Military

The Multiple Launch Rocket System In Support Of The

Marine Air Ground Task Force

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting

 

 

 

                       EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: Multiple Launch Rocket System in Support of the Marine Air

Ground Task Force.

 

Author: Major Herman J. Orgeron, United States Army.

 

Research Question:

   What are the optimal tactics, techniques, and procedures for the

   integration of MLRS and its family of munitions into the MAGTF?

 

Discussion:

  As of February 1995, the United States Army and the United States Marine

Corps (USMC) have continued their work on a draft memorandum of agreement

concerning the use of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) as a part of

the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). With the addition of the MLRS and

its family of munitions, the MAGTF would control a ground combat weapon that

could fight close or range deep. Before MLRS, only aviation could touch targets

over thirty kilometers from the forward line of troops.

  To answer the research question, this paper examined the evolving

relationship between MLRS and the Marine Corps to provide background

information. Also, the paper provides some essential information into the

workings of MLRS.

  This Paper then examined the deployment and logistical perspectives of

MLRS as it applies to the MAGTF. Using this research to set the Parameters of

overall MLRS operations, the paper then examined the operational

perspectives of MLRS support to the MAGTF. This part of the paper includes a

comparison of doctrine between the two services and an examination of the

need for additional assets to accompany MLRS.

 

Conclusions:

  Under most circumstances, the CINC should place MLRS under OPCON to

the MAGTF, for this relationship provides the most flexibility to the MAGTF

commander. The MAGTF commander should place an MLRS unit under a GGE

whenever possible. Under certain conditions, the MAGTF commander may

keep an MLRS unit under his control; in that case, the MAGTF commander must

assign an artillery tactical mission that will optimize the use of MLRS in close

and deep operations.

 

  The launchers alone may not provide proper support to the MAGTF in

combat operations. The addition to the package of the AN/TPQ-37 radar would

greatly improve target acquisition. The MLRS package must also bring

sufficient support items to sustain itself from the CSSE's main supply base, or

work with the CSSE to arrange logistical support from a forward support area.

The MLRS unit must include robust liaison cells to work with the MAGTF and the

GCE. if Army TACMS comes with the MLRS package, additional target

acquisition assets would greatly assist the MAGTF in employment of this

missile.

 

                               TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

 

I.   Introduction.                                           1

 

 

II.  History of the MLRS in the United States Marine Corps.  3

 

 

III. The MLRS Package:  Capabilities and Limitations.         8

 

 

IV.  The MLRS Package: Logistics and Deployment

     Considerations.                                         23

 

 

V.   The MLRS Package and Its Employment Options:

     Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.          36

 

 

VI.  Conclusions.                                            58

 

 

Notes                                                        61

 

 

Bibliography.                                                68

 

                               I.  INTRODUCTION.

 

 

  As of February 1995, the United States Army and the United States Marine

 

Corps (USMC) have continued their work on a draft memorandum of agreement

 

concerning the use of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) as a part of

 

the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

 

  Prior to this development, several field artillery units in the USMC seized the

 

initiative and have worked with their U.S. Army counterparts on MLRS support

 

over the last decade. More recently, some units such as the 11th Marine

 

Regiment have integrated the MLRS into their live fire exercises.  Military

 

publications such as Field Artillery have captured several of these events.

 

Most of this work has focused on MLRS fires in support of the ground combat

 

element. Some work, especially recent Marine Staff Training Program

 

exercises, has been done by the MEF on the use of the Army Tactical Missile

 

System. As of February 1995, none of this work had been captured in official

 

manuals or handbooks.

 

  On the surface, the addition of the MLRS and its family of munitions appears

 

to offer new opportunities for the MAGTF. With the Army TACMS (which is, in

 

essence, another Class V item and will probably be available to the MAGTF

 

commander), the MAGTF would control a ground combat weapon that could

 

fight close or range deep. Before MLRS, aviation was the only Marine asset

 

that could touch targets over thirty kilometers from the forward line of troops.

 

Given these circumstances, what are the optimal tactics,

 

techniques, and procedures for the integration of MLRS and its

 

family of munitions into the MAGTF?

 

  To answer this basic question, Chapter 2 examines into the background and

 

history of the relationship between MLRS and the Marine Corps. For the reader

 

who knows little about the workings of MLRS, Chapter 3 provides the essentials

 

of the functioning of this system.

 

  Chapter 4 examines the deployment and logistical perspectives of MLRS as

 

it applies to the MAGTF. What are the limitations of logistical support by the

 

MAGTF to an MLRS unit, and what additional assets must be provided by the

 

U.S. Army to sustain the MLRS? What are the deployment options for MLRS,

 

and what limitations face the planners as they work to get MLRS into the area of

 

operations?

 

  Chapter 5 examines the operational perspectives of MLRS support to the

 

MAGTF. This part of the paper starts with a comparison of doctrine of the two

 

services to determine if there are differences. If there are, how significant are

 

they? What additional assets should come with MLRS to optimize its use on the

 

battlefield? What are the impacts of the method of providing the MLRS to the

 

Marine Corps?

 

  In Chapter 6, the conclusions from the analysis accomplished in previous

 

chapters will be summarized to answer the basic question.

 

 

 

              II. HISTORY OF THE MLRS IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE

 

                                    CORPS.

 

 

  The official interest of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) in the MLRS

 

dates from 1985. In that year, Headquarters Marine Corps initiated the

 

requirement document that stated a need for the MLRS as part of the Ground

 

Combat Element (GCE). Headquarters also ordered a study to examine the

 

structure of a field artillery regiment, which is an integral part of the Marine

 

Division. The General Support Artillery Study would look at the MLRS as a

 

general support weapon system for the Marine Division. However, no funds

 

were appropriated to buy launchers or the support structure. So, at the direction

 

of Headquarters Marine Corps, the study was restructured into an examination

 

of the 105mm howitzer and its potential as a direct support/general support

 

weapon.1

 

  Another study addressing MLRS in the Marine Corps was the USMC 2001

 

Force Structure Study. It suggested the USMC activate an MLRS battalion to

 

replace some of the M198 battalions in the Fleet Marine Forces.2 But the

 

USMC still had no funds to purchase the MLRS launchers, nor had the Corps

 

worked out the support structure needed to sustain such an organization.

 

  Other than those two studies few official documents have been archived on

 

this subject. Undoubtedly, many Marines stood up and argued the virtues of an

 

MLRS capability for the Marines, but there appeared to be little official interest in

 

the weapon--until 1991. The Persian Gulf War renewed the Marines' interest in

 

MLRS.

 

  As part of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), Headquarters Marine

 

Corps deployed two regiments of 155mm howitzers to support infantry units.

 

Additional USMC artillery assets were called up from the reserves, and by the

 

time Operation Desert Storm kicked off in January 1991 100 M198 155mm

 

howitzers, plus 12 M110A2 203mm howitzers and 12 M109A3 155mm self-

 

propelled howitzers, stood ready to support combat operations. Six weeks

 

later, the number of M198s increased to 18O.3

 

  In the mind of the leaders in the Gulf, I MEF needed more firepower to

 

accomplish its mission in Desert Storm. Initially, the U.S. Central Command

 

(CENTCOM) reinforced I MEF with the British 1st Armored Division. For a

 

variety of reasons, CENTCOM ordered the British forces to be moved westward

 

to reinforce the main attack. In its place the CINC, General Schwarzkopff,

 

ordered the U. S. Army to place an armored brigade under the operational

 

control of I MEF. That brigade, Tiger Brigade, brought with its M1A1 tanks and

 

M2 fighting vehicles the 1st Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery (a155mm self-propelled

 

howitzer battalion) and the nine rocket launchers of A Battery, 92d Field

 

Artillery.4

 

  Placed under operational control of the 2d Marine Division, A Battery fired its

 

rockets in general support of that division's combat operations.

 

  In its after action report, the 10th Marine Regiment noted that the addition of

 

the U.S. Army's field artillery assets gave the unit "adequate artillery to support

 

the division. It allowed the artillery commander the flexibility to provide each

 

committed maneuver brigade/regiment with an artillery battalion in direct

 

support, weight the main effort with a reinforcing artillery battalion, and still have

 

artillery remaining in general support to influence the battle in the division's

 

zone and to attack counterfire targets."5 The MLRS battery proved to be

 

especially effective in its general support and counterfire roles; "especially

 

noteworthy is the lethality of the...rocket, the mobility of the launcher, and the

 

firepower of the...battery...."6

 

  With a renewed interest in procuring the MLRS, Headquarters Marine Corps

 

considered the use of additional funds to buy MLRS. Congress appropriated

 

approximately 18 million dollars to buy some launchers. However, limited

 

money was provided to the Marines for the logistical support of such a force--a

 

serious shortfall. Also, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin

 

Powell, ordered the first examination of roles and missions. In that examination,

 

he recommended that a study should examine the merits of the Army providing

 

MLRS units for the Marine Corps versus an organic MLRS capability for the

 

Marine Corps. Given the fiscal atmosphere and the interest in joint operations,

 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl Mundy, and the Chief of

 

Staff, United States Army, General Gordon Sullivan, concluded that MLRS

 

support for the Marine Corps should come from the Army.7

 

     The U.S. Marine Corps artillery community received this information at Fort

 

Sill Oklahoma, in March 1993. With the realization that Headquarters Marine

 

Corps did not provide a logistical force structure, and aware of the recent

 

recommendation of the JCS roles and missions report, the conferees concurred

 

on fielding a Marine force structure of four battalions per artillery regiment, with

 

each battalion having 18 towed 155mm howitzers. Also, the conferees

 

suggested that the artillery regimental commanders brief their division and MEF

 

commanders on the logistical needs and capabilities of an Army MLRS unit.8

 

  Meanwhile, the two services embarked on developing a memorandum of

 

agreement that would detail the specific needs and requirements of placing an

 

MLRS unit under the control of the U.S. Marine Corps. Under the proposed

 

agreement, an MLRS unit supporting the Marine Corps would work as a part of

 

the Joint Task Force, and the JTF Commander would decide the command

 

relationship. The memorandum stated that there are "no significant doctrinal

 

changes required to permit effective integration of an Army MLRS unit in

 

support of Marine Corps operations." The memorandum addressed some

 

communication issues, provided the basic logistical responsibilities, noted that

 

the MLRS units assigned to the Marine Corps would come from reserve or

 

active corps-level battalions, and pointed out training needs.

 

  The draft memorandum of agreement addressed training at the level of

 

"scheduled joint Command Post Exercises," and nothing more. The Marine

 

artillery regiments did not wait for this memorandum; they expanded their

 

training program to include various types of exercises which included MLRS

 

units. For example, the 10th Marine Regiment worked with the XVIII Airborne

 

Corps Artillery at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; these exercises included the use

 

of MLRS assets. But the most notable of these exercises is the 11th Marine

 

Regiment's biannual live fire exercise called Desert Fire Exercises

 

(DESFIREX).9

 

  Starting in September 1993, Colonel J.C. McAbee, the commander of the

 

11th Marines, and his staff worked with III Corps Artillery to obtain MLRS units

 

for joint training exercises.  III Corps Artillery sent a battery package and a

 

battalion headquarters group from the 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery.

 

Lieutenant Colonel Cline, the commander of 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery,

 

had worked on a series of deployment packages for real world contingencies,

 

so the invitation to work with the Marines at DESFIREX provided him the

 

opportunity to execute a package. He arrived with his force at Twenty-Nine

 

Palms, California, linked up with the 11th Marine Regiment (Reinforced), and

 

executed a variety of training events, to include regimental level exercises.

