Military

Gulf War Close Air Support:  Implications for the Future

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Aviation

 

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: Gulf War Close Air Support: Implications for the Future

 

Author: Major Gary P. Shaw, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis: Although close air support (CAS) played a relatively minor role in the context of

the Gulf War as a whole, it had a crucial impact on the performance of Marine ground

forces.

 

Background: This paper presents an analysis of Marine Gulf War CAS using

standardized CAS case study methodology. Specific topics discussed include: doctrine

and organization; operations; command, control, and communications (C weaponry and

technology; decisions and decision makers; and fratricide. Throughout the analysis,

maneuver warfare and the MEF single battle concept provide a standard by which to

assess current CAS architecture. The discussion begins with an explanation of CAS

theory and definitions, and underscores the conceptual incompatibility of current Marine

CAS doctrine with the MEF single battle concept. A review of GAS historical

development follows. Next, comparisons between different basing schemes, such as

carrier versus air base, illustrate the unsuitability of aircraft carriers for the direct support

of sustained ground combat. A study of Marine Gulf War ground combat operations

focuses on the contribution of CAS and the integration of all supporting arms. An

evaluation of Marine doctrinal air C3 architecture concludes that present hardware and

procedures are inadequate to effectively prosecute a maneuver campaign, which becomes

the central theme of the paper. Comparisons between different aircraft types, such as

attack helicopter versus fixed-wing, illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of each

vis-a-vis the CAS mission. Crucial decisions by key Gulf War leaders highlight the need

for strong leadership and open communication, especially between service components in

joint operations. A review and tabulation of air-to-ground fratricide incidents conclude

the case study.

 

Recommendation: Specific CAS lessons learned from the Gulf War should be

incorporated in order to prepare for the next war. Current CAS architecture, especially in

terms of command, control, and communications, is not consistent with either maneuver

warfare doctrine or the MEF single battle concept.

 

 

CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES                                                                                                                    v

 

LIST OF TABLES                                                                                                                      vi

 

Chapter                                                                                                                                    Page

 

l. FOCUS ON CLOSE AIR SUPPORT                                                                               l

 

2. GULF WAR CAS CASE STUDY                                                                                   3

 

Doctrine and Organization                                                                                                     3

 

Definitions                                                                                                                                3

 

Uses of CAS                                                                                                                            4

 

CAS and Maneuver Warfare                                                                                                            5

 

Organization of Forces                                                                                                              7

 

Operations                                                                                                                               11

 

Combined Arms Raids                                                                                                      1l

 

Iraqi Attack into Saudi Arabia (The Battle of Khafji)                                                  l3

 

The Ground Offensive                                                                                                          l6

 

Command, Control, and Communications                                                                                   2l

 

CAS Command, Control, and Communications Processes                                                      2l

 

CAS Targeting                                                                                                                          2l

 

CAS Request Process                                                                                                            22

 

Pull CAS: Apportionment and Allotment                                                                          25

 

The ATO and "Push CAS"                                                                                                     26

 

Terminal Control                                                                                                                         26

 

Weaponry and Technology                                                                                                       28

 

Attack Helicopters versus Fixed-Wing                                                                            28

 

Multimission Versus Dedicated CAS Aircraft                                                                30

 

Decisions and Decision Makers                                                                                                33

 

Fratricide                                                                                                                                  36

 

Gulf War Air-Ground Fratricide in Context                                                                                    36

 

3. GULF WAR CAS ASSESSMENT                                                                                  39

 

Notes                                                                                                                                       44

 

Bibliography                                                                                                                             49

 

 

 

LIST OF FIGURES

 

 

Figure                                                                                                                                                Page

 

l. DESERT STORM Carrier Deployment                                                                              9

 

2. Location of Marine Combined Arms Raids                                                                  11

 

3. Attacks of the Iraqi III Corps,  29-3l January l99l                                                      l3

 

4. Kill Box Locations in the Kuwait Theater of Operations                                                  l5

 

5. Ground Tactical Plan                                                                                                     l9

 

 

LIST OF TABLES

 

Table                                                                                                                                        Page

 

l. Sample Raid Force Task Organization                                                                             l2

 

2. CAS/Interdiction Sorties During the Ground Offensive by Day                                          l6

 

3. Number of Marine Fixed-Wing Missions in Relation to the FSCL

 

    During the Ground Offensive                                                                                              20

 

4. Coalition Combat Aircraft Losses                                                                                      3l

 

5. Fratricide Causes (by percent)                                                                                                36

 

G. Fratricide Costs and Causes                                                                                                 37

 

 

 

Gulf War Close Air Support: Implications for the Future

 

 

CHAPTER l

 

FOCUS ON CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

 

            The history of close air support since World War I has been marked by tragedy--

lives lost, unduly protracted conflict, and victory deferred--because both air and ground

officers have too often failed to benefit as they might from history, from experience

garnered and recorded by earlier generations of airmen.

--I.B. Holley, Jr.

   "A Retrospect on Close Air Support"

   Case Studies in the Development of

   Close Air Support                                                                                                                                                                       

                                                                                                                                                 "Marines in contact!" Perhaps no other phrase better captures the raison d'etre for

 

Marine aviation.  As a result, the topic of close air support (CAS) usually generates a

 

visceral response from most Marines, ground officers and aviators alike. The end of the

 

Cold War, attendant downsizing of the military, and current focus on "roles and missions"

 

have only heightened the concern. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, a war in which air

 

power as a whole played a decisive role, a critical analysis of the CAS flown and its

 

contribution to the overall effort is a fundamental prerequisite for future projections.

 

Conventional wisdom would have it that the lack of determined Iraqi resistance during the

 

ground offensive and few situations of troops in contact made traditional CAS a

 

rare/peripheral aspect of the Gulf War.1  While  that may be arguably true in the context of

 

the entire war, or even the air campaign, it is decidedly not  true in the context of Marine

 

ground combat operations. According to MGen Myatt, Commanding General of the lst

 

Marine Division during the Gulf War, CAS played a crucial role in all three major types of

 

ground engagements, namely:

 

            l) artillery/combined arms raids

            2) defeat of the Iraqi attack into Kuwait (at Khafji et al.)

            3) the ground offensive.2

 

            While each war or campaign is unique and one should be careful in application of

 

the lessons learned, case studies are useful in that they provide both a window on the past

 

and a bridge to the future. Standardized CAS case study methodology includes topics

 

such as:

 

            l) doctrine/organization of forces

            2) operations

            3) command, control, and communications (C3)

            4) weaponry and technology (platforms/hardware)

            5) decisions and decision makers3

 

In addition to these, the analysis includes a section on fratricide, both because of the

 

disproportionate share of Gulf War casualties caused by "friendly fire" and the resulting

 

visibility this subject has generated. Despite the relatively short duration and

 

comprehensive documentation of the Gulf War air campaign, a study of first hand sources

 

yields confusing and even contradictory accounts. Nevertheless, this information is

 

invaluable to operators and planners alike in order to ensure increased availability and

 

effectiveness of CAS in the future. The focus is on CAS provided the Marine Corps,

 

regardless of the source -- because evaluating different platforms (tactical jet versus attack

 

helicopter), or basing methods (aircraft carrier versus expeditionary airfield), is at the crux

 

of the current debate.

 

CHAPTER  2

 

GULF WAR CAS CASE STUDY

 

Doctrine and Organization

 

            The case is somewhat different with regards to the Marines. The Army has always

invested heavily in artillery support for front-line units; the Marines on the other hand

have put  resources into support for their own air component. Consequently,

particularly in the Kuwait theater they had to have close air support at times, while Army

units could rely on artillery fire to fight the close in battle.

--Operations

   Gulf War Air Power Survey

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

             Definitions

 

            Close air support is defined by JCS Pub l-O2 as: "air action against hostile targets

 

which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of

 

each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces."4  The Marine Corps

 

definition is exactly the same. The two operative phrases, i.e., close proximity and

 

detailed integration, are somewhat imprecise. Regardless, this definition effectively

 

defines CAS along procedural lines according to the geographic location where it is

 

performed, hence the  definition by Marine aviators of CAS as: air action flown at

 

the request of ground commanders conducted short of the fire support coordination line

 

(FSCL). Other air power theorists put slightly different spins on the subject. These fail

 

primarily into two camps: those who define CAS functionally (according to the type of

 

target being hit), and those who define it in the context of fire support means ("any air

 

operation that theoretically could and would be done by ground forces on their own, if

 

sufficient troops or artillery were available." )5 The functional definition dovetails well

 

with the definition of other types of air action, such as strategic attack and air interdiction,

 

which are differentiated by the distance of target to the battle area and the immediacy of

 

its impact on the close battle. That is, a strategic target is one far removed from the battle

 

area whose loss wilt not have an immediate effect on frontline forces. Interdiction refers

 

to the reduction in the flow of men and supplies to and within the battle area. The

 

contextual definition is useful when evaluating CAS in terms of other fire support means,

 

as well as putting it in perspective in comparison to other air power missions. For the

 

purposes of this analysis, all air actions falling within the context of the above definitions

 

for CAS are acceptable, since the purpose of the exercise is to evaluate CAS on a practical

 

as well as theoretical basis.

