Single Air Manager In Three Wars: The Integration Of Marine Air With
The Joint Environment
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
Table of Contents
Executive Summary iii
Evolution of an Interservice Rivalry 1
Origins of Inter-Service Dispute 4
The Marine Experience in Korea 6
The Air Force in Korea 8
Marine Aviation Joins the Fifth Air Force 10
The Effects on Marine Operations 12
Single Air Manager in Vietnam 18
Marine Aviation in Vietnam: 1965-1967 19
The Move Towards Single Management 21
The Marine Corps Fights the Issue 24
The Rise of the JFACC in Joint Doctrine 31
The Success of Desert Storm 36
Marine Integration with the JFACC 38
Sources of Friction 40
Strategic Air and Shaping the Battlefield 41
Airspace Control Problems 45
The Air Tasking Order 48
Marine Resistance to Integration 52
Desert Storm in Summary 53
Changes Since Desert Storm 54
Conclusion: The Changing Marine Corps Focus 61
Endnotes 63
Bibliograghy 71
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Single Air Manager in Three Wars: Integration of Marine
Air with the Joint Environment.
Author: Major Michael J. Manuche, USMC
Thesis: Beginning with the Korean War, Marine resistance to the
concept of a single manager for tactical aviation during joint
sustained combat operations ashore has been justified. The
Persian Gulf War, however, along with continuing developments
since the war, demonstrates that the concept of a single air
manager in joint operations has evolved to the point that the
Marine Corps can and should participate fully in today's single
air manager, the joint force air component commander (JFACC).
Background: Since World War II the Marine Corps has shown a
marked reluctance to allow its tactical aviation assets to come
under the control of anyone other than the senior Marine
commander in theater during sustained combat operations ashore.
This reluctance has placed the Marine Corps in direct opposition
to the greatest advocate of centralized control of air power, the
U.S. Air Force, on more than one occasion.
During the Korean War, the Marine Corps experienced such
degraded air support while operating under Air Force control that
the Marine Corps fiercely contested single air management in
Vietnam. Although a single manager for air was established, the
Marine Corps won concessions that enabled Marine aviation to
function as part of the Marine air-ground team. The increased
emphasis on joint warfare after Vietnam resulted in the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the establishment of the joint
force air component commander in joint doctrine. Experiences in
Vietnam, however, resulted in the 1986 Omnibus Agreement on the
command and control of Marine tactical aviation in sustained
operations ashore. The Persian Gulf War was the first real test
of the JFACC concept, and Marine aviation integrated into the
joint force relatively well when compared to Korea and Vietnam.
Inter-service skirmishes continued, however, as service doctrine
and old memories intruded on an otherwise outstanding example of
air power's dominance on today's battlefield. The Marine Corps
was not blameless in this regard. Efforts are on-going to solve
issues which arose in Desert Storm.
Recommendation: The JFACC is established in joint doctrine, and
greatly enhances the effect of air power in joint operations.
Increased Marine participation in the development of the JFACC
concept is warranted in order to solve continuing problems
demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, and to avoid the impression
that the Marine Corps prefers to fight its own mini-war when part
of a larger joint force.
SINGLE AIR MANAGER IN THREE WARS: THE INTEGRATION OF MARINE
AIR WITH THE JOINT ENVIRONMENT
Evolution Of An Inter-Service Rivalry
Since the end of World War II the issue of how to
integrate the air power of separate services in joint
operations has continued to be a thorn in the side of joint
warfare. All four major branches of the U.S. Armed Forces
have a stake in the issue. Questions include how air power
relates to ground forces (close air support versus
interdiction and strategic attack), the division of tasks
between sea-based and land-based air when used in the same
theater, whether or not air power should come under the
control of a single authority in a joint theater, and who
(or what) that authority should be. To date, few would
dispute that the best example of unity of effort in air
warfare covering an entire conflict is Desert Storm. But it
was also far from perfect, and represented an ideal
combination of circumstances, such as an over abundance of
air power, which mitigated many potential problems.
One of the enduring aspects of this issue has been the
historical reluctance (some would say stubborn resistance)
of the Marine Corps to allow its organic aircraft to come
under the control of any agency other than the senior Marine
commander in the theater.1 Since the problem only occurs
when engaged in sustained combat operations ashore, it has
necessarily defined itself as a problem between the Marine
Corps and the greatest advocate of centralized control of
air power, the Air Force. Beginning with the Korean War,
the Marine Corps justifiably avoided a single air manager
concept as advocated by the Air Force. The Persian Gulf
War, however, demonstrates that today's single air manager
concept, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC),
has evolved to the point that the Marine Corps can and
should fully participate in the process when participating
in sustained joint combat operations ashore.
The problem has its roots in the different purposes
which formed the two air forces, and the different
experiences each had in World War II. In Korea, Marine
Corps aviation came under the control of the Air Force for
the first time. Operating under the Air Force system and
doctrine, the Marine Corps experienced seriously degraded
support of its ground forces, which was the reason for
Marine aviation in the first place. While the Air Force
arguments, such as the importance of unity of effort, had
some merit, the practical application was so poor that it
did justify Marine resistance to Air Force control of its
air assets. Vietnam was transitional. While the Air Force
command and control system was still cumbersome and
unresponsive by Marine Corps standards, Air Force tactical
aviation improved considerably. Most important, although
the Air Force established a single air manager system,
marine aviation gained some autonomy in the system and
established that the primary purpose of Marine aviation was
to support the Marines on the ground. Finally, the 1986
Omnibus Agreement on Marine aviation codified that purpose
in joint doctrine. That enabled Marine aviation to operate
under the limited authority of the joint forces air
component commander (JFACC) in Desert Storm while still
fulfilling its primary function as part of the Marine air
around task force (MAGTF).
Unfortunately, the remnants of the Air Force/Marine
dispute led to some animosity, if not between the services,
at least between some members. The personalities of the
commanders overcame these problems, but they indicated the
potential for trouble in the future. From the Marine Corps
perspective, basic issues which justified Marine skepticism
and resistance in the past are either not there or have been
addressed in doctrine. Today, conditions have evolved
favorably for single air management in joint operations, and
the Marine Corps embraces the JFACC concept. The Marine
Corps needs to become even more involved in the process,
however, in order to solve doctrinal and procedural disputes
arising from Desert Storm.
ORIGINS OF INTER-SERVICE DISPUTE: THE KOREAN WAR
Background
The dispute between the Marine Corps and the Air Force
regarding the control of fixed-wing tactical air in a joint
theater is more than a simple case of inter-service rivalry.
At its origins, it evolved from a basic doctrinal conflict
on the tactical and strategic employment of air power.
Specifically, Marine air power was designed, trained and
equipped to support Marine ground forces. The amphibious
nature of the Marine Corps meant that the Corps would be a
force light in artillery and armor. Naval gunfire and close
air support, particularly during the early phases of an
amphibious operation, were the primary means of fire
support. The island campaigns of World War II helped
solidify the doctrinal concept of the Marine air-ground
team. As a result, the Marines gave the highest priority to
the mission of dedicated close air support for ground
forces.2
The Air Force view of air-power comes from an entirely
different experience. Disasters such as Kasserine Pass in
North Africa during World War II convinced Army Air Corps
leaders that air power must come under centralized control,
and not handed out piece-meal to Army ground commanders as
it was in North Africa. The Army, heavy in both artillery
and armor, could handle anything in the close battle as long
as the Air Force could carry out an air campaign focused on
establishing air superiority and then sustaining a strategic
and tactical air interdiction campaign. That would deprive
the enemy of the means to carry on the fight by denying
materials, supplies, and reinforcements to front-line
forces. The Army Air Corps, soon to become the Air Force,
iewed close air support as wasteful and inefficient, to be
used only in in-extremis situations.3
These two fundamentally different views of air power,
wedded as they were to the two services' different
experiences in World War II, clashed head-on in the Korean
War. This doctrinal split formed the basis for Marine Corps
resistance to the single air manager concept.
The Marine Experience in Korea
LtGen. Lemuel C. Sheperd, Commanding General Fleet
Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), in a memo to the commander
of the Pacific Fleet in April of 1951; crystallized the
Marine Corps' assesment of the air support they were
receiving during the Korean War.
"A study of all the foregoing has made
it quite apparent to me that we are confronted
with a most serious problem - one which has its
course in a fundamental divergence in principle.
We believe in providing for a small number of
on-station planes; the Air Force does not. We
believe in continuous direct communication between
the front line battalion and the controlling air
agency; the Air Force does not. We believe that
close air support of the front line troops should
take precedence over routine interdiction
missions; the Air Force does not. We believe
these things implicitly, have repeatedly
demonstrated their soundness, and adhere to them
as principles. Nevertheless, we are at present
unable to exploit their tactical usefulness
because the 5th Air Force will not permit our air
units to function under the technique which we
recognize as most effective. I feel that this
situation cannot be permitted to continue; that
the issue must be brought clearly into focus and
that a solution must be sought which will permit a
full employment of Marine air-ground power as we
know it."4
It was not always that way, to be sure. Marine ground
forces received excellent support from both carrier based
naval air and Japan-based Marine air under operational
control of Naval Forces Far East (NavFE). Marine air based
inside Korea also provided excellent support up to and
including the Chosin Reservoir withdrawal. Land-based
Marine air was technically under operational control (opcon)
of the Fifth Air Force, commanded by Major General Earle E.
