The Japanese Self-Defense Force: Its Role and
Mission in The Post-Cold War Period
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
ITS ROLE AND MISSION IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Japanese Self-Defense Force: Its Role and
Mission in The Post-Cold War Period
Author: Captain Kaneepol Songjaroen, Royal Thai Marine Corps
Thesis: Is the Japanese Self-Defense Force's buildup plan
and increasing participation in United Nations peacekeeping
activities in consonance with Japan's peace constitution,
U.S.-Japan security agreements, and international
expectations?
Background: Through an investigation of historical
background, political and economic considerations, and the
influence of such things as the collapse of the former
Soviet Union, this paper discusses the reasons for increased
Japanese interest in UN peacekeeping operations and the
concomitant increase in the size and scope of the Japanese
Self-Defense Force (SDF). Pacific Rim security issues are
of vital concern as the region embarks upon an unprecedented
rate of economic and demographic development. Thailand, as
well as other Asian nations, foresee future problems if this
issue is not presently addressed. As the economic power of
Asia, Japan has rights and responsibilities that can no
longer be ignored or placed totally on the shoulders of
other nations. The hurdles for Japan to overcome are
significant; their peace constitutional limitations, the
internal political struggle over the issue, and the
surviving generation whose vivid memories of Imperial Japan
invoke fear and distrust.
Recommendation: The regional stability surrounding Japan
and the attendant military situation remains quite
complicated. There remain diverse problems, including the
divided Korean Peninsula, the disputed sovereignty of the
Spratly Islands and Japan's Northern Territories.
Therefore, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement remains an
important element in maintaining security in East Asia.
Currently, U.S.-Japan treaties and its constitution
have limited Japan to a minimal operational capability;
therefore, Japan must revise its constitution in order to
substantially participate in the enforcement of global legal
statutes. It is not only helping to maintain world peace
but also stabilizing their own national defense that
justifies strengthening the military and modernizing
equipment.
With the passage of time and the steady decline of
victims and veterans of World War IT, Japan's military may
be able to escape the specter of its past. In turn, Japan
must proceed slowly, informing the world at every step of
its peaceful intentions.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION l
Chapter Page
l. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 4
The Post-Cold War Era, lO
2. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS l3
Economic Considerations, 14
Political Considerations, l6
People, l6
Government Attitudes, l9
Treaties, 22
Political Philosophies, 26
Mainstream, 26
Nationalist, 27
Pacifist, 28
3. SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD 32
Threats, Risks and Influence on Japan's
Defense Posture, 33
Changing Geo-Political Threats to Japan, 34
Japan's Basic Security Needs, 4O
Defense Policy of Japan, 42
Current Force Structure and Buildup
Program, 43
Future Forces, 46
4. UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 48
Past Involvement, 49
Constraints, 5O
Future Involvement, 5l
5. CONCLUSIONS 54
Endnotes 57
Bibliography 6O
Appendixes
A. Japan's Public Opinion Regarding the SDF A-1
B. Changes in Japan's Buildup Programs B-1
C. Changes in Composition of Defense Expenditures C-1
D. Military Postures in and around Japan D-l
Appendixes, continued
E. Military Postures in Southeast Asia E-l
F. Comparison of Defense Expenditure in Major
Countries F-1
G. Major Systems and Equipment of Japan on which
Development Completed G-l
H. Major Systems and Equipment of Japan Currently
under Development H-1
I. Contents of Assignments SDF Members Conduct for
International Peace Cooperation Assignments I-1
J. Expenses for Major Equipment Items in FYl994 J-l
K. Japan's Major Equipment to be Acquisitioned
or Procured in FYl994 K-1
INTRODUCTION
The memory of Imperial Japan's assault on its Asian
neighbor during World War II is still painfully clear. The
atrocities committed by those dedicated to establishing the
"East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" created a long standing and
deep-seated distrust of Japan which encompasses a whole
generation. Japan's relentless pursuit of resources from
its neighbors during the war is one memory that stirs
powerful emotions when coupled with the incredible economic
development of Japan since World War II. Japan seems to be
caught on the horns of a dilemma - that is, if it gets in-
volved in world affairs even in such operations as peace
keeping, they will have to contend with the negative image
that a new Imperial Japan is rising. Conversely, as a world
economic power, remaining uninvolved creates yet another
unfavorable image of selfishness and isolation from the
community of nations.
Through an investigation of historical background,
political and economic considerations, and the influence of
such things as the collapse of the former Soviet Union, this
paper will highlight the reasons for the increased Japanese
interest in U.N. peacekeeping operations and the concomitant
increase in the size and scope of the Japanese Self-Defense
Force (SDF).
How Japan handles this increased military presence and
development is critical to not only stability in Asia, but
to the world economic community as well. A misstep creating
the impression of a new imperialistic Japan could easily
lead to economic sanctions due to Japan's closed domestic
market, or worse yet, economic warfare. Some critics say
that this economic warfare has already begun -- that Japan
is now economically imperialistic vice militarily.
To the student of military studies, this issue brings
in many of the works of such notables as Clausewitz and
Paul Kennedy. Likewise, the issue is not only of keen
interest to the Asian reader, but also the American due to
the meshing of the United States and Japan via security
agreements.
First of all, Japan must solve the dilemma internally
first with regard to its Constitution, laws and public
opinion. In order to understand whatever action they may
take, it is important for us to understand what is behind
it.
This thesis will discuss the current build-up plan of
the JSDF and its participation in U.N. peacekeeping activi-
ties. Of primary concern is whether or not these actions
are in consonance with the Japanese Constitution and the
U.S./Japan Mutual Security Agreement. If the Japanese
deploy in support of the U.N., what will be the internation-
al reaction to the increased range and depth of their
participation?
Pacific Rim security issues are of vital concern as the
region embarks upon an unprecedented rate of economic and
demographic development. Thailand, as well as other Asian
nations, foresee future problems if this issue is not ad
dressed in the present. As the economic power of Asia,
Japan has rights and responsibilities that can no longer be
ignored or placed upon the shoulders of others. The road to
defense self-reliance for Japan is a long and torturous one,
but one which must be traveled -- even if it is one slow
step at a time.
CHAPTER l
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The past, it seemed, did not die ..... but lived on
beside the present, and sometimes perhaps, become the
future.
John Galsworthy, A Modern Comedy
While Japan has a long historical and societal
evolution, this chapter will focus on some interesting
developments from immediately following World War II to the
current Japanese involvement in the United Nations Peace
keeping Forces. This historical treatment will provide a
contextual framework to analyze attitudes and actions that
have brought Japan to its current world status.
At noon, l5 August l945, activity all over Japan came
to a halt. The national anthem was played and for the first
time in its history, the Emperor spoke to the people of
Japan:
The enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel
bomb. Should we continue to fight, it would not only
result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the
Japanese nation, but also would lead to the total
extinction of human civilization. This is the reason
why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of
the Joint Declaration of the Powers.
Let the entire nation continue as one family from
generation to generation. Unite your total strength to
be devoted to the construction of the future. Culti-
vate the ways of rectitude, foster nobility of spir-
it, and work with resolution that you may enhance the
innate glory of the Imperial State and keep peace
with the progress of the world."1
Many obvious facts about the episode lend credence to
the bilateral rendition of Occupation history. Japan, no
longer a sovereign nation after surrender, was not permitted
representation in foreign capitals or membership in
international organizations. All foreign relations --
governmental, business, and individual were conducted
through the intermediary of Supreme Command of the Allied
Powers (SCAP). Surveys of the Occupation generally
emphasized the policy to seal off Japan from foreign contact
and stress the minimal input of the Allied Powers in an
almost exclusively American operation. Indeed the
Occupation's positive achievements are commonly attributed
to the audacity of a unitary command which neither sought
nor tolerated international interference. The technical
misnomer "American Occupation" raises few eyebrows and
chronicles write blithely of Japan's "American interlude."
Japan virtually became a surrogate colony of the United
States, which gave it most of the advantages of colonial
status, without the disadvantages. Just as the United
States was once a colony of Great Britain, but is now the
stronger of the two, Japan became a "colony" of the United
States it may very well became the stronger of the two
nations. Japan was given American defense protection,
technology and markets, for which it paid little or nothing.