 

            Uses of CAS

 

            Air power is a potent fire support means due primarily to its speed and mobility,

 

which enables it to concentrate or mass, and its firepower, which considerably enhances its

 

shock effect. Tactically, there are two concepts on the employment of close air support.

 

In The Air Campaign, Col John Warden likens the use of CAS to that of an operational

 

reserve or maneuver element.6 In this context, close air support would be used for the

 

same reasons as a ground reserve, namely, either to exploit a successful offensive or to

 

counterattack an attacking force in the defense. A Gulf War example of the former would

 

be the attack on Iraqi vehicles retreating along the grade leading up the Mutla Ridge,

 

northwest of Kuwait City (the so-called "highway of death").7  An example of the latter

 

would be during what has become known as the battle of Al Khafji, wherein fixed and

 

rotary wing aircraft, along with ground forces, stopped and turned back two of the Iraqi

 

attacks into Saudi Arabia and assisted in operations to dislodge and drive back a third

 

attack which had occupied the Saudi town of Al Khafji.  In addition, potential Iraqi

 

reinforcements were turned back both at the Saudi border and in Kuwait itself.8  The

 

classic example of the use of CAS as a maneuver element is the assignment to XIX

 

Tactical Air Command the mission of flank security for GEN Patton's 3d Army as it raced

 

east across France in l944. These examples demonstrate situations where air power's

 

speed and mobility enabled it to concentrate at a specific time and place in order to mass

 

its firepower. Additionally, the sheer firepower inherent in today's combat aircraft can be

 

a decisive tactical tool for the ground commander. During the 78-day North Vietnamese

 

siege of the isolated Marine outpost of Khe Sanh in l968, tactical aircraft dropped more

 

than 95,OOO tons of ordnance, defeating the attack on 6,OOO Marines by an attacking

 

enemy force three times that number.9  This massive firepower is especially important to

 

the Marines. Intentionally organized as an expeditionary, amphibious, light infantry force,

 

the Marines are resultingly light on artillery, which is normally the primary fire support

 

means for infantry. Moreover, during the initial stages of an amphibious assault, artillery

 

is rarely available to troops ashore, due to prioritization and constraints in ship-to-shore

 

transportation.

 

            CAS and Maneuver Warfare

 

            The doctrinal orientation of each service shapes the way it employs air power. In

 

DESERT STORM, for example:

 

            Seventh Corps utilized its air power assets in accordance with the army's "air-land

            battle" doctrine--as a tool to fight the deep battle. . . On the other hand, the

            Marines with less organic firepower in their ground units depended more on close

            air support.10 

 

CAS, especially as traditionally flown by the Marine Corps, was designed and perfected

 

to support set piece infantry battles. On Pacific islands during WWII, where close air

 

support matured as an air mission, the terrain was constrained and limited maneuver.

 

Even in Korea, where operational maneuver was used with great success at Inchon,

 

Marines primarily fought set-piece battles with a definite front and rear. The advent of

 

maneuver warfare in the l98O's and the single battle concept of the l99O's pose challenges

 

to effective employment of CAS. Maneuver warfare developed as a reaction to the

 

attrition style warfare practiced by Americans during WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, with its

 

reliance on massive firepower and geographic orientation. Although attrition warfare

 

effectively played to the primary strengths of the United States -- its industrial base and

 

population -- it was also costly in terms of casualties, time, and money. Maneuver warfare

 

attempts to reduce these costs through a reliance on increased tempo and maneuver in

 

order to quickly focus combat power at decisive times and places. In the context of

 

operations, these decisive times and places are known as critical vulnerabilities, which if

 

exploited lead to a rapid defeat of the enemy. The increased tempo of operations

 

complicates the planning and scheduling process, while the increase in maneuver places

 

increased strain on C3 systems and architectures  tasks logistic support more heavily.

 

The farther removed the air bases are from the troops they support (due to increased

 

maneuver), and the higher the tempo of operations (in attempting to out-maneuver the

 

enemy), the more difficult becomes the detailed integration with the ground scheme crucial

to the effectiveness of CAS. The single battle concept is a refinement of maneuver

 

warfare theory that aims to integrate the battlefield, thereby enhancing unity of effort, and

 

to orient the effort on the enemy, rather than on the terrain. Despite the challenges

 

presented to air power by increased tempo and maneuver, its speed and mobility make it

 

uniquely able to shift between the deep (shape), close (decisive), and rear (sustainment)

 

battles envisioned in the single battle concept, or indeed conduct all three "battles"

 

simultaneously.12  That is, to maneuverists air power could not only shape the battle

 

through deep strikes but deliver powerful support throughout the battle and

 

simultaneously strike at the enemy's ability to sustain operations through attacking his

 

rear.

 

Organization of Forces

 

As the "customers" of close air support, it is primarily the responsibility of ground

 

forces to define or measure what effective CAS is. The measures of effectiveness (MOEs)

 

for most ground commanders are timeliness and accuracy. Organizing forces to

 

effectively conduct close air support is contingent upon several factors. Among them are

 

a "corporate" desire to do CAS and an ability to generate the necessary CAS sorties when

 

they are needed. These factors address timeliness. The factors that have an impact on

 

accuracy are training and hardware. Hardware will be addressed later. Training is driven

 

by service culture and the emphasis placed on alternative missions. Despite the views of

 

many Marines, there is nothing that makes a Marine pilot inherently better at the

 

mechanics of CAS than a Navy or Air Force pilot. The difference is in the training and

 

service culture, in that the Marine pilots' knowledge of ground operations is significantly

 

greater, on average, than that of his counterparts in the other services.

 

The ability to generate the required CAS sorties when needed differs significantly

 

between services, due to differences in basing methods utilized by each. The aircraft

 

carrier is particularly ill suited to supply CAS for sustained (more than a day or so) land

 

operations. The best utilization of the aircraft carrier is in a war at sea, which only makes

 

sense since it is a naval asset. It also does well in limited surge operations such as an

 

amphibious assault. The carrier rose to primacy during WWII conducting just such

 

operations. The battles of Midway and Guadalcanal are two of many examples. Midway

 

was a classic carrier versus carrier battle and Guadalcanal was an example of carrier

 

aviation supporting an amphibious operation. Just as the Marine Corps excels as an

 

enabling force but requires augmentation for sustained land operations, the carrier is

 

likewise an austere version of an air force based at sea. Due to crew and logistics

 

limitations, today's carrier air wings (CVWs) operate best when scheduling as many

 

aircraft as possible (about half of their complement) together in one or two launches per

 

day. This method is suitable for scheduled strategic attack or interdiction missions but too

 

inflexible for round-the-clock support of ground forces in sustained combat. Moreover,

 

the carriers, with a finite supply of logistic support, must go off line every two to four

 

days to rearm and refuel. This evaluation is borne out by the utilization of carrier aircraft

 

in the Gulf War (figure l). Despite having an average of 34 strike aircraft on each of the

 

six carriers, "they averaged 3O strike sorties per carrier per day."12  During a relatively

 

short 42-day war, they were on line (launching aircraft) for 2O1 out of 252 carrier-days.13

 

Despite flying the same strike aircraft as the Marines (the FIA-l8 and A-6), "no U. S.

 

Navy or non-U. S. Coalition fixed-wing aircraft took part in close air support."14

 

 

Operation Desert Storm Carrier Operating Areas - 2l January l99l

 

Figure l. DESERT STORM Carrier Deployment17

 

The lesson learned here is not that the Navy was unwilling or unable to perform CAS or to

 

support the Marine Corps but rather to point out that during DESERT STORM carrier air

 

was used in the most effective manner, that being to support the strategic strike and

 

interdiction missions with scheduled strike packages. Evaluation of the sortie rates and

 

percentage of on-line carrier days must be taken in context of a short (42-day) air war,

 

wherein tanking was a requirement for all carrier based sorties due to the distance between

 

the carriers' operating areas and the targets. That is, the entire 42-day war could easily be

 

considered a surge operation. This characterization would further reduce sustained carrier

 

sortie rate projections. Conversely, a tactical scenario that necessitated less tanking would

 

result in increased sortie rate projections.

