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The United States And Peacekeeping: Can It Work

The United States And Peacekeeping: Can It Work?


CSC 1995


SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues







The focus of this paper is that United States soldiers make poor


peacekeepers. A brief history of the development of the United Nations


with respect to the United States is discussed. A review of four major


post cold war missions (Somalia, Cambodia, Rwanda and Bosnia) is


conducted. The conclusions indicate that Cambodia was a success,


Somalia and Rwanda a failure and Bosnia a draw (at the moment). In the


cases that failed, one of the major reasons was that both the UN and the


US forgot the peacekeeping lessons learned during the cold war period.


One of those lessons was the issue of consent. The other lesson was


impartiality. The paper then discusses these issues and why it is


extremely difficult for troops from the United States to abide by these




There are four major reasons why United States troops make poor


peacekeepers. They are: political decision making, super power status,


training , and expectations. Political decision makers in the United


States are pragmatic, results orientated individuals who are weak in the


historical aspects of problems. Consequently, they tend to make


decisions looking for concrete results in a short time period. The


United States super power status dictates that peacekeeping deployments


it is involved with must succeed. They must succeed because of the


tremendous combat power available. Unfortunately, the availability of


combat power encourages people to try to solve a problem by using it.


Doctrinal training for soldiers emphasizes the aggressive, warrior image


that is not normally compatible with peacekeeping. Finally, the United


States soldier is always regarded as primarily under control of


Washington, even when supposedly under the United Nations.


All of these reasons make it extremely difficult for United States


troops to make good peacekeepers.




Executive Summary II


Table of Contents III




Chapter Page


Introduction: What is Possible, What is Realistic 1


1. A Historical Prologue 5


2. Post Cold War Optimism 11


3. Traditional Peacekeeping Evolves after 1990 18


4. The United States View of Peacekeeping Post 1993 44


Conclusion: It Must Have Been a Dream 55






A. Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter 58


B. Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter 60


C. Summary of United Nation Missions 65


Bibliography 71






... the US is an essential ingredient both of the UN

military structure, and the entire structure of the UN

itself. The doctrine of minimum force, as we understand

it, is not part of the US military ethos, nor is the

Wahlgren concept of the Firm, Fair and Friendly UN soldier1


General Sir David Ramsbotham

United Kingdom



We are big enough to discharge with effect the

responsibilities that we undertake, we are not big enough

for others to fear us.2


Lester B. Pearson

former Prime Minister of Canada



The contradictions inherent in these two quotations are the basis


of many arguments on the use of United States (US) troops on United


Nation's (UN) Missions. Are the United States highly trained armed


forces too aggressive to use in peacekeeping operations? Due to the


United States position as the sole global superpower, can any of its


participation in peacekeeping operations be impartial? The latter


point is very important, for hard won experience with UN operations


indicate that impartiality is essential for success. In this paper I


shall look at whether US forces in UN peacekeeping missions are


effective peacekeepers or counterproductive to such a mission's goals.


Why would US troops be counterproductive? I have deliberately limited


this study to missions that have taken place after the end of the Cold


War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. I have not included


operations prior to 1990 as these missions were conducted under the


constraints of the Cold War.


After 1990, many nations felt that the lessons learned by the UN


during the Cold War no longer applied. This paper will look at whether


that assessment was too hasty. Specifically, I shall study the UN


missions that took place in Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda. I


have not included Haiti in this study as the mission has just started


and the lessons to be learned have not yet been written.


There are three terms that I will use throughout this paper, they


are peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement. The definitions




(1). Peacekeeping, involves two or more belligerents who wish to


keep the peace but need an impartial party to provide


outside assistance. Although not specifically mentioned,


Peacekeeping is considered to be a Chapter VI operation


under the United Nations Charter.


(2). Peacemaking, involves any military operation short of full


combat to rectify a crisis situation and the consent of


those involved is not necessary. Peacemaking is a Chapter


VI operation under the UN charter.


(3). Peace enforcement, involves the use of full combat forces


by the United Nations to stop hostilities; consent of the


all parties involved is not necessary and it is a Chapter


VII operation under the UN charter.



This paper will consist of four chapters. Chapter one briefly


reviews the pre-1989 view that the United States had about its role


concerning the UN and foreign policy in general. It will also examine


the role idealism had in influencing US policy and how this often


conflicted with the policy of self interest. Chapter Two examines the


post-Cold War ideas that the US had about the United Nations and how


those ideas evolved. Specifically, this chapter will cover the


influence of the Weinberger Doctrine, the "CNN"3 effect, and the ongoing


debate between idealism and national interest. Chapter Three reviews


the "traditional" peacekeeping role of the UN and the four major UN


operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda. It contains a


brief history of the UN's traditional peacekeeping role (with consent)


and background on the four conflicts and the part the UN played in


each. This Chapter will also examine whether the presence or absence


of significant US troop levels played an important part in the success


of each mission. Chapter Four will address the post Cold War views on


the role of the UN and the implementation of peace enforcement and


peacekeeping roles; it will study the US military as peacekeepers, and




3 The use of the generic term "CNN" effect will refer to the instant

communication of pictures 24 hours a day, via television, by all major

networks. CNN was the first major television station to initiate this



the effect of the US political process and public on this particular


role. Finally, the conclusion will look at the benefit and dangers of


US troop involvement in UN operations.


I intend to show, in the Post Cold War period, many of the well


thought out concepts of who can be involved and what a peacekeeping


mission can accomplish are forgotten. It is only after several


disasters that the United States and the UN recognized that the action


of humans had not changed significantly. Therefore, many of the


previous "rules for peacekeepers", with minor modifications still


applied. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the


effect of the North American "Channel Surfing Culture" the


Administration of the US. That subject would be worth a paper alone.


Due to the current nature of each of these operations, many of


the sources used in this paper are from newspaper and journal articles.


Commentary from original sources is limited, as many of the individuals


involved are still active members of their respective militaries and


their post deployment reports have not yet been declassified.





The UN and the US have had a love-hate relationship over the last


forty years. Within this time period, the method the United States


uses when dealing with the United Nations has swung from the idealistic


to the pragmatic and on a few occasions, hostile.


During its idealistic phase (roughly the first 5 years), the US


contributed tremendously to the basic setup of the UN. The United


States was one of the founding members of the United Nations. The US


directly influenced the construction of the UN charter. As Thomas M.


Frank states in his book, Nation Against Nation,


... the UN Charter was a sort of extension of the US

constitution...being built in a large part to American

national specifications... the Charter, like the US.

Constitution, would become the fundamental law of society,

determining and umpiring basic power relationships.1



These "fundamental laws" would be enforced by collective security


armies (supplied by the permanent members of the Security


Council). Precisely how and when these armies were to be created


was never agreed upon, and the use of collective security armies


never happened. The optimistic attitude towards the UN


disappeared as the Cold War developed during the late 1940's.


The United States then adopted a pragmatic approach to the


United Nations. The value of the organization was viewed almost


in direct proportion to how much use it could be to American


foreign policy. During the early part of the Cold War, US


policies were successful at the UN and the Soviet Union (using its


veto power) constantly blocked the resolutions at the Security


Council. The one notable exception was Korea in 1950, where the


Soviet delegate left the meeting before exercising his veto. The


United States and its allies moved swiftly and passed a resolution


authorizing the use of force in Korea.


During the 1960s and 1970s, the UN environment changed. The


Soviet Union allied with Third World Nations, many whom were newly


created states emerging as a result of the end of European


colonialism (ironically, the US had a lot to do with the end of


European colonialism after WWII). The Soviet Union made the


policies and the United States exercised its veto. Thus, the


United Nations became an organization in which the two superpowers


competed for influence according to their own national interests.


For example, during the Arab/Israeli wars of the 1970s, the Soviet


Union would support resolutions condemning Israel's aggression.


Israel's ally, the United States, would veto the resolution at the


Security Council. Therefore, the United States would look like


the supporter of aggression.


Unable to achieve its policies through the United Nations,


the United States entered into a number of bilateral/multilateral


arrangements (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization


(NATO) in the late 1940s) to fulfill its interests. The aim of


these bilateral and regional arrangements was to contain the


spreading influence of the Soviet Union. These arrangements were


to lead the United States into the Vietnam war and the subsequent


bitter experience. It was during the 1960s that the idea of an


"impartial" peacekeeper arose.


Peacekeepers, to be impartial, came from nations considered


to be impartial by the those who were involved in the conflict


being mediated. A group of middle powers (Canada, Norway, and


some non-Western states) arose who were willing to contribute to


peacekeeping missions. A peacekeeping mission generally consists


of a group of military observers who would establish a presence


between two fighting states (see Appendix C). During the 1960s,


civil wars were not candidates for peacekeeping. It would be the


late 1980's before peacekeeping missions world be sent into civil


wars. The mission typically had terms to which each side had


agreed. It was the task of the observers to report violations of


the agreement and to act as impartial go betweens for either side.


In order for peacekeepers to be deployed, it was necessary to have


the consent of both fighting parties. Normally, the situation


involved two sovereign states, involved in a dispute. In fact,


the initial idea of the UN was based around conflicts between


states, not groups of people within a state. If in many cases the


US could theoretically do it alone, why did it involve the UN at




Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara expressed one of the


recurring themes of US foreign policy in 1966 when he addressed


the American Society of Newspaper Editors,



... neither conscience nor sanity itself suggests that the

United States is, should, or could be the global gendarme.

...The United States has no mandate from on high to police

the world and no inclination to do so. There have been

classic cases in which our deliberate non-action was the

wisest action of all.2



Accordingly, the United States has usually attempted to


involve others, with varying degrees of success, in helping to


solve the problems that arise in the world. "World's Policeman"


reoccurs. If necessary, the US can and will act alone to achieve


its own national interest unilaterally. Korea was an example of


cooperation with the UN. Vietnam was an example of the US acting


alone. But how does the United States determine its foreign


policy? Does the US follow some grand design?


