The United States Military and Domestic Peacekeeping
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA National - Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The United States Military and Domestic Peacekeeping
Author: Major Lawrence P. Stawicki USMC
Research Questions: What has been the military's role in
domestic peacekpeeing and what should it be in the future?
Discussion: There are some in the United States who argue that
there is no authority under Title lO of the United States Code
(U.S.C.) to use the military to quell civil disorder except under
circumstances equivalent to war. Others argue that the military
mission is to help civil authorities protect life and property,
preserve social values, and maintain the tradition of individual
liberty together with social order. Probably most citizens feel
that when civil disorder occurs, "something must be done." It is
generally accepted that National Guard units are the first line
of defense, and if they are insufficient, that active duty forces
reinforce them. It is the latter argument this paper supports.
Using military units to enforce civil law is distasteful and
dangerous, but it is preferable to lawlessness and anarchy.
While abusive use of military forces in the domestic sphere can
cause untold destruction to domestic values and political and
social structure, judicious arrangements can nurture, support and
bolster internal institutions and morale.
Conclusions: The use of the military in domestic peacekeeping
missions to preserve order and backup civilian police has a long
history. This mission is both justified and constitutional.
Indicators suggest that the use of the military to again perform
a domestic peacekeeping mission is very likely. The need for the
military to be trained and ready to execute this mission is
essential.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION l
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 5
The Whiskey Rebellion 5
The Slavery Issue 7
Reconstruction 8
Labor Strife 9
The Great Depression ll
The World War II Years l2
Civil Rights and Urban Race Riots l4
The Antiwar Movement l8
Surveillance Operations 2O
Drug Enforcement 2l
The l992 Los Angeles Riot 22
III MILITARY INTERVENTION AND DOMESTIC LAW 25
The Constitution 25
The Early Laws 27
The Posse Comitatus Act of l878 3O
The l97O's 32
The l98l Amendments 34
The l988 Amendments 35
IV CURRENT LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 37
Title lO, United States Code 37
Department of Defense Directives 4l
V ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 46
Command and Control 46
Training 48
Direct Intervention 5O
Force Selection 5l
The Media 52
VI A REASON FOR READINESS 55
Crime 56
A Widening Gap 57
The Family 58
Immigration 6O
VII CONCLUSION 62
NOTES 65
BIBLIOGRAPHY 74
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
To the conscience of the nation that fancies itself the
world's greatest democracy, the idea of military intrusion into
the affairs of civil government is profoundly repugnant. In
l972, for example, the United States Supreme Court, through Chief
Justice Warren Burger, had occasion to recall the "traditional
and strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into
civilian affairs. That tradition has deep roots in our
history.. ." (Laird v. Tatum, 4O8 U.S. l,l5). Again in l974 the
same Chief Justice observed on behalf of the court that even
where some form of government force is warranted "the decision to
involk military power has traditionally been viewed with
suspicion and skepticism since it often involves the temporary
suspension of some of our most cherished rights..." (Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 4l6 U.S. 232, 246).1
This aversion to domestic peacekeeping is found in the
military as well. Beginning in l884, when officers in the
military accepted their commissions they took an oath "to support
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic."2 Whether in the l9th or 2Oth
century, officers have much preferred confronting foreign enemies
than domestic ones. The professional soldier's preference for
national defense over internal peacekeeping in part prevented the
military from becoming a national gendarmerie, but, in the final
analysis, the decision to intervene was a political act. Under
the Constitution, that decision belonged to civilian leaders, and
military men wanted it that way.3
The professional soldier dislikes domestic duty for a
variety of reasons. Military men and women see themselves as the
defenders of a nation from foreign enemies using organized armed
forces. This is not only their reason for existence; it is the
job they want to concentrate on! Diversionary tasks, such as
fighting forest fires, assisting in flood relief programs, or
performing police work, detract from their ability to meet
foreign enemies. Finally, professional soldiers abhor a
situation that pits them against their fellow citizens, who often
may be veterans. Everything about the suppression of domestic
disorder in fact, violates the professional soldiers' code and
their view of themselves.4
It would be easier if defending the country involved only
foreign enemies. It would be easier if all civil disorder could
be controlled by our civil police forces. But that is not the
case. At times our country needs help from its military and no
one ever said those times would be easy or fair. When the United
States is involved in very real wars in our cities and at our
borders, the military cannot justify a reluctance to participate
on the grounds that they must stand ready to fight a major
conflict that fewer and fewer Americans believe will occur.
Reluctance to take part because it is unglamorous, degrading, or
too difficult may lead to reduced confidence and support for the
military.
The growing threat of international terrorism, its domestic
imitators and civil disobedience on a major scale, and the need
for a response beyond the capabilities of the civil authority
raises serious questions that need to be faced with realism. The
United States thus far has not experienced the type of terrorism
and civil disobedience that has threatened the very existence of
some Latin American countries or that has so radically altered
the quality of life even in several quite stable European
countries. Although it would be alarmist to suggest that such
possibilities were imminent, it would be irresponsible to
discount the eventuality entirely. Experience elsewhere has
shown that when terrorism and civil disorder reach a certain
level of intensity, the only appropriate response is a military
one.5
The most fundamental right any government owes its citizens
is personal safety - the right to live, work, and move about
peaceably, secure in one's person and property. The fear of
civil disorder dissolves the social fabric that binds Americans
together into a community of common experience. It turns
strangers into enemies, unfamiliar ground into dangerous turf,
and random social contact into risky business. When civil
disorder afflicts a neighborhood, those who can avoid it, stay
away; those who cannot, suffer alone. The former becomes
isolated, the latter abandoned.6
It is the intent of this paper to explore the subject of the
military's role in domestic peacekeeping. I will build a
foundation by first addressing some historical and legal
background information on the subject. Next I will examine the
current laws and directives that guide the military in the
controversial issue of intervention into domestic law
enforcement. Lastly, I will explore some issues for
consideration and reasons for concern. Hopefully, this argument
will demonstrate why the military needs to be ready to execute a
domestic peacekeeping mission, what areas of this execution
require more attention, and that a domestic peacekeeping mission
will assuredly be a mission the military receives in the future.
The military cannot stand idly by while U. S. cities are
being destroyed and citizens are being murdered during a civil
disorder. The American people will tolerate nothing less from
its Armed Forces than a quick, decisive, and professional
response. The military must be ready and willing to protect the
nation against its domestic enemies.
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It is important to review U. S. history to understand the
issue of domestic peacekeeping. Just as we study battles and
campaigns to be proficient at fighting major conventional wars,
so too must we study domestic disorders to become proficient in
executing our domestic peacekeeping missions. The mistakes made
in the past can be avoided if we learn from history. Writing a
complete history of the military's involvement in domestic
disorders is well beyond the scope of this paper, therefore, I
will focus on selected pivotal events in which the U. S. military
was called upon to respond.
The Whiskey Rebellion
The first use of federal forces to suppress organized
resistance to United States law was in the Whiskey Rebellion in
l794. The farmers of western Pennsylvania displayed open and
violent resistance to the collection of a federal tax on whiskey.
President George Washington issued a proclamation in August l794
calling upon the tax resisters to obey the law. Resistance
persisted, however, and the administration decided to enforce
compliance.
By employing federal troops Washington was aware that he was
setting a precedent, thus he pursued with caution. In September
l794 Washington issued another proclamation and sent three peace
commissioners to Pittsburgh, the center of opposition, to
negotiate with the rebels. When it became clear that
negotiations would fail, Washington nationalized l2,95O
militiamen, a force approximately the same size as the
Continental Army of the Revolution. Washington, along with the
governors of three states, personally led the military expedition
into western Pennsylvania. Although the militia encountered
evidence of western discontent, it met with no rebel force.1
Events after the militia's rendezvous were in fact anticlimactic.
The rebellion burned itself out, in part because the rebels
realized the administration intended to use force. By the time
the Federal Force reached the Pittsburgh area, resistance had
collapsed. Federal marshals arrested twenty men at random and
sent them to Philadelphia for trial. Two were convicted of
treason, but Washington pardoned both.2
Washington recognized that federal military intervention in
a situation that normally called for civil law enforcement was a
potentially explosive political act. He went beyond the letter
of the law to obtain prior support from state authorities and the
general public before calling for a military expedition. He was
also careful to subordinate the military to civilian authority.3
The first threat of the use of federal force was not only a
precedent setting event but it was also a genuine test of the
federal government's ability to control disorder and enforce the
law.
The Slavery Issue
For over eight years after the Whisky Rebellion, nearly all
federal interventions dealt in some manner with the turbulence
connected with slavery and its abolition.4
The intensification of the antislavery issue in the l85O's
produced mounting challenges to civil authority, and government
officials used state and national troops to enforce unpopular
policies in an increasingly divided society. The difficulty was
with the compromise of l850 and in particular with the Fugitive
Slave Law. This law provided for the return of runaway slaves
and denied the fugitives the right to testify or seek writs of
habeas corpus against their removal. Federal judges or special
commissioners were given power to call out a "posse comitatus
composed of federal troops, militia or other citizens if
necessary to return fugitive slaves. Posse comitatus is the body
of men that a sheriff or other peace officer calls or may call to
his assistance in the discharge of his official duty, as to quell
a riot or make an arrest (Randon House Dictionary l984). In l85l
in Christiana, Pennsylvania, the government used a Marine
detachment to suppress an anti-slavery riot when armed Free
Negroes drove off a posse of federal officers seeking to
recapture four fugitive slaves.
In l854, in Boston, fifty thousand demonstrators assembled
to block the return of one slave to his southern owner. It took
federal marshals, twenty-two militia companies, a battalion of
regular soldiers, and a company of Marines, a total of sixteen
hundred men to restore order. This has been the largest posse
comitatus in the nation's history. This action was requested by
U. S. Marshals, in conjunction with the Mayor and authorized by
President Franklin Pierce.6
Attorney General Caleb Cushing explained later that a
marshal's call for a posse obligated not only civilians but any
and all organized forces whether militia of the state or
officers, soldiers, sailors, and Marines of the United States.