 

The distinction between Air Force and Marine basing philosophies is in the

 

inherent expeditionary nature of the Marine aircraft wing and its structure. By basing

 

their aircraft at austere airfields close to the front lines, Marines reduce response time for

 

CAS missions. What is more important, however, is the synergy that develops by enabling

 

the aviators and ground forces to coordinate face to face whenever possible. With the

 

current emphasis on commander's intent  the single battle concept, this coordination

 

is increasingly important.

 

Operations

I can't say enough about the two Marine divisions. If I used words like brilliant,

it would really be an underdescription of the absolutely superb job that they did in

breaching the so--ca/led impenetrable barrier. It was a class!', absolutely classic,

military breaching of a very, very tough minefield, barbed wire, lire trenches-type

harrier... Absolutely superb operation, a textbook, and I think it will he studied for

many, many years to come as the way to do it.

-- GEN H Norman Schwarzkopf USA

    CENTCOM News Briefing

    Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

    27February l99l

 

Combined Arms Raids

 

The first use of CAS in DESERT STORM was as the air component of twelve

 

combined arms raids executed between 2l January and 22 February 1991 (figure 2).

 

Marine commanders were extremely concerned about Iraqi artillery; it could outrange

 

Marine artillery and there was a lot of it. This concern was understandable, since the

 

 

Figure 2. Locations of Marine Combined Arms Raids17

 

 

Marines' task was to breach the vaunted Iraqi defensive obstacle belts. These belts were

 

presumably well covered by artillery, since the combination of obstacles and covering fires

 

was consistent with Iraqi doctrine and had been demonstrated during the Iran-Iraq War.18

 

The primary purpose of the raids was to support the CINC's deception plan by increasing

 

the activity along the Saudi-Kuwait border, thereby confusing the Iraqis as to the location

 

and intentions of coalition units. Also, the Marine commanders wanted to condition the

 

Iraqi artillerymen that whenever they fired their cannon, there would be an instantaneous

 

response from the air. An added benefit of the raids was the opportunity for ground

 

forces to "warm up" in preparation for the ground offensive. Raid forces organization

 

consisted of two batteries of artillery, one light armored infantry (LAI) company, and

 

(preplanned) on-call CAS from F/A-l8s controlled by an F/A-l8D FastFAC (table l).l9

 

Since the raids were conducted at night against known enemy positions, it was an easy

 

matter for the CAS aircraft to locate and hit the enemy as soon as Iraqi artillery attempted

 

to return fire.20

 

"Enemy prisoner of war reports indicated that the certainty of counterfire was so pervasive

 

that Iraqi cannoneers frequently pulled their lanyard once and 'ran like hell' to get to

 

protected positions before the 'iron rain' began."22 The synergy obtained by combining the

 

two complementary fire support capabilities was a great example of the maneuver warfare.

 

The CAS aircraft were able to mass and engage the enemy in relative safety, whereas the

 

alternative would have been for friendly artillery to slug it out with the enemy in an

 

attrition style engagement. Not only were these raids effective, they were unique in that

 

they effectively assigned fixed wing aircraft in direct support of ground units.  this

 

decentralized command is occasionally used with attack helicopters in support of ground

 

units, it is rare to find fixed wing assets used in this manner.

 

Iraqi Attack into Saudi Arabia (The Battle of Khafji)

 

On the night of 29 January l99l, Iraqi forces launched a brigade-strength attack

 

into Saudi Arabia along three axes (figure 3). While not fully appreciated at the time, this

 

battle effectively turned out to be the turning point of the war.

 

 

Enemy prisoner of war reports indicate the probable Iraqi intentions of drawing the

 

Coalition forces into a major ground engagement in order to induce casualties, heighten

 

the morale of their own forces after enduring the devastating coalition air attack, and take

 

prisoners as a source of intelligence.25 There were five separate enemy attacks in all. In

 

the westernmost attack, an Iraqi armored brigade attacked l7 miles west of Al Wafrah.

 

Task Force Shepard, a four-company LAI unit, engaged them. Marine AV-8s, F/A-l8s,

 

A-6s, and AH-lWs, along with Air Force A-10s and AC-l30s, provided close air support.

 

Long range fires from 2d LAI Battalion turned back another Iraqi tank column South of

 

Wafrah. Several hours later, an Iraqi mechanized infantry battalion attacked and seized the

 

Saudi town of Khafji. In an attempt to reinforce its success, mechanized infantry and

 

tanks soon followed. A combination of LAI and CAS drove these back across the border.

 

Soon after sunrise, LAI and CAS engaged another force of 4O tanks west of Wafrah and

 

drove them back across the border. Marine AV-8Bs, F/A-l8s, A-6s, and AII-lWs and

 

Air Force A-l0s defeated a final Iraqi attempt to reinforce Khafji. On 3l January, the 2d

 

Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade drove the Iraqis out of Khafji with the support of

 

Marine artillery, CAS, and naval gunfire.26

 

This was the last offensive action undertaken by Iraq during the war, and the

 

contribution of air power cannot be overstated. During the three-day period of the battle,

 

a total of more than one thousand sorties, both fixed wing and helicopter, were flown in

 

the area around Khafji (figure 4: kill boxes AG4, AG5, and AH4).27  AV-8B and OV-lO

sorties doubled during this period. These aircraft were able not only to stop the Iraqi

 

attack in the close battle (traditional CAS), but also to prevent second echelon forces from

 

 

Figure 4. Kill Box Locations in the Kuwait Theater of Operations

 

 

moving to reinforce or attack effectively. A strict definition limiting CAS to troops in

 

contact situations would exclude the attack on second echelon forces. These attacks on

 

second echelon forces would be classified as interdiction. The apparent blending of the

 

CAS and interdiction missions is important to note. In many cases, CAS and interdiction

 

aircraft were flying exactly the same profiles (for example, attacking enemy armored

 

columns under FastFAC control) just a few miles apart. The difference was in the location

 

of the fire support coordination line (FSCL), the location of which is primarily dependent

 

upon the range of organic weapons and the ability to observe their fires. The challenge lay

 

in the C3 and targeting of targets just outside of the FSCL. A reinforcing enemy tank

 

column, for example, was obviously of great interest to the ground commander regardless

 

of its position in relation to the FSCL. Although the single battle doctrine addressed this

 

problem, the C3 architecture was not in place to consistently answer it.

 

The Ground Offensive

 

The air tasking order (ATO) for 24 February (the first day of the ground offensive)

 

provided over 6OO Marine and Air Force close air support sorties (table 2). In order to

 

reduce response time, CAS was provided via the push CAS system, wherein CAS aircraft

 

were launched at predetermined intervals, sometimes as frequently as seven minutes apart.

 

If they were not needed at that time by the ground forces, they proceeded on to a

 

secondary interdiction mission.

 

Table 2. CAS/Interdiction Sorties During the Ground Offensive by Day

 

 

The system worked well, as CAS aircraft were available to requesting units and surplus

 

CAS sorties could continue to pound the retreating Iraqis. The CNN view of the ground

 

offensive focused on the rapid advance of Marine forces, with hundreds of Iraqis

 

surrendering at every opportunity. This view does a disservice to the Marines of I MEF,

 

especially those that lost their lives during the battle. A review of the operational logs for

 

units in the lst Marine Division yields a different view, that of an effective, professionally

 

conducted, exhausting, combined arms effort. A representative sampling is included

 

below:

 

G-Day/24 February l99l

TASK FORCE RIPPER

--0530 A-G run on four tanks at grid QS 835908

--0600 Three enemy tanks withdrawing to northwest. 3d Tanks calls for CAS.

TASK FORCE PAPA BEAR

-- Air on station, Cobra's, AV-8Bs, OV-10s. They destroyed l FO tower, 2 mortar

    bunkers, 2 T-55 tanks, l infantry bunker.

TASK FORCE KING

-- 0930 42 separate counterfire targets cleared by appropriate maneuver units.

    Regt FDC issued fire orders for attack of 26 targets by artillery; l6 were

    coordinated by 11th Marines Air Officer via quickfire channel with Tactical Air

   Controller Airborne (TAC(A)) for attack by close air support aircraft.31

 

The following three days of the ground offensive read much the same. The Task Force

 

King32 entry clearly illustrates the combined arms nature of Marine operations, wherein the

 

enemy targets are: l) identified by maneuver units: 2) called into the appropriate C3

 

agency, in this case the artillery fire direction center; and, 3) assigned to the supporting

 

arm (artillery, CAS, or naval gunfire) best suited to engage that target. lst Marine

 

Division units were continually in and out of their nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)

 

protective gear due to chemical agent detection. The smoke from the burning oil fires was

 

frequently a problem, especially for aircraft. CAS (both fixed wing and helicopter),

 

artillery, and organic infantry weapons complemented each other when enemy resistance

 

was encountered.

