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The United States Military and Domestic Peacekeeping
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA National - Military Strategy
Title: The United States Military and Domestic Peacekeeping 
Author: Major Lawrence P. Stawicki USMC 
Research Questions: What has been the military's role in 
domestic peacekpeeing and what should it be in the future? 
Discussion: There are some in the United States who argue that 
there is no authority under Title lO of the United States Code 
(U.S.C.) to use the military to quell civil disorder except under 
circumstances equivalent to war. Others argue that the military 
mission is to help civil authorities protect life and property, 
preserve social values, and maintain the tradition of individual 
liberty together with social order. Probably most citizens feel 
that when civil disorder occurs, "something must be done." It is 
generally accepted that National Guard units are the first line 
of defense, and if they are insufficient, that active duty forces 
reinforce them. It is the latter argument this paper supports. 
Using military units to enforce civil law is distasteful and 
dangerous, but it is preferable to lawlessness and anarchy. 
While abusive use of military forces in the domestic sphere can 
cause untold destruction to domestic values and political and 
social structure, judicious arrangements can nurture, support and 
bolster internal institutions and morale. 
Conclusions: The use of the military in domestic peacekeeping 
missions to preserve order and backup civilian police has a long 
history. This mission is both justified and constitutional. 
Indicators suggest that the use of the military to again perform 
a domestic peacekeeping mission is very likely. The need for the 
military to be trained and ready to execute this mission is 
Chapter 							Page 
The Whiskey Rebellion 					5 
The Slavery Issue 					7 
Reconstruction 						8 
Labor Strife 						9 
The Great Depression 					ll 
The World War II Years 					l2 
Civil Rights and Urban Race Riots 			l4 
The Antiwar Movement 					l8 
Surveillance Operations 				2O 
Drug Enforcement 						2l 
The l992 Los Angeles Riot 				22 
The Constitution 						25 
The Early Laws 						27 
The Posse Comitatus Act of l878 			3O 
The l97O's 							32 
The l98l Amendments 					34 
The l988 Amendments 					35 
Title lO, United States Code 				37 
Department of Defense Directives 			4l 
Command and Control 					46 
Training 							48 
Direct Intervention 					5O 
Force Selection 						5l 
The Media 							52 
Crime 							56 
A Widening Gap 						57 
The Family 							58 
Immigration 						6O 
NOTES 							65 
To the conscience of the nation that fancies itself the 
world's greatest democracy, the idea of military intrusion into 
the affairs of civil government is profoundly repugnant. In 
l972, for example, the United States Supreme Court, through Chief 
Justice Warren Burger, had occasion to recall the "traditional 
and strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into 
civilian affairs. That tradition has deep roots in our 
history.. ." (Laird v. Tatum, 4O8 U.S. l,l5). Again in l974 the 
same Chief Justice observed on behalf of the court that even 
where some form of government force is warranted "the decision to 
involk military power has traditionally been viewed with 
suspicion and skepticism since it often involves the temporary 
suspension of some of our most cherished rights..."  (Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 4l6 U.S. 232, 246).1 
This aversion to domestic peacekeeping is found in the 
military as well. Beginning in l884, when officers in the 
military accepted their commissions they took an oath "to support 
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all 
enemies, foreign and domestic."2  Whether in the l9th or 2Oth 
century, officers have much preferred confronting foreign enemies 
than domestic ones. The professional soldier's preference for 
national defense over internal peacekeeping in part prevented the 
military from becoming a national gendarmerie, but, in the final 
analysis, the decision to intervene was a political act. Under 
the Constitution, that decision belonged to civilian leaders, and 
military men wanted it that way.3
The professional soldier dislikes domestic duty for a 
variety of reasons. Military men and women see themselves as the 
defenders of a nation from foreign enemies using organized armed 
forces. This is not only their reason for existence; it is the 
job they want to concentrate on! Diversionary tasks, such as 
fighting forest fires, assisting in flood relief programs, or 
performing police work, detract from their ability to meet 
foreign enemies. Finally, professional soldiers abhor a 
situation that pits them against their fellow citizens, who often 
may be veterans. Everything about the suppression of domestic 
disorder in fact, violates the professional soldiers' code and 
their view of themselves.4 
It would be easier if defending the country involved only 
foreign enemies. It would be easier if all civil disorder could 
be controlled by our civil police forces. But that is not the 
case. At times our country needs help from its military and no 
one ever said those times would be easy or fair. When the United 
States is involved in very real wars in our cities and at our 
borders, the military cannot justify a reluctance to participate 
on the grounds that they must stand ready to fight a major 
conflict that fewer and fewer Americans believe will occur. 
Reluctance to take part because it is unglamorous, degrading, or 
too difficult may lead to reduced confidence and support for the 
The growing threat of international terrorism, its domestic 
imitators and civil disobedience on a major scale, and the need 
for a response beyond the capabilities of the civil authority 
raises serious questions that need to be faced with realism. The 
United States thus far has not experienced the type of terrorism 
and civil disobedience that has threatened the very existence of 
some Latin American countries or that has so radically altered 
the quality of life even in several quite stable European 
countries. Although it would be alarmist to suggest that such 
possibilities were imminent, it would be irresponsible to 
discount the eventuality entirely. Experience elsewhere has 
shown that when terrorism and civil disorder reach a certain 
level of intensity, the only appropriate response is a military 
The most fundamental right any government owes its citizens 
is personal safety - the right to live, work, and move about 
peaceably, secure in one's person and property. The fear of 
civil disorder dissolves the social fabric that binds Americans 
together into a community of common experience. It turns 
strangers into enemies, unfamiliar ground into dangerous turf, 
and random social contact into risky business. When civil 
disorder afflicts a neighborhood, those who can avoid it, stay 
away; those who cannot, suffer alone. The former becomes 
isolated, the latter abandoned.6 
It is the intent of this paper to explore the subject of the 
military's role in domestic peacekeeping. I will build a 
foundation by first addressing some historical and legal 
background information on the subject. Next I will examine the 
current laws and directives that guide the military in the 
controversial issue of intervention into domestic law 
enforcement. Lastly, I will explore some issues for 
consideration and reasons for concern. Hopefully, this argument 
will demonstrate why the military needs to be ready to execute a 
domestic peacekeeping mission, what areas of this execution 
require more attention, and that a domestic peacekeeping mission 
will assuredly be a mission the military receives in the future. 
The military cannot stand idly by while U. S. cities are 
being destroyed and citizens are being murdered during a civil 
disorder. The American people will tolerate nothing less from 
its Armed Forces than a quick, decisive, and professional 
response. The military must be ready and willing to protect the 
nation against its domestic enemies. 
It is important to review U. S. history to understand the 
issue of domestic peacekeeping. Just as we study battles and 
campaigns to be proficient at fighting major conventional wars, 
so too must we study domestic disorders to become proficient in 
executing our domestic peacekeeping missions. The mistakes made 
in the past can be avoided if we learn from history. Writing a 
complete history of the military's involvement in domestic 
disorders is well beyond the scope of this paper, therefore, I 
will focus on selected pivotal events in which the U. S. military 
was called upon to respond. 
The Whiskey Rebellion 
The first use of federal forces to suppress organized 
resistance to United States law was in the Whiskey Rebellion in 
l794. The farmers of western Pennsylvania displayed open and 
violent resistance to the collection of a federal tax on whiskey. 
President George Washington issued a proclamation in August l794 
calling upon the tax resisters to obey the law. Resistance 
persisted, however, and the administration decided to enforce
By employing federal troops Washington was aware that he was 
setting a precedent, thus he pursued with caution. In September 
l794 Washington issued another proclamation and sent three peace 
commissioners to Pittsburgh, the center of opposition, to 
negotiate with the rebels. When it became clear that 
negotiations would fail, Washington nationalized l2,95O 
militiamen, a force approximately the same size as the 
Continental Army of the Revolution. Washington, along with the 
governors of three states, personally led the military expedition 
into western Pennsylvania. Although the militia encountered 
evidence of western discontent, it met with no rebel force.1 
Events after the militia's rendezvous were in fact anticlimactic. 
The rebellion burned itself out, in part because the rebels 
realized the administration intended to use force. By the time 
the Federal Force reached the Pittsburgh area, resistance had 
collapsed. Federal marshals arrested twenty men at random and 
sent them to Philadelphia for trial. Two were convicted of 
treason, but Washington pardoned both.2 
Washington recognized that federal military intervention in 
a situation that normally called for civil law enforcement was a 
potentially explosive political act. He went beyond the letter 
of the law to obtain prior support from state authorities and the 
general public before calling for a military expedition. He was 
also careful to subordinate the military to civilian authority.3 
The first threat of the use of federal force was not only a 
precedent setting event but it was also a genuine test of the 
federal government's ability to control disorder and enforce the 
The Slavery Issue 
For over eight years after the Whisky Rebellion, nearly all 
federal interventions dealt in some manner with the turbulence 
connected with slavery and its abolition.4 
The intensification of the antislavery issue in the l85O's 
produced mounting challenges to civil authority, and government 
officials used state and national troops to enforce unpopular 
policies in an increasingly divided society. The difficulty was 
with the compromise of l850 and in particular with the Fugitive 
Slave Law. This law provided for the return of runaway slaves 
and denied the fugitives the right to testify or seek writs of 
habeas corpus against their removal. Federal judges or special 
commissioners were given power to call out a "posse comitatus 
composed of federal troops, militia or other citizens if 
necessary to return fugitive slaves. Posse comitatus is the body 
of men that a sheriff or other peace officer calls or may call to 
his assistance in the discharge of his official duty, as to quell 
a riot or make an arrest (Randon House Dictionary l984). In l85l 
in Christiana, Pennsylvania, the government used a Marine 
detachment to suppress an anti-slavery riot when armed Free 
Negroes drove off a posse of federal officers seeking to 
recapture four fugitive slaves. 
In l854, in Boston, fifty thousand demonstrators assembled 
to block the return of one slave to his southern owner. It took 
federal marshals, twenty-two militia companies, a battalion of 
regular soldiers, and a company of Marines, a total of sixteen 
hundred men to restore order. This has been the largest posse 
comitatus in the nation's history. This action was requested by 
U. S. Marshals, in conjunction with the Mayor and authorized by 
President Franklin Pierce.6 
Attorney General Caleb Cushing explained later that a 
marshal's call for a posse obligated not only civilians but any 
and all organized forces whether militia of the state or 
officers, soldiers, sailors, and Marines of the United States. 
