Operations Other Than War: Where Are We Heading"
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Operations
United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MILITARY ISSUES
PAPER
AY 1994-95
Title: Operations Other Than War: Where Are We Heading?
Author: Walter L. Miller, Jr.
Date: 18 April 1995
TABS OF CONTINTS
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY p i.
II. INTRODUCTION p 1
III. BACKGROUND p 6
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS p 9
V. CONCLUSIONS p 18
VI. FOOTNOTES p 20
VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY p 21
'There is a sad lack of authoritative texts on the methods employed in
small war... The future opponent may be as well armed as they are; he
will be able to concentrate a numerical superiority against isolated
detachments at the time and place he chooses; as in the past he will
have a thorough knowledge of the trails, the country, and the
inhabitants...'1 SMW 1-6 p.8
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: Operations Other Than War; Where are We Heading
AUTHOR: Walter L. Miller, Jr., Maj, USMC
Date: 1 April 1995 PAGES: 20 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
The purpose of this research paper is to examine how to
enhance the military's conduct of Operation's Other Than War
(OOTW). One characteristic of the United States (U.S.)
involvement, when it has been drawn into Operations Other Than
War, previously called Low and Mid - Intensity Conflicts, is that
it performs poorly, at least at the onset. In order for the
military planner to understand OOTW better, this paper highlights
the events that led to OOTW being incorporated as a means to
accomplish the National Military Strategy of "Enhancement and
Engagement". It will examine how inter agencies throughout the
U.S. government do not properly interoperate to provide support
to the lower and upper ends of the spectrum from
civilian/military involvement to solely military involvement in
those cases just short of war. As this is the background,
historical cases will be provided to clarify problems that have
occurred in the past and actions taken or in many cases not taken
to improve diplomatic relations and military operations. From
these principles, recommendations are made that can enhance the
effectiveness of future United States Marine Corps (USMC) actions
in 'Operations Other Than War'.
INTRODUCTION
The Cold War is over. The world is no longer a neat orderly
playing field where a line is drawn between definitive antagonist
powers in black hats and protagonist in white hats. In fact the
hats now appear to be more gray than a specific color.
Throughout the globe, boundaries drawn establishing Nation
States during the decline of the colonial era are now
deteriorating due to ethnic and cultural clashes. Population
growth is continuing to rise beyond many third world nation's
desire or capacity to support such as we see in Somalia, Rwanda,
and Latin America.
More than seventy-five percent of this rapid rise in
population growth will migrate to or is already located within
one hundred miles of a coast, the littorals of the world.
Drug trafficking will continue to rise as long as their is a
demand. Much of the demand resides within the Continental United
States (CONUS). As long as this demand increases, it could
ultimately lead to the degradation of societal values as has been
evidenced with robberies and slayings within our borders, which
have involved all levels of our society.
At one time the United States boasted that terrorism would
not be found within its borders. Recent examples, such as the
World Trade Center bombing and thwarted attempts on prime
facilities in New York City such as the United Nations (U.N.)
building, have opened some eyes to the fact that this can happen
in the U.S. Initial steps to counter terrorism require targeting
the terrorist abroad. Waiting until it is brought to our borders
is not countering terrorism but is then considered anti
terrorism.
Combating the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
nuclear, chemical, and biological, poses a major threat to the
United States interests. Therefore we must train to locate and
counter the proliferation of these weapons.
To paraphrase a quote from a Marine Corps Intelligence
Activity briefer, Captain Harry Frank, "... with no specific
enemy, chaos will be the norm, at least for the foreseeable
future".2 The need for a Strategy of Nuclear deterrence, though
it cannot be totally put aside, is now in a secondary role.
What then has become the primary role of our national
strategy? The answer depends upon how the reader interprets the
1994 National Security Strategy of 'Enlargement and Engagement'
statement which follows:
Not all security risks are military in nature. Transitional phenomena
such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation,
rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security
implications for both present and long term American policy.3
The above, though not all inclusive, equals operations that
the United States Military will be involved in one form or
another short of war, or as termed today Operations Other Than
War (OOTW).