Japanese leaders determined to rebuild from the ashes
of defeat by concentrating exclusively on economic
development, left Japan's defense to the American victor, to
save money and to avoid rekindling fears among prospective
customers about a resurgent military threat.
Meanwhile, the international community took prompt
action after the end of World War II and the United Nations
began to reconstruct a security framework because of the
failure of the League of Nations.
A period of demilitarization and democratization
followed in Japan (l945-47). Under the direction of General
Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers (SCAP), Japan's Army and Navy Ministries were
abolished, munitions and military equipment were destroyed,
and war industries were converted to civilian uses. State
Shinto was disestablished, and on l January l94E, Emperor
Hirohito repudiated his divinity. MacArthur pushed the
government to amend the l889 Meiji Constitution, and on 3
May l947, the New Japanese constitution (MacArthur
Constitution) came into force. Constitution is the
reintroduction of Western-style liberalism, the emergence of
a stable parliamentary system under the dominance of the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This Constitution includes
the following distinctive features: the purely symbolic
role of the emperor, the prominence of guarantees of civil
and human rights, and the renunciation of war.
The Article 9 of the Constitution, the "No War Clause",
contains two paragraphs. The first states that the Japanese
people "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling
international disputes". The second is that "land, sea, and
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained".4 Article 9 has had broad implications for
foreign policy, the institution of judicial review as
exercised by the Supreme Court, the status of the Self-
Defense forces, and the nature and tactics of opposition
politics. This Article has remained an important brake on
the growth of Japan's military capabilities.
The Post-World War II period can be summarized as
following:
- Serious efforts were made between the United States
and Japan to formulate a security framework. The postwar
period has seen the United States and Japan sign three major
defense treaties, in l95l, l954 and l96O. These have all
tied Japan closer to the Western camp, committed the United
States to the defense of Japan and allowed the Japanese to
minimize defense spending. Additionally, it allowed for the
basing of American troops on Japanese soil and for the rent
to be paid to the Japanese government. The pact determined
that American land, sea and air forces could be stationed
"in and about Japan" to safeguard "international peace and
security in the Far East", help protect Japan "against armed
attack from without" and help, "at the express request of
the Japanese Government", to put down "large-scale internal
riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation
or intervention by an outside power or powers".
- Japan was hit by severe economic crises accompanied
by relentless inflation. With militarization in the l93Os
Japan had become a controlled economy. As the war
progressed, disastrously, the regulatory system was
tightened. By its end the Japanese government minutely
controlled all economic activities through a comprehensive
system of material and fuel allocation, product and food
rationing, production quotas, supplies contracts, financial
directives, price controls, wage controls, and labor
conscription. At the end of war, the Japanese economy
suffered virtually total breakdown: Industrial output
dropped sharply, inflation accelerated, unemployment
remained low, but only because the unemployed received no
relief from their plight. Everyone eked out a living in
whatever way they could, or lived off whatever real or
financial assets they retained. The unemployed returned to
the countryside, and others actively participated in the
black market, trading in whatever they could.
- National boundaries were redrawn, giving birth of a
number of new and independent states such as India, declared
independent from the Great Britain in l947, Indonesia
declared independent from the Dutch on l7 August l945,
Vietnam proclaimed its independence from France in l954, and
East and West Germany divided into a communist eastern half
and a capitalist western half in l95O, etc..
The seeds for the next era were sown, germinated, and
took root in the immediate postwar period. The quality of
the "seeds" depended in both cases on how the vanquished
were treated, and how the newly rising powers were
accommodated. The salient difference between post-World War
I and post-World War II periods was the hostile relationship
between China and the Soviet Union that developed soon after
the war and the way they the principal alliances among the
Western states stayed in force.
The beginning of the Cold War is traced to the Truman
Doctrine declared in March l947. In fact, the actual
process by which the Cold War developed was punctuated by
such events as the sealing of Berlin by the Soviets (l94B),
the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and finally, the outbreak of the Korean War in June
l95O, which decisively defined the structure of the Cold
War. Both Germany and Japan became economic superpowers and
reliable principal allies of the Western camp in this
period. The l952 ratification of the Japan-United States
Mutual Security Assistance Pact also ensured a strong
defense for Japan and a large postwar role for the U.S. in
Asia; however, the world community failed to find a way to
accommodate the Soviet Union.
In l954, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were estab-
lished. Japan's biggest postwar political crisis took place
in l96O. As the new treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security was concluded, which renewed the United States role
as military protector of Japan, massive street protests and
political upheaval occurred, and the Cabinet resigned a
month after the Diet's ratification of the treaty.5
After World War II, the people of the Japan devoted
themselves to the reconstruction of the national economy.
The role and view of the military changed from imperialistic
to that of peacekeeper. These efforts, as well as the
assistance from the international community, enabled Japan
to become an economic power. In accordance with its
economic growth, Japan has made substantial contributions to
the international community, primarily in the field of
financial cooperation efforts such as development
assistance.
The Post-Cold War Era
The Persian Gulf Crisis, triggered by Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait in August l99O, posed a challenge to the
international community. It responded by adopting a United
Nations Security Council Resolution, forming multinational
forces, providing international support for the costs of
operations and taking other unprecedented measures of
cooperation under the authority of the United Nations.
Although Japan contributed a total of $l3 billion to these
collective operations by the international community, it was
criticized because its cooperation did not include personnel
contributions.
This criticism is the embodiment of the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces dilemma -- if they build up, they are fearful
of the imperialistic perception, if they don't participate,
they are fearful of being viewed as self-centered.
Through these experiences, Japan became keenly aware of
the need not merely to implement financial and material
cooperation, but also to conduct effective manpower support
in times of crisis.
Against this background, Japan enacted the
International Peace Cooperation Law in June l992, following
a long domestic debate, with discussions centered in the
Diet, over how to assume its international responsibility
through personnel contributions. While Japan had a already
participated in United Nations Peacekeeping activities
through the dispatch of election supervisors to the United
Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the
enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law enabled
Japan to establish a domestic framework to provide manpower
contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping operations and
humanitarian international relief operations on a full
fledged scale.
In summary, Japan's recent history is an important
factor in not only its constitution, but the structure and
missions of the SDF as well. This historical influence,
coupled with political and economic aspects, will directly
affect any decisions regarding U.N peacekeeping
participation or SDF restructuring efforts.
CHAPTER 2
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS
The economy of a country is the foundation of its
military power and the military is the foundation of
economic power, a mutually supporting relationship.
The classical theorists such as Adam Smith and the
senior statesman of nineteenth-century mercantilism,
Friedrich List, had believed that the economic foundation of
military power, strong armies and national survival depended
on national wealth:
War or the very possibility of war makes the
establishment of a manufacturing power an indispensable
requirement for a nation of the first rank. Power is
more important than wealth...because the reverse of
power-namely feebleness-leads to the relinquishment of
all that we possess, not of acquired wealth alone, but
of our powers of production, of our civilization, of
our freedom, nay, even of our national independence,
into the hands of those who surpass us in might.6
War in the late twentieth century has become as much
financial as technological. The military is expensive to
maintain, and only rich and productive nations can defend
themselves in modern times. Japanese practices make clear
that collective benefits and national security can be
derived from the economy as well as from the development of
forces.
This chapter will discuss the various political and
economic considerations which influence the future use of
the SDF in other than traditional UN support roles and the
associated SDF structure with which to accomplish those
missions.
Economic Considerations
Japan was the first Asian industrialized country since
Tokugawa-Meiji transition, in the mid-nineteenth century.
Since Japan first opened the country to Western commerce and
influence until now, it has exposed the Japanese to Western
ideas and influence, experienced revolutionary social,
political, and economic changes, and become a world power
with carefully developed spheres of influence.
In the l99Os, Japan had the world's second largest
gross national product. During the l98Os, Japan became a
financial center, the world's largest stock exchange and a
world leader in technological research and production.
Imports and exports totalled the equivalent of US$ 4S2
billion in l988.