Partridge, throughout this period. Verbal agreements,
however, between Major General Field Harris, commander of
the 1st Marine Air Wing (1st MAW), and General Partridge
negated the need for Marine aviation to work through the Air
Force command and control system. Thus, Korea-based Marine
air, in reality, operated within the Marine command and
control (C2) system, providing support in the manner to
which Marines were accustomed.5 Why, then, did the Fifth
Air Force receive opcon of Marine aviation in Korea, and
what was the result? The answers to these questions provide
insights to the Marine Corps' resistance to the idea of a
single manager for aviation in joint operations which exists
to this day.
The Air Force in Korea.
To fully understand the problems the Marine Corps
encountered working with the Air Force in Korea, it is
necessary to examine the position in which the Air Force
found itself at the start of the conflict. Most air
strategists in the United States believed that nuclear
weapons and air power had fundamentally changed the nature
of warfare in the 20th century. Large land forces were
vulnerable to nuclear attack, and even in "limited" wars
only small land forces would be necessary to draw out the
enemy and make them vulnerable to attack.6 Since that was
the case, the argument went, it was not necessary to spend
money on training and equipping a large tactical air force.
Not all airmen subscribed to this view, of course, but in a
time of drastically reduced defense budgets the Air Force
spent its scarce dollars on strategic nuclear forces to the
detriment of its tactical forces.7
Far East Air Forces Command (FEAF), the parent command
of the Fifth Air Force, suffered as a result of these
strategic decisions. FEAF's primary mission was the air
defense of Japan, and nearly all of its training and
equipment went towards that mission. The Fifth Air Force
spent little or no time training with the Army in air-ground
operations, and no viable system of command and control for
air-ground operations existed.8 FEAF would have to construct
one on the spot in Korea. Marine aviation, on the contrary,
was a tactical force without any strategic mission, and so
maintained a better state of readiness with respect to
support of ground troops.
In addition to the lack of emphasis on air-ground
operations due to budgetary constraints, the Air Force view
of the use of tactical air was much different from that of
the Marine Corps. To the Marine Corps, aviation was
integral to the ground combat forces. As alluded to in the
introduction, that was anathema to the Air Force. Any
system that divided air power among the ground units meant
that air commanders could not concentrate and employ air
power at what they saw as the decisive place and time.9
Finally, the priority of missions for the Air Force was:
first air superiority, then interdiction, and lastly close
air support. In the Air Force view, although close air
support was at times necessary, it detracted from the
interdiction effort which could bring the conflict to an
end more quickly.10 Major General Otto P. Weyland,
commander of FEAF after General Stratemeyer, expressed this
view well:
"In a static situation close support is an expensive
substitute for artillery fire. It pays its greatest
dividends when the enemy's sustaining capability has
been crippled and his logistics cut to a minimum while
his forces are immobilized by interdiction and armed
reconnaissance."11
Marine Aviation Joins the Fifth Air Force.
On October 8th, 1950, Lieutenant General Stratemeyer,
commander of FEAF, requested that Far East Command, under
General Douglas MacArthur, assign to FEAF operational
control of all air units operating over North and South
Korea. He believed that the allies could realize the full
potental of air power only if it was brought under the
control of a single air commander directly responsible to
MacArthur.12 That included, of course, Marine aviation as
well.
Stratemeyer's request came at a time of an increasing
tendency by the Army to request a close air support system
similar to the Marine Corps system. Marine close air
support was very effective up through the Chosin Reservoir
campaign not only for the 1st Marine Division, but for the
Army's X Corps as well.13 Additionally, the publicity for
the Air Force at home in the U.S. was at an all time low,
while the Marine Corps, in comparison, received especially
favorable coverage for its close air support operations.
Incidents of fratricide by Air Force bombers were well
publicized.14 In December of 1950, the Army X Corps
produced studies that recommended that each corps receive
operational control over its own force of tactical aircraft.
Seeing a repeat of North Africa, FEAF moved to stop demands
for a change in the Army-Air Force system of air support.
It was clear that the Air Force could not possibly provide
the same level of close air support to 60 to 100 divisions
that the Marine Corps provided for just one. By Christmas
of 1950, the 1st Marine Air Wing found itself under the
operational control of the Fifth Air Force and the joint
operations center (JOC).15
The Effects On Marine Operations
In their book Joint Air Operations: Unity in Command
and Control, 1942-1991 James Winnefeld and Dana Johnson
state "...once one got past the doctrinal differences
between the Marine Corps and the Air Force on the subject of
close air support, the interface between the two services
proved to be more harmonious than that between the Air Force
and the Navy."16 They go on to quote the official Air Force
history by Robert Futrell:
"Operating as it did from South Korean airfields, the
First Marine Air Wing's operations were smoothly and
effectively integrated into the control
system.... General Partridge therefore allowed the
Marine air wing considerable latitude for planning and
ordering its air operations....In order to maintain
their primary specialty, the Marine airmen customarily
used most of their sorties for the support of ground
troops."17
This may have been true prior to Christmas of 1950, but
Marine commanders were anything but happy with the air
support they received after Fifth Air Force assumed true
opcon of Marine aviation. In February 1951, the U. S.
Eighth Army launched "Operation Killer" in order to cut off
enemy troops who had penetrated into eastern South Korea and
formed a salient. According to the official Air Force
history, "Operation Killer" was a smashing success.18 The
official Marine Corps history is not so generous, however.
"Operation Killer" was the first real test for Marine air
working within the JOC, and the Marines viewed it as a
serious degradation of support. Marine General Lewis
"Chesty" Puller, acting commander of the 1st Marine
Division, considered the air support on March 1st so bad
that he sent the following memo to CG FMFPac for the record:
"We are having very little success in obtaining Marine
air for CAS...missions and practically no success in
having Marine air on station for CAS missions...Most of
our CAS missions in the current operation have been Air
Force of Navy Carrier planes.... We have attempted to
insure that Marine air would support us, and to cut
down the delays in receiving such support, as evidenced
by the attached dispatches. We have received no
decision relative to our requests. Apparently, the
answer is no by default."19
On March 3rd, Marine F-4U Corsairs did provide the
required close air support, but the problem as the Marines
saw it was that air support when coordinated through the JOC
was often late in arriving. On several occasions infantry
had to go ahead with only artillery support, causing the
whole plan of attack to be altered.20 Meetings with General
Partridge meant to rectify the situation met with only
temporary success, as sorties available for CAS increased
only for a short time.
During "Operation Ripper", a follow up operation for
"Killer", Marine CAS problems continued to worsen. On April
8th, Major Roy R. Hewitt witnessed an engagement from the
Air Support Section of Marine Tactical Air Control
Squadron-2 (MTACS-2), in which 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines,
requested air support against an enemy 120mm mortar
position. It took the air support section 45 minutes just
to contact the JOC. Four Marine jets were supposed to be
available for scramble alert, but had already been sent to
another target by the JOC. Twice, the JOC informed the air
support center that aircraft had been scrambled, but none
appeared in the intervening two hours. Next, the JOC
informed the Marines that they would have to request support
through the 1st Cavalry Division to which they were
attached. During this time, 10 Marine fighters had checked
in and out of the area but, under control of Air Force
"Mosquito" airborne controllers, provided no support to the
7th Marines. Finally, after six hours, the Marines got
support from four Air Force F-80s under the control of a
Mosquito who:
" would not relinquish control of the aircraft to the
Forward Air Controller on the ground who could see the
target much better... After having the fighters make a
couple of passes, the Mosquito took the fighters and
went to another target without having completely
destroyed the position."21
This is in sharp contrast to operations prior to
December 25th, 1950, when the Marine C2 system was in use.
During the Inchon-Seoul operation, for example, the average
response time to requests for air support was 15 minutes,
while in May and June of 1951 it was 80 minutes.22 The
Marine system worked equally well for the Army when
receiving air support from Marine aviation. The following
is from the commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division,
U. S. Army, commenting on support received from 17 September
through 20 December, 1950:
"It is worthy to note that in 57 Days of combat
1024 sorties were flown by Marine Aircraft in close
support of the division without a single casualty among
our own troops due to friendly air action. This record
I attribute to the fact that adequate control was
available with front line units.. In many instances
Marine planes were bombing and strafing within 200
yards of our front lines."23
One of the reasons air support deteriorated so
drastically for the Marines was that General Partridge
treated the 1st MAW as simply another unit of the Fifth Air
Force, with no special need to support the Marines. All the
units of the Eight Army needed air support and there was
simply not enough to go around. Still, in a letter he wrote
in 1959, he stated that he believed the Marines got more air
support than any other unit on the ground. But the problem
as the Marines saw it was not so much quantity as quality.24
As has been described above, delays and unreliability were
the primary culprits under the Air Force system.
The main difficulty with the Joint Operations Center
for the Marines was that it separated close air support from
ground control. Under the Marine system, tactical air
control parties (TACP) at the battalion and company levels
could request air directly from the controlling authority.
