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Somalia: Humanitarian Success And Political/Military Failure

Somalia: Humanitarian Success And Political/Military Failure


CSC 1995


SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues






Title: Somalia: Humanitarian Success and Political/Military Failure


Author: Major L. M. Martin, United States Marine Corps


Thesis: That although the commitment of U.S. forces in Somalia was ordered for

humanitarian reasons, the more ambitious goal of peacemaking failed due to the

absence of an achievable mission.


Background: In ordering forces to Somalia in December 1992, President Bush

articulated the humanitarian mission, but did not ensure that the United States' and

United Nations' (UN) goals were in consonance. Additionally, he did not involve

incoming President Clinton in his decision. From the beginning, UN

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali intended the United Nations effort to include

disarmament of the Somali warring factions and nation building. In contrast to

former President Bush, President Clinton's views toward Somalia more closely

mirrored those of the UN Secretary-General. Although the UN assumed control of

the Somali operation in March 1993, the U.S. continued to play a major role in

military operations and UN negotiations. The humanitarian effort succeeded in

saving lives, but the political/military operation failed to achieve its mission. The

following factors contributed to that political/military failure: the lack of an

achievable military and political objective; the impact of the media on military

operations; the absence of an articulated foreign policy toward Somalia; and the lack

of American public support for continued operations.


Recommendation: The U.S. should continue to support humanitarian operations to

the greatest extent possible. To avoid another failure such as Somalia, the United

States should not support nor participate in UN peacemaking or peace enforcement

actions involving civil wars unless all major warring factions actively seek a peaceful

solution to the crisis and there is an articulated and achievable end state.








On April 24, 1992, the United Nations Security Council established a UN


Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to "facilitate an immediate cessation of hostilities


and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country, and to promote the


process of reconciliation and political settlement."1 This initial resolution regarding


Somalia was modest in scope with only 50 UN observers and 500 security


personnel.2 UNOSOM's mission also included a 90-day Plan of Action for


Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia.


With a fragile cease-fire in the capitol city of Mogadishu only (declared in


March 1992), and continued fighting in the north and south, warring factions greatly


outnumbered the UNOSOM forces. Tons of food began to flow into the country


and numerous nongovernment organization (NGO) personnel attempted to


distribute it to the starving masses. In a short period of time, it became evident that


armed bandits and looters were benefiting from the aid far more than those in true


need. Therefore, on December 3, 1992, the United Nations Security Council


approved a resolution authorizing member states to deploy combat troops "to


establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."3 Few


individuals following the story doubted that "member states" provided the UN cover


for a major deployment of U.S. troops and material to Somalia.


President George Bush publicly declared that the United States was the only


nation capable of quickly mounting a military operation designed to facilitate the


humanitarian effort in Somalia. Journalistic speculation of the president's motives


varied from a belief that he wanted to end his term on a high note to the opinion that


he had caved in to public pressure generated by graphic news footage of starving


Somalis. As with most military operations that "fail," debate continues on whether


U.S. should have committed forces to such a mission. Certainly, the operation did


not meet the requirement of the Weinberger Doctrine since American vital interests


did not exist in Somalia; however, current national security strategy does not require


such "vital interest" and the issue of internal morality cannot be discounted.


This analysis will discuss why the United States committed forces to Somalia,


whether the commitment of U.S. forces was in consonance with the National


Security Strategy, why we left Somalia, and how the Somalia experience may shape


future U.S. involvement in UN peace operations. This discussion begins with a short


background on Somalia, and is then broken down into the major phases of the


Somalia operation which directly involved American forces.






A general understanding of Somalia's geography, demographics, and culture


is essential to this analysis. Roughly the shape of a boomerang, and nearly equal in


square miles to the State of Texas, Somalia sits on the Horn of Africa at the entrance


to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Djibouti to the north, Ethiopia to the west,


and Kenya to the south provide its borders.