Former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, a noted


historian, best summarizes how the United States makes foreign


policy. He believes that, "Issues are dealt with only as the


pressure of events imposes the need for resolving them."3


Foreign policy remains static for long periods of time and then as


the pressure of events builds, it will take a big change all at


once. Kissinger feels that this is due to the people who make the


policy for the United States and how the bureaucracy works. He


describes it as a,


Bureaucratic-pragmatic leadership --when a problem arises it

is assigned to one group/person, then it is resolved, long

term thinking is neglected since it has no bureaucratic

consequence - this causes Foreign Policy to be rigid for

long periods of time, then to change all at once as the

solution is attempted.4



Kissinger contends that the bureaucratic-pragmatic


leadership, combined with the fact that the vast majority of


America's leaders come from a legal background, lead them to make


decisions based upon a Constitutional conception whenever


possible. Therefore, he feels most leaders are good at "...high


competence in dealing with technical issues, and much less


virtuosity in mastering a historical process."5 The United States


political system produces an American decision maker who is a


legalistic, pragmatic, and results oriented individual somewhat


weak on the historical process. Combining that decision maker


with a political system which can rapidly change the


Administration, profoundly affects how the United States works on


any foreign policy issue. A good example of this would be the


differences between President Carter and President Reagan.


President Carter's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union


was generally low key with only a modest emphasis on defence


spending. President Reagan came to power and US foreign policy


took a massive shift. The United States embarked upon a


tremendous military expansion and took a very hard line approach


towards the Soviet Union going as far as to call Russia the "evil


empire". In a very short period of time, Washington's foreign


policy shifted drastically. Sudden shifts in foreign policy are


characteristic of how Washington deals with the UN and


peacekeeping as well.


A quick review of Cold War (1945 to 1989) historical themes,


are: an idealistic idea (i.e. charter modeled after US


constitution) which conflicts with a pragmatic-bureaucratic style


decision making process; a desire not to become the world's


policeman; a two superpower deadlock in the UN leading to


peacekeeping missions being undertaken by impartial middle powers;


and, finally, the concept of consent of the belligerents (normally


two sovereign states). But the world changed after the collapse


of the USSR and the end of the Cold War and so did the fundamental


nature of the type of peacekeeping missions the UN would attempt.






Painful as it may be to admit, we could benefit from a

counterweight that would discipline our occasional

impetuosity and, by supplying historical perspective, modify

our penchant for abstract and "final" solutions1


Henry Kissinger



All Change is not Progress


Holiday Inn Sign. Hibbing Minnesota. October 1991




The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 triggered a new


world confidence in the international community. The United


States had a renewed surge of optimism with victory in the Cold


War and its status as the remaining superpower. The success of


the Gulf War lead many to think that the United Nations could


achieve many things in this new "global" order. However, this


view was unrealistic. By 1995, many people had begun to realize


that, despite the best intentions, the international community had


indeed changed but not necessarily for the better! In many areas,


it was actually reverting to patterns of behavior from a more


distant past.


This chapter will examine five areas: the "New World Order";


the United States approach to the UN in the post Cold War; the


effect of the "CNN factor"; the resurgence of the belief in the


effectiveness of the multinational community (ie UN); and,


finally, when reality did not bet expectations, the


disillusionment. Although many people claimed a new age had


dawned, the historical patterns of how the United States deals


with the international community has not changed.


It is not the intent of this paper to expound completely on


all the various theories that circulated after the collapse of the


Soviet Union. For the United States there are three generally


accepted ideas of how it should conduct foreign policy during the


new conditions of the altered international community.2


The first concept is the Lone Super Power Theory that


postulates the United States as the hegemon, any other alternative


for the world resulting in anarchy. Under the first theory,


Washington would be the "World's Policeman." The second theory,


by Samuel Huntington, is the "Clash of Civilizations". The "Clash


of Civilizations" states that with the collapse of the bi-polar


Cold War world, old cultural animosities, and grouping would


override the nation states. Many existing nation states will


collapse as these various groups of people struggle to assert


themselves and their cultural identities. Under the second theory


some people believe that the role of the United States should be


to provide the bulwark of Western values against all others. The


final theory states the United States should act as the balance in


world politics. In essence the country would fill the role that


Great Britain did in the 19th century at the height of England's


imperial days. The interplay between these various theories and


the changes in the post Cold War world has lead to a change in the


UN's view.


Post Cold War policy for the United States is a combination


of both pragmatism and idealism. The pragmatic policies were a


result of the US experience in the Vietnam War, Beirut, and the


Gulf War. Both military and civilian leadership put forth


versions of the Weinberger doctrine3. General Colon Powell,


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commented on what


guidelines the United States would employ when using force:


"...that force must be used massively, if at all, with clear


political objectives and a definitive 'exit strategy'..."4. The


United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine K.


Albright stated in September 1993, further basic criteria for the


involvement of US troops in a UN mission:


Is there a real threat to international peace and

security? Does the proposed peacekeeping mission have clear

objectives and can its scope be clearly identified? Is a

cease fire in place and have the parties agreed to a United

Nations presence? Can an end point to the mission be




With the end of the Cold War, the US public, tired of


shouldering the burden of defense desired a peace dividend. In


addition, the public tolerance for the loss of American lives in


foreign conflicts for any reason had decreased dramatically. To


allow for these developments, the Clinton administration generated


new ideas on foreign policy. The ideas were: the United States


would not act unless its own vital interests are at stake or


unless Washington obtains multilateral consensus on the issue


(attributed unofficially as the Tarnoff Doctrine6 after a US State


Department Official).


The new policy of the United States theoretically reduces


the number of operations that the US unilaterally embarks upon.


The US taxpayer pays less because other nations shoulder a share


of the burden. The ideal and only truly international institution


is the United Nations. An operation sanctioned by the United


Nations not only has both other nations support and/or


participation, but it is regarded as legitimate as well. Nations


who might look upon a unilateral US operation as one in which only


Washington's vital interests matter, view a UN operation as being


impartial. Again the reoccurring theme of no desire to be the


world's policeman combines with the political pragmatic approach


help form the foreign policy of the United States. The United


Nations for the third time since it's creation has become the main


collective-security organization for the United States. However,


as on all the previous occasions when the United States placed


heavy emphasis upon the UN there were always idealistic elements


and this time is no exception.


As the following chapters will elaborate, Somalia, Rwanda,


and Bosnia all had a very altruistic basis to them. In each of


these missions, the prime motivator was humanitarian aid. In the


case of Bosnia, from the United States perspective, there was a


strong emphasis on the continuing violation of human rights.


During the initial post Cold War period, the United States is


following a policy of promoting democracy and human rights as


outlined in the latest National Security Strategy: "...we must


prepare our forces for peace operations to support democracy or


conflict resolution."7 The assumption is that those being rescued


will emulate institutions that promote both democracy and human


rights. But practically, it is often cheaper to prevent conflicts


before they become massive wars rather than try to repair the


damage afterward. The continuing question that faces US leaders


is, "how to effectively help?" As the following chapters will


show, the involvement of US troops in a UN peace operation is not


necessarily the most effective, nor are the results as




Finally, US leaders have to combat the effect of the "CNN


factor", the spreading influence of the world wide electronic


reporting media. The "CNN factor" specifically named after Ted


Turner's Atlanta based Cable News Network, CNN is the organization


that can show instantly, television pictures of what is happening


world wide. Currently, other networks, such as the BBC are


undertaking this type of coverage as well. The nature of


television means that the coverage is composed of short time


frames and generally localized views. Pictures of a war torn


country or starving children has a massive influence on the


general public.


The CNN type of coverage connects with real time reporting


as simultaneously political leaders are trying to develop a


situation and military subordinates to implement it. The public


wants their politicians to do something, and in most cases that


means "right now". Unfortunately, the television coverage is


short on the history and explanation for what is happening, and


fast on instant analysis. Often UN and US leaders must make quick


decisions to appear to be at least taking some action. These


decisions have involved Washington in operations the country would


not normally, and perhaps should never have been involved. It


also leads to those areas that do not receive coverage being


ignored (as Rwanda was). Major General Dallaire, former UN


commander in Rwanda, commented in a lecture at the Marine Corps


Command and Staff College that if the war had shown the slaughter


of the gorillas instead of people, the world would have paid more




By 1995, enthusiasm for the UN as major focus of foreign


policy for the United States has all but disappeared. The many


complications that resulted from participation in Somalia, the


seemingly endless fight in Bosnia, and the bottomless barrel a


commitment to Rwanda appears to be, have soured the American


public to the UN. The US public's disillusionment with the UN has


existed for decades, but recently the feeling has expanded. The


new Republican Congress wishes to cut one third of the United


Nations budget and further impose restraints on the command of US


troops.8 The lessons of Somalia and the responsibility for the


loss of the rangers are being laid at the feet of the UN. Yet,


somehow forgotten, is the fact that the UN Leader of the Somali


mission was American, the mission was commanded by Americans, and


the ill-thought out proposal to find Adhid was sponsored by the US


Ambassador to the UN. What went wrong? In the following


chapters, I shall show how in many cases the lessons of forty


years of UN operations were ignored. It was this ignorance of the


past which in many cases caused the failures in the Post Cold War








In order to fully understand UN participation in post


Cold War operations, it is necessary to know the history of each


operation and the United Nations approach to them. This chapter


will consider the notion of "consent" in peacekeeping and the


typical development of what are now considered "traditional


peacekeeping rules". Four UN missions (Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia,


and Rwanda) will be examined: each will be reviewed to include the


basis for UN participation. I shall then point out what might be


the seed of the future success or failure in each one.


UN peacekeeping commenced in 1948 with a peace observer


force. In the next thirty years, fifteen more operations


occurred. A body of five commonly accepted principles for


peacekeeping developed out of these operations:


(1). Operations should be UN operations, formed, selected


and financed by the UN and reporting to the Secretary




(2). When the warring factions have reached a political


settlement upon which all sides agree, UN troops would




(3). UN forces must be strictly impartial.