Except for a few instances in northern cities in the late l85O's, 
this broad assertion, the so-called Cushing Doctrine, was little 
used until the Reconstruction era following the Civil War.7 
On l6 October, l859 President James Buchanan dispatched 
three companies of artillery, and a detachment of Marines in 
response to John Brown's raid on the federal arsenal at Harpers 
Ferry. The commander of the force, Colonel Robert E. Lee, 
arrived on the scene on l9 October. After a brief negotiation 
the Marines stormed the building, killing two of the 
abolitionists and losing one of their own men. Brown and six 
other survivors were tried and executed for conspiracy to incite 
a slave insurrection and treason against the state of Virginia.8 
Following the Civil War, the U. S. Army, for the first and 
only time in it's history, executed the mission as an army of 
occupation within the United States. President Andrew Johnson 
divided the Southern States into five military districts and the 
Army assisted law enforcement officers in enforcing 
reconstruction policies. In addition, the Army was used to 
control the illegal production of liquor, to suppress labor 
disputes, and even to collect taxes.9 
The enforcement of civil law by federal forces caused 
intense controversy and opposition in the Southern States and in 
the Democratically controlled Congress. By l878, most 
congressmen decided that using the military to enforce the law 
was counter-productive.10
The result was that Congress passed the so-called Posse 
Comitatus Act of lB78, prohibiting the use of the military in law 
enforcement.11  This act will be analyzed in greater detail in 
Chapter III. 
Labor Strife 
Industrial disorders dominated federal intervention from 
l877 to the early l920'S. In most cases, regular Army units, 
occasionally augmented by Marine Corps detachments, were 
committed at the request of state officials who were unable to 
restore order with state and local law enforcement agencies.12 
In l877 railroad strikes began when the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad cut wages for a second time that year during an economic 
depression. With over l00,000 workers idle, violence erupted in 
many cities and property was destroyed in Baltimore and 
Pittsburgh. President Rutherford B. Hayes deployed two thousand 
regular troops who rushed from city to city to put down 
rebellious strikers.13  was the first time the Army was used 
to break a strike since the l830's. The display of federal force 
helped end the strike as well as the violence.14
As a result of the violence of l877 the states began to 
rebuild the National Guard and train them in riot control. Many 
Governors, however, were reluctant to use the military in labor 
disputes due to voters sympathy for workers. Also, a number of 
industrial states, led by Pennsylvania, created a new 
paramilitary instrument, the State Police. This new paramilitary 
concept quickly spread to other states including New York and New 
After the l89O's Congress generally followed a policy of 
maintaining federal troops under the direct control of the 
President and using them to preserve order rather than assisting 
management in crushing organized labor. President Theodore 
Roosevelt spurned persistent calls from Colorado in l903 and l9O4 
to provide federal troops to police strike disorders in the 
Cripple Creek mining region. The President sent an Army officer 
to investigate the situation. The officer reported that the 
state had the resources to control the disorder and that federal 
troops were not needed. In l9O7 President Roosevelt granted a 
request from Nevada too hastily; once the federal force reached 
the disturbed area little disorder was found. An infuriated 
Roosevelt then ordered the commander of the force not to assist 
Nevada officials. Following Roosevelt's example in l9O3 many 
presidents sent Army officers or a civilian representative to 
survey the disorder before deciding to commit troops.16 
In l9l4, as a result of the Ludlow Massacre, in which two 
women and eleven children were killed when company guards and 
Colorado militiamen destroyed a tent city of striking coal miners 
and their families, and following open warfare in which at least 
fifty persons were killed, President Woodrow Wilson agreed to the 
governor s request for federal troops. The President, however, 
made it clear publicly that the soldiers were to restore order, 
not to assist the mine owners in breaking the strike. 
Consequently, he requested that the Colorado National Guard be 
withdrawn, that everyone in the region including company guards 
and local police be disarmed, and that strikebreakers not be 
brought in by the mining companies. Strikers welcomed the 
seventeen hundred troops with cheers and a brass band. In 
contrast to previous similar disturbances, the troops acted under 
federal orders only, with no pretense of cooperation with state 
and local officials and were withdrawn some six months later.' 
The Great Depression 
In the l92O's in addition to the courses at the Army Command 
and General Staff College on more effective use of troops during 
civil disorder the intelligence officers put together a 
domestic contingency plan to fight civil disorders. Among the 
so-called Rainbow Plans (color-coded for different world 
adversaries) was Emergency Plan White, a detailed outline for 
Army intervention to suppress radical, Communist-led civil 
disorders and armed insurrection if they occurred, within the 
United States.18
In l932 the Army used a modified form of Emergency Plan 
White against the so-called Bonus Army, an assemblage of 
unemployed veterans and their families who had come to the 
nation's capital at the depth of the Great Depression to petition 
Congress for an immediate cash payment of their "bonus" for 
service in World War I. When Congress rejected them many left, 
but many did not. The Washington Police Force tried to remove 
the remaining two thousand of the Bonus Army but in the 
confrontation two policemen and two veterans were killed. 
President Hoover called on the U.S. Army Troops to evict the 
veterans from their encampment. The troops were led by the Chief 
of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur. With his young aide, Major 
Dwight D. Eisenhower at his side, MacArthur employed infantry, 
cavalry, tanks, and tear gas to clear the veterans out of their 
shanties, which were then set on fire. President Hoover, 
MacArthur, and the Army were subsequently criticized for 
excessive use of force. The actions, however, were successful 
and the Bonus Army left the capital.19 
The World War II Years 
Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December l94l, 
President Roosevelt assigned protection of defense plants to the 
Army. Military Intelligence (G-2) established a network of 
thousands of informants in its defense-plant protection system. 
Military forces were used many times during the war to maintain 
defense production. In the summer of l94l Roosevelt used twenty- 
five hundred troops to enable strikebreakers to continue 
production at the North American Aviation plant in Los Angeles 
which was under a wildcat strike. The strike ended a month 
later. Once the United States entered the war, Congress 
specifically empowered the President to seize industrial 
facilities where war production was threatened by labor 
Additionally, President Roosevelt, under pressure from the 
Army and Navy and from western economic and political groups, 
authorized the War Department in February l942 to remove the 
approximately 7,OOO Japanese aliens and some l00,000 Americans of 
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast and intern them in prison-
like camps in remote areas of California, the Midwest, and the 
Rocky Mountain states. Run by a civilian agency, the War 
Relocation Authority, the camps were guarded by soldiers of the 
U. S. Army. The Army was responsible for the movement of these 
people and management of the camps until the emergency regulation 
was lifted on 2 January l945. Similar actions took place in 
Hawaii as well as the imposition of martial law.21 
The Army was used to restore order in the summer of l943 in 
Detroit when in June, race riots turned into a full-scale war. 
The governor of Michigan requested federal assistance. By the 
time the Army arrived twenty-five blacks and nine whites had been 
killed and more than 7OO people had been injured. In August 
l944, when a protest strike in Philadelphia against upgrading 
black transportation workers led to interracial clashes, 
Roosevelt sent federal troops, who quickly restored order. 
Civil Rights and Urban Race Riots 
The primary domestic use of the U. S. Army in the late 
l95O's and l96O's was in response to the civil rights revolution 
that established equal legal rights for African-Americans. 
President Eisenhower found himself in such a position in l957. 
Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas defied a federal court order 
directing the racial integration of Central High School in Little 
Rock. Faubus not only denounced the court but ordered out the 
Arkansas National Guard to halt integration.23  Eisenhower's  
Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, had cautioned the President 
that if Faubus persisted, Federal action was unavoidable. 
Eisenhower was already on record against using the military to 
enforce Supreme Court rulings on civil rights, having told a 
press conference in July l957 that "I can't imagine any set of 
circumstances that would ever induce me to send federal troops 
to enforce a court order.  continued defiance, and his 
calling out and then removing the Arkansas National Guard, led to 
rioting in Little Rock on 23 and 24 September. Though still 
loathe to use troops Eisenhower had to act, especially after the 
mayor of Little Rock pleaded for federal assistance. Eisenhower 
began by federalizing the Arkansas National Guard, the first time 
that had been done since Reconstruction. In addition, the 
President dispatched twelve hundred paratroopers from the lOlst 
Airborne Division and these uniformed soldiers kept Central High 
School open until May lg58.25 
In the fall of l962 at the University of Mississippi at 
Oxford, James H. Meredith, a black transfer student, was admitted 
under a federal court order. In addition to ten thousand 
National Guardsmen President Kennedy dispatched twelve thousand 
regular soldiers under Major General Creighton V. Abrams, Jr. to 
surround "Ole Miss." More than two thousand persons engaged in 
pitched battles with federal marshals escorting Meredith into the 
school, resulting in the deaths of two rioters and injuries 
sustained by l66 federal marshals, 4B soldiers, and 3l civilians. 
A small detachment of marshals continued to protect Meredith 
until he was graduated in August l963.26 
In the summer of l963, on petition from black Alabamians, a 
federal court ordered the desegregation of that state's 
university. Governor George C. Wallace called out seven hundred
members of the National Guard to preserve order and block 
desegregation. President Kennedy twice federalized the Alabama 
National Guard, forcing Wallace to back down from his refusal to 
allow integration of the university or public schools in 
Birmingham, Mobile and Tuskegee.27 
One of the most acrimonious confrontations between a 
governor and a President occurred during the l967 Detroit riots. 
In the heart of the black ghetto in Detroit, an early morning 
police raid on an after-hours drinking establishment on July 23, 
l967, triggered the appearance of a group of several hundred 
blacks. One person threw a bottle at a police cruiser, others 
shouted obscenities, and a mob surged down l2th Street breaking 
windows. The small band of demonstrators quickly multiplied, 
looting increased, fires broke out, and disorder and destruction 
escalated. The disorder spread over almost eleven square 
A delay in obtaining federal troops occurred because 
Governor George Romney, a potential Republican presidential 
nominee, proved reluctant to declare that the state government 
could not control the situation by formally requesting federal 
assistance. President Lyndon Johnson was also reluctant to 
commit federal troops because he did not want to be branded with 
the burden of using military force against civilians at the 
height of the war in Vietnam and with an election pending in 
l968. Finally, after a formal request from Romney, President 
Johnson at ll:3O pm on 24 July l967 agreed to deploy regular 
After several days of a massive, yet controlled commitment 
of troops, together with police, in the streets, the riot died 
down and came to an end on July 27th. The withdrawal of regulars 
began on the following day and ended on August 2nd. The Guard 
remained on the scene for four more days. 
