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The Politicalization Of The Officer Corps Of The United States

The Politicalization Of The Officer Corps Of The United States

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Manpower

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: The Politicalization of the Officer Corps of the United States

 

Author: Robert A. Newton II, Major, U.S. Army

 

Research Question: Due to growing pressures from society and within, has the American

officer corps developed a sense of isolation and alienation from society? If so, what impact will

this rift have upon future civil-military relations within the United States?

 

Discussion: Unlike most major world powers, the United States has never faced a real threat of

a military coup. The English heritage of divided power and the colonial fear of a strong Executive

Branch ensured that our military remained small and politically neutral during our country's

development. This legacy produced a highly educated, professional officer corps which plays an

active role in a wide range of operations outside of normal military duties today.

 

In 1992, LtCol Dunlap wrote an article which discussed the conditions which could lead

to a coup within the U.S. In particular, he criticized many of the policies and trends which he

observed in the current military system which could produce the conditions necessary for a coup

to occur. He also expressed grave concern about the growing political activism of the officer

corps and the performance of non-traditional military missions.

 

I used a survey of selected officers attending courses at the Marine Corps Base Quantico

to evaluate LtCol Dunlap's thesis. Combined with an analysis of the theory which could explain

how such a shift in officer values could occur, I attempted to confirm his views. The results of my

survey indicate that LtCol Dunlap's position may have greater merit than one would believe at

first.

 

Conclusion: Many of the conditions which LtCol Dunlap outlined exist within the officer

groups participating in my survey. A growing sense of political activism and isolation does exist.

The officers accept the fact that the military will perform more non-traditional functions. Thus,

they believe the military should play an active role in policy formulation. Many of the suggested

methods of strengthening the bonds between society and the military have little appeal to the

respondents. As a result, we must think of alternative methods to ensure that our officer corps

does not become an American Praetorian Guard.

 

Table Of Contents

 

SUBJECT PAGE

 

Introduction 3

 

Historical Perspective 4

 

The Professional, Corporate Military 16

 

The Military Mindset 20

 

The Current View 26

 

The Survey and Results 31

 

Conclusions 44

 

Notes 49

 

Bibliography 52

 

Appendix A: Sample Survey 54

 

Appendix B: Survey Results 61

 

 

 

Introduction

 

In his award-winning essay "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 20l2,"

 

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dunlap explored a scenario which discussed the possible origins of a

 

military coup in our Nation's future.1 In his presentation, Colonel Dunlap discussed in depth the

 

various changes in policy and perceptions within civilian and military segments of the government

 

and society which led to this coup. The heart of the discussion focused on how these changes

 

provided the climate necessary for an ambitious officer to assume absolute power without any

 

resistance from the military or civilian sectors.

 

Dunlap cited several changes within the military which contributed to this climate. We can

 

break down these changes into structural and sociological elements. As an example of a structural

 

change which produced this coup, Dunlap cited the unification of the Nation's Armed Forces into

 

a single service. Colonel Dunlap believed this change would eliminate any possibility of opposition

 

or dissent to dictatorial leaders within the military. Another change he cited was the decision by

 

the civilian leadership to assign non-traditional tasks to the military (such as drug interdiction and

 

disaster relief). Dunlap believed this action increased the demand for a voice in policy formulation

 

by the leadership of the military.

 

Dunlap also discussed how sociological factors could contribute to a potential coup. For

 

example, he stated the military community will become isolated from society and alienated by the

 

inefficiency of the government. In addition, Colonel Dunlap believed the loss of diverse sources

 

for recruits will contribute to the development of a military caste. Instead of representing a cross

 

section of the country, the military will assume its own unique set of values. Due to this

 

transformation, Dunlap believed that the American military will assume the role of a Praetorian

 

Guard such as Rome experienced under Marius. Instead of defending national values, he believed

 

the military will consider itself the savior of the Nation's future in the time of a domestic crisis.

 

Instead of remaining politically neutral, Dunlap believed such a crisis will provide the means and

 

justification for the military to assume power.

 

Although an in-depth analysis of the factors cited by Colonel Dunlap would pose an

 

interesting challenge, I believe it is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will focus upon

 

those factors cited by Dunlap which could produce this change in values within the military's

 

leadership. I will also attempt to determine if the officer corps has developed a new perspective on

 

civilian control of the military by analyzing two groups of United States Marine Corps' officers.

 

Considering the results of this analysis, I shall attempt to determine if a new perspective exists.

 

Further, I plan to use the results to outline a strategy which will assist in re-establishing civilian

 

control if a problem exists.

 

I shall use the following format to study this subject. First, I shall present a brief history of

 

civil-military relations in American history. Subsequently, I shall apply some of the theories on

 

civil-military relations to the United States. Following this discussion, I shall present the data and

 

results of my analysis on the two groups of Marine officers. Finally, I shall close with a discussion

 

of possible methods to reverse (or prevent) the development of the climate within the officer

 

corps which could lead to a military coup.

 

 

 

Historical Perspective

 

Dunlap's scenario requires a major change in the outlook of the Nation's military

 

leadership concerning political activism. Although military leaders have ventured into the political

 

arena on occasion, such actions have occurred only under extremely unusual conditions.2 In fact,

 

the United States occupies a unique position in the world. Unlike every other major industrial

 

country, our Nation's military leaders have never threatened the stability of the government.3,4

 

Why did the United States avoid this catastrophe? An analysis of American history in civil-military

 

relations will provide us with part of the answer.

 

A complete understanding of this subject requires us to start with a discussion of English

 

history in this area. Since British settlers and their progeny dominated our early government, it is

 

natural that their beliefs and perspectives would influence our Nation's values. Ever since the

 

revolt under Cromwell, British society distrusted military forces. British citizens associated

 

standing armies with the absolute power of the Crown. Unlike the rise of mass armies in other

 

nations, the British developed the concept of the militia to counter the power of the Crown.5

 

Instead of allowing the Crown to hold a monopoly upon the use of force, Parliament used the

 

militia as a counterbalance to the Crown's influence.

 

This idea of divided military power and authority followed the British colonists to North

 

America. Except in times of war, the colonists resisted strongly any attempt by the British Crown

 

to station regular troops within the colonies.6 Instead, the colonists preferred to rely upon the

 

militia for their collective defense. However, the militia continued to thrive even in areas where a

 

major security threat did not exist. This condition occurred because the colonist's duty to serve

 

within the militia became associated with the responsibilities of citizenship.7 In other words, this

 

duty became a right and part of the citizen's liberty.

 

In Britain, the militia guaranteed liberty by countering the power of the Crown. In the

 

Colonies, the situation was different. Since all citizens became members of the militia, it

 

represented a nation-in-arms. In general, the militia leaders also served as the leaders of the local

 

community.8 As stated by the Declaration of Rights of Virginia: "In all cases the military should

 

be under the strict subordination to and governed by civil power."9 Society fully accepted the

 

idea of the military serving society, but not the belief that the military should help rule society. As

 

a result, the militia did not pose a threat to the social nor political order of the community. In

 

addition, the self efficiency of the militia served as a deterrent to Crown political domination by

 

fulfilling a role analogous to the British militia. (In the colonies, the Royal Governors served as

 

the conduits for conveying the power of the Crown to the colonists.)

 

After the Revolution, a critical event occurred which colored civil-military relations for a

 

considerable time. As the Continental Army prepared to demobilize near Newburg, New York, a

 

conflict developed over compensation for the soldiers. After receiving the encouragement of

 

several supporters within the new Congress, several military officers threatened a revolt.

 

However, when General Washington learned of these activities, he quickly defused the effort. As

 

a result, the revolt did not occur and the Continental Army demobilized.10

 

In contrast, the Spanish and Portuguese heritage in Latin America produced a different

 

legacy for those regions. Since Spain and Portugal elected to administer these areas under joint

 

military and Catholic jurisdiction, a viable civil government structure did not develop. Instead, the

 

local populations came to believe military participation in political activities was normal. When

 

these countries obtained their freedom, a pattern of military interference in civilian affairs

 

followed. This problem still continues to affect many of the countries in this region.

 

Based upon this event and their British heritage, the Founders of our Nation ensured a

 

single person could not control the military and monopolize the use of force. The Founding

 

Fathers codified this relationship in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. In essence, the solution

 

incorporated a system of checks and balances with separation of powers to ensure effective

 

civilian control of the military existed. Under these provisions, the civilian leadership split the

 

control of the military in two ways. First, the federal government's Executive and Legislative

 

branches shared responsibility for controlling the military. This action prevented the military from

 

becoming affiliated too closely with any one civilian leader or political faction. In addition, the

 

Founding Fathers further split the power of the military by authorizing the establishment of state

 

militias. As a result, the Federal government lost its monopoly on the use of force. Thus, the

 

decision to use military force required the President to obtain the consent of multiple political

 

groups.

