os, the U.S. learned a valuable foreign
policy lesson in its effort to contain communism. The
exclusion of South Korea from America's vital interests, as
proclaimed by Secretary of State Acheson, may have
encouraged North Korea to invade South Korea in l95O.2l
Excluding South Korea from America's sphere of influence and
the subsequent North Korean invasion proved to the U.S. the
importance of defending friendly territories adjacent to
communist countries. Of significant importance was clearly
stating the U.S. intentions to defend against Communism and
the most effective way to do this was through military
alliances.22
The lesson was clear. President Roosevelt had called
for providing others with the means to defend themselves to
avoid direct U.S. involvement in his l94O "Arsenal for
Democracy" speech. Establishing political and military ties
with South Korea would have demonstrated strong U.S. resolve
and support for the South Korean government and made any
attempt by North Korea to attack South Korea seem futile.
Had the U.S. not ignored South Korean requests for
assistance and provided them with arms transfers, the U.S.
could have significantly reduced the possibilities of this
conflict occurring. This foreign policy failure
demonstrated to the U.S. the consequences of not protecting
countries important to U.S. national interests.
CHAPTER 3
U.S. LAWS AND PRESIDENTIAL DOCTRINE
Mutual Security Act of l954
After the Korean War, Congress sought to establish
means by which the U.S. and other nations could promote
international peace and security without the use of the U.S.
armed forces except in the common defense of its allies and
friends. The emphasis which the U.S. desired to place upon
other nations of the world was that of self-help and mutual
common defense. The first major piece of U.S. legislation
aimed at reducing the probability of U.S. troop involvement
in world conflict was the Mutual Security Act of l954. This
Act, approved by Congress on August 26, l954, provided
"military assistance to friendly nations and international
organizations in order to promote the foreign policy,
security, and general welfare of the U.S., and to facilitate
the effective participation of such nations in arrangements
for individual and collective self-defense."23
This legislation served to solidify and demonstrate
strong Congressional support for allied and friendly nations
by transferring arms abroad. Providing arms demonstrated
strong U.S. commitment to the security of these nations
abroad while protecting U.S. national interests.
The Eisenhower Doctrine
The Korean peninsula was not the only hot spot during
the l95Os. During the latter part of the decade, the Middle
Eastern region gained economic significance because of its
vast oil supplies. To make it perfectly clear to the
Communists that aggression would not be tolerated, President
Eisenhower published what has become known as the
"Eisenhower Doctrine." This doctrine stated the U.S. was
prepared to employ "the armed forces of the U.S. to secure
and protect the territorial integrity and political
independence of such nations [Middle East], requesting such
aid, against overt aggression from any nation controlled by
International Communism.24
Eager to spread communism to new regions, the Soviet
Union looked toward the Middle East as an access avenue into
Africa, a lucrative target for communist activity. The
Soviets also believed that control of the Middle East would
spell economic ruin for the western countries, thus creating
additional targets for communism. Soviet goals and
intentions thus constituted a severe threat to American
national interests.25 In response, the U.S. began to
increase arms transfers and force presence within the region
to bolster the local governments and to deter further action
by the Soviets. Invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine allowed
Washington to demonstrate its resolve to contain communism
and defend areas of U.S. national interest.
The Foreign Assistance Act of l96l
By the late l95Os, U.S. interest was more focused in
Europe, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle East than in
Latin America. It was not until l959, when Fidel Castro
rose to power in Cuba and later declared Cuba a Socialist
state and member of the Communist bloc that U.S. attention
was drawn to this area. President Kennedy realized the
importance of Latin America and initiated the Alliance for
Progress in the early l96Os as an attempt to contain
communism in the Western Hemisphere. Addressing the
economic grievances of Latin American countries, the
Alliance also helped meet U.S. political and security
concerns in the region. Administered through the provision
of aid to Latin American countries friendly to the U.S., it
was an attempt to deal firmly with Castro and his Soviet
allies.26 Additionally, the Foreign Assistance Act of l96l
authorized the President to:
furnish military assistance . . . to any friendly
country or international organization, the assisting of
which . . . will strengthen the security of the U.S.
and promote world peace . . . [and] to permit the
recipient . . . to participate in regional or
collective arrangements . . . for the purpose of
maintaining or restoring international peace and
security.
The Act further stipulated certain requirements which
the recipient country was required to abide by to ensure
continued U.S. assistance. These requirements were aimed at
controlling the spread of arms supplied by the U.S. to
countries whose interests were not in concert with those of
the U.S. The most important of these restrictions stated:
[The recipient country] will not, without the
consent of the President--
(A) permit any use of such articles by anyone not
an officer, employee, or agent of that country,
(B) transfer, or permit any officer, employee, or
agent of that country to transfer such articles by
gift, sale, or otherwise, or
(C) use or permit the use of such articles for
purposes other than those for which furnished.28
This differs significantly from how other countries
handle arms transfers. Once weapons are paid for, most
nations do not place such restrictions on further transfers.
This creates an environment conducive to the proliferation
of arms throughout the world. Brazil provides a good
example of a government that "sells its arms to all comers
with no strings attached . . . and does not insist that the
arms it sells to one country not be resold to another.
Thus, in one instance, weapons sold to Libya wound up in
Iranian hands."29
The U.S., through this legislation and doctrine, was
sending the message that communist regimes would not be
allowed to aggressively market communism and that Washington
was prepared to furnish military assistance to friendly
nations to thwart such attempts and protect U.S. national
interests.
The Nixon Doctrine
By the late l96Os, the U.S. was fully embroiled in the
largely unpopular Vietnam War trying to prop up the failing
South Vietnamese government against the communist insurgency
by the North. As a result, the American public was not
supportive of continued U.S. troop involvement. Responding
to the wishes and desires of the American people, while
maintaining the security needs of U.S. allies and other
friendly nations, President Nixon formulated what has become
known as the "Nixon Doctrine."
This doctrine, announced in l969, signaled a return to
the earlier U.S. philosophy of providing the means (arms
transfers) for foreign countries to provide for their own
security and self-defense without requiring the introduction
of U.S. troops into the country. The principle of self-help
brought with it an increased level of technology and amount
of arms being transferred overseas under the umbrella of
security assistance. While the U.S. supplied arms to member
nations of NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, plus South Korea and
Taiwan, the Soviet Union was doing the same for their
Eastern European Warsaw Pact allies, China, and North Korea.
In addition to the two superpowers, other arms
producing nations (NATO and Warsaw Pact countries) joined
the ranks of arms exporters.30 The increasing number of
nations involved in the arms exporting business contributed
to the proliferation problem and highlighted the need for
arms control. The U.S. did not make any significant effort
at controlling conventional arms transfers until l976 when
President Carter took office.
The Arms Export Control Act of l976
The l967 and l973 Arab-Israeli wars highlighted
instability within the Middle East. Since the Persian Gulf
region is responsible for supplying a vast majority of the
world's oil, there was growing concern that instability in
the Middle East could jeopardize the world's oil supply.
Therefore, Washington believed that all international
agreements in this area had to account for the free flow of
oil. To promote regional stability, the U.S. continued to
increase shipments of arms to friendly countries. "Since
l972 the Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf countries have
received by far the greatest share of arms exports. U.S.
harms] orders in fiscal year l976 were approximately $9
billion, of which 65 percent were from the countries in the
Middle East-Persian Gulf region."31
This worldwide arms build-up was noted by the U.S.