To some observers, the riot resembled a war. It bordered on 
mass insurrection, more closely resembling guerrilla warfare than 
the riots and disorders with which the nation is more familiar. 
By the time it ended, 43 people were dead, 2,OOO injured, and 
5,OOO were homeless as a result of 4,000 fires. A large part of 
the nation's fifth-largest city lay in ruins. 
On April 4, l968, Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. was 
assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee. Memphis, closest to the 
tragedy, blew up first; but as news of the assassination quickly 
spread, a wave of riots in l25 cities in 29 states erupted. Most 
explosively of all was in Washington D.C. where heavily armed 
units of the 82nd Airborne Division were flown in from Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina, to help restore order. In Washington 
D.C., 8 people were killed and 705 were injured.31
On the day following King's death, massive rioting erupted 
in Chicago, where 6,000 guardsmen and 5,000 army troops joined 
the police. In Chicago ll demonstrators were killed and 35O were 
arrested.32  On April 6 futher rioting occurred in Cincinnati, 
Ohio, Newark and Trenton, New Jersey and particularly in 
Baltimore, Maryland, where 6000 guardsmen and 2,000 federal 
troops were brought in. In Baltimore, 5 people were killed and 
258 were injured. The week's upheavals left 46 people dead 
across the nation.33 
Under intense pressure from the White House, Department of 
Defense leaders moved quickly to establish a full set of 
oversight committees and a command agency that would be able, in 
the words of the Undersecretary of the Army, "to expand as 
rapidly as is feasible the Federal military capability to respond 
with large forces and with speed to directives from the President 
to control multiple disorders."34 
The increase of civil disorder caused the formation of the 
Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Steering Committee which 
included representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Department of Justice, the White House, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. The Committee set overall policy, but gave 
responsibility, for planning and directing civil disturbance 
operations to the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of 
Staff. In turn, the Army established the Directorate of Civil 
Disturbance Planning and Operations, a joint-service command 
headed by an Army lieutenant general. The Directorate was to 
plan and oversee the training of Army and National Guard units, 
develop nonlethal civil disorder weapons, and monitor civil 
disturbances across the nation.35 
The Antiwar Movement 
Opposition to the U.S. role in the Vietnam War led to 
widespread demonstrations and protests. Most of these activities 
were relatively peaceful, among them the university "sit-ins" 
that began in l965; the massive antiwar parades in the spring of 
l967 in New York, San Francisco, and other cities and the massive 
march on Washington, D.C.36
On May 4, l970, at Kent State University in Ohio, a ragged 
line of poorly trained, improperly equipped, inadequately led 
National Guard troops confronted an unorganized group of milling 
students and other radicals, many of whom were changing classes 
or going to lunch. Operating in a climate of intense anti-war 
sentiment and unfamiliar with such duty the Guardsmen, taunted by 
the mob, felt angry and scared. When either an officer or a 
noncommissioned officer gave an order, the troops fired into the 
crowd. They wounded nine individuals and killed four. Nine of 
the thirteen victims were shot in the back or side.37 
Although polls showed that most Americans supported the 
National Guard, it was recognized that their training, equipment, 
discipline, and leadership was inadequate for containing civil 
disturbances. Suggested solutions included: more use of regular 
troops, better training and equipment, and greater integration of 
blacks into the guard.38 
The government also realized the effectiveness of a new 
tactic, the prepositioning of troops. From l968 to l973, the 
government repositioned troops six different times, covering such 
events as an antiwar demonstration at Yale University in l970, 
both the Republican and Democratic presidential nominating 
conventions in Miami, Florida in l972, and Richard Nixon's second 
inauguration in January l973. Troops were not needed but it 
showed a federal propensity to intervene quickly which had never 
been seen in the past.39 
Surveillance Operations 
The most controversial expansion of the domestic role of the 
armed forces was the growth of military surveillance of U.S. 
citizens in the l960's and l97O's. Military intelligence groups 
gathered information from a variety of sources including the FBI 
and police reports. All data on persons was forwarded to the 
Army's Counterintelligence Analysis Branch in Washington for 
analysis, then permanently deposited in personal dossiers, often 
computerized, at the U.S. Army Intelligence Command at Fort 
Holabird, Maryland. The army's extensive surveillance of American 
civilians, and its accumulation of thousands of dossiers, meant 
that in the late l96O's and early l97O's, army intelligence had 
crossed the dividing line into illegal, unconstitutional 
Public exposure of this intelligence gathering in l97O 
brought this activity to an end, and the dossiers were ordered 
destroyed. In testimony to a Senate Investing Committee, 
President Richard Nixon's Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Administration, Robert Froelke, explained the civil disorder 
intelligence program as the Army's "aggressive" response to 
demands for more information, and added lamely, "we maintain that 
there was no illegal activity. We maintain there was 
inappropriate activity."4l 
Congress held a series of hearings in l975 into the abuses 
of various civilian and military intelligence agencies. The 
Senate Committee called for stricter supervision and the House 
Committee recommended that the military be prohibited from any 
domestic intelligence operations. Several military officers also 
believed that those types of missions should be avoided.42 
Drug Enforcement 
The most dramatic new development in the use of the military 
to enforce civil authority was the employment of the Armed Forces 
in the l98O's in support of drug-enforcement laws. The Reagan 
Administration enlisted the Armed Forces in its "War Against 
Drugs" Campaign as a result of budgetary constraints against 
major increases in civilian law-enforcement agencies. The 
military leadership resisted this new role. 
On December l3, l989, a small contingent of Marines, 
patrolling the Arizona border came across a group of smugglers on 
horseback. The Marines sent an illumination flare into the sky, 
and in the blaze of light that followed, shots were exchanged. 
The smugglers dropped their load, some 57O pounds of marijuana, 
and fled back to Mexico.44 
The military's role also includes carrier task forces off 
the coast of Columbia, mobile ground radar stations in Bolivia 
and Peru, and AWACS flights over suspected drug routes. The 
military unit charged with coordinating this effort is the Joint 
Task Force - Six (JTF-6) at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas. Since 
its creation in l989 JTF-6 has responded to hundreds of requests 
for support. These requests came from a wide array of federal, 
state, and local task forces set up to stem the flow of drugs.45 
Traditional military reluctance to engage in operations 
which they considered police work was overcome by the fact that 
the war on drugs had become one of the few areas of increased 
appropriations for the Pentagon. Although the overall defense 
budget shrank dramatically, the Defense Department's 
antinarcotics spending tripled from $44O million in l989 to $l.2 
billion in l992.46 
The l992 Los Angeles Riot 
At the end of April and early May l992, the ghetto in the 
predominantly black south-central district of Los Angeles 
exploded in one of the deadliest riots in American history. The 
violence followed the acquittal of four of the city's white 
police officers' charged with savagely beating a black motorist, 
Rodney G. King, who had initially resisted arrest. On 29 April 
l992, when the acquittal by an all-white jury was announced, 
social order in the nation's second-largest city broke down. 
Violence, looting, vandalism, and arson spread from south-central 
Los Angeles to Koreatown, immediately north, and as far 
as Santa Monica, West Los Angeles, Long Beach, Hollywood, and 
Beverly Hills. Confronted with warring youth gangs, especially 
the notorious "Crips" and "Bloods," who were armed with an 
arsenal of weapons and munitions ranging from sub machine guns to 
grenades, the Los Angeles police initially withdrew from the 
south-central district. 
California Governor Peter Wilson sent in ten thousand 
members of the National Guard. In response to the governor's 
request, President Bush ordered in eighteen hundred soldiers, 
members of the 7th U.S. Infantry Division, a "light-infantry" 
unit trained in low intensity conflict, which had fought in 
Panama in l989, and was stationed in Fort Ord, California. Bush 
also sent in fifteen hundred Marines from Camp Pendleton, 
California, most veterans of the l99l Gulf War. They joined 
several hundred FBI, state, and local police officers.47 
Once the military was deployed, its response was coordinated 
and effective compared with many of the military actions in the 
l960s riots. Unlike the l96O's, all state and federal 
troops were immediately placed under a single temporary command,
Joint Task Force - L.A. (JTF-L.A.), headed by Army Major General 
Marvin L. Covault, commander of the 7th U.S. Infantry Division. 
This time the National Guard included large numbers of black 
soldiers, as did the Army and Marine units. The units worked in 
harmony to bring peace to the area. Four days of violence, 
including two nights of uncontrolled rioting and gang warfare, 
left 53 dead, more than 2,3OO wounded, l7,OOO arrested, and an 
estimated $785 million in property damage from looting and 5,600 
The problem of civil disorder in the United States is not 
new. By its very persistence it is a more serious problem for 
our society than it would be were it new, for its roots run very 
deep. The use of the military to quell civil disorder has a 
varied history. The effectiveness of military intervention has 
largely been attributed to the disciplinary superiority of 
federal forces as compared to police, militia, or National Guard. 
From past events many valuable lessons have been learned. 
Lessons the military needs to study and act upon. If history 
teaches anything it warns that the military will be called upon 
again to execute a domestic peacekeeping mission. 
The national government's commitment of military forces in 
civil disorders paralleled many of the most important social and 
economic conflicts in history. As with any controversies of this 
magnitude, our legal and judicial system dictated what actions 
should or should not be taken. And as could be expected, the use 
of military forces in civil disorders was not always a smoothly 
executed evolution. In this chapter I will highlight the legal 
involvement and key laws enacted that affected the military's 
intervention into domestic disorders. In so doing, I hope to 
demonstrate how the military arrived at the point it is at today. 
I hope this information will also shed some light on what actions 
may and may not be taken in the future. 
The Constitution 
The framers of the United States Constitution were much 
concerned with domestic disorder in the aggressive new republic. 
The nationalists at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia 
in l787 wanted to ensure that the new central government would 
not find itself powerless in the future. States' rights 
advocates, however, feared giving the national government the 
power to intervene militarily in the states. 