Of its approximately 8.5 million people, more than 98 percent are Somali,


giving it an unusual ethnic homogeneity. More than 45 percent of the population are


under 15 years of age. About 70 percent of Somali's are nomads who travel with


their livestock herds through Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. A lack of definitive


borders contributes to the unresolved land disputes between Somalia and its




From the late 1800's until World War II, Somalia was split under British and


Italian colonial rule. During World War II, Britain occupied all of Somalia, and in


1948, gave the Ogaden region to Ethiopia even though Somalis primarily populated


it. In 1950, the United Nations voted to grant independence to Somalia; and in 1960.


Somalia became a republic with its current borders.4


Following 9 years of civilian government, President Muhammad Siad Barre


assumed power in 1969 in a military coup. As a publicly declared "scientific socialist"


Barre received both military and financial aid from the former Soviet Union until


1977, when a dispute with Soviet-backed Ethiopia caused him to break off relations


with the Soviets and turn to the United States. To counter Soviet influence on the


Horn of Africa, the United States then provided Somalia with military and economic


aid. Somalia played the Cold War game very well, requesting hundreds of millions


of dollars in arms and financial aid to fight two U.S. foes, Libya's Muammar Qaddafi


and Ethiopia's pro-Soviet leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam. Additionally, Somalia


purchased tens of millions of dollars worth of U.S. arms under Foreign Military


Sales in the mid-1980's.5 Ironically, a mere decade later, American policymakers


tried to disarm a nation the U.S. had helped to arm. Aid to Somalia gradually


increased until it peaked in the mid-1980s at more than $ 100 million annually; but as


the Cold War wound down, aid began to decrease significantly.


In 1988, the Somali National Movement (Isaq clan) rose in rebellion and


seized several towns in the north. Although President Barre responded with military


force, heavy bombing and shelling could not put down the rebels. Another group,


the Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogadeni clan), gradually took over the southern


region; and the United Somali Congress (Hawiye clan) dominated in the central


region and in Mogadishu, the capitol. In 1989, Barre's violent retaliation against


rival clans could no longer be ignored, and the United States cut off all aid.


After nearly 3 years of civil war, Siad Barre finally fled Somalia in January


1991. Although the three dominant Somali groups declared their intent to form a


transitional government leading to a democracy, within a few months there were


challenges to the authority of the transitional president, Ali Mahdi Mohammed. The


primary challenge came from General Mohammed Farrah Aidid, chairman of the


ruling United Somali Congress and a fellow Hawiye clansman of Ali Mahdi.


In addition to the carnage of a civil war with no end in sight, a drought-


caused famine was in full force and Somalis were dying of starvation by the


thousands. Although numerous humanitarian relief organizations were at work in


Somalia, they made little headway in stopping the devastation. In addition, Somali


refugees were becoming a problem in neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia.6





On 23 January 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution


733 (1992) which called for an embargo on weapons and military equipment being


sent to Somalia. In the meantime, recently-elected UN Secretary-General Boutros


Boutros-Ghali continued his personal ongoing dialogue with all Somali "parties,


movements and factions" attempting to convene a conference on national


reconciliation and unity.7 Boutros-Ghali's previous relationship with former-


president Siad Barre, however, hampered his effectiveness in negotiating with the


warring Somali clans.


On 24 April 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 751


(1992) to "facilitate an immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a


cease-fire throughout the country, and to promote the process of reconciliation and


political settlement."8 The resolution also supported Boutros-Ghali's 90-day Plan of


Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia.


Resolution 751 called for the immediate deployment of 50 UN observers to


monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and approved "in principle" Boutros-Ghali's


plan to deploy a 500-member security force to assist with humanitarian supply


deliveries. Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council that the UN would


establish UNOSOM "in accordance with agreements signed on 27 and 28 March,


respectively, by Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid."9


Although the 50 observers were in Somalia in short order, UNOSOM was in


trouble from the start. The UN had to place the 500-man Pakistani battalion,


designated as the UNOSOM security force, on standby for months as General Aidid


refused to agree to allow armed UN forces in Somalia.10 The UN observers made


little progress in reducing the conflict or securing supplies, and in July, the UN


asked for increased airlifting of food.