Except for a few instances in northern cities in the late l85O's,
this broad assertion, the so-called Cushing Doctrine, was little
used until the Reconstruction era following the Civil War.7
On l6 October, l859 President James Buchanan dispatched
three companies of artillery, and a detachment of Marines in
response to John Brown's raid on the federal arsenal at Harpers
Ferry. The commander of the force, Colonel Robert E. Lee,
arrived on the scene on l9 October. After a brief negotiation
the Marines stormed the building, killing two of the
abolitionists and losing one of their own men. Brown and six
other survivors were tried and executed for conspiracy to incite
a slave insurrection and treason against the state of Virginia.8
Reconstruction
Following the Civil War, the U. S. Army, for the first and
only time in it's history, executed the mission as an army of
occupation within the United States. President Andrew Johnson
divided the Southern States into five military districts and the
Army assisted law enforcement officers in enforcing
reconstruction policies. In addition, the Army was used to
control the illegal production of liquor, to suppress labor
disputes, and even to collect taxes.9
The enforcement of civil law by federal forces caused
intense controversy and opposition in the Southern States and in
the Democratically controlled Congress. By l878, most
congressmen decided that using the military to enforce the law
was counter-productive.10
The result was that Congress passed the so-called Posse
Comitatus Act of lB78, prohibiting the use of the military in law
enforcement.11 This act will be analyzed in greater detail in
Chapter III.
Labor Strife
Industrial disorders dominated federal intervention from
l877 to the early l920'S. In most cases, regular Army units,
occasionally augmented by Marine Corps detachments, were
committed at the request of state officials who were unable to
restore order with state and local law enforcement agencies.12
In l877 railroad strikes began when the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad cut wages for a second time that year during an economic
depression. With over l00,000 workers idle, violence erupted in
many cities and property was destroyed in Baltimore and
Pittsburgh. President Rutherford B. Hayes deployed two thousand
regular troops who rushed from city to city to put down
rebellious strikers.13 was the first time the Army was used
to break a strike since the l830's. The display of federal force
helped end the strike as well as the violence.14
As a result of the violence of l877 the states began to
rebuild the National Guard and train them in riot control. Many
Governors, however, were reluctant to use the military in labor
disputes due to voters sympathy for workers. Also, a number of
industrial states, led by Pennsylvania, created a new
paramilitary instrument, the State Police. This new paramilitary
concept quickly spread to other states including New York and New
Jersey.15
After the l89O's Congress generally followed a policy of
maintaining federal troops under the direct control of the
President and using them to preserve order rather than assisting
management in crushing organized labor. President Theodore
Roosevelt spurned persistent calls from Colorado in l903 and l9O4
to provide federal troops to police strike disorders in the
Cripple Creek mining region. The President sent an Army officer
to investigate the situation. The officer reported that the
state had the resources to control the disorder and that federal
troops were not needed. In l9O7 President Roosevelt granted a
request from Nevada too hastily; once the federal force reached
the disturbed area little disorder was found. An infuriated
Roosevelt then ordered the commander of the force not to assist
Nevada officials. Following Roosevelt's example in l9O3 many
presidents sent Army officers or a civilian representative to
survey the disorder before deciding to commit troops.16
In l9l4, as a result of the Ludlow Massacre, in which two
women and eleven children were killed when company guards and
Colorado militiamen destroyed a tent city of striking coal miners
and their families, and following open warfare in which at least
fifty persons were killed, President Woodrow Wilson agreed to the
governor s request for federal troops. The President, however,
made it clear publicly that the soldiers were to restore order,
not to assist the mine owners in breaking the strike.
Consequently, he requested that the Colorado National Guard be
withdrawn, that everyone in the region including company guards
and local police be disarmed, and that strikebreakers not be
brought in by the mining companies. Strikers welcomed the
seventeen hundred troops with cheers and a brass band. In
contrast to previous similar disturbances, the troops acted under
federal orders only, with no pretense of cooperation with state
and local officials and were withdrawn some six months later.'
The Great Depression
In the l92O's in addition to the courses at the Army Command
and General Staff College on more effective use of troops during
civil disorder the intelligence officers put together a
domestic contingency plan to fight civil disorders. Among the
so-called Rainbow Plans (color-coded for different world
adversaries) was Emergency Plan White, a detailed outline for
Army intervention to suppress radical, Communist-led civil
disorders and armed insurrection if they occurred, within the
United States.18
In l932 the Army used a modified form of Emergency Plan
White against the so-called Bonus Army, an assemblage of
unemployed veterans and their families who had come to the
nation's capital at the depth of the Great Depression to petition
Congress for an immediate cash payment of their "bonus" for
service in World War I. When Congress rejected them many left,
but many did not. The Washington Police Force tried to remove
the remaining two thousand of the Bonus Army but in the
confrontation two policemen and two veterans were killed.
President Hoover called on the U.S. Army Troops to evict the
veterans from their encampment. The troops were led by the Chief
of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur. With his young aide, Major
Dwight D. Eisenhower at his side, MacArthur employed infantry,
cavalry, tanks, and tear gas to clear the veterans out of their
shanties, which were then set on fire. President Hoover,
MacArthur, and the Army were subsequently criticized for
excessive use of force. The actions, however, were successful
and the Bonus Army left the capital.19
The World War II Years
Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December l94l,
President Roosevelt assigned protection of defense plants to the
Army. Military Intelligence (G-2) established a network of
thousands of informants in its defense-plant protection system.
Military forces were used many times during the war to maintain
defense production. In the summer of l94l Roosevelt used twenty-
five hundred troops to enable strikebreakers to continue
production at the North American Aviation plant in Los Angeles
which was under a wildcat strike. The strike ended a month
later. Once the United States entered the war, Congress
specifically empowered the President to seize industrial
facilities where war production was threatened by labor
disturbances.2O
Additionally, President Roosevelt, under pressure from the
Army and Navy and from western economic and political groups,
authorized the War Department in February l942 to remove the
approximately 7,OOO Japanese aliens and some l00,000 Americans of
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast and intern them in prison-
like camps in remote areas of California, the Midwest, and the
Rocky Mountain states. Run by a civilian agency, the War
Relocation Authority, the camps were guarded by soldiers of the
U. S. Army. The Army was responsible for the movement of these
people and management of the camps until the emergency regulation
was lifted on 2 January l945. Similar actions took place in
Hawaii as well as the imposition of martial law.21
The Army was used to restore order in the summer of l943 in
Detroit when in June, race riots turned into a full-scale war.
The governor of Michigan requested federal assistance. By the
time the Army arrived twenty-five blacks and nine whites had been
killed and more than 7OO people had been injured. In August
l944, when a protest strike in Philadelphia against upgrading
black transportation workers led to interracial clashes,
Roosevelt sent federal troops, who quickly restored order.
Civil Rights and Urban Race Riots
The primary domestic use of the U. S. Army in the late
l95O's and l96O's was in response to the civil rights revolution
that established equal legal rights for African-Americans.
President Eisenhower found himself in such a position in l957.
Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas defied a federal court order
directing the racial integration of Central High School in Little
Rock. Faubus not only denounced the court but ordered out the
Arkansas National Guard to halt integration.23 Eisenhower's
Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, had cautioned the President
that if Faubus persisted, Federal action was unavoidable.
Eisenhower was already on record against using the military to
enforce Supreme Court rulings on civil rights, having told a
press conference in July l957 that "I can't imagine any set of
circumstances that would ever induce me to send federal troops
to enforce a court order. continued defiance, and his
calling out and then removing the Arkansas National Guard, led to
rioting in Little Rock on 23 and 24 September. Though still
loathe to use troops Eisenhower had to act, especially after the
mayor of Little Rock pleaded for federal assistance. Eisenhower
began by federalizing the Arkansas National Guard, the first time
that had been done since Reconstruction. In addition, the
President dispatched twelve hundred paratroopers from the lOlst
Airborne Division and these uniformed soldiers kept Central High
School open until May lg58.25
In the fall of l962 at the University of Mississippi at
Oxford, James H. Meredith, a black transfer student, was admitted
under a federal court order. In addition to ten thousand
National Guardsmen President Kennedy dispatched twelve thousand
regular soldiers under Major General Creighton V. Abrams, Jr. to
surround "Ole Miss." More than two thousand persons engaged in
pitched battles with federal marshals escorting Meredith into the
school, resulting in the deaths of two rioters and injuries
sustained by l66 federal marshals, 4B soldiers, and 3l civilians.
A small detachment of marshals continued to protect Meredith
until he was graduated in August l963.26
In the summer of l963, on petition from black Alabamians, a
federal court ordered the desegregation of that state's
university. Governor George C. Wallace called out seven hundred
members of the National Guard to preserve order and block
desegregation. President Kennedy twice federalized the Alabama
National Guard, forcing Wallace to back down from his refusal to
allow integration of the university or public schools in
Birmingham, Mobile and Tuskegee.27
One of the most acrimonious confrontations between a
governor and a President occurred during the l967 Detroit riots.
In the heart of the black ghetto in Detroit, an early morning
police raid on an after-hours drinking establishment on July 23,
l967, triggered the appearance of a group of several hundred
blacks. One person threw a bottle at a police cruiser, others
shouted obscenities, and a mob surged down l2th Street breaking
windows. The small band of demonstrators quickly multiplied,
looting increased, fires broke out, and disorder and destruction
escalated. The disorder spread over almost eleven square
miles.28
A delay in obtaining federal troops occurred because
Governor George Romney, a potential Republican presidential
nominee, proved reluctant to declare that the state government
could not control the situation by formally requesting federal
assistance. President Lyndon Johnson was also reluctant to
commit federal troops because he did not want to be branded with
the burden of using military force against civilians at the
height of the war in Vietnam and with an election pending in
l968. Finally, after a formal request from Romney, President
Johnson at ll:3O pm on 24 July l967 agreed to deploy regular
troops.29
After several days of a massive, yet controlled commitment
of troops, together with police, in the streets, the riot died
down and came to an end on July 27th. The withdrawal of regulars
began on the following day and ended on August 2nd. The Guard
remained on the scene for four more days.
To some observers, the riot resembled a war. It bordered on
mass insurrection, more closely resembling guerrilla warfare than
the riots and disorders with which the nation is more familiar.
By the time it ended, 43 people were dead, 2,OOO injured, and
5,OOO were homeless as a result of 4,000 fires. A large part of
the nation's fifth-largest city lay in ruins.