Congress. Their concern over the seemingly endless and
uncontrolled flow of arms out of the U.S. led to the passage
of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act (AECA) of l976. Placing tighter controls on
future arms transfers, this Act gave Congress the right to
block any proposed transfer if it were not in the best
interests of the U.S. The AECA of l97G also served to
highlight the importance of human rights to the U.S. and
linked them to the consideration process for arms transfers.
For countries in violation of internationally recognized
human rights, arms transfers were to be prohibited and
security assistance grant aid terminated unless specifically
authorized by Congress.32
The Carter Doctrine
Despite Congressional attempts to limit arms transfers,
significant global interest remained for U.S. manufactured
arms. During the Carter Administration, the U.S. accounted
for over 5O percent of a $2O billion annual international
arms business.33 Due to this fact and President Carter's
view that the U.S. should take the lead in discouraging
worldwide arms proliferation, he took the position of using
arms transfers as an exceptional policy tool. Barring those
countries in major defense treaties with the U.S. (NATO
members, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand), President
Carter sought to require individuals within Congress and the
defense industry who supported arms transfers justify their
support for such transfers.
Providing ample justification for arms transfers proved
relatively easy for Congress and the defense industry.
Associating orders for defense goods with economic
conditions, jobs, and their incumbency, Congressional
members effectively lobbied for continued arms transfers.
Similarly, dwindling arms orders directly affect defense
industry revenue, a loss of which results in scaled back
production, possible plant closures, work force reductions,
and erosion of the defense industrial base.
Concerns of Congress and the defense industry over job
loss and reduction of defense industrial base highlight the
close political and economic ties that exist between
domestic issues and U.S. national interests with regard to
arms transfers. This has contributed to the difficulty the
U.S. has experienced in controlling worldwide arms
proliferation.
During l979, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the
coup in Iran, and the taking of U.S. hostages at the
American Embassy in Tehran all highlighted the significance
of the Persian Gulf region and the need for stability in the
Middle East. These events also delineated the danger of
uncontrolled arms transfers to any one country in a region.
President Carter, in his 1980 State of the Union address to
Congress, voiced U.S. concerns over the Middle East by
stating:
[l]et our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by
any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests of the U.S. of America, and such an assault
will be repelled by any means necessary, including
military force.34
Carter's statement of the U.S. position went beyond
the Truman Doctrine in support of nation resisting
subjugation. Whereas the Truman Doctrine was non-specific,
the "Carter Doctrine" was regional-specific with an implicit
threat to use nuclear weapons to defend U.S. national
interests.
The Reagan Doctrine
President Reagan took a more pragmatic approach to the
transfer of arms. At the time he took office, U.S.
conventional forces were more defensively oriented due to
Carter's policies on force reductions that resulted in a
hollow force. Faced with a massive military build-up by the
Soviets during the 1970s, these policies were rescinded by
Reagan as he sought to establish an equal offense-defense
mix to counter the communist threats facing the U.S. As
part of his efforts, he formulated the "Reagan Doctrine"
which aimed at supporting anti-Communist insurgencies.35
This doctrine came in response to increasing Soviet support
for communist regimes in developing countries such as
Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Opting for
an activist policy of American support for non-communist
insurgencies against Soviet-backed communist regimes, he
championed the strengthening of U.S. power by tripling the
defense budget from l98l.l9B4, the largest peacetime
military build up in U.S. history.36
President Reagan viewed arms transfers as an effective
tool in the execution of U.S. foreign policy. Reagan
clarified his views in his 8 July l98l Conventional Arms
Transfer Policy in which he specified that U.S. arms
transfers were essential to U.S. global defense posture and
could:
a. help deter aggression by enhancing the states of
preparedness of allies and friends;
b. increase our own armed forces' effectiveness by
improving the ability of the U.S. . . . to project
power in response to threats posed by mutual
adversaries;
c. support efforts to foster the ability of our forces
to deploy and operate with . . . our friends and
allies, thereby strengthening and revitalizing our
mutual security relationships;
d. demonstrate that the U.S. has an enduring interest
in the security of its friends and partners, and that
it will not allow them to be at a military
disadvantage;
e. foster regional and internal stability, thus
encouraging peaceful resolution of disputes and
evolutionary change; and
f. help to enhance U.S. defense production
capabilities and efficiency?
These aims of Reagan's arms transfer policy illustrate
the wide use for arms transfers and considerations that must
be accounted for when making decisions to transfer arms.
Developing a successful arms transfer policy requires
careful examination of a multitude of political, military,
and economic factors. These factors are not static and are
subject to change as the world situation changes. Reagan
made an effort to account for these changes while protecting
U.S. national interests and preventing the unrestricted flow
of weapons overseas. There were specific criteria that
required consideration before arms transfer approval could
be granted. These criteria included:
a. the degree to which the transfer responds
appropriately to the military threats confronting the
recipient;
b. whether the transfer will enhance the recipient's
capability to participate in collective security with
the U.S.;
c. whether the transfer will promote mutual interests
in countering externally supported aggression;
d. whether the transfer is consistent with United
States interests in maintaining stability within
regions where friends of the U.S. may have differing
objectives;
e. whether the transfer is compatible with the needs
of U.S. forces, recognizing that occasions will arise
when other nations may require scarce items on an
emergency basis;
f. whether the proposed equipment transfer can be
absorbed by the recipient without overburdening its
military support system or financial resources; and
g. whether any detrimental effects of the transfer are
more than counterbalanced by positive contributions to
U.S. interests and objectives.38
This criteria focused primarily on the security
requirements of friendly nations with regard to their net
contributions to U.S. national security. The underlying
theme behind Reagan's arms transfer policy remained the
support of U.S. national interests over the recipient's
interests.
President Reagan's approach was a reinforcement of the
earlier Nixon Doctrine, with the U.S. not using arms
transfers as a substitute for U.S. involvement (commitment
and capability) in foreign affairs but as a complementary
tool. While treating each arms request individually, arms
transfers were a flexible foreign policy tool used to
achieve and maintain U.S. national security goals and
objectives. "We will deal with the world as it is, rather
than as we would like it to be."39
The Pressler Amendment
When decisions are made to provide weapons to a
country, they are made on the best information available at
the time. In the event something should occur which affects
the stability of the foreign government or draws into
question the legitimacy of arms transfers to a particular
country, the U.S. can withhold shipment of the weapons,
pending further analysis of the situation.
One of the primary reasons for arms transfers is to
strengthen the national security of friendly countries and
to steer them away from the pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs). Pakistan provides a recent example of a
country which continues to pursue WMDs despite previous
purchases and receipt of U.S. weapons. Seeking to force an
end to Islamabad quest for WMDs, the U.S. passed the
Pressler Amendment in l985 which had immediate affect on the
sale and delivery of 7l F-l6 fighter aircraft Pakistan had
recently purchased.40
The Pressler amendment was enacted to prohibit the
transfer of weapons to Pakistan unless the President could
verify to Congress that they did not possess a nuclear
explosive device. In October l99O, President Bush concluded
that he could no longer provide the verification required,
so an arms ban went into effect, and the F-l6s were placed
in storage where they will remain until such time as
verification can be made.
It remains important for Washington to monitor those
governments with which arms business is being conducted to
ensure they abide by the agreements through which arms are
supplied. Should they fail to comply, Washington must take
immediate action to encourage compliance or cease all future
sales, deliveries, and service as has been done in the past.