Higher headquarters listening in on the frequency checked
for conflicts and gave approval by remaining silent. Under
the Air Force system, forward air controllers (FACs) were
assigned only to the regimental level and every request for
air support had to be channeled through regimental and
division levels to the JOC for approval before the tactical
air command center (TACC) got the request for action. Since
the Air Force would not allow the use of aircraft on station
over the battlefield, sorties often had to be diverted from
other missions. That meant the pilots were not familiar
with the situation on the ground and often did not have the
ideal ordnance for the job.25
In addition to the control problems, the Marines
suffered from philosophical differences with the Air Force
right into late 1951. During an interdiction campaign
called "Operation Strangle," the commanding general of the
Eighth Army had agreed to a limit of 96 sorties per day for
close air support so that the bulk of available air could go
for interdiction. Of that 96 sorties, the Marine division
received roughly 23 per day, a number that the official Air
Force history referred to as the "lion's share." This was
during the bloody "Punchbowl" operations in August and
September of 1951. The 1st Division commander complained to
General Frank Everest, who had relieved General Partridge as
Fifth Air Force commander, but received no increased
support.26 From 3 to 21 September, the Marines requested
182 missions and received 127, but of these only 24 arrived
when needed. General Thomas, the 1st Division commander,
estimated that many of his 1,621 casualties during that time
were due to poor or no air support.27
It is important not to underestimate the need for
interdiction and air superiority, and the Air Force effort
at unity of command guaranteed both. It was also a good
faith effort at providing close air support by concentrating
it at the right time and place, rather than breaking it up
into "small packets" which, in the Air Force view, was
wasteful and unable to shift the effort in response to a
concerted enemy attack at a given point.28 For the Marine
Corps, however, it was a lesson in how not to do business,
and one that Marines would not soon forget.
The Single Air Manager in Vietnam: Korea Part II
The Marine and Air Force doctrinal conflict continued
full swing during the Vietnam conflict. As Retired Admiral
James Winnefeld wrote, "A book could be written about the
doctrinal disagreements between the Air Force and the
Marines during the Vietnam War."29 Most of those
disagreements were simply a continuation of the dispute over
close air support philosophy and command and control systems
that still existed right up to the end in the Korean War.
The Marines saw the idea of unity of command under an Air
Force system as a threat to the Marine air-ground team
concept, something they had already seen in Korea with
negative results.30 The Marines would again lose their
argument and come under control of the Seventh Air Force in
South Vietnam, commanded by General William W. Momyer. The
difference this time was that Marine perseverance (some
would say stubbornness) would lead to a situation which was
acceptable to Marine leaders in the field, if not in
Washington.
Marine Aviation in Vietnam: 1965-67
Relations between the Marine Corps and the Air Force
were cordial enough at first. Marine ground forces entered
Vietnam in March of 1965, taking responsibility for the area
along the demilitarized zone known as I Corps. By 1966, the
Marines had reached full strength. The Third Marine
Amphibious Force (III MAF) consisted of the 1st and 3rd
Marine Divisions and the 1st Marine Air Wing with associated
service support elements. Since there were no other major
allied ground forces in the area, the great majority of
Marine sorties went to supporting Marine ground forces.31
From 1965 to March of 1967, Military Assistance Command
Vietnam (MACV) Directive 95-4, issued by General William
Westmoreland on 13 July 1965, governed the control of Marine
aviation. Under this agreement, the Marines provided
sorties to the 2nd Air Division, later to become the 7th Air
Force, for air defense missions which the Air Force would
have responsibility for. The 1st MAW provided these sorties
only after support requirements for III MAF had been met.32
As Allen Millet points out in his book Semper Fidelis, under
this system the concept of the Marine Air Ground Team grew
to fruition, reaching the highest point of effectiveness in
the history of the Marine Corps against heavy and determined
opposition from Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in I
Corps. Ironically, this effectiveness occurred in a
sustained land campaign, not amphibious operations.33
Throughout this period, 80 percent of the approximately
60,000 sorties flown by 1st MAW were in support of III MAF.
Unfortunately, that figure would become a source of friction
for two somewhat conflicting reasons. First, as Army forces
entered I Corps, General Westmoreland became concerned that
not enough Marine sorties were going to Army units, as he
had directed.34 Second, General Momyer, Seventh Air Force
commander, believed that he needed to acquire operational
control of all aviation in South Vietnam in order to reduce
the number of command and control systems in one theater,
and so that he could better focus air power where it was
needed most, consistent with Air Force doctrine.35 As will
be shown below, these two requirements were in conflict
because the intent of the two commanders were different.
General Westmoreland seemed concerned about air support for
Army units, while General Momyer seemed concerned that he
have more air available for interdiction, a mission he
considered more important than close air support.
The Move Towards Single Management.
While MACV directive 95-4 worked well for the Marines
up to mid-1967 , the enemy chose to make I Corps a focus of
effort. Marine casualties began to rise as the ratio of
forces in the zone dropped to 4:1 in favor of the allied
forces, the worst ratio in Vietnam.36 The Marines were
still exacting fearsome casualties on the enemy, but in
response to the increased activity, General Westmoreland
added the Americal Division in the Fall of 1967 and two more
Army divisions in January of 1968.37 Soldiers outnumbered
Marines by over two to one, but Marine air continued to give
the bulk of its support to Marine ground forces. This was a
source of great concern to Westmoreland, and General Momyer
also cited that as a problem in his book Air Power in Three
Wars.38 Oddly enough, General Victor Krulak, Commanding
general, FMFPac, worried in 1966 that the Marine Corps was
providing too many sorties to Seventh Air Force. Many of
these sorties were being used North of the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ) in Operation "Rolling Thunder." In March of
1966, over half of all sorties flown by Marine aviation were
in support of the Seventh Air Force.
"[General Krulak] observed that the CinCPac rationale
for the number of Marine fixed-wing squadrons in
Vietnam rested on the support required by III MAF
ground forces. Krulak feared that the sortie figures
could be used against the Marines in interservice
differences over the employment of Marine air."39
Increased enemy action made the issue a moot point; 80
percent of Marine sorties were going in support of Marine
ground forces by the end of 1966.
To the Marine Corps, the concern over the support given
to the Army seemed hollow. For one thing, the Army used
armed helicopters in direct support of ground troops,
something the Marines had not yet adopted. Secondly, one
might ask why the Air Force was not doing more to support
the Army forces on the ground. Millet suggests that General
Momyer wanted Marines to conduct the lion's share of air
support in I Corps so that Momyer could increase the number
of Air Force sorties devoted to interdiction.40 FMFPac
statistics for 1967 support that view. In 1967, 22 percent
of the 80,000 sorties flown by Marine air came under the
direction of the 7th Air Force. Of these 18,000 sorties,
7th Air Force used more than half against lines of
communication in Laos and in North Vietnam. An FMFPac
report for March of 1968 notes that any number of these
sorties could have been used for close air support of Army
units in I Corps, had that been a priority.41 Such figures
seem to refute General Momyer's claim that "The Marines
provided no significant amount of sorties for use by the 7th
Air force for close air support in South Vietnam during this
period."42 However, he reveals his true sentiments in the
next paragragh of Air Power in Three Wars when he says "It
would have been much more effective... to use aircraft on
the lines of communications in Laos or the lower Route
Packages where there were some significant targets."43
A better argument for a single air manager in South
Vietnam revolved around the difficulties of coordinating the
activities of two large air forces in the small area of
Vietnam with each operating under a different air control
system.44 The Marine Corps felt the system as it existed
prior to March 1968 had worked well the previous three years
for both Army and Marine ground forces, and consequently
argued that a change was not necessary. The Marines also
felt that the single air manager system proposed by the Air
Force would add layers to their tactical air control system,
increasing response time.45 The Air Force, on the other
hand, felt having two separate systems led to some targets
being hit by both forces while others went without being hit
at all.46 The massive air effort of both forces around Khe
Sanh in March 1968 seemed to be the culminating point for
General Westmoreland, and on March 2nd 1968 he requested
that his deputy for air, General Momyer, assume "mission
direction" of all fixed wing assets in South Vietnam. After
taking the case all the way to the President, the Marine
Corps lost the fight, and CincPac approved General
Westmoreland's request on March 8th.47
The Marine Corps Fights the Issue.
General Momyer subsequently was to maintain that it was
the establishment of a single air manager which provided him
the flexibility needed to deal with the ensuing Tet
offensive by South Vietnamese communist forces in the Spring
of 1968.48 More recent analysts, such as Willard J. Webb,
writing in Joint Forces Quarterly, also suggest that the
single air manager in Vietnam was preferable to the system
in place prior to March of 1968:
"The single manager experience in Vietnam proved
the value of central control of air assets in joint
operations. When air forces of two or more services
participate, the joint commander must look to a single
manager to plan, allocate, and coordinate all air
resources."49
Yet it is difficult to find hard data to support such a
view, logical as it may seem. The single air manager
probably did have a positive effect on interdiction efforts
in South Vietnam, since Naval air power could then be better
coordinated with Air Force assets. The initial effect on
Marine operations was tangibly negative, however.
It is easy, in fact, to find data on the negative
effect single air management had on Marine air support. The
Marine Corps supplied it in abundance as it chose to fight
the issue until 1970, when a new directive satisfied most of
the Corps' concerns.
