Military

Sixty Dos For The MEF:  Still Valid?

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues

 

 

                             EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: Sixty Days of Supply (DOS) for the MEF: Still Valid?

 

Author: Major Peter B. McMurran, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis: With the near term arrival of enhanced in-transit visibility technology, "off the

shelve" products of supply, and the reduced threat, is there still a need for our MEF

commanders to deploy with sixty days of supply?

 

Background:  The United States Marine Corps has billed itself for years as the force in

readiness. Our Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) are flexible, task organized,

expeditionary, sustainable, combined arms teams, the largest of which is the Marine

Expeditionary Force (MEF). We have historically advertised our sustainment for a MEF

at sixty days. In other words, the MEF can sustain itself for sixty days with what it brings

to the theater. This "requirement" can place a burden on the MEF commander in terms of

managing these resources. These assets are held either within his force or with the

Supporting Establishment. Defense dollars are dwindling. A way of stretching limited

defense dollars is through inventory reduction. Arguments could be made that because of

technology, industrial base products and a reduced threat, holding and deploying with 60

DOS of all ground supply stocks is necessary and wasteful.

 

Recommendation:  The MAGTF is the operational center of gravity for the Marine

Corps. Disrupting MAGTF sustainment dilutes the expeditionary combat capability of the

MAGTF. Our nation and the joint /combined community have come to depend on what

the Marine Corps can do as the enabling force. The possible dollars saved is not worth

the risk of diluting our combat sustainment which translates into combat staying

power and flexibility for the CINC.

 

             Sixty Days of Supply (DOS) for the MEF: Still Valid?

 

 

 

                                 Introduction

 

   You are the MEF G-4. The wartime host nation support agreement that the

 

Department of State and Commander in Chief(CINC) negotiated has just been dissolved

 

due to a change in the political climate of the host nation. Recent Service policy changes

 

have shifted the bulk of medical consumables and subsistence items to the industrial base.

 

You are currently in-country with a joint/combined force under MARFOR operational

 

control. Your order and shipping for wartime is estimated to be 42 days. You currently

 

have 22 days of supply (DOS) on hand with a CINC safety level of fifteen DOS.

 

Unfortunately, the MEF deployed with only 30 DOS in these two critical classes of supply

 

based upon policy decisions driving funding realities. You will be short supplies in one

 

week or you will be consuming your safety stocks unless the MEF commander requests a

 

radical shift in his airlift support from personnel transport to sustainment. Either option

 

will have an operational impact...

 

   Taking into account the above scenario, ask the basic question: Is it still valid for the

 

MEF to deploy with sixty days of supply in all classes or should the MEF deploy with

 

less? There are numerous issues and many additional questions that spring from this basic

 

question. For example, is present technology able to track supplies better then ever before

 

and thus shorten the request/ response/fill time from the distributor to the consumer?

 

            If so, would this visibility allow for our supply depots to hold less inventory? Are

 

there contractors in the industrial base that can stock items in certain classes of supply and

 

provide them at lower cost and deliver them more quickly than our ground supply system?

 

Does the reduced threat of a Soviet global war and the emphasis upon regional conflict

 

impact upon our levels of sustainment? Do we need more or less? Where did the number

 

of sixty days come from? Is it DoD policy or did it evolve over time?

 

Is it based upon Army support in theater after a period of time and is it still valid in a two

 

MRC strategic concept?

 

                                   Purpose

 

   The purpose of this military issues paper is to attempt to answer the above questions.

 

Additionally, I want to see if there is reason to shape our sustainment tail differently,

 

enabling the MEF commander more flexibility and possibly enhancing his ability to better

 

train and deploy MAGTFs. The 60 DOS position, for the purposes of this paper, will be

 

based on the deliberate plans currently tasked by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

 

(JSCP). This means that the MEFs currently plan to a 120 day plan length and assume

 

that two simultaneous MRCs could take place. I will not argue whether or not that is a

 

good or bad plan, it is given. A primary reason why I chose this topic was to improve my

 

knowledge of Marine Corps sustainment and war materiel policy and also see if maybe

 

there is a better way to utilize a shrinking defense dollar without harming the capabilities