These legislative acts and Presidential doctrine have
contributed to the maintenance of U.S. national interests
worldwide. Although the world has changed dramatically
since the end of World War II, the basic political,
military, and economic factors which affect the way
countries deal with one another still exist. Arms transfers
remain an effective tool for implementing foreign policy.
CHAPTER 4
ARMS TRANSFERS GONE AWRY
How could it happen that Western arms are transferred
to a hostile government? It is difficult to keep current on
all developments and counter them as they occur in a rapidly
changing world. Although the U.S. State Department monitors
developments around the globe through its Political-Military
Branch, there are some incidents involving U.S. national
interests that they are unable to remedy until after the
fact. For example, the U.S. observed Saddam Hussein's build
up of forces along the Iraq-Kuwait border but failed to
accurately assess his intentions until he invaded Kuwait on
2 August l99O.
Although U.S. arms sales are subject to close scrutiny
by the State, Defense, and Commerce Departments, this does
not stop "inadvertent" transfers of U.S. weapons from
friendly to hostile countries. Legitimate arms transfers to
friendly governments can instantly turn into disaster if
those governments are subjected to a coup. In such
instances hostile regimes easily gain access to and control
of advanced weaponry, thus enhancing their power base and
potentially upsetting regional stability.
To increase stability in the Persian Gulf region and to
protect vital U.S. interests, President Nixon furnished
sophisticated weapons to the Shah of Iran to provide a
"pillar" of stability within the region. Transfers included
weapons such as the F-l4 Tomcat fighter aircraft armed with
the Phoenix air-to-air missile, the E-3A Airborne Warning
and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, and the improved Hawk
(I-Hawk) anti-aircraft missile.
The U.S. failed to fully assess the internal forces
operating within Iran and recognize the presence of
anti-American sentiment. Efforts by the U.S. to equip Iran
with the latest advanced weaponry to stabilize the region
were ineffective, as the Shah was ousted during the Islamic
Revolution led by the Ayatollah Khomeini in l979. Radical
anti-American militants now had possession of the U.S.'
front line weaponry. Fortunately, the Iranians were unable
to use these weapons against others in the region, due to
their inability to operate and maintain them once U.S.
maintenance and supply links were severed immediately after
the coup.
Poor U.S. control over arms shipments to Afghanistan
caused the Stinger surface-to-air missile to fall into the
hands of Iran and the Soviet Union. Following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in l979, the U.S. provided military
assistance to the Mujahideen freedom fighters using Pakistan
as an intermediary. Significant political effort was
required by the U.S. to maintain good relations with a
reluctant Pakistani government. Also desiring Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistani reluctance was based
on the fear that by assisting the Muhajideen, the Afghan
conflict could spill over the border into Pakistan.
The U.S. was concerned over the use of Pakistan as an
intermediary for arms shipments to the Afghan rebels.
Concerns included the stability of Pakistan's government
(four out of past seven governments had failed), their human
rights record, and their nuclear development program.41
Surface-to-air missiles were critically needed by the
Afghan resistance to combat Soviet aircraft. The U.S.
delayed supplying the Mujahideen with Stinger missiles
fearing that such action would provoke Soviet attacks on
Pakistan and that the missiles would fall into terrorist
hands. The first l5O Stinger missiles did not arrive in
country until late l986. Of the 8OO missiles shipped from
October l986 to August l987, only 6OO made it to the
Mujahideen. The remainder of the missiles were either
siphoned off by Pakistan, seized by Iran, or captured by the
Soviets.42
Relying on an intermediary to supply arms to the
rebels proved untenable for the U.S. Since the Pakistani
government favored the fundamentalist leader Gulbuddin
Heckmatyar, over 5O percent of the weapons supplied went to
his group leaving many rebels without weapons.43 In
addition to weapons being siphoned off by Pakistan, Iran
seized up to 3O Stinger missiles in June l987 and
approximately l5O Stingers were destroyed in an explosion
caused by a leaking shell at an ammunition dump. Lack of
control and distribution of arms shipments by the Pakistani
government led the U.S. to begin shipping arms directly to
Afghan leaders in August l9SB. Direct shipping of arms by
the U.S. decreased Gulbuddin Heckmatyar's and the
fundamentalist Hezb-i-Islami Party's control over the flow
of arms and ensured that moderates would play a strong role
in any future government.44
During the Iraqi invasion and brief occupation of
Kuwait, advanced U.S. weaponry was seized by Saddam Hussein.
These weapons included Tubular launched, Optically tracked,
Wire guided (TOW) antitank missiles and Improved Hawk
anti-aircraft missiles. The possibility of Saddam acquiring
4O F/A.lB multirole aircraft, ordered by Kuwait but not yet
delivered, also existed had the timing of the invasion been
different.45
U.S. arms transfers to Somalia is a more recent example
of the misuse of U.S. weapons. According to the Defense
Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), the U.S. provided in
excess of $2OO million of military aid to Somalia from
l9BO-l9S9 when aid was ceased due to the outbreak of civil
war.46 Until 3 March l99S, when the last United Nations
peacekeeping forces were withdrawn, weapons supplied over
the l98Os such as M-l6 rifles, land mines, and recoilless
rifles were being used against UN peacekeepers, some of whom
were U.S. military personnel. The U.S. overlooked the
vicious dictatorship of Mohammed Siad Barre in favor of the
larger geopolitical U.S. agenda in the Middle East,
supplying Somalia with military weapons in exchange for the
use of their ports and airfields to facilitate potential
military intervention in the Middle East.47
These recent examples of arms transfers gone awry
illustrate the dangers faced when backing a friendly
government and providing them with arms. One danger
involves the unknown longevity of the governments. It is
important to know and understand a foreign government's
opposition, both internal and external, when assessing their
reliability to protect U.S. interests. Another danger
centers on third party governments involved in U.S. arms
transfers. Their intentions may differ from those of
Washington. It is vitally important for the U.S. to clarify
its goals and intentions and hold countries acting as
intermediaries accountable for their actions to ensure
compliance with U.S. policy. To do otherwise invites
manipulation of U.S. national interests and goals.
In the cases of Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia,
Washington failed to comprehend the politics and grasp the
gravity of the situation when approval for military aid was
granted. Only by understanding such politics can the U.S.
be reassured of the viability of transferring arms abroad to
further American interests.
Could this situation happen again? In the case of
selling advanced weaponry to Iran in the l97Os, the
financial condition of Grumman Corporation, the prime
contractor for the Navy's F-l4 Tomcat aircraft, was at risk
and the U.S. could not afford to lose this company from the
defense industrial base. Intensive lobbying occurred
between Grumman, Iran, and the Defense Department in seeking
approval of this deal. Final approval was granted in part
due to the financial hardship that Grumman would have
otherwise faced without the contract; a political decision
driven by economic concerns for the U.S. defense industrial
base.
The U.S. government is concerned about maintaining the
defense industrial base, maintaining jobs for American
workers, and maintaining adequate military strength at home
while having to reduce defense spending. With shrinking
U.S. orders for weapons systems, Washington is at the horns
of a dilemma: how to maintain production capacity and
achieve economies of scale of those weapons systems being
used by the U.S. armed forces.
