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The United States And Peacekeeping: Can It Work

The United States And Peacekeeping: Can It Work?

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

The focus of this paper is that United States soldiers make poor

 

peacekeepers. A brief history of the development of the United Nations

 

with respect to the United States is discussed. A review of four major

 

post cold war missions (Somalia, Cambodia, Rwanda and Bosnia) is

 

conducted. The conclusions indicate that Cambodia was a success,

 

Somalia and Rwanda a failure and Bosnia a draw (at the moment). In the

 

cases that failed, one of the major reasons was that both the UN and the

 

US forgot the peacekeeping lessons learned during the cold war period.

 

One of those lessons was the issue of consent. The other lesson was

 

impartiality. The paper then discusses these issues and why it is

 

extremely difficult for troops from the United States to abide by these

 

rules.

 

There are four major reasons why United States troops make poor

 

peacekeepers. They are: political decision making, super power status,

 

training , and expectations. Political decision makers in the United

 

States are pragmatic, results orientated individuals who are weak in the

 

historical aspects of problems. Consequently, they tend to make

 

decisions looking for concrete results in a short time period. The

 

United States super power status dictates that peacekeeping deployments

 

it is involved with must succeed. They must succeed because of the

 

tremendous combat power available. Unfortunately, the availability of

 

combat power encourages people to try to solve a problem by using it.

 

Doctrinal training for soldiers emphasizes the aggressive, warrior image

 

that is not normally compatible with peacekeeping. Finally, the United

 

States soldier is always regarded as primarily under control of

 

Washington, even when supposedly under the United Nations.

 

All of these reasons make it extremely difficult for United States

 

troops to make good peacekeepers.

 

CONTENTS

 

Executive Summary II

 

Table of Contents III

 

 

 

Chapter Page

 

Introduction: What is Possible, What is Realistic 1

 

1. A Historical Prologue 5

 

2. Post Cold War Optimism 11

 

3. Traditional Peacekeeping Evolves after 1990 18

 

4. The United States View of Peacekeeping Post 1993 44

 

Conclusion: It Must Have Been a Dream 55

 

 

 

Appendixes

 

A. Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter 58

 

B. Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter 60

 

C. Summary of United Nation Missions 65

 

Bibliography 71

 

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS REALISTIC

 

 

 

... the US is an essential ingredient both of the UN

military structure, and the entire structure of the UN

itself. The doctrine of minimum force, as we understand

it, is not part of the US military ethos, nor is the

Wahlgren concept of the Firm, Fair and Friendly UN soldier1

 

General Sir David Ramsbotham

United Kingdom

 

 

We are big enough to discharge with effect the

responsibilities that we undertake, we are not big enough

for others to fear us.2

 

Lester B. Pearson

former Prime Minister of Canada

 

 

The contradictions inherent in these two quotations are the basis

 

of many arguments on the use of United States (US) troops on United

 

Nation's (UN) Missions. Are the United States highly trained armed

 

forces too aggressive to use in peacekeeping operations? Due to the

 

United States position as the sole global superpower, can any of its

 

participation in peacekeeping operations be impartial? The latter

 

point is very important, for hard won experience with UN operations

 

indicate that impartiality is essential for success. In this paper I

 

shall look at whether US forces in UN peacekeeping missions are

 

effective peacekeepers or counterproductive to such a mission's goals.

 

Why would US troops be counterproductive? I have deliberately limited

 

this study to missions that have taken place after the end of the Cold

 

War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. I have not included

 

operations prior to 1990 as these missions were conducted under the

 

constraints of the Cold War.

 

After 1990, many nations felt that the lessons learned by the UN

 

during the Cold War no longer applied. This paper will look at whether

 

that assessment was too hasty. Specifically, I shall study the UN

 

missions that took place in Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda. I

 

have not included Haiti in this study as the mission has just started

 

and the lessons to be learned have not yet been written.

 

There are three terms that I will use throughout this paper, they

 

are peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement. The definitions

 

are:

 

(1). Peacekeeping, involves two or more belligerents who wish to

 

keep the peace but need an impartial party to provide

 

outside assistance. Although not specifically mentioned,

 

Peacekeeping is considered to be a Chapter VI operation

 

under the United Nations Charter.

 

(2). Peacemaking, involves any military operation short of full

 

combat to rectify a crisis situation and the consent of

 

those involved is not necessary. Peacemaking is a Chapter

 

VI operation under the UN charter.

 

(3). Peace enforcement, involves the use of full combat forces

 

by the United Nations to stop hostilities; consent of the

 

all parties involved is not necessary and it is a Chapter

 

VII operation under the UN charter.

 

 

This paper will consist of four chapters. Chapter one briefly

 

reviews the pre-1989 view that the United States had about its role

 

concerning the UN and foreign policy in general. It will also examine

 

the role idealism had in influencing US policy and how this often

 

conflicted with the policy of self interest. Chapter Two examines the

 

post-Cold War ideas that the US had about the United Nations and how

 

those ideas evolved. Specifically, this chapter will cover the

 

influence of the Weinberger Doctrine, the "CNN"3 effect, and the ongoing

 

debate between idealism and national interest. Chapter Three reviews

 

the "traditional" peacekeeping role of the UN and the four major UN

 

operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda. It contains a

 

brief history of the UN's traditional peacekeeping role (with consent)

 

and background on the four conflicts and the part the UN played in

 

each. This Chapter will also examine whether the presence or absence

 

of significant US troop levels played an important part in the success

 

of each mission. Chapter Four will address the post Cold War views on

 

the role of the UN and the implementation of peace enforcement and

 

peacekeeping roles; it will study the US military as peacekeepers, and

 

 

____________________________

3 The use of the generic term "CNN" effect will refer to the instant

communication of pictures 24 hours a day, via television, by all major

networks. CNN was the first major television station to initiate this

process.

 

the effect of the US political process and public on this particular

 

role. Finally, the conclusion will look at the benefit and dangers of

 

US troop involvement in UN operations.

 

I intend to show, in the Post Cold War period, many of the well

 

thought out concepts of who can be involved and what a peacekeeping

 

mission can accomplish are forgotten. It is only after several

 

disasters that the United States and the UN recognized that the action

 

of humans had not changed significantly. Therefore, many of the

 

previous "rules for peacekeepers", with minor modifications still

 

applied. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the

 

effect of the North American "Channel Surfing Culture" the

 

Administration of the US. That subject would be worth a paper alone.

 

Due to the current nature of each of these operations, many of

 

the sources used in this paper are from newspaper and journal articles.

 

Commentary from original sources is limited, as many of the individuals

 

involved are still active members of their respective militaries and

 

their post deployment reports have not yet been declassified.

 

CHAPTER ONE: A HISTORICAL PROLOGUE

 

 

The UN and the US have had a love-hate relationship over the last

 

forty years. Within this time period, the method the United States

 

uses when dealing with the United Nations has swung from the idealistic

 

to the pragmatic and on a few occasions, hostile.

 

During its idealistic phase (roughly the first 5 years), the US

 

contributed tremendously to the basic setup of the UN. The United

 

States was one of the founding members of the United Nations. The US

 

directly influenced the construction of the UN charter. As Thomas M.

 

Frank states in his book, Nation Against Nation,

 

... the UN Charter was a sort of extension of the US

constitution...being built in a large part to American

national specifications... the Charter, like the US.

Constitution, would become the fundamental law of society,

determining and umpiring basic power relationships.1

 

 

These "fundamental laws" would be enforced by collective security

 

armies (supplied by the permanent members of the Security

 

Council). Precisely how and when these armies were to be created

 

was never agreed upon, and the use of collective security armies

 

never happened. The optimistic attitude towards the UN

 

disappeared as the Cold War developed during the late 1940's.

 

The United States then adopted a pragmatic approach to the

 

United Nations. The value of the organization was viewed almost

 

in direct proportion to how much use it could be to American

 

foreign policy. During the early part of the Cold War, US

 

policies were successful at the UN and the Soviet Union (using its

 

veto power) constantly blocked the resolutions at the Security

 

Council. The one notable exception was Korea in 1950, where the

 

Soviet delegate left the meeting before exercising his veto. The

 

United States and its allies moved swiftly and passed a resolution

 

authorizing the use of force in Korea.

 

During the 1960s and 1970s, the UN environment changed. The

 

Soviet Union allied with Third World Nations, many whom were newly

 

created states emerging as a result of the end of European

 

colonialism (ironically, the US had a lot to do with the end of

 

European colonialism after WWII). The Soviet Union made the

 

policies and the United States exercised its veto. Thus, the

 

United Nations became an organization in which the two superpowers

 

competed for influence according to their own national interests.

 

For example, during the Arab/Israeli wars of the 1970s, the Soviet

 

Union would support resolutions condemning Israel's aggression.

 

Israel's ally, the United States, would veto the resolution at the

 

Security Council. Therefore, the United States would look like

 

the supporter of aggression.

 

Unable to achieve its policies through the United Nations,

 

the United States entered into a number of bilateral/multilateral

 

arrangements (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

 

(NATO) in the late 1940s) to fulfill its interests. The aim of

 

these bilateral and regional arrangements was to contain the

 

spreading influence of the Soviet Union. These arrangements were

 

to lead the United States into the Vietnam war and the subsequent

 

bitter experience. It was during the 1960s that the idea of an

 

"impartial" peacekeeper arose.

 

Peacekeepers, to be impartial, came from nations considered

 

to be impartial by the those who were involved in the conflict

 

being mediated. A group of middle powers (Canada, Norway, and

 

some non-Western states) arose who were willing to contribute to

 

peacekeeping missions. A peacekeeping mission generally consists

 

of a group of military observers who would establish a presence

 

between two fighting states (see Appendix C). During the 1960s,

 

civil wars were not candidates for peacekeeping. It would be the

 

late 1980's before peacekeeping missions world be sent into civil

 

wars. The mission typically had terms to which each side had

 

agreed. It was the task of the observers to report violations of

 

the agreement and to act as impartial go betweens for either side.

 

In order for peacekeepers to be deployed, it was necessary to have

 

the consent of both fighting parties. Normally, the situation

 

involved two sovereign states, involved in a dispute. In fact,

 

the initial idea of the UN was based around conflicts between

 

states, not groups of people within a state. If in many cases the

 

US could theoretically do it alone, why did it involve the UN at

 

all?

 

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara expressed one of the

 

recurring themes of US foreign policy in 1966 when he addressed

 

the American Society of Newspaper Editors,

 

 

... neither conscience nor sanity itself suggests that the

United States is, should, or could be the global gendarme.

...The United States has no mandate from on high to police

the world and no inclination to do so. There have been

classic cases in which our deliberate non-action was the

wisest action of all.2

 

 

Accordingly, the United States has usually attempted to

 

involve others, with varying degrees of success, in helping to

 

solve the problems that arise in the world. "World's Policeman"

 

reoccurs. If necessary, the US can and will act alone to achieve

 

its own national interest unilaterally. Korea was an example of

 

cooperation with the UN. Vietnam was an example of the US acting

 

alone. But how does the United States determine its foreign

 

policy? Does the US follow some grand design?