Sentiment remained strong in the post revolutionary period that 
maintaining a standing army in peacetime would be dangerous to 
the liberties of the people.1 
The new Constitution proposed in l787 met with opposition on 
several grounds, but no feature was more controversial than its 
provision for a National Army. States' rights advocates feared 
giving the national government the power to intervene militarily 
in the states. Sentiment remained strong that maintaining a 
standing army in peacetime would be dangerous to the liberties of 
the people. To appease the localists, many writers of the 
Constitution published articles explaining that the Army was 
merely to be used to suppress rebellions and dangerous 
insurrections. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison used their 
Federalist Papers to express their views. Hamilton wrote in The 
Federalist No. 28, 
That there may happen cases in which the national 
government may be necessitated to resort to force 
cannot be denied...Seditions and insurrections are, 
unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body 
politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural 
body...Should such emergencies at any time happen 
under the national government, there could be no 
remedy but force.2
Despite Antifederalist opposition, the Constitution gave the 
national government final authority. Article I Section 8 granted 
Congress the power "To provide for the calling forth the militia 
to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and 
repel invasion." Article II, Section 2 gave the President 
authority over the armed forces by making him their Commander-in- 
Chief. Article II, Section 3 directed of the President that "he 
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Finally, 
Article IV, Section 4 assured that "The United States shall 
guarantee to every State a Republican form of government, and 
shall protect each of them against invasion and on application of 
the Legislature or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot 
be convened) against domestic violence."3 
American federalism under the Constitution thus provided a 
means for the use of state or national military forces for 
supporting civil authority against serious internal disturbances. 
The state governments had been given that power from the state 
constitutions. The national government obtained similar, if 
somewhat circumscribed, authority from the Constitution.4  During  
ratification many states still had problems with the military's 
role in government. It was the Bill of Rights that provided the 
protection they wanted which was not found in the Constitution. 
The language which James Madison chose, which the Congress 
eventually approved and the states ratified, to calm the fears of 
military law enforcement was that "No person deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."5  As  
was true for the Constitution as a whole, the real meaning of the 
civil disorder provisions would become evident only when 
implemented by law and experienced in practice. 
The Early Laws 
The first law granting the President powers to intervene 
with military force in domestic disorders was passed by 
the Second Congress and became law on 2 May l792. The clauses 
dealing with the use of force in internal affairs were part of a 
broader scheme to carry into effect Congress' power to "provide 
for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, 
suppress insurrections and repel invasions."6  The law, in 
language similar to that of the Constitution, allowed the 
President to call militia from other states "as he may judge 
sufficient" to put down "an insurrection in any state against the 
government thereof," when so requested by a state legislature, or 
its governor if the legislature could not be convened.7  The act 
also allowed the President to call militia from within a state 
experiencing disorder, or from neighboring states if necessary, 
when the United States laws were opposed or obstructed "by 
combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course 
of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in marshals by 
this act." An associate justice of the Supreme Court or a United 
States district judge had to notify the President that such 
conditions existed before he could call out the militia. The 
President was required to issue a proclamation to "command such 
insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably...within a limited 
time" in advance of military intervention.8  This law was 
reenacted on 28 February l795 becaue the l792 Act expired in 
three years. 
An Act of 3 March l8O7 which resulted from the "Burr 
Conspiracy," expanded the power of the President. Shortly after 
slaying Alexander Hamilton, Aaron Burr, his political career now 
at an end, asked money of Anthony Mercy, British minister to the 
United States, supposedly for the purpose of organzing a movement 
for separating the Western States from the U. S. President 
Thomas Jefferson was informed of Burr's plan in Nov. l8O6. 
Whether Burr's aim was treasonable, or whether he was planning to 
lead an expedition against the Spanish dominions, is still a 
matter of dispute. Burr was indicted for treason but acquitted 
on l Sept l8O7. Jefferson was troubled by his lack of authority 
to use regulars in a domestic insurrection, which he really 
deemed the Burr conspiracy to be. In mid-December l8O6 the 
President sent the draft of a law permitting the use of regulars, 
to a friendly congresman from Virginia, John Dawson. The bill 
passed by Congress in March l807 was phrased in language almost 
the same as Jefferson's draft.9  The act provided explicitly for 
the use of the regular land or naval forces of the United States 
by the President in cases of insurrection or obstruction of the 
laws, whereas the l792 and l795 statues had authorized only his 
use of the militia. As the regular army came to displace the 
militia as the primary military arm of the nation, Federal 
Marshals, with Presidential authority, came to use national 
troops rather than militia as their "posse comitatus" when major 
force was required to enforce the exucution of the laws of the 
After the fall of Fort Sumter in April l86l, President 
Lincoln, using the powers of the law of l795, declared a state of 
insurrection and called out the militia as well as U.S. 
Volunteers. Congress subsequently approved this action, and on 
29 July l96l, Congress revised the basic laws of l795 and l8O7 
and greatly increased the President's authority to use both 
militias and regulars to suppress insurrections and execute the 
laws of the Union. The l86l act entrusted the decision to use 
military force against obstructions of the law or against 
rebellion to the "judgement of the President" whenever he deemed 
it "impracticable's to enforce the law by ordinary means. The 
l86l law authorized the President to use naval as well as land 
forces and also federalized militia forces. This l86l statute 
permitting the use of military force to deal with actions which 
cannot be overcome by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings 
has remained the basic authority for presidential use of troops 
to enforce federal law. This statute, as part of the U.S. Code, 
was used by President Eisenhower and Kennedy to enforce federally 
mandated desegregation of school facilities in the l95O's and 
The Posse Comitatus Act of l878 
One of the most important laws regarding the use of the 
military in domestic affairs is the Posse Comitatus Act of l878. 
The Act came into being in the aftermath of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction periods, owing to southern opposition to the 
growing military involvement in law enforcement with virtually no 
control by the federal government. 
The Posse Comitatus Act prohibited use of the Army "as a 
posse comitatus, or otherwise for the purpose of executing the 
laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such 
employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the 
Constitution or by act of Congress."13  What the legislation in 
effect actually did was repel the Cushing Doctrine of l854, which 
allowed Army forces to be summoned by marshals or sheriffs 
without specific approval by the President. The statues of l795, 
l8O7, and 186l remained in force. The President's authority was 
required to use troops for domestic intervention. Orders to 
support civil authorities came from the President, then through 
the Secretary of War, the Commanding General, and finally Field 
Commanders. Local civil officials had no authority to direct the 
deployment of federal troops.14  
Although not mentioned in the Act, the Navy and Marine Corps 
adhere to the statue by Navy regulation, and several courts have 
opined that only the U.S. Coast Guard is excluded from the intent 
of the statue.15 
While ending uncontrolled military involvement in law 
enforcement, such as that which occurred during and after the 
Civil War, the Posse Comitatus Act did not completely end law 
enforcement by the Armed Forces. The Act had limited application 
for two principal reasons. First, the President can employ the 
military to enforce the law in times of national crisis or 
emergency.16 Second, courts have ruled that while Posse 
Comitatus applies to "direct" military participation in law 
enforcement, it nevertheless, allows "indirect" participation.13 
The l97O's
Despite Posse Comitatus restrictions, the President has 
employed the military to enforce the law on many occasions when 
civil law enforcement agencies either could not or would not do 
so. Yet, seldom has military enforcement of the law been 
challenged in the courts by invoking the restrictions specified 
under the Posse Comitatus Act. 
Posse Comitatus received little attention until after l96O. 
There were only three cases prior to that year when the Act was 
invoked in the courts.18 All three cases dealt with military 
arrests of individuals charged with treason in occupied foreign 
territory. The courts ruled that the Act did not apply to an 
occupying force, since civil law enforcement was usurped by the 
military authority.19  After 1960, the issue of domestic civil- 
military relations and Posse Comitatus restrictions became more 
prominent in the legal arena. 
In l972 the Nixon administration promulgated a set of new 
regulations, "Employment of Military Resources in the Event of 
Civil Disturbances" (now codified as 32 C.F.R. sec 2l5), giving 
legality for very substantial military intrusions into the realm 
of domestic government. The l972 Regulations took the place of 
others first devised in l968 during the Johnson Administration 
and discontinued in l97l. The l968 regulations themselves had 
been objectionable on some points of law; but novel provisions 
in the l972 regulations dramatically increased the potential for 
domestic use of the national military while at the same time 
substantially reducing prior safeguards against abuse.2O 
The most significant challenge to military involvement in 
the enforcement of civil law came out of the l973 American Indian 
uprising at the hamlet of Wounded Knee, South Dakota. Over l00 
members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) occupied the 
village on February 27, and remained until May 8. The FBI, 
charged with restoring order, received assistance from the U.S. 
Army, which sent a Colonel to determine whether troops would be 
required in the crisis. Colonel Volney Warner made several 
recommendations during the incident. The Army provided armored 
personnel carriers, and maintenance personnel and the Nebraska 
Air National Guard assisted with reconnaissance flights. 
Following this episode, the AIM leaders were charged with 
obstruction of justice. The defendants countered that the 
Federal Government did not carry out law enforcement properly, 
since military involvement constituted a violation of the Posse 
Comitatus Act.21 
Several criminal court cases resulted from Wounded Knee, 
which dealt with civil-military relations and provided 
interpretation of the Posse Comitatus Act.22  The judgements, 
however, were vague and inconsistent. In l98O, a special 
Attorney General's Task Force looked into the decisions regarding 
Posse Comitatus and concluded, "the parameters of the Act 
are...substantially untested and remain unclear."23 
The l98l Amendments 
As early as l98l Congress became acutely aware that the 
country was concerned with a drug problem. They knew that 
drastic action was needed against the illegal drug industry. 
What resulted was a sanction for more limited military 
assistance. The action came from amending the Posse Comitatus 
Act by allowing and directing the military to provide assistance 
to law enforcement agencies.24 
The l98l Amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act authorized 
the military to provide assistance to law enforcement agencies, 
but precluded servicepersons from becoming directly involved in 
"search and seizure, and arrest, or other similar activities."25 
The new law ensured that military material, information, and 
human resources would be employed in the war against illegal 
The Department of Defense had been loaning equipment, 
providing information, and providing training to law enforcement 
agencies for quite some time.26  What Congress did in l98l was to 
ratify and codify an ever growing military activity, and to open 
the door for greater military involvement in the future. 
In l986 Congress again expanded the military's role in drug 
interdiction. Since the Navy's standard operating procedures did 
not allow Navy personnel to search, seize, and arrest on the high 
seas, Congress authorized the Legal Detachment (LEDET) program 
whereby Cost Guard personnel were assigned to Navy ships for the 
purpose of enforcing drug laws in international waters.27  The 
next big change occurred in l988. 
