The United States And Peacekeeping: Can It Work?
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The focus of this paper is that United States soldiers make poor
peacekeepers. A brief history of the development of the United Nations
with respect to the United States is discussed. A review of four major
post cold war missions (Somalia, Cambodia, Rwanda and Bosnia) is
conducted. The conclusions indicate that Cambodia was a success,
Somalia and Rwanda a failure and Bosnia a draw (at the moment). In the
cases that failed, one of the major reasons was that both the UN and the
US forgot the peacekeeping lessons learned during the cold war period.
One of those lessons was the issue of consent. The other lesson was
impartiality. The paper then discusses these issues and why it is
extremely difficult for troops from the United States to abide by these
rules.
There are four major reasons why United States troops make poor
peacekeepers. They are: political decision making, super power status,
training , and expectations. Political decision makers in the United
States are pragmatic, results orientated individuals who are weak in the
historical aspects of problems. Consequently, they tend to make
decisions looking for concrete results in a short time period. The
United States super power status dictates that peacekeeping deployments
it is involved with must succeed. They must succeed because of the
tremendous combat power available. Unfortunately, the availability of
combat power encourages people to try to solve a problem by using it.
Doctrinal training for soldiers emphasizes the aggressive, warrior image
that is not normally compatible with peacekeeping. Finally, the United
States soldier is always regarded as primarily under control of
Washington, even when supposedly under the United Nations.
All of these reasons make it extremely difficult for United States
troops to make good peacekeepers.
CONTENTS
Executive Summary II
Table of Contents III
Chapter Page
Introduction: What is Possible, What is Realistic 1
1. A Historical Prologue 5
2. Post Cold War Optimism 11
3. Traditional Peacekeeping Evolves after 1990 18
4. The United States View of Peacekeeping Post 1993 44
Conclusion: It Must Have Been a Dream 55
Appendixes
A. Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter 58
B. Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter 60
C. Summary of United Nation Missions 65
Bibliography 71
INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS REALISTIC
... the US is an essential ingredient both of the UN
military structure, and the entire structure of the UN
itself. The doctrine of minimum force, as we understand
it, is not part of the US military ethos, nor is the
Wahlgren concept of the Firm, Fair and Friendly UN soldier1
General Sir David Ramsbotham
United Kingdom
We are big enough to discharge with effect the
responsibilities that we undertake, we are not big enough
for others to fear us.2
Lester B. Pearson
former Prime Minister of Canada
The contradictions inherent in these two quotations are the basis
of many arguments on the use of United States (US) troops on United
Nation's (UN) Missions. Are the United States highly trained armed
forces too aggressive to use in peacekeeping operations? Due to the
United States position as the sole global superpower, can any of its
participation in peacekeeping operations be impartial? The latter
point is very important, for hard won experience with UN operations
indicate that impartiality is essential for success. In this paper I
shall look at whether US forces in UN peacekeeping missions are
effective peacekeepers or counterproductive to such a mission's goals.
Why would US troops be counterproductive? I have deliberately limited
this study to missions that have taken place after the end of the Cold
War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. I have not included
operations prior to 1990 as these missions were conducted under the
constraints of the Cold War.
After 1990, many nations felt that the lessons learned by the UN
during the Cold War no longer applied. This paper will look at whether
that assessment was too hasty. Specifically, I shall study the UN
missions that took place in Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda. I
have not included Haiti in this study as the mission has just started
and the lessons to be learned have not yet been written.
There are three terms that I will use throughout this paper, they
are peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement. The definitions
are:
(1). Peacekeeping, involves two or more belligerents who wish to
keep the peace but need an impartial party to provide
outside assistance. Although not specifically mentioned,
Peacekeeping is considered to be a Chapter VI operation
under the United Nations Charter.
(2). Peacemaking, involves any military operation short of full
combat to rectify a crisis situation and the consent of
those involved is not necessary. Peacemaking is a Chapter
VI operation under the UN charter.
(3). Peace enforcement, involves the use of full combat forces
by the United Nations to stop hostilities; consent of the
all parties involved is not necessary and it is a Chapter
VII operation under the UN charter.
This paper will consist of four chapters. Chapter one briefly
reviews the pre-1989 view that the United States had about its role
concerning the UN and foreign policy in general. It will also examine
the role idealism had in influencing US policy and how this often
conflicted with the policy of self interest. Chapter Two examines the
post-Cold War ideas that the US had about the United Nations and how
those ideas evolved. Specifically, this chapter will cover the
influence of the Weinberger Doctrine, the "CNN"3 effect, and the ongoing
debate between idealism and national interest. Chapter Three reviews
the "traditional" peacekeeping role of the UN and the four major UN
operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda. It contains a
brief history of the UN's traditional peacekeeping role (with consent)
and background on the four conflicts and the part the UN played in
each. This Chapter will also examine whether the presence or absence
of significant US troop levels played an important part in the success
of each mission. Chapter Four will address the post Cold War views on
the role of the UN and the implementation of peace enforcement and
peacekeeping roles; it will study the US military as peacekeepers, and
____________________________
3 The use of the generic term "CNN" effect will refer to the instant
communication of pictures 24 hours a day, via television, by all major
networks. CNN was the first major television station to initiate this
process.
the effect of the US political process and public on this particular
role. Finally, the conclusion will look at the benefit and dangers of
US troop involvement in UN operations.
I intend to show, in the Post Cold War period, many of the well
thought out concepts of who can be involved and what a peacekeeping
mission can accomplish are forgotten. It is only after several
disasters that the United States and the UN recognized that the action
of humans had not changed significantly. Therefore, many of the
previous "rules for peacekeepers", with minor modifications still
applied. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the
effect of the North American "Channel Surfing Culture" the
Administration of the US. That subject would be worth a paper alone.
Due to the current nature of each of these operations, many of
the sources used in this paper are from newspaper and journal articles.
Commentary from original sources is limited, as many of the individuals
involved are still active members of their respective militaries and
their post deployment reports have not yet been declassified.
CHAPTER ONE: A HISTORICAL PROLOGUE
The UN and the US have had a love-hate relationship over the last
forty years. Within this time period, the method the United States
uses when dealing with the United Nations has swung from the idealistic
to the pragmatic and on a few occasions, hostile.
During its idealistic phase (roughly the first 5 years), the US
contributed tremendously to the basic setup of the UN. The United
States was one of the founding members of the United Nations. The US
directly influenced the construction of the UN charter. As Thomas M.
Frank states in his book, Nation Against Nation,
... the UN Charter was a sort of extension of the US
constitution...being built in a large part to American
national specifications... the Charter, like the US.
Constitution, would become the fundamental law of society,
determining and umpiring basic power relationships.1
These "fundamental laws" would be enforced by collective security
armies (supplied by the permanent members of the Security
Council). Precisely how and when these armies were to be created
was never agreed upon, and the use of collective security armies
never happened. The optimistic attitude towards the UN
disappeared as the Cold War developed during the late 1940's.
The United States then adopted a pragmatic approach to the
United Nations. The value of the organization was viewed almost
in direct proportion to how much use it could be to American
foreign policy. During the early part of the Cold War, US
policies were successful at the UN and the Soviet Union (using its
veto power) constantly blocked the resolutions at the Security
Council. The one notable exception was Korea in 1950, where the
Soviet delegate left the meeting before exercising his veto. The
United States and its allies moved swiftly and passed a resolution
authorizing the use of force in Korea.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the UN environment changed. The
Soviet Union allied with Third World Nations, many whom were newly
created states emerging as a result of the end of European
colonialism (ironically, the US had a lot to do with the end of
European colonialism after WWII). The Soviet Union made the
policies and the United States exercised its veto. Thus, the
United Nations became an organization in which the two superpowers
competed for influence according to their own national interests.
For example, during the Arab/Israeli wars of the 1970s, the Soviet
Union would support resolutions condemning Israel's aggression.
Israel's ally, the United States, would veto the resolution at the
Security Council. Therefore, the United States would look like
the supporter of aggression.
Unable to achieve its policies through the United Nations,
the United States entered into a number of bilateral/multilateral
arrangements (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in the late 1940s) to fulfill its interests. The aim of
these bilateral and regional arrangements was to contain the
spreading influence of the Soviet Union. These arrangements were
to lead the United States into the Vietnam war and the subsequent
bitter experience. It was during the 1960s that the idea of an
"impartial" peacekeeper arose.
Peacekeepers, to be impartial, came from nations considered
to be impartial by the those who were involved in the conflict
being mediated. A group of middle powers (Canada, Norway, and
some non-Western states) arose who were willing to contribute to
peacekeeping missions. A peacekeeping mission generally consists
of a group of military observers who would establish a presence
between two fighting states (see Appendix C). During the 1960s,
civil wars were not candidates for peacekeeping. It would be the
late 1980's before peacekeeping missions world be sent into civil
wars. The mission typically had terms to which each side had
agreed. It was the task of the observers to report violations of
the agreement and to act as impartial go betweens for either side.
In order for peacekeepers to be deployed, it was necessary to have
the consent of both fighting parties. Normally, the situation
involved two sovereign states, involved in a dispute. In fact,
the initial idea of the UN was based around conflicts between
states, not groups of people within a state. If in many cases the
US could theoretically do it alone, why did it involve the UN at
all?
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara expressed one of the
recurring themes of US foreign policy in 1966 when he addressed
the American Society of Newspaper Editors,
... neither conscience nor sanity itself suggests that the
United States is, should, or could be the global gendarme.
...The United States has no mandate from on high to police
the world and no inclination to do so. There have been
classic cases in which our deliberate non-action was the
wisest action of all.2
Accordingly, the United States has usually attempted to
involve others, with varying degrees of success, in helping to
solve the problems that arise in the world. "World's Policeman"
reoccurs. If necessary, the US can and will act alone to achieve
its own national interest unilaterally. Korea was an example of
cooperation with the UN. Vietnam was an example of the US acting
alone. But how does the United States determine its foreign
policy? Does the US follow some grand design?