 

Former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, a noted

 

historian, best summarizes how the United States makes foreign

 

policy. He believes that, "Issues are dealt with only as the

 

pressure of events imposes the need for resolving them."3

 

Foreign policy remains static for long periods of time and then as

 

the pressure of events builds, it will take a big change all at

 

once. Kissinger feels that this is due to the people who make the

 

policy for the United States and how the bureaucracy works. He

 

describes it as a,

 

Bureaucratic-pragmatic leadership --when a problem arises it

is assigned to one group/person, then it is resolved, long

term thinking is neglected since it has no bureaucratic

consequence - this causes Foreign Policy to be rigid for

long periods of time, then to change all at once as the

solution is attempted.4

 

 

Kissinger contends that the bureaucratic-pragmatic

 

leadership, combined with the fact that the vast majority of

 

America's leaders come from a legal background, lead them to make

 

decisions based upon a Constitutional conception whenever

 

possible. Therefore, he feels most leaders are good at "...high

 

competence in dealing with technical issues, and much less

 

virtuosity in mastering a historical process."5 The United States

 

political system produces an American decision maker who is a

 

legalistic, pragmatic, and results oriented individual somewhat

 

weak on the historical process. Combining that decision maker

 

with a political system which can rapidly change the

 

Administration, profoundly affects how the United States works on

 

any foreign policy issue. A good example of this would be the

 

differences between President Carter and President Reagan.

 

President Carter's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union

 

was generally low key with only a modest emphasis on defence

 

spending. President Reagan came to power and US foreign policy

 

took a massive shift. The United States embarked upon a

 

tremendous military expansion and took a very hard line approach

 

towards the Soviet Union going as far as to call Russia the "evil

 

empire". In a very short period of time, Washington's foreign

 

policy shifted drastically. Sudden shifts in foreign policy are

 

characteristic of how Washington deals with the UN and

 

peacekeeping as well.

 

A quick review of Cold War (1945 to 1989) historical themes,

 

are: an idealistic idea (i.e. charter modeled after US

 

constitution) which conflicts with a pragmatic-bureaucratic style

 

decision making process; a desire not to become the world's

 

policeman; a two superpower deadlock in the UN leading to

 

peacekeeping missions being undertaken by impartial middle powers;

 

and, finally, the concept of consent of the belligerents (normally

 

two sovereign states). But the world changed after the collapse

 

of the USSR and the end of the Cold War and so did the fundamental

 

nature of the type of peacekeeping missions the UN would attempt.

 

CHAPTER TWO: POST COLD WAR OPTIMISM

 

 

 

Painful as it may be to admit, we could benefit from a

counterweight that would discipline our occasional

impetuosity and, by supplying historical perspective, modify

our penchant for abstract and "final" solutions1

 

Henry Kissinger

 

 

All Change is not Progress

 

Holiday Inn Sign. Hibbing Minnesota. October 1991

 

 

 

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 triggered a new

 

world confidence in the international community. The United

 

States had a renewed surge of optimism with victory in the Cold

 

War and its status as the remaining superpower. The success of

 

the Gulf War lead many to think that the United Nations could

 

achieve many things in this new "global" order. However, this

 

view was unrealistic. By 1995, many people had begun to realize

 

that, despite the best intentions, the international community had

 

indeed changed but not necessarily for the better! In many areas,

 

it was actually reverting to patterns of behavior from a more

 

distant past.

 

This chapter will examine five areas: the "New World Order";

 

the United States approach to the UN in the post Cold War; the

 

effect of the "CNN factor"; the resurgence of the belief in the

 

effectiveness of the multinational community (ie UN); and,

 

finally, when reality did not bet expectations, the

 

disillusionment. Although many people claimed a new age had

 

dawned, the historical patterns of how the United States deals

 

with the international community has not changed.

 

It is not the intent of this paper to expound completely on

 

all the various theories that circulated after the collapse of the

 

Soviet Union. For the United States there are three generally

 

accepted ideas of how it should conduct foreign policy during the

 

new conditions of the altered international community.2

 

The first concept is the Lone Super Power Theory that

 

postulates the United States as the hegemon, any other alternative

 

for the world resulting in anarchy. Under the first theory,

 

Washington would be the "World's Policeman." The second theory,

 

by Samuel Huntington, is the "Clash of Civilizations". The "Clash

 

of Civilizations" states that with the collapse of the bi-polar

 

Cold War world, old cultural animosities, and grouping would

 

override the nation states. Many existing nation states will

 

collapse as these various groups of people struggle to assert

 

themselves and their cultural identities. Under the second theory

 

some people believe that the role of the United States should be

 

to provide the bulwark of Western values against all others. The

 

final theory states the United States should act as the balance in

 

world politics. In essence the country would fill the role that

 

Great Britain did in the 19th century at the height of England's

 

imperial days. The interplay between these various theories and

 

the changes in the post Cold War world has lead to a change in the

 

UN's view.

 

Post Cold War policy for the United States is a combination

 

of both pragmatism and idealism. The pragmatic policies were a

 

result of the US experience in the Vietnam War, Beirut, and the

 

Gulf War. Both military and civilian leadership put forth

 

versions of the Weinberger doctrine3. General Colon Powell,

 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commented on what

 

guidelines the United States would employ when using force:

 

"...that force must be used massively, if at all, with clear

 

political objectives and a definitive 'exit strategy'..."4. The

 

United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine K.

 

Albright stated in September 1993, further basic criteria for the

 

involvement of US troops in a UN mission:

 

Is there a real threat to international peace and

security? Does the proposed peacekeeping mission have clear

objectives and can its scope be clearly identified? Is a

cease fire in place and have the parties agreed to a United

Nations presence? Can an end point to the mission be

identified?5

 

 

With the end of the Cold War, the US public, tired of

 

shouldering the burden of defense desired a peace dividend. In

 

addition, the public tolerance for the loss of American lives in

 

foreign conflicts for any reason had decreased dramatically. To

 

allow for these developments, the Clinton administration generated

 

new ideas on foreign policy. The ideas were: the United States

 

would not act unless its own vital interests are at stake or

 

unless Washington obtains multilateral consensus on the issue

 

(attributed unofficially as the Tarnoff Doctrine6 after a US State

 

Department Official).

 

The new policy of the United States theoretically reduces

 

the number of operations that the US unilaterally embarks upon.

 

The US taxpayer pays less because other nations shoulder a share

 

of the burden. The ideal and only truly international institution

 

is the United Nations. An operation sanctioned by the United

 

Nations not only has both other nations support and/or

 

participation, but it is regarded as legitimate as well. Nations

 

who might look upon a unilateral US operation as one in which only

 

Washington's vital interests matter, view a UN operation as being

 

impartial. Again the reoccurring theme of no desire to be the

 

world's policeman combines with the political pragmatic approach

 

help form the foreign policy of the United States. The United

 

Nations for the third time since it's creation has become the main

 

collective-security organization for the United States. However,

 

as on all the previous occasions when the United States placed

 

heavy emphasis upon the UN there were always idealistic elements

 

and this time is no exception.

 

As the following chapters will elaborate, Somalia, Rwanda,

 

and Bosnia all had a very altruistic basis to them. In each of

 

these missions, the prime motivator was humanitarian aid. In the

 

case of Bosnia, from the United States perspective, there was a

 

strong emphasis on the continuing violation of human rights.

 

During the initial post Cold War period, the United States is

 

following a policy of promoting democracy and human rights as

 

outlined in the latest National Security Strategy: "...we must

 

prepare our forces for peace operations to support democracy or

 

conflict resolution."7 The assumption is that those being rescued

 

will emulate institutions that promote both democracy and human

 

rights. But practically, it is often cheaper to prevent conflicts

 

before they become massive wars rather than try to repair the

 

damage afterward. The continuing question that faces US leaders

 

is, "how to effectively help?" As the following chapters will

 

show, the involvement of US troops in a UN peace operation is not

 

necessarily the most effective, nor are the results as

 

anticipated.

 

Finally, US leaders have to combat the effect of the "CNN

 

factor", the spreading influence of the world wide electronic

 

reporting media. The "CNN factor" specifically named after Ted

 

Turner's Atlanta based Cable News Network, CNN is the organization

 

that can show instantly, television pictures of what is happening

 

world wide. Currently, other networks, such as the BBC are

 

undertaking this type of coverage as well. The nature of

 

television means that the coverage is composed of short time

 

frames and generally localized views. Pictures of a war torn

 

country or starving children has a massive influence on the

 

general public.

 

The CNN type of coverage connects with real time reporting

 

as simultaneously political leaders are trying to develop a

 

situation and military subordinates to implement it. The public

 

wants their politicians to do something, and in most cases that

 

means "right now". Unfortunately, the television coverage is

 

short on the history and explanation for what is happening, and

 

fast on instant analysis. Often UN and US leaders must make quick

 

decisions to appear to be at least taking some action. These

 

decisions have involved Washington in operations the country would

 

not normally, and perhaps should never have been involved. It

 

also leads to those areas that do not receive coverage being

 

ignored (as Rwanda was). Major General Dallaire, former UN

 

commander in Rwanda, commented in a lecture at the Marine Corps

 

Command and Staff College that if the war had shown the slaughter

 

of the gorillas instead of people, the world would have paid more

 

attention.

 

By 1995, enthusiasm for the UN as major focus of foreign

 

policy for the United States has all but disappeared. The many

 

complications that resulted from participation in Somalia, the

 

seemingly endless fight in Bosnia, and the bottomless barrel a

 

commitment to Rwanda appears to be, have soured the American

 

public to the UN. The US public's disillusionment with the UN has

 

existed for decades, but recently the feeling has expanded. The

 

new Republican Congress wishes to cut one third of the United

 

Nations budget and further impose restraints on the command of US

 

troops.8 The lessons of Somalia and the responsibility for the

 

loss of the rangers are being laid at the feet of the UN. Yet,

 

somehow forgotten, is the fact that the UN Leader of the Somali

 

mission was American, the mission was commanded by Americans, and

 

the ill-thought out proposal to find Adhid was sponsored by the US

 

Ambassador to the UN. What went wrong? In the following

 

chapters, I shall show how in many cases the lessons of forty

 

years of UN operations were ignored. It was this ignorance of the

 

past which in many cases caused the failures in the Post Cold War

 

period.

 

CHAPTER THREE: TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING EVOLVES AFTER 1990

 

 

 

In order to fully understand UN participation in post

 

Cold War operations, it is necessary to know the history of each

 

operation and the United Nations approach to them. This chapter

 

will consider the notion of "consent" in peacekeeping and the

 

typical development of what are now considered "traditional

 

peacekeeping rules". Four UN missions (Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia,

 

and Rwanda) will be examined: each will be reviewed to include the

 

basis for UN participation. I shall then point out what might be

 

the seed of the future success or failure in each one.

 

UN peacekeeping commenced in 1948 with a peace observer

 

force. In the next thirty years, fifteen more operations

 

occurred. A body of five commonly accepted principles for

 

peacekeeping developed out of these operations:

 

(1). Operations should be UN operations, formed, selected

 

and financed by the UN and reporting to the Secretary

 

General.