 

Colonel McAbee reported to the 1st Marine Division Commander that

 

"incorporating MLRS was a resounding success."10

 

  Concurrently, MEF and divisional wargaming exercises started including the

 

use of the MLRS and the Army Tactical Missile System. I MEF used MLRS and

 

Army TACMS in its CPX MEFEX 2-92. In this case, the Force Fires

 

Coordination Center (FFCC) noted in its after action report that the lack of

 

knowledge of the system inhibited the staff from accurately employing the

 

weapon. The after action report concluded that information such as time factors

 

is critical "to realistic(ally) simulate new equipment or technology.11

 

  As of this writing, action officers have developed a rough draft of a manual

 

outlining Army-Marine Corps integrated operations. This document includes a

 

section on MLRS operations. Other than this effort, a couple of white papers,

 

and the draft memorandum of agreement, no other official document exists on

 

the use of MLRS in support of the MAGTF. However, a lot of individuals have

 

worked hard on this problem. Others have published general information on

 

the subject in various military journals. Some of their insights have been

 

captured in this chapter, and many others will be applied in the following

 

chapters.

 

   III. THE MLRS PACKAGE: CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS.

 

 

a. Introduction.

 

  One of the basic challenges facing the MAGTF commander, his staff, and

 

subordinate units in employing the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)

 

centers on knowledge of the system-its capabilities, limitations, and

 

organization. This chapter will focus on providing some basic understanding of

 

the MLRS by answering the following questions:

 

  - What are the characteristics of the equipment (the launcher and its

 

supporting equipment)?

 

  - How does a commander employ the system?

 

  - What can a Marine commander expect from the United States Army in

 

terms of launchers, equipment, people, and organization?

 

  This chapter will start with the basic components of the MLRS. Army TACMS

 

will be treated separately. This chapter will also describe the organizations

 

which employ the MLRS. The chapter will conclude with the possible force

 

packages that could be deployed to support the MAGTF.

 

 

b. The Elements of the Multiple Launch Rocket System.

 

  The MLRS provides a commander a highly mobile rapid fire surface-to-

 

surface field artillery system. The U.S. Army designed this system to attack

 

enemy artillery and rocket positions, air defense artillery sites, and other high

 

payoff targets at depth. MLRS provides maximum firepower in a short period of

 

time to the division, corps, and joint force commander. The system's range,

 

lethality, and mobility allow it to execute "the full spectrum of fire support"1,to

 

include attacking operational targets for the division, corps, and joint force

 

commander.

 

  MLRS can fight well forward on the battlefield. They normally operate in the

 

regiment/brigade area of operations to maximize their long range capability and

 

excellent mobility. In order to survive in this area, the MLRS launcher will move

 

to a firing position, execute the fire mission, then move again to escape enemy

 

retaliation and/or reload. The field artillery community calls this capability

 

"shoot and scoot"2

 

  MLRS can and has played a critical role in contingency operations3

 

because it provides the commander with massive firepower in a relatively small

 

package. The extreme lethality of the MLRS Family of Munitions (MFOM),

 

coupled with its air deployability, provides a commander with rapid, responsive

 

long range fires in a single unit. The main drawback to the contingency option

 

comes with the logistical needs of the system; the MLRS can consume its basic

 

load of ammunition in under four hours.

 

  The systems consists of the M270 launcher; the ammunition vehicle and

 

trailer; the MLRS Family of Munitions (MFOM); and the command, control, and

 

communications system.

 

  M270 Launcher. The M270 uses a modified Bradley Fighting Vehicle

 

chassis (M993 Carrier Vehicle) to carry a loader-launcher module. This

 

combination results in a highly mobile automatic system that fires the MFOM.

 

From inside the cab, the crew of three can ready a fully powered launcher to fire

 

in less than three minutes. The launcher's fire control system computes a firing

 

Click here to view image

 

solution, then on command fires up to 12 MLRS rockets or 2 Army TACMS in

 

less than a minute. The launcher can engage multiple targets in this time

 

period. In less than two minutes from the firing of the last rocket, the launcher

 

can stow its loader-launcher module and leave the firing position. Unlike the

 

M198 howitzer, the launcher can locate and orient itself to deliver fires

 

accurately. After every 6 to 8 kilometers of travel, the launcher will need to use

 

a survey control point to update its location; it is important that some form of

 

survey be established early to ensure that the MLRS can deliver accurate fires.

 

  Table 3-1 provides some basic information about the launcher. Table 3-2

 

provides a rough comparison of the firepower of the MLRS with the M198 (a

 

towed 155mm howitzer currently in use by the U.S. Marine Corps). Table 3-2

 

uses a typical light material target to compare the two systems; the actual target

 

type will determine actual equivalent firepower. For example, if the target is

 

personnel, the M198 must fire 240 rounds to equal the destructive firepower of a

 

single MLRS launcher. If the target is light material, Table 3-2 provides an

 

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Ammunition Resupply Vehicle and Trailer.  The M985 Heavy

 

Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) coupled with the M989A1 Heavy

 

Expanded Mobility Ammunition Trailer (HEMAT) provides the M270 launcher

 

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with its ammunition resupply. Each one carries 4 rocket/pod containers

 

(R/PCs), 4 missile/launch pod assemblies (M/LPAs), or a combination of the

 

two. The 10 ton 8X8 HEMTT carries a hydraulic crane on the back of the truck;

 

this material handling crane allows the HEMTT to load and upload itself and the

 

HEMAT. The HEMTT and the HEMAT can be carried in a C-141B, if partially

 

unloaded. This truck-trailer combination can fit in a C-5A fully loaded. A fully

 

loaded HEMTT weighs 59,000 lbs, while the fully loaded HEMAT weighs

 

31,000 lbs.7

 

  MLRS Family of Munitions. The M270 launcher can fire the entire family

 

of munitions available in the inventory. Currently, there are two members of the

 

MFOM that the MLRS will fire in combat. The M77 rocket reaches 32 kilometers;

 

six rockets fit in the R/PC. The M39 missile (Army TACMS) can reach targets

 

well over 100 kilometers; only one will fit in the M/LPA. Table 3-3 provides

 

basic information on the two containers.

 

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                    Table 3-3.  MFOM Comparison.8

 

 

  The two containers look alike if observed from over 10 meters away.

 

Although a great idea for deception, inexperienced ordnance personnel must

 

be trained on the differences to ensure proper delivery procedures.

 

   Command, Control, and Communications Systems. The M270

 

launcher's fire control computer will interface with the unit's command and

 

control system. That system will interface with many joint computer systems.

 

  The MLRS battery and battalion uses the M577A2 Command Post Vehicle

 

for command, control, and communications of the unit. Mounted with the Fire

 

Direction System (FDS), the vehicle provides tactical fire control and digital

 

communications to a host of computers. Tactical fire control decides which

 

launcher, launchers, or units will fire against a target. The launcher will

 

compute the technical fire solution-where to point the weapon so that the

 

target will be hit.

 

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  As noted earlier, the FDS communicates with many other tactical computers

 

and target acquisition assets in the Army and the Marine Corps using FM

 

radios. Figure 3-4 shows a typical computer system that interfaces with the

 

FDS. Currently, some of the computers require manual inputs to work in

 

unison; these procedures are called "workarounds." By June 1995, the new

 

computers and their software will interface with no need for "workarounds."9

 

 

c. The Army Tactical Missile System (Army TACMS).

 

  Army TACMS provides the commander with a deep attack capability using

 

minimal assets. Every MLRS launcher can execute an Army TACMS mission.

 

Army TACMS itself consists of the M39 M/LPA which has been described

 

earlier. In other words, Army TACMS alone is nothing more than a Class V

 

ammunition item. However, to properly employ Army TACMS, the commander

 

will need additional assets.

 

  First, the targets must be found. Army TACMS excels in attacking stationary

 

targets with light or no armor protection. Examples of these targets include

 

surface to air missile sites, supply depots, command and control systems, early

 

warning radar sites, and any other nonarmored target. Therefore, the

 

commander must get access to good reconnaissance platforms, such as Joint

 

STARS, force recon, remote piloted vehicles, and direction finding equipment.

 

With the accuracy of the missile and the warhead's area of coverage, Army

 

TACMS can attack a target with an approximate target location error (TLE) of

 

250 meters or less.10

 

  Next, the reconnaissance platform must be linked to the launcher. As noted

 

earlier, the computer system of MLRS includes Army TACMS processing.

 

These computers can link to the Ground Station Module (GSM) for airborne

 

radar systems (i.e., Joint STARS), the Commander's Tactical Terminal (CTT) for

 

signal sensors and data collection systems, and the Marine Corps Fire Support

 

System (MCFSS) for other developed targets. The commander needs to obtain

 

the necessary computers to access those reconnaissance platforms, then

 

develop the communication linkages to provide the necessary target

 

information to the launcher.

 

 Finally, the commander must decide which launchers will fire Army TACMS

 

and at what time. Although the MLRS unit will manage the technical aspects of

 

ammunition management, the commander and his staff must understand the

 

operational importance of launcher utilization. A launcher loaded with Army

 

TACMS can not support a unit with MLRS fires. Given the limited numbers of

 

Army TACMS and M270 launchers, the commander should make every missile

 

count. Chapter 5 discusses this management process in detail.

 

 

d. AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Countermortar/Counterbattery Radar

 

System.

 

  Although not a part of the MLRS, the AN/TPQ-37 radar gives the commander

 

a target acquisition capability to match the range of the MLRS M26 rocket. This

 

system doubles the detection range of the AN/TPQ-36 radar currently found in

 

the Marine artillery regiment.11 Capable of detecting low trajectory artillery

 

weapons and surface to surface rockets, the AN/TPQ-37 has a computer that

 

rapidly computes the target location and transmits it digitally to the computers of

 

the field artillery unit for firing. The system consists of the radar (mounted on a

 

large trailer), two 5-ton trucks, two 60 kW generators (one on a truck, one on a

 

trailer), two HMMWV's (one reconnaissance vehicle, one S250 computer

 

shelter vehicle), and other equipment. In the future, the radar may be mounted

 

on a truck as shown in Figure 3-5.12

 

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The AN/TPQ-37 can cover an arc of 90 degrees to a maximum range of 36 to 50

 

kilometers. In tactical situations, the crew will position the system 8 to 12

 

kilometers behind the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Processing time upon

 

detecting a target varies from a few seconds to 15 seconds, depending on the

 

volume of enemy fires. The entire system will fit on a C-5A or on two C141B

 

cargo aircraft. In terms of vehicle space for sea transport, the AN/TPO-37 takes

 

up about 975 square feet. However, the height of the radar trailer is 134 inches,

 

which may cause some storage problems on a ship.13

 

e. The MLRS Firing Battery and the MLRS Battalion.

 

  The basic MLRS organization for combat is the firing battery.14 The MLRS

 

firing battery, which has 124 soldiers in its five platoons, can be found in the

 

heavy division under the command of the division artillery or in an MLRS

 

battalion at the corps artillery. An MLRS battery can accept artillery tactical

 

missions, and their design allows for independent operations (with appropriate

 

logistical linkages to a support battalion or a CSSE). The firing units of the

 

batteries operate 3 to 6 kilometers behind the FLOT, and the optimal size for an

 

MLRS battery's area of operations is 9 kilometers by 9 kilometers.15 The MLRS

 

battery consists of a headquarters platoon, an ammunition platoon, and three

 

firing platoons.

 

  The headquarters platoon provides most of the logistical support, battery-

 

level command and control, and all survey support to the firing platoons. This

 

platoon includes a battery fire direction center, a survey party, a mess section, a

 

maintenance section, and a supply section.