Former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, a noted
historian, best summarizes how the United States makes foreign
policy. He believes that, "Issues are dealt with only as the
pressure of events imposes the need for resolving them."3
Foreign policy remains static for long periods of time and then as
the pressure of events builds, it will take a big change all at
once. Kissinger feels that this is due to the people who make the
policy for the United States and how the bureaucracy works. He
describes it as a,
Bureaucratic-pragmatic leadership --when a problem arises it
is assigned to one group/person, then it is resolved, long
term thinking is neglected since it has no bureaucratic
consequence - this causes Foreign Policy to be rigid for
long periods of time, then to change all at once as the
solution is attempted.4
Kissinger contends that the bureaucratic-pragmatic
leadership, combined with the fact that the vast majority of
America's leaders come from a legal background, lead them to make
decisions based upon a Constitutional conception whenever
possible. Therefore, he feels most leaders are good at "...high
competence in dealing with technical issues, and much less
virtuosity in mastering a historical process."5 The United States
political system produces an American decision maker who is a
legalistic, pragmatic, and results oriented individual somewhat
weak on the historical process. Combining that decision maker
with a political system which can rapidly change the
Administration, profoundly affects how the United States works on
any foreign policy issue. A good example of this would be the
differences between President Carter and President Reagan.
President Carter's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union
was generally low key with only a modest emphasis on defence
spending. President Reagan came to power and US foreign policy
took a massive shift. The United States embarked upon a
tremendous military expansion and took a very hard line approach
towards the Soviet Union going as far as to call Russia the "evil
empire". In a very short period of time, Washington's foreign
policy shifted drastically. Sudden shifts in foreign policy are
characteristic of how Washington deals with the UN and
peacekeeping as well.
A quick review of Cold War (1945 to 1989) historical themes,
are: an idealistic idea (i.e. charter modeled after US
constitution) which conflicts with a pragmatic-bureaucratic style
decision making process; a desire not to become the world's
policeman; a two superpower deadlock in the UN leading to
peacekeeping missions being undertaken by impartial middle powers;
and, finally, the concept of consent of the belligerents (normally
two sovereign states). But the world changed after the collapse
of the USSR and the end of the Cold War and so did the fundamental
nature of the type of peacekeeping missions the UN would attempt.
CHAPTER TWO: POST COLD WAR OPTIMISM
Painful as it may be to admit, we could benefit from a
counterweight that would discipline our occasional
impetuosity and, by supplying historical perspective, modify
our penchant for abstract and "final" solutions1
Henry Kissinger
All Change is not Progress
Holiday Inn Sign. Hibbing Minnesota. October 1991
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 triggered a new
world confidence in the international community. The United
States had a renewed surge of optimism with victory in the Cold
War and its status as the remaining superpower. The success of
the Gulf War lead many to think that the United Nations could
achieve many things in this new "global" order. However, this
view was unrealistic. By 1995, many people had begun to realize
that, despite the best intentions, the international community had
indeed changed but not necessarily for the better! In many areas,
it was actually reverting to patterns of behavior from a more
distant past.
This chapter will examine five areas: the "New World Order";
the United States approach to the UN in the post Cold War; the
effect of the "CNN factor"; the resurgence of the belief in the
effectiveness of the multinational community (ie UN); and,
finally, when reality did not bet expectations, the
disillusionment. Although many people claimed a new age had
dawned, the historical patterns of how the United States deals
with the international community has not changed.
It is not the intent of this paper to expound completely on
all the various theories that circulated after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. For the United States there are three generally
accepted ideas of how it should conduct foreign policy during the
new conditions of the altered international community.2
The first concept is the Lone Super Power Theory that
postulates the United States as the hegemon, any other alternative
for the world resulting in anarchy. Under the first theory,
Washington would be the "World's Policeman." The second theory,
by Samuel Huntington, is the "Clash of Civilizations". The "Clash
of Civilizations" states that with the collapse of the bi-polar
Cold War world, old cultural animosities, and grouping would
override the nation states. Many existing nation states will
collapse as these various groups of people struggle to assert
themselves and their cultural identities. Under the second theory
some people believe that the role of the United States should be
to provide the bulwark of Western values against all others. The
final theory states the United States should act as the balance in
world politics. In essence the country would fill the role that
Great Britain did in the 19th century at the height of England's
imperial days. The interplay between these various theories and
the changes in the post Cold War world has lead to a change in the
UN's view.
Post Cold War policy for the United States is a combination
of both pragmatism and idealism. The pragmatic policies were a
result of the US experience in the Vietnam War, Beirut, and the
Gulf War. Both military and civilian leadership put forth
versions of the Weinberger doctrine3. General Colon Powell,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commented on what
guidelines the United States would employ when using force:
"...that force must be used massively, if at all, with clear
political objectives and a definitive 'exit strategy'..."4. The
United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine K.
Albright stated in September 1993, further basic criteria for the
involvement of US troops in a UN mission:
Is there a real threat to international peace and
security? Does the proposed peacekeeping mission have clear
objectives and can its scope be clearly identified? Is a
cease fire in place and have the parties agreed to a United
Nations presence? Can an end point to the mission be
identified?5
With the end of the Cold War, the US public, tired of
shouldering the burden of defense desired a peace dividend. In
addition, the public tolerance for the loss of American lives in
foreign conflicts for any reason had decreased dramatically. To
allow for these developments, the Clinton administration generated
new ideas on foreign policy. The ideas were: the United States
would not act unless its own vital interests are at stake or
unless Washington obtains multilateral consensus on the issue
(attributed unofficially as the Tarnoff Doctrine6 after a US State
Department Official).
The new policy of the United States theoretically reduces
the number of operations that the US unilaterally embarks upon.
The US taxpayer pays less because other nations shoulder a share
of the burden. The ideal and only truly international institution
is the United Nations. An operation sanctioned by the United
Nations not only has both other nations support and/or
participation, but it is regarded as legitimate as well. Nations
who might look upon a unilateral US operation as one in which only
Washington's vital interests matter, view a UN operation as being
impartial. Again the reoccurring theme of no desire to be the
world's policeman combines with the political pragmatic approach
help form the foreign policy of the United States. The United
Nations for the third time since it's creation has become the main
collective-security organization for the United States. However,
as on all the previous occasions when the United States placed
heavy emphasis upon the UN there were always idealistic elements
and this time is no exception.
As the following chapters will elaborate, Somalia, Rwanda,
and Bosnia all had a very altruistic basis to them. In each of
these missions, the prime motivator was humanitarian aid. In the
case of Bosnia, from the United States perspective, there was a
strong emphasis on the continuing violation of human rights.
During the initial post Cold War period, the United States is
following a policy of promoting democracy and human rights as
outlined in the latest National Security Strategy: "...we must
prepare our forces for peace operations to support democracy or
conflict resolution."7 The assumption is that those being rescued
will emulate institutions that promote both democracy and human
rights. But practically, it is often cheaper to prevent conflicts
before they become massive wars rather than try to repair the
damage afterward. The continuing question that faces US leaders
is, "how to effectively help?" As the following chapters will
show, the involvement of US troops in a UN peace operation is not
necessarily the most effective, nor are the results as
anticipated.
Finally, US leaders have to combat the effect of the "CNN
factor", the spreading influence of the world wide electronic
reporting media. The "CNN factor" specifically named after Ted
Turner's Atlanta based Cable News Network, CNN is the organization
that can show instantly, television pictures of what is happening
world wide. Currently, other networks, such as the BBC are
undertaking this type of coverage as well. The nature of
television means that the coverage is composed of short time
frames and generally localized views. Pictures of a war torn
country or starving children has a massive influence on the
general public.
The CNN type of coverage connects with real time reporting
as simultaneously political leaders are trying to develop a
situation and military subordinates to implement it. The public
wants their politicians to do something, and in most cases that
means "right now". Unfortunately, the television coverage is
short on the history and explanation for what is happening, and
fast on instant analysis. Often UN and US leaders must make quick
decisions to appear to be at least taking some action. These
decisions have involved Washington in operations the country would
not normally, and perhaps should never have been involved. It
also leads to those areas that do not receive coverage being
ignored (as Rwanda was). Major General Dallaire, former UN
commander in Rwanda, commented in a lecture at the Marine Corps
Command and Staff College that if the war had shown the slaughter
of the gorillas instead of people, the world would have paid more
attention.
By 1995, enthusiasm for the UN as major focus of foreign
policy for the United States has all but disappeared. The many
complications that resulted from participation in Somalia, the
seemingly endless fight in Bosnia, and the bottomless barrel a
commitment to Rwanda appears to be, have soured the American
public to the UN. The US public's disillusionment with the UN has
existed for decades, but recently the feeling has expanded. The
new Republican Congress wishes to cut one third of the United
Nations budget and further impose restraints on the command of US
troops.8 The lessons of Somalia and the responsibility for the
loss of the rangers are being laid at the feet of the UN. Yet,
somehow forgotten, is the fact that the UN Leader of the Somali
mission was American, the mission was commanded by Americans, and
the ill-thought out proposal to find Adhid was sponsored by the US
Ambassador to the UN. What went wrong? In the following
chapters, I shall show how in many cases the lessons of forty
years of UN operations were ignored. It was this ignorance of the
past which in many cases caused the failures in the Post Cold War
period.
CHAPTER THREE: TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING EVOLVES AFTER 1990
In order to fully understand UN participation in post
Cold War operations, it is necessary to know the history of each
operation and the United Nations approach to them. This chapter
will consider the notion of "consent" in peacekeeping and the
typical development of what are now considered "traditional
peacekeeping rules". Four UN missions (Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia,
and Rwanda) will be examined: each will be reviewed to include the
basis for UN participation. I shall then point out what might be
the seed of the future success or failure in each one.
UN peacekeeping commenced in 1948 with a peace observer
force. In the next thirty years, fifteen more operations
occurred. A body of five commonly accepted principles for
peacekeeping developed out of these operations:
(1). Operations should be UN operations, formed, selected
and financed by the UN and reporting to the Secretary
General.
(2). When the warring factions have reached a political
settlement upon which all sides agree, UN troops would
deploy.