On April 4, l968, Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. was
assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee. Memphis, closest to the
tragedy, blew up first; but as news of the assassination quickly
spread, a wave of riots in l25 cities in 29 states erupted. Most
explosively of all was in Washington D.C. where heavily armed
units of the 82nd Airborne Division were flown in from Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, to help restore order. In Washington
D.C., 8 people were killed and 705 were injured.31
On the day following King's death, massive rioting erupted
in Chicago, where 6,000 guardsmen and 5,000 army troops joined
the police. In Chicago ll demonstrators were killed and 35O were
arrested.32 On April 6 futher rioting occurred in Cincinnati,
Ohio, Newark and Trenton, New Jersey and particularly in
Baltimore, Maryland, where 6000 guardsmen and 2,000 federal
troops were brought in. In Baltimore, 5 people were killed and
258 were injured. The week's upheavals left 46 people dead
across the nation.33
Under intense pressure from the White House, Department of
Defense leaders moved quickly to establish a full set of
oversight committees and a command agency that would be able, in
the words of the Undersecretary of the Army, "to expand as
rapidly as is feasible the Federal military capability to respond
with large forces and with speed to directives from the President
to control multiple disorders."34
The increase of civil disorder caused the formation of the
Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Steering Committee which
included representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Department of Justice, the White House, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The Committee set overall policy, but gave
responsibility, for planning and directing civil disturbance
operations to the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of
Staff. In turn, the Army established the Directorate of Civil
Disturbance Planning and Operations, a joint-service command
headed by an Army lieutenant general. The Directorate was to
plan and oversee the training of Army and National Guard units,
develop nonlethal civil disorder weapons, and monitor civil
disturbances across the nation.35
The Antiwar Movement
Opposition to the U.S. role in the Vietnam War led to
widespread demonstrations and protests. Most of these activities
were relatively peaceful, among them the university "sit-ins"
that began in l965; the massive antiwar parades in the spring of
l967 in New York, San Francisco, and other cities and the massive
march on Washington, D.C.36
On May 4, l970, at Kent State University in Ohio, a ragged
line of poorly trained, improperly equipped, inadequately led
National Guard troops confronted an unorganized group of milling
students and other radicals, many of whom were changing classes
or going to lunch. Operating in a climate of intense anti-war
sentiment and unfamiliar with such duty the Guardsmen, taunted by
the mob, felt angry and scared. When either an officer or a
noncommissioned officer gave an order, the troops fired into the
crowd. They wounded nine individuals and killed four. Nine of
the thirteen victims were shot in the back or side.37
Although polls showed that most Americans supported the
National Guard, it was recognized that their training, equipment,
discipline, and leadership was inadequate for containing civil
disturbances. Suggested solutions included: more use of regular
troops, better training and equipment, and greater integration of
blacks into the guard.38
The government also realized the effectiveness of a new
tactic, the prepositioning of troops. From l968 to l973, the
government repositioned troops six different times, covering such
events as an antiwar demonstration at Yale University in l970,
both the Republican and Democratic presidential nominating
conventions in Miami, Florida in l972, and Richard Nixon's second
inauguration in January l973. Troops were not needed but it
showed a federal propensity to intervene quickly which had never
been seen in the past.39
Surveillance Operations
The most controversial expansion of the domestic role of the
armed forces was the growth of military surveillance of U.S.
citizens in the l960's and l97O's. Military intelligence groups
gathered information from a variety of sources including the FBI
and police reports. All data on persons was forwarded to the
Army's Counterintelligence Analysis Branch in Washington for
analysis, then permanently deposited in personal dossiers, often
computerized, at the U.S. Army Intelligence Command at Fort
Holabird, Maryland. The army's extensive surveillance of American
civilians, and its accumulation of thousands of dossiers, meant
that in the late l96O's and early l97O's, army intelligence had
crossed the dividing line into illegal, unconstitutional
activity.40
Public exposure of this intelligence gathering in l97O
brought this activity to an end, and the dossiers were ordered
destroyed. In testimony to a Senate Investing Committee,
President Richard Nixon's Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Administration, Robert Froelke, explained the civil disorder
intelligence program as the Army's "aggressive" response to
demands for more information, and added lamely, "we maintain that
there was no illegal activity. We maintain there was
inappropriate activity."4l
Congress held a series of hearings in l975 into the abuses
of various civilian and military intelligence agencies. The
Senate Committee called for stricter supervision and the House
Committee recommended that the military be prohibited from any
domestic intelligence operations. Several military officers also
believed that those types of missions should be avoided.42
Drug Enforcement
The most dramatic new development in the use of the military
to enforce civil authority was the employment of the Armed Forces
in the l98O's in support of drug-enforcement laws. The Reagan
Administration enlisted the Armed Forces in its "War Against
Drugs" Campaign as a result of budgetary constraints against
major increases in civilian law-enforcement agencies. The
military leadership resisted this new role.
On December l3, l989, a small contingent of Marines,
patrolling the Arizona border came across a group of smugglers on
horseback. The Marines sent an illumination flare into the sky,
and in the blaze of light that followed, shots were exchanged.
The smugglers dropped their load, some 57O pounds of marijuana,
and fled back to Mexico.44
The military's role also includes carrier task forces off
the coast of Columbia, mobile ground radar stations in Bolivia
and Peru, and AWACS flights over suspected drug routes. The
military unit charged with coordinating this effort is the Joint
Task Force - Six (JTF-6) at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas. Since
its creation in l989 JTF-6 has responded to hundreds of requests
for support. These requests came from a wide array of federal,
state, and local task forces set up to stem the flow of drugs.45
Traditional military reluctance to engage in operations
which they considered police work was overcome by the fact that
the war on drugs had become one of the few areas of increased
appropriations for the Pentagon. Although the overall defense
budget shrank dramatically, the Defense Department's
antinarcotics spending tripled from $44O million in l989 to $l.2
billion in l992.46
The l992 Los Angeles Riot
At the end of April and early May l992, the ghetto in the
predominantly black south-central district of Los Angeles
exploded in one of the deadliest riots in American history. The
violence followed the acquittal of four of the city's white
police officers' charged with savagely beating a black motorist,
Rodney G. King, who had initially resisted arrest. On 29 April
l992, when the acquittal by an all-white jury was announced,
social order in the nation's second-largest city broke down.
Violence, looting, vandalism, and arson spread from south-central
Los Angeles to Koreatown, immediately north, and as far
as Santa Monica, West Los Angeles, Long Beach, Hollywood, and
Beverly Hills. Confronted with warring youth gangs, especially
the notorious "Crips" and "Bloods," who were armed with an
arsenal of weapons and munitions ranging from sub machine guns to
grenades, the Los Angeles police initially withdrew from the
south-central district.
California Governor Peter Wilson sent in ten thousand
members of the National Guard. In response to the governor's
request, President Bush ordered in eighteen hundred soldiers,
members of the 7th U.S. Infantry Division, a "light-infantry"
unit trained in low intensity conflict, which had fought in
Panama in l989, and was stationed in Fort Ord, California. Bush
also sent in fifteen hundred Marines from Camp Pendleton,
California, most veterans of the l99l Gulf War. They joined
several hundred FBI, state, and local police officers.47
Once the military was deployed, its response was coordinated
and effective compared with many of the military actions in the
l960s riots. Unlike the l96O's, all state and federal
troops were immediately placed under a single temporary command,
Joint Task Force - L.A. (JTF-L.A.), headed by Army Major General
Marvin L. Covault, commander of the 7th U.S. Infantry Division.
This time the National Guard included large numbers of black
soldiers, as did the Army and Marine units. The units worked in
harmony to bring peace to the area. Four days of violence,
including two nights of uncontrolled rioting and gang warfare,
left 53 dead, more than 2,3OO wounded, l7,OOO arrested, and an
estimated $785 million in property damage from looting and 5,600
fires.48
The problem of civil disorder in the United States is not
new. By its very persistence it is a more serious problem for
our society than it would be were it new, for its roots run very
deep. The use of the military to quell civil disorder has a
varied history. The effectiveness of military intervention has
largely been attributed to the disciplinary superiority of
federal forces as compared to police, militia, or National Guard.
From past events many valuable lessons have been learned.
Lessons the military needs to study and act upon. If history
teaches anything it warns that the military will be called upon
again to execute a domestic peacekeeping mission.
24
CHAPTER III
MILITARY INTERVENTION AND DOMESTIC LAW
The national government's commitment of military forces in
civil disorders paralleled many of the most important social and
economic conflicts in history. As with any controversies of this
magnitude, our legal and judicial system dictated what actions
should or should not be taken. And as could be expected, the use
of military forces in civil disorders was not always a smoothly
executed evolution. In this chapter I will highlight the legal
involvement and key laws enacted that affected the military's
intervention into domestic disorders. In so doing, I hope to
demonstrate how the military arrived at the point it is at today.
I hope this information will also shed some light on what actions
may and may not be taken in the future.
The Constitution
The framers of the United States Constitution were much
concerned with domestic disorder in the aggressive new republic.
The nationalists at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
in l787 wanted to ensure that the new central government would
not find itself powerless in the future. States' rights
advocates, however, feared giving the national government the
power to intervene militarily in the states.
Sentiment remained strong in the post revolutionary period that
maintaining a standing army in peacetime would be dangerous to
the liberties of the people.1
The new Constitution proposed in l787 met with opposition on
several grounds, but no feature was more controversial than its
provision for a National Army. States' rights advocates feared
giving the national government the power to intervene militarily
in the states. Sentiment remained strong that maintaining a
standing army in peacetime would be dangerous to the liberties of
the people. To appease the localists, many writers of the
Constitution published articles explaining that the Army was
merely to be used to suppress rebellions and dangerous
insurrections. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison used their
Federalist Papers to express their views. Hamilton wrote in The
Federalist No. 28,
That there may happen cases in which the national
government may be necessitated to resort to force
cannot be denied...Seditions and insurrections are,
unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body
politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural
body...Should such emergencies at any time happen
under the national government, there could be no
remedy but force.2
Despite Antifederalist opposition, the Constitution gave the
national government final authority. Article I Section 8 granted
Congress the power "To provide for the calling forth the militia
to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and
repel invasion." Article II, Section 2 gave the President
authority over the armed forces by making him their Commander-in-
Chief. Article II, Section 3 directed of the President that "he
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Finally,
Article IV, Section 4 assured that "The United States shall
guarantee to every State a Republican form of government, and
shall protect each of them against invasion and on application of
the Legislature or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic violence."3
American federalism under the Constitution thus provided a
means for the use of state or national military forces for
supporting civil authority against serious internal disturbances.
The state governments had been given that power from the state
constitutions. The national government obtained similar, if
somewhat circumscribed, authority from the Constitution.4 During
ratification many states still had problems with the military's
role in government. It was the Bill of Rights that provided the
protection they wanted which was not found in the Constitution.
The language which James Madison chose, which the Congress
eventually approved and the states ratified, to calm the fears of
military law enforcement was that "No person shall...be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."5 As
was true for the Constitution as a whole, the real meaning of the
civil disorder provisions would become evident only when
implemented by law and experienced in practice.