Previously, approval for export of American weapons
systems involved a lengthy process of checks and balances
that could take l8 months or longer, due in part to the
understaffed U.S. State Department Office of Munitions
Control. The Bush administration took positive steps to
reduce approval time after realizing long delays were
causing the U.S. defense industry economic hardship since
foreign competition undercut them with rapid approval and
delivery of ordered goods.
The U.S. State Department created the Center for
Defense Trade in l99O and tasked it with accelerating the
approval process to ensure the defense industry remains
competitive in the international market. By l99l, approval
time was reduced in most cases to ten days and the Center
continues to decrease the list of items requiring approval
for export.48 Ten days is inadequate to adequately assess
regional considerations relating to the approval for export
of most defense articles. The AECA of l976 provides some
protection by permitting the President to withhold shipment
of arms to countries if the situation dictates. However,
this law does not compel U.S. companies to notify Washington
when shipping arms once export approval has been obtained.
More concerned with revenue, there are no incentives for
defense contractors to act appropriately. The defense
contractors are not concerned with the political or domestic
situation in a foreign country; if a country wants to buy
weapons and the U.S. government will grant an export
license, defense contractors will sell them weapons. A
spokesperson at Hewlett Packard (a company that sold
advanced computers to Iraq) stated: "We [Hewlett Packard]
are not in the foreign policy business. When the guys in
the black hats can change so quickly, we look to the federal
government to help us decide who to sell to."49
Will foreign governments with whom the U.S. deals with
today be friendly, legitimate governments five or ten years
from now? Will the weapons be used for purposes other than
those for which they were originally supplied? There will
always be tradeoffs in the transfer of weapons and thus the
importance to adequately assess regional stability, the
stability of the recipient government, and how the recipient
intends to utilize the requested weapons prior to transfer.
CHAPTER 5
POST COLD WAR
The containment and the eventual defeat of communism
were the primary goals of the U.S. throughout the Cold War.
The U.S. was actively engaged in providing arms to allies
and friendly countries to such a degree that by l987, the
U.S. accounted for over 54 percent of all NATO arms exports
and this supplier role would continue to grow to over 58
percent of the NATO total during the Bush administration.50
U.S. and allied efforts to contain communism and promote
freedom, human rights, and democratic principles began to
yield results when the Iron Curtain fell in l989.
While the Cold War was subsiding, there were other
threats and challenges emerging that the U.S. and other
friendly countries would be forced to confront, such as
Saddam Hussein's aggression in the Persian Gulf region.
Whatever Saddam's ultimate goal was in his aggression into
Kuwait, the fact remained that this aggression would not be
tolerated by the U.S.
The effects of a decade of heavy U.S. defense spending
and arms transfers (varies depending on source $ll8.9
billion - $l29.8 billion51) resulted in a massive build-up
in the armed forces of the U.S., NATO allies, and other
friendly countries. The immense combat power possessed by
these countries provided the necessary means to counter
Saddam Hussein s aggressive action. The coalition's combat
power also gave credibility to earlier U.S. foreign policy
decisions which supplied U.S. allies with weapons of
sufficient quality, quantity, and interoperability. The
result of this action was the creation of an effective
political and military coalition against Saddam Hussein.
There were instances where the coalition partners faced
the potential of having to fight against their own weapons
systems. "The French public was dismayed . . . to see their
troops go up against Iraqis armed with French weaponry in
some cases even more advanced than that fielded by the
French forces."52 They had previously provided Iraq with
Mirage jet fighters armed with Exocet missiles. This,
however, has not deterred the French from continuing arms
sales abroad. In the case of fighter aircraft, the French
over the past 3O years have had to:
register foreign sales before it could go into large
scale production for the French Air Force. . . . most
notably is the . . . Mirage 2OOO, French units must
wait if a customer wants his aircraft first. . .
[they] are 'accustomed to that. . . . Without exports,
they have no program whatsoever, ' an industry source
said. 'It is their priority . . . out of necessity.53
Similar to the French, the U.S. Navy has agreed to "defer
its own deliveries of F/A-l8C/D multi-role fighters if a
[qualified] customer with the right price wants to take the
Navy's place on the production line"54 to achieve economies
of scale in production.
France is not the only country which has
transferred weapons to hostile governments. U.S. and
British advanced weapons have also made their way to Iraq
and Iran primarily during the Iran-Iraq conflict.
Fortunately for the coalition forces of the Gulf War, they
possessed the preponderance of combat power needed to offset
any advantage that Saddam may have had with the western
weapons he had accumulated.
Confronting friendly weapons remains likely with arms
transfers fast becoming the western nation's foreign policy
tool of choice to maintain regional stability and balance of
power. Not only do they accomplish the political objective
of maintaining influence within regional governments, but
they also provide significant economic rewards in terms of
economies of scale, jobs, and maintenance of the defense
industrial base.
Viewing subsequent transfer of U.S. arms to unfriendly
countries as a detriment to U.S. national interests and
foreign policy, the U.S. took action to ensure such
occurrences do not occur. Dating back to the Carter
administration, the AECA of l976 strictly forbids follow-on
transfer of U.S. arms to third party countries without the
express consent of the U.S. Unfortunately, this specific
legislation has not prevented follow-on arms transfers,
which occur with more regularity than desired. The U.S. has
encouraged Israel to transfer American made weapons to Iran,
and Saudi Arabia has transferred U.S. arms to Iran and
Syria.55 This independent action by the Saudis is in clear
violation of U.S. law, yet the U.S. chooses to ignore this
violation and continues to sell arms to them based on U.S.
national interests in the Persian Gulf region. This is the
Presidents prerogative, as allowed by law, if he deems it
is in the best interest of the U.S. national security.
According to the latest figures from the DSAA and the U.S.
State Department, the U.S. has sold over $29 billion in arms
to Saudi Arabia, in excess of 36 percent of the over $8O
billion in worldwide U.S. sales from l99O-l993.56
Violations of U.S. arms export laws by the Saudis are
not unique. Japan and Israel have also engaged in illegal
arms sales in violation of arms bans to countries such as
China, Iran, and the former Soviet Union.57 In the case of
Israel, the U.S. is in a precarious position and they are
aware of it. Israel has on numerous occasions violated U.S.
law by replicating and selling U.S. weapons systems to other
countries. Examples of these irresponsible actions include
the sale of air-to-air missiles, adapted from the U.S.
Sidewinder missile, to China and Thailand, the
re-exportation of TOW anti-tank missile technology, and the
installation or duplication of numerous U.S. electronic
components into Israeli-assembled weapons for export.58
In addition to Israel's tremendous lobby effort on
Capitol Hill, Israel is acutely aware of the U.S. position
with regard to imposing sanctions against them and has
sought to use this advantage to their benefit. The U.S.
cannot impose sanctions against Israel due to the frailty of
the situation in the Middle East. In particular, such
action would likely derail the current peace process.
CHAPTER 6
U.S. ARMS TRANSFER POLICY
U.S. Emerges as World Arms Export Leader
President Bush led the U.S. during a period of great
change throughout the world. Under his leadership, the U.S.
witnessed the fall of the Iron Curtain in l9B9, successful
coalition operations countering Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in
August l99O with Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM,
increased efforts to revive Middle East peace talks, and the
breakup of the Soviet Union in December l99l. All of these
events can be connected to U.S. participation in the arms
transfers business.