 

(2). When the warring factions have reached a political

 

settlement upon which all sides agree, UN troops would

 

deploy.

 

(3). UN forces must be strictly impartial.

 

(4). To maintain a balanced approach, no super power should

 

have an obvious presence.

 

(5). Troops can use only the minimum of force.1

 

These principles combine with the philosophy expressed in

 

1963 by Secretary General U Thant. Speaking at Harvard, he said

 

UN forces "are essentially peace and not fighting forces and they

 

operate only with the consent of the parties directly concerned."2

 

U Thant emphasized that peacekeeping operations must be consensual

 

but acknowledged this would not prevent one side from cheating if

 

they thought the gains would be worth it. What does consent mean?

 

A good definition of consent is "a general public attitude

 

that tolerates a peacekeeping presence and represents a quorun of

 

cooperation."3 Charles Dobbie in his book A Concept for Post-Cold

 

War Peacekeeping, points out that you can have consent at the

 

Operational level of war, while lacking consent at the local

 

level. An example would be the recent hostage taking of Canadian

 

troops in Bosnia. The Canadians, as UN troops, had the consent of

 

the senior Serb and Croatian commanders. A local Serb commander

 

took the Canadians hostage but released them after negotiations

 

with higher commands. The Canadians did not have local consent,

 

but they did have consent from the higher authorities and

 

therefore were allowed to do their job. One of the prime reasons

 

that Peacekeepers gain and keep consent is impartiality.

 

A nation was generally considered impartial if it had an

 

"absence of significant political or economic interests in . .

 

areas of conflict, lack of prejudicial colonial or imperial

 

histories, . . . independent internationalism."4 Present

 

throughout the history of United Nation's missions are these

 

principles of consent and impartiality. Yet for some reason,

 

after 1990 the UN and the US ignored these very basic tenets in

 

some UN commitments. The results were often a disaster, resulting

 

in missions that were a waste of money and lives.

 

In the past, what did the UN expect from a soldier involved

 

in peacekeeping? A summary of expectations is best expressed in

 

the following quotation from Larry O.L. Fabian's book Soldier

 

Without Enemies:

 

they have no deadly foe to destroy or be destroyed by. They

fight very little and use their weapons rarely. They prefer

compromise to conquest. They substitute persuasion and

prevention for punishment, and they apply tact instead of

firepower.5

 

 

Training a fighting force to follow this philosophy, which is

 

directly opposite to the normal methods, is difficult. However,

 

in the following chapters I shall show how the closer a fighting

 

force comes to this ideal, the better it succeeds in peacekeeping.

 

The United States does not train nor want its military to do

 

this as its major role. In fact, Kissinger's analysis is valid:

 

the US makes decisions based upon a pragmatic assessment of the

 

current situation with very little regard to history. The

 

pendulum of enthusiasm for the UN was high after 1990,

 

particularly after the Gulf War. Again, unrealistic expectations

 

were placed upon an organization that in the previous forty years

 

had proved conclusively that it had distinct limits on what the

 

international body could do. None the less commitments were made

 

in Somalia, Cambodia, Rwanda and Bosnia.

 

 

Somalia

 

We can call Somalia a "CNN mission". In 1991-92, factional

 

fighting among rival Somalian war lords had created massive

 

starvation amongst the population. The two main competing war

 

lords were Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed and General Mohame

 

Farah Aidid, leader of the United Somali Congress. The tribal

 

factions had stymied relief agencies in their attempts to get food

 

aid to the people. These agencies were forced to bribe the

 

competing tribal factions to deliver the aid. Unfortunately

 

negative consequences ensued: often the bribes did not work and

 

the agencies were not delivering the food. A small group of UN

 

troops sent in the summer of 1992 (lead by Pakistan) was to act as

 

an observer force for a negotiated cease fire. Unfortunately, the

 

cease fire did not occur and the UN mission was ineffective. The

 

relief agencies estimated that up to 1,000 people a day were

 

dying6 in the continuing fighting. The nightly televised pictures

 

of countless starving people created intense political pressure

 

among Western countries to do something. A decision on where to

 

go next had to be made.

 

The American public expected quick action on the issue from

 

President Bush. He had three options presented to him the day

 

before Thanksgiving in 1992.

 

(1). To expand the peacekeeping operation by adding 3,500

 

troops to the current Pakistani peacekeeping effort.

 

(2). To assist in making it into a peacemaking operation

 

with the US supplying transportation and logistical

 

aid.

 

(3). To send in a US division under the UN flag but US

 

command.

 

He chose option three because it provided a quick method of taking

 

control of the situation and stop the factional fighting.7

 

Unfortunately, the State Department ignored the advice of the US

 

Ambassador in Kenya. He called Somalia a "tar baby,. . .

 

Somalis, as the Italians and British discovered to their

 

discomfiture, are natural-born guerrillas. They will mine the

 

roads. They will lay ambushes. They will launch hit-and-run

 

attacks."8

 

The UN Security Council Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992

 

authorized a change, the "Use of all necessary means to establish

 

when possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief

 

operations."9 The United States then lead the operation, called

 

"Restore Hope." It was a humanitarian mission, involving many

 

other countries, to ensure that the relief agencies could deliver

 

the necessary food supplies. They heavily armed the troops and

 

left no doubt that the UN force would impose peace, by force, if

 

necessary. The mission was sent under Chapter VII provisions,

 

which meant it was to be a mission authorized to use force. The

 

UN never obtained consent of the warring parties.

 

Initially, the mission went well with the tribes ceasing to

 

fight and the aid agencies commencing to deliver food to the

 

starving people. The UN force then commenced setting up the

 

former police force as an effective unit and began to reimpose law

 

and order on an area that had been lawless for two years.

 

After the initial honeymoon period, the tone and aim of the

 

mission began to change. The United States, under heavy internal

 

pressure from home, reduced its troop level from 28,000 to 4,800

 

and turned over its operation officially to the United Nations

 

Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Although officially a UN

 

organization, Americans commanded UNOSOM at both the civilian and

 

military level. Even at the reduced level, heavy pressure existed

 

from the US public to pull out completely and leave the nation

 

building to the UN and not get involved in disarming of the

 

Warlords10. US politicians and the public were interested in the

 

"quick fix" approach to problem solving. The US lead forces had

 

arrived, aid was now getting through, in the public's perception,

 

it was now time to leave.

 

Unfortunately, the continuing underlying tensions and

 

conflict between the Somali clans was not well understood by any

 

of the American or UN leaders. Internally, the Warlords were

 

starting to reassert their power and one, General Aidid, was more

 

prominent in taking control of the capital, Mogadishu. After

 

General Aidid's men had ambushed a Pakistani unit in Mogadishu,

 

the UN security council voted on a resolution that directed the

 

United Nations force to arrest him.

 

It was at this point that two major shifts in policy took

 

place. The first was that the UN put a $25,000 bounty on General

 

Aidid, and secondly the operation became actively dedicated to

 

disarming the Warlords. Two of the Peacekeepers rules had now

 

been broken, UNOSOM was not operating with even tacit consent of

 

most of the combatants and it was no longer impartial. The mission

 

was now one of peace enforcement. Charles Dobbie in his book A

 

Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping states that:

 

if a peacekeeping force crosses the impartiality divide from

peacekeeping to peace enforcement. If perceived to be

taking sides, the force loses its legitimacy and credibility

as a trustworthy third party, thereby prejudicing its

security. The force's resources will then become ever more

devoted to its need to protect itself. It actually joins

the conflict it was there to police and is likely to become

embroiled in activities that are irrelevant to the overall

campaign aim....Once on the other side, there is very little

chance of getting back and the only way out is likely to be

by leaving the theatre.11

 

 

Nevertheless, the crossover of the UN force from impartial

 

peacekeeping to peace enforcement was not considered important at

 

this point in the post 1990's. The world's sole super power was

 

involved with its massive (although reduced) well-trained force

 

and it would simply be a matter of time until they would catch

 

General Aidid, or so Washington and the UN thought.

 

The very fact that the US was so heavily committed to the

 

operation placed unrealistic expectations on the operation.

 

Public opinion put intense pressure on the UNOSOM's commanders

 

when General Aidid proved difficult to capture. General Aidid's

 

capture became tied to the prestige of the United States. The

 

issue culminated in the poorly timed raid by the US rangers

 

against General Aidid's suspected hideout in October 1993 that

 

lead to eighteen US rangers and hundreds of Somalis being killed.

 

A captured US helicopter pilot, Michael Durant, summarized best

 

what General Aidid had lectured on: "When you don't live here,

 

you can't understand what's going on in this country. We

 

Americans have tried to help. But at one point things turned

 

bad."12 The loss of life accentuated the pressure on Washington

 

to withdraw the US troops and turn it over to the UN completely.

 

Within a couple of months the US had withdrawn its forces from the

 

operation.

 

General Aidid reverted to being a significant participant in

 

the political process and no longer a bandit. The UN soldiered

 

on, attempting to put the basics of an infrastructure together

 

until March 1995. Then the US Marines returned to provide

 

covering fire for the last withdrawal of UN troops. Somalia

 

returned to the control of the Warlords.

 

Cambodia

 

The main UN mission in Cambodia commenced in 1992. The name

 

of the mission was the United Nations Transitional Authority in

 

Cambodia (UNTAC). Prior to UNTAC, a small force of observers

 

called the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNIMRC) had

 

been sent there in November of 1991. UNTAC arose out of the

 

October 1991 Paris peace agreement signed by the four Cambodian

 

combatant factions. The four groups were the Khmer Rouge

 

(Communist), the Khmer Peoples National Liberation Front (a right

 

wing organization), the Cambodian Government (backed by Vietnam),

 

and the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,

 

Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (supported by Prince Sihanouk).

 

Cambodians had been fighting for over thirty years and more than

 

350,000 were refugees in Thailand. The 1991 Paris peace agreement

 

was to stop the conflict in two steps. Step one formed an interim

 

Supreme National Council (SNC) composed of members from each party

 

and headed by Prince Sihanouk. As the second step, the UN was to

 

set up an environment for peaceful elections.

 

UNTAC deployed six months late with the mission "to

 

dismantle 70 percent of the opposing military forces and gain

 

complete control over the remaining 30 percent; to organize,

 

supervise, and conduct free and fair elections; and to return and

 

rehabilitate the 350,000 Cambodians living in refugee camps in

 

Thailand."13 The operation was divided into seven components:

 

Human Rights, Civil Administrations, Civil Police, Repatriation

 

Component, Rehabilitation, Electorial, and Military. The main

 

purpose of the UN Military forces was to verify the withdrawal of

 

foreign forces, supervise cease fires, make a weapons control

 

system, conduct mine clearing training, investigate complaints and

 

assist the repatriation of refugees. The military component

 

consisted of 16,000 peacekeepers (from 47 different countries).

 

Only 47 peacekeepers were American. The United States also

 

supplied logistics and monetary aid.