The Early Laws
The first law granting the President powers to intervene
with military force in domestic disorders was passed by
the Second Congress and became law on 2 May l792. The clauses
dealing with the use of force in internal affairs were part of a
broader scheme to carry into effect Congress' power to "provide
for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union,
suppress insurrections and repel invasions."6 The law, in
language similar to that of the Constitution, allowed the
President to call militia from other states "as he may judge
sufficient" to put down "an insurrection in any state against the
government thereof," when so requested by a state legislature, or
its governor if the legislature could not be convened.7 The act
also allowed the President to call militia from within a state
experiencing disorder, or from neighboring states if necessary,
when the United States laws were opposed or obstructed "by
combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course
of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in marshals by
this act." An associate justice of the Supreme Court or a United
States district judge had to notify the President that such
conditions existed before he could call out the militia. The
President was required to issue a proclamation to "command such
insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably...within a limited
time" in advance of military intervention.8 This law was
reenacted on 28 February l795 becaue the l792 Act expired in
three years.
An Act of 3 March l8O7 which resulted from the "Burr
Conspiracy," expanded the power of the President. Shortly after
slaying Alexander Hamilton, Aaron Burr, his political career now
at an end, asked money of Anthony Mercy, British minister to the
United States, supposedly for the purpose of organzing a movement
for separating the Western States from the U. S. President
Thomas Jefferson was informed of Burr's plan in Nov. l8O6.
Whether Burr's aim was treasonable, or whether he was planning to
lead an expedition against the Spanish dominions, is still a
matter of dispute. Burr was indicted for treason but acquitted
on l Sept l8O7. Jefferson was troubled by his lack of authority
to use regulars in a domestic insurrection, which he really
deemed the Burr conspiracy to be. In mid-December l8O6 the
President sent the draft of a law permitting the use of regulars,
to a friendly congresman from Virginia, John Dawson. The bill
passed by Congress in March l807 was phrased in language almost
the same as Jefferson's draft.9 The act provided explicitly for
the use of the regular land or naval forces of the United States
by the President in cases of insurrection or obstruction of the
laws, whereas the l792 and l795 statues had authorized only his
use of the militia. As the regular army came to displace the
militia as the primary military arm of the nation, Federal
Marshals, with Presidential authority, came to use national
troops rather than militia as their "posse comitatus" when major
force was required to enforce the exucution of the laws of the
Republic.10
After the fall of Fort Sumter in April l86l, President
Lincoln, using the powers of the law of l795, declared a state of
insurrection and called out the militia as well as U.S.
Volunteers. Congress subsequently approved this action, and on
29 July l96l, Congress revised the basic laws of l795 and l8O7
and greatly increased the President's authority to use both
militias and regulars to suppress insurrections and execute the
laws of the Union. The l86l act entrusted the decision to use
military force against obstructions of the law or against
rebellion to the "judgement of the President" whenever he deemed
it "impracticable's to enforce the law by ordinary means. The
l86l law authorized the President to use naval as well as land
forces and also federalized militia forces. This l86l statute
permitting the use of military force to deal with actions which
cannot be overcome by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings
has remained the basic authority for presidential use of troops
to enforce federal law. This statute, as part of the U.S. Code,
was used by President Eisenhower and Kennedy to enforce federally
mandated desegregation of school facilities in the l95O's and
l96O's.12
The Posse Comitatus Act of l878
One of the most important laws regarding the use of the
military in domestic affairs is the Posse Comitatus Act of l878.
The Act came into being in the aftermath of the Civil War and
Reconstruction periods, owing to southern opposition to the
growing military involvement in law enforcement with virtually no
control by the federal government.
The Posse Comitatus Act prohibited use of the Army "as a
posse comitatus, or otherwise for the purpose of executing the
laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such
employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the
Constitution or by act of Congress."13 What the legislation in
effect actually did was repel the Cushing Doctrine of l854, which
allowed Army forces to be summoned by marshals or sheriffs
without specific approval by the President. The statues of l795,
l8O7, and 186l remained in force. The President's authority was
required to use troops for domestic intervention. Orders to
support civil authorities came from the President, then through
the Secretary of War, the Commanding General, and finally Field
Commanders. Local civil officials had no authority to direct the
deployment of federal troops.14
Although not mentioned in the Act, the Navy and Marine Corps
adhere to the statue by Navy regulation, and several courts have
opined that only the U.S. Coast Guard is excluded from the intent
of the statue.15
While ending uncontrolled military involvement in law
enforcement, such as that which occurred during and after the
Civil War, the Posse Comitatus Act did not completely end law
enforcement by the Armed Forces. The Act had limited application
for two principal reasons. First, the President can employ the
military to enforce the law in times of national crisis or
emergency.16 Second, courts have ruled that while Posse
Comitatus applies to "direct" military participation in law
enforcement, it nevertheless, allows "indirect" participation.13
The l97O's
Despite Posse Comitatus restrictions, the President has
employed the military to enforce the law on many occasions when
civil law enforcement agencies either could not or would not do
so. Yet, seldom has military enforcement of the law been
challenged in the courts by invoking the restrictions specified
under the Posse Comitatus Act.
Posse Comitatus received little attention until after l96O.
There were only three cases prior to that year when the Act was
invoked in the courts.18 All three cases dealt with military
arrests of individuals charged with treason in occupied foreign
territory. The courts ruled that the Act did not apply to an
occupying force, since civil law enforcement was usurped by the
military authority.19 After 1960, the issue of domestic civil-
military relations and Posse Comitatus restrictions became more
prominent in the legal arena.
In l972 the Nixon administration promulgated a set of new
regulations, "Employment of Military Resources in the Event of
Civil Disturbances" (now codified as 32 C.F.R. sec 2l5), giving
legality for very substantial military intrusions into the realm
of domestic government. The l972 Regulations took the place of
others first devised in l968 during the Johnson Administration
and discontinued in l97l. The l968 regulations themselves had
been objectionable on some points of law; but novel provisions
in the l972 regulations dramatically increased the potential for
domestic use of the national military while at the same time
substantially reducing prior safeguards against abuse.2O
The most significant challenge to military involvement in
the enforcement of civil law came out of the l973 American Indian
uprising at the hamlet of Wounded Knee, South Dakota. Over l00
members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) occupied the
village on February 27, and remained until May 8. The FBI,
charged with restoring order, received assistance from the U.S.
Army, which sent a Colonel to determine whether troops would be
required in the crisis. Colonel Volney Warner made several
recommendations during the incident. The Army provided armored
personnel carriers, and maintenance personnel and the Nebraska
Air National Guard assisted with reconnaissance flights.
Following this episode, the AIM leaders were charged with
obstruction of justice. The defendants countered that the
Federal Government did not carry out law enforcement properly,
since military involvement constituted a violation of the Posse
Comitatus Act.21
Several criminal court cases resulted from Wounded Knee,
which dealt with civil-military relations and provided
interpretation of the Posse Comitatus Act.22 The judgements,
however, were vague and inconsistent. In l98O, a special
Attorney General's Task Force looked into the decisions regarding
Posse Comitatus and concluded, "the parameters of the Act
are...substantially untested and remain unclear."23
The l98l Amendments
As early as l98l Congress became acutely aware that the
country was concerned with a drug problem. They knew that
drastic action was needed against the illegal drug industry.
What resulted was a sanction for more limited military
assistance. The action came from amending the Posse Comitatus
Act by allowing and directing the military to provide assistance
to law enforcement agencies.24
The l98l Amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act authorized
the military to provide assistance to law enforcement agencies,
but precluded servicepersons from becoming directly involved in
"search and seizure, and arrest, or other similar activities."25
The new law ensured that military material, information, and
human resources would be employed in the war against illegal
drugs.
The Department of Defense had been loaning equipment,
providing information, and providing training to law enforcement
agencies for quite some time.26 What Congress did in l98l was to
ratify and codify an ever growing military activity, and to open
the door for greater military involvement in the future.
In l986 Congress again expanded the military's role in drug
interdiction. Since the Navy's standard operating procedures did
not allow Navy personnel to search, seize, and arrest on the high
seas, Congress authorized the Legal Detachment (LEDET) program
whereby Cost Guard personnel were assigned to Navy ships for the
purpose of enforcing drug laws in international waters.27 The
next big change occurred in l988.
The l988 Amendments
The drug problem worsened and by l988 more Americans were
calling for stronger action. Under pressure, Congress decided to
take even greater steps to allow military participation in the
war on drugs. Many senior leaders in the Department of Defense
expressed concern. In June l988, Secretary of Defense Frank
Carlucci told Congress, "The Armed Forces should not become a
police force, nor can we afford to degrade readiness by diverting
badly needed resources from their assigned mission."28
Nevertheless, Congress decided to enhance the nation's drug
fighting capability by marshaling more DoD resources into the
struggle. Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of l988, Congress, in
addition to establishing a "drug czar", Director, Office of
National Drug Control Policy, directed the DoD to devise a plan
to use federal research and development facilities to develop
drug law enforcement technology.29 Additionally, the National
Defense Authorization Act of l989 directed the DoD to become the
"lead agency for detection and monitoring of air and sea drug
trafficking across our borders."30 It also charged the military
to "integrate the command, control, communication, and technical
intelligence (C3I) assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an
effective communications network; and enhance state governors'
use of the National Guard in support of drug interdiction."3l
As described in Chapter II, the military unit responsible with
coordinating this effort was Joint Task Force - Six (JTF-6) at
Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas.
In summary, the intervention of the military into domestic
affairs is a sometimes vague and still developing area of
constitutional law. The issue of military involvement in law
enforcement is an issue political in nature. Posse Comitatus is
a statute that was created by Congress and already significantly
amended by that same body. There is even precedent for annulling
Posse Comitatus restrictions. Owing to chaos resulting from the
Alaskan "gold rush," in l890, Congress passed legislation that
exempted Alaska from the Posse Comitatus Act. The exemption was
not repealed until l959.32 Therefore, when it becomes necessary,
Congress can revoke the restrictions on military law enforcement
provided by the Posse Comitatus Act. If this should happen the
courts would be hard pressed to limit military involvement in law
enforcement.
CHAPTER IV
CURRENT LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the current laws
and directives that deal with the military's domestic
peacekeeping mission. The chapter is divided into two sections.
The first section looks at laws found in Title lO of the United
States Code (U.S.C.). The second section deals with Department
of Defense (DoD) directives. Laws are the regulations that
establishes what the military is allowed to do or not allowed to
do. The directives are more of a guide to describe how something
should be done.
In the preceding chapters, some material covered relating to
the military's role in drug interdiction has been addressed.
Since I am primarily concerned with the military's role in
domestic disorders I will not discuss the laws and directives
related to drug interdiction. Lastly, the directives that will
be examined will be Department of Defense level directives and
not those of individual services, which are based on the DoD
directives.