 

of our MAGTFs. I will organize my paper by first defining and explaining current Marine

 

Corps sustainment policy with emphasis on the MAGTF. Secondly, I will briefly explain

 

how we arrived at our current policy and what DoD policies support or influence our

 

policy. Next, I will briefly examine the fiscal side of the Marine Corps and it's impact

 

upon sustainment. Then, I will introduce some aspects of deliberate planning in order to

 

demonstrate where sustainment fits into defense planning. At this point I will then look at

 

the roles and missions of the Marine Corps and why changing sustainment policy may not

 

be a good idea at this, or any other time. Lastly, in working my way through these pages,

 

I will hope to answer my initial question and in so doing, discount the idea of reducing

 

MAGTF support levels.

 

 

 

                     A Beginning:  MAGTF's and Sustainment

 

   A fundamental capability of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is it's ability to

 

operate for extended periods of time as an expeditionary force while relying upon its own

 

resources for sustainment. Whether the MAGTF is a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU),

 

a Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward ) MEF(FWD) or a Marine Expeditionary Force

 

(MEF), all are capable of initial self sustainment. This level of initial self sustainment is

 

also known as accompanying supplies. Accompanying Supplies are the amount of

 

supplies that deploy with the MAGTF providing initial sustainment. If this level is beyond

 

Naval organic lift capability (i.e. amphibious shipping) then additional lift assets (withold

 

shipping) will be allocated in order to ensure that these accompanying supplies arrive with

 

or shortly after the MAGTF arrives in the area of operations and will continue until the

 

appropriate level has been reached. Accompanying Supplies are all the unit has to operate

 

with until the establishment or execution of resupply channels, host nation support (HNS)

 

or Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA's).

 

   Accompanying Supplies may come from a combination of FMF stocks: Maritime

 

Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS), Landing Force Operational Reserve Material (LFORM)

 

or Force Service Support Group (FSSG) held assets, are but a few examples.

 

   The Marine Corps supply system is designed to support MAGTF ground operations

 

with up to the following levels of accompanying supplies:

 

                         1)SPMAGTF - as required

                         2)MEU-15 DOS

                         3)MEF(FWD)-30 DOS

                         4)MEF-60 DOS

 

   MAGTFs will deploy in response to varying missions. With a military strategy that

 

emphasizes engagement in addition to regional focus, forward presence and crisis

 

response, the Marine Corps is uniquely suited to be the initial force of choice by the

 

National Commmand Authorities (NCA). An attractive aspect of our employability are

 

the characteristics of all MAGTFs. They are task organized, expeditionary,

 

self-sustaining, combined arms teams which are forward deployed or ready to deploy. If

 

a theater combatant commander calls for the employment of a MAGTF, the size of the

 

MAGTF will depend upon the mission requirements of that CINC. If it is a situation that

 

can be accomplished by the capabilitues resident within a MEU then normally a floating

 

MEU already operating in that CINC's area of operations would be given the mission or

 

another MEU would be "chopped" to that CINC for the mission. If it is a larger

 

requirement, then a MEF (FWD) would be deployed and would probably, in most

 

circumstances, marry up with MPS shipping. As the situation develops further, and if

 

more forces are required, the MEF would be deployed.

 

            The Marine Corps can deploy initially as an enabling force and perform in a low

 

intensity/Operations Other Than War (OOTW) scenario and with echelonment of force,

 

respond to a mid to high level intensity scenario in a relatively short period of time.

 

              Responding with a sustained, combined arms capability is what our Corps is designed

 

for. It is our ability to deploy rapidly and to be ready, that is, and will continue to be, a

 

critical element to our success. It is how we advertise ourselves to the defense

 

community. If we did not have the sustainment initially to carry out our mission, it would

 

be similar to deploying a MAGTF without the notional aviation, ground combat or

 

command elements. It just isn't going to work as well as we and our Nation have come to

 

expect. The MAGTF is the operational center of gravity of the Marine Corps.

 

            Any part of which is diluted, dilutes the essence of our operational backbone and

 

because of this, there would be tremendous institutional skepticism and resistance to

 

changing the current MAGTF model. Thus, proposing to change the sustainment policy

 

of deploying MAGTFs without concrete reasoning would also be met with resistance.