The l988 Amendments 
The drug problem worsened and by l988 more Americans were 
calling for stronger action. Under pressure, Congress decided to 
take even greater steps to allow military participation in the 
war on drugs. Many senior leaders in the Department of Defense 
expressed concern. In June l988, Secretary of Defense Frank 
Carlucci told Congress, "The Armed Forces should not become a 
police force, nor can we afford to degrade readiness by diverting 
badly needed resources from their assigned mission."28 
Nevertheless, Congress decided to enhance the nation's drug 
fighting capability by marshaling more DoD resources into the 
struggle. Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of l988, Congress, in 
addition to establishing a "drug czar", Director, Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, directed the DoD to devise a plan 
to use federal research and development facilities to develop 
drug law enforcement technology.29  Additionally, the National 
Defense Authorization Act of l989 directed the DoD to become the 
"lead agency for detection and monitoring of air and sea drug 
trafficking across our borders."30  It also charged the military 
to "integrate the command, control, communication, and technical 
intelligence (C3I) assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an 
effective communications network; and enhance state governors' 
use of the National Guard in support of drug interdiction."3l 
As described in Chapter II, the military unit responsible with 
coordinating this effort was Joint Task Force - Six (JTF-6) at 
Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas. 
In summary, the intervention of the military into domestic 
affairs is a sometimes vague and still developing area of 
constitutional law. The issue of military involvement in law 
enforcement is an issue political in nature. Posse Comitatus is 
a statute that was created by Congress and already significantly 
amended by that same body. There is even precedent for annulling 
Posse Comitatus restrictions. Owing to chaos resulting from the 
Alaskan "gold rush," in l890, Congress passed legislation that 
exempted Alaska from the Posse Comitatus Act. The exemption was 
not repealed until l959.32 Therefore, when it becomes necessary, 
Congress can revoke the restrictions on military law enforcement 
provided by the Posse Comitatus Act. If this should happen the 
courts would be hard pressed to limit military involvement in law 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the current laws 
and directives that deal with the military's domestic 
peacekeeping mission. The chapter is divided into two sections. 
The first section looks at laws found in Title lO of the United 
States Code (U.S.C.). The second section deals with Department 
of Defense (DoD) directives. Laws are the regulations that 
establishes what the military is allowed to do or not allowed to 
do. The directives are more of a guide to describe how something 
should be done. 
In the preceding chapters, some material covered relating to 
the military's role in drug interdiction has been addressed. 
Since I am primarily concerned with the military's role in 
domestic disorders I will not discuss the laws and directives 
related to drug interdiction. Lastly, the directives that will 
be examined will be Department of Defense level directives and 
not those of individual services, which are based on the DoD 
Title lO United States Code 
The United States Code (U.S.C.) is a consolidation and 
codification of all the general and permanent laws of the United 
States. Their are fifty titles that make up the Code. Each 
title addresses a different subject, i.e., agriculture, 
bankruptcy, commerce and trade, education, patents, 
transportation, etc. The last edition that was published was in 
l988. The title that concerns itself with the Armed Forces is 
Title l0. Title l0, Chapter l5 deals with insurrection. It is 
here that the laws are found relating to military intervention.1
There are three key sections in Chapter l5, Title l0, that 
provide the legal ground for the military's intervention into 
domestic disorders. They are:
33l. Federal aid for State governments. 
Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against 
its government, the President may, upon the request of 
its legislature or of its governor if the legislature 
cannot be convened, call into Federal service such 
of the militia of the other States, in the number 
requested by that State, and use such of the armed 
forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the 
332. Use of militia and armed forces to enforce 
Federal authority.
Whenever the President considers that unlawful 
obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or 
rebellion against the authority of the United States, 
make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the 
United States in any State or Territory by the 
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may 
call into Federal service such of the militia of any 
State, and use such of the armed forces, as he 
considers necessary to enforce those laws or to 
suppress the rebellion.
333. Interference with State and Federal law. 
The President, by using the militia or the armed 
forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such 
measures as he considered necessary to suppress, in a 
State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful 
combination or conspiracy, if it - 
(l) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, 
that any part or class of its people is deprived of a 
right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the 
Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted 
authorities of that state are unable, fail, or refuse 
to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to 
give protection; or 
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of 
the United States or impedes the course of justice under 
those laws. 
In any situation covered by clause (l), the State shall 
be considered to have denied the equal protection of the 
laws secured by the Constitution.4
Additionally, a l972 Civil Disturbance Regulation authorized the 
use of military force 
to prevent loss of life and to restore 
governmental functioning and public order when 
sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disasters, 
or calamities seriously endanger life and property 
and disrupt normal governmental functions to such 
an extent that duly constituted local authorities 
are unable to control the situation.5
The regulation draws its authority from lO U.S.C.  33l-333 
(l988). Therefore, under these laws, the President has the 
authority to use emergency powers in times of crisis. Because 
the Chief Executive must "take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed,"6  Congress gave the President the power to use the 
military in times of emergencies, such as "insurrection," 
"rebellion," "obstruction" of the law, "domestic violence," or 
"conspiracy."7  The President also has the responsibility when 
enacting the authority in Title lO to issue a proclamation asking 
for dispersal, so that the perpetrators of the civil disturbance 
will have the opportunity to desist.8 
In addition to Chapter l5 of Title lO, Chapter l8 entitled 
"Military Support For Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies" is an 
area important to this discussion. This Chapter deals with the 
use of military equipment, the maintenance of that equipment, 
military facilities, military training and information collected 
by the military and the relationship between this military 
support and civilian law enforcement agencies. Additionally 
there are two sections that are of special interest because they 
have the potential of causing controversy. They are: 
375. Restriction on direct participation by military 
The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such 
regulations as may be necessary to ensure that 
the provision of any support (including the 
provision of any equipment or facility or the 
assignment or detail of any personnel) to any 
civilian law enforcement official under this 
chapter does not include or permit direct 
participation by a member of the Army, Navy, 
Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search and 
seizure, an arrest, or other similar activity 
unless participation in such activity by such 
member is otherwise authorized by law. 
376. Support not to affect adversely military 
Support (including the provision of any equipment 
of facility or the assignment or detail of any 
personnel) may not be provided to any civilian law 
enforcement official under this chapter if the 
provision of such support will adversely affect the 
military preparedness of the United States. The 
Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations 
as may be necessary to ensure that the provision of 
any such support does not adversely affect the 
military preparedness of the United States.10 
Both G375 and #376 generate areas of concern that will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
It is the above mentioned laws that legally allows the 
military to intervene in domestic disturbances. One can infer 
that it is entirely up to the leadership of this country to 
decide when the military "trump card" is to be played. It 
certainly seems that the laws place that decision firmly with the 
President, entirely dependent upon his interpretation of the laws 
and the situation. How the military prepares itself and 
organizes itself to carry out this type of mission is largely 
placed in the hands of the Department of Defense. 
Department of Defense Directives 
The term used by the Department of Defnese for "domestic 
peacekeeping" is Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances 
(MACDIS). The focus of this paper is strictly with civil 
disturbances and not fighting forest fires or providing 
humanitarian assistance after floods or earthquakes. The key 
directives in this area are: DoD Directive 3025.l2, "Military 
Assistance for Civil Disturbances;" DoD Directive 3O25.l, 
"Military Support to Civil Authorities;" Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 32l6.Ol, "Military Assistance 
to Civil Disturbances;" and the DoD Civil Disturbance Plan, 
"Garden Plot." "Garden Plot" is the codename given to that plan. 
If an operation's command relationships are undefined or 
vague then the operation is destined to fail. DoD Directive 
3O25.l2 defines policy, responsibilities, and command 
relationships in the event the military is called to intervene in 
a civil disturbance. A civil disturbance is defined as: 
Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial 
to public law and disorder within the 5O states, 
District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
u.s. possessions and territories, or any political 
subdivision thereof; includes all domestic conditions 
requiring the use of federal armed forces pursuant 
to the provisions of Chapter l5 of title lO, United 
States Code.11 
The process of getting the military involved to quell a 
civil disturbance is exact and should be followed to the letter. 
It is this process and the command relationships that will now be 
When a civil disturbance occurs that goes beyond the 
capability of what a state, territory, or possession can control 
with its own assets then the governor, or equivalent, requests 
federal military support through the Attorney General to the 
President. The President shall determine the federal action to 
be taken. "The employment of federal military forces to control 
civil disturbances will normally be authorized by a Presidential 
Directive or Executive Order in a specified state or locality."12 
The President may also use a representative to communicate his 
guidance to the military commander for MACDIS operations. The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) is the Chief civilian agency in 
charge of coordinating all federal government activities relating 
to civil disturbances.13  Attorney General will designate his 
representative to be located in each city where federal forces 
are committed. This representative is called the Senior Civilian 
Representative of the Attorney General or SCRAG.14 
At the Department of Defense level the process involves an 
Executive Agent, an Action Agent, and an Operating Agent. The 
Executive Agent is the Secretary of the Army and is responsible 
for developing planning guidance, plans, and procedures for 
MACDIS. He/She will also coordinate with the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff on any commitment of military forces 
assigned to the Combatant Commands. The Executive Agent also has 
the authority of the Secretary of Defense when tasking DoD 
components. The Director of Military Support (DOMS), normally an 
Army major general, is the Action Agent for the Executive Agent. 
"The DOMS plans for, coordinates, and directs the employment of 
all designated federal resources for the Executive Agent in civil 
disturbance operations and serves as the DoD point of contact in 
all such matters."15  The Operating Agent is the Supported CINC 
assigned to direct civil disturbance operations in his area of 
responsibility.16  During this process the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff is a coordinating agent who helps to work out any 
problems that may arise. 
It is the Supported CINC who appoints a JTF commander to 
take control of the operation. This command relationship just 
described is seen in figure l. 
It is important to understand that representatives of 
civilian agencies may augment but shall not replace the 
military's chain of command. Additionally, the Executive Agent 
or his designated representatives will coordinate activities, 
planning, and support with other civilian agencies.17 
When the JTF commander is selected and his units are 
assigned it then becomes a military operation is support of 
civilian law enforcement. Appropriate plans and orders are 
developed and written based on the situation. 
The current laws and the MACDIS process proved to work 
extremely well for the l992 Los Angeles Riot. However, problems 
and issues arose that need further attention. 