The debate on whether OOTW is a misnomer is not relevant.
Therefore this author will attempt not to divulge into that arena
other than to remind the reader that the fire team leader
receiving rounds in this environment may not be compelled to
consider it other than war.
What the author will attempt to do is point out areas that
need to be addressed by the hierarchy in both the civilian and
military in order to prevent a lack of capability in combat
readiness. The Marine Corps must maintain the ability to
transition from one end of the OOTW spectrum to the other with a
minimum amount of atrophy in required skills, during a period of
significant draw down in personnel, equipment, and training
funds. This will be done by examining and comparing the skills
required to operate in OOTW as well as shed light on the need to
operate with a high degree of cohesion with the civilian
organizations involved.
BACKGROUND
Is this a shift in thought or is the National Security
Strategy in support of new National desires? Clearly, as seen in
the new strategy, it is not new. History repeats itself, as a
National Policy of involvement in operations such as these have
been in the United States interest since the early 1800s when
President Monroe sent a loud message to the European powers,
known as the 'Monroe Doctrine', that there would be no more
European colonies in the western hemisphere. Later followed the
Manifest Destiny of the 1840s and the Roosevelt Corollary of the
early 1900s. These documents legitimized the further advancement
of United States to the west and south through force via military
international police powers.4
With all this previous experience in small wars, why then
does it appear that, at least initially, the United States
performs poorly in OOTW?
Two well versed authorities on the subject, Noel Koch and
Neil Livingstone, recently pointed a finger at the inability of
our civilian and military leadership to reorganize assets and
reorder priorities to meet the future challenges in order to be
more successful in prosecuting OOTW.5 This is partially true,
as the end of the Cold War became the catalyst for the draw down
of our military forces. The strategy was changing from that of
forward defense to one of forward presence. However we failed to
reconstruct our doctrine and in so doing we have been deficient
in focusing our priorities for drawing down. Therefore the draw
down's design remained predicated on the Cold War military.
Figure one provides a pictorial of how this organization has
been employed over the past eight years. Notice that even though
there is a current draw down in the USMC base force, there has
not been a reduction in requirements:
Click here to view image
Another dilemma at the operational and tactical levels
could be aimed at the warriors refusal to accept the fact that
our military force, Desert Storm withstanding, has been generally
involved in OOTW. At face value, OOTW does not connote to the
warrior spirit nor does it relate itself to an understandable
enemy doctrine as pointed out by the retired Lieutenant General
Bernard Trainer,
A template mentality prevailed, and military study groups sought a
single formula universally applicable to theme contemptible little wars.
Unfortunately, this gave rise to the phrase "low-intensity conflict,"
which is used loosely by many to describe any conflict short of World
War III. The term gives the impression that non-NATO wars are something
a reinforced corporal's guard can handle. Of course, nothing could be
farther from the truth.6
In recent times media involvement has been the first
indication that intervention will be needed to resolve a conflict
or provide assistance to a nation or nations in need. This is
not to say that the military intelligence community has no prior
knowledge that there has been a crisis in an area, in fact in
most cases they are well aware. Rather, it is an indication that
our leadership may have trouble determining what is a national
vital interest and what is not. A key component in the United
States 1994 National Security Strategy is values and therefore
values are considered a vital interests. In that light,
involvement of our forward deployed assets, to assist in
restoration of order or to provide some form of humanitarian
assistance such as with the Kurds in Northern Iraq during
'Provide Comfort' and the Somalians during 'Provide Relief', will
probably increase.7
In as much as the "Cold War" is in the past and this is the
future of our global commitment, we must continue to prepare
ourselves for the eventualities of OOTW.
Once the State Department has made a decision that a nation
is in crisis and requires some form of assistance, and given the
normal emergency status of that crisis, the closest military
organization is called upon to initiate that aid. As the USMC
maintains forward presence year round in CENTCOM, EUCOM and
PACOM, it is normally called upon as the military force of choice
to encounter a crisis, due to an oppressed nations austerity and
proximity to the littorals. Some recent examples are Fiery Vigil
during the Mount Pinatubo crisis in the Philippines and Sea Angel
during the typhoon caused floods in Bangladesh.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Providing the services required is not the problem at the
strategic or operational level, it is the amount of unplanned
operations and maintenance funds (O&M Funds) expended. The loss
of these training dollars sorely atrophies the over all readiness
of not only the Corps but also our sister services.