 

CAS, delivered by tactical jets and attack helicopters, supported every major

 

engagement of the ground offensive (figure 5). "Iraqi artillery fire frequently interdicted

 

the breach lanes,"33 as I MEF forces commenced the attack and was engaged by both air

 

and artillery. Cobra gunships screened ahead of the force, strafed Iraqi trenchlines, and

 

engaged armor with TOW and Hellfire missiles. On G+l, the enemy counter-attacked the

 

lst Marine Division in the vicinity of the Burquan Oilfield (lO kilometers east of Al Jaber

 

Air Base (MEF Objective A)). They were stopped by attack helicopters, AV-8Bs, and

 

tanks.34 In fact, "the tank engagements that day were the largest in Marine Corps

 

history."35 Farther to the west, an OV-1O and an AV-8B were shot down by Iraqi

 

hand-held surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) as they engaged an enemy tank column

 

counter-attacking the 2d Marine Division. Smoke from the Burquan Oilfield, which the

 

Iraqis had set on fire, was particularly bad on G+2, and reduced the visibility in some areas

 

to less than l GO meters. A flight of five Cobra gunships was able to penetrate the smoke

 

to support the l St Marine Division in its attack on MEF Objective C (Kuwait International

 

Airport), earning the Navy Cross for their commander. Gunships were also used by the 2d

 

Marine Division in their attack on MEF Objective B (key terrain and road intersections

 

near Al Jahra, 33 kilometers west of Kuwait City). MEF Objective B was very close to

 

Mutla Ridge and the later "highway of death." During the previous night, electronic

 

indications of Iraqi vehicle movement turned out to be a retreat of the Iraqis from Kuwait

 

City.

 

Figure 5. Ground Tactical Plan

 

 

LtGen Walter E. Boomer, the MEF Commander, directed as many aircraft with a night

 

capability as possible be launched to interdict them. Marine A-6Es and F/A-l8s were

 

joined in the morning by AV-8Bs in a devastating demonstration of air power.37

 

Successful blending of CAS and interdiction proved just as important in the ground

 

offensive as it was in the defensive operations three weeks earlier. The majority of targets

 

engaged by fixed wing CAS were outside of the FSCL, even though those targets were

 

important to the outcome of the close--decisive battle (table 3). According to a strict

 

interpretation, only those missions attacking targets inside the FSCL are classified as CAS,

 

while those missions attacking targets outside the FSCL are classified as interdiction. The

 

classification of these targets, ostensibly a semantic exercise, is not trivial.38

 

 

Table 3.

Number of Marine Fixed-Wing Missions in Relation to the FSCL

During the Ground Offensive

 

           

Command, Control, and Communications

 

. . . we couldn't talk to them and they couldn't mark targets.

-- Col Manfred Rietsch

    MAG - 11 Commanding Officer

   (on the capabilities of the

   ground FAC C3 system)40

 

 

CAS Command, Control, and Communications Processes

 

Because of the detailed integration required with ground forces for successful use

 

of CAS, effective C3 architecture and execution is crucial. There are several vital

 

processes which must be accomplished in order to engage enemy forces by air in the

 

decisive--close battle. These include targeting, or the identification and nomination of

 

targets to be attacked; the request process, whereby ground or airborne controllers obtain

 

aircraft to attack targets under their control; apportionment and allotment, whereby CAS

 

sorties are planned for (as a percentage of the total air effort) and assigned to various

 

ground units; and, terminal control, wherein targets are actually engaged. Current

 

architecture, both organization and equipment, are inadequate to cope with maneuver

 

warfare and the single battle concept.

 

CAS Targeting

 

Historically, CAS targeting has been a relatively uncomplicated affair. In the

 

limited area set-piece battles of WWII, troops in contact could see their potential targets,

 

or at least knew where they were based on incoming fire. The same is true today for those

 

actual instances of troops in contact. However, for the fast moving non-linear battles

 

common to maneuver warfare and the single battle concept, identification of targets

 

pertinent to the decisive battle but outside the range of observation or the FSCL can be

 

difficult. Several platforms are available to contribute to the targeting effort. Weapons

 

platforms, such as the AH-1W and F/A-18D can double as reconnaissance assets. In fact,

 

a reconnaissance "package" for the F/A-l8D has been programmed to increase its

 

capability in this area. Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) are another, very useful tool

 

used to improve targeting capability. Unfortunately, both the reconnaissance upgrade and

 

RPVs are years away from being fielded in operationally significant numbers.

 

CAS Request Process

 

Once the targets have been identified, a request must be made for aircraft to attack

 

them. The direct air support center (DASC) is the key node in this process. Forerunners

 

of the DASC go back to the battle of Okinawa, where target information centers (TICs)

 

were used for the first time. The TICs were present at every echelon from corps to

 

battalion level. They coordinated, for the first time, the efforts of the three traditional

 

supporting arms: artillery, air support, and naval gunfire.41  According to current doctrine,

 

the DASC is normally co-located with the ground combat element (GCE) senior fire

 

support coordination center (FSCC), in order to optimize and deconflict supporting fires.

 

Normally the senior FSCC is at the regimental (brigade-sized operation) or division

 

(MEF-sized operation) level; but MarCent had a corps-sized GCE in DESERT

 

SHIELD-STORM, so the DASC was co-located with the expeditionary force fire support

 

coordination center. Although the location of the DASC near the MEF Commander

 

facilitated his knowledge of the air picture and ability to employ the aviation combat

 

element (ACE), it also increased the distance between a requesting agency, such as a

 

forward air controller, and a providing agency, such as the DASC.

 

Ground forces, pilots, and air control personnel were unanimous in their frustration

 

with the communications problems. The problems were not in the performance of the

 

DASC itself as much as its connectivity to the other parts of the net due to the distances

 

involved, mobility of ground forces, and frequency allocation.42 For example, on the night

 

of 29/3O January, during the first significant ground action of the war, the Air Officer of

 

lst LAI Battalion, Task Force Shepard, unsuccessfully attempted to contact the DASC

 

and DASC(A). With approximately 5O enemy vehicles approaching his position, he was

 

able to contact the Air Force airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC).

 

The ABCCC diverted Air Force CAS aircraft for support (the ABCCC crew was later

 

chastised during debriefing for not checking with the combined tactical air control center

 

(CTACC) before diverting aircraft).43 The Air Officer summed up his frustration with

 

communications connectivity succinctly: "The Marine Corps command and control

 

system is broken!"44  Similarly, only l5 percent of those interviewed by the Marine

 

Aviation Battle Assessment Team (BAT) thought the air control communication systems

 

were workable.45 The primary problem was distance, and the inability of current hardware

 

and doctrine to cope. When Task Force Shepard was engaged with forward screening

 

operations, the distance to the DASC and current doctrine dictated HF communication,

 

which was unreliable at best and worse at night. In contrast, artillery support requests are

 

passed directly to the firing units over line-of-sight VHF radios, since they are located

 

much closer.

 

Several C3 innovations helped make the system more responsive. Marine Air

 

Support Squadron-3, the air control squadron that provided the DASC, sent air support

 

elements (ASEs) to the divisions. The ASEs, also known as air support liaison teams

 

(ASLTs), were composed of 2O-36 air control personnel and associated communications

 

equipment.46 In DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the ASEs were co-located with the division

 

FSCCs. In addition to adding "muscle" to the GCE air request communications suite and

 

process, they were invaluable in keeping the division commanders up to date on the

 

overall air picture.47  An airborne DASC, or DASC(A), expedited the flow of aircraft

 

through line of sight communication. The DASC(A) was a KC-l3O aircraft equipped with

 

an AN/UYQ-3A air control communications "package."48  During DESERT STORM, the

 

DASC(A) effectively functioned as an extension of the Marine tactical air command center

 

(TACC), rather than an extension of the ground DASC, and expedited the prosecution of

 

interdiction targets beyond the FSCL.49 Moreover, a Marine liaison officer was located on

 

the ABCCC. He provided another link between the Marine and Air Force C3 systems, as

 

well as keeping the ABCCC crew advised of the Marine ground situation in their area.