 

UNTAC deployed initially with the consent of all involved

 

parties and consisted of many small and middle power

 

representatives. Although, the SNC has granted the UN "all powers

 

necessary to ensure the implementation of the agreement"14, as a

 

mission the UN closely structured itself along the "traditional

 

peacekeeping" philosophy. The troops of the middle powers were

 

considered impartial. The UN scheduled elections for May 1993 but

 

from the initial deployment problems arose.

 

The Khmer Rouge, unhappy with the process, recognizing they

 

could not win an election, disavowed the accord almost immediately

 

and began to work against it. The Khmer Rouge had a completely

 

different understanding of the Paris Accord and maintained that

 

the amount of power it delegated to the SNC was minimal.

 

Accordingly, they would not cooperate with UNTAC and would not

 

allow the verification of their forces. The Khmer Rouge refused

 

to disarm, and subsequently none of the other participants would.

 

Incidents of the Khmer Rouge harassing peacekeepers started almost

 

immediately. Pressure arose from the press, non-governmental

 

agencies, and the public for the UN to take some action against

 

those who were causing the problem. The argument presented was

 

that the UN would lose its credibility if it did not respond.

 

UNTAC strongly resisted these pressures, for it realized the UN

 

did not have enough troops to take offensive action. The

 

alternative was to reduce the aims of the mission. In November

 

1992 the Security Council revised the mandate.

 

The revised mandate concentrated solely upon ensuring that a

 

democratic election would take place. UNTAC was not going to take

 

sides in the process and as far as possible it would maintain the

 

consent of most of the parties involved. UNTAC employed the

 

military to defend the polling stations, recruited three of the

 

four parties (the exception being the Khmer Rouge) to maintain

 

control of the countryside, and concentrated the educational

 

effort on ensuring that the people would know that the polling

 

would be secret.

 

The effort to remain impartial was a success. The Khmer

 

Rouge never regarded the UN mission as the opposition. It

 

continued to threaten, harass and intimidate UN patrols in its

 

region, but despite a series of hostage incidents, never

 

considered the UN the enemy. Since the Khmer Rouge only

 

controlled a limited amount of Cambodia, UNTAC was able to

 

effectively carry out its revised mission. In May 1993, the

 

elections were an unqualified success, with a population turn out

 

of 89.6%15 (including Khmer Rouge controlled areas) with only a

 

few major incidents of violence. UNTAC was a success, where most

 

people had predicted failure. UNTAC had maintained the consent of

 

the majority, remained impartial and avoided mission creep. The

 

Khmer Rouge still remains a problem, however, there is a fairly

 

elected government in power to deal with them. The next major

 

mission, Rwanda, was not to be as successful.

 

 

Rwanda

 

A review of the history of the country since its initial

 

contact with Europeans is necessary to appreciate the contemporary

 

problem. Contact with Rwanda commenced in 1894 with German

 

explorers. Rwanda's rulers were the Tutsi who made up 15% of the

 

population with the remainder of the population being Hutus. The

 

Germans elected to maintain the status quo when they made Rwanda a

 

colony and left the Tutsi as the administrators and officials.

 

The subsequent conflict between the two tribes is the basis for

 

the current strife in Rwanda. After World War Two, the UN

 

appointed Belgium as the trustee of the country. Belgium began to

 

educate the Hutu majority and encourage them to develop so the

 

country would become a democracy. The Tutsi, feeling threatened,

 

pushed for rapid independence while they still had control of the

 

country. In 1961, the Hutus staged a coup with the backing of the

 

Belgians and took over the country. Subsequently, 130,000 Tutsi

 

fled to Uganda and formed the base for ongoing operations against

 

the Hutu's for the next thirty-four years. Rwanda, now a Hutu

 

governed country, officially obtained its independence from

 

Belgium in 1962.

 

In Uganda, the local people resented the presence of the

 

displaced Tutsi. The resentment lead to acts of violence and

 

oppression against the displaced. Many Tutsi, out of frustration,

 

then joined a Ugandan rebel group that was opposing Idi Amin, the

 

dictator ruling Uganda. The rebel group successfully took power

 

in 1986 and two prominent rebel leaders who were Tutsi, Paul

 

Kagame and Fred Rwigyama, became the chief of intelligence and

 

Minister of National Defence for Uganda. They also became leading

 

members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The objective of

 

the RPF was to incite the Tutsi who remained in Rwanda to join a

 

rebellion so that the Tutsi could return to power in Rwanda.

 

The RPF, with 4,000 men, lead an unsuccessful attack into

 

Rwanda in 1990. Although the attack was unsuccessful, it

 

emphasized the need for a political settlement to clarify the

 

power sharing of the two tribes in the country. To settle the

 

problem, the ruling Hutus and the RPF meet in Paris in 1993 and

 

arrived at the Arusha Accord. This accord laid out the formula

 

for political power between the Hutus and the Tutsi. It also

 

stated that Rwanda should hold free and fair elections which the

 

UN would oversee. The UN set up a small mission of 2,500 people,

 

the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UMAMIR). UNAMIR

 

was to help arrange the elections, monitor a demilitarized zone

 

between Uganda and Rwanda and to assist with mine clearance.14

 

The mandate for the UN was "contributing to the establishment and

 

maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and

 

subsequent operation of the transitional government."17

 

However, Rwanda exploded into civil war on 6 April 1994 when

 

President Habyarimaia's plane was shot down while returning from a

 

meeting to discuss the implementation of the Accord. The Hutu's

 

used this as an excuse for their militias to attack all Tutsi and

 

moderate Hutus. In the end the estimated death toll was half a

 

million people. The UN troops recently arrived, and with little

 

logistic support and weapons, did not fair well. Ten Belgian

 

peacekeepers, who were guarding the Prime Minister, were killed

 

defending her from the mobs. Belgium subsequently withdrew its

 

troops from the peacekeeping force.

 

Eight days after the war started, Major General Romeo

 

Dallaire, head of the UN force, pleaded with the UN Security

 

Council for additional support. On 14 March 1994, Secretary

 

General Boutros-Ghali presented the Security Council with two

 

options:

 

(1). To double the UN force to 5,000 soldiers.

 

(2). To reduce it to 270 soldiers.

 

Option 1 was designed to reinforce UNAMIR, the Security Council

 

chose Option Two. They had reduced UNAMIR to a mere observer in

 

the conflict.

 

The subsequent slaughter of the Tutsi, although reported in

 

the press, did not cause any major nation to interfere. The RPF

 

(under Paul Kagame) successfully reopened its offensive against

 

the Rwandan government. The Hutu army (French trained and

 

equipped) was unable to stop the RPF. Panic set in among the

 

Hutus and more than two million fled to Zaire, Burundi and

 

Uganda18 thus a major refugee problem was created. In Zaire,

 

France under UN auspices, finally set up a safe haven for the

 

fleeing Hutu's. By mid-July, the RPF controlled Rwanda and Paul

 

Kagame declared himself Vice President and Minister of National

 

Defence. A moderate Hutu, Pasteur Bizimugu, became President.

 

The refugee problems exploded as the camps became subject to

 

disease and famine, and an international outcry arose. The US was

 

forced to act for humanitarian reasons; massive amounts of aid

 

began to flow, as of the end of October 1994 approximately two

 

billion dollars in US aid had gone to Rwanda as various forms of

 

assistance19. Two major concerns have hindered the return of the

 

refugees to Rwanda: fear of retaliation by the Tutsi's and fear of

 

former members of the Hutu army who control the refugee camps. As

 

of October 1994, only 3,254 refugees had returned20.

 

Currently, the people in the camps are being fed with UN

 

aid while those in Rwanda itself have been left to fend for

 

themselves. The UN mission in Rwanda initially had consent of

 

both belligerents and it remained impartial, but why was it so

 

ineffective? The key failure: to act quickly when it had the

 

chance of stopping the slaughter. However, the UN could not

 

assemble enough support from any country in those initial weeks:

 

as a result it must now spend billions of dollars trying to

 

correct the resulting problems. Yet in Rwanda the problems are

 

far from being over. The large Hutu refugee camps will continue

 

to be a constant source of friction with the neighbouring

 

countries and provide future bases for new rebel groups.

 

Realistically, could the UN have stopped this conflict?

 

Certainly, the various members had enough military power, had they

 

chosen to use it. However, it would have been another case of

 

"mission creep" if UNAMIR's mandate had been expanded to allow for

 

active intervention. The United States and other major powers

 

were beginning to remember, after Somalia, that to plunge into

 

such an operation within a country was fraught with danger and

 

cost. In this case it was a conflict between the idealistic view

 

of going in to stop the killing and the practical assessment of

 

what would it cost in terms of manpower and lives. Clearly, in

 

the short term the practical view won: however, it will be a long

 

time before the true long term costs of the displaced Hutus is

 

realized. It is equally hard to predict how the legacy of hatred

 

left after the slaughter of Tutsi will manifest itself.

 

Bosnia

 

The Balkans have been the center of ethnic violence for

 

centuries. To forget or ignore this history when dealing with

 

this region is to court failure, since no matter what outsiders

 

think the people of the region have a reason for what they do and

 

remember the conflicts. The entire region is a mix of three main

 

ethnic groups; the Serbs (Orthodox Christians, and loosely akin to

 

the Russian Slavic people), the Croats (Roman Catholics, and

 

closely associated with Western Europe and, in particular,

 

Germany) and the Muslims, originally either Serbs or Croats

 

(supported by the Muslim middle eastern countries). At the risk

 

of over simplifying the problem, the Serbs and Croats do not like

 

each other, both the Serbs and the Croats do not like the Muslims,

 

but the Croats would ally themselves to the Muslims when fighting

 

the Serbs. The Serb Army was better trained and armed, as they

 

had made up the vast majority of the army of the former

 

Yugoslavia. In the case of all the armies, civilian control of

 

the generals was not particularly strong. The collapse of

 

Yugoslavia occurred shortly after the collapse of Russia, although

 

it had been weakening since the death of Tito in 1980. The

 

initial dispute occurred between the newly declared Republic of

 

Croatia, a former part of Yugoslavia, and the Serbs living in

 

Croatia who opposed the split in June 1991. The European Economic

 

Community (EEC) attempted a cease fire and contributed observers

 

under the EEC auspices. The conflict soon spread among the

 

remaining sections of the former Yugoslavia. The European

 

Community was unable to stop the fighting with negotiation.

 

Bosnia first experienced heavy conflict between the Serbs

 

and the Croats/Muslims in July 1991. At the time it was still a

 

part of Yugoslavia with a population breakdown as follows:

 

"... 43.8 percent of the residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina were

 

ethnic Muslims, 31.5 percent were Serbs, and 17.3 percent were

 

Croats."21 The Bosnian Serbs under Radovan Karadzic wanted to

 

form a separate breakaway republic in December 1991.

 

The UN began negotiations to set up a peacekeeping force in

 

Yugoslavia with the general support of most of the combatants.

 

The intent for the force was to work in Croatia.

 

In February 1992 the UN set up the United Nations Protection

 

Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia to help maintain the cease-fire (the

 

first of many) that they had arranged on 23 November 1991.