As pointed out by General George A. Joulwan, CINC U.S.
European Command, in an article in Defense 94;
I am particularly concerned about the impact of unplanned and unbudgeted
contingency operations on operating accounts, training and the quality
of life for our troops and their families.8
The capability at the operational level that the United
States is most seriously deficient in coping with OOTW is the
absence of a mechanism to integrate the various federal agencies
that work with the economic, political, social, and military
infrastructures within these third world nations.
A 1986 final report of the Army-Air Force Joint
Low-Intensity Conflict Project stated the following:
A comprehensive civil-military strategy must be developed to defend our
interests threatened by the series of low-intensity conflicts around the
globe. It must be crafted in comprehensive terms, not focused on a
single conflict or single department. It must integrate all the
national resources at our disposal, military and nonmilitary, lethal and
nonlethal.9
How can the United States Military, the Department of State,
and other assistance organizations integrate their operations to
be more proficient in the execution of all levels of OOTW? One
answer is chartering a comprehensive study to identify all
assets/capabilities available to ensure that the military and
civilian assets, money, and organizations are integrated. This
would lead to a better economy of effort through understanding
how dissimilar organizations can enhance the fluidity of
operations toward a common goal. Patience, a not to common
characteristic of the American citizen, their military, and their
civilian bureaucracies, would be a requirement in order for this
research to be accomplished.
Waiting for a study to be sanctioned and completed will be
time consuming and unproductive at least for near term
commitments. To paraphrase a comment made by Lieutenant General
Anthony Zinni, Commanding General I MEF, during a meeting with
Majors at HQMC, when asked for recommendations on preparing for
future OOTW missions "You would enhance your professional
knowledge in this area by not only inviting military personnel to
speak on this subject but also individuals from the state
department and those other assistance providing organizations to
provide their views. Those who have walked the walk..."10
STAFF TRAINING
Therefore, establishing a series of cosponsored
Professional Military Education (PME) classes with the Department
of State and in the USMC appears to be warranted. With the
Department of State, we can establish a PME successful program
giving the individual unit a broader view of the subject. This
program should be geared to preparing, through education, both
the military and civilian organizations.
Second, Table top exercises, similar to the Crisis
Interaction Exercise (CIREX) conducted between the deploying
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC))
staffs and the Joint Special Operations Capable (JSOC) staff
should be established. This could be done during the planning
phases for one of the Marine Expeditionary Unit Exercises (MEUEX)
conducted during Phase II of the MEU(SOC) pre-deployment
training. As the MEU(SOC) has been billed as an enabling force
for follow on military forces, so to should it be considered an
enabling force for follow on civilian relief assistance
organizations.
During these table top exercises, external coordination
initiatives could be established between the governmental and non
governmental agencies that may be called upon in a crisis.
Agenda that should be discussed range from security,
communications, to logistics support requirements. As many of
the non governmental agencies provide unique levels of
assistance, so to do they have specific agendas that need to be
met. Establishing these exercises as an initial forum where
these agenda items can be versed would relieve some of the
friction that might other wise occur during an actual crisis
situation. Likewise establishing the means to provide timely
security information throughout the OOTW chain of humanitarian
effort would be helpful. The following is a proposed schedule
for Peace Table Top Exercises during MEUEXs:
Peace Table Top
0800 - 1130 Presentation of the Military/State
Department/Assistance agencies capabilities
1100 - 1200 Cosponsored presentation of scenario
1200 - 1300 Break
1300 - 1400 Study by organizations of scenario (Recommended
order of the following presentations would be by precedence
of first in to the theater by last)
1400 - 1500 Military Briefing
1500 - 1600 State Department Briefing
1600 - 1700 Assistance Agencies Briefing
1700 - Wrap up Peace table top
MCCDC could take the lead for this program by establishing
liaison with both governmental and non governmental agencies
likely to be involved in these exercises. The liaison would be
used to establish the ground at which a scenario could be
provided.