 

These liaison officers were so impressed with the capability of the ABCCC, due to its

 

impressive communications suite, that they recommended the Marine Corps buy it.50

 

In order to reduce reaction time for immediate CAS, a "quickfire" system was set up,

 

whereby the air officer serving with the artillery regiments passed targets that were not

 

able to be engaged by artillery directly to the F/A-l8D FastFAC. "Although this

 

short-circuited air control doctrine, [by-passing division, MEF, and the DASC] the

 

exceptionally short time required to get aerial or artillery munitions on target was

 

unprecedented."51

 

 

 

Pull CAS: Apportionment and Allotment

 

 

In Vietnam, agreements were reached between air and ground forces on an

 

equitable way of dividing up air assets, the presumption being that there were not enough

 

aircraft available to do all that was being asked of them.52 After that, apportionment

 

became the prerogative of the overall theater commander and amounted to the division of

 

aircraft, by percentage, for different functions, such as anti-air warfare, strategic attack,

 

interdiction, and CAS. Allotment, on the other hand, became the prerogative of the GCE

 

commander and resulted in assignment of allocated sorties to different ground units based

 

on his perception of their need/importance. Ground units primarily requested sorties in

 

advance (preplanned) and held some amount in reserve for emergencies (immediate

 

missions). The idea was to ensure that limited CAS sorties would be available when

 

needed but not be wasted. The request process made this a "pull CAS" system, in practice

 

if not by definition. The time delay inherent in the request process drove several

 

modifications to the system. The employment of the AV-8 was a good example. One

 

way to improve the timeliness of CAS aircraft was to base them closer to the front.

 

Modern jet aircraft required significant infrastructure to operate, so the V/STOL concept

 

was developed whereby tactical jets could use more austere (read smaller) runways/bases.

 

Attack helicopters were another good example. Not only could these aircraft operate out

 

of forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) closer to the front lines, but they could

 

set down and wait for things to heat up. The use of a tactical air coordinator (airborne) or

 

TAC(A), was another way to improve timeliness. By moving to different locations on the

 

battlefield, the TAC(A) could establish line of sight communications with both the GCE

 

and DASC, greatly reducing communications problems, especially where distance or

 

channelized terrain was a problem.

 

The ATO and "Push CAS"

 

In order to manage the air campaign in DESERT STORM, the JFACC published a

 

daily ATO. This document listed all the sorties to be flown on a particular day, including

 

those for CAS. One of the problems with the ATO, however, was that it was run on a

 

72-hour cycle, effectively requiring sorties to be requested long before the CAS

 

requirements could be anticipated. Marines felt that the ATO process was too inflexible

 

to respond to a fast paced battle of maneuver. Fortunately, there was an abundance of

 

versatile CAS aircraft available, so a "push CAS" system was used, as has already been

 

described. The ACE was comfortable with this method, since it mirrored the air play in

 

peacetime exercises. The vast majority of CAS conducted in these exercises, e.g., Team

 

Spirit in Korea, was on an immediate basis and requested through the TAC(A). Aircraft

 

flew sorties that had been scheduled weeks in advance and diverted as necessary under

 

direction of the TAC(A). As has been noted, the push CAS system worked extremely

 

well in the Gulf War, but depended on an abundance of aircraft that may not be present in

 

future scenarios.

 

Terminal Control

 

The perennial difficulties of ground-air communications and target acquisition

 

remained as significant challenges. Since WWII, a long list of aircraft have been used to

 

improve performance in this area, by relaying ground requests for air (as noted above) and

 

"talking" the aircraft overhead onto the targets, thus making better use of the limited time

 

on station of tactical jets. The tradeoff has always been between ease of target

 

acquisition-time on station (slower aircraft can pick up ground targets better and stick

 

around longer) and survivability (faster aircraft are less susceptible to attack). L-5 high

 

wing observation planes were used for this role in WWII; they were replaced by the 0-1 in

 

Korea, and the OV-lO in Vietnam. On the second day of the Gulf War, a Marine OV-lO

 

was shot down. Thereafter, OV-l0s were restricted to areas behind the front lines and

 

F/A-18Ds assumed the TAC(A)/FAC(A) role, continuing the progression towards faster,

 

more survivable aircraft.

 

The FastFAC concept, which developed in Vietnam, matured in the Gulf War due

 

to the importance of prosecuting close interdiction type targets. Along with the RPVs,

 

FastFACs were adept at locating enemy second echelon targets maneuvering to engage

 

friendly forces. The FastFAC's ability to effectively straddle the FSCL by providing

 

terminal control to aircraft on either side of it proved invaluable in prosecuting the single

 

battle/maneuver warfare style operation. Ground FACs assigned to maneuver units relied

 

on line-of-sight communications with the FastFACs to request immediate CAS. And

 

FastFACs were frequently the only Marine C3 agency usable in forward areas due to the

 

communications problems already discussed.

 

 

Weaponry and Technology

 

The Marine Corps needs to rethink its approach to close air support. It can ill

afford to ignore the capabilities of its attack helicopters or limit the scope of its fixed

wing aircraft.

--Maj William R. Cronin, USMC

   First Place

   l99l Chase Prize Essay Contest

 

The key to comparisons of different aircraft is not in how the advantages and

 

disadvantages of one particular aircraft make it better than another but how the

 

capabilities of each complement the others. For simplicity, this discussion will focus on

 

comparing different types of aircraft (i.e., fixed wing versus attack helicopter and

 

multimission versus dedicated CAS aircraft), rather than platform-by-platform

 

comparisons. All comparisons boil down to one "tradeoff': target acquisition versus

 

survivability.

 

Attack Helicopters versus Fixed-Wing

 

Attack helicopters, such as the AH-1W Cobra and AH-64 Apache, share many

 

characteristics that make them extremely effective CAS platforms. Since they fly lower

 

and slower than tactical jets, it is much easier for them to acquire targets and get a feel for

 

"ground truth" in relation to the ground scheme of maneuver. This ability also makes

 

them less likely, theoretically, to employ weapons against friendly forces. Additionally,

 

their ability to work out of FARPs, or in some cases land among friendly forces, reduces

 

their response time and enables them to coordinate directly with supported units on a real

 

time basis. Attack helicopters (especially those in Army air cavalry units) in DESERT

 

STORM were sometimes massed and tasked as independent maneuver elements in order

 

to take advantage of their offensive "shock effect."53 TOW and Hellfire missiles have

 

enhanced this shock effect by increasing firepower and accuracy. Predictably, each of

 

these advantages is balanced by a corresponding disadvantage. Flying lower means that

 

the attack helo transits a greater number of enemy threat system envelopes, and flying

 

slower increases the helicopters' susceptibility with an associated drop in survivability.

 

Specific tactics, e.g., terrain masking and night employment, have been developed to

 

reduce this susceptibility, but ultimately their survival depends more on the nature and

 

extent of the threat than specific tactics. When on the ground in a forward area, the attack

 

helo also becomes susceptible to the same direct and indirect fire weapons that threaten

 

the GCE. Lastly, although proponents of attack helicopters liken their "shock effect" to

 

other types of cavalry units such as tanks or LAVs, their lack of armor limits this effect to

 

an offensive, rather than defensive capability. That is, there are three components of

 

shock effect, namely, firepower, mobility, and armor. Attack helicopters possess only

 

two of the three components.

 

Tactical jets, with greater speed, range, and altitude capability can either minimize

 

their exposure to surface threats, or frequently avoid them entirely. Their altitude

 

capability enables them to engage the enemy in three dimensions rather than just at ground

 

level, while their increased range capability makes them inherently more flexible. This

 

flexibility is especially important to the single battle concept, which depends on aircraft

 

able to perform shaping operations for the deep battle. Nevertheless, CAS platforms have

 

to get relatively close to their intended target in order to acquire and properly identify it;

 

and the faster an aircraft is flying, the less time is available for these crucial tasks.

 

 

Multimission Versus Dedicated CAS Aircraft

 

Fixed-wing aircraft can be further divided into two categories: multimission

 

aircraft (F/A-l8 and F-l6) and dedicated (or specialized) CAS aircraft (AV-8B, AC-l3O,

 

and A-1O). While multimission aircraft are designed to perform several missions well,

 

specialized CAS aircraft incorporate specific design features that enhance their ability to

 

perform the GAS mission. These CAS design features normally require sacrificing some

 

other capability, non-essential for the CAS mission. For example, the AV-8B sacrifices

 

range and payload capability (in the VISTOL mode) for the capability to work from

 

austere, smaller bases close to the front lines, or from amphibious shipping. The

 

AC-13O and the A-10 sacrifice speed for massive firepower (AC-l3O) and firepower

 

combined with reduced vulnerability (A-10). The CAS arena was a dangerous place to

 

operate during DESERT STORM. All seven Marine aircraft lost were CAS aircraft shot

 

down by IR SAMs (table 4).