Under the Marine system, the preplanned air support
process had only three steps, taking roughly only 18 hours
from submission of the request in the field to bombs on
target. The Air Force system added three more steps, along
with additional layers of processing between I Corps units
and the 7th Air Force tactical air control center (TACC) 50
Figures 1 and 2 contrast the two systems.
Click here to view image
The Marines saw the new system as primarily a
producer-oriented effort, while the Marine system was a
consumer-oriented system, and therefore much more responsive
to the ground commanders' needs.53 An FMFPac report on
operations in March 1968 focused exclusively on single air
management. According to that report, response times to
preplanned requirements jumped from 18 hours to anywhere
from 38 to 50 hours. The report also detailed several
instances of poor coordination and confusion caused by the
new system. Most importantly, the system greatly reduced
the reliability of air support for the Marines. During the
month of April, the Air Force TACC approved only 37 percent
of preplanned requests, while only half of those targets
were actually attacked. The key for the Marine Corps was
that the Marine direct air support center (DASC) was
essentially a tool for the use of the ground commander, in
contact with him as well as with supporting air assets. The
Air Force DASC, in contrast, operated as an extension of the
7th Air Force TACC, was remotely located from the ground
commander, and did not maintain direct contact with
aircraft. Thus, as the FMFPac report concluded, "I DASC has
operated, to a large extent, independent of the ground
commander's authority."54 The Marine Corps clearly saw a
return to the problems encountered in Korea.
Continuing pressure by Marine commanders in Vietnam and
by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in Washington were
successful in forcing some changes in the single manager
system, thanks, in part, to some loopholes in the system
which the Marines were quick to take advantage of. Under
the single air manager system, 1st MAW reported daily sortie
availability based on a 1.0 sortie rate, meaning one sortie
per aircraft per day. Because 1st MAW generally exceeded a
1.0 sortie rate, all additional sorties could be scrambled
directly by the Marine DASC at Cape Horn in I Corps, which
did not have to get approval from the 7th Air Force TACC.55
In response to further attempts by Marine commanders to
alter the system, General Westmoreland instituted a change
to the system effective 30 May 1968. 70 percent of all
strike sorties would be allocated on a weekly basis for use
in accordance with MACV priorities, while 30 percent would
be assigned daily to meet requirements in response to enemy
activity. Westmoreland believed this would put some
responsiveness back into the system for ground commanders,
who would receive a constant number of strike sorties for
their use. Although this did not satisfy General Leonard F.
Chapman, the Marine Commandant, it did improve the
situation.56 7th Air Force also returned a portion of
Marine sorties for special Marine requirements, such as
landing zone preparation and helicopter escort.57
William Webb quotes Marine Lieutenant General Keith
McCutcheon, III MAF Deputy Commander for Air in 1970, as
saying that the single air manager was a net gain for air
operations in South Vietnam.58 But General McCutcheon goes
on to say that it was made to work through "gentlemen's
agreements between the on-scene commanders.... for all
practical purposes, the system worked around to just about
where it was in the pre-single management days..."59 Taking
a more parochial view, Brigadier General Homer S. Hill,
Assistant Wing Commander, 1st MAW, echoed that view:
"Well sure it is working. It is working because the
Marine Corps had provoked so many changes to the
original single management concept that it pretty well
parallels the old Marine Corps system. We have managed
to prod some flexibility out of this thing, but the
disease is still there. It has got to be cured."60
The Marines continued to fight the single manager
system right up to 1970. At that time, General Westmoreland
published a new MACV directive on air support. The Marine
Corps agreed to this new directive because it acknowledged
the integrity of the Marine air-ground team while preserving
the single air manager in name only, at least with respect
to the Marine Corps. The official Air Force history states:
"The decision in March 1968 to make the Air Force the
single manager of tactical aircraft in Vietnam was
quickly modified, returning substantial control to the
Marines. This prevented a true test of the single
manager concept and opened the door for resumption of
the debate after the war."61
What for the Air Force was a "resumption of the debate"
was for the Marines an important precedent for establishing
the integrity of the air-ground team in future joint
operations in sustained land combat. In that sense, Vietnam
was a transition point for the Corps. Although the debate
was far from over, by validating the importance of Marine
organic air assets to Marine operations, Vietnam essentially
set the basis for how Marine forces would operate in a joint
force with an air component commander. For the first time,
Marine concerns began to be part of joint doctrine, such as
it was.
THE RISE OF THE JFACC IN JOINT DOCTRINE
After Vietnam, debate continued on the issue of control
of fixed wing air assets in sustained joint operations. The
Marine Corps in 1981 secured an agreement which recognized
the importance of Marine organic air assets to Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations. This was the
precursor to the 1986 Omnibus agreement, which certainly
would not have occurred had the Marine Corps not fought so
hard to retain control of its air assets in Vietnam. While
the Marine Corps was working out its vision of the
air-ground combined arms team, the rest of the military was
marching toward increased interoperablity and "jointness."
Several instances occurred which hastened this process
along. Naturally, many of the mid-grade officers from
Vietnam who elected to make the military a career resolved
that such a debacle would not happen again. They did not
direct their ire only at political interference from
Washington in operational details, but they also recognized
that service parochialism had played a large part in that
painful conflict.62 That may explain why three consecutive
chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vesey,
Admiral William Crowe, and General Colin Powell, listed
joint doctrine as one of their highest priorities.63 During
this time, deficiencies due to poor inter-service
cooperation often surfaced during joint operations,
sometimes with disastrous results. These included the Iran
hostage rescue disaster as well as more successful
operations such as Grenada, El Dorado Canyon (the 1986 air
strike on Libya), and the invasion of Panama. Each of these
operations, successful or not, highlighted instances of
incompatible equipment, different terminology, lack of
knowledge of sister service doctrine, or simply a sense that
another service did not even belong in the operation.
In 1986, Congress took action designed to eliminate
much of the service rivalry that seemed to be the root cause
of these problems. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
transferred power from the service chiefs to the
commander-in-chiefs (CINCs) of the various unified and
specified commands. The CINCs gained authority with respect
to both operations and contingency planning, but the most
important area was probably in resource allocation.64 As a
result, when an Army CINC said he needed a Navy asset in
order to accomplish his mission, there was little argument
among the service chiefs. Even if there were,
Goldwater-Nichols consolidated the power of the joint chiefs
in the person of the Chairman, who now had final say on JCS
issues and became the primary military advisor to the
President. By consolidating power, many interservice issues
could be more easily resolved because someone had authority
to make a decision.65
The area of air power which Goldwater-Nichols affected
the most was also the most visible and most contentious; the
control of aviation in a joint theater. On 4 March, 1986,
the joint forces air component commander was born in a
message from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
message established the authority of a joint force commander
(JFC) to appoint a JFACC whose
"responsibilities will be assigned by the Joint Force
Commander (normally these would include, but are not
limited to [emphasis added], planning, coordination,
allocation and tasking based on the Joint Force
Commander's apportionment decision)."66
Embedded in that message was the new policy for command
and control of Marine Tacair in sustained operations ashore,
also known as the Omnibus Agreement between the Air Force
and the Marines and approved by the JCS. By now, most
interested parties are familiar with that agreement, but we
will reprint it here for ease of reference:
"The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
commander will retain operational control of his
organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF
air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground
element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets
will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The
MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the
Joint Force Commander, for tasking through his Air
Component Commander, for air defense, long-range
interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties
in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be
provided to the Joint Force Commander for tasking
through the Air component commander the support of
other components of the joint force, or of the joint
force as a whole."67
The message goes on to say that the JFC has the authority to
reapportion and/or reallocate any MAGTF sorties when he has
determined that "...they are required for higher priority
missions." It also explicitly states that air defense,
long-range interdiction and reconnaissance sorties are not
excess sorties.
In response to the Chairman's message, the Commandant
of the Marine Corps issued White Letter 4-86 endorsing the
JFACC as outlined in that message. The White Letter
stressed that:
"I do not believe that the new '1986 Omnibus
Agreement' needs further elaboration of definition.
Quite clearly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorse the
integrity of the MAGTF. The bottom line is that the
Joint Force Commander is in charge. If he personally
believes that he has higher priority missions for any,
repeat any, Marine TACAIR, he has the authority to
utilize them as he sees fit."68
Clearly, we had come a long way from the Korean War,
and the Commandant's White Letter seemed plain enough to end
discussion, but it did not. There were, and still are,
ambiguities in the agreement. For one thing, the agreement
does not define the term "direct support." Does that mean
close air support only? For Marines, deep air support is
just as important, as are armed reconnaissance and
interdiction flights which the MAGTF commander may wish to
execute within his Area of Operations. It also does not
specify how many sorties the MAGTF might have to give up for
missions like air defense, which are not "excess sorties."
A "reasonable man" approach would seem to make things easy.
Commanders on the scene would work out the details, as long
as they were consistent with the obvious intent of the
agreement. Unfortunately, service doctrine and parochial
fears dating back to World War II (for the Air Force) and
Korea (for the Marines) led to some doctrinal skirmishes
over the JFACC concept. In an article published in the
December 1990 issue of Proceedings Air Force Major John
Valliere documented some of the bickering between general.
officers of the two services. Although Marines may be wary
of some implications he draws while wearing his "Air Force
hat," he correctly focuses on the issue when he says that:
"The Omnibus Agreement is in line with both Marine
Corps and Air Force doctrine. The joint counterair
doctrine tasks the MAGTF to provide only certain
sorties to the joint task force, and these sorties
would be used for priority missions by the joint force
commander. What is needed now is not doctrine but
understanding."69
Major Valliere's article was timely. Iraq had invaded
Kuwait that August, and events would soon demonstrate how
much understanding had been reached.