 

  The ammunition platoon provides ammunition (Class V) resupply to the

 

firing platoons with its 12 HEMTT/HEMAT combination.

 

  Each firing platoon consists of 3 M270 launchers, a M577A2 Command Post

 

Vehicle (for tactical fire direction), one reconnaissance HMMWV, and one

 

platoon commander vehicle (also a HMMWV). In most situations, these

 

platoons operate in a 3 kilometer by 3 kilometer area; this area includes the

 

command post, resupply points, and launcher firing positions.

 

  Under most combat operations, the battery will operate at three different

 

levels of intensity: peak, surge, and supported. Combat simulations at Fort Sill

 

show that in a day of sustained combat in a mid to high intensity conflict the

 

average launcher will expend 9 launcher loads a day16 In one hour, that

 

launcher will operate at peak intensity and fire 3 launcher loads. For three hours

 

or four hours of the day, the launcher will operate at surge intensity and fire 5 to

 

6 launcher loads. For the rest of the day, the launcher will fire 2 launcher loads

 

or less. The battery may use these different levels of intensity and METT-T-

 

SL17 to determine when to place launchers on one of three status levels: hot,

 

warm, and cold.18 Table 3-4 describes each one.

 

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  Based on the proposed memorandum of agreement between the two

 

services, the actual number of MLRS batteries that would be placed in support

 

of a MAGTF would depend on several factors. However, the smallest element

 

that would be placed in support of a MAGTF is the MLRS firing battery.19

 

  Three MLRS firing batteries and a headquarters, headquarters and service

 

battery compose an MLRS battalion of approximately 460 soldiers.20 The three

 

firing batteries do not change from the previous section. The headquarters,

 

headquarters, and service battery provides a greater span of command and

 

control, liaison sections for reinforced headquarters, additional survey

 

capability, retransmission assets for FM communications, and expanded

 

administrative and logistical capability (including a medical evacuation team).

 

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  In the U.S. Army corps, the MLRS battalions can execute one of three

 

options, or a combination of all three options. Table 3-5 provides a brief

 

description of those options; they provide a rough framework for MLRS support

 

to the MAGTF. Under each option, each MLRS firing battery can be given its

 

own artillery tactical mission, or one or more MLRS firing batteries could be

 

attached to another unit. Chapter 5 explores the impact of this procedure on the

 

MAGTF, and the determination of the size of the MLRS unit the will support a

 

MAGTF. Normally, the MLRS battalion will support a MEF.22

 

  Regardless of the option, terrain must be allocated to the battalion to position

 

its assets. The battalion needs at least 14 position areas (nine platoon areas,

 

three battery headquarters positions, a battalion CSS positions and a battalion

 

headquarters position) to effectively employ the elements of the battalion.23

 

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            In almost all circumstances, the MAGTF will receive a tailored package from

 

the U.S. Army. These packages will reflect a METT-T-SL assessment, but the

 

major factors that would impact the size and organization of the MLRS

 

packages include availability of transportation, expected expenditure of

 

ammunition, and capability of MAGTF support.

 

  III Corps developed a strategic deployment plan for MLRS. This unclassified

 

plan produced three options (Table 3-6); this approach is typical of a unit's

 

desire to maintain flexibility, yet provide a basis for training. The first option

 

emphasizes lack of transportation or a need for a small force (possibly in a low

 

intensity conflict or operations other than war). The second option emphasizes

 

more launchers at the expense of logistical support, especially ammunition

 

trucks. The third option provides a battalion package to support a large

 

operation. These options are not rigid; they will undergo further tailoring to fit

 

the tactical situation and the commander's intent. All options include the

 

maintenance support team with MLRS specific repair parts. These options will

 

provide the based for examination of deployment and logistical considerations

 

in the next chapter.

 

 

                IV. THE MLRS PACKAGE: LOGISTICS AND DEPLOYMENT

 

                                CONSIDERATIONS.

 

 

 

a. Introduction.

 

  Before an MLRS unit can support a MAGTF in combat, it has to get to that

 

MAGTF's area of operations. Once there, the unit must be sustained.

 

  It sounds simple, yet is it that simple? An examination of this area yields

 

some interesting information. This chapter opens with an examination of the

 

deployment challenge followed by a look at the logistical challenges.

 

 

 

b. Deployment by Sea.

 

  A planner with some general knowledge of U.S. military affairs might think

 

that the diversion of a ship in the U.S. Army's prepositioned afloat equipment

 

fleet would provide the MLRS unit's heavy equipment. That planner would be

 

partially right. As of 1995, the five vessels that will form the fleet of

 

prepositioned afloat equipment will fill a heavy brigade (reinforced).1 A heavy

 

brigade package in its interim form does not contain an MLRS unit, but the final

 

package will have an MLRS battery.2 But this battery will normally be used to

 

support that divisional heavy brigade. Therefore, the MLRS support to the

 

USMC in most cases will come from a corps-level MLRS unit stationed in the

 

continental United States.3

 

  With the probable elimination of the prepositioned option, the USMC can

 

exercise two other sea deployment options. They are the use of a ship of the

 

amphibious fleet that supports the Corps, or the unit can deploy to theater by the

 

fast sealift assets of the U.S. Navy.

 

  An MLRS unit can take up to 12 days to move from its garrison to the area of

 

operations using an Large Medium Speed Roll-on Roll-Off (LMSR) or similar

 

ship.4 On the positive side, the use of this ship will ensure that the entire MLRS

 

battery or battalion will arrive without using precious amphibious assets of the

 

MAGTF. Also, these ships will be more reliable than the roll on/roll off (RO/RO)

 

ships used in the Persian Gulf War. However, there are several pitfalls.

 

  One of these pitfalls is advance warning. A planner must decide quickly if a

 

MAGTF operation needs an MLRS unit so that the launchers can be placed on

 

the deployment schedule and are available when the MAGTF commander

 

needs them. Given today's world, that time may not be available to the planner.

 

  Another pitfall comes with the limitations of an LMSR or similar ship. The

 

LMSR needs causeway support, a port, or some transload capability so that the

 

MLRS launchers and other equipment can get ashore. The U.S. Army's

 

Modernization Plan includes the development and upgrading of causeway

 

support and transload capability, but these assets may have to be deployed

 

based on an analysis of the situation. However, the Force Service Support

 

Group of a MEF contains significant capabilities in executing this type of

 

operation with the use of their Maritime Preposition Force (MPF) ships.5

 

  Furthermore, an MLRS launcher placed in an LMSR or similar ship cannot

 

support an amphibious assault. The launcher would come ashore in the on call

 

or general unloading phases of an amphibious operation.

 

  Finally, another challenge centers on the availability of an LMSR to move

 

the MLRS unit to the area of operations. As of 1995, these ships were entering

 

the fleet; a complete set of nineteen ship will be ready by the end of the

 

century.6 The alternatives to an LMSR will, at best, only equal the capabilities

 

of these ships. If there is no LMSR, the preferred ship to accomplish the sea

 

movement would possess a load on/load off (LO/LO) capability. This type of

 

ship could mate with the lighters of the MPF for disembarkation of the MLRS.7

 

  The amphibious option mentioned earlier can bring the MLRS into the area

 

of operations. There are several advantages with this option. One, the MAGTF

 

commander has the MLRS capability at his disposal; the capability can be

 

employed as part of an amphibious assault instead of a follow-on force.

 

Secondly, the MLRS can be brought directly to the beach in ships and craft

 

specifically designed for ship to shore movement outside of ports.

 

  With this option come several drawbacks. An initial drawback comes from

 

the need to provide the MLRS battery or battalion early in the planning process

 

to the MAGTF commander. Again, the planner must decide quickly if a MAGTF

 

operation needs an MLRS unit so that the launchers can be moved to a port of

 

embarkation and made available for loading. Again, that time may not be

 

available to the planner.

 

  Another drawback can be found in the sheer size of an MLRS unit. Table 4-

 

1 illustrates the problem. With the other trucks and trailers of the unit, this

 

battery package occupies about 14,500 square feet of space, or nearly three-

 

fourths the vehicle deck space of an LHD Class amphibious ship.8 Also, some

 

of that deck space may not be usable for the taller vehicles in the unit because

 

of ceiling restrictions.9 Given the limited cargo space and transport capabilities

 

of the amphibious fleet, such a large number of large vehicles would rapidly

 

consume the space of an amphibious vessel in the fleet.

 

  Another challenge arises in ship to shore movement. The M270 Launcher,

 

the Position Azimuth Determining System (PADS), and the AN/TPQ-37

 

Click here to view image

 

Firefinder Radar contain delicate electronic equipment that cannot be soaked in

 

sea water. The only methods available to move an M270 or a AN/TPQ-37 to

 

shore are LCAC, port/causeway or lighter. In the case of the lighter,

 

unfavorable sea conditions or beach conditions may cause excessive exposure

 

to salt water.10 Furthermore, the other vehicles in the MLRS unit do not have

 

the fording kits that the U.S. Marine Corps has on their vehicles, so water depth

 

plays a critical role in their transfer to shore. Unlike the launchers and radars,

 

these other vehicles can be moved to shore with other landing craft, as they can

 

withstand temporary immersion in salt water.11

 

  The sea movement itself presents challenges to an MLRS unit. Prolonged

 

exposure of a launcher, a PADS, or a radar to the elements of the sea (such as

 

sea spray and salt air) will cause corrosion (and possible component failure).

 

The MLRS unit must learn from their Marine counterparts and perform

 

preventive maintenance afloat on amphibious ships. Also, the radar may be

 

wrapped or shipped using the plastic coating technique that the U.S. Army uses

 

to ship its helicopters.12

 

 

 

c. Deployment by Air.

 

  Although the sealift option should not be dismissed out of hand, the use of

 

airlift carries great appeal to the MAGTF commander.

 

  The use of airlift benefits the decisionmaker who must deploy MLRS from the

 

United States or Europe. Days turn into hours, and both the C-141B and the C-

 

5A can transport any vehicle in the MLRS unit. Critical amphibious space

 

remains available for the other assets of the MAGTF.

 

  Of course, there are drawbacks as well. Many of the challenges in using

 

airlift involve the limitations of aircraft, the need for an airfield, and the priority of

 

assets.

 

  As noted previously, there are a lot of vehicles and equipment in an MLRS

 

unit, and they are large. Consequently, the U.S. Air Force must fly a large

 

number of sorties to get an MLRS unit into the area of operations. For example,

 

one C-5A can fly 3 M270s, one M577A2 with trailer, and one HMMWV with

 

trailer-an MLRS platoon without its ammunition vehicles or support equipment.

 

If the U.S. Air Force can only provide C141B sorties, the number or sorties

 

greatly expands. Table 4-2 illustrates this challenge.

 

  Compounding that challenge is the need to land the aircraft on a functional

 

improved runway. Airlift personnel cannot transload an M270 launcher at an

 

intermediate airfield into a C130H to complete the deployment. The M270 will

 

not fit in a C130H.

 

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                                  Table 4-2.

 

                Approximate Sortie Requirements for MLRS Units

 

          (3000 Mile Air Movement, Single Aircraft Type Options).13

 

  Finally, the airlift sorties that the MAGTF commander uses to move the MLRS

 

unit into his area of operations may be the same sorties he needs for other

 

equipment or supplies, such as M1A1 tanks or humanitarian relief supplies.

 

 

d. Deployment by Land. Land deployment provides the easiest option to

 

the MAGTF Commander. Standard convoy planning procedures will allow an

 

MLRS battery or battalion to link up with the MAGTF in a matter of hours or days.

 

 

e. Sustaining the MLRS Unit.