The Japanese government encouraged economic change by
fostering a national revolution by planning and advising in
every aspect of society such as: initiating new industries,
cushioning the effects of economic depression, creating a
sound economic infrastructure, and protecting the living
standards of each citizen. The Japanese attitude towards
government was that the nation, as a family, allowed
government to influence business, and businesses worked hard
not only for their own profits, but also for national well
being. Thus, the relationship between government and
business was as collaborators rather than as mutually
suspicious adversaries. The national goal each time was to
make Japan so powerful and wealthy that its independence
would never again be threatened. Japan became the world's
largest creditor, while the United States was becoming a
debtor nation. Japan's financial institutions rapidly
expanded their international activities since the l97Os, and
they were major international players by the end of the
l98Os. Japan's financial and banking industries grew at
unprecedented rates. In l988, the nine largest banks in the
world, measured by total assets, were Japanese banks. These
banks became engaged in new activities, such as underwriting
Euro-Yen bond issues. The investment houses also increased
overseas activities, especially participating in the United
States Treasury Bond market (25-3O percent of each new issue
was purchased by Japanese investors in the late l98Os)
Besides these private institutions, there were a number of
government-owned financial institutions; the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), and the Japan Export
Import Bank (Exim Bank). Of these, the Exim Bank was the
only one with an international focus. The Exim Bank
provides financing for trade between Japan and developing
countries. These made Japan a more important international
financial power.
Japan is a member of the United Nations (UN),
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As Japan became a greater
international financial power, its roles in financing these
trade and development institutions grew. Previously, the
government had been a very quiet participant in those
organizations, but as its financial role increased, pressure
to expand voting rights and play a more active policy role
mounted.
Political Considerations
People Japanese national character is reflected in
that individual Japanese males often describe themselves
with such terms as egotistic, emotional, introspective,
illogical, hypochondriac, stoical, preserving, disciplined,
conformist, diligent, respectful, loyal, honest, polite and
unbelievably rigid about the requirements of various kinds
of duties, but as less interested in the letter of written
agreement than its emotional connotation and context, very
anxious to avoid stark confrontations and uncertainty in
almost all situations, and finally as having a realistic
ability to learn, always being interested in self- or
national-improvement.7
People are the most important resource. The Japanese
government has foreseen this and inculcated nationalism in
its people. By l99l, all eight approved Japanese elementary
school social studies textbooks contained references to
Admiral Togo, the first mention of him in post war texts.8
Among the troubling developments of recent years are
the rebirth of popular veneration for the emperor, seen
during the ascension of Emperor Akihito, and an increase in
authoritarianism. For example, on l July l99l, the Japanese
government officially reestablished the Hinomaru -- symbol
of the red sun on the white background -- as its national
flag and approved the imperial hymn Ga Yo' its
national anthem, both had been banned since World War II.
Additionally, there is the rise of State Shinto -- the
erosion of the post war legal principle of the separation of
state and religion -- in worship by Cabinet ministers at
Yasukuni Shrine. The public funding of Shinto rituals in
Akihito's accession ceremonies cannot be ignored, and now
the Japanese politicians are trying to find a way to
coordinate the defense policies and strategies with these
civilian developments.
These nationalistic movements and events have fueled
the fears of those who remember Imperial Japan. The return
of the nationalistic songs, flag and pride in their
past military history are considerably unnerving to the many
veterans, both Japanese and Allied, of World War II. While
the world does not expect Japan to ignore its history or not
foster national pride, a return to the image- and emotion-
laden symbols of Imperial Japan does little to create a
sense of confidence among those who remember the war.
The national defense can only be carried out
effectively with the understanding and cooperation of the
nation's citizens. Japan has a constant interest in
public's awareness of defense-related matters and is making
efforts to ensure that Japan's national defense posture
stands on a wide and firm base of public support. A public
survey has been conducted every three years since l972. The
results of the last survey can be summarized as following:9
Interest in the SDF and Defense Issues : Over half of
the respondents indicated "some level of interest" in such
issues for the past lO years, despite the fact that Japan
shares no common land border with other countries and the
Japanese have enjoyed steady peace and prosperity since the
end of World War II.
Impression of SDF : Most of respondents, 76 percent,
are neutral or have a favorable impression. These results
are likely due to the broad awareness and appreciation of
the public regarding the SDF.
Role of the SDF : Nearly one-half of all respondents
indicated the opinion that the primary purpose for the
existence of the SDF is "ensuring the national security".
National Defense Structure : 7O percent of respondents
acknowledged the current structure, and 60 percent indicated
satisfaction with the current size of defense forces. This
means that Japan's basic national defense policies,
including the structure that combined the SDF and the Japan-
U.S. security arrangements, along with the current defense
efforts, are generally understood and supported by the
public.
In response to the International Contribution Question,
most of respondents indicated that they "approve" of
overseas dispatch of the SDF for disaster relief activities
and United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Government Attitudes
Since l94Os, there has been a clear perception in the
Japanese government that;
- the building of a viable and then a competitive
industrial economy and a stable, effective political system
have been the primary objectives of national policy.
- the achievement of these goals is very heavily
contingent on foreign policy -- meaning avoiding war or
relying on the U.S. "shield."
- the security and economic dimensions of foreign
policy are inextricably linked since Japan's economic power
provides a large proportion of its security.
It has been clear since early in the modernization
process that the success of Japan's industrialization would
depend on access to overseas raw materials and markets. The
particular lesson of World War II is that Japan cannot
achieve this necessary access to the world economy by the
use of military force. The Japanese concluded that they
must avoid as much as possible any military role in
international politics, and they must rely on peaceful, non
military means to build their economy and to make a decent
life for themselves.10
By the late 1940s and early 1950s, Japan's conservative
government concluded that the best foreign policy (the
Yoshida policy) for Japan was to become an ally of the
United States, and to base Japan's economic future on the
relatively free, open international economic system that the
United States was constructing. Cooperative economic
relations with the United States itself would be a large
source of raw materials and a major market for Japanese
manufactured products. This policy had been rooted in the
belief that the alliance with the United States would
protect Japan against the Communist (Soviet) threat to its
military security and political stability. In the l95Os,
Japan was able to reconstruct its economy and become a
highly efficient industrial country. Thus, this means of
"economic foreign policy" was very successful.
By the end of l98Os, the world environment changed, as
Japan had become the world largest creditor and the second
largest donor of foreign aid. The Yoshida policy was being
called into question by, first, the diminishing of Soviet
threat, and, second, Japan's success in building
a competitive, industrial economy. Its economy was
generating potentially dangerous levels of resentment, fear
and antagonism toward Japan in the United States. The
United States government began moving toward protectionist
economic policies directed against Japan. Significantly, at
the same time Japan took on a larger role in the
international community to a level commensurate with its
economic power.
By l99O, Japan's foreign policy still supported close
ties with the United States. However, Japanese leaders were
well aware of strong American frustrations with Japanese
economic practices and Japan's strong economic power
relative to the United States in the world markets. Although
the United States was working with the Japanese to find the
new concept framework for Japan-United States relations, the
view is far from clear. Some optimistically predicted that
the United States and Japan would work together as truly
equal partners in dealing with global problems. Some
pessimists predicted that negative feeling generated by the
realignment in United States and Japanese economic power and
persistent trade frictions would prompt Japan to strike out
more on its own, without guidance of the United States.
Given the growing economic dominance of Japan in Asia, Japan
was seen as most likely to strike out independently and
translate its economic power into political and, perhaps,
military influence.
Treaties
The security framework for the defense of a recently
disarmed Japan was developed over the post-war period of
l945-l95l, culminating with the signing of a formal security
treaty with the United States on 8 September l95l in San
Francisco.11 On the coming into force of that Treaty,
Japan did not have the effective means to exercise its
inherent right of self-defense because it had been disarmed.
There was danger to Japan in this situation because
irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the
world. Therefore, Japan desired that a security treaty with
the United States of America to come into force
simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United
States of America and Japan. This treaty attached weight to
the U.S. military's right to be stationed in Japan. Japan
was now essentially a dependent ally of the United States,
which continued to maintain bases and military on Japanese
soil.