 

UNPROFOR's mission under Resolutin 743 was to create the

 

conditions for peace and security in Croatia until a settlement

 

could be negotiated. UNPROFOR could use force for self defence.

 

The Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Gali, briefed the Security

 

Council that there was a danger that UNPROFOR would fail for lack

 

of cooperation by the combatants, however to delay would risk the

 

entire cease-fire.22 The Security Council authorized a full

 

force deployment on 7 April 1992 initially into Croatia.

 

Unfortunately in April of 1992 the European Community

 

recognized Bosnia-Herzogovina as a separate state. On 6 April

 

1992 the Bosnian Serbs wanting to remain with Serbia, launched an

 

attack and seized 70% of Bosnia and began to move on Sarajevo.

 

Accordingly, in August 1992 the UN modified the mandate of

 

UNPROFOR under resolution 776. The new resolution tasked UNPROFOR

 

to assist the United Nations High Commissionaire for Refugees

 

(UNHCR) with the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and

 

other areas of Bosnia that needed it. UNPROFOR was authorized to

 

offer military protection to aid convoys and the movement of

 

refugees and wounded in Bosnia. UNPROFOR was now set up in

 

Croatia and Bosnia, eventually by the end of 1993, it would cover

 

Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia.

 

Major General Lewis McKenzie, the initial contingent leader

 

into Sarajevo, contends that it was unfortunate that the title of

 

UNPROFOR was kept when the mission went into Bosnia. It led many

 

people to think that UNPROFOR's mission was not purely protection

 

of humanitarian aid convoys and refugees. The confusion arose

 

over the title of the mission, which could translate that UNPROFOR

 

had a general protection role. In Bosnia, the Croats and Muslims

 

expected the UN force to protect them from attack, which was not

 

the mandate or intent of UNPROFOR in their area. The mandate of

 

the mission in Sarajevo has remained humanitarian, and was not

 

nearly as all encompassing as the one that the UN carried out in

 

Croatia.

 

It is not the purpose of this paper to get into discussions

 

on the mechanics and successes of the No Fly Zones, NATO Air

 

strikes, or the Safe Havens. UNPROFOR developed each of these

 

tactics to implement the mission of protecting the refugee

 

population and delivering humanitarian aid. Each of them involved

 

the increasing threat to use force on the warring parties. All of

 

them have met with limited success.

 

The media was a major player in Bosnia. The report of

 

shelling of the marketplace in Sarajevo became the catalyst for

 

the implementation of the threat of NATO air strikes in February

 

1994. Bosnia has thus become a magnet for many different agendas,

 

including proving that NATO still could be a credible force in the

 

post Cold War world and the US, despite small ground force levels,

 

was still interested in European affairs. President Clinton

 

stated this in his address on 9 February 1994.

 

Our nation has clear interests at stake in this conflict.

We have an interest in helping to prevent a broader conflict

in Europe; ... showing that NATO . . . remains a credible

force for peace in post-Cold War Europe . . . stemming the

flow of refugees . . . the strangulation of Sarajevo and

the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia.23

 

 

Bosnia continues to be the magnet for all European nations.

 

Russia was actively involved trying to influence the Serbs to

 

stop. NATO was threatening the Serbs to protect specific areas

 

and UN forces. The US sympathizes with the Muslim. The UN

 

forces are widely dispersed in various areas to look after the

 

humanitarian aid convoys. However, in this war there are no good

 

and bad people - no moral high ground for one side or the other.

 

General Mackenzie, briefing President Francois Mitterend in

 

Sarajevo on the situation stated ". . . There is strong but

 

circumstantial evidence that some really horrifying acts of

 

cruelty attributed to the Serbs were actually orchestrated by the

 

Muslims against their own people, for the benefit of the

 

international audience."24 A frightening reflection of what

 

lengths the warring factions were willing to go to influence the

 

media. This view has been echoed by Lieutenant-General Sir

 

Michael Rose, the past British Commander in Bosnia (December

 

1994): commenting on the fighting about Gorazde in March 1994. He

 

felt the city had been deliberately lost to gain international

 

sympathy. He then added "The Moslems are not going to get us to

 

fight their war for them."25 Some senior members of the US

 

military have also echoed this view, although it is not the

 

official view of the US government. The US position is simple and

 

simplistic: the Serbs were the aggressors and the Croats and

 

Muslims were the victim. So what is the total to date for

 

UNPROFOR?

 

UNPROFOR has cost 1.6 billion dollars and 131 lives since

 

March 92. The current troop levels remain at 39,000, of which the

 

US has contributed 748 in Macedonia.26 It is estimated that

 

between 140,000 to 300,000 people have died, and 2.5 million have

 

been displaced. The political manoeuvring necessary to arrange

 

for NATO air strikes, the various blockades combined with the

 

distinctly different views of the US and the Europeans about who

 

is at fault, has lead to a deterioration of the relationship

 

between the US and Britain, one of its strongest allies. Yet

 

there is still no end in sight to the conflict. On a more

 

positive note, despite the problems the peacekeepers have

 

experienced, humanitarian relief is getting through, all

 

combatants still want the UN to remain in Bosnia, and the UN has

 

retained its impartiality. David Walker in his article on the

 

Battles of the Balkans June 1993 wrote:

 

If we are to learn one lesson from all this, then it must be

that whatever the cost of achieving peace, it is wasted

unless it can accommodate the emotions of the past. And the

cost of not knowing that past could extract as high a price

today as at any time during the long history of these

troubled lands.27

 

But how did all of these post 1990 operations compare with the

 

previous forty years of UN experience?

 

 

Click here to view image

 

Summary Chapter Three

 

Somalia broke most of the rules established over the previous

 

forty years. It did not have consent of those involved, the mission

 

lost its impartiality, it involved a super power in a major role, it was

 

initiated prior to a political settlement by the warring factions, and

 

minimum use of force was not an overriding factor. Of the five peace

 

keeping principles it met only one: it was a UN operation, organized and

 

run by the UN. Somalia is considered to have been a failure.

 

Cambodia has met all of the five peacekeeping principles. The

 

mission never resorted to heavy use of force despite considerable

 

provocation. It maintained its impartiality and subsequently the

 

approval and consent of the majority of the people. None of the nations

 

directly involved were considered a super power, and each of them was

 

able to maintain an even handed approach. Cambodia is considered to be

 

the most successful of all the missions studied.

 

Click here to view image

 

Rwanda met the criteria in four areas. It was a UN mission, it

 

did not involve super powers, the force maintained its impartiality, and

 

it maintained an even handed approach. Nevertheless, the mission lost

 

the consent of the warring groups to fulfill its mission and in the end

 

became a helpless observer to the slaughter of civilians. Rwanda's UN

 

mission returned to a position of influence with the end of the war.

 

The United Nations was able to supply food and shelter to the Hutu

 

refugees substantially reducing the deaths in the refugee camps.

 

However, the underlying problem has not been addressed.

 

Bosnia is still an open question. It meets all of the

 

requirements for peacekeeping except consent based upon an agreement

 

with all political parties. Arguably, UNPROFOR has the consent of the

 

warring factions, but each group has different reasons for wanting the

 

UN to be there. In addition, the reasons why UNPROFOR is welcome,

 

change with each party's political and military success. Up to the

 

present, the UN forces are still considered to be impartial, even

 

handed, and applying a minimum of force. A superpower is not yet a

 

major player in the overall peacekeeping force structure. The mission

 

is delivering aid and people are being saved. However, there is a

 

continuous debate on where to go with the mission and the success or

 

failure is far from being determined. Bosnia is becoming like many of

 

the Cold War missions (ie Cyprus), long running, with no easy solution,

 

no end to the mission in sight, constant questioning of its objectives,

 

and some successes mixed in with the failures. Overall, UNPROFOR in

 

Bosnia has had more successes then failures. No nation will disagree

 

that, without UNPROFOR additional thousands would have died. The

 

question is, can the mission retain its impartiality, or will outside

 

pressure to do something, force UNPROFOR to take actions it would later

 

regret.

 

In chapter four I will look at how the internal and external

 

factors in the US political system work against the United States as a

 

peacekeeper.

 

CHAPTER FOUR: The United States View of Peacekeeping Post 1993

 

 

Peacekeeping is a part of our national security policy, but it is

not the centerpiece. The primary purpose of our military forces

is to fight and win wars . . . we'll choose between unilateral and

collective approaches between the UN or other coalitions depending

on what works best and what serves best American interests.

 

Tony Lake1

National Security Advisor

Clinton Administration

 

 

The quotation accurately portrays US policy toward the UN and

 

peacekeeping operations. Mr. Lake's observations are not unrealistic

 

cling from a superpower with many global interests. But it succinctly

 

notes why US forces have difficulty being effective peacekeepers. The

 

issue is not one of capability; rather, it is the training of the

 

military and the mentality of the US politicians and public. What are

 

the advantages to using the UN? What are the disadvantages? In this

 

chapter, I shall briefly summarize what the advantages and disadvantages

 

are for working through the United Nations. I shall then list the

 

requirements that the US insists a UN mission must meet before it will

 

deploy forces. Finally, I will show how many of these factors work

 

against the United States fielding an effective peacekeeping force.

 

The Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Frank G. Wisner,

 

summarized the advantages of participation in the UN in 1993. He told

 

the Senate Armed Services Committee that there were three major reasons

 

for participation. The three reasons are:

 

(1). The legitimacy of the operation.

 

(2). The reduction in the requirement for and risk to American

 

forces.

 

(3). The effective use of the UN prevents the spread of a

 

conflict, therefore stopping larger involvement later.2

 

All these are valid arguments, although they are very difficult to

 

quantify. However, the disadvantages are usually more obvious and

 

easier to evaluate.

 

There are five major disadvantages to working under the auspices

 

of the UN. Three of these problem areas are easy to measure:

 

(1). The costs of the mission.

 

(2). The effect on force readiness.

 

(3). Poor UN command and control.

 

The next two problems are hard to quantify:

 

(4). Doctrinal training.

 

(5). The world's perception of a US soldier.

 

A brief review of each problem area is necessary to understand the road

 

blocks they cause any potential US peacekeeping mission or potential

 

participation in a peacekeeping mission.

 

Cost

 

The Department of Defence is currently taking the cost of UN

 

missions out of the Operating and Maintenance funding. Since these

 

missions have not been budgeted for, they consume precious military

 

resources in a time of decreasing budgets. President Clinton requested

 

from Congress $320,000,000 in emergency appropriations in Fiscal Year

 

1994 to provide the ability to respond to such commitments without

 

decreasing training and regular maintenance. The Defence Departments

 

share would be $270,000,000.3 These monetary costs do not account for

 

the hidden cost of declining combat readiness for the troops involved in

 

a peacekeeping mission.

 

 

 

Force Readiness

 

The combat readiness of US troops decrease, when they retrain from

 

straight war fighting to acting as a peacekeeper between fighting

 

factions. In war fighting, the approach is the use of maximum force to

 

compel the enemy to do your will as quickly as possible. One of the

 

main tenants for a peacekeeping force is the use of minimum force. It

 

takes time and training to accustom troops to the role of peacekeeper.