 

  Once the MLRS unit arrives in the area of operations, some method of

 

sustaining the unit must be devised. Under the memorandum of agreement

 

currently being developed by the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army, most of

 

this sustainment will come from the MAGTF's Combat Service Support Element

 

(CSSE).

 

  The CSSE, of course, cannot provide everything. The MLRS unit itself will

 

bring limited combat service support assets. In general, the MLRS battery and

 

the MLRS battalion bring with them a 15 day supply of Class II, Class III

 

(Packaged), Class IV, and Class VI. With a support package specifically

 

developed for this operation, the MLRS unit will come with a 30 day or 60 day

 

supply of Class IX.14 MLRS units contain a capability for mess, maintenance,

 

medical, and supply services. Also, MLRS units will bring with them an

 

attachment of mechanics and technicians from their corps support elements;

 

this attachment (called a maintenance support team) provides repair and

 

replacement parts for MLRS specific equipment (launchers, computers,

 

communications, and radars).15

 

  Given the capability of a Force Service Support Group to task organize itself

 

into smaller units to support elements smaller than a Marine Expeditionary

 

Force, the various vignettes that can be derived from mixing sizes of MLRS units

 

with sizes of MAGTFs exceeds the limits of this study. Instead, this section will

 

focus on four critical areas of supply and the impact of an MLRS battery on a

 

logistics planner in these four areas.

 

  Class I (Subsistence). In a typical scenario, the MEF (Forward) would

 

be supported by an MLRS battery, and a MEF would be supported by an MLRS

 

battalion. An MLRS battery package would contain approximately 160 soldiers;

 

an MLRS battalion package would contain 550 soldiers.16 In general, the

 

addition of these soldiers would not stress the capabilities of a CSSE to provide

 

Class I.

 

  Class III (Bulk Fuel). Given the typical scenario mentioned above, the

 

MLRS battery package would need approximately 1900 to 2200 gallons of

 

diesel and 140 gallons of gasoline every day; the MLRS battalion package will

 

need about 5600 to 7000 gallons of diesel and 400 gallons of gasoline every

 

day.17

 

 

  In the Force Service Support Group, the Bulk Fuel Company owns 8 M69HC

 

Amphibious Assault Fuel Systems, each with a capacity of 600,000 gallons per

 

day. This company also has 56 collapsible fabric drums (500 gallon) as well.18

 

However, this organization was designed to support the Marine Air Wing and

 

the Marine Division (Reinforced); the aircraft of a Marine Air Wing consume a

 

large amount of fuel. Also, with the recent early retirement of the Landing Craft

 

Tank from the amphibious fleet, the Marines lost their main capability to use

 

ship to shore pumping.

 

  Furthermore, the capability of moving fuel beyond the bulk fuel storage area

 

rests with the General Support Company, Motor Transport Battalion, FSSG.

 

They possess twenty 5,000 fuel semitrailers, for a total of 100,000 gallons of line

 

haul capacity. The entire Motor Transport Battalion also has 116 fuel

 

SIXCONS, with 27 pumps, which provides 104,400 gallons of local

 

storage/local resupply capability. This capability must support the entire MEF,

 

possibly including aircraft.19 Can the Marines absorb an additional 7,000

 

gallon per day fuel requirement? Possibly, but the answer depends on the

 

situation, the mission, and the assets available. The MLRS battalion may need

 

to go to the storage facility at the Bulk Fuel Company to obtain fuel. Whenever

 

possible, the MLRS battery or battalion should bring at least 60% of their

 

organic bulk fuel carriers to insure a steady resupply of Class III (Bulk).

 

  Class V (Ammunition). Depending on the scenario, the MLRS launcher

 

will fire as many as 99 rockets every day.20 For an MLRS battery, 99 rockets

 

per launcher per day equates to 149 rocket pod containers. For the MLRS

 

battalion, the number triples to 447 containers. With six ammunition resupply

 

trucks and six ammunition resupply trailers, the battery package listed in III

 

Corps' Option 2 can carry 48 containers. A complete MLRS battalion can carry

 

288 containers in its 36 ammunition resupply truck/trailer sets.

 

  The FSSG can provide limited help to the MLRS unit with resupply of these

 

containers beyond the beachhead. The 5,000 lb containers are 13 feet by 3.5

 

feet by 3 feet. Four of these containers can fit on the MK48/MK15 Logistics

 

Vehicle System, a M989 HEMAT trailer, or an M985 HEMTT truck, but none can

 

fit on a 5-ton truck. The Motor Transport Battalion owns 171 MK48/MK15

 

Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) and 41 MK48/MK17 Logistics Vehicle System

 

(LVS); they are capable of moving containers, but these vehicles provide almost

 

all the line haul and all of the local transportation for the MEF.21 The Landing

 

Support Equipment Company's 10 ton forklifts and the MK17's crane can

 

transload the containers in the lodgement area, but other material handling

 

equipment can not handle them.

 

  The only real solution lies in the internal transport capabilities of the MLRS

 

units. The HEMMT can load itself and its HEMAT with the 5,600 lb material

 

handling lift. The MLRS battery or battalion will go directly to the ammunition

 

supply point at the FSSG, draw and load its rocket pod containers, then deliver

 

them to the unit for firing. If the ammunition supply point is within 100 kilometers

 

of the battery locations, then each truck can make two trips a day. Assuming an

 

80% availability rate on the trucks, the containers needed for heavy combat can

 

be delivered for firing if the MLRS unit deploys with its complete set of

 

ammunition trucks and trailers.22 If MLRS will fire only a few missions, then

 

fewer HEMMTs and HEMATs can be deployed. On an ad hoc basis, the FSSG

 

could back up the MLRS unit with its LVS assets.

 

  Aerial resupply of the MLRS by CH-46 or CH-53 provides an additional

 

capability to the MAGTF Commander. To execute aerial resupply of an launch

 

pod container (for Army TACMS, the missile/launch pod assembly), four 25 ton

 

slings are needed. Only one container can be carried at a time.

 

  How does the FSSG move the containers from the ship or the aircraft to the

 

ammunition supply point? One option may be direct delivery of the containers

 

to the MLRS unit using organic HEMMT/HEMAT assets, or use a couple of

 

these truck to execute local haul for the FSSG as needed. Also, the

 

HEMMT/HEMAT could move the containers to a location where the CH-53

 

could conduct aerial resupply for the MLRS unit. However, this use of the

 

HEMMT/HEMAT should be considered a last resort for two reasons. One, this

 

vehicle/trailer combination serves as the carriers for the MLRS launcher's

 

combat load. Two, the FSSG can move containers using their LVS.

 

Click here to view image

 

  In computing ammunition requirements, close planning between the

 

operations officer, the fire support officer, the MLRS liaison officer, and the

 

logistical officer will allow the MLRS unit and the MAGTF CSSE to develop

 

appropriate packages for the upcoming operation. If the planners cannot get

 

the necessary information, Table 4-3 will assist them in developing the Class V

 

logistical support for the MLRS unit.23

 

  Class IX (Repair Parts). As noted earlier, the U.S. Army will provide a

 

support package of repair parts, mechanics and technicians from the corps

 

support elements; this attachment (called a maintenance support team)

 

provides repair and replacement parts for MLRS specific equipment (launchers,

 

computers, communications, and radars). This package will support the MLRS

 

unit for a minimum of 30 days. After 30 days, the CSSE can get repair parts for

 

the end items peculiar to the MLRS unit through normal Defense Logistics

 

Agency channels.

 

  Marine and Army units share many common end items (the Class VII items

 

such as HMMWVs, trucks, and generators). Marine and Army units also share

 

many common repair parts, even if the vehicles and equipment serve unique

 

functions. For example, the engine that powers the M270 launcher also powers

 

the Marine family of amphibious assault vehicles. Also, the LVS and the

 

HEMMT come from a common Oshkosh design and share many repair parts.

 

The CSSE can take advantage of these compatibilities by simply bringing to the

 

operation some additional stockage of select Class IX items. At the same time,

 

maintenance personnel can explore methods to modify some Class IX items so

 

they will work in different end items (such as switching engine intake ports,

 

exhaust ports, and connectors so that the diesel engine used in the amphibious

 

vehicle will fit in the M270).

 

  As in other areas, early coordination among the logisticans can identify

 

these Class IX opportunities so they can squeeze maximum sustainment

 

capability from limited assets.

 

 

f. Conclusions.

 

  As in operations and intelligence, logistics and deployment considerations

 

depend heavily on the situation, the mission, and the assets available to the

 

planners. However, several trends do apply when an MLRS unit will deploy to

 

support the MAGTF.

 

  Deployment.  Once MLRS has been committed to support the MAGTF, the

 

commander and the staff need to know where the unit is coming from. In almost

 

every situation, the Army will use a corps level MLRS unit from the United

 

States. The MLRS unit will deploy its personnel and equipment by either air or

 

sea to the area of operations. Deployment options must be carefully weighed-

 

especially if no suitable airfields are available, no suitable ports will be

 

available, if MLRS fires will be needed early in an operation, or if the MAGTF

 

Commander intends to use MLRS fires in an amphibious assault.

 

  If the MLRS unit to be deployed is a battery, and if no other Army deployment

 

is underway, then the equipment on the Army prepositioned ships may be

 

available. In most cases, this equipment would be used to support a heavy

 

brigade deployment and would not be available.

 

  Each type of movement has advantages and disadvantages. Air movement

 

will provide MLRS quickly, but at great cost in number of sorties and amount of

 

supplies. Sea movement provides adequate supplies and efficiency in

 

movement, but at the cost of speed. Amphibious operations with MLRS are

 

possible, but at the expense of space and unique unloading restrictions; the

 

most likely amphibious scenario would place an MLRS platoon (+) in the lead

 

echelon of an amphibious landing. For an MLRS deployment, general

 

unloading would be the norm.

 

  Given the data presented earlier in the chapter, a combined air/sea

 

movement may be used to provide MLRS support early. For example, an MLRS

 

battery may be flown to an intermediate airfield for transfer to the MAGTF while

 

the remainder of the battalion deploys by sea. With this type of movement, the

 

MAGTF can then load the MLRS battery into appropriate echelons on

 

amphibious or cargo ships to support initial operations. The MLRS battalion

 

can then follow to provide the reinforcing fires for sustained operations.

 

  Sustainment.  Early planning, to include the constant exchange of

 

logistical and movement information, will provide the best combat service

 

support structure to the MAGTF Commander and the MLRS unit. Operation

 

planners and logisticans must work together to ensure that the MLRS unit will

 

bring the necessary package, to include ammunition and repair parts, that will

 

support the mission and the commander's intent. The CSSE planners must

 

balance the capabilities of the combat service support package against the

 

logistical demands of an added MLRS unit. If the planners project a low

 

ammunition expenditure rate, then the CSSE could be configured to support

 

MLRS forward. However, the MLRS unit should be ready to bypass the CSSE's

 

advance echelons of support; Class III (Bulk) and Class V items may come from

 

the lodgement area.

 

 

   V. THE MLRS PACKAGE AND ITS EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS:

     DOCTRINE, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,AND PROCEDURES.

 

 

 

a. Introduction.

 

  How does the MAGTF Commander employ the firepower of the MLRS in

 

support of his operation? He can use MLRS in a variety of ways-general

 

support, deep attack, counterfire, suppression of enemy air defense. The

 

MAGTF Commander can accomplish this usage through the processes and

 

procedures inherent in MAGTF operations, for the U.S. Army and the U.S.

 

Marine Corps share much in the areas of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and

 

procedures.

 

  But, there are some differences. This chapter will explore these differences

 

and suggest their impact on MAGTF operations. This chapter will also offer

 

options in the employment of the MLRS and the Army Tactical Missile System

 

(Army TACMS) using current MAGTF doctrine and procedures where possible.