Title lO United States Code
The United States Code (U.S.C.) is a consolidation and
codification of all the general and permanent laws of the United
States. Their are fifty titles that make up the Code. Each
title addresses a different subject, i.e., agriculture,
bankruptcy, commerce and trade, education, patents,
transportation, etc. The last edition that was published was in
l988. The title that concerns itself with the Armed Forces is
Title l0. Title l0, Chapter l5 deals with insurrection. It is
here that the laws are found relating to military intervention.1
There are three key sections in Chapter l5, Title l0, that
provide the legal ground for the military's intervention into
domestic disorders. They are:
33l. Federal aid for State governments.
Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against
its government, the President may, upon the request of
its legislature or of its governor if the legislature
cannot be convened, call into Federal service such
of the militia of the other States, in the number
requested by that State, and use such of the armed
forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the
insurrection.2
332. Use of militia and armed forces to enforce
Federal authority.
Whenever the President considers that unlawful
obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or
rebellion against the authority of the United States,
make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the
United States in any State or Territory by the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may
call into Federal service such of the militia of any
State, and use such of the armed forces, as he
considers necessary to enforce those laws or to
suppress the rebellion.
333. Interference with State and Federal law.
The President, by using the militia or the armed
forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such
measures as he considered necessary to suppress, in a
State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful
combination or conspiracy, if it -
(l) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State,
that any part or class of its people is deprived of a
right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the
Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted
authorities of that state are unable, fail, or refuse
to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to
give protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of
the United States or impedes the course of justice under
those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (l), the State shall
be considered to have denied the equal protection of the
laws secured by the Constitution.4
Additionally, a l972 Civil Disturbance Regulation authorized the
use of military force
to prevent loss of life or...property and to restore
governmental functioning and public order when
sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disasters,
or calamities seriously endanger life and property
and disrupt normal governmental functions to such
an extent that duly constituted local authorities
are unable to control the situation.5
The regulation draws its authority from lO U.S.C. 33l-333
(l988). Therefore, under these laws, the President has the
authority to use emergency powers in times of crisis. Because
the Chief Executive must "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed,"6 Congress gave the President the power to use the
military in times of emergencies, such as "insurrection,"
"rebellion," "obstruction" of the law, "domestic violence," or
"conspiracy."7 The President also has the responsibility when
enacting the authority in Title lO to issue a proclamation asking
for dispersal, so that the perpetrators of the civil disturbance
will have the opportunity to desist.8
In addition to Chapter l5 of Title lO, Chapter l8 entitled
"Military Support For Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies" is an
area important to this discussion. This Chapter deals with the
use of military equipment, the maintenance of that equipment,
military facilities, military training and information collected
by the military and the relationship between this military
support and civilian law enforcement agencies. Additionally
there are two sections that are of special interest because they
have the potential of causing controversy. They are:
375. Restriction on direct participation by military
personnel.
The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary to ensure that
the provision of any support (including the
provision of any equipment or facility or the
assignment or detail of any personnel) to any
civilian law enforcement official under this
chapter does not include or permit direct
participation by a member of the Army, Navy,
Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search and
seizure, an arrest, or other similar activity
unless participation in such activity by such
member is otherwise authorized by law.
376. Support not to affect adversely military
preparedness.
Support (including the provision of any equipment
of facility or the assignment or detail of any
personnel) may not be provided to any civilian law
enforcement official under this chapter if the
provision of such support will adversely affect the
military preparedness of the United States. The
Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations
as may be necessary to ensure that the provision of
any such support does not adversely affect the
military preparedness of the United States.10
Both G375 and #376 generate areas of concern that will be
addressed in the next chapter.
It is the above mentioned laws that legally allows the
military to intervene in domestic disturbances. One can infer
that it is entirely up to the leadership of this country to
decide when the military "trump card" is to be played. It
certainly seems that the laws place that decision firmly with the
President, entirely dependent upon his interpretation of the laws
and the situation. How the military prepares itself and
organizes itself to carry out this type of mission is largely
placed in the hands of the Department of Defense.
Department of Defense Directives
The term used by the Department of Defnese for "domestic
peacekeeping" is Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances
(MACDIS). The focus of this paper is strictly with civil
disturbances and not fighting forest fires or providing
humanitarian assistance after floods or earthquakes. The key
directives in this area are: DoD Directive 3025.l2, "Military
Assistance for Civil Disturbances;" DoD Directive 3O25.l,
"Military Support to Civil Authorities;" Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 32l6.Ol, "Military Assistance
to Civil Disturbances;" and the DoD Civil Disturbance Plan,
"Garden Plot." "Garden Plot" is the codename given to that plan.
If an operation's command relationships are undefined or
vague then the operation is destined to fail. DoD Directive
3O25.l2 defines policy, responsibilities, and command
relationships in the event the military is called to intervene in
a civil disturbance. A civil disturbance is defined as:
Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial
to public law and disorder within the 5O states,
District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
u.s. possessions and territories, or any political
subdivision thereof; includes all domestic conditions
requiring the use of federal armed forces pursuant
to the provisions of Chapter l5 of title lO, United
States Code.11
The process of getting the military involved to quell a
civil disturbance is exact and should be followed to the letter.
It is this process and the command relationships that will now be
discussed.
When a civil disturbance occurs that goes beyond the
capability of what a state, territory, or possession can control
with its own assets then the governor, or equivalent, requests
federal military support through the Attorney General to the
President. The President shall determine the federal action to
be taken. "The employment of federal military forces to control
civil disturbances will normally be authorized by a Presidential
Directive or Executive Order in a specified state or locality."12
The President may also use a representative to communicate his
guidance to the military commander for MACDIS operations. The
Department of Justice (DOJ) is the Chief civilian agency in
charge of coordinating all federal government activities relating
to civil disturbances.13 Attorney General will designate his
representative to be located in each city where federal forces
are committed. This representative is called the Senior Civilian
Representative of the Attorney General or SCRAG.14
At the Department of Defense level the process involves an
Executive Agent, an Action Agent, and an Operating Agent. The
Executive Agent is the Secretary of the Army and is responsible
for developing planning guidance, plans, and procedures for
MACDIS. He/She will also coordinate with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on any commitment of military forces
assigned to the Combatant Commands. The Executive Agent also has
the authority of the Secretary of Defense when tasking DoD
components. The Director of Military Support (DOMS), normally an
Army major general, is the Action Agent for the Executive Agent.
"The DOMS plans for, coordinates, and directs the employment of
all designated federal resources for the Executive Agent in civil
disturbance operations and serves as the DoD point of contact in
all such matters."15 The Operating Agent is the Supported CINC
assigned to direct civil disturbance operations in his area of
responsibility.16 During this process the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is a coordinating agent who helps to work out any
problems that may arise.
It is the Supported CINC who appoints a JTF commander to
take control of the operation. This command relationship just
described is seen in figure l.
It is important to understand that representatives of
civilian agencies may augment but shall not replace the
military's chain of command. Additionally, the Executive Agent
or his designated representatives will coordinate activities,
planning, and support with other civilian agencies.17
When the JTF commander is selected and his units are
assigned it then becomes a military operation is support of
civilian law enforcement. Appropriate plans and orders are
developed and written based on the situation.
The current laws and the MACDIS process proved to work
extremely well for the l992 Los Angeles Riot. However, problems
and issues arose that need further attention.
CHAPTER V
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
There are a multitude of issues that need to be examined
when speaking about domestic peacekeeping. This is an area that
is scrutinized by both the government and the American people.
Mistakes that happen on the streets of Somalia may receive much
less attention than a same type mistake made on the streets of
Los Angeles. Topics such as rules of engagement, excessive use
of force, logistics support, legal issues, and budgetary problems
are only some of the items that need to be addressed.
In this chapter I will discuss five issues of importance.
They are: command and control, training, direct intervention,
force selection, and media. I selected these five issues because
they are vital to achieving success in future domestic
peacekeeping missions.
Command and Control
Effective command and control is essential to achieving
success in any military operation. "Command is a uniquely human
dimension that principally involves decisionmaking while control
involves a complex array of resources to ensure proper mission
execution. The linking of decisionmaking and execution forms the
concept of command and control."1 Effective command and control
means not only linking together the civilian and military
relationship but also synchronizing the language and
communications assets so that all units concerned can coordinate
effectively with each other.
In domestic peacekeeping the civil authority should maintain
close liaison with commanders of the military forces employed.
There should also be an agreement on the policy to be adopted in
relation to the restoration of order and the reinstatement of the
ordinary civil process of authority. Finally the civil authority
should avoid interference with tactical and operational decisions
that might need to be taken by the military forces in
implementation of their mandate to restore order.2
During operations, the need to interface civilian agencies
and military units is essential. The use of liaison officers
will help alleviate misunderstandings and increase the flow of
information. There may be a need for several liaison officers
depending on the circumstances. During the Los Angeles Riots of
l992, the initial boundaries that delineated operations zones
were highways because they were prominent terrain features.
Unfortunately these did not always match police jurisdictions.
Operating in some areas required coordination with as many as
four police departments as well as the Los Angeles Sheriff's
office.3 This problem was solved with the help of liaison
officers and points of contact.4 Also, there may be a distinct
problem with terminology used by police and military. The words
"cover me" mean one thing to the police and another thing to an
infantry squad. Again, the use of liaison officers would aid in
eliminating those problems.
Unity of command is critical to successful civil disturbance
operations. Establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander,
who has command over all military units, active, reserve or
national guard worked extremely well in Los Angeles. This
procedure should always be followed.
Lastly, the type of communications assets should be
seriously considered. In urban areas some military
communications equipment is ineffective. The use of proper
communications equipment and radios such as the ones utilized by
police should be examined. During all types of recent operations
the use of cellular phones has become the rule instead of the
exception. The use and funding of cellular phones in the Garden
Plot plan should be implemented.
Training
In the l960's and l970's civil disturbance operations were
oriented on crowd control. Tactics such as fixed bayonets with
riot control formations were practiced at many units. Today,
operations involving domestic civil disorder are similar to
peacekeeping operations or military operations in urban
terrain (MOUT). Some observers who were part of JTF Los Angeles
compared that operation as similar to the experience on the
streets of Beirut during the l980's.5
The number of handguns and automatic weapons in hands of
private citizens is drastically increasing. Training in civil
disturbances by military units must change based on the tactics
and weapons of the future enemy. The on-line riot formations of
the 60's and 70's would place our military personnel in
unnecessary danger. The military should place greater emphasis
on peacekeeping operations, antisniper operations, positive
control by leaders, and understanding the rules of engagement.