Obviously this is not enough time to conduct what should be
done for operational continuity but at least it would be a
conduit to phase III, Command and Field Post Exercises (CPX)s.
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
Basic training of the individual marine and the small units
should not be changed. The basic infantry training provided to
each marine, whether officer or enlisted, meets the essential
basic skills required for all spectrums of OOTW and war.
However, as pointed out earlier, there are immeasurable
categories of missions and dilemmas that our marines face in
OOTW. Obviously, there are too many variations than can be
specifically trained to, therefore this author offers the
following training as a guide additional to the basic training
presently required.
First, continuous intelligence updates would be beneficial
to the individual marines to ensure they are aware of the area,
the culture, the political implications, and the environments of
future conflicts/crisis situations. These updates should be in
addition to the normal troop information classes.
In addition to intelligence preparation of the marines, an
intense program of both dry and live fire skills should be
provided. As units are normally much more dispersed in OOTW than
in conventional war scenarios, the importance of immediate
control by junior Non Commissioned Officers (NCO)s and their
personal influence on the psychological well being of each marine
and sailor in their charge is much more prevalent. Due to time
constraints, many life and death decisions, often under strict
"Rules of Engagement" (ROE), must be made in the absence of the
direct control of superiors.
Keeping that in mind, the following training evolutions are
offered to ensure marines have an opportunity to make judgment
calls prior to being placed in a position to do so in the real
situation. The following drill is titled ROE Dry Fire Exercises:
First, a brief situation should be provided to the marines
and sailors being evaluated. This situation should place them in
a position to make judgment calls in accordance with the ROEs
that have been assigned. The drills should place the marines and
sailors in Observation Post (OP)/Listening Post (LP) and
patrolling situations. In most cases the scenarios should
present the evaluated with the most drastic situation, shoot or
no shoot decisions. Remember no matter what the senior
leadership may feel at the time the final judgment call will be
made by the young marine at the business end of his weapon. It
is imperative that he make the right call.
This training should be followed with live fire shoot or no
shoot drills. Obviously the scenarios should be encompass the
ROE or likely ROE that maybe imposed. These skills should be
built on the ability to hit what is aimed at, not only during the
day time, as depicted during the required annual qualification,
but also through the use of night firing skills.
'The rifle is an extremely accurate shoulder weapon. in the hands of an
expert rifle shot (sniper) it is the most important weapon of the combat
units. Other infantry weapons cannot replace the rifle. The rifle is
exceedingly effective in the type of fire fight connected with small
wars operations.'11
As before, a brief situation should be provided to the
marines and sailors being evaluated placing them in a situation
to make judgment calls in accordance with the ROEs that have been
assigned. The training should again place the marines and
sailors in OP/LP and patrolling situations. In most cases the
scenarios should present the evaluated with the situation of
shoot or no shoot decision making. As before the final judgment
call will be made by the junior leader with his weapon. It is
imperative that he make the right call.
To ensure the live fire drills provide a specific indicator
as to the ability of the shooter to hit his aggressor, goals
should be established. The fact that the decision to shoot in
these environments normally will come at close range supports a
recommended goal of 85% hits at night progressively from 25 - 50
meters using the double tap method of firing from all positions.
This is not only attainable but should be a requirement given
that the ROE often requires the marine in jeopardy to positively
identify that his aggressor has a weapon and is maneuvering in an
aggressive manner towards his position. Given the fact that the
decision to shoot in these environments will normally come at
close range, with a limited ability to fire more than a double
tap response, a specific skill level needs to be assigned in
order to ensure the highest probability that a return of rounds
will not occur from the aggressor. This should be used as an
indicator to the unit leader as to whether the individual should
be in the field or not during contingency situations.