The Success of Desert Storm
The general consensus among Gulf War observers is that
the air war in Desert Storm was the most successful air
operation in history. Indeed, some critics of air power
engaged in some remarkable turn arounds. One writer who had
suggested abolishing the Air Force just prior to the war
sang its praises afterwards, even suggesting that it was now
the Navy which brought questionable assets to the theater.70
One aspect which nearly everyone agrees on is that the
success of the air war was attributable to the early
appointment of a single authority to direct the air
effort.71 That authority was Lieutenant General Charles
Horner, commander of Central Command's Air Force component.
This was a logical choice since, except for the early stages
of the buildup, the Air Force had the preponderance of the
air assets in the theater and the capability to commmand and
control them. General Horner's authority included
"planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based upon
U.S. Commander-in-Chief Central Command (USCINCCENT)
apportionment decisions." JFACC would have operational
control of all Air Force assets in theater, and tactical
control of Navy and Marine sorties made available.72 An
important concept is that a commander exercising operational
control has the authority to assign missions to units under
his control. This implies a more permanent arrangement than
tactical control, which gives a commander authority to
maneuver or control assigned units in accomplishment of his
assigned mission. According to joint doctrine a commander
exercising tactical control cannot assign new missions to
units over which he has tactical control.73 For the Marine
Corps, this would be the first test of the JFACC concept and
the Omnibus Agreement.
Marine Integration with the JFACC
Prior to the firing of the first shot, Major General
Royal Moore, Commanding General Third Marine Air Wing, and
General Horner worked out the ambiguities of the Omnibus
Agreement. As in previous wars, commanders on the scene
managed to work out problems which written doctrine did not
cover. General Moore states:
"When reasonable men come to a course of action, they
can work reasonable solutions. Yes, it wasn't always
right with doctrine on either side... but we made it
work."74
Unlike Korea or Vietnam, however, joint doctrine on the
JFACC and the Omnibus Agreement served as an excellent basis
for discussion of the ultimate command relationships. All
that was necessary for Moore and Horner was to nail down the
details. There was never any question about command or
operational control.
Marine aviation remained under operational control of
Lieutenant General Walter Boomer, Commander of the 1st
Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). The only question, in
the beginning, was how many Marine sorties would be
dedicated to the JFACC. Through a series of compromises,
3rd MAW provided 50 percent of its FA-18 aircraft, two
KC-130 aircraft, and all of its A-6E's to the JFACC.75
Additionally, all Marine fixed-wing sorties would appear on
the Air Tasking Order (ATO) issued by the JFACC to
coordinate all theater air operations. These agreements
were reached by mid-September, four and one-half months
prior to execution of the air war, largely through the
efforts of Major General Jeremiah W. Pearson III, General
Boomer's deputy and personal representative to Central
Command Headquarters in Rihyad, Saudi Arabia. General
Pearson, a graduate of the Air Force Air War College,
enjoyed a close friendship with General Horner, no doubt
contributing to the early resolution of any disagreements.76
From the beginning, then, it is clear that the Omnibus
Agreement addressed many of the old Marine concerns
regarding control of their organic air assets. The debate
no longer revolved around the issue of outright control.
The Air Force would not absorb Marine Air. Still, events
would show that many issues remained to be solved. These
issues, as will be shown, did not directly threaten the
sacrosanct Marine concept of its air-ground team, as had
been the case in both Korea and Vietnam. Nor do they
indicate any Marine opposition to the idea of a JFACC.
Instead, they involve questions about the execution of the
JFACC concept, such as control measures for air space, and
questions of doctrine, such as the point at which strategic
considerations should give way to battlefield preparation.
Sources of Friction
While the basic premise of a JFACC was not a source of
dispute between the Air Force and the Marines during the
Gulf War, the conduct of the air war led to several areas of
discord between the two services. There were essentially
four areas of contention, not all of which were peculiar to
just the Marines and the Air Force. They included: 1) A
doctrinal dispute over when to switch the air war focus from
strategic and long-range interdiction efforts to shaping the
battlefield for the ground commanders; 2) airspace control
measure problems resulting from a basic conflict between the
reach of the organic Marine air power of the MAGTF and the
JFACC desire to coordinate all fires past the fire support
coordination line (FSCL); 3) an ATO process that was not
responsive to a rapidly changing ground situation; and 4)
continued resistance by the 3rd MAW to fully integrating
into the joint air effort, caused by the lingering belief
that, despite safeguards in joint doctrine, the Air Force
was still trying to steal control of Marine air.
Strategic Air and Shaping the Battlefield
The campaign plan finally adopted by General
Schwarzkopf consisted of four overlapping phases. Phase one
was the strategic phase, designed to cripple Iraq's command
and control capability, destroy its chemical and biological
capability, and deny Iraq's ability to carry on a protracted
war effort by destroying key industrial and oil refining
capabilities. Phase two was the air superiority phase,
during which coalition air power would establish complete
dominance in the sky over Iraq and Kuwait. This phase
involved both the destruction of Iraq's capability to
threaten coalition ground forces with its own air power, as
well as suppressing Iraq's air defense forces. Phase three
was battlefield preparation, designed to shape the
battlefield for the coming ground offensive by coalition
forces. The final phase was the ground offensive itself,
when much of coalition air power would be devoted to
directly supporting the ground scheme of maneuver.77 Iraq's
apparent decision to ride out the coalition air assault
rather than actively opposing it with air power resulted in
the rapid completion of phase two, which ran concurrently
with phase one. The source of friction between JFACC staff
and Marine commanders, as well as Army corps commanders,
involved the transition from phase one, the strategic
campaign, to phase three, battlefield preparation.78
As the ground war approached, ground commanders worried
that the JFACC was not devoting enough attention to Iraqi
forces facing the coalition on the ground. It is important
to remember that the JFACC was not truly a joint
organization. It consisted primarily of the staff of United
States Central Air Forces (USCENTAF or CENTAF), augmented by
liason teams from other components.79 General Horner also
established a Special Planning Cell, known as "The Black
Hole" because of the amount of secrecy associatied with it,
for planning the initial phases of the air war. Commanded
by Brigadier General Buster Glosson, U.S. Air Force, this
group was also heavily weighted with Air Force Officers.80
It should not be surprising that the focus of effort of the
JFACC and his staff would reflect Air Force doctrine,81 and
that is exactly how Marine commanders perceived it.
"The Air Force strategic view, i.e. deep targets,
command and control nodes far removed from the
battlefield, and the Marine Corps tactical view, i.e.
CAS, battlefield shaping, second echelon, artillery,
etc., highlighted the philosophical differences during
Desert Storm....A strictly Air Force view failed to
adjust the tactical targets vis-a-vis strategic until
driven to it by the MARCENT insistence that we would
fly a preponderance of our sorties for battlefield
shaping as G-Day approached."82
Actually, it is more likely that the JFACC changed its
focus in response to pressure from the Army ground
commanders to redirect the air effort towards the
battlefield. On February 7, CENTCOM established a Joint
Targeting Board under the supervision of the Deputy Cinc,
Lieutenant General Calvin Waller, USA, to ensure that the
targeting process accounted for ground commanders'
concerns.81 At this point more sorties became available for
battlefield shaping, although some reports discount the
importance of the JTCB.84
For the Marine Corps, this controversy demonstrated the
effectiveness of the Omnibus Agreement in preserving Marine
control over its organic air. Although originally
contributing 50 percent of its assets to the JFACC during
the early stages of the air war, by 15 days prior to the
ground war the vast majority of Marine tactical air sorties
participated in battlefield preparation. As General Moore
states: "At that time, if a target didn't do something for
the I MEF and battlefield preparation, we weren't going.
The Air Force understood that."85
Another example of problems with the implementation of
the Omnibus Agreement is the dispute about focusing on
second-echelon Republican Guard forces vice front line
troops and artillery. It was General Scwharzkopf and not
the JFACC who insisted on giving the priority to Republican
Guard forces, but by using its own organic air power against
Iraqi artillery and front line forces Marines did not have
to rely on the JFACC to target that important Iraqi
capability.86
In essence, this dispute was a non-dispute for the
Marines because the Omnibus Agreement worked exactly as
intended. Marine air provided a large number of sorties to
the JFACC for control when Marine ground forces were not in
contact, and then quickly shifted its focus to support I MEF
once the ground war approached. The JFACC focus on the
strategic view in the Gulf War does indicate a need for a
more joint JFACC staff, at least when there is a significant
contribution to the air effort by two or more services
(addressed later in this paper).