 

Not only did our leaders limit the political power of the standing military, but they ensured

 

that it could not gain additional power. First, the civilian leadership severely limited the size of the

 

standing force. More importantly, the civilian leadership limited the political power of the military

 

through the assignment of roles and missions. The civilian leadership assigned the primary tasks of

 

the country's defense to the militia. These missions included actions such as repelling invasions

 

and suppressing internal revolts.11 The leadership assigned the standing army tasks which would

 

fall into the category of nation-building by today's standard. The regular military was assigned

 

tasks such as charting the nation's interior; performing engineering projects; and establishing civil

 

order along the frontier. As a result, the government assigned all major tasks which could lead to

 

the development of a political power base to the politically responsive, state-controlled militia.12

 

As the country grew, so did the military. However, this growth occurred only in the face

 

of vehement political opposition. In reality, the militia (a short service, home defense force) could

 

not meet the needs of an imperial army oriented upon conquest. As the doctrine of Manifest

 

Destiny consumed the Nation, the civilian leadership required a force which could deploy for

 

extended periods of time in remote regions. The government could not use the militia in this

 

manner due to the strong political repercussions such use would generate. As a result, the

 

government elected to expand the Regular forces.13

 

However, the expansion of the Regular army did not increase its interaction with civilian

 

society. Due to the requirement to serve along the frontier, few people encountered soldiers in

 

their daily life. The military's composition separated the military from society socially as well.

 

Most enlisted soldiers came from the lower strata of society. Moreover, these professional

 

enlisted soldiers seldom had any family ties to the rest of society. Most of the officers came from

 

the upper classes. As a result, the majority of society did not know anybody within the regular

 

military and lacked any interaction with them.14

 

While the size of the standing military grew, so did the bureaucracy which supported it.

 

The structural requirements to raise, support, and administer a dispersed organization required the

 

political leaders to create large bureaucratic agencies to direct operations. The civilian leadership

 

quickly sought to curtail the political power of these organizations when they attempted to exert

 

their influence. The method the leadership elected to use was to incorporate these organizations in

 

the process of political patronage. As a result, even though these bureaus housed experts on

 

military operations, the people who had the power to establish policy had a political responsibility

 

to the President and other political patrons. Thus, policy direction and control remained firmly in

 

civilian hands.15

 

During periods of crisis, the United States expanded the size and power of the military.

 

However, this increase did not produce a corresponding increase in the political power of the

 

military. Rather, a rise in civilian power radically eclipsed this change. All three branches of

 

government exerted their influence to keep the military under firm control during these periods of

 

crisis. The Executive branch exerted control by reducing the political power of the regular forces

 

within the military.16 This action occurred as the government mobilized reserves and conscripts to

 

fill its needs for manpower. As the size of the military expanded, it lost its "regular" character and

 

narrow perspective. The result was a significant increase in the number of groups and individuals

 

who had an interest in military policy and who attempted to influence decisions.

 

The Legislative branch exerted its authority over the military in a variety of ways. The

 

Congress exerted this control through such routine functions as budget hearings and the

 

establishment of policy requirements. Most significantly, any crisis or significant failure led to a

 

number of investigations and hearings conducted by the Congress.17 As a result, numerous

 

General Officers found themselves to be the subject of investigations by Congress and forced to

 

defend their actions in public fora.

 

At the same time, the Judicial branch weighed in with its restrictions upon military power.

 

The federal court system stated that neither military expediency nor exigencies of war could

 

justify violations of the Nation's laws by military officers. If officers violated such laws, the

 

government would hold them accountable by the standards of civilian law.18

 

Even though a vast military expansion occurred during war, the military leadership did not

 

develop a strong constituency within society to protect its interests when the war ended. Strong

 

political patrons did not exist, except in limited policy areas. Few civilian industries and workers

 

depended upon military production. Instead of buying its armaments from industry, the

 

government produced the equipment itself. The military only bought common items from

 

industry.19 As a result, the military competed with civilian consumers for scarce items. When

 

conflicts over priorities developed, the military did not have the final word on policy. As a result,

 

few civilian patrons had a stake in the outcome of policy decisions affecting military policy.

 

After World War II, the most significant change within the military establishment since the

 

creation of the Army and the Navy occurred. This change was the National Security Act of 1947.

 

Most significantly, it established a new tier of civilian leadership over the military by creating the

 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Act established a formal method to include

 

military advice in policy formulation. This action occurred through the creation of the Joint Chiefs

 

of Staff. Further, the Act created several new agencies which could provide alternative views to

 

the military perspective. One such example was the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency to

 

act as the President's principle agency for intelligence issues. In addition, the Act authorized the

 

creation of the National Security Council.20 The intent of this action was to create a staff to

 

integrate the views of all agencies with concerns in the national security arena. This decision

 

recognized that national power rises not only from military power, but economic, diplomatic and

 

psychological sources as well.

 

The creation of the Joint Chiefs helped and hindered civilian control of the military at the

 

same time. The creation of this advisory role gave the military leadership a means to exert their

 

influence in policy formulation. As the military expanded to counter the "permanent" Soviet

 

threat, its leadership repeatedly attempted to influence policy through legislative and executive

 

channels to obtain greater autonomy. In turn, this tendency resulted in the military leadership

 

filling power vacuums when the civilian bureaucracy failed to act.21 An example was the Bay of

 

Pigs invasion.

 

On the other hand, the National Security Act did not create a single military service. In

 

addition, it did not appoint the Chairman as the military commander of the Nation's Armed

 

Forces. As a result, the Act limited the Joint Chiefs to a military advisory role.22 Since each

 

Service tended to view problems and issues differently, the President often received multiple

 

options from which he could initiate a policy. Even more importantly, the President did not have

 

an obligation to accept the advice provided. Thus, the President remained the sole commander of

 

the armed forces.

 

Another factor which we must consider is the limit on the advice the Joint Chiefs can

 

provide due to the role of military power in national security strategy. The ultimate limit on the

 

military's political power is whether its leadership can develop a long range, national military

 

strategy. Such a strategy serves as the mechanism for the military to defend its stake in policy

 

formulation and the allocation of resources with the President and Congress.23 However, the

 

formulation of this strategy is not within the control of the military leadership. Rather, military

 

strategy is heavily dependent on the Nation's foreign policy, national security policy, and

 

diplomacy. The development of contingency plans should assist the government in obtaining its

 

foreign policy objectives. Unfortunately, most recent Presidents have focused their energy on

 

domestic issues. As a result, the guidance needed to develop a coherent military strategy does not

 

exist. This lack of military strategy becomes a weapon in the hands of any member of the

 

government who wants to attack military resources or strategy.

 

A recent example concerns the current U.S. policy on Bosnia. The Administration has not

 

developed and implemented a consistent policy for this conflict. For example, the Administration

 

has reversed its position on the use of air strikes and ground troops in the past. As a result, this

 

lack of consistency has opened the door to numerous attacks on the Department and the President

 

over his ideas. It has even led to proposals from various politicians (such as removing the ban on

 

selling weapons to the Muslims) which required the Joint Chiefs to enter the fray and defeat the

 

proposal. In addition, this lack of consistency led to attacks on the Department by other Executive

 

Branch departments (such as the Department of State) which criticized DoD's lack of desire to

 

enter the war.

 

The advisory responsibility also hinders the Joint Chief political power in another way. As

 

the Nation's senior military officers, the President expects the Joint Chiefs to represent his views

 

before Congress and the American public. However, the latter groups expect the Joint Chiefs to

 

present their assessment of policy and not the President's beliefs. As a result, a serious conflict

 

and loss of credibility may occur for the military depending on their method of addressing this

 

problem. If the Joint Chiefs fail to defend the President's policies, they risk losing his support. If

 

they do not provide their true assessment of the situation to Congress and the public, they risk a

 

serious loss of confidence and they become ineffective as representatives of their Services. In turn,

 

this situation leads to an eventual loss of resources and influence over policy issues.

 

An example of this situation occurred during the Truman Administration. President

 

Truman relied upon the Joint Chiefs to provide credibility to his foreign policy. However, the

 

Senate became convinced that General Bradley and the Service Chiefs were not providing their

 

true assessment of issues on which they testified. As a result, it destroyed General Bradley's

 

political credibility. In fact, Senator Taft told General Bradley in one hearing that the Senator no

 

longer believed anything the General said.24

 

A new development after World War II was the rise of civilian patrons for the military.

 

Following World War II, the greatest concern of President Truman was to prevent the country

 

from slipping back into an economic depression.25 This concern required the United States to

 

maintain its current level of production and expand the foreign markets in which we sold our

 

goods. However, the rise of the Soviet Union threatened our ability in the latter area. As a result,

 

the United States elected to maintain a large, standing force in part to protect our market

 

interests.

 

Instead of equipping the force with government produced equipment, our leaders elected

 

to use civilian industries to fulfill the military's needs. In addition, using grants and other

 

mechanisms, the government transferred much of the responsibility for research and development

 

to civilian institutions. The civilian leadership hoped this decision would reduce the impact of

 

demobilization. Also, the President believed the research effort would foster the development of

 

new products which we could sell at home and abroad. The net result of this effort was the

 

development of a new constituency which could influence the political process on defense issues.

 

An entire defense industry rose to fill our expanding military needs. President Eisenhower became

 

so concerned about the growing influence of this new political group that he warned the Nation of

 

the possible consequences in one of his speeches.26 His speech on this subject generated the

 

phrase "the military-industrial complex" which became associated with the country's problems

 

during the Vietnam War.

 

In the 196Os, Congress took a new interest in military affairs. Due to the vast social

 

disorder which plagued the Nation, Congress sought new methods to help unity the country.

 

Since society was extremely critical of the professional military at the time, Congress exerted its

 

power to institute a series of reforms designed to promote equality and improve the military's

 

image. Although racial desegregation of the military began in the 1950s, Congress significantly

 

strengthened the provisions in the 1960s. Also, Congress passed statutes which required the full

 

integration of women into the military by disbanding the separate "women" organizations. Due to

 

the discipline of the military, Congress believed these changes could occur with little disruption

 

and no affect upon combat effectiveness. In addition, it was believed that successful

 

implementation could serve as an example for the rest of society.27 However, some resistance

 

occurred within the military each time Congress intervened. In many cases, military officers

 

considered these intrusions to be inappropriate due to their impact upon internal military affairs.

