Military

American Naval Preparation For Pacific War:  1931-1941

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Operations

 

 

 

 

 

AMERICAN NAVAL PREPARATIONS FOR PACIFIC WAR 1931-1941

A RETROSPECTIVE AND REAPPRAISAL

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                 M. S. KOROMHAS

                                               LTCOL J. JONES

                                                 MARCH 1995

 

        Throughout the 1930's the United States Navy was guided by three interrelated

 

principles which largely served to define its warfighting strategy, force structure, and plans

 

for growth.

 

 

 

        The first of these (Principles) was War Plan Orange, which provided the rationale

 

for a big Navy. The second was the concept of the "Balanced Fleet", which served as the

 

best available compromise of competing perspectives and interests within the Navy. The

 

third was the concept of the "Treaty Navy", which provided public justification for Naval

 

Growth.1

 

 

        Several observations are relevant to these principles as they were initially outlined

 

and used in the 1930's. First, they were all interrelated. As described above the principles

 

addressed force employment, structure, and acquisition strategy for the Navy as a whole.

 

Second, all were to varying extents divorced from the realities of the American political,

 

economic, diplomatic, and military conditions of the 1930's. This in part meant that all

 

functioned with varying degrees of effectiveness in guiding naval strategy and doctrine

 

during the interwar period. The third observation is that these principles on the whole,

 

served the Navy poorly in preparing for the Pacific campaign waged between 1941 and

 

1945.

 

 

        It is on this third observation that this paper will concentrate and expand its focus.

 

In doing so the paper will address several major themes. First, what was the genesis and

 

structure of each principle? Second, what factors either enhanced or diminished the

 

usefulness of each principle as it was applied in the 1930's. Third, how well did each

 

principle shape and prepare the Navy for Pacific War? Finally, do the lessons of the

 

1930's offer the contemporary military officer a model to emulate or avoid in pondering

 

and framing force strategy and doctrine?

 

 

Treat Navy 1920-1936

 

        The first of these principles to be examined is that of Treaty Navy. As outlined

 

above this concept sought to provide the rationale for a world class, battleship based fleet

 

capable of exerting its influence globally in support of American interests overseas.2 Prior

 

to in depth analysis of this principle however, a brief historical overview is in order.

 

 

        At the conclusion of the First World War only two of the allied (or associated)

 

powers, the United States and Japan, emerged in a position of enhanced financial,

 

economic or diplomatic strength.3 America in particular was well positioned to eclipse

 

the British empire as the worlds preeminent economic and most potent military power.4

 

However, concurrent with this rise in relative and absolute power there also arose

 

widespread fear and revulsion of a second conflict. Before the Treaty of Versailles was

 

concluded public opinion in the victorious powers clamored for demilitarization and

 

effective international arms control.5

 

 

 

        It is against this background that American Secretary of State Charles Evans

 

Hughes organized and led the Washington Naval Conference of 1920-22. This conference

 

involved all of the worlds major naval powers and in part sought to diminish and stabilize

 

the size and number of the world's dreadnought fleets. To this end Hughes was largely

 

successful. Capital ships, defined as any vessel mounting a gun greater than 8" and

 

displacing more than 10,000 tons, were limited to 35,000 tons in displacement.6

 

Additionally, a ten year moratorium on capital ship construction was specified and a

 

capital ship ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 was established for the major powers, Britain, the

 

United States, Japan, France, and Italy respectively.7 Furthermore since the Japanese

 

were hesitant to accept the 5:5:3 ratio, the treaty also specified that the United States

 

could not fortify its bases in the Philippines or on Guam or Wake Island.8

 

 

        The Washington Naval Conference set a de facto limit of 525,000 tons on the

 

American dreadnought force. To comply with the treaty, the Navy scrapped several

 

battleships under construction or laid down and canceled plans to fortify its Pacific bases

 

against possible Japanese invasion.