(4). To maintain a balanced approach, no super power should


have an obvious presence.


(5). Troops can use only the minimum of force.1


These principles combine with the philosophy expressed in


1963 by Secretary General U Thant. Speaking at Harvard, he said


UN forces "are essentially peace and not fighting forces and they


operate only with the consent of the parties directly concerned."2


U Thant emphasized that peacekeeping operations must be consensual


but acknowledged this would not prevent one side from cheating if


they thought the gains would be worth it. What does consent mean?


A good definition of consent is "a general public attitude


that tolerates a peacekeeping presence and represents a quorun of


cooperation."3 Charles Dobbie in his book A Concept for Post-Cold


War Peacekeeping, points out that you can have consent at the


Operational level of war, while lacking consent at the local


level. An example would be the recent hostage taking of Canadian


troops in Bosnia. The Canadians, as UN troops, had the consent of


the senior Serb and Croatian commanders. A local Serb commander


took the Canadians hostage but released them after negotiations


with higher commands. The Canadians did not have local consent,


but they did have consent from the higher authorities and


therefore were allowed to do their job. One of the prime reasons


that Peacekeepers gain and keep consent is impartiality.


A nation was generally considered impartial if it had an


"absence of significant political or economic interests in . .


areas of conflict, lack of prejudicial colonial or imperial


histories, . . . independent internationalism."4 Present


throughout the history of United Nation's missions are these


principles of consent and impartiality. Yet for some reason,


after 1990 the UN and the US ignored these very basic tenets in


some UN commitments. The results were often a disaster, resulting


in missions that were a waste of money and lives.


In the past, what did the UN expect from a soldier involved


in peacekeeping? A summary of expectations is best expressed in


the following quotation from Larry O.L. Fabian's book Soldier


Without Enemies:


they have no deadly foe to destroy or be destroyed by. They

fight very little and use their weapons rarely. They prefer

compromise to conquest. They substitute persuasion and

prevention for punishment, and they apply tact instead of




Training a fighting force to follow this philosophy, which is


directly opposite to the normal methods, is difficult. However,


in the following chapters I shall show how the closer a fighting


force comes to this ideal, the better it succeeds in peacekeeping.


The United States does not train nor want its military to do


this as its major role. In fact, Kissinger's analysis is valid:


the US makes decisions based upon a pragmatic assessment of the


current situation with very little regard to history. The


pendulum of enthusiasm for the UN was high after 1990,


particularly after the Gulf War. Again, unrealistic expectations


were placed upon an organization that in the previous forty years


had proved conclusively that it had distinct limits on what the


international body could do. None the less commitments were made


in Somalia, Cambodia, Rwanda and Bosnia.





We can call Somalia a "CNN mission". In 1991-92, factional


fighting among rival Somalian war lords had created massive


starvation amongst the population. The two main competing war


lords were Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed and General Mohame


Farah Aidid, leader of the United Somali Congress. The tribal


factions had stymied relief agencies in their attempts to get food


aid to the people. These agencies were forced to bribe the


competing tribal factions to deliver the aid. Unfortunately


negative consequences ensued: often the bribes did not work and


the agencies were not delivering the food. A small group of UN


troops sent in the summer of 1992 (lead by Pakistan) was to act as


an observer force for a negotiated cease fire. Unfortunately, the


cease fire did not occur and the UN mission was ineffective. The


relief agencies estimated that up to 1,000 people a day were


dying6 in the continuing fighting. The nightly televised pictures


of countless starving people created intense political pressure


among Western countries to do something. A decision on where to


go next had to be made.


The American public expected quick action on the issue from


President Bush. He had three options presented to him the day


before Thanksgiving in 1992.


(1). To expand the peacekeeping operation by adding 3,500


troops to the current Pakistani peacekeeping effort.


(2). To assist in making it into a peacemaking operation


with the US supplying transportation and logistical




(3). To send in a US division under the UN flag but US




He chose option three because it provided a quick method of taking


control of the situation and stop the factional fighting.7


Unfortunately, the State Department ignored the advice of the US


Ambassador in Kenya. He called Somalia a "tar baby,. . .


Somalis, as the Italians and British discovered to their


discomfiture, are natural-born guerrillas. They will mine the


roads. They will lay ambushes. They will launch hit-and-run




The UN Security Council Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992


authorized a change, the "Use of all necessary means to establish


when possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief


operations."9 The United States then lead the operation, called


"Restore Hope." It was a humanitarian mission, involving many


other countries, to ensure that the relief agencies could deliver


the necessary food supplies. They heavily armed the troops and


left no doubt that the UN force would impose peace, by force, if


necessary. The mission was sent under Chapter VII provisions,


which meant it was to be a mission authorized to use force. The


UN never obtained consent of the warring parties.


Initially, the mission went well with the tribes ceasing to


fight and the aid agencies commencing to deliver food to the


starving people. The UN force then commenced setting up the


former police force as an effective unit and began to reimpose law


and order on an area that had been lawless for two years.


After the initial honeymoon period, the tone and aim of the


mission began to change. The United States, under heavy internal


pressure from home, reduced its troop level from 28,000 to 4,800


and turned over its operation officially to the United Nations


Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Although officially a UN


organization, Americans commanded UNOSOM at both the civilian and


military level. Even at the reduced level, heavy pressure existed


from the US public to pull out completely and leave the nation


building to the UN and not get involved in disarming of the


Warlords10. US politicians and the public were interested in the


"quick fix" approach to problem solving. The US lead forces had


arrived, aid was now getting through, in the public's perception,


it was now time to leave.


Unfortunately, the continuing underlying tensions and


conflict between the Somali clans was not well understood by any


of the American or UN leaders. Internally, the Warlords were


starting to reassert their power and one, General Aidid, was more


prominent in taking control of the capital, Mogadishu. After


General Aidid's men had ambushed a Pakistani unit in Mogadishu,


the UN security council voted on a resolution that directed the


United Nations force to arrest him.


It was at this point that two major shifts in policy took


place. The first was that the UN put a $25,000 bounty on General


Aidid, and secondly the operation became actively dedicated to


disarming the Warlords. Two of the Peacekeepers rules had now


been broken, UNOSOM was not operating with even tacit consent of


most of the combatants and it was no longer impartial. The mission


was now one of peace enforcement. Charles Dobbie in his book A


Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping states that:


if a peacekeeping force crosses the impartiality divide from

peacekeeping to peace enforcement. If perceived to be

taking sides, the force loses its legitimacy and credibility

as a trustworthy third party, thereby prejudicing its

security. The force's resources will then become ever more

devoted to its need to protect itself. It actually joins

the conflict it was there to police and is likely to become

embroiled in activities that are irrelevant to the overall

campaign aim....Once on the other side, there is very little

chance of getting back and the only way out is likely to be

by leaving the theatre.11



Nevertheless, the crossover of the UN force from impartial


peacekeeping to peace enforcement was not considered important at


this point in the post 1990's. The world's sole super power was


involved with its massive (although reduced) well-trained force


and it would simply be a matter of time until they would catch


General Aidid, or so Washington and the UN thought.


The very fact that the US was so heavily committed to the


operation placed unrealistic expectations on the operation.


Public opinion put intense pressure on the UNOSOM's commanders


when General Aidid proved difficult to capture. General Aidid's


capture became tied to the prestige of the United States. The


issue culminated in the poorly timed raid by the US rangers


against General Aidid's suspected hideout in October 1993 that


lead to eighteen US rangers and hundreds of Somalis being killed.


A captured US helicopter pilot, Michael Durant, summarized best


what General Aidid had lectured on: "When you don't live here,


you can't understand what's going on in this country. We


Americans have tried to help. But at one point things turned


bad."12 The loss of life accentuated the pressure on Washington


to withdraw the US troops and turn it over to the UN completely.


Within a couple of months the US had withdrawn its forces from the




General Aidid reverted to being a significant participant in


the political process and no longer a bandit. The UN soldiered


on, attempting to put the basics of an infrastructure together


until March 1995. Then the US Marines returned to provide


covering fire for the last withdrawal of UN troops. Somalia


returned to the control of the Warlords.




The main UN mission in Cambodia commenced in 1992. The name


of the mission was the United Nations Transitional Authority in


Cambodia (UNTAC). Prior to UNTAC, a small force of observers


called the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNIMRC) had


been sent there in November of 1991. UNTAC arose out of the


October 1991 Paris peace agreement signed by the four Cambodian


combatant factions. The four groups were the Khmer Rouge


(Communist), the Khmer Peoples National Liberation Front (a right


wing organization), the Cambodian Government (backed by Vietnam),


and the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,


Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (supported by Prince Sihanouk).


Cambodians had been fighting for over thirty years and more than


350,000 were refugees in Thailand. The 1991 Paris peace agreement


was to stop the conflict in two steps. Step one formed an interim


Supreme National Council (SNC) composed of members from each party


and headed by Prince Sihanouk. As the second step, the UN was to


set up an environment for peaceful elections.


UNTAC deployed six months late with the mission "to


dismantle 70 percent of the opposing military forces and gain


complete control over the remaining 30 percent; to organize,


supervise, and conduct free and fair elections; and to return and


rehabilitate the 350,000 Cambodians living in refugee camps in


Thailand."13 The operation was divided into seven components:


Human Rights, Civil Administrations, Civil Police, Repatriation


Component, Rehabilitation, Electorial, and Military. The main


purpose of the UN Military forces was to verify the withdrawal of


foreign forces, supervise cease fires, make a weapons control


system, conduct mine clearing training, investigate complaints and


assist the repatriation of refugees. The military component


consisted of 16,000 peacekeepers (from 47 different countries).


Only 47 peacekeepers were American. The United States also


supplied logistics and monetary aid.


UNTAC deployed initially with the consent of all involved


parties and consisted of many small and middle power


representatives. Although, the SNC has granted the UN "all powers


necessary to ensure the implementation of the agreement"14, as a


mission the UN closely structured itself along the "traditional


peacekeeping" philosophy. The troops of the middle powers were


considered impartial. The UN scheduled elections for May 1993 but


from the initial deployment problems arose.