Airspace Control Problems
The Marine view of the battle space is that the MEF
commander should exercise control of the air over his Area
of Responsibility (AOR), to include the portion of the area
forward of the FSCL up to the limits of his AOR. In Desert
Storm, that led to problems over airspace control with the
JFACC staff, which viewed any fires past the FSCL as
interdiction, not in direct support of a ground force, and
therefore properly under the control of the JFACC and its
tactical air control system.87 Marines (and the Army) view
the FSCL as a permissive measure, meaning that fires beyond
that line do not have to be coordinated with ground forces
behind it. By forcing coordination with the JFACC, the FSCL
essentially became an airspace control measure, which is not
its purpose. Initially, the DASC would control all sorties
short of the FSCL, while the Air Force's airborne command
and control center (ABCCC) would control sorties beyond the
FSCL. The 3rd MAW did not feel that this arrangement was
practical for synchronization of MEF fires beyond the FSCL,
since it required coordination of both the Marine and Air
Force command and control system, with the senior air
officer in the ABCCC having final say. The danger was that
targets struck might not have satisfied MEF commander
priorities, while others might actually have impeded the MEF
progress in offensive operations. Worst of all, it was a
one-way deal. I MEF required clearance from the JFACC to
strike targets beyond the FSCL, but the JFACC did not need
clearance from I MEF when attacking targets inside I MEF's
AOR but beyond the FSCL.88
In order to solve the problem, I MEF used an airspace
control measure called a high density air control zone
(HIDACZ). This was a compromise solution where, with the
concurrence of the JFACC, I MEF created tempory zones over
the I MEF AOR forward of the FSCL. Aircraft operating
inside these zones came under the control of the Marine air
command and control system, not the JFAAC's. It also
prevented other aircraft that I MEF did not control from
entering the area.
While these measures were effective in solving Marine
problems with airspace control measures, they were not
complete. General Moore stated that HIDACZ dimensions did
not correspond with the Marine AOR and were usually smaller
than requested. Additionally, the JFACC sometimes
deactivated HIDACZ's without first consulting or notifying I
MEF ahead of time.90 Clearly, commanders did not solve the
question of how to control fires beyond the FSCL to the
satisfaction of everyone involved. This problem is rooted
in doctrinal differences between the Air Force on the one
hand, with its more horizontal view of the battlefield, and
the Army and the Marines on the other, with a more vertical
view (especially the Marines). The Air Force sees its
responsibility beginning at the FSCL and extending outward,
while the Marine Corps sees its responsibility extending
from the surface to outer space over its entire area of
responsibility (AOR), including that area extending outward
from the FSCL. The JFC also has an interest beyond the FSCL
which component commanders must respect, suggesting that a
degree of coordination is necessary to support the
components' scheme of maneuver while still complying with
the JFC's intent. Such coordination is not, however, a
threat in any way to the integrity of the MAGTF. But, it
can affect how the MAGTF fights, implying a need for
increased understanding between services regarding the
specifics of service doctrine and how that doctrine can best
fit into joint warfare.
The Air Tasking Order
The Air Tasking Order (ATO) was essentially the daily
schedule on which all of the fixed-wing aircraft in the
theater operated, except those operating out of Turkey. The
air tasking cycle was a 72-hour process from the beginning
of planning to the actual execution of the mission. During
the first twenty-four hour period, planners developed the
master attack plan (MAP). The master attack plan
concentrated on target selection and matching assets with
targets, in accordance with CENTCOM's apportionment
guidance. The second twenty-four hour period involved
turning the MAP into an executable plan, adding air
refueling information, identification codes, and other
special instructions. The third period was the actual
execution of the ATO. Planners designed the ATO to operate
in a large-scale theater environment, reflecting Air Force
philosophy. The ATO, therefore, provided mission commanders
with detailed mission guidance.91
In the view of the 3rd MAW commander, the ATO process
was too long and inflexible. The ATO was not synchronized
with the bomb damage assesment (BDA) and retargeting cycle,
resulting in components nominating targets before the
results from previous strikes became known because they had
to nominate targets 48 hours in advance. That was often
impossible in a fast moving battlefield such as during the
ground war in Desert Storm.92 General Moore said he "gamed"
the ATO by over scheduling sorties for close air support,
knowing he might not fly them. He therefore managed to
build flexibility into the system by launching aircraft that
could be diverted to meet a changing ground situation
without withholding support from another area. If they were
not needed, that was acceptable because it was much easier
to cancel sorties than to add them on to the ATO.93
An obvious area of concern for Marines, based on
previous experience in Korea and Vietnam, was how to develop
an effective close air support plan given a 72-hour ATO.
There are two basic types of close air support: pre-planned
and immediate. The advantage of pre-planned CAS is that it
supports the ground commander's scheme of maneuver by
arriving at a designated time with ordnance appropriate for
the target. Immediate CAS, on the other hand, is usually a
result of unplanned enemy resistance or attack, and air
support received is normally whatever is available at the
time. Pre-planned CAS was virtually impossible in Desert
Storm because commanders had to submit target requests 40
hours in advance to the JFACC.94
The Marine Corps instead adopted a system known as
"push-CAS." Push-CAS is a "predetermined flow of aircraft,
per hour, per day, to each supported Corps via the
appropriate ASOC (Air Support Operations Center) or DASC."95
During the ground war, 3rd MAW launched CAS missions as
often as every seven and one-half minutes. While Marines
received more CAS than they needed, they were actually more
like immediate missions, for the use of the ground
commanders when they needed them, but not designed
specifically for the scheme of maneuver.96
As it turned out, close air support was not vital to
the success of the ground war, thanks in large part to the
success of the air war prior to G-Day, as well as to the
superiority of coalition ground forces. Over half of the
AV-8B CAS sorties turned back or were cancelled because they
were not needed.97 One wonders if the JFACC could have used
these sorties more efficiently.
Like the problems with air space control, the ATO cycle
is a joint problem which does not threaten the Marine
air-ground team, but does present some problems to overcome
in future joint operations. Again, the answer lies in
greater participation, not less, so that problems such as
the long ATO cycle are solved to everyone's satisfaction
before the next conflict. It is interesting to note that
one of the biggest critics of the 72 hour ATO cycle before
the war had been General Merril A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force,
who wrote in 1990:
"It is a disgrace that modern air forces are still
shackled to a planning and execution cycle that lasts
three days...Even when this lackluster C2 system works
properly, we are bound to forfeit much of the combat
edge we know accrues to air power because of its great
flexibility and speed of response."98
Marine Resistance to Integration
One complaint often voiced by officers from other
services is that the Marine Corps seems to want to fight its
own "mini-war" in its own zone of operations. Desert Storm
offers some limited evidence to support such and assertion.
By the beginning of the ground war 100 percent of 3rd MAW
sorties supported I MEF operations.99 As described earlier,
many sorties turned back or were cancel led, implying that
more support could have been given to the JFACC.
The Marine Liaison to CENTAF After Action Report lays
most of the blame for friction between the JFACC and I MEF
at the feet of the Marine Corps' institutional paranoia
about losing its aviation arm:
"Marines have maintained that the JFACC role, as
defined by the Air Force, was to 'control' Marine air.
The Marine definition has maintained that the JFACC's
role is strictly to coordinate the air effort. In
fact, it was the Marine definition of JFACC that came
to pass. Even so, the Marine Aircraft Wing maintained
its detachment from most of the cordinating effort
initiated by the JFACC. Eventually, it was the Marine
Aircraft Wing that created the animosity and distrust
that will come back to haunt future joint
operations."100
One could, of course, argue that the reasons for the
"animosity and distrust" are also the reasons the Marine
definition of the JFACC prevailed in Desert Storm. The
Marine Corps' unwillingness to acknowledge the supremacy of
the JFACC certainly angered some Air Force officers. The
report cites several problems, however, which deserve
attention for future operations. They include a lack of
procedures for effectively integrating MAGTF aviation into
the joint environment, non-compliance with the published
ATO, lack of familiarity with the ATO, and liaison officers
unfamiliar with the intentions and concepts of day-to-day
operations of I MEF and 3rd MAW. Most importantly, the
report suggests that 3rd MAW could have integrated its total
efforts with the JFACC without losing the integrity of the
MAGTF.
Desert Storm in Summary
The issues which bedeviled Air Force and Marine Corps
relations in Korea and Vietnam were largely absent in the
Persian Gulf. The question of command of Marine air was
never really a question at all, thanks in large part to the
Omnibus Agreement. Surely, doctrinal issues continued to
interfere with truly joint warfare, but Desert Storm proves
they can be overcome.
As has been pointed out by many observers, Desert Storm
offered a unique set of circumstances conducive to
cooperation. There was an abundance of air power available,
so that the JFC and JFACC never had to make the hard
decisions which could have led to greater inter-service
conflict, as in Korea in 1951. The enemy fought poorly and
yielded all initiative to the coalition forces, allowing
them six months to build up forces free from attack. But,
if we are to fight and win under more trying circumstances,
it is even more important that the Marine Corps participate
fully in the joint effort, providing the JFC with guidance
on how best to use MAGTF assets based on an understanding of
joint systems and cooperation with other services.