 

The next major change in the relationship between the military and civilian leadership was

 

the passage of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. Congress passed this Act because of the poor

 

performance of the United States' military during the Vietnam War and other actions in the early

 

1980s. However, the civilian leadership had realized for many years that inter-Service rivalry and

 

difficultiesexisted. As stated by President Eisenhower, "..each service is so utterly confident that it

 

alone can assure the nation's security that it feels justified in going before the Congress or the

 

public and urging fantastic programs."28 Thus, Congress had two primary objectives in mind when

 

it drafted Goldwater-Nichols. First, it wanted to increase the power of the civilian leaders over the

 

military bureaucracy. The second objective sought was to improve joint military operations by

 

increasing the power of the Combatant Commanders at the expense of the Military

 

Departments.29

 

The Act increased civilian authority in the following manner. First, the Act established the

 

Secretary of Defense as a member of the formal chain of command. In addition, the Act usurped

 

the political power of the individual Service chiefs by making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the

 

sole military advisor to the President. Equally important, the Act allowed the Services to retain

 

responsibility for raising and equipping forces instead of creating a single authority for this

 

function. As a result, the Military Departments continued to divide their political influence by

 

arguing over scarce resources without having the opportunity to plead their case before the

 

President. As former Assistance Secretary of Defense Lawrence Korb stated, "Even powerful

 

civilian leaders find it difficult to overrule unanimous military opinion. Without the existence of

 

separate services, military opinions would always be unanimous."30 This change reduced

 

significantly the number of disputes which reached the level of the President or Secretary of

 

Defense.

 

Other recent trends could produce major problems for the maintenance of civilian control

 

as well. The first activity is the review of Roles and Missions by a Congressionally-appointed

 

commission. The results of this review could lead to the first clear indication of what activities

 

each Service should perform as part of the national defense. As a result, this Review could serve

 

as the basis for a new national military strategy and the justification for new resources or political

 

power.

 

The other action is the proposal by the vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (ADM Owens)

 

to expand the power of the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC). Under current

 

policy, the primary role of the JROC is to provide a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense

 

on the relative priority of major acquisition programs for funding. The individual Military

 

Departments and the Secretary of Defense still have final authority in deciding which programs

 

are most important to them. However, Admiral Owens proposal would change this scenario.

 

Under his proposal, the JROC would determine the priority for the Services for all acquisition

 

efforts. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense would ensure the Services fluid the various

 

acquisition programs according to JROC guidance. In effect, Admiral Owens would strip the

 

Services of their ability to determine what assets they need to fulfill their obligations to the

 

country.31 The implementation of this policy would be a major step towards the unification of the

 

military services. As such, this change should reduce the number of disputes between the Services

 

even more.

 

 

 

The Professional, Corporate Military

 

What is the significance of the previous discussion? In essence, I focused the summary on

 

two topics. The first topic concerned the various methods used by national leaders to control the

 

military establishment. The other topic concerned the transformation of the U.S. military from a

 

mass, citizen-soldier army into a corporate, professional military. Each of these areas influenced

 

the other and caused significant changes to occur.

 

Samuel Huntington reviewed the history of civil-military relations in the United States in

 

the early 1950s. Over the past few decades, he has continued to study this topic and has written

 

numerous articles on the subject. Based upon his review of American history, Huntington claims

 

four factors produced our current state of civil-military relations.32 First, he believed the rapid

 

incorporation of new technology and the growing uniqueness of military operations mandated the

 

need for experts in the field. Second, he believed the rise of the bureaucratic nation state provided

 

the military with a legitimate access to resources. Also, the establishment of the state provided the

 

formal mechanism for controlling policy within the military.

 

The third factor cited by Huntington concerned clientship. Our nation developed as a

 

community under a single authority and without a significant threat to our borders. Instead of

 

being able to seek protection within one political faction or the other, the military lacked a

 

political patron to protect it. To avoid interference with its internal affairs, the military leadership

 

sought to maintain strict, political neutrality. As a result, the military came to associate its

 

existence and purpose with the nation as a whole and not any political subset or faction.

 

The previous three factors combined with the fourth factor to allow our military leadership

 

to focus their concerns on the external threats to our Nation. The fourth factor in question is the

 

rise of democratic values. Huntington believed this factor was critical for the following reasons.

 

First of all, this idea did not recognize the legitimacy of totalitarian governments. Rather, only

 

governments which represented the citizens could be considered legitimate in the eyes of the

 

citizens. As a result, the citizens who became soldiers carried this belief with them into the

 

service. The result was that the military leadership came to believe the military's primary task was

 

to defend this right. In addition, the military leadership has strongly resisted any action which it

 

viewed as a threat to this responsibility. Since the United States has been blessed with a

 

government which has maintained its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, the military has been

 

free to concentrate upon external threats instead of worrying about domestic concerns.

 

Huntington believed the development of a professional military was the only requirement a

 

country needed to ensure its civilian leaders maintained control the military. He believed that as

 

long as the government gave the military leadership free reign to establish the internal conditions

 

which enhanced professionalism, the military establishment would be too busy to become involved

 

in domestic affairs. He called this process objective control of the military.33

 

Huntington argued that the most dangerous method of exerting civilian authority was a

 

process known as subjective control. Under this concept, the civilian leaders ensured the loyalty

 

of the military by giving them a stake in the government. This action occurred when the civilian

 

leaders gave the military a voice in policy formulation. Morris Janowitz is a strong advocate of

 

this method of controlling the military. Janowitz believes the incorporation of the military in the

 

policy formulation process will prevent the development of a military caste. Such a caste could

 

become isolated and alienated from society in times of crisis if society ignores or rejects its advice.

 

If the military has a stake in the policy, the leadership will expend greater effort to ensure the

 

policy works. Otherwise, the military becomes associated with a failed policy by default.34

 

If you examine the history of U.S. civil-military relations, you will observe instances where

 

our civilian leaders used both techniques to control our military. If you examine other countries,

 

you would also observe instances where both theories fail. As a result, other scholars produced

 

new theories to describe the ideal mechanism for controlling the military. However, regardless of

 

the theory proposed, most of the authors agree with Huntington concerning the factors which

 

produced our current pattern of civil-military relations.35 The most common proposals are hybrids

 

of the two previous theories. Typical of these theories are proposals by authors such as

 

Abrahamson and Perlmuter.

 

Under Abrahamson's theory, the military leadership will seek to establish greater

 

autonomy in any area for which it has responsibility. This desire reflects a U.S. tendency to grant

 

such authority to the military leadership when the issues concerned internal operational issues or

 

professional standards. This tendency also reflects the corporate professional nature of the officer

 

corps, which is similar to other professions in this desire. As a result, the desire to incorporate

 

military participation in activities which are outside of its normal duties will inevitably lead to

 

tension. The tension is the result of the military leadership seeking greater authority and the

 

civilian agencies resisting the challenge. How the civilian leadership resolves these conflicts will

 

determine whether a feeling of alienation develops within the military and the degree of civilian

 

control.36

 

Under Perlmuter's theory, the relationship between the military, the civilian leadership,

 

and society plays an equally important consideration in determining the role of the military in

 

policy development.37 In particular, the degree of support and legitimacy provided to the

 

government by the people will play a key role in determining the military's loyalty. Should the

 

legitimacy or efficiency of the government fail, Perlmuter believes military intervention could

 

occur if one key event happens. This event concerns the transfer of blame for the government's

 

failure to the military leadership.

 

Perlmuter believes this condition increases the probability of intervention for several

 

reasons. First of all, this condition may disrupt Huntington's concept of clientship. As the military

 

leadership observes the collapse of the government's legitimacy, it loses its connection to the

 

state. This connection fails because the military requires a legitimate government to guarantee

 

access to resources. As a result, the military leadership no longer views itself as the defender of

 

the nation's values. Rather, they see themselves portrayed as forces preventing the restoration of

 

legitimate authority within the country and fear a potential loss of resources.

 

Equally important, tasking the military to solve the government's problems or suppress

 

opposition increases the likelihood of intervention. If the civilian leadership tasks the military with

 

solving the problem, they are threatening the corporate and organizational integrity of the military.

 

Failure will reflect directly upon the reputation of the military. The military leadership will seek

 

greater authority and autonomy in these activities to prevent failure. When the civilian leaders fail

 

to grant these demands, the sense of isolation and alienation mentioned by Abrahamson will

 

develop. If the civilian leadership does not take some action to relieve the situation, the

 

probability of intervention increases exponentially. Perlmuter believes the same corporate

 

professionalism which reduces the probability of military involvement in domestic affairs under

 

stable regimes can act as a catalyst for involvement under unstable regimes. Although the military

 

has no independent reason to exist without a state, threats to the integrity and reputation of the

 

military profession can produce extreme actions under Perlmuter's theory.

 

 

 

The Military Mindset

 

The previous sections provided us with a summary of the conditions which produced our

 

current state of civil-military affairs in the eyes of noted experts. Before we can continue to our

 

analysis of specific groups of officers, one additional area requires discussion. This area is the

 

"mindset" of the officer corps. By no means should this subject imply a single, monolithic ethic

 

unites the entire officer corps. Divisions and differences of opinion exist within the officer corps

 

as within any, large corporate organization. Rather, this section concerns those individuals whose

 

rank or duty places them in a position where they can influence or alter the relationship between

 

the civilian leadership and the military. In other words, their assignments will require political

 

skills that the military structure does not require in other jobs. These individuals are or will

 

become the future leaders of their Services.