 

 

        Designed to prevent a naval arms race, the Washington Naval Conference was

 

enormously popular with the American public.9 It appeared to prove the thesis that a

 

legalistic series of treaties could prevent the onset of militarization and an arms race, and

 

also that the United States could pursue security arrangements without having to bear the

 

burden of membership in a collective security arrangement such as the League of

 

Nations.10

 

        Despite these apparent successes however, the Washington Naval Conference also

 

resulted in several liabilities and accentuated several artificiality's that became increasingly

 

troubling with the passage of time. The first problem was with the process of the

 

conference itself. Largely conducted by Secretary Hughes and the State Department,

 

naval officers were consulted only before the start of the talks and then on only the most

 

basic issues (such as the definition of the term "capital ship").11 This disconnect between

 

the agencies of government, in this case the Departments of State and War resulted in a

 

disjointed and passive foreign policy in the Pacific. The treaty also largely ignored the

 

dynamic nature of balance of power relationships between the major signatories. The

 

treaty drew no distinction between expanding powers such as the United States and Japan

 

and declining British power. By doing so it imposed a financial burden on the British that

 

they were ill advised to accept.

 

 

        The most damaging outcome of this conference for the Navy however, was the

 

false sense of security it provided to the American government and people.12 Despite the

 

ceiling of 525,000 tons the Navy was never built to this limit during the duration of the

 

treaty (this failure to build was not emulated by the Japanese, who promptly built to the

 

edge of treaty limits). Instead, American public opinion remained steadfastly opposed to

 

an enlargement of the fleet until after the treaty system collapsed in January 1936. The

 

outcome of this opposition meant that the idea of Treaty Navy (that is the Navy's desire to

 

build up to treaty limits) worked poorly as a guiding principle of Navy policy because it

 

remained a clearly unattainable goal from 1922 to 1936.

 

 

War Plan Orange 1920-1940

 

        As stated above, throughout the decades preceding the Second World War the

 

Navy's basic scheme for war against Japan was Plan Orange. One of a number of color

 

coded plans developed by the Joint Board and its working group the Joint Planning

 

Committee in the decades preceding the Pacific campaign, Orange ceased to be an

 

executive plan shortly after 1922.13

 

 

        When it was developed in 1920 however, Orange was both executable and also

 

addressed America's basic military strategy concerns in the Pacific. In the event of war

 

with Japan, Orange specified that the U.S. fleet would steam from its bases in the

 

continental United States, stopping at fortified island possessions (e.g., Hawaii, Guam, the

 

Philippines) for fuel and voyage repairs. As it neared the Japanese home islands the

 

numerically superior American fleet would engage the Imperial Navy in a daylight Jutland-

 

like engagement shattering it with superior numbers and gunnery.14 After the decisive

 

blue water engagement the American fleet would clamp a total naval blockade on the

 

Japanese, starving them into submission. The duration of this campaign was estimated to

 

be from one to three years. During much of this time the fleet would draw supply from its

 

Philippine base.

 

 

        Several major assumptions grounded Orange. The plan explicitly assumed a

 

numerical superiority in dreadnoughts, the predominance of daylight gunnery tactics, and

 

the existence of a chain of fortified island bases across the Pacific.15 Orange also

 

implicitly assumed (in its original state) a passive Japanese defense and the support of the

 

American government and people for a protracted Pacific campaign. After the

 

Washington Naval Conference of 1920 and continuing well into the 1930's however, time

 

and events proved many of these assumptions to be false as Orange, despite changes and

 

adjustments, increasingly drifted towards the realm of fantasy.