Ordered by President George Bush in response to UN requests. Operation


Provide Relief began on August 15, 1992, and was to: "[p]rovide military assistance


in support of emergency humanitarian relief to Kenya and Somalia."11 Although


United States military participation at this point was strictly logistical in nature, the


United States stationed a Marine Expeditionary Unit off the coast of Somalia to


support the airlift. At that time, Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen stated


that the United States had "no intention of landing a Marine expedition."12 Merely a


few months later, his words would prove untrue. Although Operation Provide Relief


successfully airlifted more than 28,000 metric tons of relief supplies into Somalia, the


situation on the ground worsened. The fighting continued, and media pictures


beamed back to the United States of dying children resulted in an ever-increasing


demand to "do something."






On December 4, 1992, President Bush announced that he would deploy


thousands of American troops to Somalia under the terms of UN resolution 794


(1992) passed the previous day. The United Task Force (UNITAF) would be a


multinational coalition led by the United States as a stop-gap measure to provide


security for distribution of relief supplies in Somalia until a more permanent UN


peacekeeping force could assume those responsibilities. Significantly, resolution 794


referenced Chapter VII of the UN Charter which concerns peace enforcement.


At this point in the Somalia story, the disparities in expectations began to


impact American intervention in Somalia. Significant differences in goals existed


between President Bush and UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. President Bush


intended to send to Somalia "a broad force to accomplish a narrow mission in a short


time."13 Boutros-Ghali, on the other hand wanted the United States to stay until the


country was stabilized. The Secretary-General informed the UN Security Council


that he wanted the intervention force to disarm the Somalis and confiscate their


heavy weapons. Officials in Washington recognized the impossibility of that task,


refused to commit to it and left the matter to the discretion of the on-scene




Throughout the remainder of his term of office, President Bush never


wavered from his position that the U.S. was in Somalia for humanitarian reasons


only and that he would bring the troops home soon. There were even public


assurances that the troops could be home by Inauguration Day, January 20, 1993,


but the more popular opinion was that they would for remain for 6 months to a




To understand Boutros-Ghali's position, one need only review his Agenda for


Peace. The Secretary-General assumed his post with ambitious goals which included


establishing "peace-enforcement units" and permanently assigning armed forces from


member states to the Security Council to give the UN credibility as a "guarantor of


international security." He also advocated immediate establishment of a $50-million


revolving peace-keeping reserve fund and a pre-positioned stock of peacekeeping




Additionally, expectations and frustrations on the ground in Somalia were


innumerable. For the most part, the Somali people were happy to see the troops, and


some Somali clan leaders were asking for an extended commitment. Even General


Aidid staged a pro-American demonstration, although most Western observers


doubted his sincerity. As might be anticipated in such a large and quickly conceived


operation, many contingencies arose amongst the coalition, the humanitarian relief


organizations, and the Somalis.


Although the U.S. special envoy, Robert Oakley, brokered a temporary


cease-fire between Aidid and Ali Mahdi, the warlords did not agreed to lay down


their arms. In fact, their orders for their fighters to leave Mogadishu created havoc


in the countryside and caused an outcry from relief workers in outlying towns as


armed gangs attacked them.


The issue of complete disarmament was a catch-22 that the UN never fully


resolved. Few disagree with UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's position that


peace building could not begin until the coalition disarmed the warring factions.


However, military officials and experienced U.S. politicians (those who remember


Beirut) believed that wholesale disarmament would turn the coalition troops into the


enemy of all Somali factions. Although armed with modern warfighting equipment,


the coalition troops (predominantly U.S.) could not disarm so many Somalis without


an exceedingly high toll in lives: American, coalition, and Somali. It is reasonable to


assume that the American public would be unwilling to accept the deaths of so many


sons in a "humanitarian" operation.






As his presidential term came to a close, President Bush reiterated his


position that prolonged operations would not be necessary and that American


servicemen would be in Somalia "only as long as necessary to establish a secure


environment."16 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali now demanded that "before going


home, American troops not only seize the Somali clans' arsenals but also remove the


mines that have been laid in the north of the country and set up a military police


force to preserve order."17 Only under those conditions would Boutros-Ghali provide


UN peacekeepers to take over. U.S. officials maintained that they made the offer of


troops to the UN with very specific guidelines, and the pertinent Security Council


resolution did not require such actions by UNITAF. United States officials accused


the Secretary-General of "moving the goalposts" while UN officials maintained that


the U.S. knew the ground rules from the beginning.