 

At the start of the Revolution, Samuel Adams stated, "Soldiers are apt to consider

 

themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of the Citizens."38 As we have seen, U.S. leaders have

 

kept the military isolated from society in a variety of ways except when compelling problems

 

arise. However, the military leadership has traditionally resisted any attempt to involve it in

 

domestic issues. As a result, a state of equilibrium has existed until recent times.

 

The most vivid example of the military crushing an internal effort to usurp civilian control

 

occurred a little over forty years ago. During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur

 

publicly challenged the authority of President Truman. Without any hesitation, all of the Joint

 

Chiefs backed the President.39 This support occurred although the Joint Chiefs had lost significant

 

credibility in the eyes of most political leaders. The JCS damaged their reputation previously by

 

supporting Truman's policies before Congress despite the perception that they did not agree with

 

the policies. However, due to their unanimous support for the President, they eliminated any

 

support within the military or in the political environment for MacArthur. The decision by the

 

Joint Chiefs in this case is the epitome of the environment which characterizes the history of civil-

 

military relations in our country.

 

What factors in this case and others help us understand why the American military has

 

avoided direct political involvement? First and foremost, the officer corps' mindset rests upon the

 

principle of service to society. Few military officers join for the pay or job security!40 Generally,

 

the officer corps believes it provides a service which is vital to the country's survival. Not only

 

does the military defend society from external threats, but it protects society's values as well. As a

 

result, the officer corps has internalized the belief that the good of the Nation must outweigh the

 

interests of any member of the military. In the event of a conflict between loyalty to the Nation or

 

loyalty to a friend, the country must come first.

 

The second factor is the acceptance of divergent opinions. Due to the emphasis in combat

 

operations to analyze and consider multiple options, military leaders have learned to accept

 

divergent opinions within the ranks. Instead of developing a closed "social" club which has

 

characterized other nations' military establishments, the American military tends to accept a wider

 

range of values and beliefs than other professional officer corps.41 This condition developed

 

because of the recruiting system used by our officer corps. Our officer corps is open to all

 

members of society, provided they meet the initial qualification standards. Many people believe

 

this development is fairly recent. In reality, the United States has always maintained an open

 

officer corps. President Jefferson initiated the process by ensuing that the legislation establishing

 

West Point contained provisions authorizing any qualified individual to attend. Although President

 

Jefferson instituted this policy for purely partisan reasons, the net effect was to franchise the

 

officer corps and prevent it from identifying with any particular segment of society.42

 

Congress and the President have reinforced this belief multiple times since then. Not only

 

has the civilian leadership assured a range of opinion within the ranks via affirmative action

 

programs, but they have provided more subtle ways as well. For example, Congress has assured

 

the survival of Reserve Officers Training Corps and Officer's Candidate School as alternative

 

sources to military academy graduates. Although the military tends to attract individuals who are

 

conservative by nature43, the effort by the civilian leadership has assured that our military leaders

 

do not believe they are better than society. In addition, these actions ensure a single mindset does

 

not exist on every subject. As proof; all one has to do is observe one the Joint Chiefs' meetings in

 

the "Tank" on policy issues affecting resource allocation.

 

Another factor which has contributed to the unique mindset is the nature of the missions

 

the civilian leadership has assigned to the regular military. During the formative years of our

 

country, the civilian leadership deliberately assigned tasks to the Army and Navy which minimized

 

their involvement in political affairs. Instead of receiving the primary responsibility for building the

 

forces needed to repel external invasions or suppressing internal revolts, the regular forces

 

received responsibility for nation-building tasks and protecting commerce. The Nation's leaders

 

assigned the responsibility for the other tasks to the politically responsive, state-controlled militia.

 

This decision gave the armed forces the opportunity to remain small and avoid the political

 

interaction which would foster ties to a particular segment of society.

 

This trend continued through World War II. Even when one would expect the power of

 

the military to reach its political peak, the civilian leaders made a strenuous effort to limit the

 

areas where military authority reigned. For instance, consider the responsibility for mobilizing the

 

national economy. Primary policy making authority remained firmly in civilian hands. Whenever a

 

dispute arose between military requirements and requirements for civilian needs, a civilian

 

controlled War Board decided the issue. The control over the supply of military manpower

 

remained within civilian control as well. The civilian leaders limited the military leadership to the

 

identification of their requirements only. The actual control over the process of filling those needs

 

remained in civilian hands.44

 

The result of this process of limiting the influence of the military in political activities was

 

the development of a strong professional ethic within the military. The relative political isolation

 

and lack of political patrons encouraged the development of political neutrality within the officer

 

corps. In some operations, this neutrality has led to a naive assessment of the enemy (such as

 

Vietnam or Somalia). It has also hindered the military's ability to provide critical victories to the

 

political leadership. (Grant's and Sherman's operations in 1864 being a rare exception to this

 

trend!)

 

However, this legacy has helped to prevent the contamination of the officer corps with

 

political cronyism. The very structure of society and the military reinforced this belief. The

 

process of socialization within the military achieves the best results when the leadership uses it to

 

reinforce beliefs and values which already exist within society. This result is due to the fact that

 

soldiers enter the Service with many more years of experience and habits as civilians. As a result,

 

they tend to have the same beliefs and prejudices as society. Since the dominant view within

 

society was that civilian control of the military is fundamental to our form of government, policies

 

and laws which reinforced this belief received general acceptance within the military.45 Attempts

 

to alter this relationship cause resistance within the ranks.

 

As the military came to accept and embrace this concept, the leadership used the system of

 

rewards and punishment to reinforce this value within the officer ranks. The officer promotion

 

system serves as a good example. Few politically active officers have risen to the upper echelons

 

of leadership (outside of Leonard Wood and Colin Powell). Most of the top leaders in the Army

 

and Navy have been officers who distinguished themselves in combat or as the commanders of

 

units throughout their careers. Reports from the various promotion boards clearly indicate that

 

operational assignments are critical to advancement.46 The system will not reward officers who

 

spend extensive amounts of time on high level staffs or other activities where they become

 

involved in the policy formulation process. The regulations governing the preparation of efficiency

 

or fitness reports strictly prohibit references to political or community activities.47 The results of

 

these processes tend to reinforce the beliefs most officers have concerning the role of the military

 

in society. As this reinforcement continues, it tends to increase the individual's commitment to the

 

organization. This commitment increases because the individual soldier believes his values and the

 

organization's values are one in the same.

 

Together, these various factors produced a professional, corporate military officer corps.

 

Due to the Nation's decision to keep the military leadership out of the political decision making

 

process, the officer corps had the opportunity to develop corporate expertise. The decision by the

 

civilian leadership to grant the military a relatively free hand over operational issues gave the

 

military the opportunity to refine this expertise by concentrating on the defense of the country

 

from external threats. Similarly, the decision to grant the military leadership great latitude in the

 

selection, promotion and retention of its members allowed the development of a group identity

 

within the officer ranks. Most importantly, these factors encouraged a sense of duty and

 

responsibility to the Nation within the officer ranks. By soliciting the views of the military on

 

critical operational issues, the civilian leadership has prevented the development of feelings of

 

alienation and isolation from developing within the ranks. The result of these factors is a military

 

whose loyalty to the Nation and its principles are without dispute and unswerving even in times of

 

extreme crisis.

 

The Current View

 

If Colonel Dunlap's prediction should come true, a fundamental change must occur within

 

the leadership of the military. Should such an event occur, it would be very surprising because this

 

decision would require the military to break with the traditions and values which its leaders have

 

supported through out its history. For an organization which is conservative by nature and

 

dominated by tradition, such a change should pose severe trauma for the members of the Bed

 

services. Even such charismatic leaders as Curtis LeMay and Douglas MacArthur could not

 

coerce the military to violate its principle of political neutrality. What factors could produce such

 

a change?

 

I believe I can reduce the various causes for the change discussed in Dunlap's article to

 

two categories. The first category is the decline of the warrior spirit. Instead of maintaining the

 

freedom to concentrate upon the defense of the Nation, the military will receive responsibility for

 

a wide variety of new tasks which do not fall in the area of defense issues. Civilian agencies

 

perform most of these tasks right now. However, due to inefficiency and incompetence, the

 

civilian leadership and society no longer have confidence in their ability to handle the tasks.

 

Examples include such operations as disaster relief and drug interdiction. To restore some

 

legitimacy to the government's efforts in these areas, the civilian leaders have assigned the

 

responsibility for fixing the problems to the military.

 

This change in mission and responsibility affects the military in several ways. First, the

 

change in mission associates the military with problems which have been beyond the ability of the

 

government to solve in the past. The civilian leadership only turned to the military to address

 

these issues in a hope of restoring legitimacy to the effort. Associating the military with these

 

failing efforts directly affects the corporate identity of the officer corps. This situation is vexing to

 

military leaders because they believe society will blame new failures on them.

 

As a result, the military leadership will seek to expand its authority to decide policy issues

 

in these areas to prevent further tarnishing of its reputation. Whereas the civilian leadership has

 

granted significant authority to formulate policy over operational military issues, the civilian

 

leadership has resisted attempts by the military to increase their authority over these new areas.48

 

Instead, they placed the military in a supporting role to the civilian agency which has primary

 

responsibility for the task. The result of this decision is a growing sense of isolation and alienation

 

within the military, as it believes the civilian leadership ignores its views and opinions in these

 

areas.