Second came the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
between the United States and Japan, signed at Washington,
D.C. on l9 January l96O. This treaty was to strengthen the
bonds of peace and friendship existing between the two
nations. It also upheld the principles of democracy of the
government, individual liberty and the rule of law. Japan
needed to reaffirm its faith in the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations, and Japan's desire to
live in peace with all peoples and all governments.
Furthermore, the Treaty underlined the U.S. and Japanese
common concern in the maintenance of international peace and
security in the Far-East, having resolved to conclude a
treaty of mutual cooperation and security.
Twenty five years after the atomic bombs at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, the Government of Japan became convinced that
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons treaty would serve
as a first step toward nuclear disarmament and hopes that as
many states as possible will adhere to this treaty to make
it effective. Therefore, on 3 February l97O, the Government
of Japan signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.l2
While Japan's policy of against the acquisition of
nuclear weapons enjoyed the support of most political
parties, there seems to be some action to the contrary. For
example, Japan's Foreign Ministry seems to now favor nuclear
weapons. Last June, the ministry prepared a document for
the then-coalition government to send to the World Court
stating that the use of nuclear weapons in war was not
necessarily illegal.13 It seems as if the tragic events of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki are no longer enough. Other evidence
indicating a possible attitude shift in the Japanese
regarding nuclear weapons is the abnormally high quantity of
stockpiled plutonium, which they extract from spent civilian
power fuel. The approximately ll million metric tons
accumulated by the end of l993 greatly exceeded Japan's
capacity to use them as reactor fuel in the near future.
Some consider these attitude shifts and suspicious actions
as justification for requiring Japan to restate its policy
towards nuclear weapons.
In international society today, Japan needs to make an
effort in many ways to pursue the establishment of a more
stable world order. It is also very important to establish
foundations for national security by stabilizing domestic
affairs, implementing appropriate domestic policies,
encouraging people to defend their own country, and
preventing the development of a domestic situation that
allows the country to be subjected to aggression. In
accordance with the MacArthur Japanese Constitution and
Mutual Cooperation and Security Agreement, the JSDF has
limited operational capabilities.
Opinions regarding the security treaty with the United
States fall into "pro-continuity" or "pro-change" camps.
The pro-continuity group argues that the treaty is still
important in the post-Cold War era, precisely because nobody
is sure of the threats posed in the near- to mid-term
future. The latter group argues that the treaty served its
purpose of protecting Japan, while at the same time making
it unnecessary for Japan to acquire a large military
arsenal. In their view, it is unnecessary for Japan to
acquire a large military arsenal or develop nuclear weapons;
the treaty is no longer needed because Russia is not the
threat that the former Soviet Union was. However, the
common concern shared by both camps is that Japan lacks a
comprehensive new national security strategy to deal with
the post-Cold War environment, and that, US security
alliance or not, Japan must build such a strategy.
Fifty years later, the Japanese government still
heavily relies on the United States government to defend
their country. Currently, the Japanese are ranked number
two in the world for their economy and they are ready to
share greater responsibility of world peace and national
security but are unable to assume the roles and missions
because of the US Treaties and Japanese Constitution. The
United States is not wealthy enough, nor has the desire, to
act as global ring master and policeman. Regional
institutions as we have seen in Europe, the America, Africa,
are weak and not sufficiently well developed to assume major
responsibility.14 The only way to regulate the new policy,
is that the Japanese government must convince all political
parties, business communities, and government bureaucracy
(Mainstreamers, Nationalists and Pacifists) to have the same
approach and that the Japanese can defend their nation while
supporting the United Nation's mission to make our world a
better place.
Political Philosophies
The difference of Japanese politics can be viewed from
several angles: as debates among the government bureaucracy,
political parties, the big-business community, and the
relatively voiceless masses, and as debates among those
whose political philosophies could be called "mainstream,"
"nationalist," and "pacifist".l5
Mainstream - Within the government, mainstream thought
characterizes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the
Defense Agency (DA), the SDF, and the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party. It supports the maintenance of the U.S.-
Japan Security Agreement, and, to keep U.S. forces in Japan,
this group is willing for Japan to carry more of the
financial burden of the alliances. The other side of the
coin is that it does not favor expanding Japan's defense
forces in the near term.
The mainstreamers value the alliance with the U.S. not
necessarily out of admiration or respect for the United
States, but out of political calculation of what is best for
Japan. They see that Japan must need the U.S. security
"umbrella" for the indefinite future for at least two
reasons; first, because other nations' historic perception
of Japan as a potential aggressor in Asia restricts Japan's
rearmament options and, second, because without American
support the nationalists might seize the opportunity to
remilitarize Japan. A Liberal Democratic Party study group,
chaired after the Gulf War in February l992, suggested that
Japan's peace constitution be reinterpreted as advocating
and "active" form of pacifism that would be consistent with
Japan's use of force in international peacekeeping
operations. However, the report also concludes that Japan
should only assume this active role in the international
community because other countries have asked it do so.
Nationalist - Although the nationalists are not
affiliated with any significant institutional foundations or
political parties, they are scattered as influential
individuals throughout Japanese society. Nationalists see
the post-Cold War era as a non-polar world in which Japan
must be ready to defend itself without relying on the United
States, and the first task for doing so should be to revise
the Constitution, which prohibits Japan from using force
against other nations. Their reaction to the Gulf War
differ from those of the mainstreamers: they objected to
Japan's effort to gain international respect through
financial contributions to the war. They felt the monetary
option was foolish and, instead, military troops should have
gone into combat with UN forces. The blind submission to
pay $l3 billion for the Gulf War only served to demonstrate
that Japan is an uncritical follower of misguided "American
justice."
The nationalists' autonomous defense and foreign policy
orientation implies that Japan either withdraw from the
U.S.-Japan security alliance or insist on equal partnership.
However, they do not clearly spell out what Japan's defense
posture should be, especially in regard to nuclear weapons.
Pacifist - The views of Japan's pacifists on rearmament
have prevailed since the end of World War II; they have been
groomed largely within the academic community and the
Socialist Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). Japanese
academics, especially economists, are predominantly
socialists, the Marxist tradition having taken root in the
early part of this century. Although Japanese government
and business leaders claim that university professors do not
have a strong popular influence, Japan's academics -- far
more than their American counterparts -- enjoy the respect
of the public in accordance with the Confucian tradition of
"revering the literati and despising the military."
Pacifists have traditionally asserted that Japan make
its contribution to world peace in an age of collective UN
leadership by terminating its security agreement with the
United States, supporting the United Nations as a global,
nonmilitary force for peace, maintaining the Japanese peace
constitution, and reducing Japan's military capabilities.
Of particular note is that many of the less radical pacifist
views are widely held by the electorate, especially by
women.15 Instead of sending troops into combat, the
pacifists believe that Japan has to remain a peaceful power
and convince its neighbors that it is not a future military
threat. Since the l96O's, when the pacifists were most
active, public sympathy for their more extreme views was
dwindling. The SDPJ was been unsuccessful in rejuvenating
the l96O's anti-security treaty sentiment, and in a February
l993 interview with Mainichi Shimbun, SDPJ Chairman Sadao
Yamahana admitted that in order to get more votes, the SDPJ
must get more realistic and less idealistic.16 This would
happen very soon.
Developments in l993-94, have seen a dramatic change in
political Japan. Former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
"mover-and-shaker" Ichiro Ozawa, catalyzed change by
engineering events that brought Morihiro Hosokawa to power,
ending the LDP's 38-year-old iron grip on government.
However, last June, when Hosokawa's successor Tsutomu Hatta
was forced to resign after only 59 days in office, the LDP
regained power by forming a coalition with their traditional
opponents, the SDPJ, led by Tomiichi Murayama.17
The dramatic changes continued even within the SDPJ, as
it attempted to make itself more relevant. For example, as
Prime Minister, Murayama jettisoned pacifist policies by
accepting the constitutionality of the SDF, the legitimacy
of the l96O U.S.-Japan Treaty of Cooperation and Security,
and even endorsed "Kimi Ga Yo" as the national anthem!