It is not surprising, therefore, that the quick hand-off from UNITAF to the


more permanent UN force did not go "quickly." On the eve of Bill Clinton's


inauguration as president, the U.S. pulled more than 1,000 Marines out of Somalia to


return home. Most observed the move as a token effort of keeping President Bush's


word, but also as a means to prod the United Nations into creating the regular


peacekeeping force.


For several weeks, the U.S. media reported little news from Somalia News


of sporadic fighting with few coalition casualties competed with news of President


Clinton's first months in office. After much delay, however, on March 26, 1993, the


UN Security Council passed resolution 814 (1992) establishing UNOSOM II.


Resolution 814 contained several significant (and ambitious) provisions: (1) it


mandated a peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and


included the requirement to disarm all Somali clans; (2) it specifically addressed the


political objective of rebuilding a member state's political and economic structure;


and (3) it directed the creation of a secure environment throughout Somalia to


include the northern region which had declared independence.18


To carry out the resolution, the United Nations established a full


peacekeeping structure in Somalia with Admiral Jonathan Howe, U.S. Navy,


retired, as head and special representative of the Secretary-General, and Turkish


Lieutenant General Cevik Bir as commander of the UN forces.






Under UNOSOM II, the U.S. role was primarily that of logistical support,


with one significant exception. The U.S. also agreed to provide a Quick Reaction


Force of more than 1,000 Army soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division. Those


troops were to remain under the tactical control of the Commander, U.S. Forces,


Somalia.19 On May 4, 1993, the UN official took control and responsibility for


operations in Somalia.


Approximately one month later, the UN operation shifted dramatically. On


June 6, 1993, Aidid supporters ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. The


assault was particularly vicious. The Somali gunmen used women and children as


shields and mutilated the Pakistani corpses. Two days later, and with the strong


support of the Clinton administration, the UN Security Council passed resolution


837 which called for the immediate apprehension of those responsible for the


ambush. The hunt for Aidid was on, and the UN coalition started to weaken.


In the following weeks, the UN command accused the Italian and Saudi


peacekeepers of ignoring the command and taking orders only from their own


governments. The German government threatened to withhold the remainder of its


contingent promised to the UN. In the United States, debate grew in Congress over


the change in mission.


International criticism of the United States also increased. With civilian


casualties from American gunship attacks, and the UN command structure in


Somalia staffed primarily by Americans, Somali leaders held the U.S. accountable


for the dramatic change in the focus of the operation.20


In August 1993, four U.S. soldiers lost their lives when their military vehicle


hit a command detonated mine. President Clinton threatened retaliation, and in


September deployed 400 Army Rangers to augment the Quick Reaction Force.


Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said that U.S. forces would not leave Somalia until


the capitol was calm, the rebels disarmed of heavy weapons, and a national police


force was in place.21 The United States had moved closer to the goals of


Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and away from those of former President Bush.


One month later, on October 3 and 4, a U.S. Army Ranger mission to capture


Aidid ended in disaster with 18 U.S. servicemen dead and 77 wounded. After


meeting with his top advisors, the president agreed to a new U.S. strategy to


"reinforce the troops, shift from a get-Aidid policy to a more political approach and


set a hard deadline for withdrawal."22 Within a week, President Clinton established


a March 31, 1994 deadline for withdrawal of all American forces. Other major


coalition partners soon followed in announcing their withdrawal from Somalia. For


all intents and purposes, Operation Restore Hope was over.






Operation Restore Hope was a fragile undertaking from the very beginning.


It was, however, in consonance with the president's National Security Strategy.


President Bush intended that the primary purpose of the operation to be


humanitarian. More specifically, however, his National Security Strategy published


in August 1991, notes that we should be "proud of the role we played in bringing to


an end civil wars in Angola and Ethiopia."25 America had set the precedent for


involvement in the internal conflicts of an African nation.