Considering the enormous amount of money invested in
arms transfers, the U.S. large industrial production base
and capacity was theoretically able to supply allies and
friendly nations with weapons at a greater rate than the
Soviet Union could supply their allies. In reality, the
Warsaw Pact countries possessed far more weapons than NATO
allies and other free countries. This disparity was a
direct result of U.S. arms restraint efforts exercised from
the early years of the Cold War until the early l98Os, when
President Reagan increased U.S. defense spending and
production.
In l99l, the U.S. emerged as the leader among arms
exporters. By l993, the U.S. market share had jumped from
57 percent the previous year to just under 73 percent of the
world market, with Britain and Russia tied for second place
with 8.8 percent of the market. From the latest data
available from the DSAA, the majority of U.S. arms transfers
in l993 were directed at three countries: Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Taiwan. Arms transfers with these countries
accounted for over 65 percent of the $33 billion in
worldwide U.S. arms transfers that year. Among the items
requested were: F-l5 and F-l6 fighter aircraft, MlA2 Abrams
main battle tanks, Patriot anti-missile batteries, and Hawk
anti-air missile batteries.
The U.S. did not emerge as the arms export leader by
simply increasing arms production and transfers, but instead
was assisted by two major events. The first event occurred
at the end of the Cold War and the second event was the
superior performance of U.S. weapons in the Gulf War.
First, the decline of the Soviet Union has caused the
Russian arms export industry to atrophy. For years, Moscow
had provided substantial subsidies to the Soviet
military-industrial complex located throughout the Warsaw
Pact countries. Now fragmented and financially distressed,
Russia can no longer provide these subsidies thus leaving
the arms industry in turmoil. Current figures from the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) indicate that Soviet
arms sales went from $l9.8 billion (4O percent of world
total) in l989 to $6.6 billion (25 percent of world total)
in l99l while figures for the U.S. during the same time
period show a drop in spending with an increase in the world
market share, from $l3.5 billion (27 percent of world total)
to $9.6 billion (38 percent of world total).6O
Secondly, the Gulf War provided excellent advertising
for U.S. weapons. The increased demand for U.S. weapons can
be attributed mainly to their superior performance over the
predominantly Soviet weaponry used by Iraq against the
coalition forces. Sales agreement estimates resulting from
the Gulf War are placed at $4O billion and this figure is
expected to grow as Persian Gulf countries plan to spend an
additional $1O billion annually until the end of the century
to offset the arms build-up in Iran. 61
The combat proven effectiveness of U.S. weapon systems
is one aspect of the overall global demand for U.S. weapons.
The reliability of the U.S. as a dependable supplier is of
equal importance. Good business sense dictates that one
must be able to service whatever is sold and the U.S. has
maintained a good reputation for providing the required
service.
The breakup of the Soviet Union and emergence of
regional ethnic conflicts within the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) has reduced the appeal of Soviet
weaponry to buyer nations. A lack of hard currency has been
a contributing factor in the reduction in arms production by
the former Soviet Union. It is undesirable to acquire arms
for which servicing by the manufacturer is not available.
The ability to provide the hardware, software, spare parts,
training, and technical support by reliable suppliers is
critical during peace and conflict. The U.S. is likely to
retain the top position among arms exporters with
demonstrated reliability as a supplier of high quality
weapons systems and associated support.
Maintaining the lead position may not deter other
countries from challenging the U.S. in arms transfers, as
evidence by the struggling Russian and CIS states.
Strapped for much needed cash to convert their defense
industries to more useful civilian purposes, there is an
excellent chance that they will forgo a portion of the
conversion and continue to produce arms for sale abroad.
This action would generate the revenue required to complete
the conversion and other domestic reforms.
Comments by several high-ranking Russian and CIS
government officials are indicative of their dire financial
position and illustrate their intent to continue activity
within the global arms arena. Note the positions these
individuals hold within their governments when assessing
their intentions to market arms. Russian President Boris
Yeltsin has commented that:
[t]oday, trading in arms is a necessity . . . . [w]e
have cut back our expenditures for defense, and for
purchasing arms in particular. A similar cutback in
arms production would have dealt an enormous blow to
the plants which make them . . . [and] would have led
to social tensions and placed millions of people on the
edge of unemployment. so trading of arms is a kind of
buffer.62
In a similar vein, Air Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov,
former Soviet Defense Minister and now Commander-in-Chief of
the CIS has commented:
we shouldn't seriously curtail arms production, both
because arms workers and their families need protection
and because the overseas arms market could be
lucrative. With profits from arms sales . . . the
nation could buy equipment to produce consumer goods.63
Likewise, Acting Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar
has expressed Russia' s intention to:
continue exporting arms to China, Iran, Syria, and
other countries. Naturally we don't intend to spark
international conflicts and deliver weapons to conflict
zones, . . . Ebjut we have absolutely no grounds to
leave this most important market.64
Finally, Boris Yeltsin's defense conversion advisor,
Mr. Malei, has argued that international arms sales must
continue since "[t]here is no other source of financing for
[defense] conversion left."65
By selling over $l billion in arms to China, $65O
million to India, $6OO million and a submarine to Iran, the
Russians indicate they are serious about selling arms to
generate cash.66 Although Russia is of questionable
reliability as a supplier nation, these arms transfers
demonstrate the ease of access to arms when they are
unavailable elsewhere. Irresponsible arms transfers such as
these provide ample justification for the U.S. to continue
marketing arms to counter regional imbalances. The U.S.
must remain in the arms transfer business as long as other
nations produce and transfer arms abroad.
Recent Efforts at Non-Proliferation
President Carter sought to control the proliferation of
arms when he announced that arms would be used only as an
"exceptional" foreign policy tool. Even with this policy,
President Carter, after cutting arms sales by over 5O
percent in his first year (from $l3.6 billion in l976 to
just over $6 billion in l977), was responsible for
increasing arms sales to $7.l billion in l978, $l2 billion
in l979, and finally to $l3.9 billion in l98O.67 Thus, even
with well-laid plans and good intentions, slowing arms sales
is no easy task, especially when their political and
economic utility is figured into the equation of foreign
policy execution.
Making a conscious choice to increase defense spending
and arms transfers, President Reagan rescinded President
Carter's arms restraint policies and embarked upon a massive
defense buildup of U.S. and allied defenses. President
Reagan's actions involving arms transfers to allies and
friendly countries were correct and justified, especially in
view of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. As a result
of the massive defense spending and arms transfer programs
on the part of the U.S., the Soviet Union felt compelled to
spend accordingly to maintain their position with respect to
the U.S. In the end, the Soviet Union collapsed into a sea
of economic disaster.
While the U.S. proceeds with arms transfers, efforts
continue to attain a consensus among major arms exporting
nations restraining arms shipments to certain regions and
collaborating on prior sales. These efforts to achieve
restraint are not new. Shortly after the Gulf War,
President Bush attempted to gain a consensus with the major
arms producing nations of Great Britain, France, Russia, and
China to restrain sale of weapons to the Middle East.
In May l99l, President Bush began urging other major
arms producing nations to exercise restraint in dealing arms
in the Middle East. This was the first such attempt by any
country to achieve an agreement between supplier nations to
cooperate in suppressing the proliferation of arms within a
region. During the series of meetings which took place, the
U.S. presented four major recommendations:
l. The world's major arms exporters should agree to
exchange information about pending sales in secret
before delivery contracts are signed.
2. Surface-to-surface missiles should not be sold to
countries in the Middle East.