 

Once the soldier has returned from peacekeeping, it takes retraining to

 

return him to an effective war fighter. The estimate is that for every

 

battalion deployed, another one is working up to relieve it and a third

 

is retraining in the post deployment phase.4 Therefore, the ratio is

 

3:1.

 

The issue for the United States is not whether the training can be

 

accomplished, it is the cost of the training and how it depletes the

 

number of war fighters available. US Army Chief of Staff General Carl

 

E. Vuno testified that at one point "150,000 soldiers, which is about 26

 

percent of today's (active-duty) strength"5 were involved in

 

preparation, deployment or post deployment for the UN. Therefore, he

 

could not field a force strong enough to cover a major regional

 

contingency. Although, the numbers General Vuno quoted are obviously a

 

high point, the issue remains: peacekeeping troops detract from the

 

United States war fighting ability.

 

 

 

Command and Control

 

Issues of poor command and control in UN missions are an ongoing

 

problem. The UN's inability to control large numbers of troops in the

 

field gravely concerns the United States. A direct consequence of this

 

weakness is strong pressure from the Republican party to ensure that US

 

Commanders only control US troops. Bill S.5 presented by Senator Dole

 

in January 1995 proposes that no US troops be committed unless the

 

President satisfies the following:

 

(1). It is in the national security interest of the United

 

States.

 

(2). The unit commanders will at all times retain the ability to

 

report independently to the United States.

 

(3). The forces can be withdrawn at anytime and the United States

 

can take any actions it feels necessary to protect those

 

troops.

 

(4). The troops remain under US control at all times for purposed

 

of discipline and evaluation.6

 

Documents confirming these requirements must be presented to the

 

appropriate committee exercising jurisdiction 15 days before dispatch of

 

troops or in an emergency within 48 hours after dispatch. Bill HR 7 the

 

"National Security Revitalization Act" proposed in the House of

 

Representatives 22 February 1995 contains similar provisions. These

 

certainly would ensure that any peacekeeping mission involving US troops

 

would be considered biased towards Washington. The peacekeeping mission

 

would have a difficult time proving it was impartial and that would

 

place the mission at risk.

 

 

 

Doctrinal Training

 

The next issue is Doctrinal training for troops that are going to

 

peacekeeping missions. The training of the average US soldier for war

 

fighting is very good. However, some members of the UN feel that US

 

forces sometimes become too aggressive in peacekeeping situations.

 

General Sir David Ramsbotham feels that:

 

... the US is an essential ingredient both of the UN military

structure, and the entire structure of the UN itself. The

doctrine of minimum force, as we understand it, is not part of the

US military ethos, nor is the Wahlgren concept of the Firm, Fair

and Friendly UN soldier7

 

 

Most nations with large peacekeeping forces offer special training

 

to those troops involved in peacekeeping duties. Canada has recently

 

created the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping

 

Training Center in Nova Scotia, whose sole mission is to develop

 

training and encourage discussion on how best to carry out UN missions.

 

The US Army last summer ran a course where, instead of training for war,

 

a number of troops trained for peacekeeping. However, at the moment in

 

the US, peacekeeping training is the exception. If the US policy is as

 

stated by Mr. Tony Lake, then there is little incentive to do extensive

 

peacekeeping training.

 

 

 

Perceptions about the United States Soldier

 

Finally, the most difficult problem, how is the US soldier

 

perceived by those he assists? The US soldier is viewed as an extension

 

of Washington's foreign policy no matter where in the world he is.

 

Consequently, as a representative of the major super power, the US

 

soldier makes a very attractive target. He is a target that the sides

 

in a dispute will attempt to influence, preferably in favour of their

 

position. It places all US soldiers in a much more precarious position

 

then the soldiers of smaller countries. Smaller countries, such as

 

Canada, will not significantly help one side to win. Canada does not

 

have the massive combat power or the desire to interfere on only one

 

side of a dispute. Therefore, for a warring faction, it is not cost

 

effective to expend a lot of time and energy trying to influence a

 

Canadian soldier. However, the United States can bring tremendous

 

economic and combat power to bear and would make a very valuable ally,

 

therefore a warring faction will try and influence their soldiers.

 

In addition, the United States public likes to chose a good and

 

bad side in a conflict. This phenomenon is evident in the Bosnia

 

crisis. Most of the senior military commanders who have been involved

 

acknowledge that all sides are equally guilty, yet, the US press insist

 

that the Muslims are always the victims. The combination makes the

 

attempt to influence the US soldiers well worth while. Since the US

 

soldier will always experience strong attempts to influence him, then

 

his peacekeeping training must be superb to handle the pressure; it

 

would therefore be expensive. Canada's experience with the value of

 

peacekeeping training is expressed in the 1994 White Paper on Defence:

 

Recent experiences in UN operations have confirmed the value of

cultural sensitivity, international humanitarian law, and dispute

resolution training prior to deployment.8

 

Why should the US tie up the resources required for peacekeeping

 

if their overall aim is warfighting? If the above factors are combined

 

with the perceived inefficiency of the UN, a strong argument is created

 

for the American people not to participate in peacekeeping.

 

The UN needs improvement in how it organizes and arranges

 

peacekeeping missions. General Sir David Ramsbotham proposed a list of

 

ten fundamental changes that should occur in peacekeeping operations.

 

These areas for improvement are:

 

(1). Intelligence analysis and dissemination, including

 

communication,

 

(2). Contingency planning,

 

(3). Provision and selection of staff, including force

 

commanders,

 

(4). Mandate preparation and validation,

 

(5). Technical reconnaissance,

 

(6). 24 hour support of operations,

 

(7). Doctrine and training,

 

(8). Preparation and dissemination of lessons learned,

 

(9). Manpower identification and provision, and

 

(10). Logistics and procurement9

 

Of these recommendations, one, three and six directly pertain to command

 

and control issues. The remainder are meant to increase the

 

effectiveness and professionalism of peacekeeping missions.

 

Each mission is currently formed of volunteer nations who may or

 

may not have had previous experience. In some cases, the volunteers do

 

not even have the basic weapons to do peacekeeping with. The 'cobble

 

together approach" to making up a peacekeeping mission has lead to

 

accusations of waste, favoritism and abuse. The American public has no

 

inclination to fund operations that appear to be so mismanaged. House

 

Bill HR 7 reflects this attitude: Section 510 includes specific "Buy

 

American Requirements," while Sections 505 to 507 contain complex

 

formulas limiting the funding of the UN.10 The general thrust of all of

 

these provisions is the reduction in funding to the UN. If General Sir

 

David Ramsbotham's changes can be made, then there is considerable hope

 

that the UN will be able to revitalize itself.

 

In fact at a briefing by Lieutenant Colonel Rich Roan (USMC

 

Military Advisor) at the US mission to the United Nations 11 April 1995,

 

a number of changes to the Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) were

 

discussed. The most interesting changes were: the increase of

 

personnel from 100 to 321 military officers (a number loaned a no cost

 

to the UN), the activation of a 24 hour situation center and the

 

movement of control of field administration and field logistics to the

 

DPKO. Unfortunately, the remaining changes will take time to implement,

 

and, after Somalia, the United States public has little patience left.

 

How do all these factors affect the United States as a peacekeeping

 

contributor?

 

In the current era of tight budgets, the costs and benefits that

 

can be measured will have the edge. Unfortunately, the disadvantages

 

are much easier to measure than the advantages. Therefore the United

 

States participation in UN peacekeeping will decrease as the pressure on

 

budgets rises. As the US participation decreases, the US will become

 

much more selective in the operations in which it will participate.

 

This is fully reflected by President Clinton in his Presidential

 

Decision Directive (PDD) on "Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations"

 

issued on 5 May 1994. This PDD has six major tenets for future US

 

participation in UN Peacekeeping missions:

 

(1). The US will have to make choices about the peace operations

 

to support. It affirms that although peacekeeping can be

 

useful in some circumstances, it must be selective and very

 

effective.

 

(2). Secondly, the cost to the US must reduce from the current

 

31.7% to 25% by 1996.

 

(3). Thirdly, in command and control, US forces can still be

 

placed under a foreign commander on direction of the

 

President, but the greater the US role, the less likely it

 

will be.

 

(4). Fourth, eleven steps to reform UN planning, logistics,

 

information, and command and control capabilities have been

 

recommended.

 

(5). Fifth, the Defence Department will fund UN missions

 

involving combat roles, to enable military expertise to bear

 

on these missions. The State Department will fund all

 

peacekeeping missions not involving US troops and combat.

 

(6). Seven proposals were set out to improve consultation and

 

information's flow between Congress and the Executive branch

 

on UN matters.11

 

The President has made it clear that he intends to reduce the

 

United States role in peacekeeping. The reduction in budgets and the

 

use of the word "selective" and "can be useful" when talking of

 

peacekeeping are clear indications of the future. The desire of

 

Congress to withdraw from peacekeeping as a mission for their forces is

 

obvious from Bills H.R 7 and S.5. The placing of combat missions under

 

the Defence Department (primary mission war fighting) is a clear

 

indication that traditional peacekeeping, for American troops, will

 

receive very low priority. If defence budget cutbacks continue, then

 

peacekeeping training will probably be high on the list to disappear.

 

Without the necessary peacekeeping training, the troops sent on

 

peacekeeping missions, although very good war fighters, will be a at

 

grave disadvantage as peacekeepers. Accordingly, US troops due to

 

doctrinal training, senior administration direction, the public's

 

disdain for peacekeeping missions, and external perception on their

 

bias, will not be ideal troops to be in a peacekeeping mission.

 

CONCLUSION: IT MUST HAVE BEEN A DREAM

 

 

The cold war had ended. It was a time of hope and change and of

rising expectations for - and of - the United Nations.

 

Boutros Boutros-Ghali1

 

 

 

 

In the future, if ever the UN put me in a position where people

 

were using my peacekeeping force as a shooting target, I would be very

 

happy to see a powerful US force come to my rescue. Borrowing an

 

analogy from Western films, it would be the equivalent of "here comes

 

the cavalry" (with apologies to my Marine colleges). It is a role that

 

the US forces train to do and do well. However, if the aim of the

 

mission was peacekeeping, I would have to look long and hard to see if

 

US forces are the ones for the assignment. It is not that a US force

 

could not train and do the mission, they could. However, for a number

 

of reasons, they opt not to. What are these reasons?

 

Chapter Two outlined how the senior United States policy makers

 

are very pragmatic in their approach to events, short on the study of

 

history, and legalistic in their approach to a problem. In addition, US

 

policy continues to swing from one based on idealism to one based upon

 

national interest. President Clinton initially favoured the idealistic

 

approach, while lately the policy has shifted to one based heavily on

 

national interests. Chapter Three showed that the five major principles

 

for peacekeeping, if followed, lead to a mission with a higher chance of

 

success. It also noted how the loss of impartiality severely hampers a

 

peacekeeper's effectiveness. Chapter Four stressed that in most cases

 

the doctrinal training for the US forces does not emphasize

 

peacekeeping. I do not see this changing because the public and the

 

political/military leadership do not desire it to change. Conflict

 

resolution between warring parties for the United States public can be

 

simplistically represented in the well known nursery rhyme Tweedle-dum

 

and Tweedle-dee:

 

Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee

Resolved to have a battle,

For Tweedle-dum said Tweedle-dee

Had spoiled his nice new rattle.