There are a multitude of issues that need to be examined 
when speaking about domestic peacekeeping. This is an area that 
is scrutinized by both the government and the American people. 
Mistakes that happen on the streets of Somalia may receive much 
less attention than a same type mistake made on the streets of 
Los Angeles. Topics such as rules of engagement, excessive use 
of force, logistics support, legal issues, and budgetary problems 
are only some of the items that need to be addressed. 
In this chapter I will discuss five issues of importance. 
They are: command and control, training, direct intervention, 
force selection, and media. I selected these five issues because 
they are vital to achieving success in future domestic 
peacekeeping missions. 
Command and Control 
Effective command and control is essential to achieving 
success in any military operation. "Command is a uniquely human 
dimension that principally involves decisionmaking while control 
involves a complex array of resources to ensure proper mission 
execution. The linking of decisionmaking and execution forms the 
concept of command and control."1  Effective command and control 
means not only linking together the civilian and military 
relationship but also synchronizing the language and 
communications assets so that all units concerned can coordinate 
effectively with each other. 
In domestic peacekeeping the civil authority should maintain 
close liaison with commanders of the military forces employed. 
There should also be an agreement on the policy to be adopted in 
relation to the restoration of order and the reinstatement of the 
ordinary civil process of authority. Finally the civil authority 
should avoid interference with tactical and operational decisions 
that might need to be taken by the military forces in 
implementation of their mandate to restore order.2 
During operations, the need to interface civilian agencies 
and military units is essential. The use of liaison officers 
will help alleviate misunderstandings and increase the flow of 
information. There may be a need for several liaison officers 
depending on the circumstances. During the Los Angeles Riots of 
l992, the initial boundaries that delineated operations zones 
were highways because they were prominent terrain features. 
Unfortunately these did not always match police jurisdictions. 
Operating in some areas required coordination with as many as 
four police departments as well as the Los Angeles Sheriff's 
office.3  This problem was solved with the help of liaison 
officers and points of contact.4  Also, there may be a distinct 
problem with terminology used by police and military. The words 
"cover me" mean one thing to the police and another thing to an 
infantry squad. Again, the use of liaison officers would aid in 
eliminating those problems. 
Unity of command is critical to successful civil disturbance 
operations. Establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander, 
who has command over all military units, active, reserve or 
national guard worked extremely well in Los Angeles. This 
procedure should always be followed. 
Lastly, the type of communications assets should be 
seriously considered. In urban areas some military 
communications equipment is ineffective. The use of proper 
communications equipment and radios such as the ones utilized by 
police should be examined. During all types of recent operations 
the use of cellular phones has become the rule instead of the 
exception. The use and funding of cellular phones in the Garden 
Plot plan should be implemented. 
In the l960's and l970's civil disturbance operations were 
oriented on crowd control. Tactics such as fixed bayonets with 
riot control formations were practiced at many units. Today, 
operations involving domestic civil disorder are similar to 
peacekeeping operations or military operations in urban 
terrain (MOUT). Some observers who were part of JTF Los Angeles 
compared that operation as similar to the experience on the 
streets of Beirut during the l980's.5
The number of handguns and automatic weapons in hands of 
private citizens is drastically increasing. Training in civil 
disturbances by military units must change based on the tactics 
and weapons of the future enemy. The on-line riot formations of 
the 60's and 70's would place our military personnel in 
unnecessary danger. The military should place greater emphasis 
on peacekeeping operations, antisniper operations, positive 
control by leaders, and understanding the rules of engagement. 
There are many military personnel who feel that training in 
civil disturbance operations would degrade the readiness of our 
forces to fight a war. This would be true if the military 
trained solely for civil disturbance operatons. The military 
should and does train to fight all levels of war; high, medium, 
and low intensity. Even though the basics can be employed in all 
three levels, training in any one level does not assure success 
in all three. Many senior military leaders believe that if you 
train to the high intensity end of the spectrum you can easily 
shift to the low intensity level. They also argue, however, that 
the converse is not true. A difinitive answer to this training 
issue has not yet been determined. I hold that the military must 
specifically train to each level of conflict. Common 
denominators such as: weapons proficiency, exact command and 
control, skillful maneuvering, and competent small unit 
leadership are fundamental areas essential to success in all 
three conflict levels. When these skills have been achieved the 
specifics of each level of war much be taught and practiced. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Section 376, Chapter 
l8 of the title l0 U.S.C. states that the Secretary of Defense is 
responsible that the preparedness of the military is not degraded 
due to support to law enforcement agencies. It is my opinion 
that this refers more to drug enforcement operations than to 
civil disorders. I believe this section was written to prevent 
military units from being taken away from their normal duties to 
take part in drug interdiction operations. I can see how some 
individuals could use this section to keep the military out of 
domestic peacekeeping. 
Direct Intervention 
The issue of direct intervention of military personnel in 
law enforcement is covered in Section 375 of Chapter l8 of Title 
lO, U.S.C. As was discussed in Chapter IV of this paper, 
military personnel are not allowed direct participation in a 
search, seizure, or arrest. In practice, however, military units 
will take whatever steps are necessary, to included search and 
seizure to guarantee the safety of their members.6  The police 
and any reasonable person can see the need for this. In the l992 
Los Angeles riots military units would stop, search and detain 
individuals and wait for police to arrive, if the situation 
called for such action.7  A situation such as this, if litigation 
should arise, could cause a similar controversy as seen in the 
l973 cases from Wounded Knee. 
Because this is such a controversial issue legal teams 
should be readily accessible to military units during civil 
disturbance operations. These legal teams should coordinate 
closely with the Department of Justice and should be fully versed 
on the Posse Comitatus Act and the relevant chapters of Title lO, 
Force Selection 
There is no question that in the Armed Forces there are some 
units better suited to handle civil disturbance operations. The 
use of these better trained units should be a priority when the 
military is needed to assist in a civil disturbance. During an 
interview with Major John Forquer, a Military Police officer who 
was member of JTF Los Angeles, he related how the operation in 
Los Angeles was more in line with the training received by 
military police units than the training received by infantry 
units. He saw a great need to be able to work with the local 
police, understand their methods, and work closely with the local 
population. Putting vast amounts of firepower on targets was not 
the major objective.8  Therefore, the use of military police 
units and peacekeeping-trained units should be seriously 
considered when putting a JTF organization together. 
Another aspect of force selection is political in nature. 
Clausewitz's assertion that "war is simply a continuation of 
political intercourse" applies also to domestic peacekeeping 
operations, for they also must be viewed as political 
instruments.9  Close attention must be given to the political 
suitability of forces selected for a given situation. When the 
leadership selects forces for a civil disturbance operation, they 
must be sensitive to the perceptions of the local population and 
the American public. Sending in the 82nd Airborne Division to a 
U.S. city carries with it a certain message that a U. S. Army 
military police battalion doesn't have. 
The correct force selection can go a long way to 
contributing to a successful operation. Forces that do not 
project massive offensive power, that have extensive training, 
and that have tight discipline will also be more likely to avoid 
sacrificing the lives of innocent people. 
The Media 
No matter how much the military dislikes working with the 
media during military operations, its importance should make it 
another one of the battlefield activities. During civil 
disturbances since the l95O's, television's search for dramatic 
images created the impression that entire cities were about to 
fall into anarchy. Sometimes I think the media does not realize 
how the reporting of one incident of extraordinary violence may 
influence the occurrence of others. The media can set the tone 
of an operation and have a direct impact upon its success. 
Throughtout American history, the fortunes of both the 
military and the news media have varied with the climate of 
opinion prevalent in the country at any one moment. The military 
and the news media have competed, but the military has always 
held the advantage because it has controlled the battlefield. If 
history teaches anything, however, it advises commanders to 
remain above the temptation to manipulate the press for the sake 
of short-term gain. Public opinion can change with the moment, 
and the news media is the only credible means military leaders 
have for communicating with the American people. As General 
Ulysses S. Grant warned, that in the United States "the people 
governed and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop 
The news media needs to respect the seriousness of the 
mission the military is involved in and appreciate the influence 
they have in its success. They also must realize that a certain 
level of operational security is needed to protect the lives of 
the men and women in the armed forces who are executing that 
Before completing this chapter I would like to make a 
comment on a new development in the military closely related to 
this subject. That is the use of non-lethal or less lethal means 
when involved with peacekeeping missions. On l4 February l995 
ABC Nightly News aired a story on non-lethal means available for 
use in the February/March l995 military mission in Somalia, 
Operation United Shield. The mission was to assist in 
retrograding U.N. forces safely out of that country. The story 
related that items such as: plastic sticky foam, styrofoam 
bullets, nets, and other non-lethal projectiles could be used to 
control civilian crowds so that deadly force was not the only 
option left to soldiers and marines on the street. This brings 
two questions immediately to mind: first, is the introduction of 
these weapons making the Rules of Engagement too complicated? 
And second, are we going to become known as the military that 
will not use deadly force thereby placing marines and soldiers at 
greater risk? 
Especially in domestic peacekeeping, killing United States 
citizens is a dreadful outcome but it may be the only resort. 
The use of non-lethal weapons may in fact cause the exact 
opposite reaction that is intended. These are additional issues 
that our country's leadership will now have to face. 
The issues discussed in this chapter are the reasons that 
the military must be prepared to employ forces to take part in 
domestic peacekeeping operations. There are growing problems in 
this country that contribute to building an environment that is 
ripe for civil disorder. 
From l96O to l99O there has been more than a 5OO percent 
increase in violent crime; more than a 4OO percent increase in 
illegitimate births; a tripling of the percentage of children 
living in single-parent homes; a tripling in the teenage suicide 
rate; a doubling in the divorce rate; and a drop of almost 75 
points in students SAT scores.1 
Over the years teachers have been asked to identify what 
their greatest problems were with students in public schools. In 
l94O, teachers identified talking out of turn; chewing gum; 
making noise; running in the halls; cutting in line; dress code 
infractions; and littering. When answering that same question in 
l99O, teachers identified drug abuse; alcohol abuse; pregnancy; 
suicide; rape; robbery; and assault.2
It is this degradation of society and a quickness to 
violence that are key indicators for civil disorder. It is the 
crime and violence, the widening gap between the "haves" and 
"have nots," the collapse of the family, and the waves of illegal 
immigrants that makes this country more prone to experience civil 
disorder in the future. 