 

 

        In the wake of the 1920 Naval Conference the American assumption of numerical

 

superiority remained credible enough. A review of Jane's Fighting Ships editions of 1920,

 

1925, 1934, 1936, 1938 and 1941 confirms that the United States never lost its 5:3

 

dominance in dreadnoughts.16 Similarly, when war came in 1941 the circumstances

 

surrounding Americas entry into the war virtually assured the Navy of broad public and

 

government support for a Pacific campaign. There is also ample evidence to argue

 

however, that from 1920 to the autumn of 1941 the Navy did not have the public support

 

required to sustain a protracted naval campaign with the Japanese. Throughout most of

 

its existence. Orange remained fundamentally a Navy response to a national security

 

question. This issue, substantive at the plans inception, crippled Orange as a creditable

 

war plan throughout the 1920's and 1930's. At the broadest level the American public

 

remained either ignorant of Orange's existence or hostile to any plan which specified

 

participation in a large scale international conflict.17 Throughout the 1920's and to a

 

greater extent in the 1930's American isolationist and pacifist groups repeatedly brought

 

pressure to bear on the Roosevelt administration arguing that American naval and military

 

expansion would pave the way for entry into growing European and Asian conflicts.18

 

The actions of these groups had the effect of slowing military preparations in general and

 

decreasing broad support for even a "Treaty Navy".

 

        The publics apathy or hostility to Orange and plans similar to it was mirrored in the

 

government. Instead of military preparedness, the Department of State preferred

 

contractual legalistic approaches to international conflict resolution.19 The Kellogg-

 

Briand Treaty of 1927 is a manifestation of this sentiment. Signed by more than one

 

hundred nations, the signatory nations explicitly renounced war as an instrument of state

 

policy.20 Exacerbating the philosophic differences between the War and State

 

Departments was the almost total lack of formal liaison between them to communicate or

 

formulate policy. In fact, it was not until 1936 that a State Department representative

 

(Stanley Hornbeck) was sent to the War Department. Even then, the views and opinions

 

Hornbeck expressed were his own vice the State Departments.21 Presidents Coolidge and

 

Hoover were also cool to plans endorsing any expansion of military or naval strength (it

 

was the Hoover administration that sought to abolish the Marine Corps and failed to

 

authorize the construction of even one naval combatant ship throughout its tenure).22

 

 

        Even the War Department or more specifically the Joint Board or Joint Planning

 

Committee could not agree on Orange's feasibility after 1922. As historian Russell

 

Weigley wrote, "So great and difficult were the problems of the Orange Plans, especially

 

after the Washington Treaty of 1922, that the planners of the twenties and thirties never

 

had much confidence in their handiwork."23 Interservice problems with Orange were also

 

aggravated by the expansion of Japanese naval amphibious capability. The 1928 version

 

of Orange estimated that in the event of war with Japan, the enemy was capable of landing

 

60,000 men on Luzon within seven days, 100,000 within two weeks and 300,000 troops

 

within a month. At that time the U.S. Army garrison on the Philippines was 4,000 men

 

reinforced by a 7,000 strong Filipino constabulary.24 Hardly a credible deterrent or much

 

assurance that the United States could hold the Philippines long enough to await relief by

 

the battle fleet, this time supplemented by reinforcing troops.

 

 

        Complicating the problem of countering Japanese amphibious capability and

 

repelling an invasion of the Philippines were the provisions of the Washington Naval

 

Treaty which forbade fortification of American island bases in the western Pacific.25 If

 

these bases were taken by the Japanese the U.S. Navy was essentially left with two

 

options: to steam the 3,400 mile "through ticket" from Hawaii to Japan and engage the

 

Imperial Navy while low on fuel and in need of repairs, or seize island bases as the fleet

 

progressed slowly across the Pacific. The estimated duration of a campaign which

 

embraced the second option was three to ten years. Curiously, it did not specify how

 

bases were to be seized or mention a role for the Marine Corps. The estimated outcome

 

of steaming the "through ticket" as specified in option one was the annihilation of the U.S.

 

battle fleet in a probable replay of the 1905 Battle of Tsushima Straits during the Russo-

 

Japanese War.