In January 1993, just prior to his departure from office, President Bush


signed a new National Security Strategy. One major section is entitled, "The


Promotion of Peace and Democracy... Our Policy Agenda." That section notably


contains a section concerning the United Nations. It states, "The United States


should do its part to strengthen UN conflict prevention, peacekeeping and


peacemaking abilities by taking an active role in the full spectrum of UN


peacekeeping and humanitarian relief planning and support."24 With regard to


Africa, the National Security Strategy indicates, "[o]ur leadership in Operation


RESTORE HOPE is designed to encourage other nations to contribute to the


amelioration of the human condition there, laying the foundation for continued


economic and political progress."25


Critics accused President Bush of several motives in ordering Operation


Restore Hope. Most often, they accused him of ordering the mission as the last


grand-stand play of a lame duck president. Others implied that he took action in


Somalia to divert attention away from the Bosnian crisis. Regardless of his true


motives, most reports agree that he intended the operation be accomplished with a


narrowly defined mission and within a very short period of time.


President Bush's final National Security Strategy, however, does not coincide


with his "narrowly defined mission." As initially designed, Operation Restore Hope


had little chance of ending the Somali civil war. Peacemaking, peace enforcement,


and establishing democracy are decades in the making and cannot be accomplished


in a "very short period of time."






Although the initial intent of Operation Restore Hope was to facilitate


delivery of humanitarian supplies, the potential existed very strongly from the


beginning for a larger mission. Secretary-General Bofutros-Ghali was quite


outspoken in his expectations for UN peacekeepers. Complete disarmament of


warring factions, establishment of a national police force, and rebuilding the Somali


political infrastructure were always his goals. As long as the United States continued


to approve Security Council resolutions regarding Somalia and remained as part of


the UN coalition, we must accept full responsibility for our part in the operation.


The most visible "mission creep" was the UN resolution drafted in response to the


ambush on the Pakistani soldiers. Although the resolution did not name General


Aidid, he was clearly its intended focus.


Targeting General Aidid was clearly a mistake for two reasons. First, UN


representative Admiral Howe (U.S. Navy, retired) strongly asserted that we were


not targeting any clan or subclan, but in doing so, he demonstrated his lack of


understanding of the Somalia clan culture. Regardless of his protestations to the


contrary, General Aidid's clan and allies did take on the challenge and unite against a


now common enemy in defending their clansman. By targeting Aidid, we also


validated his position and raised him in stature in the eyes of many of his followers.


Secondly, it was a mission likely to fail since the most sophisticated intelligence assets


could not locate a single individual in a city where so many were determined to


protect him.


Interestingly, Turkish General Cevik Bir, upon his departure from the UN


command, in a letter to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, indirectly criticized the


United States and the European coalition members for "mission erosion." Bir stated,


"The contributing nations must be committed enough to accept the violence and loss


of life associated with war, and then stay the course."26 What General Bir clearly did


not understand is that the United States' president did not intend to participate in a


war, nor would the American public view casualties in a humanitarian mission in the


same context as those expected in war.






"Forcible disarmament is the 'bright line' of peace operations: when you cross


it, you have entered a de facto state of war."27 Beyond the initial humanitarian


mission, any attempt at forcible nation building was doomed to failure.


Boutros-Ghali obviously believed that total disarmament was possible in a nation that


has been at war with itself for centuries. Even if the Somalis had agreed to give up


the arms already in Somalia, there was no way to prevent arms from flowing back in


from Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya.


In a nation where warring factions refuse to voluntarily disarm, and


peacemakers must remain neutral with limited intervention, peace can never occur.


Limited intervention may succeed, if the peacemakers assist one belligerent in


defeating another. Impartial intervention may succeed if the peacemakers take total


command of the situation and forcibly impose a settlement such as through a UN


trusteeship.28 With all sides committing atrocities in Somalia, and with the complex,


tangled clan structures, taking one side to defeat another was not an available option.