 

The second factor behind Colonel Dunlap's thesis is the growing isolation of the military

 

from society. Just at the time when society demands an increased role for the military in domestic

 

affairs, the restructuring of the military reduces the interactions between the rank and file of the

 

military and society. Due to Reductions In Force, Selective Early Retirement, and other personnel

 

actions, the senior leadership of the military has changed significantly. Even more significantly,

 

fewer sources of new officers exist due to the reduction in Reserve Officer's Training Corps and

 

Officer Candidate School programs. As a result, the diversity in backgrounds and perspectives are

 

rapidly changing as the military reduces its size.49

 

Other activities reinforce this trend towards isolation as well. For example, the closure of

 

numerous military bases significantly reduces the regions of the country where soldiers live among

 

the other members of society. This action has a secondary effect of forcing military retirees and

 

other people who rely on the military bases for essential services to concentrate in fewer areas as

 

well. Combined with the fact that no draft or other form of national service exists, we see a

 

pattern developing where few members of society understand the social order of the military or

 

know anybody who can help them understand the peculiarities of military service.

 

Further, these changes produced a new gap between the values of society and the military.

 

Instead of accepting and reflecting the values of society, the military leadership has resorted to

 

public forums to present its views on issues with which they disagree. The clearest example of this

 

trend is the recent discussion of the sexual orientation policy in the press. This issue caused an

 

extensive number of active duty officers to enter the public debate on the topic. Even more

 

disturbing was the continuation of the debate after the President issued his final decision on the

 

subject. If this situation is more than an isolated event, it could serve as an indicator that

 

Dunlap's premise is correct. In other words, societal and structural changes produce a sense of

 

isolation and alienation from the greater society.

 

Outside of isolated events, are there any other mechanisms we can use to help us confirm

 

or refute Colonel Dunlap's thesis? Moreover, can any of these mechanisms give us a clue as to

 

what actions the military or civilian leadership should take to prevent this future scenario from

 

developing? The ideal mechanism would be an in-depth study of the entire officer corps.

 

However, this thesis cannot conduct such a demanding survey.

 

Instead, the mechanism I shall use is the comparison of two selected groups of officers. I

 

selected members of the United States Marine Corps to serve as the basis of my survey. I selected

 

the marines primarily because the Marine Corps is the most conservative and tradition bound

 

Service within the U.S. military.50 In addition, the Marine Corps is the smallest Service. The latter

 

aspect tends to enhance the groups cohesion, loyalty, and sense of common purpose. As a result,

 

trends discovered here could indicate problems exist in the other Services as well.

 

I split my survey into two sample groups. Both groups are students in residence at the

 

Marine Corps Base Quantico. The first subgroup consists of officers attending the Command and

 

Staff College. The Marine Corps considers officers for attendance at this course after they have

 

been selected for promotion to the grade of Major. As a result, the officers attending this course

 

have at least ten years of experience within the military.

 

More significantly, the officers attending this course will become the future leaders of the

 

Marine Corps. A central board screens and selects officers to attend the resident Command and

 

Staff course. In general, this action limits the pool of officers to the top forty percent of their

 

respective year groups. As a result, selection for this course is a recognition of the officer's

 

potential for service at higher levels of responsibility.

 

This group of students offers another advantage as well. Not only do marines attend this

 

course, but so does a small percentage of officers from other Services. As a result, a control

 

group exists within this sample. Comparing the results between these two elements could assist

 

with our analysis.

 

The second major subgroup used in this study are students attending the Officer Basic

 

Course. According to Marine Corps policy, all officers attend this course upon entry to the Corps

 

regardless of branch of service. As a result, one can expect a cross section of backgrounds and

 

perspectives in this class. Even more important, this group offers us a glimpse of the types of

 

individuals who are entering the Corps at this time. In addition, this group gives us the

 

opportunity to sample their views before extensive socialization within the Corps has happened.

 

In general, what questions did I want this survey to answer? I centered my efforts on

 

questions which could provide indicators of Colonel Dunlap's two primary concerns. Thus, my

 

initial questions concerned demographic issues. I hope to use the results of this information to see

 

if any trends in the demographics of the two officer groups support his contention of growing

 

isolation of the military from society. In particular, should the values of society and the officer

 

corps be identical? If so, does the officer corps resent efforts to influence its value system to

 

ensure such similarity?

 

The second objective is an assessment of the impact of the new missions the civilian

 

leadership has assigned to the military. In particular, I am concerned with issues such as the

 

assessed impact of these changes on our combat readiness; whether officers believe these missions

 

are the military's responsibility; and whether we should accept new missions in these areas.

 

Closely related to these questions is the issue of the effect of this responsibility upon the officer

 

corps. Do officers believe these missions improve our ties to society or pose a threat to our long

 

term relations. In addition, I hope to determine if the officers participating in this survey believe

 

the military leadership should have a greater role in policy development.

 

I believe the answers to such questions can serve as the basis for assessing Colonel

 

Dunlap's concerns. Even more importantly, I believe the trends I will identity could serve as the

 

basis for proposing changes to existing policy to prevent unfavorable trends from continuing.

 

Moreover, the results may encourage additional studies of this nature across the Armed Forces.

 

 

 

 

The Survey and the Results

 

I administered the survey (enclosed at Annex A, tabulated results enclosed at Annex B) to

 

a total population of 203 officers attending courses of instruction at the Marine Corps Base

 

Quantico. Of this population, 150 officers returned a survey form to me. Unfortunately, I had to

 

eliminate 6 of the response forms. I did not use these 6 responses because the officers had not

 

answered all of the questions or their responses showed a lack of consistency in their answers

 

(such as responding with a single answer to every question).

 

Of the remaining respondents, forty of the officers attended the introductory Basic School

 

for newly commissioned officers. The other participants attended the Command and Staff College.

 

of this latter group, 71 of the officers were Marines. The remaining officers (33 total) were

 

members of the sister Services or other federal agencies.

 

I compiled demographic information on the respondents to identify indicators of the

 

causes of possible discrepancies in the results among the three groups. In the case of the Basic

 

School students, I compiled the following information on the group. The average participant was

 

under 25 years of age (75%) and had served on active duty for less than 3 years (95%). In fact,

 

most of these students had served on active duty for less than 6 months. The majority of the

 

respondents had gained their commission through the Officer Candidate School (55%). Of those

 

officers who indicated that they joined the service because of a contractual obligation, all of them

 

indicated that they would join again even if they did not have this obligation. Almost one-quarter

 

(22.5%) come from families which included career military members. All of the respondents had

 

completed their Bachelor's degree and 5% had completed graduate degrees. A total of 35

 

respondents (87.5%) identified themselves as Caucasians.

 

In terms of experience and military service, none of the respondents had served on the

 

staff at the National Command Authority (Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, etc.)

 

level. Neither did they have any direct experience in civil disturbance and law enforcement

 

operations. Five of the respondents (12.5%) did have combat experience and three of the officers

 

had participated in disaster relief operations.

 

In the case of the Marine officers attending the Command and Staff College (CSC), a

 

different profile emerges. Unlike the Basic School which trains new officers, CSC is a course of

 

instruction for field grade officers. As a result, the average officer in this group was 38 years old.

 

In addition, all of the officers in this group had completed at least ten years of service. The

 

majority of these officers were close to the fifteenth year of service to the country. At least 19 of

 

the officers had completed their graduate degree at the time of the survey and all had their

 

Bachelors degree. In addition, 61 of the officers identified themselves as Caucasians.

 

In terms of experience, this group of respondents showed a greater range of activities than

 

the Basic School students. Almost 10% of the respondents (6) had served on a staff at the NCA

 

level. Moreover, 37 of the officers had combat experience and 19 officers had participated in

 

disaster relief operations. Yet, only one officer had participated in law enforcement operations.

 

In other ways, the Marines of this group were very similar to the respondents from the

 

Basic School. For example, the majority (55%) of the participating officers earned their

 

commission via Officer Candidate School. Further, less than 10% of the respondents earned their

 

commission from one of the Service academies. Although the ratio of officers who came from

 

military families was slightly higher (38%), it was not significantly different from the Basic School

 

participants. Yet, the number of officers who would not have joined the Service had they not had

 

a contractual obligation was significantly higher (25%) than the Basic School students.

 

However, a greater demographic difference existed between the Marine officers of both

 

groups and the officers of the sister Services attending CSC. For example, the officers in this

 

group tended to be younger and have a wider variety of experiences than the Marine counterparts

 

at CSC. Almost fifty percent (45%) of the officers had combat experience. Moreover, thirty

 

percent of the officers had experience in disaster relief operations and twenty-seven percent had

 

served on a staff at the NCA level. Further, more than half of these officers (19) had completed

 

their graduate degree at the time of the survey. Yet, only one officer had experience in law

 

enforcement operations.

 

In terms of similarities, several factors in this group's profile matched the other two

 

groups. Ninety percent of this group considered themselves to be Caucasians. In addition, the

 

number of respondents from military families was similar (24%) to the results of the other two

 

groups. Also, we see a similarity in the source of the officers' commissions, with the percentage

 

of OCS and Academy graduates reflecting the profiles of the other two groups (52% and 15%,

 

respectfully).