There are many military personnel who feel that training in
civil disturbance operations would degrade the readiness of our
forces to fight a war. This would be true if the military
trained solely for civil disturbance operatons. The military
should and does train to fight all levels of war; high, medium,
and low intensity. Even though the basics can be employed in all
three levels, training in any one level does not assure success
in all three. Many senior military leaders believe that if you
train to the high intensity end of the spectrum you can easily
shift to the low intensity level. They also argue, however, that
the converse is not true. A difinitive answer to this training
issue has not yet been determined. I hold that the military must
specifically train to each level of conflict. Common
denominators such as: weapons proficiency, exact command and
control, skillful maneuvering, and competent small unit
leadership are fundamental areas essential to success in all
three conflict levels. When these skills have been achieved the
specifics of each level of war much be taught and practiced.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Section 376, Chapter
l8 of the title l0 U.S.C. states that the Secretary of Defense is
responsible that the preparedness of the military is not degraded
due to support to law enforcement agencies. It is my opinion
that this refers more to drug enforcement operations than to
civil disorders. I believe this section was written to prevent
military units from being taken away from their normal duties to
take part in drug interdiction operations. I can see how some
individuals could use this section to keep the military out of
domestic peacekeeping.
Direct Intervention
The issue of direct intervention of military personnel in
law enforcement is covered in Section 375 of Chapter l8 of Title
lO, U.S.C. As was discussed in Chapter IV of this paper,
military personnel are not allowed direct participation in a
search, seizure, or arrest. In practice, however, military units
will take whatever steps are necessary, to included search and
seizure to guarantee the safety of their members.6 The police
and any reasonable person can see the need for this. In the l992
Los Angeles riots military units would stop, search and detain
individuals and wait for police to arrive, if the situation
called for such action.7 A situation such as this, if litigation
should arise, could cause a similar controversy as seen in the
l973 cases from Wounded Knee.
Because this is such a controversial issue legal teams
should be readily accessible to military units during civil
disturbance operations. These legal teams should coordinate
closely with the Department of Justice and should be fully versed
on the Posse Comitatus Act and the relevant chapters of Title lO,
U.S.C.
Force Selection
There is no question that in the Armed Forces there are some
units better suited to handle civil disturbance operations. The
use of these better trained units should be a priority when the
military is needed to assist in a civil disturbance. During an
interview with Major John Forquer, a Military Police officer who
was member of JTF Los Angeles, he related how the operation in
Los Angeles was more in line with the training received by
military police units than the training received by infantry
units. He saw a great need to be able to work with the local
police, understand their methods, and work closely with the local
population. Putting vast amounts of firepower on targets was not
the major objective.8 Therefore, the use of military police
units and peacekeeping-trained units should be seriously
considered when putting a JTF organization together.
Another aspect of force selection is political in nature.
Clausewitz's assertion that "war is simply a continuation of
political intercourse" applies also to domestic peacekeeping
operations, for they also must be viewed as political
instruments.9 Close attention must be given to the political
suitability of forces selected for a given situation. When the
leadership selects forces for a civil disturbance operation, they
must be sensitive to the perceptions of the local population and
the American public. Sending in the 82nd Airborne Division to a
U.S. city carries with it a certain message that a U. S. Army
military police battalion doesn't have.
The correct force selection can go a long way to
contributing to a successful operation. Forces that do not
project massive offensive power, that have extensive training,
and that have tight discipline will also be more likely to avoid
sacrificing the lives of innocent people.
The Media
No matter how much the military dislikes working with the
media during military operations, its importance should make it
another one of the battlefield activities. During civil
disturbances since the l95O's, television's search for dramatic
images created the impression that entire cities were about to
fall into anarchy. Sometimes I think the media does not realize
how the reporting of one incident of extraordinary violence may
influence the occurrence of others. The media can set the tone
of an operation and have a direct impact upon its success.
Throughtout American history, the fortunes of both the
military and the news media have varied with the climate of
opinion prevalent in the country at any one moment. The military
and the news media have competed, but the military has always
held the advantage because it has controlled the battlefield. If
history teaches anything, however, it advises commanders to
remain above the temptation to manipulate the press for the sake
of short-term gain. Public opinion can change with the moment,
and the news media is the only credible means military leaders
have for communicating with the American people. As General
Ulysses S. Grant warned, that in the United States "the people
governed and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop
supplies."lO
The news media needs to respect the seriousness of the
mission the military is involved in and appreciate the influence
they have in its success. They also must realize that a certain
level of operational security is needed to protect the lives of
the men and women in the armed forces who are executing that
mission.
Before completing this chapter I would like to make a
comment on a new development in the military closely related to
this subject. That is the use of non-lethal or less lethal means
when involved with peacekeeping missions. On l4 February l995
ABC Nightly News aired a story on non-lethal means available for
use in the February/March l995 military mission in Somalia,
Operation United Shield. The mission was to assist in
retrograding U.N. forces safely out of that country. The story
related that items such as: plastic sticky foam, styrofoam
bullets, nets, and other non-lethal projectiles could be used to
control civilian crowds so that deadly force was not the only
option left to soldiers and marines on the street. This brings
two questions immediately to mind: first, is the introduction of
these weapons making the Rules of Engagement too complicated?
And second, are we going to become known as the military that
will not use deadly force thereby placing marines and soldiers at
greater risk?
Especially in domestic peacekeeping, killing United States
citizens is a dreadful outcome but it may be the only resort.
The use of non-lethal weapons may in fact cause the exact
opposite reaction that is intended. These are additional issues
that our country's leadership will now have to face.
CHAPTER VI
A REASON FOR READINESS
The issues discussed in this chapter are the reasons that
the military must be prepared to employ forces to take part in
domestic peacekeeping operations. There are growing problems in
this country that contribute to building an environment that is
ripe for civil disorder.
From l96O to l99O there has been more than a 5OO percent
increase in violent crime; more than a 4OO percent increase in
illegitimate births; a tripling of the percentage of children
living in single-parent homes; a tripling in the teenage suicide
rate; a doubling in the divorce rate; and a drop of almost 75
points in students SAT scores.1
Over the years teachers have been asked to identify what
their greatest problems were with students in public schools. In
l94O, teachers identified talking out of turn; chewing gum;
making noise; running in the halls; cutting in line; dress code
infractions; and littering. When answering that same question in
l99O, teachers identified drug abuse; alcohol abuse; pregnancy;
suicide; rape; robbery; and assault.2
It is this degradation of society and a quickness to
violence that are key indicators for civil disorder. It is the
crime and violence, the widening gap between the "haves" and
"have nots," the collapse of the family, and the waves of illegal
immigrants that makes this country more prone to experience civil
disorder in the future.
Crime
The rate of violent crime in the United States is worse
than in any other industrialized country. The United States'
homicide rate is more than five times that of Europe, and four
times that of Canada, Australia, or New Zealand. In addition,
the rate at which rapes occur in the United States in nearly
seven times higher than it is in Europe.3
Gangs have taken over the inner cities across America.
Instead of the bludgeon, billy, or knife used by past gangs,
today's gang members carry assault weaponry, and often have more
firepower than police.
From l960 to l980, the population of the United States
increased by 26 percent while the homicide rate due to guns
increased by l6O percent.4 In l99l, in Los Angeles, there was a
greater chance that a citizen would die from a bullet wound than
from a traffic accident.5
Drugs like guns, are a tide against which no single city or
state can erect a dike. There is an undeniable relationship
between crime and drugs. Drug addiction can both lower
inhibitions among offenders and spur them on to other crimes to
finance their dependency. Over 5Q percent of all convicted jail
inmates are under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time
of their current offense.
No subject generates more concern than violent crime, and
none touches people more deeply and personally; none triggers
more emotion. The growing problem of violence leads people to
think that something fundamental has been broken in America.
Crime and violence influence where one goes, where one lives,
where one attends school, how one looks at another person, how
one parks, especially at night and even how one dresses. Crime
and its consequences sharpen every racial and economic division
of our nation, and blunt every popular impulse toward faith in
government and willingness to sacrifice to achieve ones dreams.
A Widening Gap
America has lost the initiative in the war on poverty.
Despite rising social spending and moderate growth, the U.S. has
made negligible progress against poverty since l973. Our poverty
rates are twice those of other advanced countries. And poverty in
America increasingly wears a child's face: one out of every five
of our children is poor. Most alarming of all is the emergence
of an angry and demoralized "underclass" that is at once
dependent on government yet isolated from society at large. The
U.S. is in danger of creating a caste system in which scattered
pockets of impoverished and mainly minority citizens are
permanently barred from taking part in the nation's productive
and civic life.7
Poverty itself does not cause civil disorder, but there is a
rift developing between the Haves and the Have Nots.8 This rift
was seen both in Oakland in l99l and in Los Angeles in l992. In
both cases widespread looting occurred that did not start out of
racial hatred. Quite simply, the uprisings were directly related
to class. The Have Nots were taking from those who have.9
In the book The Dream and the Nightmare: The Sixties'
Legacy to the Underclass, the author relates how the liberal
programs the "sixties generation" fought so hard to implement
have been ruinous to society's most marginal members. Society,
which should be a crucible for forming character, is saturated
with programs that give incentives to fail. The Have Nots have
been incapacitated for upward mobility by the sixties's culture
of the Haves.10
When a society creates a class of people that see no way for
upward mobility an environment for crime and civil disorder is
created. When other factors such as fear are added to the
environment the situation becomes even more grave.
The Family
In l965 President Lyndon Johnson said:
The family is the cornerstone of our society.
More than any other force it shapes the attitude,
the hopes, the ambitions, and the values of
the child. And when the family collapses, it is
the children that are usually damaged. When it
happens on a massive scale the community itself is
crippled.11
By l992, non-marital childbearing had reached near parity
with divorce as a social generator of female-headed homes. If
current trends continue, sometime by the late l99O's the total
number of fatherless homes created by unwed childbearing women
will surpass the number created by divorce12 Even more alarming
are the projections that only 6 percent of black children and 3O
percent of white children born in l98O will live with both
parents through age l8. In comparison to l95O where the figures
were 52 percent and 8l percent respectively.13
This trend has had a devastating affect on our children.