Basically, the SDPJ still clings to some of its pacifist
ideology such as Article 9 of the constitution, but has
given its support to fullest possible involvement in non-
combat peacekeeping roles under U.N. auspices.18
In summary of the economic and political considerations
regarding Japan's increased involvement in international
peacekeeping missions and the concomitant structural changes
in the SDF, it can be safely said that the economic might of
Japan will continue to invite pressure from the world
community to "do more" in support of stability for many
years to come. The three dominant political philosophies --
mainstream, nationalist and pacifist -- will be engaged in a
three-way tug-of-war for control over the size and
composition of the SDF. While the "mainstreamers" have been
in control for some time, the nationalist movement is
gaining some momentum. The pacifist movement, as mentioned
above, has essentially adapted its philosophy to be more
relevant. Perhaps all three will adapt to the point of
becoming a homogeneous political philosophy. In the
meantime, what will keep all three political camps in check
is the presence of the World War II generation of Japanese
that vividly remember the pain and international castigation
from the war. Over the course of the next twenty years, as
this generation dies off, the well-spring of nationalism may
spring forth unchecked by those who remember. A number of
factors can lead to a resurgence in nationalism within
Japan: the fading of memories both inside and external to
Japan regarding World War II; the children of today continue
to be influenced by their history and recent nationalistic
initiatives like the Hinomaru; and if the Japanese continue
to view the United States commitment to their security with
skepticism. These factors will contribute to a swaying of
the peace constitution revision pendulum towards a greater
Japanese role and a restructured SDF to support it; however,
because of the continued presence of the World War II
generation, this expansion in the SDF role will most likely
not be achieved until 2OlO or longer.
CHAPTER 3
SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD
We must consult our means rather than our wishes, and
not endeavor to better our affairs by attempting things
which, for want of success, may make them worse.
- George Washington to Lafayette, l78O,
The end of the Cold War has raised questions over the
future of the security relationship between the United
States and Japan and the direction of Japan's defense
buildup. With the second-largest economy in the world and
steady technological advances, Japan possesses the financial
and technological ability to transform itself into a
military power. This chapter will discuss some of the
threats which compel Japan to maintain a strong defense
program, its current status, and plans for the future.
Various local confrontations due to religious or ethnic
discord in many parts of the world, which had been contained
under the East-West confrontation, have come to the surface
or intensified, heightening the likelihood that regional
conflicts (for example the Spratly Islands, Korea, etc.) may
occur or expand. In addition, transfer or proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear arms, are
feared in the international community as they can aggravate
regional conflicts. The military situation thus remains
unstable and uncertain and under such circumstances, the
United Nations is expected to perform its function more than
before in keeping peace and security in the world.19
Threats, Risks and Influence on Japan's Defense Posture
The Japanese military establishment, as well as Japan's
public-opinion leaders and policy makers, have accepted that
the Cold War is over. While many of the implications of
this change are still emerging, the chief priority of the
new peacetime environment is for Japan to re-evaluate its
security requirements in the absence of an apparent threat
from the former Soviet Union.
International security threats comprise a combination
of aggressive intentions and military capabilities. Viewed
from a long-term perspective, as most security policies are,
the additional factor of predictability, especially
predictability of intentions, becomes a third important
variable to enter into the threat equation. The Japanese
are perhaps more concerned about the unpredictability of
their security environment than about the present intentions
or military capabilities of their neighbors.
Japan's l992 Defense White Paper identified the
following problem areas in East Asia: the confrontation
between North and South Korea, the multinational dispute
over the Spratly Islands, and the unresolved conflict in
Cambodia. On the other hand, the White Paper noted positive
signs in the region; a continuing dialogue between North and
South Korea, both of whom joined the United Nations; South
Korea's announcement that it is free of nuclear weapons;
North Korea's signing (but lack of fidelity to) of the Non
Proliferation Treaty, and acceptance of nuclear inspections
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Additionally, China established relations with South Korea
and Vietnam, and strengthened relations with Russia. North
Korea was talking about opening up to the outside world,
Vietnam had opened up, and a Cambodian peace agreement was
reached.
It is not clear how the former Soviet Union's massive
military forces in the Far East will develop in the process
of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Significant
movements toward arms proliferation have been seen in the
Far East, constituting an unstable factor for the security
of this region.
Changing Geo-Political Threats to Japan
The Russian Threat- Like most other Western nations,
Japan is experiencing difficulty in adjusting to the changed
security environment vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union.
Russian analysts argue that Japan has "belittled the changes
that Perestroika and the new thinking have brought to Soviet
foreign policy". Japanese defense analysts point to the
lack of force reductions in Russia's Far East Forces. The
Japanese are also concerned about the sale by former Soviet
republics of modern weapons to other nations, especially
China, as well as the possibility of weapons-technology
(especially nuclear technology) transfer, all in the new
Russian spirit of free-wheeling capitalism.
Ironically, it is not criticism of Russia's vast
military establishment that has preoccupied the Japanese,
but rather a relatively insignificant dispute involving the
ownership of four small islands, the Kuriles, (which Japan
designates as the Northern Territories), the closest of
which is located only a few miles north of Hokkaido. The
archipelago provides an eastern barrier to the entrance of
the Sea of Okhotsk, from which Russian ships and submarines
operate. The islands also have economic value in terms of
fishing rights and mineral deposits. Russia is believed to
have a brigade of troops supported by helicopters and MiG-23
fighters stationed on the larger two islands of Kunashiri
and Etorofu.
The Soviet Union took the entire chain at the end of
World War II. Japan has never recognized the legality of
Russia's possession of the four southern islands, claiming
they are not part of the Kurile group that Japan officially
ceded to the Soviet Union in the l952 San Francisco Peace
Treaty.
In the past (l956, l988, and l99O) the Soviet Union has
offered to give Japan the islands (Shikotan and the Habomai
group) in return for a peace treaty, but Japan has continued
to insist on the return of all four islands. Various deals
have been floated from both Tokyo and Moscow, involving the
Japanese "purchase" of the islands for a large sum of money,
or even some agreement whereby the islands might be occupied
by Russia but owned by Japan. Russia is sensitive about
setting a precedent of ceding territory to Japan, China, or
another CIS republic. The island issue has thus stalemated
Japanese-Russian relations.
The Chinese Threat- With the exception of Russia,
China is the strongest military capability in Asia. While
China has kept military expenditures at a constant
percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) since l99O, the
robust growth of the Chinese economy has produced three
consecutive years of higher military expenditures. For
example, Japan estimates that the spending in l992 was l3
percent over l99l. Among the recent additions to China's
arsenal are Russian SU-27 fighters. The Chinese were even
reported to be considering the purchase of a Ukrainian
aircraft carrier, although the deal does not seem to be
going through. In July l994, the Shidian magazine reported
that a number of Naval-Air force pilots with tens of
thousands of hours flying experience were being trained in
the Guangzhon Naval Vessel Institute. But without an
aircraft carrier battle group, Chinese cannot effectively
protect the so-called "Spratly National Marine Territory".
Japan's relations with China have been relatively
smooth. The Japanese continue to advocate the importance of
opening up China economically, and this advocacy has most
certainly been appreciated by Beijing. Except for the
passage in l992 of China's Territorial Waters Act, by which
China has laid claim not only to the Spratly Islands but
also to Japan's Senkaku Island, China's present intentions
toward Japan seem positive.
In the future, it is plausible that China could come
into conflict with other regional powers such as India or
Japan. Both India and China consider themselves "great
powers" and have expanded their ballistic missile arsenals
and nuclear capabilities. The Chinese naval capability is
beginning to protrude into the Bay of Bengal, and both
countries are suspicious of the other. Essentially, China
and India are too big, too close and too ambitious not to
conflict with each other in the future.20
The future intentions of China in regard to Hong Kong
and Taiwan are unclear to Japan. Whether Hong Kong will be
allowed to keep its democratic-capitalist system after l997
has been questioned by Beijing.