 

As needed, this chapter will recommend new tactics, techniques, and

 

procedures that maximize the capabilities of the MLRS battery/battalion as a

 

force multiplier for the MAGTF Commander.

 

 

 

b. The Compatibility of Doctrine.

 

  At first glance, the doctrines of the two services do not appear to match up

 

very well. The U.S. Army just completed its transition from AirLand Battle to

 

Army Operations, while the U.S. Marine Corps works with Warfighting and the

 

Single Battle Concept. They sound different, but they share much.1

 

  Both doctrines define battlespace into the elements of width, depth, length,

 

and time. This battlespace can be conceptualized as three interrelated battles

 

or operational areas-deep, close, and rear. Both doctrines stress an indirect

 

approach to maneuver warfare, and both doctrines speak of the nonlinear

 

nature of warfare. Both approaches to warfare stress the importance of

 

concentrating combat power in space and time against key enemy

 

vulnerabilities. The U.S. Army uses deep battle to create conditions for success

 

in the close battle, while the U.S. Marine Corps speak of deep battle as a

 

shaping of the battlespace for success in the close battle-both concepts reflect

 

a common process and a common goal. Army Operations and the Single Battle

 

Concept consider deep, close, and rear operations concurrent and

 

simultaneous battles that mutually support each other.

 

  The most significant difference between Army Operations and the Single

 

Battle Concept lies in the organizational approach to executing the doctrine.

 

The MEF approaches organization from the perspective of an integrated,

 

balanced air-ground combined arms force.2 A U.S. Army corps tailors its

 

organization to the specific theater and mission along battlefield operating

 

systems; the corps then takes its mix of "combat, combat support, and combat

 

service support units" to accomplish its mission.3

 

  The MEF (or any Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)) structures its

 

assets into four distinct elements-the Command Element (CE), the Air Combat

 

Element (ACE), the Ground Combat Element (GCE), and the Combat Service

 

Support Element (CSSE). Although doctrine emphasizes a functional

 

approach to warfighting, the GCE (assisted by the ACE and CSSE) fights the

 

close battle.4 The MEF Combat Service Support Element, assisted as needed

 

by the GCE and the ACE, works the rear battle. The MEF Commander depends

 

greatly on the ACE for the execution of deep battle. The Command Element

 

provides the MAGTF commander the capability to develop intelligence,

 

communicate information, and coordinate the battlespace while executing

 

command and control over the actions of the other elements.5

 

  The U.S. Army organizes its corps into multiple functional units (aviation,

 

field artillery, air defense, combat service support, etc.) plus combined arms

 

divisions and brigades. The corps headquarters will integrate the assets

 

assigned from sister services and other nations, then analyze its entire area of

 

operations. Using the combat functions, the corps will then allocate selected

 

functional units and other assets to combined arms divisions and brigades. The

 

remainder of the functional units and the combined arms units will then receive

 

mission-type orders to execute deep, close, and/or rear operations under the

 

command of the corps headquarters.

 

  A comparison of the Army's combat functions (also known as battlefield

 

operating systems, or BOS) and the Marine's MEF battlespace operating

 

systems (BOS) highlights this difference in doctrinal approach. As shown in

 

Table 5-1, the Marines place special emphasis on aviation as a unique

 

operating system. In fact, aviation contains six functions of its own in Marine

 

doctrine, which reflects the diversity, capabilities, and organization of an ACE.

 

The Army looks at aviation differently; an Army planner would divide up the

 

aviation functions of an ACE into three categories: maneuver, fires, and air

 

defense (shown on the table as gray).

 

Click here to view image

 

  In summary, the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps

 

share much in the area of doctrine. There are two areas in doctrine where

 

differences exist: the organizational approach to warfighting, and the role of

 

aviation in warfighting. Both of these areas impact on the employment of MLRS

 

in support of a MAGTF.

 

 

c. U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps-The Use of Fires.

 

  A discussion of the use of field artillery assets by the two services parallels

 

the discussion on doctrine. The reason for this commonality lies in the nature of

 

the United States military's approach to field artillery. Army and Marine

 

artillerymen train together at the same location (Fort Sill, Oklahoma) under the

 

same instructors. The Army and the Marine Corps use common publications in

 

most areas. Standardization in field artillery equipment and weapons systems

 

continues to improve every year; for example, the Marine automated fire support

 

computers will be totally compatible with existing Army computers.7 Both

 

services use the same fire support coordinating measures, and in most cases

 

these measures have identical meaning. With the upcoming publication of a

 

new targeting manual, both services will use the same targeting process.8

 

  The two services do differ in some aspects of doctrine. One area involves

 

the difference in organization between the corps and the MEF, and the other

 

centers on the execution of deep operations by the MEF versus the corps. Both

 

of these areas impact on the employment of the MLRS launcher (especially if

 

Army TACMS is available to the MAGTF).

 

  As noted earlier, the MEF (or any MAGTF) organizes into four combat

 

elements. In the Marine Corps, the ground combat element owns all field

 

artillery assets. Since the field artillery acquisition radars and weapons

 

available to the division commander can reach 15 to 25 kilometers beyond the

 

forward line of troops,9 the burden of deep operations usually falls to the ACE.

 

The lack of field artillery assets also explains why aviation owns such a

 

prominent place in the combat needs of a MAGTF.

 

  In the Army, multiple units perform deep operations under the direction of the

 

corps commander. Consequently, at division and corps, field artillery units

 

belong to the commander. The commander task organizes his field artillery

 

(and other functional units and/or sister service capabilities), then either

 

attaches units downward or assigns them missions. Since the field artillery can

 

range well over 100 kilometers with Army TACMS (30 kilometers with MLRS

 

rockets) and since other capabilities can also execute deep operations10, the

 

burden of planning and executing deep operations lies with the commander

 

and his staff.

 

  The differences noted above now come to the forefront with MLRS support.

 

The MAGTF commander with an MLRS unit now owns an attack system other

 

than the ACE to reach deep targets (especially with Army TACMS). Therefore,

 

who gets the unit and how the MAGTF synchronizes this capability in deep

 

operations become important questions.

 

 

d. Employment of the MLRS Unit--Command and Control.

 

  Who gets the MLRS launchers? By tracing the assignment of the unit from

 

the CINC downward, the options become apparent.

 

  The MAGTF as a Joint Force will receive the MLRS unit from the CINC of a

 

combatant command. Most likely, the memorandum of agreement between the

 

two services on MLRS support to the U.S. Marine Corps will form the basis for

 

an administrative and logistical directive from the CINC. Also, the MLRS unit

 

will be placed under tactical control (TACON) of the MAGTF, or under

 

operational control (OPCON) of the MAGTF.

 

  In most cases, the CINC should place the MLRS unit OPCON to the MAGTF.

 

TACON does not allow the MAGTF commander the flexibility of assigning

 

multiple missions to the MLRS unit, especially if the MLRS unit is a battalion.

 

Under current doctrine, each MLRS battery can be assigned a tactical

 

mission.11 An MLRS platoon can execute limited operations for brief periods of

 

time independent from the battery. With OPCON, the MAGTF commander can

 

take advantage of these capabilities to echelon the MLRS ashore during

 

amphibious operations (i.e., one platoon (+) in the assault element, the battery

 

(-) in the follow-on force). The MAGTF commander can also employ MLRS and

 

Army TACMS with greater efficiency in sustained operations with multiple

 

ground combat elements (such as a two-division MEF).

 

  If an analysis of METT-T-SL (mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time, space,

 

and logistics) concludes that the MLRS battery or battalion would execute

 

specific tasks as a whole, then the CINC should place the MLRS under TACON

 

to the MAGTF. Under this option, the CINC could execute greater flexibility in

 

shifting the MLRS from joint force to joint force, since the unit would not be

 

broken up into multiple pieces.

 

  At all times, the MAGTF commander must understand that the battery is the

 

smallest MLRS unit that can execute combat missions. Also, the administrative

 

and logistics directive must address the support of the MLRS unit as outlined in

 

Chapter 4; this directive will determine logistical channels and CSS

 

organization for the MAGTF and the MLRS unit.

 

  Once the MLRS unit has been placed OPCON to the MAGTF, then FMFM 2-

 

7 ,Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations, provides the

 

guidance for the subsequent command relationship. According to FMFM 2-7,

 

deep operations "lies beyond the area of influence of the GCE commander(s)."

 

In order to influence his area of operations, the GCE must have the sensor-

 

shooter mix12 to acquire, process, and attack a target. Without an AN/TPQ-37

 

radar, the maximum range beyond the forward line of troops (FLOT) the ground

 

combat element could attack targets is about 15 to 18 kilometers. If the GCE

 

commander wishes to influence an area beyond that range, he could direct his

 

reconnaissance platoons to seek targets, then use them as triggers for deep

 

strikes by artillery. More likely, the MAGTF commander would need to allocate

 

the GCE surveillance assets from the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and

 

Intelligence Group (SRIG) or other assigned assets, and attack assets from the

 

ACE or from the MLRS unit. If the GCE receives an AN/TPQ-37 radar and an

 

MLRS unit, the maximum range mentioned above increases to 25-30

 

kilometers. For this reason, the CINC should include the AN/TPQ-37 radar

 

element with the MLRS battery or battalion when the package is placed OPCON

 

or TACON to the MAGTF.

 

  Therefore, the MAGTF commander defines the limits of close operations and

 

deep operations. The MAGTF commander exercises his authority on all three

 

battles, but he usually focuses on deep operations. "To execute this deep

 

battle, the MAGTF commander retains operational control of all organic assets

 

which can influence this battle, including Marine aviation, and exercises

 

authority of tasking aircraft. He also retains (control) of long range target

 

acquisition assets."13 With MLRS, the MAGTF commander can execute three

 

options: (1) expand the area of operations of the close battle and attach MLRS

 

to the ground combat element, (2) place MLRS under the command element

 

(CE) and use the Force Fires Coordination Center to coordinate MLRS with

 

other CE assets and aviation for deep operations, or (3) some combination of

 

(1) and (2).

 

  In most cases, the best solution is the first option. The ground combat

 

element has organic field artillery assets, to include a fire support coordination

 

center. The senior field artillery commander knows as a result of his common

 

training experiences how to employ MLRS. Computer systems can be linked

 

up for rapid response. The field artillery unit can greatly assist the MLRS unit in

 

accessing some logistical areas (maintenance, services, Class I, water, Class

 

II/IV, Class VIII, and common Class IX). If the MLRS unit comes with an

 

AN/TPQ-37, the area of operations for the ground combat element should be

 

expanded accordingly. To execute this option, the MAGTF commander will

 

attach the MLRS unit to the ground combat element, who will then attach the

 

MLRS unit to the field artillery unit.14

 

  In some situations, the attachment of MLRS to one GCE will not work. For

 

example, if the GCE cannot acquire targets for the MLRS unit so as to take

 

advantage of its range, then the first option will not suffice. In this case, the

 

MAGTF must either control MLRS fires or provide the GCE the capability to

 

acquire targets for MLRS. Also, if the MAGTF commander intends to use the

 

MLRS unit in his deep operations (especially if Army TACMS is available), then

 

placing MLRS with the GCE runs counter to Marine doctrine; Army TACMS

 

operates in the range band of the ACE, and will exceed the area of influence of

 

the GCE. Another case for not attaching the MLRS unit centers on the TACON

 

by the MAGTF commander of an MLRS battalion and the MAGTF controls two or

 

more GCEs. In this cases TACON will not allow the MAGTF commander to split

 

up the battalion, yet the need for MLRS fires extends to all GCEs (and probably

 

to deep operations as well). A lack of logistical support from the GCE's area of

 

operations may also preclude attaching MLRS to the ground combat element

 

  In these situations, the traditional methods of task organizing field artillery

 

assets will work well for the MAGTF commander and will eliminate possible

 

confusion from the MLRS units. To accomplish task organization, the MAGTF

 

commander executes a two step process: establishes a command relationship,

 

then assigns an artillery tactical mission.15

 

  In the first step, the MAGTF commander establishes the MLRS unit as a

 

component of the command element. This relationship then requires the MLRS

 

unit to coordinate directly with the CSSE for administrative and logistical

 

support instead of using the GCE assets. The MLRS package will need to

 

include enough combat service support capability to perform resupply with the

 

CSSE.16 Also, this option will require a robust liaison section to tie into the

 

Force Fires Coordination Center; this additional capability can come from the

 

MLRS battalion headquarters or can come from the colocation of the MLRS unit

 

headquarters with the Force Fires Coordination Center. If the MAGTF has an

 

MLRS battalion OPCON, one or more batteries could be attached to a GCE, and

 

the rest of the battalion could become a component of the CE.