 

Especially, if it sends the message, even the perception, to the joint community and to the

 

DoD at large that we are lessening the capabilities of our MAGTFs.

 

                   A Look Back: Policy History and Current Policy

 

    With a focus upon a Soviet led invasion of Europe, previous DoD policy called for

 

the concept of Prepositioned War Reserves (PWR) and Other War Reserves (OWR)

 

which would support forces through a planned baseline of 180 days. The PWR

 

requirement would support forces for day 1-60 and the OWR requirement would support

 

the force from day 61-180. Our 60 day figure was adapted from DoD policy, CINC

 

requirements and the Marine Corps interpretation of this policy. Implementation, in

 

general terms, called for our PWR to be procured

 

(60 DOS/DOA per MEF) and to be held either in the force or in-stores. The availability

 

of funding would translate this planning requirement to actual stocks. Certain classes of

 

supply cannot be procured in required quantities due to funding constraints, availability or

 

shelf life. This is usually the case with Class V (ammunition) and Class VIII (medical).

 

The MEF commander holds PWR in his immediate vicinity (force-held) or at Marine

 

Corps Logistic Bases, Albany or Barstow or at an integrated materiel managers

 

geo-location (stores- held).

 

   The caveat being that the MEF commander will have access to these stocks in able to

 

support the timelines prescribed by the CINC via the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

 

(JSCP) upon initiation of a contingency. Therefore, it was, and still is common practice

 

among the MEF commanders to force-hold a MEF(FWD) worth of stocks, roughly 30

 

DOS with the remainder being held in-stores. Current DoD policy allows for the Services

 

to use peacetime operating stocks and training stocks to meet wartime requirements.

 

Thus, these stocks are additive to war reserve materiel stocks. This enables the Services

 

to better support their wartime contingencies.

 

   Our MAGTFs are apportioned for plug to the Unified Commanders via the JSCP.

 

The JSCP states that the apportioned MAGTF, a MEF, will normally deploy with sixty

 

days of accompanying supplies. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is much broader in

 

scope and program driven. It tasks the Services to be prepared to support the National

 

Military Strategy (NMS) and the needs of the Unified Commanders.

 

   DoD policy calls for the Services war reserve materiel inventories to be sized,

 

managed, and positioned to achieve the greatest flexibility in responding to regional

 

contingencies, while minimizing DoD investment in inventories. Thus, the procurement

 

of sustainment is a balancing act between funding levels, competing requirements within

 

the Services and the warfighting requirements of the CINCs. In order to understand this

 

relationship more fully a brief explanation of the fiscal structure of the Marine Corps and

 

its impact on sustainment is needed.

 

                                Fiscal Overview

 

   The Marine Corps has five Marine unique appropriation categories. There are three

 

other categories that fall under Navy appropriations which are not required for our

 

discussion. The two Marine Corps categories that are linked to sustainment supporting

 

operations are the Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps (O&MMC) account and the

 

Procurement, Marine Corps (PMC) account. In simple terms, O&MMC account dollars

 

pay for the expense of running the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). This includes among other

 

things: transportation, training and consumable supplies. The total dollar amount of this

 

account has decreased in the last three fiscal years (1992,'93, and '94). The ability of the

 

MEF to train at consistent levels has thus fallen off as the support training dollars have

 

declined. However, the tasking to the MEF have not. Thus, equipment, personnel and

 

supplies are being pushed to perform at higher levels with less time off. This squeezes the

 

performance of assets to a finer point, one that may not be sustained over time without

 

failure. The impact upon force readiness could be substantial. As we are tasked at the

 

high end and funded at a decreasing rate, the possibility of broken systems is increased yet

 

our ability to fix them is lessened because the dollars are not there. This generates

 

maintenance backlogs. Maintenance backlogs equate to less sustainment as there is less in

 

the "barn" to pull from. Less sustainment could put the Marine Corps in a position of not

 

being able to adequately respond to CINC operational taskings. This is a readiness point

 

our congressional and political leaders are currently wrestling with. Since we are near the

 

breaking point of meeting our "routine" day in and day out missions it may be foolish to

 

further decrease our ability to sustain our MAGTFs.