Developments Since Desert Storm
An analysis of the Korean War, Vietnam War, and the
Persian Gulf war indicates that an evolutionary process is
at work with respect to the employment of air power in joint
warfare. Certainly, the Persian Gulf War offers the best
example of unity of effort while preserving individual
service concepts of warfare since the later stages of World
War II. At the same time, there are areas which need to
improve. The Air Force's JFACC Primer states:
"Service concerns with the JFACC concept became clearer
[as a result of the Gulf War], and better operations
under future JFACCs should be possible if we learn from
the lessons of Desert Storm."101
There have been efforts since Desert Storm to address some
of the problems encountered. These efforts include attempts
at the Cinc level to establish standing JFACC organizations
which, with augmentation, can be ready to go when
contingencies occur. Also, JCS finally published Joint Pub
3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, in
November 1994, which establishes the basic principles for
using a JFACC to manage the joint air effort. Hardware and
software systems are also under development to improve
command, control, communication, computer, and intelligence
(C4I) in the battlespace. An example of this is the
Contingency Tactical Air Control Planning System (CTAPS),
designated to replace the Computer Assisted Force Management
System (CAFMS) used in Desert Storm to disseminate the ATO.
CAFMS was not available on board aircraft carriers and was a
very slow system. CTAPS improves on CAFMS and has been
designated a joint program. It has limitations, such as no
off-site direct input to the ATO, but updates to the
software are in the works. Efforts are also underway to
improve the ATO process itself.102
While these efforts are promising, issues remain which
might lead to some of the same problems experienced in
Desert Storm. Several writers have suggested that the JFACC
staff needs to be a truly joint organzition.103 Both the Army
and the Marine Corps felt that the Air Force strategic
emphasis neglected battlefield targets as the ground war
approached. How does joint doctrine address this issue? It
appears that current joint doctrine still envisions a
"pick-up" game for the next conflict. Joint Pub 0-2 states
that the JFACC will normally be the service component with
the preponderance of air power in the theater.104 Joint Pub
3-56.1 depicts a notional JFACC organization which implies a
service component JFACC (Air Force) with various liaison
elements from the other components. Interestingly, there is
a Naval element, an Army element, and a Special Operations
element, but only a Marine Liaison Officer.105 Such an
organization does not support a truly joint view of air
power because of the potential for the service doctrine of
the JFACC, regardless of which service provides the JFACC,
to overwhelm the process.
Joint Pub 3-56.1 does address the establishment of a
joint targeting coordination board (JTCB). The JFC defines
the scope and limits of this board.106 If the JFACC is a
service component, then the JTCB needs to be the mechanism
which integrates target nominations from the service
components with the JFC's broad apportionment guidance.
Otherwise, targets may reflect the JFACC's service doctrine
at the expense of the other services. Perhaps more
importantly, other services may perceive that to be the case
even if it is not. The best solution would be to establish
the concept of a "purple" JFACC in joint doctrine. A joint
JFACC would mean a standing organization within the
Combatant Cinc's command which would form the nucleus of a
JFACC when contingencies arise. The air component commander
job would rotate among services, and billets for each
service would exist on the staff. Planning cells would be
joint by nature, elimimating the need for large liaison
teams from service components.
Progress has been made at the Cinc level. The best
example is at USPACOM and USACOM. The 15 September 1994
JFACC Concept of Operations outlines a truly joint
organization.
"The JFACC staff will be considered joint, not by
virtue of the presence of liaison elements from other
service comonents, but by the integration of augmentees
into all JFACC functional areas. The nucleus of
augmentees to a JFACC staff will be pre-identified by
all components. This nucleus, tailored for the scope
of the operation, will ensure that each component is
adequately represented."1O7
The USPACOM/USACOM concept should be incorporated into joint
doctrine. It is entirely possible that issues such as who
would control fires and airspace beyond the FSCL would be
resolved through such an organization to the satisfaction of
component commanders, avoiding ad hoc solutions seen in
Desert Storm. It should also soothe Marine fears of coming
under domination of the Air Force in a theater of
operations.
Another stumbling block to full integration of Marine
aviation into the Joint air effort continues to be service
parochialism and fears. While measures described above will
do much to overcome those factors, a perusal of professional
military publications and writings since the Gulf War
indicates that the belief that one's own service has all the
answers is alive and well. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel
Price Bingham, writing in Airpower Journal, for example,
suggests all the other services need to change their
doctrine to reflect the dominance of air power on the modern
battlefield. While there is nothing wrong with suggesting
that, his article reflects a poor understanding of Marine
aviation doctrine, perhaps because his only source is FMFM
1-1 Campaigning.108 Likewise, a research paper written by
the "Special Assistant to U.S. Air Forces Central Command
Director of Campaign Plans" and published in United States
European Command JFACC training syllabus claims that
coalition airmen could not complete phase one of Desert
Storm's air campaign plan because of "premature acceleration
of Phase III, Battlefield Preparation" and because 50
percent of Marine aviation did not come under the control of
the JFACC.109 While it is a compliment to suggest that the
addition of an additional 75 to 100 Marine sorties a day to
a 2500-sortie-a-day effort would make such a difference,
assertions like these can add to Marine Corps fears of Air
Force power plays.
In the end, however, petty assertions by individual
officers are not really important. The issues surrounding
command and control of fixed-wing air power in a joint
environment have changed considerably since the Korean War.
The basic tenet that Marine air power exists primarily for
support of the MAGTF is codified in joint doctrine and in
every document dealing with command and control of air power
at the Cinc level. The fear of losing control of Marine
organic aviation assets is groundless. At the same time, if
Marines wish to continue to participate in large-scale joint
operations, we must recognize what General Kelly did in his
White Letter on the Omnibus Agreement. Unity of effort may
demand that, under some conditions, the MAGTF subordinate
its own best interests to those of the Joint Force. It also
demands that Marines stay engaged in the process so that
Joint Force Commanders understand that under most conditions
Marines can contribute best as an air-ground team whose
capabilities are greater than the sum of its parts.
Continued participation in joint exercises and better
education at the squadron level and up in such areas as the
Joint ATO process will dissuade people of the notion that
Marines are difficult to work with in joint warfare.
Conclusion: The Changing Marine Corps Focus
As a final note on the evolution of Marine
participation in joint air warfare, it is interesting to
note that the source of dispute in the Korean war, close air
support, is not so much an issue today. The command and
control aspects still exist, but Marine aviation doctrine is
changing. Many Marines seem to be missing this important
point. Echoing a familiar mantra, Major Dwight Motz wrote
in the January 1993 Marine Corps Gazette:
"The Marine Corps focus on air support, in close
proximity to Marine ground forces engaged with the
enemy, is what differentiates the Marine air power
perspective from that of the Air Force. Marine
aviation is organized, equipped, and trained to be the
aviation combat element (ACE) of a MAGTF that is
immediately responsive to the needs of its ground
combat element (GCE) commander."110
Yet in 1991 and 1992 the Gazette published at least
three articles on the ACE as a maneuver element.111 It has
not been written down yet in any doctrinal publication, but
as taught at the Marine Command and Staff College, the ACE
is an equal element with the GCE in the MAGTF. The MAGTF
Commander can assign missions to the ACE separate from the
GCE in support of the MAGTF objective. It can even be the
focus of effort. It is not clear that Marines have thought
out all the implications of this apparent change in
doctrine. The idea of the ACE as the focus of effort is
truly an Air Force concept, and some airmen may suggest that
if support of the GCE is not the main point of Marine
aviation, why do we need it? To Marines the answer is
obvious. With the Marine Corps the Joint Force gets a total
package of air and ground forces working closely together
for a common goal.
Whether the ACE exists to support the GCE or not, it is
clear that the Joint Force Commander wants his force to be a
total package as well. As Marines, we need to decide
whether we want to fit into that package, or whether we will
exist in our own "'Zone of Operations'...carved out for a
separate USMC war."112 If it is the latter, we may well find
ourselves uninvited, with no zone at all.
ENDNOTES
1 James A. Winnenfeld and Dana Johnson. Joint Air
Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control,
1942-1991. (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press,
1993), 101. (find a page)
2 Allen R. Millet, Semper Fidelis: The History of the
United States Marine Corps. (New York: Macmillan Publishing
Co., 1980) 425-426. Marine aviation also performed
virtually every mission except strategic bombing. Of
particular note is the contribution to the air superiority
mission, flown as part of naval land based air in support of
the naval campaign. The importance of air superiority has
never been lost on Marine aviators.
3 Gen. William W. Momyer, USAF, Ret. Airpower in Three
Wars. (Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Air
Force, 1978), 39-41.
4 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
memorandum to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, 00126-51,
subject: "Observations of Close Air Support in Korea." 27
April 1951.
5 Lyyn Montross, Hubard D. Kuokka, and Norman W. Hicks.
U. S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953, Vol IV: The
East-Central Front (Washington, DC: Historical Branch,
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corp, 1962), 14.
6 Momyer, 2.
7 Ibid., 3. General Momyer points out that several Air
Force officers argued that the use of nuclear weapons was
unlikely since the Soviets posessed them as well. Nobody
would want to use them for fear of the response. For that
reason, a strong tactical air force was essential.
Unfortunately, the fiscal situation did not allow these
arguments to prevail.
8 Robert F. Futrell. The United States Air Force in
Korea: 1950-1953. (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force Office
of Air Force History, 1983.), 61-62. "The Air-Ground
Operation in Korea" Air Force 34, no. 3 (Special Issue
March 1951), 39.
9 Momyer, 286.
10 "The Air-Ground Operation in Korea", 38
11 Quoted in Montross, Vol. IV, 169.
12 Momyer, 54-55.
13 Futrell, 706.
14 As an example see "Weakness in the Air Force." US News
and World Report, 3 November 1950, 16-19. The publicity was
so bad that publications like Air Force Magazine, devoted
entire issues to countering it, such as the one in footnote
(8), above.