The Khmer Rouge, unhappy with the process, recognizing they


could not win an election, disavowed the accord almost immediately


and began to work against it. The Khmer Rouge had a completely


different understanding of the Paris Accord and maintained that


the amount of power it delegated to the SNC was minimal.


Accordingly, they would not cooperate with UNTAC and would not


allow the verification of their forces. The Khmer Rouge refused


to disarm, and subsequently none of the other participants would.


Incidents of the Khmer Rouge harassing peacekeepers started almost


immediately. Pressure arose from the press, non-governmental


agencies, and the public for the UN to take some action against


those who were causing the problem. The argument presented was


that the UN would lose its credibility if it did not respond.


UNTAC strongly resisted these pressures, for it realized the UN


did not have enough troops to take offensive action. The


alternative was to reduce the aims of the mission. In November


1992 the Security Council revised the mandate.


The revised mandate concentrated solely upon ensuring that a


democratic election would take place. UNTAC was not going to take


sides in the process and as far as possible it would maintain the


consent of most of the parties involved. UNTAC employed the


military to defend the polling stations, recruited three of the


four parties (the exception being the Khmer Rouge) to maintain


control of the countryside, and concentrated the educational


effort on ensuring that the people would know that the polling


would be secret.


The effort to remain impartial was a success. The Khmer


Rouge never regarded the UN mission as the opposition. It


continued to threaten, harass and intimidate UN patrols in its


region, but despite a series of hostage incidents, never


considered the UN the enemy. Since the Khmer Rouge only


controlled a limited amount of Cambodia, UNTAC was able to


effectively carry out its revised mission. In May 1993, the


elections were an unqualified success, with a population turn out


of 89.6%15 (including Khmer Rouge controlled areas) with only a


few major incidents of violence. UNTAC was a success, where most


people had predicted failure. UNTAC had maintained the consent of


the majority, remained impartial and avoided mission creep. The


Khmer Rouge still remains a problem, however, there is a fairly


elected government in power to deal with them. The next major


mission, Rwanda, was not to be as successful.





A review of the history of the country since its initial


contact with Europeans is necessary to appreciate the contemporary


problem. Contact with Rwanda commenced in 1894 with German


explorers. Rwanda's rulers were the Tutsi who made up 15% of the


population with the remainder of the population being Hutus. The


Germans elected to maintain the status quo when they made Rwanda a


colony and left the Tutsi as the administrators and officials.


The subsequent conflict between the two tribes is the basis for


the current strife in Rwanda. After World War Two, the UN


appointed Belgium as the trustee of the country. Belgium began to


educate the Hutu majority and encourage them to develop so the


country would become a democracy. The Tutsi, feeling threatened,


pushed for rapid independence while they still had control of the


country. In 1961, the Hutus staged a coup with the backing of the


Belgians and took over the country. Subsequently, 130,000 Tutsi


fled to Uganda and formed the base for ongoing operations against


the Hutu's for the next thirty-four years. Rwanda, now a Hutu


governed country, officially obtained its independence from


Belgium in 1962.


In Uganda, the local people resented the presence of the


displaced Tutsi. The resentment lead to acts of violence and


oppression against the displaced. Many Tutsi, out of frustration,


then joined a Ugandan rebel group that was opposing Idi Amin, the


dictator ruling Uganda. The rebel group successfully took power


in 1986 and two prominent rebel leaders who were Tutsi, Paul


Kagame and Fred Rwigyama, became the chief of intelligence and


Minister of National Defence for Uganda. They also became leading


members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The objective of


the RPF was to incite the Tutsi who remained in Rwanda to join a


rebellion so that the Tutsi could return to power in Rwanda.


The RPF, with 4,000 men, lead an unsuccessful attack into


Rwanda in 1990. Although the attack was unsuccessful, it


emphasized the need for a political settlement to clarify the


power sharing of the two tribes in the country. To settle the


problem, the ruling Hutus and the RPF meet in Paris in 1993 and


arrived at the Arusha Accord. This accord laid out the formula


for political power between the Hutus and the Tutsi. It also


stated that Rwanda should hold free and fair elections which the


UN would oversee. The UN set up a small mission of 2,500 people,


the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UMAMIR). UNAMIR


was to help arrange the elections, monitor a demilitarized zone


between Uganda and Rwanda and to assist with mine clearance.14


The mandate for the UN was "contributing to the establishment and


maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and


subsequent operation of the transitional government."17


However, Rwanda exploded into civil war on 6 April 1994 when


President Habyarimaia's plane was shot down while returning from a


meeting to discuss the implementation of the Accord. The Hutu's


used this as an excuse for their militias to attack all Tutsi and


moderate Hutus. In the end the estimated death toll was half a


million people. The UN troops recently arrived, and with little


logistic support and weapons, did not fair well. Ten Belgian


peacekeepers, who were guarding the Prime Minister, were killed


defending her from the mobs. Belgium subsequently withdrew its


troops from the peacekeeping force.


Eight days after the war started, Major General Romeo


Dallaire, head of the UN force, pleaded with the UN Security


Council for additional support. On 14 March 1994, Secretary


General Boutros-Ghali presented the Security Council with two




(1). To double the UN force to 5,000 soldiers.


(2). To reduce it to 270 soldiers.


Option 1 was designed to reinforce UNAMIR, the Security Council


chose Option Two. They had reduced UNAMIR to a mere observer in


the conflict.


The subsequent slaughter of the Tutsi, although reported in


the press, did not cause any major nation to interfere. The RPF


(under Paul Kagame) successfully reopened its offensive against


the Rwandan government. The Hutu army (French trained and


equipped) was unable to stop the RPF. Panic set in among the


Hutus and more than two million fled to Zaire, Burundi and


Uganda18 thus a major refugee problem was created. In Zaire,


France under UN auspices, finally set up a safe haven for the


fleeing Hutu's. By mid-July, the RPF controlled Rwanda and Paul


Kagame declared himself Vice President and Minister of National


Defence. A moderate Hutu, Pasteur Bizimugu, became President.


The refugee problems exploded as the camps became subject to


disease and famine, and an international outcry arose. The US was


forced to act for humanitarian reasons; massive amounts of aid


began to flow, as of the end of October 1994 approximately two


billion dollars in US aid had gone to Rwanda as various forms of


assistance19. Two major concerns have hindered the return of the


refugees to Rwanda: fear of retaliation by the Tutsi's and fear of


former members of the Hutu army who control the refugee camps. As


of October 1994, only 3,254 refugees had returned20.


Currently, the people in the camps are being fed with UN


aid while those in Rwanda itself have been left to fend for


themselves. The UN mission in Rwanda initially had consent of


both belligerents and it remained impartial, but why was it so


ineffective? The key failure: to act quickly when it had the


chance of stopping the slaughter. However, the UN could not


assemble enough support from any country in those initial weeks:


as a result it must now spend billions of dollars trying to


correct the resulting problems. Yet in Rwanda the problems are


far from being over. The large Hutu refugee camps will continue


to be a constant source of friction with the neighbouring


countries and provide future bases for new rebel groups.


Realistically, could the UN have stopped this conflict?


Certainly, the various members had enough military power, had they


chosen to use it. However, it would have been another case of


"mission creep" if UNAMIR's mandate had been expanded to allow for


active intervention. The United States and other major powers


were beginning to remember, after Somalia, that to plunge into


such an operation within a country was fraught with danger and


cost. In this case it was a conflict between the idealistic view


of going in to stop the killing and the practical assessment of


what would it cost in terms of manpower and lives. Clearly, in


the short term the practical view won: however, it will be a long


time before the true long term costs of the displaced Hutus is


realized. It is equally hard to predict how the legacy of hatred


left after the slaughter of Tutsi will manifest itself.




The Balkans have been the center of ethnic violence for


centuries. To forget or ignore this history when dealing with


this region is to court failure, since no matter what outsiders


think the people of the region have a reason for what they do and


remember the conflicts. The entire region is a mix of three main


ethnic groups; the Serbs (Orthodox Christians, and loosely akin to


the Russian Slavic people), the Croats (Roman Catholics, and


closely associated with Western Europe and, in particular,


Germany) and the Muslims, originally either Serbs or Croats


(supported by the Muslim middle eastern countries). At the risk


of over simplifying the problem, the Serbs and Croats do not like


each other, both the Serbs and the Croats do not like the Muslims,


but the Croats would ally themselves to the Muslims when fighting


the Serbs. The Serb Army was better trained and armed, as they


had made up the vast majority of the army of the former


Yugoslavia. In the case of all the armies, civilian control of


the generals was not particularly strong. The collapse of


Yugoslavia occurred shortly after the collapse of Russia, although


it had been weakening since the death of Tito in 1980. The


initial dispute occurred between the newly declared Republic of


Croatia, a former part of Yugoslavia, and the Serbs living in


Croatia who opposed the split in June 1991. The European Economic


Community (EEC) attempted a cease fire and contributed observers


under the EEC auspices. The conflict soon spread among the


remaining sections of the former Yugoslavia. The European


Community was unable to stop the fighting with negotiation.


Bosnia first experienced heavy conflict between the Serbs


and the Croats/Muslims in July 1991. At the time it was still a


part of Yugoslavia with a population breakdown as follows:


"... 43.8 percent of the residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina were


ethnic Muslims, 31.5 percent were Serbs, and 17.3 percent were


Croats."21 The Bosnian Serbs under Radovan Karadzic wanted to


form a separate breakaway republic in December 1991.


The UN began negotiations to set up a peacekeeping force in


Yugoslavia with the general support of most of the combatants.


The intent for the force was to work in Croatia.


In February 1992 the UN set up the United Nations Protection


Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia to help maintain the cease-fire (the


first of many) that they had arranged on 23 November 1991.


UNPROFOR's mission under Resolutin 743 was to create the


conditions for peace and security in Croatia until a settlement


could be negotiated. UNPROFOR could use force for self defence.


The Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Gali, briefed the Security


Council that there was a danger that UNPROFOR would fail for lack


of cooperation by the combatants, however to delay would risk the


entire cease-fire.22 The Security Council authorized a full


force deployment on 7 April 1992 initially into Croatia.


Unfortunately in April of 1992 the European Community


recognized Bosnia-Herzogovina as a separate state. On 6 April


1992 the Bosnian Serbs wanting to remain with Serbia, launched an


attack and seized 70% of Bosnia and began to move on Sarajevo.


Accordingly, in August 1992 the UN modified the mandate of


UNPROFOR under resolution 776. The new resolution tasked UNPROFOR


to assist the United Nations High Commissionaire for Refugees


(UNHCR) with the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and


other areas of Bosnia that needed it. UNPROFOR was authorized to


offer military protection to aid convoys and the movement of


refugees and wounded in Bosnia. UNPROFOR was now set up in


Croatia and Bosnia, eventually by the end of 1993, it would cover


Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia.


Major General Lewis McKenzie, the initial contingent leader


into Sarajevo, contends that it was unfortunate that the title of


UNPROFOR was kept when the mission went into Bosnia. It led many


people to think that UNPROFOR's mission was not purely protection


of humanitarian aid convoys and refugees. The confusion arose


over the title of the mission, which could translate that UNPROFOR


had a general protection role. In Bosnia, the Croats and Muslims


expected the UN force to protect them from attack, which was not


the mandate or intent of UNPROFOR in their area. The mandate of


the mission in Sarajevo has remained humanitarian, and was not


nearly as all encompassing as the one that the UN carried out in




It is not the purpose of this paper to get into discussions


on the mechanics and successes of the No Fly Zones, NATO Air


strikes, or the Safe Havens. UNPROFOR developed each of these


tactics to implement the mission of protecting the refugee


population and delivering humanitarian aid. Each of them involved


the increasing threat to use force on the warring parties. All of


them have met with limited success.


The media was a major player in Bosnia. The report of


shelling of the marketplace in Sarajevo became the catalyst for


the implementation of the threat of NATO air strikes in February


1994. Bosnia has thus become a magnet for many different agendas,


including proving that NATO still could be a credible force in the


post Cold War world and the US, despite small ground force levels,


was still interested in European affairs. President Clinton


stated this in his address on 9 February 1994.


Our nation has clear interests at stake in this conflict.

We have an interest in helping to prevent a broader conflict

in Europe; ... showing that NATO . . . remains a credible

force for peace in post-Cold War Europe . . . stemming the

flow of refugees . . . the strangulation of Sarajevo and

the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia.23



Bosnia continues to be the magnet for all European nations.


Russia was actively involved trying to influence the Serbs to


stop. NATO was threatening the Serbs to protect specific areas


and UN forces. The US sympathizes with the Muslim. The UN


forces are widely dispersed in various areas to look after the


humanitarian aid convoys. However, in this war there are no good


and bad people - no moral high ground for one side or the other.


General Mackenzie, briefing President Francois Mitterend in


Sarajevo on the situation stated ". . . There is strong but


circumstantial evidence that some really horrifying acts of


cruelty attributed to the Serbs were actually orchestrated by the


Muslims against their own people, for the benefit of the


international audience."24 A frightening reflection of what


lengths the warring factions were willing to go to influence the


media. This view has been echoed by Lieutenant-General Sir


Michael Rose, the past British Commander in Bosnia (December


1994): commenting on the fighting about Gorazde in March 1994. He


felt the city had been deliberately lost to gain international


sympathy. He then added "The Moslems are not going to get us to


fight their war for them."25 Some senior members of the US


military have also echoed this view, although it is not the


official view of the US government. The US position is simple and


simplistic: the Serbs were the aggressors and the Croats and


Muslims were the victim. So what is the total to date for




UNPROFOR has cost 1.6 billion dollars and 131 lives since


March 92. The current troop levels remain at 39,000, of which the


US has contributed 748 in Macedonia.26 It is estimated that


between 140,000 to 300,000 people have died, and 2.5 million have


been displaced. The political manoeuvring necessary to arrange


for NATO air strikes, the various blockades combined with the


distinctly different views of the US and the Europeans about who


is at fault, has lead to a deterioration of the relationship


between the US and Britain, one of its strongest allies. Yet


there is still no end in sight to the conflict. On a more


positive note, despite the problems the peacekeepers have


experienced, humanitarian relief is getting through, all


combatants still want the UN to remain in Bosnia, and the UN has


retained its impartiality. David Walker in his article on the


Battles of the Balkans June 1993 wrote:


If we are to learn one lesson from all this, then it must be

that whatever the cost of achieving peace, it is wasted

unless it can accommodate the emotions of the past. And the

cost of not knowing that past could extract as high a price

today as at any time during the long history of these

troubled lands.27


But how did all of these post 1990 operations compare with the


previous forty years of UN experience?



Click here to view image


Summary Chapter Three


Somalia broke most of the rules established over the previous


forty years. It did not have consent of those involved, the mission


lost its impartiality, it involved a super power in a major role, it was


initiated prior to a political settlement by the warring factions, and


minimum use of force was not an overriding factor. Of the five peace


keeping principles it met only one: it was a UN operation, organized and


run by the UN. Somalia is considered to have been a failure.


Cambodia has met all of the five peacekeeping principles. The


mission never resorted to heavy use of force despite considerable


provocation. It maintained its impartiality and subsequently the


approval and consent of the majority of the people. None of the nations


directly involved were considered a super power, and each of them was


able to maintain an even handed approach. Cambodia is considered to be


the most successful of all the missions studied.


Click here to view image


Rwanda met the criteria in four areas. It was a UN mission, it


did not involve super powers, the force maintained its impartiality, and


it maintained an even handed approach. Nevertheless, the mission lost


the consent of the warring groups to fulfill its mission and in the end


became a helpless observer to the slaughter of civilians. Rwanda's UN


mission returned to a position of influence with the end of the war.


The United Nations was able to supply food and shelter to the Hutu


refugees substantially reducing the deaths in the refugee camps.


However, the underlying problem has not been addressed.


Bosnia is still an open question. It meets all of the


requirements for peacekeeping except consent based upon an agreement


with all political parties. Arguably, UNPROFOR has the consent of the


warring factions, but each group has different reasons for wanting the


UN to be there. In addition, the reasons why UNPROFOR is welcome,


change with each party's political and military success. Up to the


present, the UN forces are still considered to be impartial, even


handed, and applying a minimum of force. A superpower is not yet a


major player in the overall peacekeeping force structure. The mission


is delivering aid and people are being saved. However, there is a


continuous debate on where to go with the mission and the success or


failure is far from being determined. Bosnia is becoming like many of


the Cold War missions (ie Cyprus), long running, with no easy solution,


no end to the mission in sight, constant questioning of its objectives,


and some successes mixed in with the failures. Overall, UNPROFOR in


Bosnia has had more successes then failures. No nation will disagree


that, without UNPROFOR additional thousands would have died. The


question is, can the mission retain its impartiality, or will outside


pressure to do something, force UNPROFOR to take actions it would later




In chapter four I will look at how the internal and external


factors in the US political system work against the United States as a




CHAPTER FOUR: The United States View of Peacekeeping Post 1993



Peacekeeping is a part of our national security policy, but it is

not the centerpiece. The primary purpose of our military forces

is to fight and win wars . . . we'll choose between unilateral and

collective approaches between the UN or other coalitions depending

on what works best and what serves best American interests.


Tony Lake1

National Security Advisor

Clinton Administration



The quotation accurately portrays US policy toward the UN and


peacekeeping operations. Mr. Lake's observations are not unrealistic


cling from a superpower with many global interests. But it succinctly


notes why US forces have difficulty being effective peacekeepers. The


issue is not one of capability; rather, it is the training of the


military and the mentality of the US politicians and public. What are


the advantages to using the UN? What are the disadvantages? In this


chapter, I shall briefly summarize what the advantages and disadvantages


are for working through the United Nations. I shall then list the


requirements that the US insists a UN mission must meet before it will


deploy forces. Finally, I will show how many of these factors work


against the United States fielding an effective peacekeeping force.


The Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Frank G. Wisner,


summarized the advantages of participation in the UN in 1993. He told


the Senate Armed Services Committee that there were three major reasons


for participation. The three reasons are:


(1). The legitimacy of the operation.


(2). The reduction in the requirement for and risk to American




(3). The effective use of the UN prevents the spread of a


conflict, therefore stopping larger involvement later.2


All these are valid arguments, although they are very difficult to


quantify. However, the disadvantages are usually more obvious and


easier to evaluate.


There are five major disadvantages to working under the auspices


of the UN. Three of these problem areas are easy to measure:


(1). The costs of the mission.


(2). The effect on force readiness.


(3). Poor UN command and control.


The next two problems are hard to quantify:


(4). Doctrinal training.


(5). The world's perception of a US soldier.


A brief review of each problem area is necessary to understand the road


blocks they cause any potential US peacekeeping mission or potential


participation in a peacekeeping mission.




The Department of Defence is currently taking the cost of UN


missions out of the Operating and Maintenance funding. Since these


missions have not been budgeted for, they consume precious military


resources in a time of decreasing budgets. President Clinton requested


from Congress $320,000,000 in emergency appropriations in Fiscal Year


1994 to provide the ability to respond to such commitments without


decreasing training and regular maintenance. The Defence Departments


share would be $270,000,000.3 These monetary costs do not account for


the hidden cost of declining combat readiness for the troops involved in


a peacekeeping mission.




Force Readiness


The combat readiness of US troops decrease, when they retrain from


straight war fighting to acting as a peacekeeper between fighting


factions. In war fighting, the approach is the use of maximum force to


compel the enemy to do your will as quickly as possible. One of the


main tenants for a peacekeeping force is the use of minimum force. It


takes time and training to accustom troops to the role of peacekeeper.