(3). UN forces must be strictly impartial.
(4). To maintain a balanced approach, no super power should
have an obvious presence.
(5). Troops can use only the minimum of force.1
These principles combine with the philosophy expressed in
1963 by Secretary General U Thant. Speaking at Harvard, he said
UN forces "are essentially peace and not fighting forces and they
operate only with the consent of the parties directly concerned."2
U Thant emphasized that peacekeeping operations must be consensual
but acknowledged this would not prevent one side from cheating if
they thought the gains would be worth it. What does consent mean?
A good definition of consent is "a general public attitude
that tolerates a peacekeeping presence and represents a quorun of
cooperation."3 Charles Dobbie in his book A Concept for Post-Cold
War Peacekeeping, points out that you can have consent at the
Operational level of war, while lacking consent at the local
level. An example would be the recent hostage taking of Canadian
troops in Bosnia. The Canadians, as UN troops, had the consent of
the senior Serb and Croatian commanders. A local Serb commander
took the Canadians hostage but released them after negotiations
with higher commands. The Canadians did not have local consent,
but they did have consent from the higher authorities and
therefore were allowed to do their job. One of the prime reasons
that Peacekeepers gain and keep consent is impartiality.
A nation was generally considered impartial if it had an
"absence of significant political or economic interests in . .
areas of conflict, lack of prejudicial colonial or imperial
histories, . . . independent internationalism."4 Present
throughout the history of United Nation's missions are these
principles of consent and impartiality. Yet for some reason,
after 1990 the UN and the US ignored these very basic tenets in
some UN commitments. The results were often a disaster, resulting
in missions that were a waste of money and lives.
In the past, what did the UN expect from a soldier involved
in peacekeeping? A summary of expectations is best expressed in
the following quotation from Larry O.L. Fabian's book Soldier
Without Enemies:
they have no deadly foe to destroy or be destroyed by. They
fight very little and use their weapons rarely. They prefer
compromise to conquest. They substitute persuasion and
prevention for punishment, and they apply tact instead of
firepower.5
Training a fighting force to follow this philosophy, which is
directly opposite to the normal methods, is difficult. However,
in the following chapters I shall show how the closer a fighting
force comes to this ideal, the better it succeeds in peacekeeping.
The United States does not train nor want its military to do
this as its major role. In fact, Kissinger's analysis is valid:
the US makes decisions based upon a pragmatic assessment of the
current situation with very little regard to history. The
pendulum of enthusiasm for the UN was high after 1990,
particularly after the Gulf War. Again, unrealistic expectations
were placed upon an organization that in the previous forty years
had proved conclusively that it had distinct limits on what the
international body could do. None the less commitments were made
in Somalia, Cambodia, Rwanda and Bosnia.
Somalia
We can call Somalia a "CNN mission". In 1991-92, factional
fighting among rival Somalian war lords had created massive
starvation amongst the population. The two main competing war
lords were Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed and General Mohame
Farah Aidid, leader of the United Somali Congress. The tribal
factions had stymied relief agencies in their attempts to get food
aid to the people. These agencies were forced to bribe the
competing tribal factions to deliver the aid. Unfortunately
negative consequences ensued: often the bribes did not work and
the agencies were not delivering the food. A small group of UN
troops sent in the summer of 1992 (lead by Pakistan) was to act as
an observer force for a negotiated cease fire. Unfortunately, the
cease fire did not occur and the UN mission was ineffective. The
relief agencies estimated that up to 1,000 people a day were
dying6 in the continuing fighting. The nightly televised pictures
of countless starving people created intense political pressure
among Western countries to do something. A decision on where to
go next had to be made.
The American public expected quick action on the issue from
President Bush. He had three options presented to him the day
before Thanksgiving in 1992.
(1). To expand the peacekeeping operation by adding 3,500
troops to the current Pakistani peacekeeping effort.
(2). To assist in making it into a peacemaking operation
with the US supplying transportation and logistical
aid.
(3). To send in a US division under the UN flag but US
command.
He chose option three because it provided a quick method of taking
control of the situation and stop the factional fighting.7
Unfortunately, the State Department ignored the advice of the US
Ambassador in Kenya. He called Somalia a "tar baby,. . .
Somalis, as the Italians and British discovered to their
discomfiture, are natural-born guerrillas. They will mine the
roads. They will lay ambushes. They will launch hit-and-run
attacks."8
The UN Security Council Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992
authorized a change, the "Use of all necessary means to establish
when possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief
operations."9 The United States then lead the operation, called
"Restore Hope." It was a humanitarian mission, involving many
other countries, to ensure that the relief agencies could deliver
the necessary food supplies. They heavily armed the troops and
left no doubt that the UN force would impose peace, by force, if
necessary. The mission was sent under Chapter VII provisions,
which meant it was to be a mission authorized to use force. The
UN never obtained consent of the warring parties.
Initially, the mission went well with the tribes ceasing to
fight and the aid agencies commencing to deliver food to the
starving people. The UN force then commenced setting up the
former police force as an effective unit and began to reimpose law
and order on an area that had been lawless for two years.
After the initial honeymoon period, the tone and aim of the
mission began to change. The United States, under heavy internal
pressure from home, reduced its troop level from 28,000 to 4,800
and turned over its operation officially to the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Although officially a UN
organization, Americans commanded UNOSOM at both the civilian and
military level. Even at the reduced level, heavy pressure existed
from the US public to pull out completely and leave the nation
building to the UN and not get involved in disarming of the
Warlords10. US politicians and the public were interested in the
"quick fix" approach to problem solving. The US lead forces had
arrived, aid was now getting through, in the public's perception,
it was now time to leave.
Unfortunately, the continuing underlying tensions and
conflict between the Somali clans was not well understood by any
of the American or UN leaders. Internally, the Warlords were
starting to reassert their power and one, General Aidid, was more
prominent in taking control of the capital, Mogadishu. After
General Aidid's men had ambushed a Pakistani unit in Mogadishu,
the UN security council voted on a resolution that directed the
United Nations force to arrest him.
It was at this point that two major shifts in policy took
place. The first was that the UN put a $25,000 bounty on General
Aidid, and secondly the operation became actively dedicated to
disarming the Warlords. Two of the Peacekeepers rules had now
been broken, UNOSOM was not operating with even tacit consent of
most of the combatants and it was no longer impartial. The mission
was now one of peace enforcement. Charles Dobbie in his book A
Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping states that:
if a peacekeeping force crosses the impartiality divide from
peacekeeping to peace enforcement. If perceived to be
taking sides, the force loses its legitimacy and credibility
as a trustworthy third party, thereby prejudicing its
security. The force's resources will then become ever more
devoted to its need to protect itself. It actually joins
the conflict it was there to police and is likely to become
embroiled in activities that are irrelevant to the overall
campaign aim....Once on the other side, there is very little
chance of getting back and the only way out is likely to be
by leaving the theatre.11
Nevertheless, the crossover of the UN force from impartial
peacekeeping to peace enforcement was not considered important at
this point in the post 1990's. The world's sole super power was
involved with its massive (although reduced) well-trained force
and it would simply be a matter of time until they would catch
General Aidid, or so Washington and the UN thought.
The very fact that the US was so heavily committed to the
operation placed unrealistic expectations on the operation.
Public opinion put intense pressure on the UNOSOM's commanders
when General Aidid proved difficult to capture. General Aidid's
capture became tied to the prestige of the United States. The
issue culminated in the poorly timed raid by the US rangers
against General Aidid's suspected hideout in October 1993 that
lead to eighteen US rangers and hundreds of Somalis being killed.
A captured US helicopter pilot, Michael Durant, summarized best
what General Aidid had lectured on: "When you don't live here,
you can't understand what's going on in this country. We
Americans have tried to help. But at one point things turned
bad."12 The loss of life accentuated the pressure on Washington
to withdraw the US troops and turn it over to the UN completely.
Within a couple of months the US had withdrawn its forces from the
operation.
General Aidid reverted to being a significant participant in
the political process and no longer a bandit. The UN soldiered
on, attempting to put the basics of an infrastructure together
until March 1995. Then the US Marines returned to provide
covering fire for the last withdrawal of UN troops. Somalia
returned to the control of the Warlords.
Cambodia
The main UN mission in Cambodia commenced in 1992. The name
of the mission was the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC). Prior to UNTAC, a small force of observers
called the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNIMRC) had
been sent there in November of 1991. UNTAC arose out of the
October 1991 Paris peace agreement signed by the four Cambodian
combatant factions. The four groups were the Khmer Rouge
(Communist), the Khmer Peoples National Liberation Front (a right
wing organization), the Cambodian Government (backed by Vietnam),
and the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (supported by Prince Sihanouk).
Cambodians had been fighting for over thirty years and more than
350,000 were refugees in Thailand. The 1991 Paris peace agreement
was to stop the conflict in two steps. Step one formed an interim
Supreme National Council (SNC) composed of members from each party
and headed by Prince Sihanouk. As the second step, the UN was to
set up an environment for peaceful elections.
UNTAC deployed six months late with the mission "to
dismantle 70 percent of the opposing military forces and gain
complete control over the remaining 30 percent; to organize,
supervise, and conduct free and fair elections; and to return and
rehabilitate the 350,000 Cambodians living in refugee camps in
Thailand."13 The operation was divided into seven components:
Human Rights, Civil Administrations, Civil Police, Repatriation
Component, Rehabilitation, Electorial, and Military. The main
purpose of the UN Military forces was to verify the withdrawal of
foreign forces, supervise cease fires, make a weapons control
system, conduct mine clearing training, investigate complaints and
assist the repatriation of refugees. The military component
consisted of 16,000 peacekeepers (from 47 different countries).
Only 47 peacekeepers were American. The United States also
supplied logistics and monetary aid.
UNTAC deployed initially with the consent of all involved
parties and consisted of many small and middle power
representatives. Although, the SNC has granted the UN "all powers
necessary to ensure the implementation of the agreement"14, as a
mission the UN closely structured itself along the "traditional
peacekeeping" philosophy. The troops of the middle powers were
considered impartial. The UN scheduled elections for May 1993 but
from the initial deployment problems arose.