 

 

        An interesting conclusion of the preceding discussion is that Orange was not

 

clearly linked to any corner of the Clauswitzian paradoxical trinity - the state, the military

 

or the people. Thus its acceptance as well as its practical feasibility was weak at

 

interception and grew increasingly improbable over time. Additionally, due in part to the

 

Washington Naval Conference of 1920 as well as the tiny size of the U.S. Army during the

 

interwar years the Navy lacked the basic force structure to execute Orange and the Army

 

lacked the troops to support it. After 1929 American domestic preoccupation with the

 

Great Depression kept the public focused on economic vice international matters until

 

almost the end of the 1930's.26 In short, involvement in a long, potentially costly war

 

against the Japanese was an anathema to most Americans during the Depression years.

 

 

 

        After 1937, several international factors also impinged on Orange. The first and

 

most important of these factors was the rise of Hitler's Germany, particularly after

 

rearmament commenced in 1936.27 By 1940, the expansion of German power in all

 

directions gave the Roosevelt administration cause for grave concern. As a result of

 

several planning meetings held between British and American leaders in 1941, Germany

 

was determined to be the primary threat to Anglo-American security interests.28

 

 

 

        The second of these factors was the expansion of Japanese power in China and the

 

concurrent diminution of Occidental influence in Asia after the outbreak of full scale Sino-

 

Japanese war in July 1937. Advancing quickly into the Chinese interior, Japanese forces

 

captured the Nationalist capital at Nanking after a bloody three week struggle which

 

culminated in a orgy of violence and terror. Western powers, preoccupied with economic

 

domestic concerns or Hitler's growing power, protested but felt incapable of providing

 

direct military assistance to China.29 By the autumn of 1940 the French and Dutch

 

collapse and British involvement in Europe virtually assured Japan a free hand in East Asia

 

with two exceptions: further resistance from the battered Nationalist Chinese and the

 

potential challenge of the United States.

 

        In One Hundred Years of Sea Power historian George Baer wrote, "The

 

experience of World War II proved the fundamental features of War Plan Orange to be

      

correct."30  While this observation may be true, it is equally almost certainly irrelevant.

 

While continually updated in the 1920's and 1930's and wargamed extensively, Orange

 

was never executed. Instead, Orange was superseded by five Rainbow options developed

 

in 1940, then by Adm Harold Stark's Plan Dog in November 1940. Essentially a policy

 

outline that concluded with four options (Alpha through Dog) Stark wrote "In my opinion

 

Alternatives (A), (B), and (C) will most probably not provide the necessary degree of

 

assistance, and, therefore, it we undertake war, that Alternative (D) [a policy of defeating

 

Germany before Japan with a strategic offense in the Atlantic and a strategic defense in the

 

Pacific] is likely to be the most fruitful for the United States, particularly if we enter the

 

war at an early date."31 Following deliberations with several domestic agencies and the

 

British, Roosevelt adopted Alternative D. The elements of this alternative were

 

incorporated into Plan ABC-1 and eventually into Rainbow Five which remained the

 

primary strategic vision for the United States during the Second World War.32

 

 

        Rather than following Orange, the American campaign in the Pacific War was

 

based on a clear assessment of military reality, the availability of material assets made

 

possible by America's colossal industrial capacity and was fought with tactics (e.g.,

 

USMC amphibious assault) and weapons (e.g., aircraft carriers) almost completely

 

unforeseen or unappreciated by the planners of Orange.

 

Balanced Fleet: 1933-1941

 

        The principle of Balanced Fleet, although executed with uneven results, best

 

prepared the Navy for the Pacific War. This principle succeeded where the preceding two

 

largely failed for several reasons. First, Balanced Fleet explicitly recognized the

 

importance of new weapons and tactics in the force structure. Unfortunately some of the

 

most innovative tactics contained in Marine Amphibious Doctrine were not incorporated

 

prior to 1942.