Like China, Taiwan's strong economy enables it to
improve its defense capabilities. For example, it has
purchased advanced fighter planes from the United States
(l5O F-l6s) and France.21 The minority Democratic
Progressive Party, which received a third of the votes in
the December l992 election, has called for Taiwan's
independence from mainland China, that is, a renunciation of
its claim to be the legitimate government of China. Such a
break is unlikely to come in the near future. If it did, it
could conceivably trigger an armed conflict with the
mainland. Such conflict at Japan's doorstep could easily
have repercussions for Japan's security, especially if the
United States should extend assistance to Taiwan, perhaps
even from American bases in Japan. In fact, a number of
Chinese strategists and security analysts identify the
United States as the primary enemy in the post-Cold War era.
For the United States, China today is an important
actor in both international and regional environments.
While it is in no sense a superpower, it has significant
global capabilities with which it can influence the success
of U.S. policies, and it has the potential to wield even
greater influence in the future. It is a member of the UN
Security Council with a veto, and can therefore frustrate
or, at least strongly influence, any U.S. policy which
requires a Security Council decision.
As a self-proclaimed "Third World" state, increasingly
successful in an economic and military sense, it has the
ability to influence other Third World governments, either
in support of, or in opposition to, U.S. global interests.
Because it is one of the five acknowledged nuclear powers,
China is central to restraining the spread of nuclear
weapons and weapons technology.22 The verdict on China's
performance in this area is not in - - especially regarding
North Korea's mysterious "nuclear program".
Lastly, China is an important exporter of arms which
sells relatively sophisticated missiles to customers that
the United States considers dangerous, including Iran,
Syria, and Libya.23
The Korean Peninsula Threat- Although both North and
South Koreans have bitter memories of Japan's colonial
aggression, the South Koreans have developed strong economic
ties with the Japanese and have learned to work with them.
Curiously, North Korea also has strong ties with Japan;
an estimated 2OO,OOO North Koreans have lived in Japan since
World War II. The Kim IL Sung regime had been courting
Tokyo in pursuit of diplomatic recognition and a large
wartime compensation package. Although the Japanese
government is also eager to normalize relations in order to
provide greater stability to the region, the normalization
talks have made little progress over the failure of the
North Koreans to agree to permit mutual North-South Korean
nuclear inspections.
Most worrisome to the Japanese is the possibility that
North Korea could develop a nuclear weapon capable of being
delivered to western Japan by its new Scud-C missile
(NODONG). What purpose such an attack would serve is not
obvious; however, given the somewhat reckless nature of
North Korean military policy in the past-from launching the
Korean War to attempting to assassinate the South Korean
President-the possibility of such an attack is one reason
why Japan is eager both for mutual North-South Korean
inspections and for the establishment of normalization with
the North Koreans.
Southeast Asian "Threat" - Japan's relations with the
Southeast Asian nations have improved greatly in the recent
years, and Japanese investment has been pouring into the
region. None of the nations in this region pose a security
threat to Japan in the foreseeable future.
In summary, while not all of the aforementioned geo-
political threats pose imminent danger to Japan, they do
present an enormous potential threat to regional stability
and to Japan. The Japanese feel, rightfully so, that with
two major nuclear powers in close proximity, total reliance
on the U.S. security umbrella may be too little or too late.
Japan's Basic Security Needs
In view of the threats mentioned above, the grand
strategy of Japan should aim at developing and effectively
utilizing political, military, economic, and psychological
forces for the purpose of attaining Japan's long term
national goal of achieving regional stability. Japan's
basic security strategy, rooted in mainstream philosophy,
can be summarized into ten points:24
l. Maintenance of the US-Japan Security Alliance and
establishment of a regional multilateral collective
security framework. In essence, including other
friendly nations in the region into the U.S.-Japan
security cooperative. Japan has to protect and
stabilize its raw material sources and export markets.
The important regions are the connecting Sea Lines of
Communication (SLOC); the Indian Ocean, the Straits of
Malacca, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea.
By nature, this implies a large SDF.
2. Contribution to strengthened international economic
cooperation and economic policy coordination because
Japan cannot survive if the international economy
collapses.
3. Implementation of assistance programs targeted at
Russia and China. Russia still remains a mighty
military power, while China is the newly rising power
from the Cold War. The idea is to prevent problems and
by encouraging stability.
4. Participation in international activities aimed at
the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons and
preparedness for nuclear accidents.
5. Participation in international cooperation to
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, especially nuclear weapons.
6. Positive participation in United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations and the strengthening of UN
functions. Especially, participation in UN-sponsored
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) in all areas for
resolving regional conflicts.
7. Participation in other international activities
aimed at resolving non-military problems of global
concern.
8. Focusing on the need to resolve the Korean North-
South problem.
9. Institutional preparation to become a major
information power. Japan's economic and national
security can be firmly built upon the foundation of a
stable international interdependence. Japan can use
its technology and economic power to carve a niche in
the information market and create an "informational
interdependence."
lO. Preparation of a self-defense capability with
well-defined limits on equipment systems, operational
ranges, and force structure. For example, by not
acquiring offensive weapons.
Defense Policy of Japan
The Defense Policy Japan has pursued under the
constitution is based on the "Basic Policy for National
Defense", adopted by the National Defense Council and approved
by the Cabinet in l957.25 Its main basic policy is as
follows: making a contribution to world peace through the
United Nations, consolidating of the foundations for national
security through comprehensive policies, and gradually
acquiring a moderate but effective capacity to defend Japan.
In the same year, Japan's 1st Defense Buildup Plan (l958-l96l)
was also introduced.
The "National Defense Program Outline", adopted in l976,
included Mid-term Defense Programs and was based on the
following assumptions:
l) major military clashes between East and West could be
deterred by a balance of powers, including the nuclear powers,
2) there could be limited armed conflict in vicinity of
Japan, and
3) any major military attack on Japan is unlikely so
long as the Japan-U.S. security arrangement remains
functional.
In the first part of the Defense Buildup plan, emphasis
was laid on the defense of Japan in conjunction with U.S.
force against external threats, particularly from the Soviet
Union. That orientation explained the priority given to the
defense of the main island and the Kuriles. However,
because of their strong anti-nuclear policy at the time,
Japan was insisted that U.S. forces on Japan or Okinawa be
non-nuclear.
The internal security mission was played down until the
massive demonstration and riots instigated by the Left to
overthrow the government in its opposition to the l96O
Security Treaty with U.S.. Since that time, internal
security has been a high priority of the armed forces,
especially the JSDFI and has been tackled with great
thoroughness.26
The recent Mid-term Defense Program (l99l-l995) was
adopted in l99O and has achieved the force structure level
specified in the original Outline Program; however, there
are still on-going efforts to rationalize and modernize the
JSDF. 27
Current Force Structure and Buildup Program
Japan's armed forces, as in "Article 9" of their
constitution, preclude existence of offensive military
forces. Japan's armed forces, totalling some 234,OOO
personnel, are composed of:28
- Five Armies
- Five Maritime Districts
- Three Air Defense Forces
Main bases are in Hokkaido, eastern Honshu, central and
western Honshu and Shikoku, and Kyushu.
A revision of the Japanese Force structure which has
been listed in the outline program is shown in Appendix
A.29 The new force structure will probably mean a
reduction in the numbers of personnel and equipment. This
is the strong political requirement. Japan has no option
but to reduce the size of its forces; to maintain quality,
the JSDF must undergo restructuring to become efficient and
highly
capable. The restructured forces will have increased access
to military technology, including the latest high-tech
weapons and equipment. The restructured JSDF will also have
improved intelligence, transport, and deployment
capabilities.
Although there is a lot of political pressure in the
West and Japan to realize a peace dividend from the end of
the Cold War, there remains much uncertainty over security
in Northeast Asia. It is unlikely that there will be a
large-scale reduction in Japan's defense force because it
has not yet reached a level comparable to that of the
defense forces of other advanced industrial nations in the
West. Japan's defense expenditures, in term of dollars, are
very high (l.O percent of GNP), but more than 4O percent of
this is attributable to personnel and provision expenses.30
According to the latest edition of "Military Balance",
issued by the International Institute for Strategic Studies
in the U.K., Japan, as of FY l994, ranked 7th in the world
in annual defense expenditures after the United States,
Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom and Germany.