Statistics about young Americans are alarming. Every thirty
minutes in America, fifty young people drop out of school,
eighty-five commit a violent crime, and twenty-seven teenage
girls give birth, sixteen of them out of wedlock. That process
continues until by the end of a year a million students have
dropped out of school, l.3 million youths have committed a
violent crime, and 478,000 teenagers have given birth.14
In addition, many of these youths turn to gangs to replace
their families. They become a generation that lives and grows up
in the streets. An accurate description of the situation on
families was given by the then Assistant Secretary of Labor,
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, when he wrote
From the wild Irish slums of the l9th century
Eastern seaboard to the riot-torn suburbs of
Los Angeles, there is one unmistakable lesson
in American history: A community that allows
a large number of young men to grow up in broken
families, dominated by women, never acquiring
any stable relationship to male authority,
any stable relationship to male authority,
never acquiring any rational expectations about
the future - that community asks for and gets
chaos...(In such a society) crime, violence,
unrest, unrestrained lashing out at the whole
social structure - these are not only to be
expected, they are very nearly inevitable.15
Immigration
Never has America experienced such an explosion of legal and
illegal immigration as that which now reshapes the nation's
population and racial/ethnic composition. The decade of the
Eighties saw the single largest flow of immigration in U.S.
history - some nine million who entered legally and at least two
million illegally. The number of illegal aliens in the United
States is impossible to determine, but some demographic studies
estimate it to be as high as eight million, and rising. The
lowest estimate is two million.16
In addition to the stress from shear numbers there is also a
racial problem associated with immigration. As black and Latino
gangs have begun to compete for turf and drug profits, a power
struggle has developed that, if it explodes won't compare to
anything we've seen before.17
Blacks who have battled longest and hardest for racial and
economic equality find themselves facing new competition from
those of other races and ethnicities. This competition lies at
the root to some of the problems raised earlier in this chapter
about class, crime, poverty and increasing cultural tensions.
These problems will not go away but will be of great concern well
into the 2lst century.
When a society is boiling with the problems previously
described it may only take one incident to cause it to erupt like
a volcano into civil disorder. In l968 it was the assassination
of Martin Luther King Jr. In l992 it was the Rodney King beating
and the acquittal of the white police officers. It would be wise
for the senior civilian and military leadership of the United
States to make sure that the military is ready and capable to
execute its domestic peacekeeping mission.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
An accepted political principle in the United States is that
intervention by the military at home should be kept as limited as
possible even in times of crisis. This is part of an accepted if
unwritten constitutional principle that goes beyond civilian
supremacy of the military to include the belief that the military
should be kept out of civilian politics and the political
process. Using military units to enforce civil law is
distasteful and dangerous, but it is preferable to lawlessness
and anarchy.
The employment of military forces to quell civil disorders
resembles the activities performed by the Army on the western
frontier. Throughout the nineteenth century, along the moving
edge of civilization, soldiers functioned to suppress lawlessness
and to promote law and order. Their purpose was to establish
conditions that would permit the civil forces to provide social
order consistent with and required for the peaceful life of law-
abiding citizens. Although the scene has changed to an urban
one, the military's domestic peacekeeping mission is still much
the same. That is, to help the civil authorities protect life
and property, preserve social values, and maintain the tradition
of individual liberty together with social order.1
The most striking aspect of federal intervention in domestic
disorders has been that regardless of the sources of violence or
the extent of disorder, the appearance of federal forces has
invariably restored order with a minimum of bloodshed. Their
arrival has never provoked violent retaliation from those in
disorder; neither have federal forces used their military power
to wreak havoc on disturbers of the peace. Since so much
American violence "has taken the form of action by one group of
citizens against another, rather than by citizens against the
state," national authority almost always has been accepted as
legitimate.2 While the military's organizational strength served
it well in domestic peacekeeping, and its capacity to impose a
high level of violence on rioters was more than incidental to its
success, in many instances regulars prevailed not merely from
their potential military power but because they symbolized
national power.3
When the subject of domestic peacekeeping comes up many
military leaders respond that "we can't do it" or "it won't work"
or "it's not our job." These types of responses are not only
incorrect based on facts but they erode the trust and support the
people of the United States have given its military. If the
military drags its feet on taking part, it could encourage the
formation of a national police such as the type that existed in
the former Soviet Union. Are greatly increased federal and state
law enforcement forces, which are difficult to remove or
downsize, preferable to the use of military forces which normally
are returned to bases arid other missions when order is restored?
While abusive use of military forces in the domestic sphere can
cause untold destruction to domestic values and political and
social structure, judicious arrangements can nurture, support and
bolster internal institutions and morale.
As this paper demonstrates the military has had a long and
successful history of domestic peacekeeping. It has had some
rough times but has benefited from its mistakes. The military
should only be used as a last resort when civil law enforcement
agencies and states' National Guard forces can no longer contain
the situation. The mission is a lawful one and one that can be
expected in the future. The military should be willing and has
an obligation to be ready to successfully execute this mission
when the time comes.
NOTES
CHAPTER I
l. David E. Engdahl, "Foundations For Military Intervention
In The United States," in Military Intervention in Democratic
Societies, ed. Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan (London:
Croom Helm, l985), l.
2. Edward M. Coffman, "The Army Officer and the
Constitution, "Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly, l7
(Sept l987), 5.
3. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in
Domestic Disorders," in The U.S. Military Under the Constitution
of the United States, l789-l989, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York:
New York University Press, l99l), l43.
4. Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Armed Forces and Civil
Disorder," in The Military and American Society, ed. Stephen E.
Ambrose and James A. Barber Jr., (New York: The Free Press,
l972), 242.
5. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, Report of the Task Force on Disorders and
Terrorism (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, l976),
57.
6. Ed Kilgore, "Safer Streets and Neighborhoods," in
Mandate for Change, ed. Will Marshall and Martin Schram (New
York: Berkley Books, l993), l79-l85.
CHAPTER II
l. Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier
Epilogue to the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University
Press, l986), passim.
2. Ibid.
3. John Whiteclay Chambers II, "The Military and Civil
Authority," in Encyclopedia of the American Military, eds. John
E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
l994), l8O9-l8lO.
4. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in
Domestic Disorders," in The U. S. Military Under the Constitution
of the United States, l789-l989, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York:
New York University Press, l99l), l23.
5. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority", l8l3.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., l8l4.
9. E. Sherman, "Contemporary Challenges to Traditional
Limits on the Role of the Military in American Society," in
Military Intervention in Democratic Societies, ed. Peter J. Rowe
and Christopher J. Whelan (London: Croom Helm, l985), 2l9.
lO. Ibid.
ll. Ibid.
l2. Bennet M. Rich, The Presidents and Civil Disorders
(Washington, l94l), 52.
l3. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," 1818
l4. Ibid.
l5. Ibid., l8l9.
l6. Ibid., l82O.
l7. ibid.
i8. Ibid., 1821.
Since the early l9OOs colors had been used in war planning and
war gaming to identify the various powers involved. Blue for
instance meant the United States; red identified Great Britain;
black was Germany; and orange meant Japan. During the l92Os and
1930s, the Army-Navy Joint Board prepared a series of contingency
war plans against specific countries, each plan identified by a
different color. Where the color plans considered only one
country per plan, the rainbow series postulated operations
pitting the United States, sometimes with allies, against a
variety of coalitions. (See Simon & Schuster Encyclopedia of
WWII, l978).
l9. Ibid., 1822.
2O. Ibid., 1823.
2i. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New
York, l984), 4l0.
24. Ibid., 4l7.
25. Ibid.
26. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l825
27. Ibid.
28. Martin Blumenson, "On the Function of the Military in
Civil Disorders," in The Military and American Society, ed
Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber Jr. (New York: The Free
Press, l972), 249-254.
29. Ibid.
3O. Ibid.
3l. W. Augustus Low. ed. Encyclopedia of Black America,
(New York: McGraw-Hill, l98l), 239.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 24O.
34. Memo, David E. Giffert, Undersecretary of the Army, to
Chief of Staff, Army, l3 April l968, in U.S. Senate,
Subcommittees on Constitutional Rights, Federal Data Banks,
Computers, and the Bill of Rights, part 2, l283.
36. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l826.
37. Ambrose, "The Armed Forces and Civil Disorder," 24l.
38. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l827.
39. Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: It's
Impact on American Society (New York, l97l), l83-l84.
4O. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l829.
In l967 two Supreme Court decisions, Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (l967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 4l (l967), held
that electronic surveillance was a search and seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that in criminal proceedings
the fruits of domestic electronic surveillance activities would
be inadmissible if the probable cause and warrant requirement of
the Constitution had not been satisfied.
4l. From Annex B, reprinted in U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, Federal Data Banks, Computers, and The
Bill of Rights, part I, 43l.
42. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l83O.
43. Ibid., l832.
44. Miriam Davidson, "Militarizing the Mexican Border," The
Nation, l April l99l, 4O6.
45. Ed Magnuson, "More and More, a Real War," Time, 22
January l99O, 22.
46. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l832.
47. Ibid., l827-l828.
48. Ibid.
CHAPTER III
l. John Whiteclay Chambers II, "The Military and Civil
Authority," in Encyclopedia of the American Military, eds. John
E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
l994), l8O7.
2. Hamilton addressed the question of military suppression
of domestic disorders in Numbers 25 and 29 also, as did James
Madison in Number 43. See The Federalist Papers, Isaac Kramnic,
ed. (New York, l987), l95, 2O4-2O6, 2l0-2ll, 28l-284.
3. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in
Domestic Disorders," in The U.S. Military Under the Constitution
of the United States, l789-l989 ed. Richard. Kohn (New York:
New York University Press, l99l), l20.
4. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l807.
5. David E. Engdahl, "Foundations for Military Intervention
in the United States," in Military Intervention in Democratic
Societies, ed. Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan (London:
Croom Helm, l985), 5.
6. l Statues at Large 264.
7. Cooper, "Foundations For Military Intervention," l2l.
8. Ibid.
9. Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces
in Domestic Disorders, l789-l878 (Washington D. C.: Center of
Military History, l988) 83.
lO. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l8O8.
ll. Ibid., l8l4.
l2. Ibid.
l3. Ibid., l8l7.
l4. Ibid., l8l8.
l5. SECNAVINST 54OO.l2 (l7 January l969); U.S. v Walden,
49O F. 2d 372 (4th Cir. l974); U.S. v. Chaparo-Almeida, 679 F. 2d
423 (5th Cir. l982); U.S. v. Yunis, 68l F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C.
l988)
l6. U.S. l, 63.64 (l89O).
l7. United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 9l6 (D.S.D.
l975).
l8. D'Aguino v. United States, l92 F. 2d 338 (9th Cir.
l952); Gillars v. United States, l82 F. 2d 962 (D.C.Cir. l95O);
and Chandler v. United States, l7l F. 2d 92l (lst Cir.l949).
l9. Peter M. Sanchez, "Drug War: The U.S. Military and
National Security," Air Force Law Review, l99l, l2O.
20. Engdahl, "Foundations For Military Intervention," 2-3.
2l. Sanchez, 'The U.S. Military and National Security,"
l2l.