 

   The other account with a much more direct link to sustainment is the PMC. These are

 

the account dollars that purchase ammunition, weapons, combat vehicles, support

 

vehicles, spares and repair parts, etc. This account has decreased by about one third since

 

1991. Thus, not only are our near term operating dollars shrinking, our ability to

 

physically purchase sustainment into the future is also declining. With this fiscal picture

 

and the continued high tempo of requirements thrust upon our operating forces, we are

 

going down a high risk, little gain road that will eventually hollow out our force readiness

 

and sustainment. From a funding perspective it could be reasoned that reducing future

 

inventory, i.e. not programming as much, could put more dollars into training, which

 

could better maintain the warfighting posture of the MEF. Well, in a sense that has

 

happened. The PMC, in simple terms, buys our inventory. It has been slashed. Our

 

operations account, O&MMC, which buys our training, has been as closely maintained as

 

possible with some decrease. Thus, today we can fight but tomorrow, well it depends. I

 

bring these points to the table because they directly relate to sustainment and the ability of

 

the MAGTF to fight per current JSCP taskings.

 

   We are already walking a fine edge and any policy change that reduces our sustainment

 

could put us in a situation that restricts rather than enhances our MAGTFs in support of

 

CINC taskings. It is my opinion that the Marine Corps would be extremely hard pressed

 

to execute and sustain two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs).

 

From an operators point of view any further degradation of sustainment could prove

 

hazardous to operating forces.

 

                       Requirements, Sourcing, and Shortfalls

 

   As mentioned earlier, the JSCP tasks the CINCs with various regional taskings and

 

apportions forces. The CINC is then responsible to develop an Operations Plan (OPLAN)

 

or a Concept Plan (CONPLAN) in order to execute what he has been tasked to do. For

 

our purposes, we will focus on the operation plan as this requires a Time Phased Force

 

and Deployment Data (TPFDD).

 

   Each component is required, based on the CINC's guidance, to develop an operations

 

plan that supports their part of the overall plan. This planning process is normally

 

conducted over a 8-10 month time span. There are numerous planning meetings and

 

refinement conferences that take place during this period of development. For our

 

purposes, we will merely look at the sustainment portion of the cycle. It is important that

 

we look here because this is where we build sustainment for our operating forces in

 

support of the CINC's OPLAN. If the Marine Corps cannot provide sustainment for the

 

MEF, this is resolved during this planning process. For example, MEF is the MARFOR

 

component for OPLAN XXXX. Class I will be used to illustrate the process. In simple

 

terms, the MEF G-4 would find a source of supply for the entire MEF Class I requirement

 

which is computed based on total number of personnel, combat consumpton factors, and

 

the length of the plan. He would first look to his force held stocks and apply those against

 

the total requirement. The delta or difference would be passed on to Marine Corps

 

Logistics Base, Albany or Barstow as they would then look to their in-stores stocks and

 

apply those against the total requirement. This delta would then he passed to the Defense

 

Logistics Agency (DLA) as they would apply their resources against the requirement. If

 

the requirement could not he filled by the DoD, private industry could then he contracted

 

to fill the void.

 

   The point here is that a requirement, its source of supply and a shortfall are passed on

 

until there is no delta and agreements or plans are initiated that fill the requirement. The

 

other part to this puzzle, logistically, is that transportation assets will need to be allocated

 

to move the supplies from its source to its port of debarkation. The important point is

 

that, conceptually, it does not matter where the class of supply comes from as long as it

 

meets the following criteria: it has transportation allocated against it, it is registered in the

 

TPFDD, and it meets the required time-lines of the component commander and the CINC.

 

   What if the Marine Corps could only source 43 days of Class I within its force held and

 

in-stores assets and then passed the delta on to outside agencies? What impact would this

 

have on our sustainability? None whatsoever, if ,and it could become a big if; the

 

remaining 15 days of Class I arrived in theater meeting the OPLAN's time lines. Which, as

 

tasked by the JSCP, means our MEF deploys with 60 DOS of accompanying supplies.

 

Thus, for our example, the source of supply would have to have that Class I requirement

 

aboard shipping on, or shortly after, the day the MEF's deployment began.

 

 

 

                       Role: and Missions: An Impact?