 

"... [T]he extensive night operations, the poor weather, and the presence of

obscurants (notably, smoke from burning oil wells)... made distinguishing

friendly from enemy forces difficult, and had the important tactical consequence of

rendering GAS missions more dangerous to execute."56

 

An additional advantage, depending on one's point of view, is that dedicated CAS

 

aircraft are rarely tasked to perform other missions, and are therefore more often available

 

for tasking by the GCE. For example, Marine AV-8Bs and OV-1Os were not tasked by

 

the JFACC, but rather were available for the exclusive use of I MIEF, while half of all

 

F/A-18 sorties and all A-6 sorties were allotted to the JFACC under the Omnibus

 

Agreement.57 The opposing point of view is that this type of arrangement amounts to

 

sub-optimization and that multimission aircraft that can perform better in different arenas.

 

 

 

Table 4. Coalition Combat Aircraft Losses

 

 

The difference of opinion goes to the heart of interservice (primarily Marine and Air

 

Force) debate about two primary issues: C3 of aircraft and the priority of the CAS

 

mission. The Air Force believes in centralized command and control of all theater

 

aircraft. This concept was the driving force behind the creation of the JFACC. By

 

putting all aircraft in the same "pot," the theater commander can apportion air assets to

 

suit his own operational vision. Apportioning aircraft to the CAS mission may or may

 

not be a priority at the operational level. The Marine Corps, however, believes that the

 

primary role of the JFACC is coordination of, rather than command and control of, air

 

assets. Since support of ground forces is the primary motivation for Marine aviation,

 

CAS is always their highest priority. If CAS aircraft are not factored in to the

 

apportionment process due to their specialized nature, the result is that the Marine Corps

 

gains aircraft available for its use and the theater commander loses aircraft available for

 

his use.

 

 

 

Decisions and Decision Makers

 

The pressure today is for us to provide support for the maneuvering forces on the

ground. So be alert and aggressive, I want the close air support to be flown. . . I think

the ground forces will do just exactly what they want to do, and they'll execute superbly.

So make sure that the air is there where they need it, when they need it--that's your job.

-- Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, USAF

    CENTCOM JFACC

    24 February 1991

 

 

Marine CAS during the Gulf War could not have been as successful as it was

 

without the contributions of four key leaders:

 

l) GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA -- balanced strategic, operational, and

tactical requirements

2) Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, USAF -- kept Marine airs role in perspective

3) LtGen Walter Boomer, USMC -- effectively fought the whole MAGTF

4) MajGen Royal N. Moore, USMC -- fostered a spirit of teamwork between the

ACE and GCE

 

Due to the short duration of the campaign, abundance of aircraft available, and

 

outstanding leadership, interservice bickering over the control and use of air assets was

 

extremely limited in comparison to other wars. Additionally, the Omnibus Agreement

 

between the Air Force and Marine Corps in l98O, reaffirmed by the JCS in l986, helped

 

clarify the role of Marine aviation in the joint context. According to the agreement, the

 

Marines made sorties available to the JFACC for air defense, interdiction, and

 

reconnaissance. After Marine requirements had been met, any "excess" sorties would also

 

be released to the JFACC. But at last there was a single coordinating authority (the

 

JFACC) for joint air operations.59

 

As theater commander (and CTNC), GEN Schwarzkopf was responsible for

 

apportionment of aircraft. On the whole, he struck an effective balance between the

 

strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. For the most part, he "consigned the

 

strategic air campaign to Gen Homer and his staff."60 His personal focus was on the

 

Republican Guard. Since they were the operational center of gravity of the Iraqi forces in

 

the Kuwait theater of operations (KTO), this was entirely appropriate. The focus of Army

 

and Marine ground commanders was on Iraqi forces just across the border. These forces

 

were still a potent threat and had the capability to attack. Two weeks into DESERT

 

STORM, the apportionment shifted to weight battlefield preparation more heavily.

 

On 3l January, [GEN] Schwarzkopf told [Gen] Horner that. . . As we move into

battlefield preparation, maneuver commander input into the target selection

process becomes even more important. Therefore, the opportunity for corps and

other subordinate commanders to plan for and receive air sorties to fly against

targets of their choosing must increase.61

 

Even more important than the CINC's allocation, from the Marine perspective, was

 

the relationship between the JFACC and the MarCent Commander, Gen Boomer. In this

 

Gen Horner was aided by both the Omnibus Agreement and practical reality. With only

 

about nine percent of the coalition fixed-wing aircraft, the Marine ACE was really only a

 

junior partner in the air campaign (albeit an important one).62 Rather than argue about a

 

small slice of the total effort, Generals Homer and Boomer concentrated instead on

 

effective communication and how to defeat the threat by using the assets available. For

 

example, Gen Horner would trade A-1O CAS/close interdiction sorties to the Marines in

 

exchange for F/A-18 strikes on "pure" interdiction targets such as rail yards or power

 

lines.63 He was also responsive to requests from Gen Boomer. During the Battle of

 

Khafji, Gen Boomer requested and received a B-52 strike and two tactical air packages,

 

diverted from Republican Guard targets, to strike Iraqi forces when they attempted to

 

reinforce their penetrations.64

 

Gen Boomer fought his MAGTF as a combined arms team. In addition to the

 

above-described example, he made other great calls on the use of air power in the context

 

of the MEF single battle. Along with GEN Frederick Franks, USA (XVIII Airborne

 

Corps Commander), he properly shifted the focus from enemy tanks to artillery during the

 

battlefield preparation phase and requested B-52 strikes, having learned in Vietnam of

 

their immense psychological impact.65 And when the Iraqis commenced their retreat from

 

Kuwait City, he sent all night-capable Marine aircraft to attack them, in order to capitalize

 

on their increased susceptibility during movement.66

 

LtGen Royal Moore, Commander of 3d MAW in the war, was also effective at

 

making the ACE an effective partner of the MAGTF. Communication between the ACE

 

and GCE was the key to this effort. During map exercises, staff exercises, and "sand table

 

drills" conducted by the MEF and two divisions, he ensured that the ACE was well

 

represented, frequently with group and squadron commanders. This contact increased the

 

comfort level of all concerned, as well as enhancing the ACE knowledge of commander's

 

intent and the ground scheme of maneuver.67 Also, he used the F/A-18D crews for real

 

time intelligence collection, and continually passed this battlefield intelligence to the

 

ground commanders.

 

 

Fratricide

 

Casualties from friendly fire are never acceptable and warrant relentless

corrective action to preclude further occurrences. . . although, given the confusion

inherent in warfare,  will prove virtually impossible to entirely eliminate.

- -"Fire From Friendly Forces"

     Conduct of the Persian Gulf War

     Final Report to Congress

 

 

Gulf War Air-Ground Fratricide in Context

 

An Army study conducted during the early l98O's analyzed the historical causes of

 

casualties attributed to all types of fratricide. Table 5 compares historical and Gulf War

 

causes of fratricide (all types):

 

 

 

Table 5.FratricideCauses(by percent)68

 

 

Drawing conclusions from statistics based on such a small sample size (Gulf War

 

casualties totaled only 6l3) is unwise. However, one important item to note is the

 

presence of an entirely new fratricide causal factor: equipment malfunction. In fact,

 

equipment malfunction was the cause of two incidents, causing eight of nine Marine

 

deaths due to air-ground fratricide. The first incident occurred during an intense firefight

 

between the LAVs of Task Force Shepard and enemy mechanized forces. A IIR Maverick

 

missile fired by an A-10 at an enemy vehicle almost a mile away hit a Marine LAV that

 

was directly below the launch aircraft.69 In the other, a Marine EA-6B fired a HARM

 

missile at an Iraqi radar site on G-Day. When the site stopped transmitting, the missile

 

homed in on an AN/TPQ-36 counterbattery radar of the 11th Marines.70 The third

 

incident involved a coordination problem. A Marine A-6 dropped a laser-guided bomb on

 

an artillery unit returning from a combined arms raid during the night of l-2 February. The

 

aircrew were unaware that the aircraft was on the "friendly" side of the FSCL; they were

 

also unaware of the presence of any friendly units that close to the border.71  A breakdown

 

of the Gulf War's 35 fratricide deaths and 28 incident causes is listed in table 6, below:

 

Fratricide is not likely to end CAS, despite the heightened visibility generated by

 

friendly-fire deaths in the Gulf War, because each fratricide event is evaluated on a

 

case-by-case basis. There is almost always a specific cause, either mechanical or human,

 

which can be identified and corrected, so fratricide will be reduced incrementally by

 

technological improvements such as better navigation systems and more reliable weapons,

 

by increased procedural controls, and by better training. Because of the tendency to view

 

fratricide as an episodic phenomenon, it can be compared to the carnage on American

 

highways. People tend to ask what caused a specific accident, rather than taking a

 

systems approach and evaluating the country's reliance on the automobile. In the same

 

way, each fratricide event is preventable, but fratricide itself will continue.