It is unlikely that the United States, nor any other members of the UN coalition,


would have agreed to unlimited military action to put down the fighting. Nor is it


likely that the international community would have accepted the concept of a UN


trusteeship as it is too akin to colonialism. Hence, a stalemate among all parties was


the only possible result. "The predicament of peacekeeping soldiers on the ground is


that they are unable to move forward into an unwinnable battle, unable to stay put


taking casualties for no purpose, and unable to withdraw without repercussions for


the U.S. position in the region and in the world."29






The United Nations was established following World War II to maintain


international peace. Its Charter provides two primary means: peaceful settlement of


disputes under Chapter VI and collective enforcement under Chapter VII.


Increasingly, peacekeeping operations have fallen somewhere between those two


chapters and have been informally termed "Chapter VI and a half" operations. The


UN Security Council cannot enforce resolutions against member states under


Chapter VI. The collective security articulated under Chapter VII is not directly


applicable to internal disputes such as in Somalia. Chapter VII clearly provides for


UN Security Council action in cases of international aggression or even in cases


where internal conflict may threaten international peace and security. With the


dramatic increase in UN intervention in domestic crises, it is likely that the UN


charter will be amended to include "Chapter VI and a half" provisions.


With the failure of the UN in Somalia, the UN has suffered significant


financial strain and a loss in credibility. In the words of Kofi Annan, UN


Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, "It has done quite a lot of damage to the


United Nations. There is no doubt about it."30 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali


has 2 years remaining on his term of office. That is little enough time to accomplish


the tasks asked of the UN, such as a reorganization of its staff and its accounting and


budgeting procedures. With innumerable hotspots around the world including


Bosnia, Angola, and Rwanda, the international community is likely to expect the UN


to do more with less.






The media played a significant role in Operation Restore Hope. Increased


media coverage of the famine and starvation in Somalia placed significant pressure


on President Bush to take the lead in humanitarian intervention. Favorable coverage


of the humanitarian effort in distributing relief supplies helped validate the decision


to become involved. What most Americans will remember, however, are the graphic


pictures of the Somalis dragging the body of an American servicemen through their


streets. Few images could have more quickly turned the American will from


sympathy for the plight of the Somalis to outrage and a demand to bring the U.S.


forces home.


In the opinion of Andrew Kohut, former president of the Gallup


Organization. "[t]he media probably has the most negative effect on military


operations abroad in the absence of coherent policy and firm leadership that


persuasively reiterates the purpose of the use of force throughout the mission."31 The


use of force implies potential loss of life. American servicemen lost their lives prior to


the October 1993 firefight; and the June 1993 ambush which killed 24 Pakistanis


implied a danger to all coalition forces. By October 1993, however, the media was


no longer showing pictures of starving Somalis. Consequently, when 18 U.S.


soldiers died, the White House did not (or could not) convince the American public


that they had died for a "good cause." Should President Clinton elect to use military


force in the future, he and his staff must do a much better job of articulating the need


for American involvement than was done during the Somalia operation.






What will be the U.S. role in future UN peacekeeping and peacemaking


operations? Numerous studies suggest that the American people are supportive of


military action under two situations: if it involves American vital interests and if


U.S. forces can provide humanitarian relief without becoming involved in protracted


armed conflict. Americans are ambivalent over peacekeeping, but have emphatically


rejected the peacemaking mission.32


There is currently a strong movement in Congress to slash financial support to


the UN, which would dramatically degrade its ability to mount future operations.


Both the Secretary of Defense and President Clinton oppose such a move; however,


UN funding is likely to remain a viable target for congressmen looking to balance the


budget in ways that do not directly impact their constituents. In addition to the


budget issue, U.S. policymakers are debating the issue of UN command of U.S.


forces. For isolationists and UN opponents, this emotional issue continues to play


well in congressional and presidential election rhetoric.


Although supportive of UN operations in general, President Clinton has


clearly learned the lessons of Somalia. His eagerness to send troops to Bosnia has


waned significantly in view of consistent public opinion polls against such action.


Limited operations involving American interests, such as Operation Restore


Democracy in Haiti, are likely to retain the American public's support. As he


prepares to run for reelection, President Clinton will weigh carefully the public


response to any action involving the use of American military forces abroad.