 

   The Marine Corps has proven one thing over and over again and that is it's internal

 

flexibility. What is it that makes us so flexible? At least a couple of points. First, our

 

missions have been so varied throughout our history that as an institution we have had to

 

be flexible. Secondly, our emphasis upon coming from the sea, recently labeled but

 

functionally as old as the Corps, has shaped our need for flexibility.

 

   Carrying our own sustainment and relying on our own is the Marine way. In 1952 we

 

were mandated, "...to be the most ready when the nation is the least ready". This is the

 

bedrock foundation of our Corps and the MAGTF is the unit which provides this

 

readiness to our nation. The MAGTFs readiness is built around it's ability to sustain and

 

care for itself.  Examples of this readiness and flexibility are expeditionary airfields, MPS

 

stocks feeding non-Marines or a MEU command element acting as a short duration joint

 

headquarters. Over the years this has contributed to a Marine mindset of being able to do

 

more with less and to be innovators within our doctrine. Historically, whether we look at

 

the birth of amphibious doctrine in the 1920's, the innovation of the 1st Marine Provisional

 

Brigade in Korea or our current emphasis on operational manuever from the sea, the

 

Marine Corps has continuely fine tuned a ready and capable combat machine. Shifting our

 

sustainment responsibilities in certain classes of supply to lessen the inventory deployed

 

with our MAGTFs and the amount the supporting establishment holds is an innovation.

 

But the test that it will have to pass is posed by a simple question: what do we gain by it?

 

And more importantly, does it enhance or detract from our combat capability?

 

 

                                     Analysis

 

   The analysis can be simple in general terms and be looked at as a function of cost,

 

sourcing and transporting. If a class or sub-class of supply can be obtained/contracted

 

when needed, in the quantities required, and transported to meet the wartime timeline's of

 

the theater combatant commander, then does it not make sense to task the industrial base

 

to provide this? On paper that may be a good argument. But you are reducing your

 

cushion against the unknown. The world has become less stable and the situations the

 

Marine Corps will find themselves deployed to requires more flexibility and staying power

 

than ever before. The Cold War world was alot clearer than today's world and our

 

responses were tailored to meet global wars. What do we tailor our force and sustainment

 

to in today's threat environment? Are we handcuffing our MAGTFs if we lessen the

 

DOS? I say we are. A MEF(FWD) deployed with 30 DOS will be constrained by the

 

CINCs fifteen day safety level policy and an order-ship-time of thirty days. Thus, the

 

flexibility and leeway for forces in country is not much. Place this MAGTF in an

 

infrastructure poor environment with a credible threat and we can see how critical it is to

 

have staying power afloat, offshore and ready. Secondly, consider the lift consraints for a

 

major regional contingency. One must be cognizant of the fact that all Services are going

 

to be requesting and competing for lift assests from CINCTRANS. As it is now we have

 

planned, dedicated sealift to carry our accompanying supplies. If the Marine Corps does

 

not have its stocks ready for embarkation at the designated port, as we don't have control

 

now since we are relying on commercial vendors, we could lose that transportation and

 

would certainly incur a cost to our Service in both credibility and dollars. Is the industrial

 

base prepared to manage stocks and have them ready at the port in time? The MEF and

 

the Supporting Establishment commanders would have less inventory to manage which

 

equates to dollars saved but how much and is it worth it? It can be arqued that as long as

 

the sustainment requirement is shown and all agencies have visibility of the requirement,

 

and if the critical transportation assets are allocated to move those supplies as prescribed

 

by the component commander than it is invisible to the CINC where it comes from or

 

where it is held. However, at the time of execution all plans change and it is concievable

 

that this neat arrangement could collapse. Is the payoff of not holding these supplies

 

greater than the risk of not having them in time of need? Pose this question to a MEF

 

commander and I propose that not a one would put his future and faith initially in a

 

commercial source of supply unless they had to. Given the choice, they would rather have

 

the gear in their barn, and ready, rather than in the midwest somewhere, maybe ready.