The rate of violent crime in the United States is worse 
than in any other industrialized country. The United States' 
homicide rate is more than five times that of Europe, and four 
times that of Canada, Australia, or New Zealand. In addition, 
the rate at which rapes occur in the United States in nearly 
seven times higher than it is in Europe.3 
Gangs have taken over the inner cities across America. 
Instead of the bludgeon, billy, or knife used by past gangs, 
today's gang members carry assault weaponry, and often have more 
firepower than police. 
From l960 to l980, the population of the United States 
increased by 26 percent while the homicide rate due to guns 
increased by l6O percent.4  In l99l, in Los Angeles, there was a 
greater chance that a citizen would die from a bullet wound than 
from a traffic accident.5 
Drugs like guns, are a tide against which no single city or 
state can erect a dike. There is an undeniable relationship 
between crime and drugs. Drug addiction can both lower 
inhibitions among offenders and spur them on to other crimes to 
finance their dependency. Over 5Q percent of all convicted jail 
inmates are under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time 
of their current offense. 
No subject generates more concern than violent crime, and 
none touches people more deeply and personally; none triggers 
more emotion. The growing problem of violence leads people to 
think that something fundamental has been broken in America. 
Crime and violence influence where one goes, where one lives, 
where one attends school, how one looks at another person, how 
one parks, especially at night and even how one dresses. Crime 
and its consequences sharpen every racial and economic division 
of our nation, and blunt every popular impulse toward faith in 
government and willingness to sacrifice to achieve ones dreams. 
A Widening Gap 
America has lost the initiative in the war on poverty. 
Despite rising social spending and moderate growth, the U.S. has 
made negligible progress against poverty since l973. Our poverty 
rates are twice those of other advanced countries. And poverty in 
America increasingly wears a child's face: one out of every five 
of our children is poor. Most alarming of all is the emergence 
of an angry and demoralized "underclass" that is at once 
dependent on government yet isolated from society at large. The 
U.S. is in danger of creating a caste system in which scattered 
pockets of impoverished and mainly minority citizens are 
permanently barred from taking part in the nation's productive 
and civic life.7 
Poverty itself does not cause civil disorder, but there is a 
rift developing between the Haves and the Have Nots.8  This rift 
was seen both in Oakland in l99l and in Los Angeles in l992. In 
both cases widespread looting occurred that did not start out of 
racial hatred. Quite simply, the uprisings were directly related 
to class. The Have Nots were taking from those who have.9 
In the book The Dream and the Nightmare: The Sixties' 
Legacy to the Underclass, the author relates how the liberal 
programs the "sixties generation" fought so hard to implement 
have been ruinous to society's most marginal members. Society, 
which should be a crucible for forming character, is saturated 
with programs that give incentives to fail. The Have Nots have 
been incapacitated for upward mobility by the sixties's culture 
of the Haves.10 
When a society creates a class of people that see no way for 
upward mobility an environment for crime and civil disorder is 
created. When other factors such as fear are added to the 
environment the situation becomes even more grave. 
The Family 
In l965 President Lyndon Johnson said: 
The family is the cornerstone of our society. 
More than any other force it shapes the attitude, 
the hopes, the ambitions, and the values of 
the child. And when the family collapses, it is 
the children that are usually damaged. When it 
happens on a massive scale the community itself is 
By l992, non-marital childbearing had reached near parity 
with divorce as a social generator of female-headed homes. If 
current trends continue, sometime by the late l99O's the total 
number of fatherless homes created by unwed childbearing women 
will surpass the number created by divorce12  Even more alarming 
are the projections that only 6 percent of black children and 3O 
percent of white children born in l98O will live with both 
parents through age l8. In comparison to l95O where the figures 
were 52 percent and 8l percent respectively.13 
This trend has had a devastating affect on our children. 
Statistics about young Americans are alarming. Every thirty 
minutes in America, fifty young people drop out of school, 
eighty-five commit a violent crime, and twenty-seven teenage 
girls give birth, sixteen of them out of wedlock. That process 
continues until by the end of a year a million students have 
dropped out of school, l.3 million youths have committed a 
violent crime, and 478,000 teenagers have given birth.14 
In addition, many of these youths turn to gangs to replace 
their families. They become a generation that lives and grows up 
in the streets. An accurate description of the situation on 
families was given by the then Assistant Secretary of Labor, 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, when he wrote 
From the wild Irish slums of the l9th century 
Eastern seaboard to the riot-torn suburbs of 
Los Angeles, there is one unmistakable lesson 
in American history: A community that allows 
a large number of young men to grow up in broken 
families, dominated by women, never acquiring 
any stable relationship to male authority, 
any stable relationship to male authority, 
never acquiring any rational expectations about 
the future - that community asks for and gets 
chaos...(In such a society) crime, violence, 
unrest, unrestrained lashing out at the whole 
social structure - these are not only to be 
expected, they are very nearly inevitable.15 
Never has America experienced such an explosion of legal and 
illegal immigration as that which now reshapes the nation's 
population and racial/ethnic composition. The decade of the 
Eighties saw the single largest flow of immigration in U.S. 
history - some nine million who entered legally and at least two 
million illegally. The number of illegal aliens in the United 
States is impossible to determine, but some demographic studies 
estimate it to be as high as eight million, and rising. The 
lowest estimate is two million.16 
In addition to the stress from shear numbers there is also a 
racial problem associated with immigration. As black and Latino 
gangs have begun to compete for turf and drug profits, a power 
struggle has developed that, if it explodes won't compare to 
anything we've seen before.17 
Blacks who have battled longest and hardest for racial and 
economic equality find themselves facing new competition from 
those of other races and ethnicities. This competition lies at 
the root to some of the problems raised earlier in this chapter 
about class, crime, poverty and increasing cultural tensions. 
These problems will not go away but will be of great concern well 
into the 2lst century. 
When a society is boiling with the problems previously 
described it may only take one incident to cause it to erupt like 
a volcano into civil disorder. In l968 it was the assassination 
of Martin Luther King Jr. In l992 it was the Rodney King beating 
and the acquittal of the white police officers. It would be wise 
for the senior civilian and military leadership of the United 
States to make sure that the military is ready and capable to 
execute its domestic peacekeeping mission. 
An accepted political principle in the United States is that 
intervention by the military at home should be kept as limited as 
possible even in times of crisis. This is part of an accepted if 
unwritten constitutional principle that goes beyond civilian 
supremacy of the military to include the belief that the military 
should be kept out of civilian politics and the political 
process. Using military units to enforce civil law is 
distasteful and dangerous, but it is preferable to lawlessness 
and anarchy. 
The employment of military forces to quell civil disorders 
resembles the activities performed by the Army on the western 
frontier. Throughout the nineteenth century, along the moving 
edge of civilization, soldiers functioned to suppress lawlessness 
and to promote law and order. Their purpose was to establish 
conditions that would permit the civil forces to provide social 
order consistent with and required for the peaceful life of law- 
abiding citizens. Although the scene has changed to an urban 
one, the military's domestic peacekeeping mission is still much 
the same. That is, to help the civil authorities protect life 
and property, preserve social values, and maintain the tradition 
of individual liberty together with social order.1 
The most striking aspect of federal intervention in domestic 
disorders has been that regardless of the sources of violence or 
the extent of disorder, the appearance of federal forces has 
invariably restored order with a minimum of bloodshed. Their 
arrival has never provoked violent retaliation from those in 
disorder; neither have federal forces used their military power 
to wreak havoc on disturbers of the peace. Since so much 
American violence "has taken the form of action by one group of 
citizens against another, rather than by citizens against the 
state," national authority almost always has been accepted as 
legitimate.2  While the military's organizational strength served 
it well in domestic peacekeeping, and its capacity to impose a 
high level of violence on rioters was more than incidental to its 
success, in many instances regulars prevailed not merely from 
their potential military power but because they symbolized 
national power.3 
When the subject of domestic peacekeeping comes up many 
military leaders respond that "we can't do it" or "it won't work" 
or "it's not our job." These types of responses are not only 
incorrect based on facts but they erode the trust and support the 
people of the United States have given its military. If the 
military drags its feet on taking part, it could encourage the 
formation of a national police such as the type that existed in 
the former Soviet Union. Are greatly increased federal and state 
law enforcement forces, which are difficult to remove or 
downsize, preferable to the use of military forces which normally 
are returned to bases arid other missions when order is restored? 
While abusive use of military forces in the domestic sphere can 
cause untold destruction to domestic values and political and 
social structure, judicious arrangements can nurture, support and 
bolster internal institutions and morale. 
As this paper demonstrates the military has had a long and 
successful history of domestic peacekeeping. It has had some 
rough times but has benefited from its mistakes. The military 
should only be used as a last resort when civil law enforcement 
agencies and states' National Guard forces can no longer contain 
the situation. The mission is a lawful one and one that can be 
expected in the future. The military should be willing and has 
an obligation to be ready to successfully execute this mission 
when the time comes. 
l. David E. Engdahl, "Foundations For Military Intervention 
In The United States," in Military Intervention in Democratic 
Societies, ed. Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan (London: 
Croom Helm, l985), l. 
2. Edward M. Coffman, "The Army Officer and the 
Constitution, "Parameters:  U.S. Army War College Quarterly, l7 
(Sept l987), 5. 
3. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in 
Domestic Disorders," in The U.S. Military Under the Constitution 
of the United States, l789-l989, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York: 
New York University Press, l99l), l43. 
4. Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Armed Forces and Civil 
Disorder," in The Military and American Society, ed. Stephen E. 
Ambrose and James A. Barber Jr., (New York: The Free Press, 
l972), 242. 
5. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals, Report of the Task Force on Disorders and 
Terrorism (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, l976), 
6. Ed Kilgore, "Safer Streets and Neighborhoods," in 
Mandate for Change, ed. Will Marshall and Martin Schram (New 
York: Berkley Books, l993), l79-l85. 
l. Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier 
Epilogue to the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University 
Press, l986), passim. 
2. Ibid. 
3. John Whiteclay Chambers II, "The Military and Civil 
Authority," in Encyclopedia of the American Military, eds. John 
E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
l994), l8O9-l8lO. 
4. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in 
Domestic Disorders," in The U. S. Military Under the Constitution 
of the United States, l789-l989, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York: 
New York University Press, l99l), l23. 
5. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority", l8l3. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid., l8l4. 