 

With this information as a backdrop, we will proceed to a discussion of the actual issues

 

addressed by the survey. As I indicated in the previous sections, the probabilities of greater

 

military influence and participation in policy formulation and political activity will depend upon a

 

change occurring within the officer corps. Due to the strong tradition of political neutrality by the

 

officer corps, such a change would require a fundamental shift in the beliefs of the military about

 

the viability and credibility of the country's government. In effect, the officer corps must believe

 

the Nation's viability is at risk.

 

Based upon Colonel Dunlap's premise concerning the potential causes of a military coup

 

within the United States, I divided my results into seven areas for assessment. The first question I

 

addressed concerned the political orientation of the respondents. As expected, all three groups

 

indicated they were conservatives on most political and social issues. The percentage of

 

respondents which placed themselves in this category ranged from a low of 50% in the Basic

 

School (TBS) to a high of 69% among the Marines attending the Command and Staff College

 

(CSC/M). The only other category to receive more than one vote was the "middle" category. In

 

both cases, these results reflected similar values to the Bachman survey of officers two decades

 

before.51

 

This political and social orientation of the respondents raises the second topic for

 

consideration. This topic concerns the level of congruence between society and the military officer

 

corps. In other words, does the military reflect the values and beliefs of the society which

 

produced it? If we stopped our analysis at the political orientation of the military and society, we

 

would see a clear distinction already. Rarely has our society identified more than 30% of its

 

members as conservatives. However, by itself this distinction should not concern us. Rather, we

 

should concern ourselves with the question of whether the officer corps believes its values and

 

beliefs are better than similar elements within society as a whole.

 

The survey results indicated some areas where the participating officers thought they

 

differed from society's views on issues. One example concerns the military justice system

 

compared with civil system. Respondents from all three groups indicated a clear preference for the

 

military system over the civilian system. They believed the military system would give them the

 

best chance to correct any wrong they might suffer (TBS 75%, CSC/M 81%, CSC/O 80%). The

 

participating officers did not possess the same degree of confidence in the civilian system with less

 

than half the respondents believing this system would treat them as well (TBS 48%, CSC/M 44%,

 

CSC/O 55%).

 

I obtained similar results on the issue of discrimination in the military and civilian society.

 

By wide margins (TBS 56%, CSC/M 76%, CSC/O 67%), the officers believed the military system

 

would protect minorities and women from discrimination. As a result, they did not believe

 

affirmative action programs should exist within the military (TBS 87%, CSC/M 85%, CSC/O

 

76%). Although the respondents did not believe such programs should exist in civilian society, the

 

officers did not share the same level of confidence that society would protect minorities as well

 

(TBS 80%, CSC/M 69%, CSC/O 64%).

 

An issue of concern to me was the officers' responses to questions concerning the values

 

of the military and society. For example, one of my questions asked the respondents if the values

 

espoused by the military come closer to the values discussed in the country's founding documents

 

than those values accepted by the rest of society. A clear majority (TBS 81%, CSC/M 64%,

 

CSC/O 42% (plurality)) endorsed this proposition.

 

Two other questions reflected similar feelings by the participating officers. These

 

questions pertained to the manner in which the military and society view problems. First of all, the

 

respondents believed that society does not view the country's problems in the same manner as the

 

military (TBS 61%, CSC/M 72%, CSC/O 60%). Similarly, the participating officers stated they

 

did not believe that society has the same priorities for the problems that they do (TBS 75%,

 

CSC/M 76%, CSC/O 69%). Perhaps the most disturbing statistic in the survey concerned the

 

officers' perceptions of the trend in these areas. As in the previous questions, the officers of all

 

three groups indicated a gap existed between the values of the military and society. Moreover,

 

they stated the passage of time will increase the gap between these two groups (TBS 60%,

 

CSC/M 51%, CSC/O 42% (plurality)).

 

I believe these results indicate the potential for a serious problem in civil-military relations

 

for the United States. In particular, I believe these results indicate a growing alienation of the

 

officer corps from society. Instead of viewing themselves as the representatives of society, the

 

participating officers believe they are a unique element within society. This trend existed in all

 

three groups, even the officers in the Basic Course who had limited time on active duty. As a

 

result, one of the indicators of potential problems highlighted by Colonel Dunlap does exist within

 

this survey population.

 

The third issue which I addressed concerns political activism and the military. I wanted to

 

assess the degree of support which existed for the participation of military leaders in political

 

activity and policy formulation. As discussed earlier, a professional military will seek a greater

 

role in policy formulation as society tasks them to perform non-traditional duties. This need

 

reflects the military's desire to protect its corporate identity and reputation within society. Colonel

 

Dunlap indicated this desire was a critical step in the process which could lead to a coup within

 

the United States. I wanted to determine if this desire existed within my sample population.

 

The results of my survey in this area had positive and negative results. On the positive

 

side, the survey results indicated the participants did not want to play an active role in policy

 

formulation. Rather, the respondents would leave this responsibility with the Nation's civilian

 

leadership. For example, only 6 of the 144 respondents believed the probability of a military coup

 

within the United States was higher today than it was twenty-five years ago. Although several

 

officers included negative comments about the civilian government on their response sheets, none

 

expressed any desire to eliminate the civilian government and assume military rule. The comments

 

they included expressed the belief that if the public would elect the right people then the

 

government would work. As a result, the respondents still have faith in the political system.

 

Similarly, the majority of the officers did not believe active duty military personnel should

 

participate in political activity. Less than one-third of the respondents believed the restrictions on

 

political activities by active duty personnel violated their rights as citizens (TBS 31%, CSC/M

 

28%, CSC/O 24%). Rather, the respondents believed these restrictions ensured the political

 

neutrality of the military and prevented political appointments from contaminating the promotion

 

system (TBS 58%, CSC/M 65%, CSC/O 62%).

 

The respondents extended their support for restrictions on political activity by the military

 

to the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The majority of the participating officers did not

 

believe the senior leadership should debate policy issues in public fora such as the mass media.

 

Rather, the respondents believed the Joint Chief should limit their discussions of issues to only

 

those topics which the President or the Secretary of Defense has not decided (TBS 53%, CSC/M

 

59%, CSC/O 73%). Only 21 of the officers participating in the survey believed military leaders

 

should use press leaks or similar techniques to disrupt policy decisions with which they disagreed.

 

In addition, the participants recognized the desirability of having people with different

 

political views within their organizations (TBS 43%, CSC/M 41%, CSC/O 53%). However, when

 

I asked the participants to discuss the role of civilian policy makers in operational issues, a

 

distinction between the Basic School students and Command and Staff College students

 

developed. The majority (53%) of the Basic School students did not believe the civilian leadership

 

should play a role in operational issues. However, the CSC students recognized a valid right and

 

need for civilian participation in operational decisions. A clear majority in both groups (CSC/M

 

66%, CSC/O 63%) recognized this role. The most likely explanation for this discrepancy is the

 

recent exposure of the CSC students to strategic and operational policy formulation in their

 

curriculum. As a result, the officers recent exposure to this instruction may have modified their

 

views on the relationship of war to policy.

 

On the negative side, the respondents believed the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

 

should play a role in policy formulation. A significant majority in each group (TBS 73%, CSC/M

 

88%, CSC/O 79%) believed the Chic have an obligation to voice their concerns on military

 

policy issues to Congress, the media, or the public. Less than fifty percent of the participants

 

(TBS 40%, CSC/M 43%, CSC/O 42%) believed the discussion of policy decisions in public fora

 

by active duty officers was inappropriate. Moreover, none of the groups believed the military

 

should force an officer to resign if he or she contests a policy decision in a public forum (TBS

 

43%, CSC/M 40%, CSC/O 45%). In addition, they did not believe retired officers should face any

 

restrictions to their political activities even if they use their former rank as part of their argument

 

(TBS 53%, CSC/M 75%, CSC/O 72%).

 

I believe these results could indicate potential long term problems for the Nation's

 

military. Although the majority of the officers did not believe the military should play an active

 

role in political decisions, a significant minority did believe such activity was appropriate. Further,

 

they strongly believed the senior military leaders must play a role in such decisions. As discussed

 

in Colonel Dunlap's article, this acquiescence of the officer corps to a growing accumulation of

 

political power by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one of the primary facilitators of the

 

coup. (The other factor being the weakness of the Executive and Legislative Branches.) If such a

 

move by a future Chairman had the public support of numerous retired General Officers, I can

 

easily imagine a scenario where Colonel Dunlap's thesis becomes fact.

 

Let us turn our attention to the next issue of concern. This topic is the impact of policy

 

decisions upon the military and how the officers interpret the consequences of these decisions.

 

Perhaps one of the more contentious issues concerns Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The

 

military community jumps many different types of activities and operations into this category.

 

Depending upon the Service, these activities may include humanitarian assistance operations, drug

 

interdiction, or peace enforcement operations as possible examples.

 

Surprisingly, the majority of all officers participating in the survey believed the military

 

should perform these tasks. However, the three groups differed greatly in their acceptance of

 

these missions. The majority of the Marines believed the Services should perform these tasks. In

 

the case of the Basic School students, more than 63% of the respondents believed the military had

 

a role to play in these activities. The CSC Marines only had 28% of their members voice negative

 

concerns about such operations. However, they only had 40% of their members believe the

 

military should perform these tasks. Surprisingly, the officers of the other Services at CSC voiced

 

strong opposition to such operations. More than 63% of these officers did not believe the military

 

should play a role in such operations.