Once the soldier has returned from peacekeeping, it takes retraining to


return him to an effective war fighter. The estimate is that for every


battalion deployed, another one is working up to relieve it and a third


is retraining in the post deployment phase.4 Therefore, the ratio is




The issue for the United States is not whether the training can be


accomplished, it is the cost of the training and how it depletes the


number of war fighters available. US Army Chief of Staff General Carl


E. Vuno testified that at one point "150,000 soldiers, which is about 26


percent of today's (active-duty) strength"5 were involved in


preparation, deployment or post deployment for the UN. Therefore, he


could not field a force strong enough to cover a major regional


contingency. Although, the numbers General Vuno quoted are obviously a


high point, the issue remains: peacekeeping troops detract from the


United States war fighting ability.




Command and Control


Issues of poor command and control in UN missions are an ongoing


problem. The UN's inability to control large numbers of troops in the


field gravely concerns the United States. A direct consequence of this


weakness is strong pressure from the Republican party to ensure that US


Commanders only control US troops. Bill S.5 presented by Senator Dole


in January 1995 proposes that no US troops be committed unless the


President satisfies the following:


(1). It is in the national security interest of the United




(2). The unit commanders will at all times retain the ability to


report independently to the United States.


(3). The forces can be withdrawn at anytime and the United States


can take any actions it feels necessary to protect those




(4). The troops remain under US control at all times for purposed


of discipline and evaluation.6


Documents confirming these requirements must be presented to the


appropriate committee exercising jurisdiction 15 days before dispatch of


troops or in an emergency within 48 hours after dispatch. Bill HR 7 the


"National Security Revitalization Act" proposed in the House of


Representatives 22 February 1995 contains similar provisions. These


certainly would ensure that any peacekeeping mission involving US troops


would be considered biased towards Washington. The peacekeeping mission


would have a difficult time proving it was impartial and that would


place the mission at risk.




Doctrinal Training


The next issue is Doctrinal training for troops that are going to


peacekeeping missions. The training of the average US soldier for war


fighting is very good. However, some members of the UN feel that US


forces sometimes become too aggressive in peacekeeping situations.


General Sir David Ramsbotham feels that:


... the US is an essential ingredient both of the UN military

structure, and the entire structure of the UN itself. The

doctrine of minimum force, as we understand it, is not part of the

US military ethos, nor is the Wahlgren concept of the Firm, Fair

and Friendly UN soldier7



Most nations with large peacekeeping forces offer special training


to those troops involved in peacekeeping duties. Canada has recently


created the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping


Training Center in Nova Scotia, whose sole mission is to develop


training and encourage discussion on how best to carry out UN missions.


The US Army last summer ran a course where, instead of training for war,


a number of troops trained for peacekeeping. However, at the moment in


the US, peacekeeping training is the exception. If the US policy is as


stated by Mr. Tony Lake, then there is little incentive to do extensive


peacekeeping training.




Perceptions about the United States Soldier


Finally, the most difficult problem, how is the US soldier


perceived by those he assists? The US soldier is viewed as an extension


of Washington's foreign policy no matter where in the world he is.


Consequently, as a representative of the major super power, the US


soldier makes a very attractive target. He is a target that the sides


in a dispute will attempt to influence, preferably in favour of their


position. It places all US soldiers in a much more precarious position


then the soldiers of smaller countries. Smaller countries, such as


Canada, will not significantly help one side to win. Canada does not


have the massive combat power or the desire to interfere on only one


side of a dispute. Therefore, for a warring faction, it is not cost


effective to expend a lot of time and energy trying to influence a


Canadian soldier. However, the United States can bring tremendous


economic and combat power to bear and would make a very valuable ally,


therefore a warring faction will try and influence their soldiers.


In addition, the United States public likes to chose a good and


bad side in a conflict. This phenomenon is evident in the Bosnia


crisis. Most of the senior military commanders who have been involved


acknowledge that all sides are equally guilty, yet, the US press insist


that the Muslims are always the victims. The combination makes the


attempt to influence the US soldiers well worth while. Since the US


soldier will always experience strong attempts to influence him, then


his peacekeeping training must be superb to handle the pressure; it


would therefore be expensive. Canada's experience with the value of


peacekeeping training is expressed in the 1994 White Paper on Defence:


Recent experiences in UN operations have confirmed the value of

cultural sensitivity, international humanitarian law, and dispute

resolution training prior to deployment.8


Why should the US tie up the resources required for peacekeeping


if their overall aim is warfighting? If the above factors are combined


with the perceived inefficiency of the UN, a strong argument is created


for the American people not to participate in peacekeeping.


The UN needs improvement in how it organizes and arranges


peacekeeping missions. General Sir David Ramsbotham proposed a list of


ten fundamental changes that should occur in peacekeeping operations.


These areas for improvement are:


(1). Intelligence analysis and dissemination, including




(2). Contingency planning,


(3). Provision and selection of staff, including force




(4). Mandate preparation and validation,


(5). Technical reconnaissance,


(6). 24 hour support of operations,


(7). Doctrine and training,


(8). Preparation and dissemination of lessons learned,


(9). Manpower identification and provision, and


(10). Logistics and procurement9


Of these recommendations, one, three and six directly pertain to command


and control issues. The remainder are meant to increase the


effectiveness and professionalism of peacekeeping missions.


Each mission is currently formed of volunteer nations who may or


may not have had previous experience. In some cases, the volunteers do


not even have the basic weapons to do peacekeeping with. The 'cobble


together approach" to making up a peacekeeping mission has lead to


accusations of waste, favoritism and abuse. The American public has no


inclination to fund operations that appear to be so mismanaged. House


Bill HR 7 reflects this attitude: Section 510 includes specific "Buy


American Requirements," while Sections 505 to 507 contain complex


formulas limiting the funding of the UN.10 The general thrust of all of


these provisions is the reduction in funding to the UN. If General Sir


David Ramsbotham's changes can be made, then there is considerable hope


that the UN will be able to revitalize itself.


In fact at a briefing by Lieutenant Colonel Rich Roan (USMC


Military Advisor) at the US mission to the United Nations 11 April 1995,


a number of changes to the Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) were


discussed. The most interesting changes were: the increase of


personnel from 100 to 321 military officers (a number loaned a no cost


to the UN), the activation of a 24 hour situation center and the


movement of control of field administration and field logistics to the


DPKO. Unfortunately, the remaining changes will take time to implement,


and, after Somalia, the United States public has little patience left.


How do all these factors affect the United States as a peacekeeping




In the current era of tight budgets, the costs and benefits that


can be measured will have the edge. Unfortunately, the disadvantages


are much easier to measure than the advantages. Therefore the United


States participation in UN peacekeeping will decrease as the pressure on


budgets rises. As the US participation decreases, the US will become


much more selective in the operations in which it will participate.


This is fully reflected by President Clinton in his Presidential


Decision Directive (PDD) on "Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations"


issued on 5 May 1994. This PDD has six major tenets for future US


participation in UN Peacekeeping missions:


(1). The US will have to make choices about the peace operations


to support. It affirms that although peacekeeping can be


useful in some circumstances, it must be selective and very




(2). Secondly, the cost to the US must reduce from the current


31.7% to 25% by 1996.


(3). Thirdly, in command and control, US forces can still be


placed under a foreign commander on direction of the


President, but the greater the US role, the less likely it


will be.


(4). Fourth, eleven steps to reform UN planning, logistics,


information, and command and control capabilities have been




(5). Fifth, the Defence Department will fund UN missions


involving combat roles, to enable military expertise to bear


on these missions. The State Department will fund all


peacekeeping missions not involving US troops and combat.


(6). Seven proposals were set out to improve consultation and


information's flow between Congress and the Executive branch


on UN matters.11


The President has made it clear that he intends to reduce the


United States role in peacekeeping. The reduction in budgets and the


use of the word "selective" and "can be useful" when talking of


peacekeeping are clear indications of the future. The desire of


Congress to withdraw from peacekeeping as a mission for their forces is


obvious from Bills H.R 7 and S.5. The placing of combat missions under


the Defence Department (primary mission war fighting) is a clear


indication that traditional peacekeeping, for American troops, will


receive very low priority. If defence budget cutbacks continue, then


peacekeeping training will probably be high on the list to disappear.


Without the necessary peacekeeping training, the troops sent on


peacekeeping missions, although very good war fighters, will be a at


grave disadvantage as peacekeepers. Accordingly, US troops due to


doctrinal training, senior administration direction, the public's


disdain for peacekeeping missions, and external perception on their


bias, will not be ideal troops to be in a peacekeeping mission.





The cold war had ended. It was a time of hope and change and of

rising expectations for - and of - the United Nations.


Boutros Boutros-Ghali1





In the future, if ever the UN put me in a position where people


were using my peacekeeping force as a shooting target, I would be very


happy to see a powerful US force come to my rescue. Borrowing an


analogy from Western films, it would be the equivalent of "here comes


the cavalry" (with apologies to my Marine colleges). It is a role that


the US forces train to do and do well. However, if the aim of the


mission was peacekeeping, I would have to look long and hard to see if


US forces are the ones for the assignment. It is not that a US force


could not train and do the mission, they could. However, for a number


of reasons, they opt not to. What are these reasons?


Chapter Two outlined how the senior United States policy makers


are very pragmatic in their approach to events, short on the study of


history, and legalistic in their approach to a problem. In addition, US


policy continues to swing from one based on idealism to one based upon


national interest. President Clinton initially favoured the idealistic


approach, while lately the policy has shifted to one based heavily on


national interests. Chapter Three showed that the five major principles


for peacekeeping, if followed, lead to a mission with a higher chance of


success. It also noted how the loss of impartiality severely hampers a


peacekeeper's effectiveness. Chapter Four stressed that in most cases


the doctrinal training for the US forces does not emphasize


peacekeeping. I do not see this changing because the public and the


political/military leadership do not desire it to change. Conflict


resolution between warring parties for the United States public can be


simplistically represented in the well known nursery rhyme Tweedle-dum


and Tweedle-dee:


Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee

Resolved to have a battle,

For Tweedle-dum said Tweedle-dee

Had spoiled his nice new rattle.