Just then flew by a monstrous crow,

As big as a tar barrel,

Which frightened both the heroes so,

They quite forgot their quarrel.2

 

Throughout all the chapters in the paper it is evident due to the combat

 

power and influence that the United States represents, fighting factions

 

will obviously go to almost any lengths to influence it. Bosnia is an

 

excellent example. Combine these factors with the prestige of being the

 

sole super power and therefore not allowed to "fail" at a mission and it

 

is a potent combination.

 

The United States has been providing logistic support successfully

 

for many years to UN peacekeeping missions. After 1990, everyone

 

thought the world and how it worked had changed. The US strongly

 

supported more aggressive UN missions and terms such as peace

 

enforcement and peacemaking entered the equation. Unfortunately,

 

although the Cold War no longer existed, many of the underlying problems

 

had not. It took four major missions before the US and the UN realized

 

that the lessons learned from the previous forty years should not have

 

been so easily discarded. One of these lessons is that super powers

 

should not get involved in peacekeeping missions.

 

Smaller countries, with less well equipped but highly trained

 

forces, can take on these missions. Some of these forces will require

 

extensive logistics and infrastructure support, probably from the United

 

States. The international city will applaud their efforts whether

 

a success or failure. The United States is not so fortunate: when it

 

enters the battle, the world community and the US public expect results,

 

and this means quick victory. Somalia is an excellent example of what

 

happens when politically, the public demands instant results to a

 

situation that has no easy answer.

 

Therefore, any US peacekeeper arrives at a mission with the

 

following baggage. He has been highly trained as a war fighter with an

 

outside chance of having had some peacekeeping training. He will be

 

subject to extreme pressure by the combatants to take their side of the

 

battle and bring the tremendous combat power of the US to bear. His

 

senior political leadership will be demanding quick concrete "results",

 

often from a situation and series of events that have lasted for

 

hundreds of years and have no instant solution. The combination does

 

not make for a good peacekeeper, despite the tremendous resources the US

 

can bring to bear. But should the US be in the peacekeeping business at

 

all?

 

The United Nations has many countries who can supply well trained

 

troops that do not have to worry about a number of these considerations.

 

If remaining impartial is almost impossible for US peacekeepers, then

 

they should not send combat troops on peacekeeping missions.

 

The intent of this paper was not to prove that the United States

 

should withdraw from peacekeeping. Rather, to show that the type of

 

participation should be closer to what Washington did prior to 1990.

 

Support for improvement in the United Nations' infrastructure,

 

assistance in setting up a truly effective UN structure for

 

peacekeeping, logistics support for smaller countries, and in extremis

 

combat support. All of these are missions the United States could do a

 

credible job on. For as Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the

 

UN said:

 

All this confirms that we are still in a time of transition. The

end of the cold war was a major movement of tectonic plates and

the after-shocks continue to be felt. But even if the ground

beneath our feet has not yet settled, we still live in a new age

that holds great promise for both peace and development.3

 

Appendix A:CHAPTER VI OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

 

CHAPTER VI

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

 

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to

endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,

first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,

conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional

agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the

parties to settle their dispute by such means.

 

 

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which

might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order

to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is

likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

 

 

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any

situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of

the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the

attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute

to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the

dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present

Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought

to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of

Articles 11 and 12.

 

 

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature

referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend

appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures

for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the

parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council

should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a

general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of

Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

 

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article

33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall

refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is

in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and

security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to

recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

 

 

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security

Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make

recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of

the dispute.

 

 

Appendix B: CHAPTER VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

 

 

CHAPTER VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS

TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE

PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

 

 

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the

peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make

recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance

with Articles 4 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and

security. Article 40 In order to prevent an aggravation of the

situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations

or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the

parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems

necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without

prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned.

The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with

such provisional measures.

 

 

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of

armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it

may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.

These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations

and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of

communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

 

 

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in

Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may

take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to

maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may

include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or

land forces of Members of the United Nations.

 

 

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the

maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make

available to the Security Council, on its and in accordance with a

special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and

facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of

maintaining international peace and security.

 

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of

forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature

of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible

on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded

between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council

and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the

signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional

processes.

 

 

Article 44

When Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling

upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in

fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that

Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the

Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that

Member's armed forces.

 

 

Article 45

In order to enable the Nations to take urgent military measures,

Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents

for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree

of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action

shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special

agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security

Council with the assistance of the Military Committee.

 

 

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security

Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

 

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and

assist the Security Council on questions relating to the Security

Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international

peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its

disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the

permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any

Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the

Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it

when the efficient discharge of the committee's responsibilities

requires the participation of that Member its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee be responsible under the Security

Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces paced at the

disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of

such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the security

Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may

establish subcommittees.

 

 

 

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security

Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be

taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as

the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United

Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate

international agencies of which they are members.

 

 

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual

assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security

Council.

 

 

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the

Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United

Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic

problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the

right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those

problems.

 

 

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of

individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against

a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken

measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence

shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in

any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council

under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems

necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and

security.

 

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ENDNOTES:

 

Introduction

 

1. General Sir David Ramsbotham, "How can the Military best help the

United Nations?" (Tavistock (Devon, England): Army Quarterly and

Defense Journal, July 1994), 293.

 

2. Larry O.L. Fabian, Soldier Without Enemies, (Washington, D.C.: The

Brookings Institution, 1971), 94.

 

Chapter One

 

1. Thomas M. Frank, Nation Against Nation, (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1985), 15.

 

2. Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peacekeeping, (Washington, D. C.: The

Brookings Institution, 1967), 30.

 

3. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy Expanded Edition, (New

York: WW Norton & Company, 1974), 30.

 

4. Kissinger, 31.

 

5. Kissinger, 34.

 

Chapter Two

 

1. Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy Expanded Edition, (New

York: WW Norton & Company, 1974), 74.

 

2. Linda B. Miller, "The Clinton Years: Reinventing US Foreign

Policy?" International Affairs, October 1994, Vol 70.

 

3. Casper W. Winberger, The Uses of Military Power, Text of Remarks

by Secretary of Defense to the National Press Club, 28 November 1984;

reprint in Theory and Nature of War Readings AY 1994-95, vol III,

(Quantico, VA, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College,

1994), 029-036.

 

 

4. Linda B. Miller, 626.

 

5. James H. Baker, "Policy Challenges of Un Peace Operations," US Army

War College Parameters, Spring 1994, 26.

 

6. Mark T. Clark, "The Future of Clinton's Foreign and Defense Policy:

Multilateral Security," Comparative Strategy an International Journal,

June 1994.

 

7. The White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement," (Washington D.C., US Government Printing Office, July

1994), 13.

 

8. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Republicans Seek to Curb UN Funding,"

Washington Post, 23 January 1994.

 

 

Chapter Three

 

1. John F. Hillen III, "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a

Half," Parameters, Spring 94.

 

2. Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peacekeeping, (Washington, D. C.: The

Brookings Institution, 1967), 131.

 

3. Charles Dobbie, A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping, (Tollbugt,

Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1994), 17.

 

4. Larry O.L. Fabian, Soldier Without Enemies, (Washington, D.C.: The

Brookings Institution, 1971), 26.

 

5. Larry O.L. Fabian, 28.

 

6. George J. Church, "Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster," Time (on line),

15 October 1993, Downloaded from American OnLine. Vienna, VA.

 

7. George J. Church, "Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster."

 

8. George J. Church, "Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster."

 

9. Colonel F.M. Lorencz, "Confronting Thievery in Somalia," Military

Review, August 1994.

 

10. J.F.O McAllister, When to Stay, When to Go," Time (on line), 10

October 1993, Downloaded from American OnLine. Vienna, VA.

 

11. Charles Dobbie, A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping, 10.

 

12. George J. Church, "Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster."

 

13. Karl Farris, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, a Success,"

Parameters, Spring 1994, 42.

 

 

14. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations" Cambodia

section, subsection Background, December 1994, Downloaded from INTERNET

via server at hhtp://ralph.gmu.edu.lepalpeac/toc.html.

 

15. Karl Farris, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, a Success."

 

16. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations", Rwanda

section, subsection UNAMIR recommended.

 

17. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations," Rwanda

section, subsection UNAMIR recommended.

 

18. "Consolidated Rwanda Report # 17", 27 October 1994, Downloaded from

INTERNET 14 Mar 1994 via HTML Daniel Zalik@brown.edu

 

19. "Consolidated Rwanda Report # 17", 27 October 1994.

 

20. "Consolidated Rwanda Report # 17", 27 October 1994.

 

21. Sabrina Petra Ramet, "The Bosnian War and the Diplomacy of

Accommodation," Current History (Philadelphia), November 1994.

 

 

22. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations,

December 1994.

 

23. White House, PRESS RELEASE, STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON , 9

February 1994, Downloaded from the INTERNET 14 March 1995 from

Admin@whitehouse.gov

 

24. Maj General Lewis McKenzie, Peacekeeper, (Toronto, Ont: Douglas &

McIntyre, 1993), 256.

 

25. John Pomfret, "Year in Bosnia Changes British General's Views."

Washington Post, 23 January 1995.

 

26. "Background Note: United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations," Bosnia

chapter.

 

27. David Walker, "Battles of the Balkans." Royal United Services

Institute for Defence Studies (Whitehall, London Eng), June 1993, 63.

 

Chapter Four

 

1. The White House, Press Briefing by National Security Council Advisor

Tony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and Policy General Wesley

Clark, 5 May 1994, Downloaded from INTERNET 14 Mar 94 originally from

Admin@whitehouse.gov.

 

2. Department of Defense, Frank G Wisner, Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy, "U.S. Peacekeeping Operations: Why, When, How, How Long,"

speech before the Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces Subcommittee

Senate Armed Services Committee, July 14, 1993.

 

3. The White House, White House Press Release Office of the Press

Secretary, 29 July 1994, Downloaded via INTERNET 14 March 1995,

originally from Admin@whitehouse.gov.

 

4. James H. Baker, "Policy challenges of UN Peace Operations,"

Parameters, Spring 1994.

 

5. John G. Roos, "The Perils of Peacekeeping," Armed Forces Journal,

December 1993, 17.

 

6. U.S. Congress, Senate, "Peace Powers Act of 1995," 104th Cong.,

1st sess., 1995.

 

7. General Sir David Ramsbotham, "How can the Military best help the

United Nations?" Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (Tavistock, Devon

England), July 1994, 293.

 

8. Canada, National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper, (Ottawa: Queens

Printers, December 1994), 34.

 

9. General Sir David Ramsbotham, "How can the Military best help the

United Nations?"