 

Three possible explanations for this difference exist. First, the Marines may have a

 

different view of these activities due to the incorporation of such contingencies into their Marine

 

Expeditionary Unit deployment plans. The other possible explanation is the members of other

 

Services have more experience performing such operations. As a result, their participation in such

 

actions and operations may lead these officers to a different estimate of their worth. The final

 

possibility is that such operations fall within the bounds of the "small wars" mentality upon which

 

the modern Marine Corps developed in this century. As a result, this type of operation appeals to

 

those Marines who joined because of the Corps' emphasis upon tradition.

 

Similar results occurred on the issue of which units should perform these missions.

 

Whereas the Marines believed the Reserves should not perform these missions exclusively, the

 

majority of the respondents from the other Services did believe the Reserves should do these

 

missions. When I asked the participants if such operations helped justify the Services' budgets,

 

only 28% of TBS students and 30% of sister Service students disagreed. However, 51% of the

 

Marine CSC students disagreed with this assessment.

 

The most likely explanation for this difference is the Marines recent experience in the

 

Supplemental Budget Authorization. This Bill, designed to reimburse the Services for recent

 

humanitarian operations, actually removes money from other accounts to pay a portion of the

 

costs associated with these operations. As discussed by several speakers at CSC, the Marines paid

 

a particularly high percentage of this cost. As a result, this information might have influenced the

 

participants' views.

 

By ratios of more than two-thirds, the participants supported the position that many of the

 

tasks performed under Operations Other Than War do improve the military's reputation and

 

support within society. However, by similar ratios, the respondents stated such operations do not

 

improve the morale of the unit nor strengthen the ties of the military with society. Yet the officers

 

razed the military's role in these operations will increase in the future. Pluralities in each group

 

stated the inefficiency of the civilian government and the military's recognized ability to adapt to

 

difficult tasks will force the President to use the military more often in these areas. However, a

 

plurality in each group does not believe such operations will hinder combat effectiveness.

 

Although the participants believed military participation in OOTW activities must grow,

 

they did not possess a strong desire to participate as an organization. Even though they believed

 

military organizations are the most competent organizations within the government (TBS 51%,

 

CSC/M 59%, CSC/O 33%), they did not want the military to take the lead in OOTW activities. A

 

large percentage of each group believed the President should attempt to fix the agencies which

 

have responsibility for these activities before he or she turns to the military (TBS 51%, CSC/M

 

63%, CSC/O 69%). Even more important, a large number of officers do not believe any agency in

 

the government can solve these problems (TBS 30%, CSC/M 31%, CSC/O 33%).

 

This issue does raise new concerns because we see a possible indicator which Colonel

 

Dunlap discussed in his article. This issue is the growing role of the military in OOTW. Colonel

 

Dunlap believed such operations caused a severe impact on combat effectiveness. In addition, he

 

believed such operations gave the military the opportunity to enter the domestic policy

 

formulation arena. Since many of these tasks are extremely difficult to perform well, the military

 

has a high probability of failing or being ineffective. To improve its probability of success, the

 

military leadership seeks greater authority over these areas. If the civilian government cannot or

 

will not grant this authority, the probability of the military feeling frustrated and alienated grows

 

considerably. Thus, the corporate reputation and identity of the officer corps is at risk in this

 

environment. Together, these areas give the military leadership the incentives they needed to

 

usurp the government in a time of crisis.

 

The survey results tend to support his thesis in this area. We see a recognition by the

 

officers that their role in OOTW win probably increase in the future. Although they do not seek

 

such operations, they believe the military will attempt to do these tasks because the rest of the

 

government cannot do them. They even realize that their efforts may be in vain because the

 

problems may not have solutions. However, by agreeing to do such tasks, the military risks its

 

professional reputation by attempting to solve the problem. This risk is inherent in a government

 

which requires a "quick fix", to all problems because of the short tenure of the decision makers.52

 

If the military leadership does not have any greater success than civilian agencies, the reputation

 

of the military will suffer. In light of the effort to cut the Federal budget, such failure could result

 

in new attacks on the military's access to resources. The combined effects of these circumstances

 

are the ones which Dunlap and Perlmuter addressed. These concerns are the attacks on the

 

military a corporate identity which threaten its professional values. As a result, the potential for

 

military intervention in politics increases dramatically.

 

How can our society ensure that our military does not become isolated politically and

 

socially? Many people believe OOTW would strengthen the ties of the military to society.

 

However, the results of this survey indicated the officers do not believe it improved the bonds. As

 

a result, are there any other options available to strengthen our ties? The other common proposals

 

include the use of National Service (Draft) or making the military reflect the composition of

 

society via social engineering. Examples of the latter activity include the recent policy on sexual

 

orientation and Affirmative Action programs.

 

Considering the results of the survey, neither idea has much support within the officer

 

corps. The majority of the respondents did not believe the civilian leadership should attempt to

 

mold the military through social policies. While the TBS students split on this issue, the CSC

 

officers had firm majorities (CSC/M 62%, CSC/O 54%) opposing such policies. Surprisingly,

 

similar results occurred even if the President promised the proposed program would not hinder

 

combat effectiveness or morale. Only the TBS students agreed to support such a policy. The other

 

groups did not support such programs even under these conditions.

 

On the issue of National Service, similar results occurred. Although I expected strong

 

support for the Draft among the participants, such support did not exist. The majority of the

 

respondents did not believe we should have a Draft just to ensure everybody has an obligation to

 

serve the Nation. Also, they recognized the fact that the military and government do not have a

 

method to use all of the labor provided should such service become universal. Further, the

 

respondents believed such a proposal would harm civil-military relations and widen the gulf

 

between the military and society.

 

As a result, neither of the proposals to bring the military closer to society has much

 

support among the survey population. Thus, the military leadership may have to turn to a review

 

of its recruitment and retention policies to address this issue. In particular, we may need to

 

actively recruit among the population which has traditionally shunned military service. Such

 

actions, combined with inducements, may provide the military with a broader spectrum of people

 

within its ranks. Such a broad cross section may become critical as the military reduces its size. In

 

particular, Dunlap believes this narrowing of views combined with the unification of the military

 

services could lead to a "group-think" mentality. Without any mavericks to oppose their actions,

 

Dunlap's General Officers assumed power without any opposition. To ensure a similar future

 

does not await us, we need a base of officers who are not afraid to oppose such activity. Such a

 

base will only exist if the military believes they are the defenders of society and not a separate

 

society of their own.

 

 

 

 

 

Conclusions

 

The results of the survey should give the reader some degree of discomfort. The

 

respondents spanned the spectrum from recently commissioned lieutenants to field grade officers

 

with more than twenty years of service. However, the degree of agreement between the officers

 

on most issues showed a high degree of correlation. I expected to see a wider divergence due to

 

the vastly different backgrounds of the participants. As a result, I must conclude that many of the

 

opinions expressed by the officers on this survey existed when they entered the Service. Except

 

for marginal changes, socialization within the military did not seem to have much impact.

 

The second issue of concern was the value system of the military. I have grave concerns

 

over the respondents' belief that the military's values are different or better than society's values.

 

More importantly, the officers polled in this survey believe the differences in values will increase

 

over time. Although the military encourages an image of elitism, such a belief in this area could

 

produce the Praetorian Guard mentality I discussed earlier. Instead of associating with the defense

 

of society's values, a Praetorian Guard will impose and defend fundamental values it believes

 

society needs.

 

A classic example of this situation happened in Chile almost twenty years ago. The Chilean

 

military was a very professional organization. The majority of the officer corps came from the

 

middle class. When the society elected a communist President, the military broke from society.

 

The officer corps believed this change threatened the basic principles upon which the society

 

rested. As a result, the military seized power and assassinated the country's elected President.

 

Could such a situation arise within the United States? Nobody can predict the future. At

 

the time of the coup, Chile was one of the most stable countries in South America. However, this

 

example demonstrates the clear danger of what can happen if the officer corps does not believe

 

society has the same values as they do. Under these circumstances, the officer corps has a much

 

easier time justifying its actions.

 

In line with the previous issue is the third area of concern to me. This area concerns the

 

extremely strong opposition which exists to any effort to use the military as a tool of social action.

 

Since World War II, the civilian leadership has used the military often to introduce policies needed

 

to bind society closer together. These policies ranged from the Draft; to racial integration, to the

 

integration of women. In almost every case, subsequent reviews by independent auditors have

 

praised the military leadership for their outstanding accomplishments in these areas. By almost

 

every standard of evaluation, the U.S. military is a leader in the country and the world in

 

integration efforts.

 

Despite this history of success, the degree of opposition to these policies among the

 

respondents was surprisingly high. I was very surprised by the degree of opposition to these

 

policies. Several of the respondents included detailed statements explaining their opposition to

 

such policies and their extreme dislike for them as well. Some individuals would charge that the

 

military is reflecting the values of society in this area. As demonstrated by a recent Washington

 

Post survey, less than 25% of the adult population believes such policies should exist.53 However,

 

I believe the military has served a key role in unifying our country through such policies in the

 

past. I believe many key policy makers realize this fact as well. So when the civilian leadership

 

attempts to implement more controversial proposals (such as a relaxed sexual orientation policy),

 

I am afraid such actions may further alienate the military from society.