3. Important new military technologies, such as
"stealth" radar avoiding materials, should not be
transferred to the region.
4. Middle East countries should not increase the
numbers of their stocks of five major types of weapons:
armored combat vehicles, tanks, fighter/attack jet
aircraft, and artillery pieces.68
These recommendations would have made the major arms
producing nations aware of changing military capabilities
within the Middle East, allowing them the opportunity to
discuss the proposed transfers which could have upset the
balance of power.
Unable to bring China fully into agreement with these
recommendations, the only significant results were basic
promises to exercise restraint and a general agreement not
to transfer any equipment related to nuclear, chemical, or
biological warfare to any other country. Had these meetings
produced more positive results, they could have been a
stepping stone to achieving greater control of worldwide
arms proliferation. The fundamental flaw with this proposal
is that the U.S., as a proponent of non-proliferation in the
Middle East, has not lived up to arms transfer restraint and
is today the single largest supplier of arms to the Middle
East.
How can the U.S. expect other countries to exercise
caution and restraint when not abiding by the very ideas
being preached to the rest of the world? Other arms
producing nations will not exercise restraint while the U.S.
establishes political influence in foreign governments in
addition to making all of the profits in a highly profitable
business.
The major arms producers all agree that restraint must
be exercised, but realize that if they do not export weapons
to the Middle East, other countries will fill the void. The
Middle Eastern countries, as well as others, will get the
weapons they want, one way or another. The real question
will remain--to what degree does the U.S. desire to
participate from both a political and economic point of
view?
Current U.S. Arms Transfer Policy
For the past 18 months the U.S. has been without a
definitive arms transfer policy. The mid-February l995
classified presidential decision directive indicates that
U.S. policy on arms transfers abroad will continue transfers
in support of U.S. national interests. However, without a
clearly defined threat to focus on, the policy is vague and
ill-defined. Approval of arms sales continue to be based
upon flexible decision making, rewarding countries that
pursue favorable policies and punishing those that do not.
The U.S. must avoid policy inconsistency in negotiating
arms deals while overlooking gross violations of U.S.
principles such as human rights. U.S. interests will, of
course, continue to weigh heavily into the decision making
process; however, playing favorites may backfire, creating
anti-American sentiment and instability within a region.
This was one of the causal factors in the Iranian debacle.
The Shah's government was known to be repressive with a
poor human rights record, yet the U.S. transferred mass
quantities of weapons to Iran. Washington failed to
recognize the degree of anti-American sentiment present
throughout Iran due to the citizens' view of the U.S. as a
hypocritical nation that condoned the wrongful actions of
the Shah and his government.
The decision by President Clinton to maintain the
status quo with regard to arms sales, while fully supported
by the State Department and Defense Department, is contrary
to the desires of the ACDA. Established in l96l as an
independent government agency to advise the President on
arms control matters and provide assessments of proposed
arms sales with respect to their impact on regional balances
and future arms control between countries, the ACDA pleaded
for greater arms transfer restraint.
U.S. government agencies have differing points of view,
goals, and objectives. For instance, the State Department
looks for ways to gain influence with other nations in the
furtherance of U.S. interests, and the transfer of weapons
has proven to be a useful tool. This tool is particularly
effective today considering the current high demand for U.S.
weapons systems. The Defense Department, on the other hand,
is interested in arms sales to maintain the U.S. defense
industrial base, important for future development of
advanced weapons systems. In addition, these sales produce
economies of scale in production and help to finance the
future research and development of the follow-on systems.
The end result for the Defense Department is increased
purchasing power with a greatly reduced budget.
Lastly, the ACDA feels that the U.S. will continue to
supply friendly nations with conventional weapons in the
execution of foreign policy. A foreign nation's perception
of vulnerability to external threats is the driving factor
in their requests for arms transfers. In reviewing such
requests, the ACDA seeks to determine if such transfers will
reduce this vulnerability and relieve the recipient of any
pressure to seek out WMDs as the answer to their security
needs. Officials within the ACDA view this continued
transfer of conventional weapons as potential fuel for
nations within regions to attempt to meet or exceed the
capability held by their neighbors.7O
Ideally, U.S. transfers of weapons should be based upon
their use for defensive purposes and as deterrents to
aggression within supplied regions. Providing arms to help
a country build up an offensive capability is not in the
best interest of the U.S. and therefore should not be a part
of the U.S. arms transfer policy. Although many weapons
systems, such as jet fighters, can be used both defensively
and offensively, the U.S. must maintain tight control over
such transfers ensuring they are used for intended purposes.
This tight control remains the only method by which the U.S.
can provide security assurances to neighboring countries.
One country acquiring more capable weapon systems will drive
others within the region to demand equal treatment.
Such is the case with Israel, which has remained
relatively quiet over U.S. decisions to transfer large
numbers of advanced fighters such as the F-l5 to Saudi
Arabia. Israel knows that the U.S. will not allow another
country in the Middle East to attain a superior offensive
capability over them and that Washington will provide Israel
with offsetting capabilities. If Washington allows another
country to provide the arms requested, the U.S. will suffer,
both politically in the loss of potential influence with the
foreign government and potential anti-American sentiment,
and economically in the loss of revenue for the defense
contractors and increased unit costs for U.S. military
weapons.
As the U.S. weapons increase in cost, foreign customers
will be driven elsewhere for less expensive weapons. Unlike
their foreign competitors who receive substantial subsidies
from their governments, the U.S. weapons manufacturers are
private enterprises and are thus ineligible to receive
subsidies from the U.S. government. This highlights the
need for economies of scale as a critical factor in the
manufacturing process if U.S. companies are to remain
competitive in the arms market.
In addition to the ACDA seeking restraint in the
transfer of weapons abroad, there have been ongoing efforts
by Democratic lawmakers as well as public interest groups
such as the Federation of American Scientists who have been
advocating arms restraint for a number of years with little
success. time the U.S. contemplates arms restraint
there is an overriding national interest concern that leads
to tabling the action. All talk and no action best
describes current U.S. efforts at restraint.
CHAPTER 7
THE FUTURE
As countries, new and old, maneuver for position in the
emerging new world order, U.S. arms transfers continue to
play a vital part in maintaining its national interests and
regional stability. Recent events in the former Soviet
Union demonstrate the importance of a strong U.S. arms
transfer policy in addition to monitoring the advancements
of Russia political and economic position to ensure u.s.
national interests are not jeopardized.
The economic and industrial strength of the U.S. during
the course of the Cold War literally drove the Soviet Union
to financial ruin as they concentrated on weapons production
instead of more pressing domestic issues. The defense
industrial prioritization by the Soviets helped fuel
internal dissension among their citizens with cries for
political, social, and economic reforms to reestablish some
semblance of normal life in the country. This situation
became evident with the demise of the Soviet Union and the
financial condition which Russia and the CIS found
themselves in l99l and still suffer from today. They are
striving very hard to make a market economy work in spite of
their collapsed economy. So desperate are the Russians that
"officials warn that they cannot deal with the political and
social consequences of collapse in defense] industry
that employs tens of millions of people."72
Faced with financial disaster and an outmoded
industrial base to produce revenue, these countries are
turning to the quickest and easiest way to make
money--weapons sales by any means possible. Confusion over
command of the military forces and equipment (due to the
establishment of new borders within the former Soviet Union)
generates legitimate concern that a lack of control will
result in the sale of lethal weapons to rogue governments
and other hostile organizations. The Russians have in
essence "thrown open the doors on a backcountry yard sale,
offering all corners bargains on everything from highly
sophisticated conventional-weapons systems to rare and
strategic metals."73 Most of the Russian arms sales are
from their own armed forces' inventories and from continued
production of military equipment produced while a member of
the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.