9. E. Sherman, "Contemporary Challenges to Traditional 
Limits on the Role of the Military in American Society," in 
Military Intervention in Democratic Societies, ed. Peter J. Rowe 
and Christopher J. Whelan (London: Croom Helm, l985), 2l9. 
lO. Ibid. 
ll. Ibid. 
l2. Bennet M. Rich, The Presidents and Civil Disorders 
(Washington, l94l), 52. 
l3. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," 1818
l4. Ibid. 
l5. Ibid., l8l9. 
l6. Ibid., l82O. 
l7. ibid. 
i8. Ibid., 1821. 
Since the early l9OOs colors had been used in war planning and 
war gaming to identify the various powers involved. Blue for 
instance meant the United States; red identified Great Britain; 
black was Germany; and orange meant Japan. During the l92Os and 
1930s, the Army-Navy Joint Board prepared a series of contingency 
war plans against specific countries, each plan identified by a 
different color. Where the color plans considered only one 
country per plan, the rainbow series postulated operations 
pitting the United States, sometimes with allies, against a 
variety of coalitions. (See Simon & Schuster Encyclopedia of 
WWII, l978). 
l9. Ibid., 1822. 
2O. Ibid., 1823. 
2i. Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New 
York, l984), 4l0. 
24. Ibid., 4l7. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l825 
27. Ibid. 
28. Martin Blumenson, "On the Function of the Military in 
Civil Disorders," in The Military and American Society, ed 
Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber Jr. (New York: The Free 
Press, l972), 249-254. 
29. Ibid. 
3O. Ibid. 
3l. W. Augustus Low. ed. Encyclopedia of Black America, 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, l98l), 239. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid., 24O. 
34. Memo, David E. Giffert, Undersecretary of the Army, to 
Chief of Staff, Army, l3 April l968, in U.S. Senate, 
Subcommittees on Constitutional Rights, Federal Data Banks, 
Computers, and the Bill of Rights, part 2, l283. 
36. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l826. 
37. Ambrose, "The Armed Forces and Civil Disorder," 24l. 
38. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l827. 
39. Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment:  It's 
Impact on American Society (New York, l97l), l83-l84. 
4O. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l829. 
In l967 two Supreme Court decisions, Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (l967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 4l (l967), held 
that electronic surveillance was a search and seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that in criminal proceedings 
the fruits of domestic electronic surveillance activities would 
be inadmissible if the probable cause and warrant requirement of 
the Constitution had not been satisfied. 
4l. From Annex B, reprinted in U.S. Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights, Federal Data Banks, Computers, and The 
Bill of Rights, part I, 43l. 
42. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l83O. 
43. Ibid., l832. 
44. Miriam Davidson, "Militarizing the Mexican Border," The 
Nation, l April l99l, 4O6. 
45. Ed Magnuson, "More and More, a Real War," Time, 22 
January l99O, 22.
46. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l832.
47. Ibid., l827-l828. 
48. Ibid. 
l. John Whiteclay Chambers II, "The Military and Civil 
Authority," in Encyclopedia of the American Military, eds. John 
E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
l994), l8O7. 
2. Hamilton addressed the question of military suppression 
of domestic disorders in Numbers 25 and 29 also, as did James 
Madison in Number 43. See The Federalist Papers, Isaac Kramnic, 
ed. (New York, l987), l95, 2O4-2O6, 2l0-2ll, 28l-284. 
3. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in 
Domestic Disorders," in The U.S. Military Under the Constitution 
of the United States, l789-l989 ed. Richard. Kohn (New York: 
New York University Press, l99l), l20. 
4. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l807. 
5. David E. Engdahl, "Foundations for Military Intervention 
in the United States," in Military Intervention in Democratic 
Societies, ed. Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan (London: 
Croom Helm, l985), 5. 
6. l Statues at Large 264. 
7. Cooper, "Foundations For Military Intervention," l2l. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces 
in Domestic Disorders, l789-l878 (Washington D. C.: Center of 
Military History, l988) 83. 
lO. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l8O8. 
ll. Ibid., l8l4. 
l2. Ibid.
l3. Ibid., l8l7. 
l4. Ibid., l8l8. 
l5. SECNAVINST 54OO.l2 (l7 January l969); U.S. v Walden, 
49O F. 2d 372 (4th Cir. l974); U.S. v. Chaparo-Almeida, 679 F. 2d 
423 (5th Cir. l982); U.S. v. Yunis, 68l F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 
l6. U.S. l, 63.64 (l89O). 
l7. United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 9l6 (D.S.D. 
l8. D'Aguino v. United States, l92 F. 2d 338 (9th Cir. 
l952); Gillars v. United States, l82 F. 2d 962 (D.C.Cir. l95O); 
and Chandler v. United States, l7l F. 2d 92l (lst Cir.l949). 
l9. Peter M. Sanchez, "Drug War: The U.S. Military and 
National Security," Air Force Law Review, l99l, l2O. 
20. Engdahl, "Foundations For Military Intervention," 2-3. 
2l. Sanchez, 'The U.S. Military and National Security," 
22. United States v. Caspar, 54l F. 2d l275 (8th Cir. 
l976); United States v. McArthur, 4l9 F. Supp. l86, l92, n.2 
(D.N.D. l976); United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 9l6 
(D.S.D.l975); United States v. Means, 383 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.D. 
l974); and United States v. Jaramillo, 38O F. Supp. l375 (D. Neb. 
23. Posse Comitatus Act: Hearing on H.R. 35l9 Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., lst 
Sess. 42 (l9Sl) l0. 
24.Sanchez, "The U. S. Military and National Security," l22. 
25. lO U.S.C. 37l.7S (Pub. L. No 97.86, 95 Stat. llO4). 
26. Posse Comitatus Act: Hearing (l98l), l5. 
27. U.S.C. 379 (l988); Pub. L. No 99-57O Title III, 3053 
(b) (l). 
28. Report of the Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to 
a Joint Hearing of Congress, June l988. 
29. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of l988, Pub. L. No. lOO-68O, 2l
U.S.C. 1501
3O. Pub. L. No. l00-456, l02 Stat. l933, lO U.S.C.  37l- 
8O (l988). 
3l. Ibid. 
32. Siemer P. Effron, "Military Participation in United 
States Law Enforcement Activities Overseas: The Extraterritorial 
Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act," 54 St. John's Law Rev 44-45 
l. United States Code, l988 Edition, Volume Three Title 
10-Armed Forces. (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 
l989), VII.
2. Ibid., 96. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 97. 
5. 32 C.F.R. #2l5.4. (c). (l). (i) 
6. U. S. Constitution Article II, 3. 
7. lO U.S.C. 331-33 (l988). 
8. lO U.S.C. 334 (l988). 
9. lO U.S.C. 375 (l988), lO2. 
lO. Ibid. 
ll. Department of Defense "Civil Disturbance Plan," 
Department of the Army, (Washington D.C. l99l) L-2. 
l2. Ibid., l. 
l3. Department of Defense Directive 3O25.l2, "Military 
Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MASDIS)," (Washington D.C. 
1994) 7. 
l4. Ibid. 
l5. "Civil Disturbance Plan," l. 
l6. "Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances," l2. 
l7. Ibid., 7. 
l. FMFM 3, Command and Control (Washington: Department of 
the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, l6 June l993), 
2. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals, Report of the Task Force on Disorders and 
Terrorism (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, l976), 
3. Major David R. Heinz and Major David C. Damm, "SPMAGTF 
in Los Angeles: Overview," Marine Corps Gazette, October l992, 
4. Ibid. 
5. CINCFOR After Action Report on Operation Garden Plot, 
JTF-L.A. (Washington: Department of Defense, l2 July l992), II- 
6. Major John Forguer, USMC, interviewed by author, 
Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA. l6 February l995. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Carl von Clausewitz,  On War, ed. and trans. Michael 
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
l976), 6O5. 
lO. William M. Hammond. "The News Media and the Military", 
in Encyclopedia of the American Military, eds. John E. Jessup and 
Louise B. Ketz (New York: Charles Scrilner's Sons, l994), 2lll. 
ll. Non Lethal Weapons In Somalia, ABC Nightly News, l4 
February l995. 
Chapter VI 
1. William J. Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural 
Indicators; Facts and Figures on the State of American Society 
(New York: Simond & Schuster, l994), 8. 
2. Ibid., 9. 
3. U. S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, "International Crime Rates," (Wash D.C.: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, l988) 
4. Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators, 24. 
5. Ibid., 25. 
6. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal 
Justice Statistics (Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing 
Office, l99l), Table 6.63, 629.
7. Will Marshall and Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, " Replacing 
Welfare with Work," in Mandate for Change, eds. Will Marshall and 
Martin Schran (New York: Berkley Books, l993), 2l7. 
8. The terms "Haves" and "Have Nots" are widely used today 
by writers and social scientists. In most cases "Haves refer to 
the rich while the "Have Nots" refer to the poor. However, the 
author Myron Magnet argues that poverty is more of a cultural 
than economic phenomenon produced by a poverty of "inner 
resources." The "Have Nots" not only suffer from a lack of 
material needs but also suffer from a lack of cultural values 
which prevents their upward mobility. Magnet blames this 
deficiency on the attitudes and programs created by the "Haves 
of the l96O's. (Myron Magnet, The Dream and the Nightmare:  The 
Sixties' Legacy to the Underclass. New York, l992). 
9. Haynes Johnson, Divided We Fall (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co., l994), 23l, 232.
lO. Myron Magnet, The Dream and the Nightmare:  The 
Sixties' Legacy to the Underclass (New York: William Morrow & 
Co., l992).
ll. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Howard University 
Commencement, June l965, in Families First, National Commission 
on America's Urban Families, l993.
l2. Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators, 5l. 
l3. Ibid. 
l4. Johnson, Divided We Fall, 2O3. 
l5. Cited in Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural 
Indicators, 53. 
l6. Johnson, Divided We Fall, 277. 
l7. Andrew Peyton Thomas, Crime and the Sacking of America, 
The Roots of Chaos (Washington: Brassey's, l994), 239. 
l. Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Armed Forces and Civil 
Disorder," in the Military and American Society, eds. Stephen E. 
Ambrose and James A. Barber Jr. (New York: The Free Press, 
l972), 256. 
2. Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace eds.,
"Reflections on Violence in the United States," in American 
Violence:  A Documentary History (New York: Vintage Books, l97l), 
3. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in 
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of the United States, l789-l989, eds. Richard H. Kohn (New York: 
New York University Press, l99l), l3l. 
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