 

10. U.S. Congress, Senate, "National Security Revitalization Act,"

104th Cong., 1st sess.,1995

 

11. Department of Defense(Public Affairs), Executive Summary: The

Clinton Administrations Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace

Operations, 5 May 1994, Downloaded from INTERNET 14 March 1995

originally from navpalib@opnav-emh.mnavy.mil.

 

Conclusion

 

1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace 1995, (New York: United

Nations, 1995), 1.

 

2. Peter Stevenson, Best Loved Nursery Rhymes, (London: Ward Lock

Limited, undated), 12.

 

3. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace 1995, 6.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

BOOKS

 

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace 1995. New York:

United Nations. 1995. This edition includes a very useful

preamble which modifies the original Agenda for Peace based

on the experience of the last few years.

 

Cox, Arthur M. Prospects for Peacekeeping. Washington D.C.:

The Brookings Institution. 1967. Emphasizes the lessons of

experience with the Blue Berets. It also points out that

peacekeeping is the mission for the UN, not peacemaking.

 

Fabian, Larry O.L. Soldier Without Enemies. Washington D.C.: The

Brookings Institution. 1971. The author is primarily

concerned with the UN Military Committee and the Standing UN

Army, however he offers a good review of the initial setup

of the UN.

 

Frank, Thomas M. Nation Against Nation. New York: Oxford

University Press. 1985. The book gives a quick background

on the development of the UN charter. It refers to the two

power Blocs (Russia and United States) and the weaknesses of

the UN. Although a good history of the development of the

UN, the author does not offer much insight into the problems

that arose post 1990.

 

Haas, Ernst B. Tangle of Hopes. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-

Hall Inc. 1969. The book was not particularly useful for

this paper. The author proposes 3 theories of leadership

for the U.S. : Pragmatic-Bureaucratic, Ideological, and

Revolutionary. In the end the author feels that the U.S.

normally follows the pragmatic decision making process.

 

Kissinger, Henry A. American Foreign Policy Expanded Edition. New

York: NW Norton & Company. 1974. The author outline the

way the US Government makes leadership decisions. The

concepts he uses is an excellent framework for understanding

the foreign policy decision making of the United States.

 

McKenzie, Major General Lewis. Peacekeeper. Toronto Ont.:

Douglas & McIntyre. 1993. Major General McKenzie outlines

the establishment of the initial UN group in Sarajevo and

the frustrations experienced by the peacekeepers with both

sides in the conflict. The remainder of the book covers

Major General McKenzie's extensive career in UN missions.

 

Roberts, Adam and Kingsbury, Benedict. United Nations, Divided

World. Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press,

1994. The authors have compiled an excellent group of

essays on the development of the United Nations. It is well

worth reading for a good understanding of the organization.

 

Stevens, Peter. Best Loved Nursery Rhymes. London: Ward Lock

Limited. Undated.

 

Wainhouse, David W. International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads.

Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 1973. The

author provides a good listing of UN operations up until the

early 1970's, however, the book was not useful in this

paper.

 

 

 

 

ARTICLES

 

Abizaiad, Colonel John P. and Wood, Colonel John R. "Preparing for

Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping

Environment." The United States Army John F. Kennedy

Special Warfare Center and School. April 1994. The author

deals with the unique training that US forces should take in

order to become peacekeepers. He emphasizes that at the

moment there is a doctrinal void.

 

Baker, James H. "Policy challenges of UN Peace Operations."

Parameters. Spring 1994. A good article on the UN and how

the United States has dealt with the it's relationship on

peacekeeping. The author also points out ideas of

Unilateralism and Multilateralism.

 

Church, George J. "Anatomy of a Disaster." Time. 15 October

1993. Down loaded from America Online, Vienna, V.A. The

author addresses the problems involving the ill fated Ranger

mission as well as providing some of the background leading

up to the event.

 

Clark, Mark T. "The Future of Clinton's Foreign and Defence

Policy: Multilateral Security." Comparative Strategy and

International Journal. His basic premise is the US will use

Multilateral Security efforts because it can not afford to

conduct them unilaterally.

 

 

Curry, David. M. Ethics of Political and Military Involvement

in Peace Operations. Washington D.C.: Strayer College. 1

June 1994. The document talks about the ethics of the

application of force and the Weinberger Document as the

basis for the future use of force by the U.S.

 

Diamond, Larry. "The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic

World Order." Current History. January 1994. The article

emphasizes the fact that the U.S. is at a decision point as

to whether it will go; Isolationist or maintain a democratic

globalism.

 

Farris, Karl. "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, a

Success." Parameters. Spring 1994. The author provides an

excellent background on Cambodia and the UN mission.

 

Goldman, Jan. "A Changing World A Changing UN." Military Review.

September 1994. Emphasizes the changing nature of the UN.

 

 

Harries, Colonel David. "Challenges in Military Futures."

Canadian Defence Quarterly. December 1993. The author

covers the post Cold War reality and how shrinking defence

budgets will effect the number and types of missions the UN

can take on.

 

Hillen III, John F. "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a

Half." Parameters. Spring 1994. A good summary of the

five principles of Peacekeeping developed over the Cold War

years.

 

Kearns, Darien L.. "The Need For Criteria in UN Peace Operations".

Military Review. July 1994. A good summary on the first 40

years of the UN. The author introduces the concept of a

special criteria when using the United States troops on a UN

mission.

 

Lorencz, F.M., "Confronting Thievery in Somalia." Military

Reviw. August 1994. The article addresses the problems in

trying to reestablish law and a court system in a foreign

society.

 

Martin, Laurence. "Peacekeeping as a Growth Industry from the

National Interest." The National Interest. Summer 1993.

The author emphasizes that peacekeeping should be done under

the "Just War" theory. He feels that each nations self

interest should control the amount of their contribution.

 

McAllister, J.F.O. "When to Stay, When to Go." Time. 3 October

1993.. Down loaded from America Online, Vienna, V.A. The

article addresses the pullout of troops from Somalia.

Miller, Linda B. "The Clinton Years: Reinventing Foreign Policy?"

International Affairs Vol 70. October 1994. The article

looks critically at what the US should do in future UN

missions and remarks on the zigzag of U.S. foreign policy.

 

Morillon, Lieutenant General Philippe. "UN Operations in Bosnia:

Lesson and Realities." Royal United Services Institute FO

Defence Studies. December 1993. The author provides a good

background on the operations that led to the set up of

UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

 

Morrison, Alex. and Plain, Suzanne M. "The New Peacekeeping

Partnership." The Strathrobyn Papers. Toronto Ont.: The

Canadian Forces Staff College. August 1994. The paper

points out the changes in the post-Cold War international

situation. The authors place emphasis on the new

humanitarian peacekeeping and the problems that it creates.

The article also discuses the need to be selective with

where the UN deploys its very limited resources.

 

Plaut, Martin. "Rwanda - Looking beyond the Slaughter." Institute

of International Affairs. September 1994. This piece is an

excellent summary of what occurred in Rwanda as well as a

background history of what lead up to the conflict. The

history starts with the Germans making the country into a

colony.

 

Pomfret, John. "Year in Bosnia Changes British General's Views."

Washington Post. 23 January 1995. The article discusses

how Lt General Michael Rose's views on how to handle

violations in Bosnia changed from when he first arrived.

The article emphasizes that Lt General Rose feels that the

UN must remain neutral.

 

Ramet, Sabrina Petra. "The Bosnian War and the Diplomacy of

Accommodation." Current History. November 1994. The author

provides background to the Bosnia war from 1991 to 1994.

 

Ramsbotham, General Sir David. "How can the Military best help

the United Nations?" Army Quarterly and Defence Journal.

July 1994. A good summary on 10 steps necessary to improve

a UN operation. Ramsbotham points out that the U.S. forces

do not understand the doctrine on the use of minimum force.

 

Ramsbotham, General Sir David. "UN Operations: The Art of

the Possible." Royal United Services Institute for Defence

Studies. December 1993. The article deals with the

necessary improvements needed for UN missions but feels that

the criticisms of the UN are often ill-informed. General

Ramsbotham feels that UN membership implies an obligation to

supply forces to look after peace and security.

 

Reiff, David. "The Illusion of Peacekeeping." The World Policy

Journal. Fall 1994. Reiff's major point is that after

intervention, the great powers want the UN to move in and

take over the mission somewhat similar to what the old

Colonial Authorities used to do.

 

Roos, John G. "The Perils of Peacekeeping." Armed Forces

Journal. December 1993. The article points out the cost to

the U.S. of running a peacekeeping mission and the danger

encountered when a mission (such as Somalia) does not have a

precisely defined goal.

 

Smith, Jeffrey R. "Republicans Seek to Curb UN Funding."

Washington Post. 23 January 1995. The author mentions how

the Republicans are emphasizing the National Interest with

future participation with UN activities. The article points

out that the new measures would reduce the UN's budget by

one third.

 

Walker, David. "Battles of the Balkans." Royal United Services

Institute for Defence Studies. June 1993. The article

contains a very good history of the Balkans from the early

Ottoman empire up until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

 

Weinberger, Casper. "Text of Remarks by Secretary of Defense

Caspar W. Winberger to the National Press Club." 28

November 1984. Theory and Nature of War Readings Vol III.

Quantico V.A.: United States Marine Corps Command and Staff

College.

 

 

OTHER

 

Background Note: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. December

1994. Down loaded from INTERNET 15 March 1995 via server @

http://ralph.gmu.edu. lefpalpeace/toc.html. The background

note provides excellent information on each of the UN

operations. The viewpoint is from the Secretary General of

the United Nations.

 

Consolidated Rwanda Report # 17. 27 October 1994. Down loaded

from INTERNET 14 March 1995 via html Daniel Zalek@brown.edu.

 

Department of Defence(Public Affairs). Executive Summary: The

Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral

Peace Operations. 5 May 1994. Down loaded from INTERNET 14

March 1995 originally from navpali@opnav-emh.mnavy.mil.

 

Wisner, Frank G. Under Secretary of Defence for Policy. "U.S.

Peacekeeping Operations: Why, When, How, How Long." Speech

before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 14 July 1993.

The speech emphasized that the US did not want the status as

the World's Policeman yet liked the legitimacy that a

mission had when it was endorsed by the UN.

 

The White House. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement. Washington D.C. US Government Printing Office.

July 1994.

 

The White House. Press Release, Statement by President Clinton. 9

February 1994. Down loaded from the INTERNET 14 March 1995

via Admin@whitehouse.gov.

 

The White House. Press Briefing by National Security Council

Advisor Tony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and

Policy General Wesley Clark. 5 May 1994. Down loaded from

INTERNET 14 March 1995 originally from Admin@whitehouse.gov.

 

The White House. White House Press Release Office of the Press

Secretary. 29 July 1994. Down loaded from INTERNET 14

March 1995 originally from Admin@whitehouse.gov.

 

U.S. Congress, Senate. Peace Powers Act of 1995. 104th Cong. 1st

sess. 1995.

 

U.S. Congress, Senate. National Security Revitalization Act.

104th Cong. 1st sess. 1995.



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