 

  In the second step, the MAGTF commander would assign an artillery tactical

 

mission to the MLRS unit. If the MAGTF has OPCON or TACON of an MLRS

 

battalion, he can assign tactical missions to each battery; but the MAGTF

 

commander cannot break up the battalion. Again, the MLRS battery cannot be

 

divided into platoons; the battery as a whole must be assigned an artillery

 

tactical mission. The MAGTF commander will need the advice of the Force

 

Fires Coordination Center and senior field artillerymen to craft the proper

 

tactical mission.

 

  Table 5-2 shows the inherent responsibilities of the four standard tactical

 

missions. Using the inherent responsibilities as a guide, the MAGTF

 

commander can issue a standard or nonstandard artillery tactical mission to the

 

MLRS battery or battalion. A nonstandard tactical mission would normally be

 

used to tie together sensors and shooters, require additional liaison parties, or

 

addresses some other concern of the commander. In the case of the MLRS

 

units, the following guidelines should be followed:

 

  - Avoid giving an MLRS unit a mission of direct support. The MLRS does

 

not have the capability to either execute precise fires on targets close to friendly

 

forces or deliver continuous fires over a long period of time. Cannon units

 

execute direct support missions well; they remain the field artillery unit of choice

 

for direct support.

 

  - Assigning an MLRS battery or battalion a reinforcing mission to a ground

 

combat element provides control of fires to that GCE commander, but puts the

 

logistical requirements on the MLRS unit. Unless the MAGTF commander

 

(especially at the MEF level) anticipates a rapid change of mission or needs the

 

launchers for deep fires, he should attach an MLRS battery to the GCE. An

 

MLRS battalion that is TACON to the MAGTF would keep its batteries, but one

 

or more of them may be assigned reinforcing mission; this option properly uses

 

the capabilities of the battalion and should work well.

 

  - Assigning an MLRS unit a general support mission under the MAGTF

 

would seriously delay any reinforcing fires to the GCE. Under general support

 

to the MAGTF, the MLRS unit would communicate only with the Force Fires

 

Coordination Center (unless directed to communicate with other sensors or

 

other agencies directly). Therefore, general support missions place tight

 

controls on the MLRS unit at the MAGTF level; unless some overriding concern

 

requires it, the GS mission at the MAGTF level should be avoided. At the GCE

 

level, MLRS should be either GS or general support reinforcing because of the

 

robust communication systems and extensive target acquisition abilities of a

 

GCE artillery unit.

 

Click here to view image

 

  - If the MAGTF commander wishes to execute Army TACMS fires in a timely

 

manner, yet provide maximum support to a GCE, then he can issue a mission of

 

general support-reinforcing to the GCE. Also, he can issue a nonstandard

 

reinforcing mission that requires so many launchers (probably a platoon) to

 

load with Army TACMS and establish a quick fire channel to the Force Fires

 

Coordination Center (FFCC) or a target acquisition asset (such as a Joint

 

STARS ground station or a UAV). This allows the MAGTF to execute deep fires

 

with MLRS launchers, provide maximum MLRS fires to the GCE, and not

 

confuse the MLRS unit with an attachment to the GCE concurrent with an

 

OPCON to the MAGTF.17 These options also point out the need for the Force

 

Fires Coordination Center to get a liaison section from the MLRS unit, and these

 

options require the MAGTF to link together the target acquisition assets for deep

 

operations with the Army TACMS/MLRS launchers that will execute the fires.

 

  - Based on conversations with Fleet Marine Force units, Desert Storm after

 

action reports, and Marine Corps Lessons Learned information, liaison

 

elements from the MLRS unit must be made available at the Marine force

 

artillery headquarters and at the FFCC to provide critical expertise in the proper

 

employment of the M270 and the MLRS Family of Munitions. Also, the FFCC

 

must have the capability and expertise to plan and coordinate deep fires;

 

specific items in this area will be discussed later.

 

  Once the commander establishes the relationship and the tactical mission,

 

the MAGTF is ready to employ the MLRS launchers. Although the next two

 

sections address the MEF, they apply to any MAGTF.

 

e. Support to the MEF--the Close Battle.

 

  The close battle will be fought by the GCE, with help from the ACE and the

 

CSSE. In this battle, the force field artillery headquarters is the Marine artillery

 

regiment. The MLRS battery or battalion should be placed under the control of

 

the Marine artillery regimental commander and his Command Operations

 

Center. As noted earlier, the MLRS battery or battalion should be attached

 

whenever possible, preferably with the AN/TPQ-37 radar.

 

  If the GCE needs MLRS fires during the amphibious assault phase of an

 

amphibious operation, a platoon of 3 M270s, 4 HEMMTs towing 4 HEMATs, one

 

PADS vehicle, one M577A2, and two additional HMMWVs can be placed in an

 

amphibious ship that has LCACs.18 This element, which takes up about 3500

 

square feet, could then be brought in to execute fires against critical area

 

targets in support of the assault. This arrangement would be temporary; once

 

general unloading occurs, the rest of the MLRS unit will reunite with the platoon

 

(+) and start sustaining it.19

 

  If the GCE does not need MLRS fires during the amphibious assault phase

 

(or if entry into an area of operations will be done with no resistance), then

 

MLRS can be brought in by air or under general unloading.

 

  Once ashore, the launchers need a lot of land to operate effectively. A

 

platoon of three M270 launchers will need a 3 kilometer by 3 kilometer area to

 

execute their "shoot and scoot" technique of delivering fires. An MLRS battery

 

will use a 9 kilometer by 9 kilometer area for its combat operations. The

 

launchers can share land with other elements, but the artillery and the

 

maneuver elements must coordinate closely for firing points "because the

 

signature of MLRS when it fires increases the vulnerability of all elements in the

 

vicinity to enemy fire."20 Normally, the launchers work from 3 to 6 kilometers

 

behind the FLOT, but this distance can be adjusted based on a balance

 

between the range needed to strike targets and the exposure to enemy attack.

 

  MLRS attacks by area fire. Targets of choice for MLRS fires include air

 

defense artillery sites, personnel, artillery and rocket firing positions, light

 

material targets, and stationary lightly armored targets. The large footprint of the

 

MLRS M26 rocket and the probability of dud DPICM bomblets should caution

 

the fire support officers against assigning targets that are too close to friendly

 

troops. A fire support planner should allow a minimum safe distance of 2

 

kilometers.

 

  Although the MLRS can attack targets of opportunity, the system works best

 

when its fires are planned. The Army plans MLRS fires using the "decide-

 

detect-deliver-assess" methodology.21 This methodology requires that the

 

commander decide in advance what enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities are

 

high value targets. Then, the commander and his staff decide what target

 

acquisition assets will find these targets, what weapon system will attack these

 

targets, when will each target be attacked,22 and how will the targeting

 

information flow from "sensor" to "shooter". The linkages are set up, the

 

weapons are readied, and the target acquisition devices seek out the targets.

 

Upon detection, the target acquisition asset sends its information to the fire

 

support coordination center for final verification and coordination with other

 

friendly units (if required), then to the weapon systems to "deliver" their fires as

 

previously decided. Once attacked, intelligence assets will "assess" the results.

 

The decide-detect-deliver methodology emphasizes planned fires. MLRS

 

delivers a lot of firepower in a very short time, but the MLRS unit owns a limited

 

number of rockets and missiles. Also, the launcher must reload after firing its

 

two containers, so careful planning ensures constant availability of launchers

 

that can fire.

 

  As noted in Chapter 4, the MLRS battery or battalion consumes a lot of

 

supplies, especially bulk fuel and rocket pod containers. The intelligence

 

analysts, the fire support officers, the operations officers and the logisticans

 

must work closely to ensure that the MLRS has the fuel and rockets necessary

 

to accomplish the mission. By planning ahead of time what targets MLRS will

 

strike, how many targets will be attacked, and how much damage will be

 

inflicted the appropriate amount of ammunition can be placed in the resupply

 

flow. With this information, the proper linkages between shooters and sensors

 

can be made. The MLRS launchers can position themselves to best engage

 

the targets, and the MLRS commander can surge the appropriate number of

 

launchers to meet demand.

 

  The commander, with the recommendation of the force artillery commander,

 

should establish fire support coordination measures to maximize the range and

 

lethality of MLRS fires while preventing multiple attacks against the same

 

targets and preventing fratricide. If MLRS fires will reinforce the GCE's close

 

battle, the coordinated fire line should be at least two kilometers beyond the

 

forward line of friendly troops. Restricted fire areas should be established

 

around force reconnaissance elements or other sensitive areas. Informal

 

airspace coordination areas should be used to protect Marine CAS aircraft. The

 

MLRS unit and fire support coordinators should rehearse procedures for proper

 

clearance of fires at every opportunity.

 

f. Support to the MEF--the Deep Battle.

 

  "To execute this deep battle, the MAGTF commander retains operational

 

control of all organic assets which can influence this battle, including Marine

 

aviation, and exercises authority of tasking aircraft. He also retains (control) of

 

long range target acquisition assets."23 Based on this approach to deep battle,

 

the MEF commander should also retain control of Army TACMS. Since Army

 

TACMS will always be in limited supply, target selection and launcher usage

 

play critical roles in the execution of these fires.

 

  If the MEF does not have Army TACMS and does not intend to use M26

 

rockets in support of deep operations, then the launchers should be placed

 

under the control of the GCE (either a reinforcing mission or attached,

 

depending on METT-T-SL). If needed, selected assets from the command

 

element's Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG) may

 

be allocated to the GCE to ensure sensor-shooter linkages. The reason centers

 

on expertise in fire support matters, ability to communicate and capability to

 

respond rapidly to fire support needs.

 

  Otherwise, the MEF commander should direct detailled planning by the

 

FFCC, the MLRS unit, the ACE commander, and the GCE to determine the

 

number of launchers that will be executing deep fires. Unit integrity should be

 

maintained whenever possible in deciding which launchers will fire the missile

 

launch pod assembly (M/LPA) and which launchers will fire the rocket pod

 

container (R/PC). By doing so, appropriate command relationships and tactical

 

missions can be issued. Also, logistical needs will be simplified (one unit gets

 

one type of ammunition). In this situation, the preferred command relationship

 

within an MLRS battalion would be either a combination of attached MLRS

 

battery plus one battery in a general support-reinforcing role or a combination of

 

MLRS batteries in reinforcing roles plus one battery in a general support-

 

reinforcing role. Another option to place launchers under the control of the MEF

 

commander to execute deep attacks would be giving an MLRS battery a

 

nonstandard reinforcing mission. This nonstandard mission would specify

 

number of launchers to be placed under general support to the MEF, the times

 

this event would occur, and communication requirements.