Defense budget requests for l994 total 4,683.5 billion Yen,
up O.9 percent from the previous fiscal year. The Defense
budget for l993 is 4,64O.6 billion Yen, up l.95 percent.31
In the future, defense budgets will be frozen at
approximately this present level, although the budgets will
be allocated so that some equipment can be modernized.
The "Mid-Term Defense Program (FY l99l-l995)", MTDP,
was adopted in December l99O and was revised in order to
reflect changes in the domestic and international situation
in l992. Under the revised MTDP, the Fiscal l994 defense
expenditure has been restrained in consideration of the
extremely serious fiscal situation and some other factors.
The Japanese government reached the conclusion that there
was a need to reflect such changes in defense buildup as
soon as possible, and it revised the MTDP as follows:32
(l) put off the implementation of some projects
envisaged in the Program, and
(2) strive to replace and modernize old equipment and
to improve deficient capability.
The results are that the growth rate in defense
expenditure in l994 has been held around l percent. The FY
l994 Defense Budget is basically designed to replace or
modernize old equipment and improve deficient capabilities.
Regarding logistic support, the budget focuses on various
measures, including the upgrading of living-related
facilities, such as barracks, and the promotion of the SDF
base countermeasures.
Future Forces
Japan's future modernization of its defense capability
covers a broad range of matters, including the organization,
function and deployment of the SDF, by paying due heed to
the aforementioned changes in the international situation,
diverse domestic factors, increased restrictions on
availability of personnel resources in future, and the
latest technological trends, among others. In February
l994, Japan's Prime Minister Hosokawa decided to hold the
"Advisory Group on Defense Issues", a private advisory group
to the Prime Minister, to hear from knowledgeable people
about a new frame of reference as a substitute for the
present Outline. In June l993, a private advisory group to
the Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy , the
"Panel on Japan's Defense in the New Era", was set up. The
perspectives which would be the basis for the study of
Japan's defense modernization included:
l. the international situation surrounding Japan
2. Japan's national security
3. Japan's international contribution
4. the SDF's relations with the people and society
While the formation of these study groups is a step
toward a rational, measured approach to force modernization,
the path to a restructured SDF remains obstructed by the
limits of the constitution, political and economic
considerations, and the strong influence of Japan's Imperial
history. In summary, Japan must make significant changes to
the national security framework before it can embark on a
meaningful revision of its force structure.
CHAPTER 4
UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
As of April l994, U.N. peacekeeping operations being
conducted throughout the world encompassed about 7O,OOO
people from 66 countries.33 Traditionally, U.N.
peacekeeping operations are roughly divided into three
categories:
l) peacekeeping forces
2) crease-fire observer missions
3) election monitoring and others
After the Cold-War, there is a tendency toward making
arms control and disarmament agreements such as those
regarding U.S. and Russian nuclear arms or conventional
weapons of which development was premised on confrontation
in Europe.
On the other hand, diverse rivalries resulting from
religious or racial problems in various parts of the world,
which were contained under the East-West confrontation in
the past, have surfaced, increasing the danger of developing
into disputes. The military balance at the regional level
would undergo change in a short period of time due to the
transfer or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or
high-performance weapons.
Compared with the Cold War era in which the East-West
confrontation was wholly reflected in the Security Council,
members of the United Nations have become more cooperative,
and expectations are growing upon the function of the United
Nations in the arena of security. However, the U.N.
function is not of such a nature as to provide deterrence to
conflicts in advance, while the reality is that U.N.
peacekeeping activities cannot be expected to produce
sufficient results unless certain conditions are ensured.
Past Involvement
During the Persian Gulf War, April l99l, the SDF, for
the first time, participated in the minesweeping activities.
This was the SDF's first international contribution in terms
of human resources. More significant than the actual number
of mines cleared -- only 34 in a six-month period -- is the
further expansion in constitutional interpretation, and the
precedent set for Japanese vessels, reportedly under U.S.
naval command, that far away from the Japanese archipelago.
The government's next attempt to widen the scope of
SDF activities was made in June l992, when the " Law
Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations and Other Operations" and the "Law to Amend Part
of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief
Teams" were enacted, thereby providing a statutory framework
for Japan to positively address the task of pursuing
activities for national contribution in terms of human
resources.34
Based on these laws, the SDF has prepared for the
International disaster relief activities, while dispatching
contingents and personnel to engage in U.N. peacekeeping
operations in Cambodia from September l992 through October
l993. Currently, the SDF continues to dispatch forces to
Mozambique, where their involvement began in May l993.
Constraints
As previously mentioned, Japan's international peace
operation assignments have been conducted on the basis of
the "Law Concerning Cooperation for the United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations".
The International Peace Cooperation Law was legislated
in line with the basic guidelines for Japan's Participation
in Peacekeeping Forces on the five principles shown
below:35
l) Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached
among the parties to the conflicts.
2) The parties to the conflicts, including the
territorial state(s), shall have given their consent to
deployment of peacekeeping forces and Japan's participation
in the force.
3) The peacekeeping force shall strictly maintain
impartiality, not favoring any party to the conflict.
4) Should any of the above guideline requirements
cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw
its contingent.
5) Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum
necessary to protect the personnel's lives, etc.
The SDF's participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations
is conducted under the Law, therefore, will never entail the
possibility of the "use of force" or the "dispatch of armed
forces to foreign countries for purpose of using force" as
prohibited under Article 9 of the Constitution.
Future Involvement
Peacekeeping has changed dramatically and has also
expanded very rapidly in recent years. Seventeen peace
operations are now in place throughout the world, and most
of these have been set up during the past four years. We
have moved away from the old-style peacekeeping which for
the most part involved military observers, or an
interposition of United Nations forces to oversee a cease-
fire. Such forces were lightly armed and could count on the
full cooperation and consent of the parties involved. Some
have recently described these functions as no more than
"cooking and looking," since military action in such cases
is practically non-existent. New style missions, however,
require peacekeepers to do much.36
The Japanese now realize that they have to take a more
active position in the United Nations, whose role in the
post-Cold War era is likely to increase in importance. They
have begun to lobby quietly for a Security Council Seat.
Yet it is difficult for them to play a more prominent role
because they do not have a permanent seat on the Security
Council and because Japan's peace constitution has been
interpreted as forbidding the dispatch of Japanese soldiers
abroad.37
When it comes to the creation of a separate
organization, there are views to the effect that it is
considered appropriate to make the best use of the SDF's
capabilities in order to make Japan's cooperation feasible
and that there is no need to institute a new organization
separate from the SDF due to a host of problems that
include:
l. for peacekeeping forces or cease-fire observation
teams, dispatches of members who belong to each
participating country's military organization are asked for;
2. for U.N. peacekeeping operations that are conducted
in harsh environments immediately after the end of an armed
conflict, participation of an organization with self-
sufficient capabilities is asked for;
3. in order for dispatched units to fully display their
capabilities, organizational logistics support, such as
supplies and transportation, is needed, and only
establishment of a separate dispatch unit is insufficient;
and
4. given the capabilities and achievements the SDF
demonstrated in Cambodia and Mozambique, any moves to
neglect such would affect the pride and morale of the SDF
considerably.38
Regarding the creation of an expert organization within
the SDF, it is believed to be a matter that should be
discussed deliberately by studying the most appropriate form
of the SDF's participation in such assignments, including
the aspect of organization.
In summary, Japan has shown a willingness to participate
in UN peacekeeping operations and has performed admirably.
Once again, as one of the world economic powers, Japan is
expected by the community of nations to "do her part". In
fact, the Japanese desire to participate rather than be a
spectator on the sidelines. With most members of the Diet
supporting a push for permanent membership on the UN
Security Council, they want Japan to be more involved in the
UN affairs. This should be considered only natural for a
nation that has such intense pride. Conversely, the
Japanese continue to worry about how their participation
will be viewed by Western powers as a breach of their "peace
constitution." The dilemma of this defense-dependent
economic power continues.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The regional stability surrounding Japan and the
attendant military situation remains quite complicated.