The Khmer Rouge, unhappy with the process, recognizing they
could not win an election, disavowed the accord almost immediately
and began to work against it. The Khmer Rouge had a completely
different understanding of the Paris Accord and maintained that
the amount of power it delegated to the SNC was minimal.
Accordingly, they would not cooperate with UNTAC and would not
allow the verification of their forces. The Khmer Rouge refused
to disarm, and subsequently none of the other participants would.
Incidents of the Khmer Rouge harassing peacekeepers started almost
immediately. Pressure arose from the press, non-governmental
agencies, and the public for the UN to take some action against
those who were causing the problem. The argument presented was
that the UN would lose its credibility if it did not respond.
UNTAC strongly resisted these pressures, for it realized the UN
did not have enough troops to take offensive action. The
alternative was to reduce the aims of the mission. In November
1992 the Security Council revised the mandate.
The revised mandate concentrated solely upon ensuring that a
democratic election would take place. UNTAC was not going to take
sides in the process and as far as possible it would maintain the
consent of most of the parties involved. UNTAC employed the
military to defend the polling stations, recruited three of the
four parties (the exception being the Khmer Rouge) to maintain
control of the countryside, and concentrated the educational
effort on ensuring that the people would know that the polling
would be secret.
The effort to remain impartial was a success. The Khmer
Rouge never regarded the UN mission as the opposition. It
continued to threaten, harass and intimidate UN patrols in its
region, but despite a series of hostage incidents, never
considered the UN the enemy. Since the Khmer Rouge only
controlled a limited amount of Cambodia, UNTAC was able to
effectively carry out its revised mission. In May 1993, the
elections were an unqualified success, with a population turn out
of 89.6%15 (including Khmer Rouge controlled areas) with only a
few major incidents of violence. UNTAC was a success, where most
people had predicted failure. UNTAC had maintained the consent of
the majority, remained impartial and avoided mission creep. The
Khmer Rouge still remains a problem, however, there is a fairly
elected government in power to deal with them. The next major
mission, Rwanda, was not to be as successful.
Rwanda
A review of the history of the country since its initial
contact with Europeans is necessary to appreciate the contemporary
problem. Contact with Rwanda commenced in 1894 with German
explorers. Rwanda's rulers were the Tutsi who made up 15% of the
population with the remainder of the population being Hutus. The
Germans elected to maintain the status quo when they made Rwanda a
colony and left the Tutsi as the administrators and officials.
The subsequent conflict between the two tribes is the basis for
the current strife in Rwanda. After World War Two, the UN
appointed Belgium as the trustee of the country. Belgium began to
educate the Hutu majority and encourage them to develop so the
country would become a democracy. The Tutsi, feeling threatened,
pushed for rapid independence while they still had control of the
country. In 1961, the Hutus staged a coup with the backing of the
Belgians and took over the country. Subsequently, 130,000 Tutsi
fled to Uganda and formed the base for ongoing operations against
the Hutu's for the next thirty-four years. Rwanda, now a Hutu
governed country, officially obtained its independence from
Belgium in 1962.
In Uganda, the local people resented the presence of the
displaced Tutsi. The resentment lead to acts of violence and
oppression against the displaced. Many Tutsi, out of frustration,
then joined a Ugandan rebel group that was opposing Idi Amin, the
dictator ruling Uganda. The rebel group successfully took power
in 1986 and two prominent rebel leaders who were Tutsi, Paul
Kagame and Fred Rwigyama, became the chief of intelligence and
Minister of National Defence for Uganda. They also became leading
members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The objective of
the RPF was to incite the Tutsi who remained in Rwanda to join a
rebellion so that the Tutsi could return to power in Rwanda.
The RPF, with 4,000 men, lead an unsuccessful attack into
Rwanda in 1990. Although the attack was unsuccessful, it
emphasized the need for a political settlement to clarify the
power sharing of the two tribes in the country. To settle the
problem, the ruling Hutus and the RPF meet in Paris in 1993 and
arrived at the Arusha Accord. This accord laid out the formula
for political power between the Hutus and the Tutsi. It also
stated that Rwanda should hold free and fair elections which the
UN would oversee. The UN set up a small mission of 2,500 people,
the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UMAMIR). UNAMIR
was to help arrange the elections, monitor a demilitarized zone
between Uganda and Rwanda and to assist with mine clearance.14
The mandate for the UN was "contributing to the establishment and
maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and
subsequent operation of the transitional government."17
However, Rwanda exploded into civil war on 6 April 1994 when
President Habyarimaia's plane was shot down while returning from a
meeting to discuss the implementation of the Accord. The Hutu's
used this as an excuse for their militias to attack all Tutsi and
moderate Hutus. In the end the estimated death toll was half a
million people. The UN troops recently arrived, and with little
logistic support and weapons, did not fair well. Ten Belgian
peacekeepers, who were guarding the Prime Minister, were killed
defending her from the mobs. Belgium subsequently withdrew its
troops from the peacekeeping force.
Eight days after the war started, Major General Romeo
Dallaire, head of the UN force, pleaded with the UN Security
Council for additional support. On 14 March 1994, Secretary
General Boutros-Ghali presented the Security Council with two
options:
(1). To double the UN force to 5,000 soldiers.
(2). To reduce it to 270 soldiers.
Option 1 was designed to reinforce UNAMIR, the Security Council
chose Option Two. They had reduced UNAMIR to a mere observer in
the conflict.
The subsequent slaughter of the Tutsi, although reported in
the press, did not cause any major nation to interfere. The RPF
(under Paul Kagame) successfully reopened its offensive against
the Rwandan government. The Hutu army (French trained and
equipped) was unable to stop the RPF. Panic set in among the
Hutus and more than two million fled to Zaire, Burundi and
Uganda18 thus a major refugee problem was created. In Zaire,
France under UN auspices, finally set up a safe haven for the
fleeing Hutu's. By mid-July, the RPF controlled Rwanda and Paul
Kagame declared himself Vice President and Minister of National
Defence. A moderate Hutu, Pasteur Bizimugu, became President.
The refugee problems exploded as the camps became subject to
disease and famine, and an international outcry arose. The US was
forced to act for humanitarian reasons; massive amounts of aid
began to flow, as of the end of October 1994 approximately two
billion dollars in US aid had gone to Rwanda as various forms of
assistance19. Two major concerns have hindered the return of the
refugees to Rwanda: fear of retaliation by the Tutsi's and fear of
former members of the Hutu army who control the refugee camps. As
of October 1994, only 3,254 refugees had returned20.
Currently, the people in the camps are being fed with UN
aid while those in Rwanda itself have been left to fend for
themselves. The UN mission in Rwanda initially had consent of
both belligerents and it remained impartial, but why was it so
ineffective? The key failure: to act quickly when it had the
chance of stopping the slaughter. However, the UN could not
assemble enough support from any country in those initial weeks:
as a result it must now spend billions of dollars trying to
correct the resulting problems. Yet in Rwanda the problems are
far from being over. The large Hutu refugee camps will continue
to be a constant source of friction with the neighbouring
countries and provide future bases for new rebel groups.
Realistically, could the UN have stopped this conflict?
Certainly, the various members had enough military power, had they
chosen to use it. However, it would have been another case of
"mission creep" if UNAMIR's mandate had been expanded to allow for
active intervention. The United States and other major powers
were beginning to remember, after Somalia, that to plunge into
such an operation within a country was fraught with danger and
cost. In this case it was a conflict between the idealistic view
of going in to stop the killing and the practical assessment of
what would it cost in terms of manpower and lives. Clearly, in
the short term the practical view won: however, it will be a long
time before the true long term costs of the displaced Hutus is
realized. It is equally hard to predict how the legacy of hatred
left after the slaughter of Tutsi will manifest itself.
Bosnia
The Balkans have been the center of ethnic violence for
centuries. To forget or ignore this history when dealing with
this region is to court failure, since no matter what outsiders
think the people of the region have a reason for what they do and
remember the conflicts. The entire region is a mix of three main
ethnic groups; the Serbs (Orthodox Christians, and loosely akin to
the Russian Slavic people), the Croats (Roman Catholics, and
closely associated with Western Europe and, in particular,
Germany) and the Muslims, originally either Serbs or Croats
(supported by the Muslim middle eastern countries). At the risk
of over simplifying the problem, the Serbs and Croats do not like
each other, both the Serbs and the Croats do not like the Muslims,
but the Croats would ally themselves to the Muslims when fighting
the Serbs. The Serb Army was better trained and armed, as they
had made up the vast majority of the army of the former
Yugoslavia. In the case of all the armies, civilian control of
the generals was not particularly strong. The collapse of
Yugoslavia occurred shortly after the collapse of Russia, although
it had been weakening since the death of Tito in 1980. The
initial dispute occurred between the newly declared Republic of
Croatia, a former part of Yugoslavia, and the Serbs living in
Croatia who opposed the split in June 1991. The European Economic
Community (EEC) attempted a cease fire and contributed observers
under the EEC auspices. The conflict soon spread among the
remaining sections of the former Yugoslavia. The European
Community was unable to stop the fighting with negotiation.
Bosnia first experienced heavy conflict between the Serbs
and the Croats/Muslims in July 1991. At the time it was still a
part of Yugoslavia with a population breakdown as follows:
"... 43.8 percent of the residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina were
ethnic Muslims, 31.5 percent were Serbs, and 17.3 percent were
Croats."21 The Bosnian Serbs under Radovan Karadzic wanted to
form a separate breakaway republic in December 1991.
The UN began negotiations to set up a peacekeeping force in
Yugoslavia with the general support of most of the combatants.
The intent for the force was to work in Croatia.
In February 1992 the UN set up the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia to help maintain the cease-fire (the
first of many) that they had arranged on 23 November 1991.
UNPROFOR's mission under Resolutin 743 was to create the
conditions for peace and security in Croatia until a settlement
could be negotiated. UNPROFOR could use force for self defence.
The Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Gali, briefed the Security
Council that there was a danger that UNPROFOR would fail for lack
of cooperation by the combatants, however to delay would risk the
entire cease-fire.22 The Security Council authorized a full
force deployment on 7 April 1992 initially into Croatia.
Unfortunately in April of 1992 the European Community
recognized Bosnia-Herzogovina as a separate state. On 6 April
1992 the Bosnian Serbs wanting to remain with Serbia, launched an
attack and seized 70% of Bosnia and began to move on Sarajevo.
Accordingly, in August 1992 the UN modified the mandate of
UNPROFOR under resolution 776. The new resolution tasked UNPROFOR
to assist the United Nations High Commissionaire for Refugees
(UNHCR) with the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and
other areas of Bosnia that needed it. UNPROFOR was authorized to
offer military protection to aid convoys and the movement of
refugees and wounded in Bosnia. UNPROFOR was now set up in
Croatia and Bosnia, eventually by the end of 1993, it would cover
Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia.
Major General Lewis McKenzie, the initial contingent leader
into Sarajevo, contends that it was unfortunate that the title of
UNPROFOR was kept when the mission went into Bosnia. It led many
people to think that UNPROFOR's mission was not purely protection
of humanitarian aid convoys and refugees. The confusion arose
over the title of the mission, which could translate that UNPROFOR
had a general protection role. In Bosnia, the Croats and Muslims
expected the UN force to protect them from attack, which was not
the mandate or intent of UNPROFOR in their area. The mandate of
the mission in Sarajevo has remained humanitarian, and was not
nearly as all encompassing as the one that the UN carried out in
Croatia.
It is not the purpose of this paper to get into discussions
on the mechanics and successes of the No Fly Zones, NATO Air
strikes, or the Safe Havens. UNPROFOR developed each of these
tactics to implement the mission of protecting the refugee
population and delivering humanitarian aid. Each of them involved
the increasing threat to use force on the warring parties. All of
them have met with limited success.
The media was a major player in Bosnia. The report of
shelling of the marketplace in Sarajevo became the catalyst for
the implementation of the threat of NATO air strikes in February
1994. Bosnia has thus become a magnet for many different agendas,
including proving that NATO still could be a credible force in the
post Cold War world and the US, despite small ground force levels,
was still interested in European affairs. President Clinton
stated this in his address on 9 February 1994.
Our nation has clear interests at stake in this conflict.
We have an interest in helping to prevent a broader conflict
in Europe; ... showing that NATO . . . remains a credible
force for peace in post-Cold War Europe . . . stemming the
flow of refugees . . . the strangulation of Sarajevo and
the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia.23
Bosnia continues to be the magnet for all European nations.
Russia was actively involved trying to influence the Serbs to
stop. NATO was threatening the Serbs to protect specific areas
and UN forces. The US sympathizes with the Muslim. The UN
forces are widely dispersed in various areas to look after the
humanitarian aid convoys. However, in this war there are no good
and bad people - no moral high ground for one side or the other.
General Mackenzie, briefing President Francois Mitterend in
Sarajevo on the situation stated ". . . There is strong but
circumstantial evidence that some really horrifying acts of
cruelty attributed to the Serbs were actually orchestrated by the
Muslims against their own people, for the benefit of the
international audience."24 A frightening reflection of what
lengths the warring factions were willing to go to influence the
media. This view has been echoed by Lieutenant-General Sir
Michael Rose, the past British Commander in Bosnia (December
1994): commenting on the fighting about Gorazde in March 1994. He
felt the city had been deliberately lost to gain international
sympathy. He then added "The Moslems are not going to get us to
fight their war for them."25 Some senior members of the US
military have also echoed this view, although it is not the
official view of the US government. The US position is simple and
simplistic: the Serbs were the aggressors and the Croats and
Muslims were the victim. So what is the total to date for
UNPROFOR?
UNPROFOR has cost 1.6 billion dollars and 131 lives since
March 92. The current troop levels remain at 39,000, of which the
US has contributed 748 in Macedonia.26 It is estimated that
between 140,000 to 300,000 people have died, and 2.5 million have
been displaced. The political manoeuvring necessary to arrange
for NATO air strikes, the various blockades combined with the
distinctly different views of the US and the Europeans about who
is at fault, has lead to a deterioration of the relationship
between the US and Britain, one of its strongest allies. Yet
there is still no end in sight to the conflict. On a more
positive note, despite the problems the peacekeepers have
experienced, humanitarian relief is getting through, all
combatants still want the UN to remain in Bosnia, and the UN has
retained its impartiality. David Walker in his article on the
Battles of the Balkans June 1993 wrote:
If we are to learn one lesson from all this, then it must be
that whatever the cost of achieving peace, it is wasted
unless it can accommodate the emotions of the past. And the
cost of not knowing that past could extract as high a price
today as at any time during the long history of these
troubled lands.27
But how did all of these post 1990 operations compare with the
previous forty years of UN experience?
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Summary Chapter Three
Somalia broke most of the rules established over the previous
forty years. It did not have consent of those involved, the mission
lost its impartiality, it involved a super power in a major role, it was
initiated prior to a political settlement by the warring factions, and
minimum use of force was not an overriding factor. Of the five peace
keeping principles it met only one: it was a UN operation, organized and
run by the UN. Somalia is considered to have been a failure.
Cambodia has met all of the five peacekeeping principles. The
mission never resorted to heavy use of force despite considerable
provocation. It maintained its impartiality and subsequently the
approval and consent of the majority of the people. None of the nations
directly involved were considered a super power, and each of them was
able to maintain an even handed approach. Cambodia is considered to be
the most successful of all the missions studied.
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Rwanda met the criteria in four areas. It was a UN mission, it
did not involve super powers, the force maintained its impartiality, and
it maintained an even handed approach. Nevertheless, the mission lost
the consent of the warring groups to fulfill its mission and in the end
became a helpless observer to the slaughter of civilians. Rwanda's UN
mission returned to a position of influence with the end of the war.
The United Nations was able to supply food and shelter to the Hutu
refugees substantially reducing the deaths in the refugee camps.
However, the underlying problem has not been addressed.
Bosnia is still an open question. It meets all of the
requirements for peacekeeping except consent based upon an agreement
with all political parties. Arguably, UNPROFOR has the consent of the
warring factions, but each group has different reasons for wanting the
UN to be there. In addition, the reasons why UNPROFOR is welcome,
change with each party's political and military success. Up to the
present, the UN forces are still considered to be impartial, even
handed, and applying a minimum of force. A superpower is not yet a
major player in the overall peacekeeping force structure. The mission
is delivering aid and people are being saved. However, there is a
continuous debate on where to go with the mission and the success or
failure is far from being determined. Bosnia is becoming like many of
the Cold War missions (ie Cyprus), long running, with no easy solution,
no end to the mission in sight, constant questioning of its objectives,
and some successes mixed in with the failures. Overall, UNPROFOR in
Bosnia has had more successes then failures. No nation will disagree
that, without UNPROFOR additional thousands would have died. The
question is, can the mission retain its impartiality, or will outside
pressure to do something, force UNPROFOR to take actions it would later
regret.
In chapter four I will look at how the internal and external
factors in the US political system work against the United States as a
peacekeeper.
CHAPTER FOUR: The United States View of Peacekeeping Post 1993
Peacekeeping is a part of our national security policy, but it is
not the centerpiece. The primary purpose of our military forces
is to fight and win wars . . . we'll choose between unilateral and
collective approaches between the UN or other coalitions depending
on what works best and what serves best American interests.
Tony Lake1
National Security Advisor
Clinton Administration
The quotation accurately portrays US policy toward the UN and
peacekeeping operations. Mr. Lake's observations are not unrealistic
cling from a superpower with many global interests. But it succinctly
notes why US forces have difficulty being effective peacekeepers. The
issue is not one of capability; rather, it is the training of the
military and the mentality of the US politicians and public. What are
the advantages to using the UN? What are the disadvantages? In this
chapter, I shall briefly summarize what the advantages and disadvantages
are for working through the United Nations. I shall then list the
requirements that the US insists a UN mission must meet before it will
deploy forces. Finally, I will show how many of these factors work
against the United States fielding an effective peacekeeping force.
The Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Frank G. Wisner,
summarized the advantages of participation in the UN in 1993. He told
the Senate Armed Services Committee that there were three major reasons
for participation. The three reasons are:
(1). The legitimacy of the operation.
(2). The reduction in the requirement for and risk to American
forces.
(3). The effective use of the UN prevents the spread of a
conflict, therefore stopping larger involvement later.2
All these are valid arguments, although they are very difficult to
quantify. However, the disadvantages are usually more obvious and
easier to evaluate.
There are five major disadvantages to working under the auspices
of the UN. Three of these problem areas are easy to measure:
(1). The costs of the mission.
(2). The effect on force readiness.
(3). Poor UN command and control.
The next two problems are hard to quantify:
(4). Doctrinal training.
(5). The world's perception of a US soldier.
A brief review of each problem area is necessary to understand the road
blocks they cause any potential US peacekeeping mission or potential
participation in a peacekeeping mission.
Cost
The Department of Defence is currently taking the cost of UN
missions out of the Operating and Maintenance funding. Since these
missions have not been budgeted for, they consume precious military
resources in a time of decreasing budgets. President Clinton requested
from Congress $320,000,000 in emergency appropriations in Fiscal Year
1994 to provide the ability to respond to such commitments without
decreasing training and regular maintenance. The Defence Departments
share would be $270,000,000.3 These monetary costs do not account for
the hidden cost of declining combat readiness for the troops involved in
a peacekeeping mission.
Force Readiness
The combat readiness of US troops decrease, when they retrain from
straight war fighting to acting as a peacekeeper between fighting
factions. In war fighting, the approach is the use of maximum force to
compel the enemy to do your will as quickly as possible. One of the
main tenants for a peacekeeping force is the use of minimum force. It
takes time and training to accustom troops to the role of peacekeeper.
Once the soldier has returned from peacekeeping, it takes retraining to
return him to an effective war fighter. The estimate is that for every
battalion deployed, another one is working up to relieve it and a third
is retraining in the post deployment phase.4 Therefore, the ratio is
3:1.