 

  Almost all of the items discussed in the previous section apply to MLRS

 

support of the MAGTF in deep operations. The target sets remain the same-

 

only deeper. Logistical needs do not change. The use of "decide-detect-

 

deliver-assess" methodology applies to Army TACMS as much (if not more) as

 

MLRS rockets.

 

  The planners should place extra emphasis on Army TACMS target selection.

 

The supply of Army TACMS will probably limit target engagements. Also, the

 

ACE and Army TACMS should complement each other in the prosecution of

 

deep attacks. As noted earlier, Army TACMS works best against soft stationary

 

targets. F/A-18 sorties can find and attack hard moving targets. Planners

 

should consider using these two attributes in tandem. For example, planners

 

could target Army TACMS against large surface to air missile complexes to

 

complement ACE operations against enemy columns.

 

  In planning Army TACMS fire missions, the MEF FFCC must place additional

 

emphasis on working with the SRIG in developing targets and emplacing target

 

acquisition assets. Based on after action reports from Desert Storm and a

 

conversation with MAJ Mathews of I MEF24, the preferred asset for developing

 

and locating targets for deep attack include national surveillance assets, Joint

 

STARS, EA-6 aircraft, UAV's, then SRIG assets. The FFCC and the SRIG must

 

determine what intelligence collection assets are needed to supplement

 

organic capabilities early in the planning process, then ensure that the MEF

 

commander requests them. Unless asked for, key target gathering items such

 

as ground station modules and access to national intelligence will not be

 

provided.

 

  The commander, with the recommendation of the subordinate commanders

 

and FFCC, should establish fire support coordination measures to maximize the

 

range and lethality of MLRS, Army TACMS, and other lethal and nonlethal fires

 

while preventing multiple attacks against the same targets and preventing

 

fratricide. The proper use of fire support coordination measures will achieve

 

these goals, but everyone must understand the definition of the measures. The

 

best example of a misunderstood fire support coordination measure is the fire

 

support coordination line (FSCL). The FSCL, by joint definition, permits all fires

 

beyond it once prior coordination for safety purposes is accomplished. The

 

FSCL will not override the need for restrictive fire areas, airspace coordination

 

areas, or other restrictive measures beyond it. If the MEF commander intends to

 

execute formal coordination between the GCE and the ACE beyond the FSCL,

 

then the FSCL should be changed to a boundary. Also, the changeover from

 

the MEF's area of deep operations to the CINC's area of deep operations

 

should be marked as a boundary, since formal coordination for attack is

 

required. Prior to MLRS, the FSCL marked the end of the area of influence by

 

the GCE. With the advent of MLRS and Army TACMS, the line's informal

 

definition has faded. The MLRS unit, the FFCC, and other fire support agencies

 

(such as the Tactical Air Operation Center and the Tactical Air Command

 

Center) should rehearse procedures for proper clearance of fires at every

 

opportunity.

 

  The Force Fires Coordination Center plays a critical role in the coordination

 

and synchronization of deep operations. Without Army TACMS or long range

 

naval gunfire, the only attack options lie with the Marine Aircraft Wing. With

 

Army TACMS and long range naval surface fire support, the Force Fires

 

Coordination Center must orchestrate the MEF's commander's deep

 

operations. To accomplish such difficult tasks, the FFCC must practice their

 

trade often and their action officers must understand the fundamentals of deep

 

operations, to include intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The FFCC must

 

rehearse their deep operations to ensure proper "sensor-shooter" linkages and

 

optimal use of limited assets. No other organization in the MEF can bring

 

together these diverse deep assets. A strong MLRS liaison element would

 

greatly assist the FFCC in their mission.

 

 

g. Conclusions.

 

 

   In summary, the doctrine of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps have

 

much in common. Two differences in doctrine impact on the employment of the

 

MLRS launcher (especially if Army TACMS is available)-the difference in

 

organization between the corps and the MEF, and the execution of deep

 

operations by the MEF versus the corps.

 

  A thorough analysis of the mission, the situation, and the commander's

 

intent will determine the command relationship between the MAGTF and the

 

MLRS unit. Under most circumstances, the CINC should place MLRS under

 

OPCON to the MAGTF. The CINC should also direct a administrative and

 

logistical relationship in accordance with the proposed memorandum of

 

agreement on MLRS support to the Marine Corps.

 

  The establishment of a command relationship for the MLRS unit within a

 

MAGTF must consider the differences in organization between the Army and the

 

Marine Corps and the capabilities of the system. The MAGTF commander

 

should strongly consider placing an MLRS unit under a GCE whenever

 

possible. Under certain conditions, the MAGTF commander may keep an

 

MLRS unit under his control; in that case, the MAGTF commander must craft an

 

artillery tactical mission that will optimize the use of MLRS in close and deep

 

operations.

 

  Logistics plays a critical role in sustaining MLRS operations, and target

 

acquisition plays a key role in attacking targets successfully. The MLRS liaison

 

section, the fire support officer, the operations officer, the intelligence analyst,

 

and the logistican must work together to ensure successful employment of the

 

MLRS battery/battalion in support of MAGTF operations. Staff officers should

 

place special emphasis on ammunition management and "sensor to shooter"

 

linkages.

 

  To effectively employ MLRS, the deployment package to the MAGTF should

 

include the AN/TPQ-37 radar. If the MAGTF gets Army TACMS, the deployment

 

package should include any target acquisition assets needed to assist the

 

command elements in executing deep operations. Also, sufficient liaison teams

 

ensure all echelon of commands understand the capabilities and limitations of

 

the MLRS. This expansion of communication requirements force the MLRS unit

 

to bring additional retransmission assets to ensure continuous FM

 

communications.

 

  With Army TACMS, the Force Fires Coordination Center plays a critical role

 

in orchestrating the deep battle for the MAGTF commander. This section should

 

contain a small, permanent core of personnel and equipment, then use liaison

 

cells to expand for wartime operations. Rehearsals prior to execution of orders

 

are a must.

 

 

                        VI.  CONCLUSIONS.

 

   What are the optimal tactics, techniques, and procedures for the

 

Integration of MLRS and its family of munitions into the MAGTF?

 

  From the CINC's perspective, a thorough analysis of the mission, the

 

situation, and the commander's intent will determine the command relationship

 

between the MAGTF and the MLRS unit. Under most circumstances, the CINC

 

should place MLRS under OPCON to the MAGTF, for this relationship provides

 

the most flexibility to the MAGTF commander. Also, the CINC should direct an

 

administrative and logistical relationship in accordance with the proposed

 

memorandum of agreement on MLRS support to the Marine Corps. Finally, the

 

CINC should include the AN/TPQ-37 radar in the deployment package. If the

 

MAGTF gets Army TACMS with the MLRS package, additional target acquisition

 

assets may be needed to support deep attack.

 

  In addition to the AN/TPQ-37 radar, the MLRS unit must also bring sufficient

 

trucks to obtain bulk fuel and ammunition directly from the FSSG's supply area.

 

The FSSG can help, but their assets in transportation remain limited. The

 

MLRS unit must bring robust liaison cells to work with the MAGTF and the GCE.

 

Also, one or more additional retransmission teams would greatly assist

 

communication links for the launchers.

 

  From the MAGTF commander's view, he should place an MLRS unit under

 

the GCE commander whenever possible. Under certain conditions, the MAGTF

 

commander may keep an MLRS unit under his control; in that case, the MAGTF

 

commander must craft an artillery tactical mission that will optimize the use of

 

MLRS in close and deep operations. In most cases, the best mission is a

 

nonstandard reinforcing mission to the GCE.

 

  In the case of amphibious assaults, the MLRS can contribute to the success

 

of the operations through deep attack. Although there are significant limitations,

 

the MLRS can execute amphibious operations by echeloning platoons on a

 

temporary basis.

 

  From deployment to arrival to combat to redeployment to closure, the MLRS

 

liaison section, the fire support officer, the operations officer, the intelligence

 

analyst, and the logistican must work together to ensure successful employment

 

of the MLRS battery/battalion in support of MAGTF operations. Staff officers

 

should place special emphasis on ammunition management and "sensor to

 

shooter" linkages.

 

  With Army TACMS, the Force Fires Coordination Center plays a critical role

 

in orchestrating the deep battle for the MAGTF commander. This section should

 

contain a small, permanent core of Marines and equipment, then use liaison

 

cells to expand for wartime operations. Rehearsals prior to execution of orders

 

are a must.

 

  Deployment options must be carefully weighed-especially if no suitable

 

airfields are available, no suitable ports will be available, if MLRS fires will be

 

needed early in an operation, or if the MAGTF Commander intends to use

 

MLRS fires in an amphibious assault. The CSSE planners must balance the

 

capabilities of the combat service support package against the logistical

 

demands of an added MLRS unit. If the planners project a low ammunition

 

expenditure rate, then the CSSE could be configured to support MLRS forward.

 

However, the MLRS unit should be ready to bypass the CSSE's advance

 

echelons of support. The MLRS unit will probably obtain Class III (Bulk) and

 

Class V items from the FSSG's lodgement area in a mid intensity to high

 

intensity battle.

 

  This paper provides several options for possible MLRS use by the MAGTF,

 

with the foundation of each option secured to established doctrine, tactics,

 

techniques, and procedures. This paper also points out some physical

 

limitations in the areas of deployment, technical employment, and logistics. But

 

the commander retains the flexibility to execute his MLRS fires-and his

 

operations-in accordance with his intent and command vision. The actual

 

limits can only be found in the commander's imagination...and that is how it

 

should be.

 

                                     NOTES

 

 

Chapter 2.

 

 

 

  1. Marine Corps Artillery Structure Study (1986-1995)-Examples of Scenarios,

Targets, and Tactical Dispositions Used in the Effectiveness Analysis. (Washington,

D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1986).

 

  2. Lieutenant ColoneL H. W. Evans, Artillery Regiment Reorganization, a Marine

Corps Lessons Learned Report, no. 80786-71683, 3.

 

  3. Colonel Charles J. Quilter, U. S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With

the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.:

History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), Appendix C.

 

  4. Quilter, 33-4.

 

  5. Evans, 1-2.

 

  6. Evans, 1-3.

 

  7. Major Dave Smith, a student at U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College,

0nterview by author, 28 March 1995.

 

 8. Major Clifford Simmons, MLRS Support for the U.S. Marine Corps, a Marine

Corps Lessons Learned Report, no. 51249-67631, 1.

 

  9. "MLRS Support for the Marine Corps" Fire Support Quarterly, September 1994:

5-6.

 

  10. Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Cline, "DESFIREX 1-94: MLRS in USMC

Operations" Field Artillery, October 1994: 44-47.

 

  11. Captain Glen Starnes, Integration of Simulated Assets into Training, a Marine

Corps Lessons Learned Report, no. 92335-39937, 1.

 

 

Chapter 3.

 

 

  1. Field Manual (FM) 6-60 with Change 1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations (Washington D.C.: Department

of the Army, September 1993), 1-1.

 

  2. Field Manual (FM) 6-6O with Change 1, 1-1.

 

  3. For example, MLRS units deployed immediately after the 82d Airborne Divison's

combat brigade in Desert Shield.