15 Futrell, 706-707.
16 Winnefeld and Johnson, 50.
17 Quoted in Ibid.
18 Futrell, 346-347.
19 Quoted in Montross,Vol. IV, 76.
20 Ibid., 78.
21 Ibid., 96-97.
22 Ibid., 135.
23 Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division letter to
Commandant, United States Marine Corps, subject: "Marine Air
Support." 10 January 1951, In appendix K of Nicholas A.
Canzona and Lynn Montross. U. S. Marine Operations in Korea
1950-1953, Vol II: The Inchon-Seoul Operation (Washington,
DC: Historical Branch, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps,
1955), 375.
24 Montross, Vol IV, 135-136.
25 Ibid., 17-18, 137.
26 Futrell, 469.
27 Montross, Vol IV, 186.
28 "Has the Air Force Done its Job in Korea?", 30-31.
29 Winnefeld and Johnson, 70.
30 LtGen. Keith B. McCutcheon, USMC. "Marine Aviation in
Vietnam, 1962-1970." Proceedings, May 1971, 137.
31 Momyer, 285.
32 Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding
War. (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division,
Headquaters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1982.), 200.
33 Millet, 585.
34 General William D. Westmoreland, USA (Ret.). A Soldier
Reports. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976), 344.
35 Momywer, 286
36 Millet, 585.
37 Williard J. Webb, "Single Air Manager for Air in
Vietnam." Joint Forces Quarterly. Winter, 1993-1994, 91.
38 Westmoreland, 416-418. Momyer, 285.
39 Shulimson, 274.
40 Millet, 586.
41 Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPac): Operations of the
III Marine Amphibious Force: Vietnam for the Month of March
1968 Report March 1968, 56.
42 Momyer, 286.
43 Ibid., 287.
44 Webb, 91
45 FMFPac Report, March 1968, 56. Webb, 94. McCutcheon,
137.
46 John Schlight, The War in South Vietnam: The Years of
the Offensive, 1965-1968. (Washington, DC: Office of Air
Force History, 1988), 286.
47 Ibid. Millet, 587.
48 Momyer, 313-320.
49 Webb, 98.
50 Charles R. Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High
Mobility and Standdown, 1969. (Washington, DC: History and
Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1988.),
224.
51 FMFPac report, March 1968, 62.
52 Ibid., 63.
53 Ibid.
54 FMFPac report,March 1968, 65-66.
55 McCutcheon, 137.
56 Webb, 95.
57 McCutcheon, 137.
58 Webb, 97.
59 McCutcheon, 137.
60 Smith, 225.
61 Schlight, 296.
62 For an excellent treatment of this subject, see Al
Santoli. Leading the Way: How America's Vietnam Veterans
Rebuilt the U.S. Military. (New York: Ballantine Books,
1993)
63 Winnenfeld and Johnson, 100-101
64 Ibid.
65 Bernard E. Trainor. "Jointness, Service Culture, and
the Gulf War." Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1993-94, 72.
66 Message, CJCS, 4 March 1986, subject: Joint Doctrine
for Theater Counterair Operations. The wording in Joint Pub
0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) is exactly the
same.
67 Winnwnfeld and Johnson, 100-101
68 General Paul X. Kelly, USMC, "1986 Omnibus Agreement
for Command and Control of Marine TACAIR In Sustained
Operations Ashore." White Letter 4-86, 18 March, 1986.
69 John E. Valliere. "Stop Quibling: Win the War."
Proceedings, December 1990, 42. Joint Pub 26, Joint
Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations, first
established the JFACC in joint doctrine. JCS did not intend
for the JFACC or the Omnibus Agreement to apply only to
counterair operations, however, as this quote might seem to
imply. It was simply the first pub to make reference to the
JFACC and the JFC's ability to appoint one.
70 Jeffrey Record, "Into the Wild Blue Yonder: Should We
Abolish the Air Force?" Policy Review, Spring 1990, 50-54.
"Why the Air War Worked" Armed Forces Journal, April 1991,
40-45.
71 See, for instance, U.S. Department of Defense. Final
Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict.
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), 125,
among many others.
72 Draft CENTCOM OPLAN 1002-90, 18 July 1990. Quoted in
Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power
Survey Summary Report, (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1993.), 146.
73 Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.
9 September, 1993, 11-8-9.
74 LtGen. Royal N.Moore, "Marine Air: There When Needed"
Proceedings, November 1991, 63.
75 Moore, 64
76 Charles Quilter, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf,
1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert
Shield and Desert Storm. (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1993.), 10-11.
77 Keaney and Cohen, 47-51. General Michael Dugan, USAF,
"The Air War" US News and World Report, February 11, 1991,
26.
78 Major Dwight R. Motz, USMC. "JFACC: The Cold War
Continues." Marine Corps Gazette, January, 1993, 70.
79 Winnenfeld, 111
80 Daniel J. Muir, "A View From the Black Hole"
Proceedings, October 1991, 85.
81 Some Air Force officers in the Black Hole actually
believed that the war could be won with air power alone.
For a good discussion, see LtCol. Daniel. A. Driscoll, "Air
Power in the Gulf War: JFACC Targeting" Unpublished research
paper, Marine Corps War College, Marine Corps University,
Quantico, VA. 20 May 1994. For comparative discussions on
the merits of strategic versus tactical bombing in Desert
Storm, see "Tactical Bombing of Iraqi Forces Outstripped
Value of Strategic Hits, Analyst Maintains" and "Strategic
Campaign Focused on Targets And Cut Casualties, Pentagon
Maintains" Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 27,
1992, 62-65
82 Letter, Commanding General, 3D MAW to Commanding
General I MEF (G3), subject: "Command and Control for Joint
Air Operations." 10 December, 1991.
83 "Desert Shield/Storm After Acton Report." U. S. Marine
Liaison CENTAF, 18 March 1991,enclosure (1), 3
84 Cohen and Keaney, 160. While the JTCB may not have
been a major player in planning, its establishment certainly
indicated to the JFACC the importance General Shwarzkopf
placed on battlefield shaping.
85 Moore, 64.
86 Cohen and Keaney, 156.
87 Ibid., 157
8S Marine Liason CENTAF, enclosure (2), 1
89 Ibid., 7. DOD Final Report to Congress, 195
90 Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Memorandum for the
Record. Subject: House Armed Services Desert Storm
Aviation Study Team, NAS Oceana, VA, July 1 1991
91 DOD Final Report to Congress, 139.
92 LtGen. Royal N. Moore, Overheads for House Armed
Services Desert Storm Aviation Study Team, July 1, 1991;
from Binder 2, JFACC papers, Marine Corps Research Center,
Quantico, Va.
93 Moore, "Marine Air..." 63.
94 Marine Liason CENTAF, enclosure (2), 13
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Keaney and Cohen, 110-111.
98 Merril A. McPeak "For the Composite Air Wing"
Airpower Journal, Fall 1990, 7.
99 House Armed Services Study Team briefing, Moore
overheads.
100 Marine Liason CENTAF, enclosure (2), 15.
101 Headquarters, United States Air Force, JFACC Primer,
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February,
1994), 8.
102 Col. J.L. Whitlow, USMC, "JFACC: Who's in Charge?"
Joint Forces Quarterly. Summer 1994, 69
103 Ibid. Motz, 70
104 Joint Pub 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). 11
August 1994
105 Joint Pub 3-56.1 (Draft) Command and Control for Joint
Air Operations. 25 August 1994, 11-12
106 Ibid., IV-5
107 Headquarters, United States Pacific Command and United
States Atlantic Command. JFACC Concept of Operations. 15
September 1994 (DRAFT), 5
108 Price T., Bingham, "Air Power in Desert Storm and the
Need For Doctrinal Change." Airpower Journal, Winter, 1991,
223-225.
109 "Desert Storm--JFACC Problems Associated with
Battlefield Interdiction. " From Headquarters, United States
Air Forces. Europe. EUCOM JFACC Training at HQ, USAFE, 21
March 1991
110 Motz, 66
111 William H. Dixon, "The Ace Is Not A Maneuver Element
Yet" Marine Corps Gazette. March 1992; Thomas Hammes,
"Air as a Maneuver Element: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?"
Marine Corps Gazette. February 1992; Gordon C. O'iell and
Daniel A. Driscoll, "Maneuver Warfare: Can the ACE Adopt
This Philosophy of War?" Marine Corps Gazette. February
1992.
112 Colonel R.W. Gaskin, USAF, quoted in Motz, 68.
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Kelly, Paul X., Gen, USMC. "1986 Omnibus Agreement for
Command and Control of Marine TACAIR in Sustained
Operations Ashore." White Letter No. 4-86, 18 March
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Moore, Royal N., LtGen., USMC. Overheads for House Armed
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Sullivan, Michael P., MajGen, USMC. "The Joint Force
Component Commander and Command and Control of Marine
Air-Ground Task Force Aviation." Letter dated 9 march
1989.
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Research Papers
Driscoll, Daniel A., LtCol. USMC. "Air Power in the Gulf
War: JFACC Targeting" Unpublished research paper,
Marine Corps War College, Marine Corps University,
Quantico, VA. 20 May 1994.
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