 

 

        Second, the ruling factions within the Navy began to recognize the importance of

 

new technology at almost the same time that a pro-Navy President took office in

 

Washington. The importance of Roosevelt's pro-Navy predelicitions, frequently

 

overlooked by many readers until obvious in 1938, are difficult to overstate. Within a year

 

of taking office Roosevelt made fleet expansion a key part of his New Deal economic

 

stimulus growth package.33 Considering the time required and labor and capital intensity

 

necessary for naval ship construction, this fleet expansion was well timed.

 

 

        This convergence of innovation, political opportunity, and the intensification of

 

threats to American security affected the three major branches of the Navy to varying

 

degrees but unquestionably aided the Navy as a whole in its war predurations. Balanced

 

Fleet's major challenge, as the title implies, was to balance both external multimission

 

capability and maintain an intragency balance of power and influence among surface,

 

aviation and subsurface advocates within the Navy. In short, Balanced Fleet was a power

 

sharing protocol as well as a rational vision for force structure.

 

 

        The development of naval aviation capability proceeded by both chance and

 

design. An unforeseen result of the Washington Naval Conference was the commissioning

 

of the worlds two largest aircraft carriers, Lexington and Saratoga, in 1927. Built on

 

battle cruiser hulls laid down as a result of the 1916 Naval Building Plan these ships were

 

almost scrapped as a result of the Washington Treaty. Their subsequent redesignation as

 

aviation vice capital ships, however, permitted completion as aircraft carriers and gave the

 

Navy a formidable strike capability.

 

 

        The independent strike capability was however, largely discounted by surface flag

 

officers until after Fleet Problem IX of 1929. Prior to this exercise the carriers normally

 

steamed in company with battleships, their air wings providing little more than gunnery

 

spotting services to the battle line. In Fleet Problem IX however, an aircraft carrier

 

(Saratoga) made a successful air attack on the Panama Canal (after an all night sprint of

 

30 knots) which prevented a cross canal transit by an opposing force.34 This

 

demonstration convinced many in the Navy power structure of the carrier's capability as

 

an independent strike element.

 

 

        The cause of aviation was also assisted by the promotion of a comparatively large

 

number of naval aviators to flag rank in the 1930's.35 These new Admirals then began to

 

use their power and influence to curtail the dominance of the Navy's battleship "gun club".

 

In part to ameridrate traditional fears of an aviation threat to the surface navy, aviation

 

doctrine was developed and articulated to complement rather than supplant surface gun

 

capability.

 

 

        This combination of tactical innovation, doctrinal development, an expanding

 

power base, and an increase in authorizations and funding for naval construction led to the

 

establishment of the world's second largest carrier force by 1941. Despite some notable

 

shortcomings in equipment (Navy fighters and torpedo bombers were obsolescent in 1941

 

and its torpedoes were among the world's worst) naval aviation was largely prepared for

 

war.36

 

 

        In contrast to the example of aviation the surface navy lagged behind in

 

technological and tactical innovation. Admittedly, some restrictions were placed on the

 

surface forces externally rather than from within. Due to the provisions of the Washington

 

and London Naval Conferences the number and displacement of dreadnoughts was

 

explicitly limited by treaty. Additionally, due to physical restrictions imposed by the width

 

of the Panama Canal, American battleships could not exceed 110 feet in beam or 900 feet

 

in length.37

 

 

        To aggravate the problem of battleship obsolence, the President and Congress

 

failed to authorize funds to build even to Treaty limits, and from 1927 to 1940 the Navy

 

possessed only 15 of its 18 authorized battleships. In an effort to modernize within these

 

restrictions battleship propulsion was changed from coal to oil fired boilers (which

 

provided greater cruising range) and main battery elevation was increased from twenty

 

four to thirty six degrees (which effectively added range to the guns).38 Radar, a major

 

technical breakthrough, was added to a number of surface combatants by 1940. Despite

 

these measures however, the surface force entered the war in a lesser state of readiness

 

than did the Japanese.