Recent fighting within Chechnya has found "Russian
officers, conscripts, and enlistees . . . contributing to
their own heavy losses by selling weapons and ammunition to
their Chechen separatist enemies."74 Although this
equipment is in most cases older and less sophisticated than
what is currently being produced by the U.S. and her allies,
it is still lethal and is above all being offered at prices
well below current market rates, in some cases even below
the cost of actual production. As part of a 6O percent
reduction in military defense spending by the Russians in
l992, there were 6O MIG-29s waiting on a Russian flightline
awaiting a buyer. According to Anatoly Belosvet, the MIG
design bureau's vice president, Moscow will sell these
aircraft to any country that wants them. Russian
unabashed and blatant sales campaign strategy tends to
create an environment conducive to arms proliferation in
regions that should not be participating in such activities.
Russia continues to pursue political influence in
foreign governments as they re-solidify their position as a
world power. They have every intention of using arms
transfers to aid them in establishing their world political
position and rebuilding their economic base. This action by
Moscow has serious implications for the U.S. The Russian
lack of control and sale of military hardware to anyone
without regard for the consequences could lead to
destabilization of regions important to the U.S. national
interests. Washington is obligated to counter these sales
with arms transfers to friendly nations to maintain balance
of power, regional stability, and to protect U.S. national
interests in regions of instability caused by irresponsible
transfers.
Being the leader of the free world is not an easy role
to play from the perspective of being a producer and
exporter of arms. While there have been many attempts to
restrict the transfer of U.S. arms, all have generally
failed to control the worldwide proliferation of
conventional arms. This failure has occurred for a number
of reasons, primarily due to transfers for U.S. national
security and U.S. national interests in regions to which
arms are transferred.
The U.S. cannot continue to arm ruthless dictators and
expect them to maintain long-term regional stability for any
length of time. Recent studies indicate that over 9O
percent of U.S. arms transfers go to "friendly" governments
that happen to be non-elected or dictatorship type
governments around the world.76 The susceptibility of these
types of governments to internal discord continues to pose a
threat to U.S. national security due to unforeseen
governmental changes and their impact on regional stability.
Within the Persian Gulf region, Saudi Arabia is a
country where an Iran-like disaster could occur. It is a
kingdom (non-elected government) with a poor human rights
record, yet it remains the U.S. number one arms customer,
similar to Iran in the l97Os. Saudi Arabia has become
Washington's stalwart in the Persian Gulf region, receiving
over $3O billion in U.S. arms alone since l99O, many of them
high-technology weapons.77 Imagine the impact this arsenal
could have in the region if the Saudi government were
replaced with radical anti-American militants as occurred
with Iran in l979 and they had only received a grand
total of $1O billion in arms from l959-l979.78 Currently,
the citizens of Saudi Arabia appear content with the
government's handling of local, national, and international
affairs, but this could change suddenly with the emergence
of radical religious groups. The Persian Gulf region
remains an area of interest to the U.S. and requires
constant care in handling political, military, and economic
issues that arise since vital U.S. national interests remain
there.
Other areas of concern involve lesser developed Third
World countries, such as those located within Africa. These
countries are struggling daily to sustain their people with
the basics of life such as food, water, and shelter.
Of the world's 82 armed conflicts in l989-92 . . . in
which more than 1,OOO people were killed [in each
conflict], 79 took place within borders: in places
like Angola, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, even Indian
Kashmir. . . . In l99O-9l Angola spent a bigger share
of GDP on its army than Iraq did; Ethiopia -- then a
military dictatorship -- spent 5O percent more than
Israel.79
These countries should not be concerned with obtaining
the most advanced weapons since they cannot afford them. In
addition, they do not have enough people to operate and
maintain them. They need to develop their infrastructure
and provide for their people, as opposed to buying up mass
quantities of arms. Although they do have legitimate
security concerns fueled by a history of external
aggression, they should concentrate on less costly systems
due to the requirements (operation, training, and
maintenance) and cost of more advanced weaponry.
Consideration of the national security threat is
paramount when building forces. Countries seeking to
develop credible counter forces provide the U.S. with an
excellent opportunity to politically influence these
countries in concert with U.S. national interests. The U.S.
can exercise assertive global leadership by encouraging and
assisting them to assess the threat, then by helping them to
confront it. One possible solution to their security needs
is the use of alliances to counter the threat, but the
country must possess capable weapons to be an active
participant.
So what is the solution? Unfortunately, there is not a
good solution other than arms exporting nations refraining
from introducing advanced weaponry into these grossly
underdeveloped areas. With the glut of older weapons
readily available on the open market and major suppliers of
arms "no longer constrained by the bounds of superpower
loyalties; the only thing that counts now is cash."80
Since it is near impossible to prevent developing
countries from acquiring weapons and considering the
interdependence of world economies, efforts must be made to
provide developing countries with less technical weaponry to
make them feel secure. These countries need not bankrupt
themselves arming against a perceived, yet nonexistent
threat. Making these countries secure while keeping them
financially solvent will only work if all arms exporting
nations agree not to introduce higher technology weapons
into the region. Such an agreement would provide a real
opportunity for controlling arms proliferation in these
areas.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Although the U.S. derives many benefits from
transferring arms worldwide, there must be renewed emphasis
on the control of these transfers. The U.S. must look
beyond what is of immediate benefit to its' economy and
consider how other nations respond to the pressures and
influences they are being subjected to. As the U.S. strives
to maintain the technological edge in weapons, it is
important that this quest does not contribute to the
uncontrolled proliferation of arms.
Until a single threat emerges in this post-Cold War
era, such as communism did after World War II, it will be
difficult to gain a consensus among arms exporters with
regard to controlling arms transfers. Economics will
continue to be a major consideration for the transfer of
arms in the future. The ability of a country to participate
in regional politics is linked to both a strong economic
base and their ability to apply political and military
pressure against potential aggressors. Countries throughout
the world, the U.S. included, will not forgo revenue
generated from arms transfers as long as there are buyers.
Retaining the ability to favorably influence foreign
governments while controlling the transfer of weapons
technology remains paramount for the protection of U.S.
interests and control of worldwide arms proliferation. In a
world of complex political and economic interdependence
issues, the U.S. policy towards arms transfers must be
pragmatic and forward-looking, emphasizing responsible
control of weapons technology transferred to all regions,
especially those of questionable stability.
NOTES
1Gordon K. Sullivan, "Projecting Strategic Land Combat
Power," Joint Force Quarterly, l (Summer l993), 9, quoted in
Summer Benson, "Shaping Arms Export Policy," Joint Force
Quarterly 6 (Autumn/Winter l994.95), 84.
2Warren Storable, "Foreign-Policy Team Vows to Look
Beyond Hot Spots to Long-Term Goals," Washington (DC) Times,
l9 January l993, Sec. A7.
3Arthur G. Atkins, "U.S Again Captures Title Of No. l
Arms Exporter," Arms Control Today 24, (September l994)
3l.
4Jeffrey Smith, "Clinton Rejects Bid To Rein In Arms
Sales," Washington (DC) Post, l7 February l995, Sec. A9.