The issue for the United States is not whether the training can be
accomplished, it is the cost of the training and how it depletes the
number of war fighters available. US Army Chief of Staff General Carl
E. Vuno testified that at one point "150,000 soldiers, which is about 26
percent of today's (active-duty) strength"5 were involved in
preparation, deployment or post deployment for the UN. Therefore, he
could not field a force strong enough to cover a major regional
contingency. Although, the numbers General Vuno quoted are obviously a
high point, the issue remains: peacekeeping troops detract from the
United States war fighting ability.
Command and Control
Issues of poor command and control in UN missions are an ongoing
problem. The UN's inability to control large numbers of troops in the
field gravely concerns the United States. A direct consequence of this
weakness is strong pressure from the Republican party to ensure that US
Commanders only control US troops. Bill S.5 presented by Senator Dole
in January 1995 proposes that no US troops be committed unless the
President satisfies the following:
(1). It is in the national security interest of the United
States.
(2). The unit commanders will at all times retain the ability to
report independently to the United States.
(3). The forces can be withdrawn at anytime and the United States
can take any actions it feels necessary to protect those
troops.
(4). The troops remain under US control at all times for purposed
of discipline and evaluation.6
Documents confirming these requirements must be presented to the
appropriate committee exercising jurisdiction 15 days before dispatch of
troops or in an emergency within 48 hours after dispatch. Bill HR 7 the
"National Security Revitalization Act" proposed in the House of
Representatives 22 February 1995 contains similar provisions. These
certainly would ensure that any peacekeeping mission involving US troops
would be considered biased towards Washington. The peacekeeping mission
would have a difficult time proving it was impartial and that would
place the mission at risk.
Doctrinal Training
The next issue is Doctrinal training for troops that are going to
peacekeeping missions. The training of the average US soldier for war
fighting is very good. However, some members of the UN feel that US
forces sometimes become too aggressive in peacekeeping situations.
General Sir David Ramsbotham feels that:
... the US is an essential ingredient both of the UN military
structure, and the entire structure of the UN itself. The
doctrine of minimum force, as we understand it, is not part of the
US military ethos, nor is the Wahlgren concept of the Firm, Fair
and Friendly UN soldier7
Most nations with large peacekeeping forces offer special training
to those troops involved in peacekeeping duties. Canada has recently
created the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping
Training Center in Nova Scotia, whose sole mission is to develop
training and encourage discussion on how best to carry out UN missions.
The US Army last summer ran a course where, instead of training for war,
a number of troops trained for peacekeeping. However, at the moment in
the US, peacekeeping training is the exception. If the US policy is as
stated by Mr. Tony Lake, then there is little incentive to do extensive
peacekeeping training.
Perceptions about the United States Soldier
Finally, the most difficult problem, how is the US soldier
perceived by those he assists? The US soldier is viewed as an extension
of Washington's foreign policy no matter where in the world he is.
Consequently, as a representative of the major super power, the US
soldier makes a very attractive target. He is a target that the sides
in a dispute will attempt to influence, preferably in favour of their
position. It places all US soldiers in a much more precarious position
then the soldiers of smaller countries. Smaller countries, such as
Canada, will not significantly help one side to win. Canada does not
have the massive combat power or the desire to interfere on only one
side of a dispute. Therefore, for a warring faction, it is not cost
effective to expend a lot of time and energy trying to influence a
Canadian soldier. However, the United States can bring tremendous
economic and combat power to bear and would make a very valuable ally,
therefore a warring faction will try and influence their soldiers.
In addition, the United States public likes to chose a good and
bad side in a conflict. This phenomenon is evident in the Bosnia
crisis. Most of the senior military commanders who have been involved
acknowledge that all sides are equally guilty, yet, the US press insist
that the Muslims are always the victims. The combination makes the
attempt to influence the US soldiers well worth while. Since the US
soldier will always experience strong attempts to influence him, then
his peacekeeping training must be superb to handle the pressure; it
would therefore be expensive. Canada's experience with the value of
peacekeeping training is expressed in the 1994 White Paper on Defence:
Recent experiences in UN operations have confirmed the value of
cultural sensitivity, international humanitarian law, and dispute
resolution training prior to deployment.8
Why should the US tie up the resources required for peacekeeping
if their overall aim is warfighting? If the above factors are combined
with the perceived inefficiency of the UN, a strong argument is created
for the American people not to participate in peacekeeping.
The UN needs improvement in how it organizes and arranges
peacekeeping missions. General Sir David Ramsbotham proposed a list of
ten fundamental changes that should occur in peacekeeping operations.
These areas for improvement are:
(1). Intelligence analysis and dissemination, including
communication,
(2). Contingency planning,
(3). Provision and selection of staff, including force
commanders,
(4). Mandate preparation and validation,
(5). Technical reconnaissance,
(6). 24 hour support of operations,
(7). Doctrine and training,
(8). Preparation and dissemination of lessons learned,
(9). Manpower identification and provision, and
(10). Logistics and procurement9
Of these recommendations, one, three and six directly pertain to command
and control issues. The remainder are meant to increase the
effectiveness and professionalism of peacekeeping missions.
Each mission is currently formed of volunteer nations who may or
may not have had previous experience. In some cases, the volunteers do
not even have the basic weapons to do peacekeeping with. The 'cobble
together approach" to making up a peacekeeping mission has lead to
accusations of waste, favoritism and abuse. The American public has no
inclination to fund operations that appear to be so mismanaged. House
Bill HR 7 reflects this attitude: Section 510 includes specific "Buy
American Requirements," while Sections 505 to 507 contain complex
formulas limiting the funding of the UN.10 The general thrust of all of
these provisions is the reduction in funding to the UN. If General Sir
David Ramsbotham's changes can be made, then there is considerable hope
that the UN will be able to revitalize itself.
In fact at a briefing by Lieutenant Colonel Rich Roan (USMC
Military Advisor) at the US mission to the United Nations 11 April 1995,
a number of changes to the Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) were
discussed. The most interesting changes were: the increase of
personnel from 100 to 321 military officers (a number loaned a no cost
to the UN), the activation of a 24 hour situation center and the
movement of control of field administration and field logistics to the
DPKO. Unfortunately, the remaining changes will take time to implement,
and, after Somalia, the United States public has little patience left.
How do all these factors affect the United States as a peacekeeping
contributor?
In the current era of tight budgets, the costs and benefits that
can be measured will have the edge. Unfortunately, the disadvantages
are much easier to measure than the advantages. Therefore the United
States participation in UN peacekeeping will decrease as the pressure on
budgets rises. As the US participation decreases, the US will become
much more selective in the operations in which it will participate.
This is fully reflected by President Clinton in his Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) on "Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations"
issued on 5 May 1994. This PDD has six major tenets for future US
participation in UN Peacekeeping missions:
(1). The US will have to make choices about the peace operations
to support. It affirms that although peacekeeping can be
useful in some circumstances, it must be selective and very
effective.
(2). Secondly, the cost to the US must reduce from the current
31.7% to 25% by 1996.
(3). Thirdly, in command and control, US forces can still be
placed under a foreign commander on direction of the
President, but the greater the US role, the less likely it
will be.
(4). Fourth, eleven steps to reform UN planning, logistics,
information, and command and control capabilities have been
recommended.
(5). Fifth, the Defence Department will fund UN missions
involving combat roles, to enable military expertise to bear
on these missions. The State Department will fund all
peacekeeping missions not involving US troops and combat.
(6). Seven proposals were set out to improve consultation and
information's flow between Congress and the Executive branch
on UN matters.11
The President has made it clear that he intends to reduce the
United States role in peacekeeping. The reduction in budgets and the
use of the word "selective" and "can be useful" when talking of
peacekeeping are clear indications of the future. The desire of
Congress to withdraw from peacekeeping as a mission for their forces is
obvious from Bills H.R 7 and S.5. The placing of combat missions under
the Defence Department (primary mission war fighting) is a clear
indication that traditional peacekeeping, for American troops, will
receive very low priority. If defence budget cutbacks continue, then
peacekeeping training will probably be high on the list to disappear.
Without the necessary peacekeeping training, the troops sent on
peacekeeping missions, although very good war fighters, will be a at
grave disadvantage as peacekeepers. Accordingly, US troops due to
doctrinal training, senior administration direction, the public's
disdain for peacekeeping missions, and external perception on their
bias, will not be ideal troops to be in a peacekeeping mission.
CONCLUSION: IT MUST HAVE BEEN A DREAM
The cold war had ended. It was a time of hope and change and of
rising expectations for - and of - the United Nations.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali1
In the future, if ever the UN put me in a position where people
were using my peacekeeping force as a shooting target, I would be very
happy to see a powerful US force come to my rescue. Borrowing an
analogy from Western films, it would be the equivalent of "here comes
the cavalry" (with apologies to my Marine colleges). It is a role that
the US forces train to do and do well. However, if the aim of the
mission was peacekeeping, I would have to look long and hard to see if
US forces are the ones for the assignment. It is not that a US force
could not train and do the mission, they could. However, for a number
of reasons, they opt not to. What are these reasons?
Chapter Two outlined how the senior United States policy makers
are very pragmatic in their approach to events, short on the study of
history, and legalistic in their approach to a problem. In addition, US
policy continues to swing from one based on idealism to one based upon
national interest. President Clinton initially favoured the idealistic
approach, while lately the policy has shifted to one based heavily on
national interests. Chapter Three showed that the five major principles
for peacekeeping, if followed, lead to a mission with a higher chance of
success. It also noted how the loss of impartiality severely hampers a
peacekeeper's effectiveness. Chapter Four stressed that in most cases
the doctrinal training for the US forces does not emphasize
peacekeeping. I do not see this changing because the public and the
political/military leadership do not desire it to change. Conflict
resolution between warring parties for the United States public can be
simplistically represented in the well known nursery rhyme Tweedle-dum
and Tweedle-dee:
Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee
Resolved to have a battle,
For Tweedle-dum said Tweedle-dee
Had spoiled his nice new rattle.