22. United States v. Caspar, 54l F. 2d l275 (8th Cir.
l976); United States v. McArthur, 4l9 F. Supp. l86, l92, n.2
(D.N.D. l976); United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 9l6
(D.S.D.l975); United States v. Means, 383 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.D.
l974); and United States v. Jaramillo, 38O F. Supp. l375 (D. Neb.
l974)
23. Posse Comitatus Act: Hearing on H.R. 35l9 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., lst
Sess. 42 (l9Sl) l0.
24.Sanchez, "The U. S. Military and National Security," l22.
25. lO U.S.C. 37l.7S (Pub. L. No 97.86, 95 Stat. llO4).
26. Posse Comitatus Act: Hearing (l98l), l5.
27. U.S.C. 379 (l988); Pub. L. No 99-57O Title III, 3053
(b) (l).
28. Report of the Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to
a Joint Hearing of Congress, June l988.
29. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of l988, Pub. L. No. lOO-68O, 2l
U.S.C. 1501
3O. Pub. L. No. l00-456, l02 Stat. l933, lO U.S.C. 37l-
8O (l988).
3l. Ibid.
32. Siemer P. Effron, "Military Participation in United
States Law Enforcement Activities Overseas: The Extraterritorial
Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act," 54 St. John's Law Rev 44-45
(l978).
CHAPTER IV
l. United States Code, l988 Edition, Volume Three Title
10-Armed Forces. (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office,
l989), VII.
2. Ibid., 96.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 97.
5. 32 C.F.R. #2l5.4. (c). (l). (i)
6. U. S. Constitution Article II, 3.
7. lO U.S.C. 331-33 (l988).
8. lO U.S.C. 334 (l988).
9. lO U.S.C. 375 (l988), lO2.
lO. Ibid.
ll. Department of Defense "Civil Disturbance Plan,"
Department of the Army, (Washington D.C. l99l) L-2.
l2. Ibid., l.
l3. Department of Defense Directive 3O25.l2, "Military
Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MASDIS)," (Washington D.C.
1994) 7.
l4. Ibid.
l5. "Civil Disturbance Plan," l.
l6. "Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances," l2.
l7. Ibid., 7.
CHAPTER V
l. FMFM 3, Command and Control (Washington: Department of
the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, l6 June l993),
l.
2. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, Report of the Task Force on Disorders and
Terrorism (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, l976),
56.
3. Major David R. Heinz and Major David C. Damm, "SPMAGTF
in Los Angeles: Overview," Marine Corps Gazette, October l992,
55.
4. Ibid.
5. CINCFOR After Action Report on Operation Garden Plot,
JTF-L.A. (Washington: Department of Defense, l2 July l992), II-
3.
6. Major John Forguer, USMC, interviewed by author,
Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA. l6 February l995.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
l976), 6O5.
lO. William M. Hammond. "The News Media and the Military",
in Encyclopedia of the American Military, eds. John E. Jessup and
Louise B. Ketz (New York: Charles Scrilner's Sons, l994), 2lll.
ll. Non Lethal Weapons In Somalia, ABC Nightly News, l4
February l995.
Chapter VI
1. William J. Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural
Indicators; Facts and Figures on the State of American Society
(New York: Simond & Schuster, l994), 8.
2. Ibid., 9.
3. U. S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, "International Crime Rates," (Wash D.C.: U. S.
Government Printing Office, l988)
4. Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators, 24.
5. Ibid., 25.
6. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics (Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, l99l), Table 6.63, 629.
7. Will Marshall and Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, " Replacing
Welfare with Work," in Mandate for Change, eds. Will Marshall and
Martin Schran (New York: Berkley Books, l993), 2l7.
8. The terms "Haves" and "Have Nots" are widely used today
by writers and social scientists. In most cases "Haves refer to
the rich while the "Have Nots" refer to the poor. However, the
author Myron Magnet argues that poverty is more of a cultural
than economic phenomenon produced by a poverty of "inner
resources." The "Have Nots" not only suffer from a lack of
material needs but also suffer from a lack of cultural values
which prevents their upward mobility. Magnet blames this
deficiency on the attitudes and programs created by the "Haves
of the l96O's. (Myron Magnet, The Dream and the Nightmare: The
Sixties' Legacy to the Underclass. New York, l992).
9. Haynes Johnson, Divided We Fall (New York: W. W.
Norton & Co., l994), 23l, 232.
lO. Myron Magnet, The Dream and the Nightmare: The
Sixties' Legacy to the Underclass (New York: William Morrow &
Co., l992).
ll. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Howard University
Commencement, June l965, in Families First, National Commission
on America's Urban Families, l993.
l2. Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators, 5l.
l3. Ibid.
l4. Johnson, Divided We Fall, 2O3.
l5. Cited in Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural
Indicators, 53.
l6. Johnson, Divided We Fall, 277.
l7. Andrew Peyton Thomas, Crime and the Sacking of America,
The Roots of Chaos (Washington: Brassey's, l994), 239.
CHAPTER VII
l. Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Armed Forces and Civil
Disorder," in the Military and American Society, eds. Stephen E.
Ambrose and James A. Barber Jr. (New York: The Free Press,
l972), 256.
2. Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace eds.,
"Reflections on Violence in the United States," in American
Violence: A Documentary History (New York: Vintage Books, l97l),
10.
3. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in
Domestic Disorders," in The U. S. Military Under the Constitution
of the United States, l789-l989, eds. Richard H. Kohn (New York:
New York University Press, l99l), l3l.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ambrose, Stephen E. "The Armed Forces and Civil Disorder." in The
Military and American Society, eds. Stephen E. Ambrose and
James A. Barber Jr. New York: The Free Press, l972.
________. Eisenhower: The President. New York: Simon &
Schuster, l984.
Bennett, William J. The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators:
Facts and Figures on the State of American Society. New
York: Simon & Schuster, l994.
Blumenson, Martin. "On the Function of the Military in Civil
Disorders." in The Military and American Society, eds.
Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber Jr. New York: The
Free Press, l972.
Chambers, John Whiteclay II. "The Military and Civil Authority."
in The Encyclopedia of the American Military, eds. John E.
Jessup and Louise B. Ketz. New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, l994.
Coakley, Robert W. The Role of the Federal Military Forces in
Domestic Disorders l789-l878. Washington D. C.: Center of
Military History, United States Army, l988.
Coffman, Edward M. "The Army Officer and the Constitution."
Parameters: U. S. Army War College Quarterly, l7: Sept,
l987.
Cooper, Jerry M. "Federal Military Intervention in Domestic
Disorders." in The U. S. Military Under the Constitution of
the United States, l789-l989, ed. Richard H. Kohn. New York:
New York University Press, l99l.
Davidson, Miriam. "Militarizing the Mexican Border." The Nation,
l April l99l, 4O6.
Effron, Siemer P. "Military Participation in United States Law
Enforcement Activities Overseas: The Extra Territorial
Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act." 54 St. John's Law Rev.
l978.
Encyclopedia of Black America, l98l ed. s.v. "Civil Disorders."
Engdahl, David E. "Foundations for Military Intervention In The
United States." in Military Intervention in Democratic
Societies, eds. Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan,
London: Croom Helm, l985.
Forquer, John. Major USMC. Interviewed by author, l6 February
l995, Quantico, VA. Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA.
Giffert, David E. Undersecretary of the Army Memo to Chief of
Staff, Army, l3 April l968 in U. S. Senate, Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, Federal Data Banks, Computers, and
the Bill of Rights.
Hammond, William M. "The News Media and the Military." in The
Encyclopedia of American Military, eds. John E. Jessup and
Louise B. Ketz. New York: Charles Scribers's Sons, l994.
Heinz, Major David R. and Major David C. Damm. "SPMAGTF in Los
Angeles: Overview." Marine Corps Gazette, 76:lO October
l992.
Hofstadter, Richard and Michael Wallace, eds. Reflections on
Violence in the United States." in American Violence: A
Documentary History. New York: Vintage Books, l97l.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Common Defense. New York: Columbia
University Press, l96l.
________. The Soldiers and the State. New York: Vintage Books,
l957.
Johnson, Haynes. Divided We Fall. New York: W. W. Norton P.
Co., l994.
Johnson, President Lyndon B. Howard University Commencement, June
l965 in Families First, National Commission on America's
Urban Families, l993.
Jordan, Amos A. and Wilham J. Taylor Jr. American National
Security: Policy and Process. Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, l98l.
Kilgore, Ed. "Safer Streets and Neighborhoods." in Mandate for
Change, eds. William Marshall and Martin Schram. New York:
Berkley Books, l993.
Kohn, Richard H. Eagle and Sword. New York: The Free Press,
l975.
Madison, James, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay. The Federalist
Papers. ed. Isaac Kramnick. New York: Penguin Books, l987.
Magnet, Myron. The Dream and the Nightmare: The Sixties Legacy
to the Underclass. New York: William Morrow & Co., l992.
Magnuson, Ed. "More and More, a Real War." Time, 22 January,
l99Q. 22.
Marshall, William and Elaine Cialla Kamarck. "Replacing Welfare
with Work." in Mandate For Change, eds. William Marshall and
Martin Schram. New York: Berkley Books, l993.
National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and
goals. Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism.
Washington D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, l976.
Nonlethal Weapons In Somalia, ABC Nightly News l4 February l995.
Rich, Bennet M. The Presidents and Civil Disorders. Washington
D. C.: Brookings Institute, l94l.
Sanchez, Peter M. "Drug War: The U. S. Military and National
Security. 34 Air Force Law Rev, l99l.
Sherman, E. "Contemporary Challenges to Traditional Limits on the
Role of the Military in American Society." in Military
Intervention in Democratic Societies, eds. Peter J. Rowe
and Christopher J. Whelan, London: Croom Helm, l985.
Simon & Schuster Encyclopedia of World War II, l978 ed. s.v.
"Rainbow".
Slaughter, Thomas P. The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to
the American Revolution. New York: Oxford University
Press, l986.
Thomas, Andrew Peyton. Crime and the Sacking of America, The
Roots of Chaos. Washington D. C.: Brassey's, l994.
United States Army. "Civil Disturbance Plan." Washington D. C.
l99l.
United States Code. l988 Edition, Volume Three Title lO - Armed
Forces. Washington D. C.; U. S. Government Printing
Office, l989.
United States Department of Defense. DOD Directive 30f25.l2,
"Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS).
Washington, D. C., l994.
United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics. "International Crime Rates." Washington D. C.:
U. S. Government Printing Office, l988.
United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics.
Washington D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, l99l.
United States Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps.
FMFM3, Command and Control. Washington D.C., l993.
United States Navy, SECNAVINST 54OO.l2. l7 January l969.
von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. ed and trans. Michael Howard and
Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, l976.
Yarmolinsky, Adam. The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on
American Society. New York: Harper and Row, l97l.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