 

 

        The reasons for this unpreparedness were again severalfold. Despite new designs

 

in the wake of expanded construction authorizations in 1934, 1936, and 1938, ship design

 

remained inferior to that of the Japanese. In general, American cruisers and destroyers

 

were more lightly armed, thinly armored and slower than their counterparts of the Imperial

 

Navy. An example which illustrates this disparity is torpedo armament. While Japanese

 

cruisers and destroyers typically carried from eight to sixteen torpedoes aboard, American

 

ships were normally fitted with half that number. Some types, such as the Northhampton

 

class cruiser, carried none.39 American (and British) combatants also fell short in the

 

number and quality of anti-aircraft armament fitted aboard. While old style barbettes were

 

altered to place lighter caliber guns topside where they could be used against aircraft, the

 

typical American battleship carried only ten to twelve AA gun mounts in 1941. The fate

 

of H.M.S. Prince of Wales and H.M.S. Repulse in December 1941 in part illustrates the

 

inadequate response of the surface navy to determined air attack.40

 

 

        American surface combatant tactics also ossified during the interwar years. During

 

fleet maneuvers and battle problems, engagements were dominated by linear, Jutland style

 

gunnery duels conducted during the daytime. During the surface engagements off the

 

Solomon Islands in the autumn of 1942 Americans confronted an enemy with superior

 

tactics, weapons, and training and suffered accordingly.41 From the autumn of 1942

 

onward the American surface navy was saved by superior industrial capacity in the United

 

States and the ability of its officers (Burke, Mooseburger) to learn (rapidly) from mistakes

 

and eventually exploit new technologies such as radar.42 In short, superior resources and

 

the ability to innovate eventually overcame interwar inertia.

 

 

        The record of the American submarine force may offer the best example of a

 

component prepared to fight by December 1941. Compared to aircraft carriers and

 

battleships, submarines were relatively inexpensive to build and maintain and were in fact

 

constructed in great numbers during the interwar years. By 1941 the United States Navy

 

possessed more submarines (185) than the Japanese and British navy's combined.43

 

 

        The navy augmented this formidable force with superior design, strategy and

 

(eventually) tactics. After trying and discarding the "Fleet Submarine" design (submarines

 

remained too slow to keep up with the surface battleforce) submarines concentrated on

 

emulating the German example of the First World War by developing patrol schemes

 

proximate to sea lines of communication.44 The Gato class, designed in 1938 successfully

 

combined armament and cruising range which optimized it as a commerce raider. This

 

concentration on commerce raiding virtually annihilated the Japanese merchant marine by

 

1945.

 

        There is also subjective evidence to suggest that the submarine force tended to

 

attract the most aggressive, innovative, and resourceful of the Navy's officers and enlisted

 

men (after 1942).45 Operating in an environment where there was little room for error,

 

often far from any source of external support, the submarine force started the war

 

prepared for combat and acquitted itself well.

 

        In summary, the experience of the Navy in the interwar years offers the

 

contemporary student, policymaker or officer no less than six lessons for present

 

application.

 

        (1) Be wary of treaties/agreements which seek to bar advancements in technology.

 

While the goals of the Washington Naval Conference were noble (arms reduction and

 

limitation) the resulting treaty inadvertently left loopholes in aviation and weapons

 

technology which were exploited in subsequent years. In the Second World War, aircraft

 

and submarines (vice surface combatants) were the killing weapons of the war. The

 

modern planner would also do well to remember that treaties tend to lose their binding

 

power when they cease to serve an involved nations interest (Japan in 1936).

 

        (2) Keep war plans grounded in reality, even if this is politically unpalatable. The

 

Orange plans lost their function as a reliable articulation of strategy soon after 1922

 

because they lacked broad support from the government and because they became

 

unexecutable as time progressed. An admission of the inability to defend the Philippines,

 

while politically unpopular, would probably have prevented the Bataan Death March.