 

 

CHAPTER 3

 

GULF WAR CAS ASSESSMENT

 

One night during one of  combined arms raids, I heard over our radios the

voice of the F/A-18D FastFAC telling the "wolfpack" pilots: "... hurry up! They are    

attacking our Marines," as he watched the muzzle flashes of the Iraqi artillery firing at

our ground raid force... Such teamwork doesn't just happen -- and it can't be legislated

by Congress or created by some instruction. . .But, the result is a marvelous marriage,

more powerful than the sum of the parts, where a Marine  most sought after privilege is

to be able to fight for another Marine.

-- MajGen Mike Myatt, USMC

    Letter to the Commission on Roles and

    Missions of the Armed Forces

    December J994

 

Despite the unique nature of the Gulf War, there are lessons to be learned from

 

DESERT STORM close air support. First, Marines practice what they preach. They

 

train and operate as a combined arms team. Tasked by the CINC to proceed directly into

 

Kuwait in the face of entrenched Iraqi forces, they depended on the firepower of CAS

 

aircraft to spearhead the way and break up Iraqi counterattacks. The cliché about "flying

 

artillery" is right on the mark. Marine ground operations in the Gulf War show that those

 

who would sound the death knell of troops-in-contact CAS are extremely premature.

 

CAS aircraft played a critical role in the majority of significant Gulf War battles. The

 

overabundance of CAS aircraft vis-a-vis the actual requirement only highlighted the

 

importance of CAS, just as the preparation for massive casualties highlighted the

 

importance of medical support. Moreover, since helicopters were effectively a

 

"non-entity" in terms of the ATO and the C3 system, documentation of helicopter

 

operations in the Gulf War was extremely sparse. As a result, the contribution of attack

 

helicopters in the prosecution of CAS is as yet undetermined. Finally, the minor role

 

attributed to CAS, in a quantitative sense, is consistent with the limited duration of ground

 

operations. Any analysis of the Gulf War should be tempered by consideration of this

 

limited duration, as well as the complementary contributions of both the air and ground

 

campaigns to overall success.

 

Second, the Marine air command and control system (MACCS), designed to

 

handle the set-piece battles of the Pacific in WWII over 5O years ago, is having trouble

 

dealing with new doctrinal concepts like maneuver warfare and the single battle.

 

Specifically, the ability to identify, target, and attack enemy forces that threaten friendly

 

forces, but are not in contact with them, is currently inadequate. The Air Force already

 

has a doctrine, architecture, and aircraft such as the ABCCC to support their view of

 

shaping operations, which ultimately entails carving up the battlefield. The debate centers

 

around the question of who will control the area outside of the FSCL. Marines believe the

 

ground commander should control this area, since it is vital to the shaping operations

 

inherent in the single battle concept and to the effective prosecution of maneuver warfare.

 

Conversely, the Air Force wants control over this same area because of the importance

 

they place on the interdiction mission. Because of the priority the Air Force gives to

 

interdiction in relation to CAS, it has effectively ceded the decisive battle area and CAS

 

mission to Army aviation and its attack helicopters. In the Gulf War, the JFACC staff

 

tried to sidestep the issue by controlling the airspace over the area beyond the FSCL.

 

Since aircraft were the principal means for attacking targets beyond the FSCL, those who

 

controlled the overlying airspace effectively controlled the area under the airspace as well.

 

Fortunately, the reality of imminent combat and the leadership qualities of Generals

 

Homer and Boomer resulted in a compromise that allowed for Marine control of certain

 

airspace blocks upon request.73 Yet, unless the Marine Corps develops its own concept of

 

how to command and control the single battle, it will lose the debate by default.

 

Even more important than winning the doctrinal argument is developing the actual

 

capability to employ the doctrine. The architectural capability to command and control

 

the effort to shape the battlefield needs to be built into the system. Some amount of

 

improvisation in combat is expected and even desirable. But now that the "first aid" has

 

been applied, it is time to seriously deal with the problem. Maneuver warfare is a thinking

 

man's game. Therefore, an effective C3 system is vital. Marine aviation can no longer

 

assign last priority to the MACCS in general, and the DASC in particular. The

 

communications deficiencies noted in DESERT SHIELD/STORM after action reports

 

must be corrected; clipboards and grease pencils must be replaced by data links and

 

computer screens. Aviators and ground forces alike have depended on the OV-lO for

 

years to provide crucial connectivity because of chronic communications problems with

 

the ground DASC: HF communications are too unreliable, distance and terrain prohibit

 

the use of line-of-sight transmission, and the ground forces  get a copy of the ATO

 

to determine if requested sorties have been scheduled. Now that the OV-lO squadrons

 

have been decommissioned, a modern, reliable, dedicated, airborne C3 platform such as the

 

ABCCC may be the answer. The current practice of slapping a "one size fits all" C3

 

module, the AN/UYQ-3A, into the back of a KC-l3O is not. The HMLA community

 

finally learned the lesson about non-integrated communications modules; it scrapped the

 

unreliable AN/ASC-26 communications package that could be installed in the UH-1N and

 

now has a system integral to the aircraft. The success of the F/A-l8D FastFAC concept

 

suggests it should be captured into doctrine and training. The capability to identify and

 

attack targets on both sides of the FSCL, inherent in Gulf War FastFAC employment, is

 

fundamental to fighting a maneuver warfare style campaign. The F/A-l8D excels as a

 

survivable replacement to the OV-lO in the FastFAC role but not without cost. Its limited

 

communications suite and greatly reduced time-on-station, in comparison to the OV-lO,

 

severely impair its utility in the C3/radio-relay role.

 

Third, preoccupation with the "Marines in contact" CAS mission as defined in

 

doctrinal publications may be impairing the Marine Corps' ability to conceptually deal with

 

threats to the decisive battle that are beyond the FSCL. Whether it is called CAS,

 

interdiction, or battlefield air interdiction, addressing this area is crucial to successful

 

execution of the single battle. The semantics of framing these concepts are complicated,

 

however. While the services all agree to the doctrine of apportionment, allotment, and

 

terminal control of CAS assets, the use of interdiction aircraft is ambiguous. Use of the

 

contextual definition, as described earlier, dovetails better with the emerging Marine

 

Corps doctrine. Blurring of the traditional CAS and close interdiction missions in

 

DESERT STORM is a precursor of things to come. This blurring should not be viewed as

 

a contest between CAS and interdiction, however. Marine experience in the Gulf indicate

 

that  are crucial to success. The point is that the targeting-request-allotment process

 

is not responsive enough to deal with the tempo of maneuver warfare. Ideas about using

 

the ACE as a maneuver element are attempts to come to grips with this phenomenon. The

 

push CAS method was effectively employed in the Gulf War to overcome this deficiency,

 

but it depends on an overabundance of aircraft, a luxury that may not always be available.

 

In conclusion, specific lessons learned about Gulf War CAS should be evaluated

 

for their relevancy to future conflicts by wargaming them against likely scenarios. In

 

todays fiscally constrained environment, finding the dollars and force structure necessary

 

to enhance the MACCS will be difficult. Marine aviation should tackle this challenge.

 

The impending loss of the (I)HAWK component of the Marine anti-air warfare function

 

presents one possibility for force structure tradeoffs. Also, some organizational

 

reorganization of MACCS components may be appropriate. Despite fielding the largest

 

single Marine force since WWII, only one Marine air support squadron was deployed to

 

southwest Asia. Since manpower constraints recently drove consolidation of the four air

 

control military occupational specialties (MOSs) into one MOS at the field grade level, an

 

operational reorganization may likewise be possible. The Marines' reserve KC-l3O

 

squadron is an obvious candidate for a "DASC(A) enhancement" or ABCCC. Tough

 

choices are inescapable, but effective C3 of Marine air in the air-ground role should be a

 

top priority. Through thoughtful and effective implementation of Gulf War lessons

 

learned in the context of emerging doctrine, future generations of airmen may yet benefit

 

from CAS experience garnered and recorded during war.

 

 

 

 

NOTES

 

1          Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary

Report (Washington, DC: GPO, l993), 110.

 

2          MGen J. M. Myatt, USMC, Close Air Support and Fire Support in DESERT

SHIELD and DESERT STORM, unpublished letter to the Commission on Roles and

Missions of the Armed Forces. December l994, 1-5.

 

3          Richard H. Kohn, "Forward," in Case Studies in the Development of Close Air

Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, DC: GPO, l99O), v.

 

4          Joint Pub l-O2, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms (Washington, DC: GPO, l989), 7O.

 

5          Col John A. Warden, USAF, The Air Campaign. Planning for Combat

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, l988), lOl-lO2.