 

  4. Field Manual (FM) 6-60 with Change 1, 4-1.

 

  5. Field Manual (FM) 6-60 with Change 1, 4-2.

 

  6. Field Manual (FM) 6-60 with Change 1, 4-2.

 

  7. Field Manual (FM) 6-60 with Change 1, 4-2.

 

  8. Field Manual (FM) 6-60 with Change 1, 4-2.

 

  9. Major Edward Hughes, "Army MLRS Support for Marines," Field/Artillery

(February 1995): 20-21.

 

  10. Based on my tenure as an analyst at Fort Sill, OK. I worked as a system analyst

on MLRS Family of Munitions and Army TACMS. This number provides an unclassified

approximation for discussion purposes.

 

  11. Maximum planning ranges are 36 kilometers for low trajectory artillery and 50

kilometers for rockets. Field Manual (FM) 6-121, Field Artillery Target Acquisition

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army. September 1993), Chapters 1 and 2.

 

  12. Field Manual (FM) 6-121, Chapters 1 and 2.

 

  13. Field Manual (FM) 6-121, Chapters 1 and 2.

 

  14. In this paper, an MLRS battery and an MLRS firing battery refer to the same

organization.

 

  15. This area can be shared with other units, except for the actual firing position areas.

The maneuver unit S-3 should deconfict land requirements.

 

  16. Actually, 8.25 launcher loads or 99 rockets. Results from the field artillery model

at Fort Sill, OK, during my tenure as an analyst support this figure. Verified in an

interview with Major Edward Hughes.

 

  17. METT-T-SL stands for mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time, space, and logistics.

Military leaders use the acronym as a memory device to ensure a proper analysis of

situation and mission.

 

  18. This method varies from unit to unit and would be established in the tactical

standard operating procedures of the unit.

 

  19. This battery could be task organized with fewer launchers, but the basic structure

would deploy. Department of the Army, United States Army Field Artillery School, a

memorandum for Commander, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), ATTN:

ATSC. ATSF-CR, subject: "Army MLRS Support to the Marine Corps; 17 October

1994.

 

  20. Major Edward Hughes, Action Officer, U.S. Army Field Artillery School,

interview by author, 12 March 1995. He provided me the latest information on the table of

organization and equipment.

 

  21. Field Manual (FM) 6-60 with Change 1, 5-1 to 53.

 

  22. This battalion could be task organized with fewer launchers, but the basic structure

would deploy. Department of the Army, United States Army Field Artillery School, a

memorandum for Commander, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), ATTN:

ATSC. ATSF-CR, subject: "Army MLRS Support to the Marine Corps," 17 October

1994.

 

  23. Field Manual (FM) 6-60 with Change 1, 5-1.

 

  24. Headquarters, III Corps Artillery Operations Plan 94-0O5, OCONUS Strategic

Deployment, (Fort Sill, OK: Headquarters, III Corps Artillery, March 1994), Annex C,

Appendix 2, Tab A.

 

 

Chapter 4.

 

 

  1. Executive Summary, United States Army Modernization Plan Update (FY95-99)

(Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 1994), 20.

 

  2. Executive Summary, United States Army Modernization Plan Update (FY95-99),

20; MLRS information comes from multiple sources. In terms of field artillery assets, one

heavy brigade will be supported by a battalion of 24 155mm self-propelled howitzers. An

MLRS battery may or may not be attached to provide reinforcing fires. Current U.S. Army

doctrine calls for a second battalion of howitzers or an MLRS battery to reinforce the

battalion supporting a heavy brigade; most MLRS units fight in general support of the

division or corps.

 

  3. Department of the Army, United States Army Field Artillery School memorandum

for Commander, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), ATTN: ATSC, ATSF-CR,

subject: "Army MLRS Support to the Marine Corps," 17 October 1994: Memorandum of

Agreement Between the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps, subject:

Army Multiple Launch Rocket System Support to the Marine Corps, January 1995

(DRAFT).

 

  4. Executive Summary, United States Army Modernization Plan Update (FY95-99),

7. 12 days is the longest amount of time needed; normally the time will be shorter--but still

measured in days.

 

  5. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Gerlaugh, instructor at United States Marine Corps

Command and Staff College, interview by author, 8 March 1995.

 

  6. Chapter 10, United States Army Modernization Plan Update(FY95-99), 10-3.

The use of lighters for this operation depends on sea conditions; if the seas are too rough,

the launcher's electronics may get drenched with sea water.

 

  7. Gerlaugh.

 

  8. Jane's Publishing, Jane's Fighting Ships, 1994-95 (London: Butler and Tanner,

Ltd., 1994), 800-807; Jane's Publishing, Jane's Military Vehicles and Ground Support

Equipment, 1987 (London: Butler and Tanner, Ltd., 1987), 596-612; Field Manual (FM)

101-10-1/2, Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, October 1987). Figures are approximate

due to variances in number and types of vehicles in a battery package.

 

  9. Gerlaugh. Another consideration would be ammunition storage requirements for

the rocket or missile pods.

 

  10. Gerlaugh.

 

  11. Department of the Army, United States Army Field Artillery School memorandum.

 

  12. LTC Charles Soby pioneered this technique while serving as a battalion

commander in the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. He used it to ship his radar to Fort

Polk, LA, for a Joint Training Readiness Center exercise. As a sister battalion executive

officer, I copied it for interisland shipping to our training areas. It works very well.

 

  13. Jane's Publishing, Jane's Military Vehicles and Ground Support Equipment,

1987, 596-612; Field Manual (FM) 101-1010-1/2 Organizational, Technical, and

Logistical Data Planning Factors (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, October

1987). Figures are approximate due to variances in number and types of vehicles and

ammuntion pods in a battery package, and the weight method of computation was used.

 

  14. Department of the Army, United States Army Field Artillery School memorandum.

Although this memorandum states that the MLRS will bring with it 15 days of supply,

there are selected items (water, fuel, and rockets) that cannot be carried.

 

  15. Department of the Army, United States Army Field Artillery School memorandum:

Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Army and the United States Marine

Corps (DRAFT).

 

  16. Headquarters, III Corps, Operation Plan 94-005, March 1994 Draft:Tab A to

Appendix 2 to Annex C. I used MTOEs, plus this plan, to produce the approximate

number of soldiers in these organizations. Every deployment will produce a slightly

different number of people.

 

  17. Department of the Army, United States Army Field Artillery School memorandum

Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Army and the United States

Marine Corps (DRAFT); Field Manual (FM) 101-10-1/2. Figures are approximate,

because of the use of selected attachments and the potential employment of an AN/TPQ-37

Radar Section. Also, JP-8 will replace diesel and gasoline in MLRS units as part of the

common fuel development program.

 

  18. Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 1-11, Fleet Marine Force

Organization. (Washington, D.C., Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, March

1992), 6-54.

 

  19. Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 1-11, 6-72.

 

  20. Department of the Army, United States Army Field Artillery School memorandum.

 

  21. Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 1-11, 6-72.; Major William

Stringer, instructor at United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, interview

by author, 8 March 1995.

 

  22. Department of the Army, United States Army Field Artillery School memorandum;

verified by using CSS references, especially Department of the Army, United States Army

Command and General Staff College Student Text (ST) 101-6, G1/G4 Battle Book, 1 June

1993.

 

  23. Field Manual (FM) 101-10-1/2; United States Army Command and Staff College

Student Text (ST) 101-6, 2-5 to 2-7.

 

 

Chapter 5.

 

 

  1. Most information used to compare Army Operations and Marine Warfighting stem

from four documents. The Army information comes from FM 100-5, Operations

(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993) and FM 100-15,

Corps Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Combined Arms Center,

September 1989). The Marine information comes from FMFM1, Warfighting

(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, June 1993) and an

instructional draft of FMFM 2-1, Fighting the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)

(Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, August 1994).

 

  2. Marine Corps Development and Education Command Operational Handbook (OH)

2, The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (Quantico, VA: Commanding General, Marine

Corps Development and Education Command, March 1987), 2-1.

 

  3. Field Manual (FM) 100-15, Corps Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United

States Army Combined Arms Center, September 1989), 2-1.

 

  4. Fleet Marine Force Manual FMFM 2-1, Fighting the Marine Expeditionary Force

(MEF) (DRAFT) (Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps Command and Staff

College, August 1994), 1-7.

 

  5. Marine Corps Development and Education Command Operational Handbook (OH)

2, Chapter 2.

 

  6. Field Manual (FM) 100-15, Corps Operations, 2-12; Fleet Marine Force Manual

FMFM 2-1, Fighting the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (DRAFT), 1-8.

 

  7. Major Edward Hughes, "Army MLRS Support for Marines." Field Artillery

(February 1995): 21.

 

  8. This upcoming manual is the U.S. Army's FM 6-20-10.

 

  9. Planning range for the M198 is 18.1 kilometers from the firing position. Field

artillerymen plan for firing positions 3 to 5 kilometers behind the forward lines of troops.

Maximum acquisition range for an AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder Radar is 24 km, with a planning

range of 18 km. The best concise source for capabilities is United States Army Command

and Staff College Student Text (ST) 100-3, Battle Book (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United

States Army Command and Staff College, 1 April 1993).

 

  10. Planning range for the M270 with rocket pod containers is 32 kilometers from the

firing position; an Army TACMS launcher plans for 100+ kilometers. Field artillerymen

plan for firing positions 3 to 5 kilometers behind the forward lines of troops. Maximum

acquisition range for an AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Radar is 50 km, with a planning range of

36 km. United States Army Command and Staff College Student Text (ST) 100-3, Battle

Book.

 

  11. Field Manual (FM) 6-60, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Multiple

Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army

Combined Arms Center, September 1989), 4-4 and 5-2.

 

  12. In this case, a sensor-shooter mix means a capability to acquire targets accurately

in real time, a communications link to an attack asset, and a weapon system to deliver

effective lethal or nonlethal fires on that target.

 

  13. Fleet Marine Force Manual FMFM 2-7, Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task

Force Operations (Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps Command and Staff

College, September 1991), 1-6.

 

  14. Who will then assign the unit a tactical mission, which will be discussed later.

 

  15. Fleet Marine Force Manual FMFM 2-7, Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task

Force Operations, 2-1 to 2-3.

 

  16. As seen in Chapter 4, the bulk items (fuel and rocket pod containers/missile launch

pod assemblies) will probably come from the CSSE area, anyway. The logistical

difference between attachment to a GCE and assignment under the MAGTF as a GCE

comes from available expertise in MLRS matters--not from the flow of resupply.

 

  17. Such a lower to higher relationship would be hard to describe in U.S. Army terms.

As seen earlier in the chapter, Army doctrine works on a higher to lower mission/allocation

process.

 

  18. The number of HEMMTs and HEMATs would depend on ammunition

requirements during the assault; they can be reduced or increased. An alternative would be

aerial resupply.

 

  19. Since this operation requires the breaking up of an MLRS unit, the preferred

command relationship from the CINC to the MAGTF is OPCON.

 

  20. Field Manual (FM) 6-60, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Multiple

Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army

Combined Arms Center, September 1989), 4-3.

 

  21. Field Manual (FM) 6-60, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Multiple

Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations, 4-2 to 4-3. This methodology will be

updated shortly in the new FM 6-2O-10.

 

  22. "When" means the commander decides on each target set whether the attack will

happen when the target is developed from multiple sources (immediate), when the target is

acquired (when acquired), or on a schedule of fires (preplanned).

 

  23. Fleet Marine Force Manual FMFM 2-7, Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task

Force Operations, 1-6.

 

  24. Major Paul Mathews, Artillery Officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force Force Fires

Coordination Center, interview by author, 1 March 1995.

 

 

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Currid, Lieutenant Colonel David. Fire Support Coordination Center

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Currid, Lieutenant Colonel David. Assistant Fire Support Coordinator, 2d

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Department of the Army, United States Army Field Artillery School.

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