There remain diverse problems, including the divided Korean
Peninsula, the disputed sovereignty of the Spratly Islands
and Japan's Northern Territories. Therefore, the Japan-U.S.
Security Arrangement remains an important element in
maintaining security in East Asia. The fact that Japan and
the United States, which share the common value of freedom
and democracy and are playing an important role -- political
and economic -- in the international community, are closely
linked which each other is deemed conducive to the stability
and prosperity not only in East Asia but also in the world
as a whole.
A new era has begun and the world must maintain peace in
a highly unstable environment. The United Nations has taken
responsibility for world peace and Japan desires to increase
its role and mission in order to help maintain world order.
Currently, U.S.-Japan treaties and its constitution have
limited Japan to a minimal operational capability;
therefore, Japan must revise its constitution in order to
substantially participate in the enforcement of global legal
statutes. These issues must also be conveyed to the public
so that the government can gain popular support. It is not
only helping to maintain world peace but also stabilizing
their own national defense that justifies strengthening the
military and modernizing equipment.
We can expect Japan to participate increasingly in UN
peacekeeping operations. This can be regarded as essential
in Japan's quest to gain a permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council. Therefore, it is seeking to gain
a permanent seat to become more fully engaged in the world
around them. At the same time, this involvement in UN
operations can be seen as a means to counterbalance Japan's
security dependence on the United States. Japan ranks
number two in the world economically and with its financial
strength can broaden its assistance in supporting the
mission of United Nations, if it gets some voice in the
matters (i.e. Security Council seat). If Japan is accepted
as a permanent member, it will no doubt play an even greater
role, with a concomitant need for new weapon procurement,
especially transport aircraft and ships. This increased
involvement not only gives a new lease on life for weapons
procurement, but also gives the politicians a tool to
enhance Japan's international status. However, this may be
difficult since many countries are still afraid of a
reemergence of the power of Japan and fears of starting
another war. The Japanese do not aspire to become a
military power, but to change the world opinion with the new
generation. They feel that the only way to be respected in
the world is to participate fully along with other nations.
Japan can be expected to expand gradually its presence
in the Asia-Pacific region. In the context of a decreasing
U.S. presence, as seen in the U.S. withdrawal from the
Philippines, and an increasing acceptance of regional
governments of a larger military role for Japan, the
Maritime SDF will probably expand to an area of sea line
defense beyond lOOO nautical miles. In a visit to South
Korea, Prime Minister Hosokawa not only apologized for the
war, but also called for Japan and South Korea to play a
role in the building of a new, peaceful order in the post-
Cold War world. In this we can perhaps see the seeds for a
new military relationship developing in the nation.
With the passage of time and the steady decline of
victims and veterans of World War II, Japan's military may
be able to escape the specter of its past. In turn, Japan
must proceed slowly, informing the world at every step of
its peaceful intentions.
In summary, Japan must make the constitutional/treaty
changes needed to increase UN participation, be patient with
the generation that remembers World War II, and carefully
proceed down the path towards greater defense self-reliance
with an active role in shaping a new world order, especially
in the Pacific Rim.
ENDNOTES
l. Brian Reading, Japan: The Comming Collapse, (New York :
Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., l992), 45-45.
2. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (New
York Random House Inc., l9B7), 45l-452.
3. Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden, Japan: A Country
Study, 5th ed., Federal Research Division, Liberty of
Congress, DA Pam. No. 55O-3O (Washington D.C.: Goverment
Printing office, l992), 6O.
4. Dolan and Worden, 3l2.
5. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan
and U.S. (Excerpts): 23 June l96O Treaty No.6 and Agreement
under Article 6 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between Japan and the United States of America,
regarding facilities and areas and the status of United
States Armed Forces in Japan (Excerpts): Treaty No. 7
effective on 23 June l96O.
6. Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation Strong Army, National
Security and The Technological Transformation of Japan,
(U.S.A.: Cornell University Press, l994), l-32.
7. Hermann Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge
and Response, (New Jersey: Prentice, Inc., l97l), 25.
8. Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese
Education". International Security, Vol.l8, no.3 (Winter
l993/l994), l29.
9. Government of Japan White Paper, Defense of Japan l994,
(Japan: The Defense Agency, l994), l9O-l94.
lO. Martin E. Weinstein, " Japan's Foreign Policy Options:
Implications for the United States," Japan's Foreign Policy,
ed. Gerald L. Curtis (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., l993),
2l8-2l9.
ll. Donald C. Hellmann, Japan and East Asia: The New
International Order, (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc.,
l972), l95-l96.
l2. Hellmann, l97-2OO.
l3. Arjun Makhijani, "What Non-Nuclear Japan Is Not Telling
The World and How Tokyo Keeps Its Options Open", The
Washington Post, 2 April l995, Sec. Al.
l4. Alexander Borg Olivier, "The United Nations in a
Changing World Order: Expectations and Realities,"
Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Coalition Warfare: The Future
Role of the United Nations, ed. Fariborz L. Mokhtari
(Washington D.C.: NDU Press, l994), 22.
l5. Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, The U.S.-Japan Security
Relationship After the Cold-War, National Research Institute
(CA: RAND l993), 24.
15. In a poll taken by Nihon Keizai Shimbun in late January
l99l, 57 percent of Japanese men but only 25 percent of
Japanese women supported the use of force by the U.S.-led
coalition in the Gulf. Similarly, the Asahi Shixnbun poll on
attitudes toward PKO participation in Cambodia showed 63
percent of Japanese men in favor and 3O percent opposed; but
only 42 percent of women in favor and the same percentage
opposed. See Asahi Shiznbun, September 2B, l992, Morning
Edition, page l.
l6. Mainichi Shimbun, February 4, l993, Morning Edition,
Page 2.
l7. Peter Polomka, "Out of the Shadows Towards Greater Self-
Reliance," Asia-Pacific Defense Review (A-PDR) l995 Annual
Reference Edition, page 35.
l8. Polomka, page 35.
l9. Joseph P. Keddell, Jr., The Politics of Defense in
Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures, (New York:
M. E. Sharpe, Inc., l993), 3.
2O. Philip L. Ritcheson, "China's Impact on Southeast Asian
Security", Military Review, May l99l, 44-57.
2l. Thomas L. Wilborn, Security Cooperation with China:
Analysis and A Proposal, (Strategic Studies Institute, U. S.
Army War College, November, l994), l6.
22. Wilborn, l2-l6.
23. Compared to the United States, Russia, and Western
European countries, the volume of China's arms trade is
modest, however, see R. Bates Gill, The Challenge of
Chinese Arms Proliferation: U.S. Policy for the l99Os,
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, August 3l, l993), l-l2.
24. Toshiyuki Shikata, Japan's Grand Strategy in the
Succeeding Era," Asia in the 2lst Century: Evolving
Strategic Priorities, ed. Michael D. Bellows, (Washington,
DC; National Defense University Press,l994), 63-67.
25. Government of Japan White Paper, G3.
26. Peter G. Tsouras, Changing Orders: The Evolution of the
World's Armies l945 to the Present, (New York: Facts On
File, Inc., l994), l4O.
27. Defense Agency, Japan, The Defense of Japan, (Tokyo,
Japan: The Japan Times, Ltd., l994), 96.
28. Dolan and Worden, xxiii.
29. Government of Japan White Paper 63.
3O. Satoshi Morimoto, "The Japanese Self-Defense Force: Its
Role and Missions in the Post-Cold War Period," Asia in the
2lst Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities, ed. Michael
D.Bellows, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University
Press, l994), l82-l83.
3l. Government of Japan White Paper, 9l.
32. Government of Japan White Paper, 9O.
33. Government of Japan White Paper, ll7-ll8.
34. This law aimed at the consolidating a domestic setup so
that Japan can contribute to U.N. peacekeeping operations
and humanitarian international relief operations
appropriately and swiftly, and thereby contribute more
positively than before to the international community,
particularly in terms of human resources. Moreover, it is
stipulated that the law is to be reviewed three years after
coming into force.
35. Government of Japan White Paper, ll8.
36. Olivier, 22.
37. Fukuyama, 18.
38. Government of Japan White Paper, l35.
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