 

6            Warden, lO5.

 

7          Col Charles J. Quilter II, USMCR, U S. Marines in the Persian Gulf l99O-1991.

with the I Marine Expeditionary Force in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

(Washington, DC: GPO, l993), 97.

 

8          Dr. Barry D. Watts and others, Effects and Effectiveness, vol. II, part II of Gulf

War Air Power Survey (Washington, DC: GPO, l993), 235.

 

9          John J. Sbrega, "Southeast Asia," in Case Studies in the Development of Close

Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, DC: GPO, l99O), 452.

 

10        Murray and others, 3lO.

 

11            Throughout this analysis, the term architecture refers inclusively to the doctrine,

equipment, software, personnel, training, and other components in the systems analysis

context.

 

l2         Here the emerging terminology (shaping, decisive, and sustainment) used for

describing battlefield areas has been introduced in conjunction with the traditional (deep,

close, and rear) terminology. Proponents of the single battle concept prefer the former,

since the terms shaping, decisive, and sustainment are functional in nature and connote an

orientation on enemy forces, rather than terrain.

 

13        James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, A League of Airmen,

U. S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, l994), 267. It is interesting

to contrast the sortie rates of AV-8Bs based aboard amphibious shipping with that of the

"average" CVW. The USS Nassau, for example, carried 2O Harriers that had a sustained

sortie rate of 4O sorties per day. 4th MEB, "DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

Overview," briefing presented to the House Armed Services Committee Air War Study

Group, NAS, Oceana, VA, l July l 99 l.

 

l4            Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, 2G7. Here, the total number of carrier-days

equals the number of carriers multiplied by the length of the air campaign in days.

 

15        Watts and others, 242.

 

l6         United States Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Final

Report to Congress Pursuant to Title the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental

Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of l99J (Public Law lO2-25), (Washington,

DC: Department of Defense, April l992), 110.

 

17        An understanding of the concept of commander's intent is crucial to the execution

of successful maneuver warfare. As explained in FMIFM l-3, Tactics, "commander's

intent describes the result [the commander] wants to get from the battle and his general

concept of how he will get it." It enables successful completion of the mission by

subordinate elements despite changing circumstances and/or the absence of specific

orders.

 

18        LtCol Charles H. Cureton, USMCR, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf,

199O-l99l, With the 1st Marine Division in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM,

(Washington, DC: GPO, l993), 28.

 

l9         The Marine Corps made good use of the time during DESERT SHIELD to study

the tactics used by the Iraqis during their eight year war with Iran and had accelerated the

printing and distribution of FMFRP 3-2O3, Lessons Learned. The Iran-Iraq War, Vol. I.

 

20        Twelve Marine F/A-18D aircraft were deployed to the theater and used in the

tactical air coordinator (airborne) (TAC(A)) and forward air controller (airborne)

(FAC(A)) roles. Also known as FastFACs, they located and identified targets for other

CAS and interdiction aircraft.

 

2l         LtCol James L. Sachtleben, USMC, "Artillery Raids in Southwestern Kuwait,"

Field Artillery, October l99l, 25-29.

 

22            Sachtleben, 26.

 

23        Richard J. Blanchfield and others, Weapons, Tactics, and Training, vol. IV, part I

of Gulf War Air Power Survey (Washington, DC: GPO, l993), 236.

 

24        In this case the term direct support (DS) is used in the artillery parlance meaning

one unit is assigned to support another exclusively, e.g., one artillery battery DS to one

infantry battalion, as opposed to general support (GS), wherein a unit may support any of

a number of other units.

 

25        Keaney and Cohen, 20.

 

26        Watts and others, 234.

 

27        DOD, 5l0-5ll.

 

28            According to Keaney and Cohen, 52, the theater was divided on the map into

squares called kill boxes. These were thirty miles on each side and reflected an already

existing Saudi overlay system. The squares, which were further subdivided into four

fifteen-by-fifteen-mile squares, became the operating areas for attack aircraft.

 

29        DOD, l35.

 

30            Blanchfield and others, 22O.

 

31            MCLLS NO. 4l55l-9l25O, After Action Report-- The lst Marine Division in

Southwest Asia, Marine Corps Research Center: WDID, Binder SWA OO73, l-33.

 

32        Task Force King was the name for the lst Marine Divisions artillery regiment, the

11th Marines. The name derived from the traditional moniker for artillery as the king of

battle.

 

33        LtCol Dennis P. Mroczkowski, USMCR, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf

1990-l99l, With the 2d Marine Division in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM,

(Washington, DC: GPO, l993), 5l.

 

34            MCLLS NO. 4l55l-9l25O, l8-24.

 

35        Quilter, 93.

 

36        DOD, 244.

 

37        Quilter, 88-lOl

 

38        For a detailed discussion of CAS/interdiction mission definitions and associated

ramifications, see Blanchfield and others, 2l6-2l8.

 

39            Murray, 246.

 

40        Maj M.A. Roberts, Battle Assessment Team Southwest Asia Aviation Study,

unpublished Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-OOO3. l5 June 199l.

 

4l         Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Victory and Occupation, vol. V of the

History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, (Washington, DC: GPO,

l989), 383.

 

42            Commanding Officer, Marine Air Support Squadron-3, "DASC Communications

Connectivity," Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM After Action Report, unpublished

MCLLS input to Marine Air Control Group-38 and 3d Marine Air Wing. lO May l99l.

 

43        Maj Traphagen, USMC, "Management Techniques Used by CTACC which

Hampered Operations," after action item to Marine Liaison, CENTAF DESERT

SHIELD/STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT, encl. 2, l8 Mar 9l, 43-44.

 

44        Capt William Wainwright, USMC, Air Officer, lst LAI Battalion, brief to tactical

air control party class, Landing Force Training Command Pacific, June l99l.

 

45            Roberts.

 

46        For a detailed description of the ASE/ASLT concept, see FMFM 5-6O, Control of

Aircraft and Missiles, 6-3.

 

47        LtCol Asadoorian, USMC, Fire Support Coordination Center, 2D Marine

Division, FSCC/ASE Integration, MCLLS No. 3l3ll-8583O (O5l98), 8 Mar 9l.

 

48        For a doctrinal explanation of the DASC(A), see FMFM 5-6O, Control of Aircraft

and Missiles, 6-2, 6-7.

 

49        CO, MASS-3, "Airborne DASC."

 

50        Maj Traphagen, USMC, "USMC Acquisition of the ABCCC system," after action

item to Marine Liaison, CENTAF DESERT SHIELD/STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT,

encl.2, l8 Mar 9l, 45.

 

51        Quilter, 86.

 

52        Holley, 543.

 

53        MGen J.M. Myatt, USMC, "The First Marine Division in the Attack," US. Naval

Institute Proceedings, November l99l, 72.

 

54        Here, standard aircraft combat survivability terminology applies. That is, aircraft

survivability is a function of its two components: susceptibility and vulnerability.

Susceptibility refers to the probability that an aircraft will be hit. Vulnerability refers to

the probability that the aircraft will be "killed," given that it is hit.

 

55        Marine AV-8Bs during the war refueled and rearmed at Tanajib, only five minutes

from the Kuwait border. Blanchfield and others, 224.

 

56            Blanchfield and others, 2l6.

 

57            4thMEB.

 

58            Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, 3l2.

 

59        Keaney and Cohen, l46.

 

60        Keaney and Cohen, l52.

 

6l         Keaney and Cohen, l54.

 

62        DOD, l64.

 

63        LtGen Royal N. Moore, Jr., USMC, "Marine Air: There When Needed," U.S.

Naval Institute Proceedings, November l99l, 65.

 

64            Blanchfield and other, 2l8.

 

65        Keaney and Cohen, l55.

 

66        Quilter, 97.

 

67        Myatt, Proceedings, 72.

 

68        DOD, 589.

 

69        Maj C.W. Gittins, USMCR, JAG Manual Investigation into the Deaths of

[Marines] Sustained in an Engagement with Iraqi Forces on 29 January l99l in the

Vicinity of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Border.

 

70        Col Thomas F. Reath, USMC, JAG Manual Investigation into the Circumstances

Surrounding the Death of [a Marine in the llth Marines].

 

71        LtCol Timothy J. Cunningham, USMC and Maj Charles W. Gittens, USMCR,

JAG Manual Investigation Into the Incident of Ol45, 2 February l99l in Which [Two] 

Marines Were Injured and [One] Killed From 5th Battalion, llth Marines, lst Marine

Division, as a Result of Fire Taken From Aircraft.

 

72        DOD, 59l.

 

73            Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, 112-il 3.

 

 

 

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