'To make the practice realistic will require much ingenuity and skillful
planning but there is no other method of training that will develop
effective combat teams. Combat practice firing presents the nearest
approach to actual battle conditions that is encountered in the whole
scheme of military training. Exercises should be so designed that
leaders are required to make an estimate of the situation, arrive at a
decision, issue orders to put the decision in effect, and actually
supervise the execution of orders they may issue. The degree of skill
and teamwork of the unit is shown by the manner in which the orders of
the leaders are executed. The conservation of ammunition should be
stressed in all combat practices.'12
These drills are primitive in requirements for external
support. Any unit, whether deployed or in CONUS, can practice in
most any area they are assigned to. The reader needs to
understand that these drills are designed to provide his/her
marines the skills to make correct judgment calls not only to
ensure that national interests are maintained but more
importantly to ensure the ideal of 'self preservation' of the
individual marine is understood and that they are capable of
providing for the preservation of those in their charge.
CONCLUSIONS
Service men and women killed in action is less acceptable
today than ever before. Preparing service personnel for their
role in OOTW is essential. It does not require a complete shift
in philosophy of basic training. Our basic training requirements
are satisfactory for preparing personnel for advanced training as
long as it is geared for the environments that they are most
likely to be employed. As depicted in fig. 1, the vast majority
of our future commitments will be in environments short of war
(OOTW).
Problems occur when OOTW leads to either a complacency or
over excited attitude to the environment in which these
individuals are placed. A perfect example was the fratricide
incident where two U.S. Army SH-60s were shot down over Northern
Iraq by U.S. Air Force F-15s. It is incumbent upon the leaders
at all levels to be well aware of everyone in their charge and
their ability to handle the situation that they are being placed,
not only daily but hourly.
Though the United States has been involved in Small Wars
almost since its initiation, it never took as serious a view in
handling these situations as it has today. Mistakes are no
longer acceptable. To avoid mistakes, the senior civilian and
military leadership must provide appropriate doctrinal direction
for the separate services and civilian organizations to train
properly for OOTW.
The Marine Corps has made great strides in planning and
exercising by providing instructional teams such as the Marine
Air-Ground Staff Training Program Team (MSPT). Possibly
providing OOTW scenarios at the MEU(SOC) and Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) level on a routine basis would enhance these
organizations as they prepare to provide assistance in these
areas.
Further, an evaluation of the Battle Skills Test (BST) maybe
in order. Though all the tests required are legitimate, possibly
some additional tests, similar to those described in
recommendations above, would be warranted in an annual
examination.
Whether liked or not, the idea of Operations Other Than War
is not new. In fact, if the services would be wise enough to
research past documents they have written, such as the Army's
manuals for the Indian wars, developed following the inception of
the 'Manifest Destiny', and the USMCs' Small Wars Manual,
developed following its incursions in Latin America and the
Caribbean islands they may well find information provided that
would aid in preparation of future doctrine.
NOTES
1 Small Wars Manual (United States Printing Office Washington, 1940), sect 1-6, p 8
2 Henry Frank, (Instructor MCIA comment during briefing on the 'USMC Threat
1995-2005), 23 Jan 95
3 President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement, the White House July 1994, (Washington D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1994), 1
4 Gary A. Nash, American Odessey, (Westville Ohio: MacMillan/MacGraw-Hill Publishing
Company 1992)182
5 Loren B Thompson, Low-Intensity Conflict, (Toronto: Lexington Books 1989), x.
6 LtGen Bernard E. Trainer, Marines and third World Conflicts, (Marine Corps Gazette,
Nov 1988), 49-50
7 President William J. Clinton, A National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, the
White House July 1994, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1994), 5
8 Defense 94, Issue 3, (Washington D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1994) p 17
9 Army-Air Force Joint Low - Intensity Conflict Project 1986; Final Report, 5-6
10 LtGen Anthony Zinni, lecture to HQMC Majors on OOTW, Jun 1994
11 Small Arms Manual, (U.S. Printing Office Washington, 1940), sect 4-2, p 5
12 Small Wars Manual, (U.S. Printing Office Washington, 1940), sect 4-2, p 6
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