 

My fourth area of concern addressed the issue of the military performing Operations Other

 

Than War. Due to a variety of factors, the officers in this survey seemed resigned to a growing

 

role of the military in such operations. In particular, they believe the military's role in domestic

 

affairs will expand. As discussed by Dunlap, this growing role in domestic affairs brings an

 

additional problem as well. This problem is the growing role of military leaders in domestic policy

 

issues. I believe this trend is very dangerous. In particular, I believe it could lead to a major

 

problem in the promotion system. More importantly, it could lead to the political contamination of

 

the General Officer ranks and are return to the incompetence which marked similar forays in the

 

past (such as the Civil War). In addition, such political contamination might make the military

 

leadership more receptive to tasks such as the suppression of the political opposition. The classic

 

examples of how the military can assume such a role includes Napoleon's role in the French

 

Revolution and the junta which controlled Brazil for several years.

 

The final issue of concern to me is the one which will tell us how to reverse these trends.

 

Unfortunately, I do not have the answers to these problems. I may not consider the concepts

 

which I developed before I administered my survey as viable due to the strong opposition which

 

exists within my sample population. As a result, I will close with two radical ideas which might

 

serve as the basis for exploration by other individuals in subsequent studies.

 

Many people believe the focus of effort should rest on attempts to help society identify

 

with the military. I disagree with this belief. Instead, I would expend my efforts to integrate the

 

military into society. I believe the critical issue in future civil-military relations is whether the

 

military rejects the values of society and becomes a society within itself. If this condition persists,

 

I believed Dunlap's thesis will become fact.

 

The two proposals I developed are simple. First, I would discontinue military housing and

 

the Base Exchange system within the Continental United States. Instead, I would offer two

 

alternatives to shelter our soldiers. One alternative is a variation of the current Basic Allowance

 

for Quarters concept. Such a system could mirror the current Rent-Plus system in Europe. The

 

alternative is to build housing throughout the local community. Instead of using DoD personnel to

 

maintain the house, the government will hold the individual soldier responsible. If the soldier

 

abuses the house, he or she will pay the government when they leave. On the other hand, if the

 

soldier improves the house, the government will pay them. Either way, these actions will force the

 

military back into society and increase their involvement in local affairs.

 

My second proposal is a change in the source of the officer corps. Through inducements

 

or other means, the senior leadership should attempt to recruit officers from a wider range of

 

backgrounds. We might need to revise our policies on the use of Reserve forces to allow them to

 

play a greater role in main stream, military politics. For certain organizations, we might want to

 

consider the use of qualified civilians as commanders. We should encourage the exchange of

 

officers with other federal agencies. Similar to Goldwater-Nichols provisions on the selection

 

requirement of joint experience for General Officers, we may want to impose a similar

 

requirement that mandates such inter-departmental service as well. Either way, the thrust of this

 

argument is to increase the perspectives within the military establishment to prevent the "group-

 

think" mentality which Dunlap warns us about in his article.

 

In conclusion, I believe the results of this survey support some of the concerns expressed

 

by Colonel Dunlap. However, I do not believe the conditions are as bad as implied by his article.

 

In fact, I believe some of his concerns lack any justification. However, the indicators do show us

 

that something must occur to bring the military and society closer together. Unfortunately, most

 

of the common proposals in the press have little appeal among the officers. As a result, one of the

 

tasks our future leaders must tackle is the method by which we can bind the military to society

 

once again.

 

 

 

NOTES

 

1 LTC Charles J. Dunlap, JR. (USAF), "The Origins of the American Military Coup Of 2012," Parameters,

no.2 (Winter 1992-93): 2.

 

2 Allen R. Millet, The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military, (Columbus, OH:

The Mershon Center of Ohio State University, 1979), 101.

 

3 Stephen Ambrose, The Military and American Society, (New York: Free Press, 1972), 7.

 

4 Although the military has never conducted nor attempted to conduct a coup within the United States,

three major civil-military conflicts did occur. As I will discuss later on, Washington suppressed one proposed

attempt at the end of the Revolutionary War at Newburgh, New York. The other conflict which I discussed is the

conflict between MacArthur and Truman. The third conflict concerned the raids by Andrew Jackson into Florida in

pursuit of Indians attacking U.S. citizens during the Monroe Administration.

 

5 Millet, 113.

 

6 Millet, 115.

 

7 J. N. Wolfe and others, The Armed Services and Society, (Chicago, Edinburgh University Press, 1969), 9.

 

8 Ambrose, 23.

 

9 J. Ronald Fox, The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition, (Boston: Harvard Business

School Press, 1988), 107.

 

10 The Annals of America, (Chicago: Encyclopedia of Britanica, 1976), 608-9.

 

11 Wolfe, 12.

 

12 Millet, 14.

 

13 Wolfe, 15.

 

14 Wolfe, 22.

 

15 Millet, 35.

 

16 Millet, 33.

 

17 Millet, 25.

 

18 Millet, 29.

 

19 Millet, 36.

 

20 Robert Previdi, Civilian Control Verses Military Rule, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1988), 25-30.

 

21 Millet, 45.

 

22 Previdi, 25-30.

 

23 Previdi, 25-30.

 

24 Ambrose, 120-122.

 

25 Ambrose, 116-119.

 

26 Ambrose, 125-127.

 

27 Wolfe, 25-30.

 

28 Fox, 115.

 

29 Previdi, 110-115.

 

30 Previdi, 95.

 

31 Joint Chiefs of Staff message to U.S. Atlantic Command, subject: "Joint Requirements Oversight Council

(JROC) Expanded Role," 042200Z, April 1994.

 

32 Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel Huntington, Civil-Military Relations, (Washington, DC: American

Enterprise Institute, 1977), 48-55.

 

33 Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,

1977), 33-34.

 

34 Perlmutter, 30-35.

 

35 Perlmutter, 30-35.

 

36 Perlmutter, 30-35.

 

37 Perlmutter, 34 -35.

 

38 Fox, 308.

 

39 American Caesar, 375.

 

40 Jerald Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal, The All Volunteer Force, (Ann Arbor, MI:

University Of Michigan Press, 1977), 106-120.

 

41 Wolf, 27-30.

 

42 Gary D. Ryan and Timothy K. Nennigor, Soldiers and Civilians, (Washington, DC: National Archives

Trust, 1987), 15-23.

 

43 Bachman, 120.

 

44 Millet, 45-50.

 

45 Bachman, 130-140.

 

46 "Extracts from the Officer Personnel Management Directorate Update," The Army Acquisition Corps

Playbook (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (TAPC-OPB-E), 18 Aug 1994), Appendix C.

 

47 Officer Evaluation Guide, 8th Edition, (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (TAPC-

OPB-ES), Aug 1991), 5.

 

48 Millet, 55-60.

 

49 U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, Appendix C.

 

50 Bachman, 106-110.

 

51 Bachman, 235.

 

52 Fox, 112.

 

53 Richard Morris and Sharon Warden, "Americans Vent Anger at Affirmative Action," The Washington

Post, March 24, 1995, Sec. A1.

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Ambrose, Stephen. The Military and American Society. New York: Free Press, 1972.

 

Bacevich, A. J., COL, USA (Ret.), "Civilian Control: A Useful Function?" Joint Force Quarterly

no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994-95): 76-79.

 

Bacevich, A. J., "Clinton's Military Problem," National Review 45, no. (January 1993): 36-40.

 

Bachman, Jerald, John D. Blair and David R. Segal. The All Volunteer Force. Ann Arbor, MI:

University of Michigan Press. 1977.

 

Defense Management Study Group on Military Cohesion. Cohesion in the United States Military.

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1984.

 

Dunlap, Charles A., LTC, USA, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012."

Parameters no.1 (Winter 1992-93): 2-21.

 

Encyclopaedia Britannica. 11th ed. Under "Annals of America."

 

Fox, J. Ronald. The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition. Boston: Harvard

Business School Press 1988.

 

Glidson, Edward B. Soldiers, Scholars and Society: The Social Impact of the American Military.

Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear Publishing, 1971.

 

Goodpaster, Andrew and Samuel Huntington. Civil-Military Relations. Washington, DC:

American Enterprise Institute. 1977.

 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Message to Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Command. Subject: "Joint

Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Expanded Role." 042200Z April 1994.

 

Kohn, Richard H. "Out of Control: the Crisis in Civil-Military Relations." The National Interest

no. 35 (Spring 1994): 3-17.

 

Millet, Allen R. The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military. Columbus,

OH: The Mershone Center of Ohio State University, 1979.

 

Morris, Richard and Sharon Warden. "Americans Vent Anger at Affirmative Action." Washington

Post, 24 March 1995, Sec. A1.

 

Perlmutter, Amos. The Military and Politics in Modern Times. New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press. 1977.

 

Previdi, Robert. Civilian Control Verses Military Rule. New York: Hippocrene Books. 1988.

 

Officer Evaluation Guide. 8th ed. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (TAPC-

OPB-ES), August 1991.

 

Owens, Mackubin T., "Civilian Control: A National Crisis?" Joint Force Quarterly no. 6

(Autumn/Winter 1994-95): 80-83.

 

Ryan, Gary D. and Timothy K. Nenniger. Soldiers and Civilians. Washington, DC: National

Archives Trust. 1987.

 

The Army Acquisition Corps Playbook. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

(TAPC-OPB-E), 18 August 1994.

 

Weigley, Edward M., "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary 97, no. 5 (May 1994): 29-

33.

 

Wolfe, J. N. and others. The Armed Services and Society. Chicago: Edinburgh University Press,

1969.

 

APPENDIX A: SAMPLE SURVEY

 

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APPENDIX B: SURVEY RESULTS

 

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