Just then flew by a monstrous crow,
As big as a tar barrel,
Which frightened both the heroes so,
They quite forgot their quarrel.2
Throughout all the chapters in the paper it is evident due to the combat
power and influence that the United States represents, fighting factions
will obviously go to almost any lengths to influence it. Bosnia is an
excellent example. Combine these factors with the prestige of being the
sole super power and therefore not allowed to "fail" at a mission and it
is a potent combination.
The United States has been providing logistic support successfully
for many years to UN peacekeeping missions. After 1990, everyone
thought the world and how it worked had changed. The US strongly
supported more aggressive UN missions and terms such as peace
enforcement and peacemaking entered the equation. Unfortunately,
although the Cold War no longer existed, many of the underlying problems
had not. It took four major missions before the US and the UN realized
that the lessons learned from the previous forty years should not have
been so easily discarded. One of these lessons is that super powers
should not get involved in peacekeeping missions.
Smaller countries, with less well equipped but highly trained
forces, can take on these missions. Some of these forces will require
extensive logistics and infrastructure support, probably from the United
States. The international city will applaud their efforts whether
a success or failure. The United States is not so fortunate: when it
enters the battle, the world community and the US public expect results,
and this means quick victory. Somalia is an excellent example of what
happens when politically, the public demands instant results to a
situation that has no easy answer.
Therefore, any US peacekeeper arrives at a mission with the
following baggage. He has been highly trained as a war fighter with an
outside chance of having had some peacekeeping training. He will be
subject to extreme pressure by the combatants to take their side of the
battle and bring the tremendous combat power of the US to bear. His
senior political leadership will be demanding quick concrete "results",
often from a situation and series of events that have lasted for
hundreds of years and have no instant solution. The combination does
not make for a good peacekeeper, despite the tremendous resources the US
can bring to bear. But should the US be in the peacekeeping business at
all?
The United Nations has many countries who can supply well trained
troops that do not have to worry about a number of these considerations.
If remaining impartial is almost impossible for US peacekeepers, then
they should not send combat troops on peacekeeping missions.
The intent of this paper was not to prove that the United States
should withdraw from peacekeeping. Rather, to show that the type of
participation should be closer to what Washington did prior to 1990.
Support for improvement in the United Nations' infrastructure,
assistance in setting up a truly effective UN structure for
peacekeeping, logistics support for smaller countries, and in extremis
combat support. All of these are missions the United States could do a
credible job on. For as Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the
UN said:
All this confirms that we are still in a time of transition. The
end of the cold war was a major movement of tectonic plates and
the after-shocks continue to be felt. But even if the ground
beneath our feet has not yet settled, we still live in a new age
that holds great promise for both peace and development.3
Appendix A:CHAPTER VI OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
CHAPTER VI
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the
parties to settle their dispute by such means.
Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order
to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 35
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any
situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of
the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the
attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute
to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the
dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present
Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought
to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of
Articles 11 and 12.
Article 36
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature
referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures
for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the
parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council
should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a
general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of
Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
Article 37
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article
33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall
refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is
in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to
recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.
Article 38
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security
Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make
recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of
the dispute.
Appendix B: CHAPTER VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
CHAPTER VII
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS
TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE
PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 4 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Article 40 In order to prevent an aggravation of the
situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations
or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the
parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems
necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without
prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned.
The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with
such provisional measures.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it
may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or
land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make
available to the Security Council, on its and in accordance with a
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and
facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature
of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible
on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded
between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council
and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the
signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes.
Article 44
When Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling
upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in
fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that
Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the
Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that
Member's armed forces.
Article 45
In order to enable the Nations to take urgent military measures,
Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents
for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree
of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action
shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special
agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security
Council with the assistance of the Military Committee.
Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security
Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and
assist the Security Council on questions relating to the Security
Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international
peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its
disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the
permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any
Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the
Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it
when the efficient discharge of the committee's responsibilities
requires the participation of that Member its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee be responsible under the Security
Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces paced at the
disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of
such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the security
Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may
establish subcommittees.
Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be
taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as
the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United
Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate
international agencies of which they are members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual
assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security
Council.
Article 50
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the
Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United
Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic
problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the
right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those
problems.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Click here to view image
ENDNOTES:
Introduction
1. General Sir David Ramsbotham, "How can the Military best help the
United Nations?" (Tavistock (Devon, England): Army Quarterly and
Defense Journal, July 1994), 293.
2. Larry O.L. Fabian, Soldier Without Enemies, (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1971), 94.
Chapter One
1. Thomas M. Frank, Nation Against Nation, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 15.
2. Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peacekeeping, (Washington, D. C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1967), 30.
3. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy Expanded Edition, (New
York: WW Norton & Company, 1974), 30.
4. Kissinger, 31.
5. Kissinger, 34.
Chapter Two
1. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy Expanded Edition, (New
York: WW Norton & Company, 1974), 74.
2. Linda B. Miller, "The Clinton Years: Reinventing US Foreign
Policy?" International Affairs, October 1994, Vol 70.
3. Casper W. Winberger, The Uses of Military Power, Text of Remarks
by Secretary of Defense to the National Press Club, 28 November 1984;
reprint in Theory and Nature of War Readings AY 1994-95, vol III,
(Quantico, VA, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College,
1994), 029-036.
4. Linda B. Miller, 626.
5. James H. Baker, "Policy Challenges of Un Peace Operations," US Army
War College Parameters, Spring 1994, 26.
6. Mark T. Clark, "The Future of Clinton's Foreign and Defense Policy:
Multilateral Security," Comparative Strategy an International Journal,
June 1994.
7. The White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement," (Washington D.C., US Government Printing Office, July
1994), 13.
8. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Republicans Seek to Curb UN Funding,"
Washington Post, 23 January 1994.
Chapter Three
1. John F. Hillen III, "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a
Half," Parameters, Spring 94.
2. Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peacekeeping, (Washington, D. C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1967), 131.
3. Charles Dobbie, A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping, (Tollbugt,
Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1994), 17.
4. Larry O.L. Fabian, Soldier Without Enemies, (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1971), 26.
5. Larry O.L. Fabian, 28.
6. George J. Church, "Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster," Time (on line),
15 October 1993, Downloaded from American OnLine. Vienna, VA.
7. George J. Church, "Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster."
8. George J. Church, "Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster."
9. Colonel F.M. Lorencz, "Confronting Thievery in Somalia," Military
Review, August 1994.
10. J.F.O McAllister, When to Stay, When to Go," Time (on line), 10
October 1993, Downloaded from American OnLine. Vienna, VA.
11. Charles Dobbie, A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping, 10.
12. George J. Church, "Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster."
13. Karl Farris, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, a Success,"
Parameters, Spring 1994, 42.
14. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations" Cambodia
section, subsection Background, December 1994, Downloaded from INTERNET
via server at hhtp://ralph.gmu.edu.lepalpeac/toc.html.
15. Karl Farris, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, a Success."
16. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations", Rwanda
section, subsection UNAMIR recommended.
17. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations," Rwanda
section, subsection UNAMIR recommended.
18. "Consolidated Rwanda Report # 17", 27 October 1994, Downloaded from
INTERNET 14 Mar 1994 via HTML Daniel Zalik@brown.edu
19. "Consolidated Rwanda Report # 17", 27 October 1994.
20. "Consolidated Rwanda Report # 17", 27 October 1994.
21. Sabrina Petra Ramet, "The Bosnian War and the Diplomacy of
Accommodation," Current History (Philadelphia), November 1994.
22. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations,
December 1994.
23. White House, PRESS RELEASE, STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON , 9
February 1994, Downloaded from the INTERNET 14 March 1995 from
Admin@whitehouse.gov
24. Maj General Lewis McKenzie, Peacekeeper, (Toronto, Ont: Douglas &
McIntyre, 1993), 256.
25. John Pomfret, "Year in Bosnia Changes British General's Views."
Washington Post, 23 January 1995.
26. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations," Bosnia
chapter.
27. David Walker, "Battles of the Balkans." Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies (Whitehall, London Eng), June 1993, 63.
Chapter Four
1. The White House, Press Briefing by National Security Council Advisor
Tony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and Policy General Wesley
Clark, 5 May 1994, Downloaded from INTERNET 14 Mar 94 originally from
Admin@whitehouse.gov.
2. Department of Defense, Frank G Wisner, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, "U.S. Peacekeeping Operations: Why, When, How, How Long,"
speech before the Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces Subcommittee
Senate Armed Services Committee, July 14, 1993.
3. The White House, White House Press Release Office of the Press
Secretary, 29 July 1994, Downloaded via INTERNET 14 March 1995,
originally from Admin@whitehouse.gov.
4. James H. Baker, "Policy challenges of UN Peace Operations,"
Parameters, Spring 1994.
5. John G. Roos, "The Perils of Peacekeeping," Armed Forces Journal,
December 1993, 17.
6. U.S. Congress, Senate, "Peace Powers Act of 1995," 104th Cong.,
1st sess., 1995.
7. General Sir David Ramsbotham, "How can the Military best help the
United Nations?" Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (Tavistock, Devon
England), July 1994, 293.
8. Canada, National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper, (Ottawa: Queens
Printers, December 1994), 34.
9. General Sir David Ramsbotham, "How can the Military best help the
United Nations?"
10. U.S. Congress, Senate, "National Security Revitalization Act,"
104th Cong., 1st sess.,1995
11. Department of Defense(Public Affairs), Executive Summary: The
Clinton Administrations Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace
Operations, 5 May 1994, Downloaded from INTERNET 14 March 1995
originally from navpalib@opnav-emh.mnavy.mil.
Conclusion
1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace 1995, (New York: United
Nations, 1995), 1.
2. Peter Stevenson, Best Loved Nursery Rhymes, (London: Ward Lock
Limited, undated), 12.
3. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace 1995, 6.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace 1995. New York:
United Nations. 1995. This edition includes a very useful
preamble which modifies the original Agenda for Peace based
on the experience of the last few years.