In March 1995 the final contingents of UN forces departed Somalia with the


assistance of a multi-nation force led by Marine Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni.


In retrospect, Operation Restore Hope was a success as a humanitarian effort.


Inevitably, it was an abject failure in peacemaking and serves as an indictment


against an aggressive UN military posture.


Did the American policymakers and military leaders learn the lessons from


Somalia? Only "the next time" will answer the most important question about


Operation Restore Hope. For the Somalis, warfare and anarchy continue. In


Lieutenant General Zinni'z words, "All the hands that have reached out to them have


been bitten and are no longer there."33


1"Security Council Establishes New UN Operation in Somalia," UN Chronicle,

September 1992, 13.



2 Ibid., 14.



3 "U.S. to Spearhead Somalia Relief Force," John D. Morrocco, Aviation Week &

Space Technology, December 7, 1992, 26.



4 "Somalia," The Software Toolworks Multimedia Encyclopedia (Grolier Inc., 1992).



5 "Somali Requests $1.6 Billion in American Arms as Aid," International Defense

Intelligence, July 18, 1983.



6 "Dealing With Anti-Countries," Strobe Talbot, Time, December 14, 1992 (Time

Inc., Magazine Co. and Compact Publishing, Inc., 1994).



7 "Security Council Established New UN Operation in Somalia," UN Chronicle,

September 1992, 13-14.



8 Ibid.



9 Ibid.


10 "Airlift for Humanity," Time, August 10, 1992, (Time Inc., Magazine Co. and

Compact Publishing, Inc., 1994).



11 "Lessons Learned; Somalia: A First Look," Colonel Kenneth Allard, U.S. Army,

Institute for National Strategic Studies, (Final Draft), (National Defense

University, Ft. McNair, Washington, DC), 7.



12 "Force Feeding," Time, September 28, 1992, (Time Inc., Magazine Co. and

Compact Publishing, Inc., 1994).



13 "The Making of a Quagmire," Brit Hume, National Review, November 1, 1993,




14 "Taking on the Thugs," Bruce W. Nelan, Time, December 14, 1992, (Time Inc.,

Magazine Co. and Compact Publishing, Inc., 1994).



15 "An Agenda for Peace," UN Chronicle, September 1992, 3.



16 "Today Somalia...," Bruce W. Nelan, Time, December 21, 1992, (Time Inc.,

Magazine Co. and Compact Publishing, Inc., 1994).



17 Ibid.



18 Allard, 9.



19 Ibid.



20 Ibid.



21 "Elite U.S. Troops to Somalia," Time, September 6. 1993, (Time Inc., Magazine

Co. and Compact Publishing. Inc., 1994).



22 "Anatomy of a Disaster," George J. Church, Time, October 18, 1993, (Time Inc.,

Magazine Co. and Compact Publishing. Inc., 1994).



23National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, (U.S.

Government Printing Officer, Washington. DC. August 1991). 11.



24National Security Strategy of the United States The White House, (U.S.

Government Printing Officer, Washington. DC, January 1993). 7.



25Ibid., 8.



26 "The Perils of Good Intentions," Marguerite Michaels, Time, February 7, 1994,

(Time Inc., Magazine Co. and Compact Publishing, Inc., 1994).



27Allard, 26.



28 "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," Richard K. Betts, Foreign Affairs,

November/December 1994, 21.



29 "From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: the UN Operation in Somalia."

Ramesh Thakur, The Journal of Modern African Studies, September 1994, 398.



30 "UN Prepares to Leave Somalia," Associated Press Report from the United

Nations, February 26, 1995, (Prodigy Services Company, 1995).



31 "Arms and the People," Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, Foreign Affairs,

November/December 1994, 68.



32 Ibid., 47.



33 "US-Led Forces Gathers Off Somalia," Associated Press Report from the USS

Belleau Wood, February 22, 1995, (Prodigy Services Company, 1995).




"Airlift for Humanity. "Time, 10 August 1992, (Time Inc., Magazine Co. and

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