 

        (3) Attempt to keep the Paradoxical Trinity united in peace as well as war. The

 

Navy could not accomplish this from 1922 to 1940. Public support for the armed forces

 

remained lukewarm at best. Additionally, liaison with the other relevant agencies of

 

government (e.g., state) was poor and this inhibited the formation of a policy that united

 

the armed forces with the civilian agencies of government. From 1964 to 1975 this

 

experience was repeated this time while fighting a war. The results of Vietnam underline

 

the importance of keeping the State, People and Army united.

 

        (4) Insure that international commitments do not overextend the capability to

 

honor them. As in item (2) above the experience of the Philippines in 1941-42 is

 

instructive. A disaster of this type almost reoccurred in Korea in 1950. Many analysts

 

argue that this situation exists today for American forces in Korea.

 

        (5) The Navy must balance the fleet to meet a wide range of threats. As stated

 

above, this was the one principle that Navy planners came closest to attaining. In the

 

present day, budget cutbacks and tactics more appropriate to the Cold War are the two

 

main threats to this objective.

 

        (6) Do not assume that the enemy will permit us to refight over last war. The

 

Surface Navy took almost two years to realize that their tactics were out of date and that

 

some of their weapons were simply bad (torpedoes) or underused (radar). The

 

contemporary world is not as patient and the American public will not accept a replay of

 

our casualties in the 1941-42 Pacific theater without requisite gain. An overreliance on

 

the American experience in the recent Gulf War will almost certainly produce casualties

 

and defeat for the United States on a subsequent battlefield.

 

 

1 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994),

119.

2 Robert L. O'Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy,(New

York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 287.

3 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1989), 298.

4 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994),

86.

5 Dexter Perkins, "The Department of State and American Public Opinion" in The Diplomats 1919-1939,

Eds. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 282.

6 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994),

96.

7Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Pres, 1973),

244.

8 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994),

100.

9 Dexter Perkins, "The Department of State and American Public Opinion" in The Diplomats 1919-1939,

Eds. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953) 282.

10 Ibid, 299.

11 Robert L. O'Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 263.

12 Dexter Perkins, "The Department of State and American Public Opinion" in The Diplomats 1919-

1939, Eds. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 300.

13 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973),

245.

14Robert L. O'Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy, (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 300.

15Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973),

245.

16 Francis E. McMurtie A.I.N.A ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1941, (New York: MacMillian Co., 1942), 447

Passim.

17 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945 (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1979), 101.

18 Ibid, 101.

19 James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox 1932-1940 (New York: Harcourt Brace

Jovanovich, 1956), 352.

20 Dexter Perkins, "The Department of State and American Public Opinion" in The Diplomats 1919-1939

Eds. Gordon & Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 295.

21 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994),

120-121.

22 Ibid, 113.

23 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973),

246.

24 Ibid, 246.

25 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994),

100.

26 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945 (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1979), 109.

27 Ibid, 124.

28 James J. Herzog, Closing the Open Door: Japanese-American Diplomatic Negotiations 1936-1941,

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), 254.

29 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945 (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1979), 236-237.

30 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994),

127.

31 James J. Herzog, Closing the Open Door: Japanese-American Diplomatic Negotiations 1936-1941

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), 254.

32 Ibid, 121.

33 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945 (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1979), 74-75.

34 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973),

251.

35 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994),

140-141.

36Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: Random

House, 1985), 45.

37 Francis E. McMurtie A.I.N.A., Ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1941, (New York: MacMillian Co., 1942),

445 Passim.

38 Robert L. O'Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy, (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 289-290.

39 Francis E. McMurtie A.I.N.A, Ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1941, (New York: MacMillian Co., 1942),

467 Passim.

40 Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, (New York: Random

House, 1985), 128.

41 Wayne D. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,

1986), 117-119.

42 Ibid, 124.

43 Francis E. McMurtie A.I.N.A., Ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1941, (New York: MacMillian Co., 1942),

480-483.

44 Ronald H. Spector, Ease Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, (New York: Random

House, 1985), 485.

45 Ibid, 486.