Cox, Arthur M. Prospects for Peacekeeping. Washington D.C.:
The Brookings Institution. 1967. Emphasizes the lessons of
experience with the Blue Berets. It also points out that
peacekeeping is the mission for the UN, not peacemaking.
Fabian, Larry O.L. Soldier Without Enemies. Washington D.C.: The
Brookings Institution. 1971. The author is primarily
concerned with the UN Military Committee and the Standing UN
Army, however he offers a good review of the initial setup
of the UN.
Frank, Thomas M. Nation Against Nation. New York: Oxford
University Press. 1985. The book gives a quick background
on the development of the UN charter. It refers to the two
power Blocs (Russia and United States) and the weaknesses of
the UN. Although a good history of the development of the
UN, the author does not offer much insight into the problems
that arose post 1990.
Haas, Ernst B. Tangle of Hopes. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall Inc. 1969. The book was not particularly useful for
this paper. The author proposes 3 theories of leadership
for the U.S. : Pragmatic-Bureaucratic, Ideological, and
Revolutionary. In the end the author feels that the U.S.
normally follows the pragmatic decision making process.
Kissinger, Henry A. American Foreign Policy Expanded Edition. New
York: NW Norton & Company. 1974. The author outline the
way the US Government makes leadership decisions. The
concepts he uses is an excellent framework for understanding
the foreign policy decision making of the United States.
McKenzie, Major General Lewis. Peacekeeper. Toronto Ont.:
Douglas & McIntyre. 1993. Major General McKenzie outlines
the establishment of the initial UN group in Sarajevo and
the frustrations experienced by the peacekeepers with both
sides in the conflict. The remainder of the book covers
Major General McKenzie's extensive career in UN missions.
Roberts, Adam and Kingsbury, Benedict. United Nations, Divided
World. Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press,
1994. The authors have compiled an excellent group of
essays on the development of the United Nations. It is well
worth reading for a good understanding of the organization.
Stevens, Peter. Best Loved Nursery Rhymes. London: Ward Lock
Limited. Undated.
Wainhouse, David W. International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads.
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 1973. The
author provides a good listing of UN operations up until the
early 1970's, however, the book was not useful in this
paper.
ARTICLES
Abizaiad, Colonel John P. and Wood, Colonel John R. "Preparing for
Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping
Environment." The United States Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School. April 1994. The author
deals with the unique training that US forces should take in
order to become peacekeepers. He emphasizes that at the
moment there is a doctrinal void.
Baker, James H. "Policy challenges of UN Peace Operations."
Parameters. Spring 1994. A good article on the UN and how
the United States has dealt with the it's relationship on
peacekeeping. The author also points out ideas of
Unilateralism and Multilateralism.
Church, George J. "Anatomy of a Disaster." Time. 15 October
1993. Down loaded from America Online, Vienna, V.A. The
author addresses the problems involving the ill fated Ranger
mission as well as providing some of the background leading
up to the event.
Clark, Mark T. "The Future of Clinton's Foreign and Defence
Policy: Multilateral Security." Comparative Strategy and
International Journal. His basic premise is the US will use
Multilateral Security efforts because it can not afford to
conduct them unilaterally.
Curry, David. M. Ethics of Political and Military Involvement
in Peace Operations. Washington D.C.: Strayer College. 1
June 1994. The document talks about the ethics of the
application of force and the Weinberger Document as the
basis for the future use of force by the U.S.
Diamond, Larry. "The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic
World Order." Current History. January 1994. The article
emphasizes the fact that the U.S. is at a decision point as
to whether it will go; Isolationist or maintain a democratic
globalism.
Farris, Karl. "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, a
Success." Parameters. Spring 1994. The author provides an
excellent background on Cambodia and the UN mission.
Goldman, Jan. "A Changing World A Changing UN." Military Review.
September 1994. Emphasizes the changing nature of the UN.
Harries, Colonel David. "Challenges in Military Futures."
Canadian Defence Quarterly. December 1993. The author
covers the post Cold War reality and how shrinking defence
budgets will effect the number and types of missions the UN
can take on.
Hillen III, John F. "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a
Half." Parameters. Spring 1994. A good summary of the
five principles of Peacekeeping developed over the Cold War
years.
Kearns, Darien L.. "The Need For Criteria in UN Peace Operations".
Military Review. July 1994. A good summary on the first 40
years of the UN. The author introduces the concept of a
special criteria when using the United States troops on a UN
mission.
Lorencz, F.M., "Confronting Thievery in Somalia." Military
Reviw. August 1994. The article addresses the problems in
trying to reestablish law and a court system in a foreign
society.
Martin, Laurence. "Peacekeeping as a Growth Industry from the
National Interest." The National Interest. Summer 1993.
The author emphasizes that peacekeeping should be done under
the "Just War" theory. He feels that each nations self
interest should control the amount of their contribution.
McAllister, J.F.O. "When to Stay, When to Go." Time. 3 October
1993.. Down loaded from America Online, Vienna, V.A. The
article addresses the pullout of troops from Somalia.
Miller, Linda B. "The Clinton Years: Reinventing Foreign Policy?"
International Affairs Vol 70. October 1994. The article
looks critically at what the US should do in future UN
missions and remarks on the zigzag of U.S. foreign policy.
Morillon, Lieutenant General Philippe. "UN Operations in Bosnia:
Lesson and Realities." Royal United Services Institute FO
Defence Studies. December 1993. The author provides a good
background on the operations that led to the set up of
UNPROFOR in Bosnia.
Morrison, Alex. and Plain, Suzanne M. "The New Peacekeeping
Partnership." The Strathrobyn Papers. Toronto Ont.: The
Canadian Forces Staff College. August 1994. The paper
points out the changes in the post-Cold War international
situation. The authors place emphasis on the new
humanitarian peacekeeping and the problems that it creates.
The article also discuses the need to be selective with
where the UN deploys its very limited resources.
Plaut, Martin. "Rwanda - Looking beyond the Slaughter." Institute
of International Affairs. September 1994. This piece is an
excellent summary of what occurred in Rwanda as well as a
background history of what lead up to the conflict. The
history starts with the Germans making the country into a
colony.
Pomfret, John. "Year in Bosnia Changes British General's Views."
Washington Post. 23 January 1995. The article discusses
how Lt General Michael Rose's views on how to handle
violations in Bosnia changed from when he first arrived.
The article emphasizes that Lt General Rose feels that the
UN must remain neutral.
Ramet, Sabrina Petra. "The Bosnian War and the Diplomacy of
Accommodation." Current History. November 1994. The author
provides background to the Bosnia war from 1991 to 1994.
Ramsbotham, General Sir David. "How can the Military best help
the United Nations?" Army Quarterly and Defence Journal.
July 1994. A good summary on 10 steps necessary to improve
a UN operation. Ramsbotham points out that the U.S. forces
do not understand the doctrine on the use of minimum force.
Ramsbotham, General Sir David. "UN Operations: The Art of
the Possible." Royal United Services Institute for Defence
Studies. December 1993. The article deals with the
necessary improvements needed for UN missions but feels that
the criticisms of the UN are often ill-informed. General
Ramsbotham feels that UN membership implies an obligation to
supply forces to look after peace and security.
Reiff, David. "The Illusion of Peacekeeping." The World Policy
Journal. Fall 1994. Reiff's major point is that after
intervention, the great powers want the UN to move in and
take over the mission somewhat similar to what the old
Colonial Authorities used to do.
Roos, John G. "The Perils of Peacekeeping." Armed Forces
Journal. December 1993. The article points out the cost to
the U.S. of running a peacekeeping mission and the danger
encountered when a mission (such as Somalia) does not have a
precisely defined goal.
Smith, Jeffrey R. "Republicans Seek to Curb UN Funding."
Washington Post. 23 January 1995. The author mentions how
the Republicans are emphasizing the National Interest with
future participation with UN activities. The article points
out that the new measures would reduce the UN's budget by
one third.
Walker, David. "Battles of the Balkans." Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies. June 1993. The article
contains a very good history of the Balkans from the early
Ottoman empire up until the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Weinberger, Casper. "Text of Remarks by Secretary of Defense
Caspar W. Winberger to the National Press Club." 28
November 1984. Theory and Nature of War Readings Vol III.
Quantico V.A.: United States Marine Corps Command and Staff
College.
OTHER
Background Note: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. December
1994. Down loaded from INTERNET 15 March 1995 via server @
http://ralph.gmu.edu. lefpalpeace/toc.html. The background
note provides excellent information on each of the UN
operations. The viewpoint is from the Secretary General of
the United Nations.
Consolidated Rwanda Report # 17. 27 October 1994. Down loaded
from INTERNET 14 March 1995 via html Daniel Zalek@brown.edu.
Department of Defence(Public Affairs). Executive Summary: The
Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral
Peace Operations. 5 May 1994. Down loaded from INTERNET 14
March 1995 originally from navpali@opnav-emh.mnavy.mil.
Wisner, Frank G. Under Secretary of Defence for Policy. "U.S.
Peacekeeping Operations: Why, When, How, How Long." Speech
before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 14 July 1993.
The speech emphasized that the US did not want the status as
the World's Policeman yet liked the legitimacy that a
mission had when it was endorsed by the UN.
The White House. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement. Washington D.C. US Government Printing Office.
July 1994.
The White House. Press Release, Statement by President Clinton. 9
February 1994. Down loaded from the INTERNET 14 March 1995
via Admin@whitehouse.gov.
The White House. Press Briefing by National Security Council
Advisor Tony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and
Policy General Wesley Clark. 5 May 1994. Down loaded from
INTERNET 14 March 1995 originally from Admin@whitehouse.gov.
The White House. White House Press Release Office of the Press
Secretary. 29 July 1994. Down loaded from INTERNET 14
March 1995 originally from Admin@whitehouse.gov.
U.S. Congress, Senate. Peace Powers Act of 1995. 104th Cong. 1st
sess. 1995.
U.S. Congress, Senate. National Security Revitalization Act.
104th Cong. 1st sess. 1995.
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