Just then flew by a monstrous crow,

As big as a tar barrel,

Which frightened both the heroes so,

They quite forgot their quarrel.2


Throughout all the chapters in the paper it is evident due to the combat


power and influence that the United States represents, fighting factions


will obviously go to almost any lengths to influence it. Bosnia is an


excellent example. Combine these factors with the prestige of being the


sole super power and therefore not allowed to "fail" at a mission and it


is a potent combination.


The United States has been providing logistic support successfully


for many years to UN peacekeeping missions. After 1990, everyone


thought the world and how it worked had changed. The US strongly


supported more aggressive UN missions and terms such as peace


enforcement and peacemaking entered the equation. Unfortunately,


although the Cold War no longer existed, many of the underlying problems


had not. It took four major missions before the US and the UN realized


that the lessons learned from the previous forty years should not have


been so easily discarded. One of these lessons is that super powers


should not get involved in peacekeeping missions.


Smaller countries, with less well equipped but highly trained


forces, can take on these missions. Some of these forces will require


extensive logistics and infrastructure support, probably from the United


States. The international city will applaud their efforts whether


a success or failure. The United States is not so fortunate: when it


enters the battle, the world community and the US public expect results,


and this means quick victory. Somalia is an excellent example of what


happens when politically, the public demands instant results to a


situation that has no easy answer.


Therefore, any US peacekeeper arrives at a mission with the


following baggage. He has been highly trained as a war fighter with an


outside chance of having had some peacekeeping training. He will be


subject to extreme pressure by the combatants to take their side of the


battle and bring the tremendous combat power of the US to bear. His


senior political leadership will be demanding quick concrete "results",


often from a situation and series of events that have lasted for


hundreds of years and have no instant solution. The combination does


not make for a good peacekeeper, despite the tremendous resources the US


can bring to bear. But should the US be in the peacekeeping business at




The United Nations has many countries who can supply well trained


troops that do not have to worry about a number of these considerations.


If remaining impartial is almost impossible for US peacekeepers, then


they should not send combat troops on peacekeeping missions.


The intent of this paper was not to prove that the United States


should withdraw from peacekeeping. Rather, to show that the type of


participation should be closer to what Washington did prior to 1990.


Support for improvement in the United Nations' infrastructure,


assistance in setting up a truly effective UN structure for


peacekeeping, logistics support for smaller countries, and in extremis


combat support. All of these are missions the United States could do a


credible job on. For as Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the


UN said:


All this confirms that we are still in a time of transition. The

end of the cold war was a major movement of tectonic plates and

the after-shocks continue to be felt. But even if the ground

beneath our feet has not yet settled, we still live in a new age

that holds great promise for both peace and development.3







Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to

endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,

first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,

conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional

agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the

parties to settle their dispute by such means.



Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which

might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order

to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is

likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.



Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any

situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of

the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the

attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute

to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the

dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present


3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought

to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of

Articles 11 and 12.



Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature

referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend

appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures

for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the


3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council

should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a

general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of

Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.


Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article

33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall

refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is

in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and

security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to

recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.



Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security

Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make

recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of

the dispute.












Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the

peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make

recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance

with Articles 4 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and

security. Article 40 In order to prevent an aggravation of the

situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations

or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the

parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems

necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without

prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned.

The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with

such provisional measures.



Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of

armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it

may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.

These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations

and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of

communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.



Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in

Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may

take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to

maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may

include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or

land forces of Members of the United Nations.



Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the

maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make

available to the Security Council, on its and in accordance with a

special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and

facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of

maintaining international peace and security.


2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of

forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature

of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible

on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded

between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council

and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the

signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional




Article 44

When Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling

upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in

fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that

Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the

Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that

Member's armed forces.



Article 45

In order to enable the Nations to take urgent military measures,

Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents

for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree

of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action

shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special

agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security

Council with the assistance of the Military Committee.



Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security

Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.


Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and

assist the Security Council on questions relating to the Security

Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international

peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its

disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the

permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any

Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the

Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it

when the efficient discharge of the committee's responsibilities

requires the participation of that Member its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee be responsible under the Security

Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces paced at the

disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of

such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the security

Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may

establish subcommittees.




Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security

Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be

taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as

the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United

Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate

international agencies of which they are members.



Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual

assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security




Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the

Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United

Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic

problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the

right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those




Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of

individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against

a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken

measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence

shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in

any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council

under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems

necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and



Click here to view image










1. General Sir David Ramsbotham, "How can the Military best help the

United Nations?" (Tavistock (Devon, England): Army Quarterly and

Defense Journal, July 1994), 293.


2. Larry O.L. Fabian, Soldier Without Enemies, (Washington, D.C.: The

Brookings Institution, 1971), 94.


Chapter One


1. Thomas M. Frank, Nation Against Nation, (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1985), 15.


2. Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peacekeeping, (Washington, D. C.: The

Brookings Institution, 1967), 30.


3. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy Expanded Edition, (New

York: WW Norton & Company, 1974), 30.


4. Kissinger, 31.


5. Kissinger, 34.


Chapter Two


1. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy Expanded Edition, (New

York: WW Norton & Company, 1974), 74.


2. Linda B. Miller, "The Clinton Years: Reinventing US Foreign

Policy?" International Affairs, October 1994, Vol 70.


3. Casper W. Winberger, The Uses of Military Power, Text of Remarks

by Secretary of Defense to the National Press Club, 28 November 1984;

reprint in Theory and Nature of War Readings AY 1994-95, vol III,

(Quantico, VA, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College,

1994), 029-036.



4. Linda B. Miller, 626.


5. James H. Baker, "Policy Challenges of Un Peace Operations," US Army

War College Parameters, Spring 1994, 26.


6. Mark T. Clark, "The Future of Clinton's Foreign and Defense Policy:

Multilateral Security," Comparative Strategy an International Journal,

June 1994.


7. The White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement," (Washington D.C., US Government Printing Office, July

1994), 13.


8. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Republicans Seek to Curb UN Funding,"

Washington Post, 23 January 1994.



Chapter Three


1. John F. Hillen III, "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a

Half," Parameters, Spring 94.


2. Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peacekeeping, (Washington, D. C.: The

Brookings Institution, 1967), 131.


3. Charles Dobbie, A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping, (Tollbugt,

Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1994), 17.


4. Larry O.L. Fabian, Soldier Without Enemies, (Washington, D.C.: The

Brookings Institution, 1971), 26.


5. Larry O.L. Fabian, 28.


6. George J. Church, "Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster," Time (on line),

15 October 1993, Downloaded from American OnLine. Vienna, VA.


7. George J. Church, "Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster."


8. George J. Church, "Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster."


9. Colonel F.M. Lorencz, "Confronting Thievery in Somalia," Military

Review, August 1994.


10. J.F.O McAllister, When to Stay, When to Go," Time (on line), 10

October 1993, Downloaded from American OnLine. Vienna, VA.


11. Charles Dobbie, A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping, 10.


12. George J. Church, "Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster."


13. Karl Farris, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, a Success,"

Parameters, Spring 1994, 42.



14. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations" Cambodia

section, subsection Background, December 1994, Downloaded from INTERNET

via server at hhtp://


15. Karl Farris, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, a Success."


16. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations", Rwanda

section, subsection UNAMIR recommended.


17. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations," Rwanda

section, subsection UNAMIR recommended.


18. "Consolidated Rwanda Report # 17", 27 October 1994, Downloaded from

INTERNET 14 Mar 1994 via HTML Daniel


19. "Consolidated Rwanda Report # 17", 27 October 1994.


20. "Consolidated Rwanda Report # 17", 27 October 1994.


21. Sabrina Petra Ramet, "The Bosnian War and the Diplomacy of

Accommodation," Current History (Philadelphia), November 1994.



22. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations,

December 1994.



February 1994, Downloaded from the INTERNET 14 March 1995 from


24. Maj General Lewis McKenzie, Peacekeeper, (Toronto, Ont: Douglas &

McIntyre, 1993), 256.


25. John Pomfret, "Year in Bosnia Changes British General's Views."

Washington Post, 23 January 1995.


26. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations," Bosnia



27. David Walker, "Battles of the Balkans." Royal United Services

Institute for Defence Studies (Whitehall, London Eng), June 1993, 63.


Chapter Four


1. The White House, Press Briefing by National Security Council Advisor

Tony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and Policy General Wesley

Clark, 5 May 1994, Downloaded from INTERNET 14 Mar 94 originally from


2. Department of Defense, Frank G Wisner, Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy, "U.S. Peacekeeping Operations: Why, When, How, How Long,"

speech before the Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces Subcommittee

Senate Armed Services Committee, July 14, 1993.


3. The White House, White House Press Release Office of the Press

Secretary, 29 July 1994, Downloaded via INTERNET 14 March 1995,

originally from


4. James H. Baker, "Policy challenges of UN Peace Operations,"

Parameters, Spring 1994.


5. John G. Roos, "The Perils of Peacekeeping," Armed Forces Journal,

December 1993, 17.


6. U.S. Congress, Senate, "Peace Powers Act of 1995," 104th Cong.,

1st sess., 1995.


7. General Sir David Ramsbotham, "How can the Military best help the

United Nations?" Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (Tavistock, Devon

England), July 1994, 293.


8. Canada, National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper, (Ottawa: Queens

Printers, December 1994), 34.


9. General Sir David Ramsbotham, "How can the Military best help the

United Nations?"


10. U.S. Congress, Senate, "National Security Revitalization Act,"

104th Cong., 1st sess.,1995


11. Department of Defense(Public Affairs), Executive Summary: The

Clinton Administrations Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace

Operations, 5 May 1994, Downloaded from INTERNET 14 March 1995

originally from




1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace 1995, (New York: United

Nations, 1995), 1.


2. Peter Stevenson, Best Loved Nursery Rhymes, (London: Ward Lock

Limited, undated), 12.


3. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace 1995, 6.







Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace 1995. New York:

United Nations. 1995. This edition includes a very useful

preamble which modifies the original Agenda for Peace based

on the experience of the last few years.


Cox, Arthur M. Prospects for Peacekeeping. Washington D.C.:

The Brookings Institution. 1967. Emphasizes the lessons of

experience with the Blue Berets. It also points out that

peacekeeping is the mission for the UN, not peacemaking.


Fabian, Larry O.L. Soldier Without Enemies. Washington D.C.: The

Brookings Institution. 1971. The author is primarily

concerned with the UN Military Committee and the Standing UN

Army, however he offers a good review of the initial setup

of the UN.


Frank, Thomas M. Nation Against Nation. New York: Oxford

University Press. 1985. The book gives a quick background

on the development of the UN charter. It refers to the two

power Blocs (Russia and United States) and the weaknesses of

the UN. Although a good history of the development of the

UN, the author does not offer much insight into the problems

that arose post 1990.


Haas, Ernst B. Tangle of Hopes. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-

Hall Inc. 1969. The book was not particularly useful for

this paper. The author proposes 3 theories of leadership

for the U.S. : Pragmatic-Bureaucratic, Ideological, and

Revolutionary. In the end the author feels that the U.S.

normally follows the pragmatic decision making process.


Kissinger, Henry A. American Foreign Policy Expanded Edition. New

York: NW Norton & Company. 1974. The author outline the

way the US Government makes leadership decisions. The

concepts he uses is an excellent framework for understanding

the foreign policy decision making of the United States.


McKenzie, Major General Lewis. Peacekeeper. Toronto Ont.:

Douglas & McIntyre. 1993. Major General McKenzie outlines

the establishment of the initial UN group in Sarajevo and

the frustrations experienced by the peacekeepers with both

sides in the conflict. The remainder of the book covers

Major General McKenzie's extensive career in UN missions.


Roberts, Adam and Kingsbury, Benedict. United Nations, Divided

World. Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press,

1994. The authors have compiled an excellent group of

essays on the development of the United Nations. It is well

worth reading for a good understanding of the organization.


Stevens, Peter. Best Loved Nursery Rhymes. London: Ward Lock

Limited. Undated.


Wainhouse, David W. International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads.

Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 1973. The

author provides a good listing of UN operations up until the

early 1970's, however, the book was not useful in this








Abizaiad, Colonel John P. and Wood, Colonel John R. "Preparing for

Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping

Environment." The United States Army John F. Kennedy

Special Warfare Center and School. April 1994. The author

deals with the unique training that US forces should take in

order to become peacekeepers. He emphasizes that at the

moment there is a doctrinal void.


Baker, James H. "Policy challenges of UN Peace Operations."

Parameters. Spring 1994. A good article on the UN and how

the United States has dealt with the it's relationship on

peacekeeping. The author also points out ideas of

Unilateralism and Multilateralism.


Church, George J. "Anatomy of a Disaster." Time. 15 October

1993. Down loaded from America Online, Vienna, V.A. The

author addresses the problems involving the ill fated Ranger

mission as well as providing some of the background leading

up to the event.


Clark, Mark T. "The Future of Clinton's Foreign and Defence

Policy: Multilateral Security." Comparative Strategy and

International Journal. His basic premise is the US will use

Multilateral Security efforts because it can not afford to

conduct them unilaterally.



Curry, David. M. Ethics of Political and Military Involvement

in Peace Operations. Washington D.C.: Strayer College. 1

June 1994. The document talks about the ethics of the

application of force and the Weinberger Document as the

basis for the future use of force by the U.S.


Diamond, Larry. "The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic

World Order." Current History. January 1994. The article

emphasizes the fact that the U.S. is at a decision point as

to whether it will go; Isolationist or maintain a democratic



Farris, Karl. "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, a

Success." Parameters. Spring 1994. The author provides an

excellent background on Cambodia and the UN mission.


Goldman, Jan. "A Changing World A Changing UN." Military Review.

September 1994. Emphasizes the changing nature of the UN.



Harries, Colonel David. "Challenges in Military Futures."

Canadian Defence Quarterly. December 1993. The author

covers the post Cold War reality and how shrinking defence

budgets will effect the number and types of missions the UN

can take on.


Hillen III, John F. "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a

Half." Parameters. Spring 1994. A good summary of the

five principles of Peacekeeping developed over the Cold War



Kearns, Darien L.. "The Need For Criteria in UN Peace Operations".

Military Review. July 1994. A good summary on the first 40

years of the UN. The author introduces the concept of a

special criteria when using the United States troops on a UN



Lorencz, F.M., "Confronting Thievery in Somalia." Military

Reviw. August 1994. The article addresses the problems in

trying to reestablish law and a court system in a foreign



Martin, Laurence. "Peacekeeping as a Growth Industry from the

National Interest." The National Interest. Summer 1993.

The author emphasizes that peacekeeping should be done under

the "Just War" theory. He feels that each nations self

interest should control the amount of their contribution.


McAllister, J.F.O. "When to Stay, When to Go." Time. 3 October

1993.. Down loaded from America Online, Vienna, V.A. The

article addresses the pullout of troops from Somalia.

Miller, Linda B. "The Clinton Years: Reinventing Foreign Policy?"

International Affairs Vol 70. October 1994. The article

looks critically at what the US should do in future UN

missions and remarks on the zigzag of U.S. foreign policy.


Morillon, Lieutenant General Philippe. "UN Operations in Bosnia:

Lesson and Realities." Royal United Services Institute FO

Defence Studies. December 1993. The author provides a good

background on the operations that led to the set up of

UNPROFOR in Bosnia.


Morrison, Alex. and Plain, Suzanne M. "The New Peacekeeping

Partnership." The Strathrobyn Papers. Toronto Ont.: The

Canadian Forces Staff College. August 1994. The paper

points out the changes in the post-Cold War international

situation. The authors place emphasis on the new

humanitarian peacekeeping and the problems that it creates.

The article also discuses the need to be selective with

where the UN deploys its very limited resources.


Plaut, Martin. "Rwanda - Looking beyond the Slaughter." Institute

of International Affairs. September 1994. This piece is an

excellent summary of what occurred in Rwanda as well as a

background history of what lead up to the conflict. The

history starts with the Germans making the country into a



Pomfret, John. "Year in Bosnia Changes British General's Views."

Washington Post. 23 January 1995. The article discusses

how Lt General Michael Rose's views on how to handle

violations in Bosnia changed from when he first arrived.

The article emphasizes that Lt General Rose feels that the

UN must remain neutral.


Ramet, Sabrina Petra. "The Bosnian War and the Diplomacy of

Accommodation." Current History. November 1994. The author

provides background to the Bosnia war from 1991 to 1994.


Ramsbotham, General Sir David. "How can the Military best help

the United Nations?" Army Quarterly and Defence Journal.

July 1994. A good summary on 10 steps necessary to improve

a UN operation. Ramsbotham points out that the U.S. forces

do not understand the doctrine on the use of minimum force.


Ramsbotham, General Sir David. "UN Operations: The Art of

the Possible." Royal United Services Institute for Defence

Studies. December 1993. The article deals with the

necessary improvements needed for UN missions but feels that

the criticisms of the UN are often ill-informed. General

Ramsbotham feels that UN membership implies an obligation to

supply forces to look after peace and security.


Reiff, David. "The Illusion of Peacekeeping." The World Policy

Journal. Fall 1994. Reiff's major point is that after

intervention, the great powers want the UN to move in and

take over the mission somewhat similar to what the old

Colonial Authorities used to do.


Roos, John G. "The Perils of Peacekeeping." Armed Forces

Journal. December 1993. The article points out the cost to

the U.S. of running a peacekeeping mission and the danger

encountered when a mission (such as Somalia) does not have a

precisely defined goal.


Smith, Jeffrey R. "Republicans Seek to Curb UN Funding."

Washington Post. 23 January 1995. The author mentions how

the Republicans are emphasizing the National Interest with

future participation with UN activities. The article points

out that the new measures would reduce the UN's budget by

one third.


Walker, David. "Battles of the Balkans." Royal United Services

Institute for Defence Studies. June 1993. The article

contains a very good history of the Balkans from the early

Ottoman empire up until the collapse of the Soviet Union.


Weinberger, Casper. "Text of Remarks by Secretary of Defense

Caspar W. Winberger to the National Press Club." 28

November 1984. Theory and Nature of War Readings Vol III.

Quantico V.A.: United States Marine Corps Command and Staff






Background Note: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. December

1994. Down loaded from INTERNET 15 March 1995 via server @ lefpalpeace/toc.html. The background

note provides excellent information on each of the UN

operations. The viewpoint is from the Secretary General of

the United Nations.


Consolidated Rwanda Report # 17. 27 October 1994. Down loaded

from INTERNET 14 March 1995 via html Daniel


Department of Defence(Public Affairs). Executive Summary: The

Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral

Peace Operations. 5 May 1994. Down loaded from INTERNET 14

March 1995 originally from


Wisner, Frank G. Under Secretary of Defence for Policy. "U.S.

Peacekeeping Operations: Why, When, How, How Long." Speech

before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 14 July 1993.

The speech emphasized that the US did not want the status as

the World's Policeman yet liked the legitimacy that a

mission had when it was endorsed by the UN.


The White House. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement. Washington D.C. US Government Printing Office.

July 1994.


The White House. Press Release, Statement by President Clinton. 9

February 1994. Down loaded from the INTERNET 14 March 1995



The White House. Press Briefing by National Security Council

Advisor Tony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and

Policy General Wesley Clark. 5 May 1994. Down loaded from

INTERNET 14 March 1995 originally from


The White House. White House Press Release Office of the Press

Secretary. 29 July 1994. Down loaded from INTERNET 14

March 1995 originally from


U.S. Congress, Senate. Peace Powers Act of 1995. 104th Cong. 1st

sess. 1995.


U.S. Congress, Senate. National Security Revitalization Act.

104th Cong. 1st sess. 1995.

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