5Department of Defense, Defense Institute of Security
Assistance Management (DISAM), Management of Security
Assistance l4 ed. (Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio: Defense
Institute of Security Assistance Management, l994), 10-l1.
6President George Washington, "Farewell Address" l7
September l796, in Speeches of the American Presidents, eds.
Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin (New York: The H. W. Wilson
Company, l988), l9.
7Geoffrey Kemp, "The Continuing Debate over U.S. Arms
Sales: Strategic Needs and the Quest for Arms Limitations,"
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 535, (September l994): l48.
8Warren F. Kimball, Most Unsordid Act, Lend-Lease
l939-l94l (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, l969), 2.
9Collier, 236.
lOPresident Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "The Arsenal of
Democracy" 29 December l94O, Speeches of the American
Presidents, ed. Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin (New York:
The H. W. Wilson Company, l988), 5O5.
11DISAM, l3.
12Collier, 227.
13Martin Edmonds, "International Military Equipment
Procurement Partnerships: The Basic Issues," in
International Arms Procurement, New Directions ed. Martin
Edmonds (New York: Peramon Press, l93l), 4.
14President Harry S. Truman. "Address of the President
of the U.S.--Greece, Turkey and the Middle East,"
Congressional Record (l2 March l947), vol. 93, pt 2 & 3,
l98O-l98l.
15Amos A. Jordon, William J Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence
Korb, American National Security, 4th ed. (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, l993), 67-68.
16Jordon, 68.
17Collier, 273.
18U.S. Department of State, "North Atlantic Treaty," 4
April l949, Treaties and Other International Agreements of
the U.S. of America: l776-l949 vol. 4 (Washington, DC:
Dept. of State Publication 852l, l97O), 829.
19Andrew J. Pierre, Arms Transfers and American Foreign
Policy (New York: New York University Press, l979), 35,
quoted in Management of Security Assistance, l6.
20R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Seen as Contributing to Arms
Proliferation," Washington (DC) Post, 2l June l99l, Sec. A5.
21Jordon, 282.
22Jordon, 72.
23National Security Act of l954, 22 U.S. Code § l8ll
(l954)
24President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the
Presidents of the U.S., l957 (Washington DC: Government
Printing Office, l958), l3.
25Eisenhower, 7-9.
26Jordan, 45l.
27Foreign Assistance Act of l96l, 22 U.S. Code § 23ll,
23l2, and 23l3 (l96l).
28Foreign Assistance Act of l96l, 22 U.S. Code § 23l4
(l96l).
29Robert A. Manning, "New Sellers in Arms Bazaar," U.S.
News & World Report, 3 February l986, 38.
30Anne Hessing Cahn and others, Controlling Future Arms
Trade (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, l977), l26.
31Cahn, 34.
32Arms Export Control Act of l976, 22 U.S. Code § 275l,
2753, and 23O4 (l976).
33DISAM, 21.
34President Jimmy Carter, "State of the Union Message" 23
January l98O, Speeches of the American Presidents, ed. Janet
Podell and Steven Anzovin (New York: The H. W. Wilson
Company, l988), 736.
35Samuel P. Huntington, "The Evolution of U.S. National
Strategy," in U.S. National Security Strategy for the l99Os,
ed. Daniel J Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, l99l), l7.
36Jordan, 83.
37DISAM, 32.
38DISAM, 33.
39DISAM, 33.
40Carroll J. Doherty, "Bid to Sell Jets to Pakistan May
Provoke Fight on Hill," Congressional Quarterly, 9 April
l994, 85l.
41"U.S. -Pakistan Ties Show Signs of Strain," U.S. News &
World Report, 9 September l985, 5l.
42Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons
of Modern War vol. 3, Afghan and Falklands Conflicts
(San Francisco: Westview Press, l99O), l74, 232.
43"Arm Us, But Don't Push Us," Economist, 27 August l988,
23.
44Cordesman, 72, 78, 84.
45Morrison, l8; Russ Britt, "Selling Weapons Abroad," Los
Angeles (CA) Daily News, 1O March l99l, Sec. F8.
46DSAA, 318
47William D. Hartung, "Somalia and the Cycle of Arms
Sales," Christian Science Monitor, February l993, l8.
48Peter Montgomery, "Re-Arm the World," Common Cause
Magazine May/June l99l, 27.
49Montgomery, 26.
5OU.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, l99l-l992 22nd
ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, l994), l5.
51ACDA, l35; U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security
Assistance Agency (DSAA), Foreign Military Sales, Foreign
Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts
(Washington, DC: FMS Control & Reports Division,
Comptroller, DSAA, l993), 2.
52David C. Morrison, "To Arms," National Journal, 2
January l993, l4.
53John Tirpak, "World Market Forces Improved Military
Exports," Aviation Week & Space Technology, l4 February
l994, 56.
54Tirpak, 55.
55"Arms Policy: Dodges, Winks, and Nods," New York
Times, 25 April l992, Sec. A22.
56 DSAA, 3.
57David Hoffman and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Israel Arms Sales
Illegal, U.S. Finds," Washington (DC)Post l4 March l992,
Sec. Al; David Sanger, "Japanese Plead Guilty in Iran Arms
Sales," New York Times, l2 March l992, Sec. Dl.
58Hoffman, Sec. Al.
59Atkins, 3l; DSAA, 2, 64, 11O, l28; Eric Schmitt, "U.S.
Arms Merchants Fatten Share of Sales to Third World," New
York Times, 2 August l994, Sec. A6; John D. Morrocco,
"Regional Arms Sales Seen Leveling Off," Aviation Week &
Space Technology, l November l993, 52.
60ACDA, l35.
61Charles P. Wallace, "Arms Race, Round 2," Los Angeles
Times 23 March l993, Sec. H5.
62Fred Hiatt, "Russia Boosts Weapons Sales to Aid
Economy," Washington (DC) Post, 23 February l992, Sec. Al.
63Hiatt, Sec. Al.
64Margaret Shapiro, "Russian Reformer Pledges Arms
Sales," Washington (DC) Post, 3 December l992, Sec. A29.
65Daniel Sneider, "Russian Armsmakers Take Off on Their
Own," Christian Science Monitor, 25 November l992, 6.
66Shapiro, A29.
67DSAA, 2.
68Peter Crier, "Attempt to Cut Arms Sales Makes No
Progress So Far," Christian Science Monitor, l June l992, 9.
69R. Jeffrey Smith, "Clinton Rejects Bid to Rein In Arms
Sales," Sec. A9.
70A source, high ranking official at a national agency,
who wishes to remain anonymous, interview by author, 9
February l995.
71R. Jeffrey Smith, "Clinton Rejects Bid to Rein in Arms
Sales," Sec. A9.
72Sneider, 6.
73Jonathan Beaty, "Russia's Yard Sale," l8 April
l994, 52.
74James Rupert, "Russians Sell Arms to Foes in Chechnya,"
Washington (DC) Post, l8 February l995, Sec. Al.
75Sneider, 6.
76Bruce Allen and Michael Closson, "We're No. l in the
Arms Bazaar, Los Angeles (CA) Times, 3 May l994, Sec. B7.
77DSAA, l28.
78DSAA, lO2.
79"Peddling Death to the Poor," Economist, 4 June l994,
43.
80Frank Smith, "Cashing in on Rwanda's Genocide," New
Statesman & Society, 29 July l994, l6.
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