 

 

 

                                   Conclusion

 

  It has been the purpose of this paper to explore the possibility of the MEFs to deploy

 

with less than 60 DOS/DOA as is currently the case. It is a fact that the industrial base

 

could provide, if contracted, certain classes of supply to the DoD that would lessen the

 

inventories of component commanders. Technology is becoming increasingly

 

sophisticated. Ordering and tracking supplies in transit has allowed the time between

 

requisition and delivery to be lessened appreciably, allowing for less stocks to be held as a

 

"safety level". Some could argue that certain stocks and consumables are not required in

 

the same quantities as they were when we had a conventional threat and that since the

 

threat has lessened so to should our sustainment. I do not agree with this assessment.

 

With the requirement of two MRC's it is even more critical that we deploy with 60 DOS

 

per MEF. Why? Because our requirements are greater. Think back to the time of

 

Desert Storm when the Marine Corps was feeding Army units those first fifteen-twenty

 

days. Look at Somalia where the MPS stocks were used as sustainment for multinational

 

forces and, at times, the Somalies. Look at Operation Sea Angel where a special purpose

 

MAGTF provided relief supplies to Bangladesh after participating in Desert Storm. Look

 

at Operation Provide Comfort where a MEU operated outside it's doctrinal envelope and

 

was initially a joint task force headquarters. If we did not have this initial sustainment

 

capability what would have happened? Who would have answered the Nations call to be

 

the most ready? Look at what the Army is doing now with their prepositioning program.

 

They certainly saw the flexibility, utility and combat enhancement our MPS program has

 

provided to us.

 

   In combat, it is still all about being there with the "mostest, firstest". I submit that

 

we, as an institution, not get distracted by the majority of operations since the Cold War

 

that have been Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Our mission in its most basic form

 

is still to locate, close with and destroy the enemy. Handing out sacks of flour and

 

building refugee camps is a hard job and, at times, deadly but it is not our raison d'etre.

 

We need to train for combat and for sustaining combat. No commander wants to be

 

caught without the staying power to prosecute the campaign. Readiness and sustainment

 

are the foundations of preparedness.

 

   Historically, the Marine Corps has been held up as the force in readiness; relevant and

 

capable. Recently, efforts have been initiated by personnel from MCCDC and HQMC that

 

have changed the way we calculate days of supply. Revised Combat Action Replacement

 

Factors (CARFS) and updated ammunition and casualty planning factors have greatly

 

increased the amount of sustainment we have.  What used to represent 30 days of

 

sustainment in terms of square, cube, weight and quantity is now capable of supporting 50

 

to 60 days, depending on the class.  With these new planning factors your number of

 

containers carrying ammunition, for example, would decline dramatically. Factor these

 

new calculations across all classes of supply and one can see a smaller footprint

 

supporting our MAGTFs without touching the accompanying supply levels we are used

 

to.  In some classes, what a MEU used to carry could now be capable of sustaining a

 

MEF (FWD).  Recalculating what goes into a DOS better supports our MAGTF's

 

sustainment than does merely subtracting DOS from existing levels.

 

   It is my opinion that we should not reduce our sustainment tail and that we should

 

continue to deploy with up to 60 days of sustainment per MEF as best we can because

 

that is what we bring to the defense of our Nation. It is not worth the possible savings to

 

tinker with our MAGTFs. We get what we pay for and the Marine Corps is a bargain.

 

 

                                 Bibliography

 

1. United States Marine Corps, Concepts and Issues 1994, Headquarters Marine Corps,

   1994.

 

2. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces, U.S. Government Printing office,

   1991.

 

3. Department of Defense Directive No. 3110.6, War Reserve Materiel Policy, April,

   1994.

 

4. Marine Corps Order (FINAL DRAFT) P4081.1, War Materiel Manual, October,

   1994.

 

5. Forward...From The Sea, November, 1994.

 

6. FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, 1991.

 

7. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), 1993. (TS)

 

8. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), 1994. (S/NF)

 

9. The Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, 1992.

 

10. Marine Corps Association, The Marine Corps Gazette, October, 1994.

 

11. Interview with Mr. Nick Linkowitz, Deputy Branch Head, Logistics,Plans and

    Operations, Installations and Logistics, HQMC.

 

12. Interview with LtCol. Roy Truba, Section Head, Logistics, Plans and Operations,

    Installations and Logistics, HQMC.