Military

Strength Requirements For Combat Engineers

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Manpower

 

 

 

 

 

                             EXECUTIVES SUMMARY

 

Title: Strength Requirements for Combat Engineers

 

Author: Major Darryl E. Knight, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis: The Marine Corps' current criteria for physical testing does not adequately

address the requirements for the military occupational specialty (MOS) of combat

engineer.

 

Background:   The Marine Corps has no MOS specific physical standards. The physical

fitness test (PFT) is the benchmark for all Marines. The physical requirements of

individual MOS's like the combat engineers are ignored, although several require a greater

capacity for physical strength than others. Lifting bridge components overhead requires

more strength than kipping three times over a pull-up bar. The requirement for strength

needs identified and included in MOS qualification. The addition of women into the

combat engineer MOS magnifies this existing shortfall. Numerous studies have identified

the physical demands of the combat engineer MOS. Likewise, other studies show that

most women are unable to meet these physical demands.

 

Recommendations:   The Marine Corps should adopt physical standards for the combat

engineers based on individual MOS tasks and unit missions.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

       Assessing a unit or individual in the Marine Corps requires using standards to

 

gauge that assessment. A fair evaluation requires the use of known, consistently applied,

 

and achievable standards. Currently there are only two physical standards used to

 

measure Marines. The physical fitness test (PFT) and the battle skill's standard of a fifteen

 

mile forced march.1 The Marine Corps bases these standards on the premise that every

 

Marine is an infantryman, thus requiring the same physical standards of all Marines. This

 

thesis will address the need for physical standards within the combat engineer military

 

occupational specialties (MOS), due to integrating women into the combat engineers.

 

This paper will further review male/female differences, assess Marine Corps physical

 

standards, survey sister services and foreign country policies, and identify combat engineer

 

requirements due to their unique mission and equipment. Finally, I will submit courses of

 

action based on analysis.

 

       For the second time in Marine Corps history, the integration of women into the

 

combat engineer MOS will take place.2 The attempt in 1977 at integrating the MOS failed

 

for three reasons. The first reason was failing to integrate the enlisted combat engineers

 

(1371). By integrating the enlisted combat engineers along with other MOS's in the

 

Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) and Force Service Support Group (FSSG) engineer units, a

 

thorough performance evaluation of women would have been achievable. By integrating

 

only the combat engineer officer (1302) MOS, the Marine Corps did not provide enough

 

female combat engineers to evaluate their performance. The second reason for failure

 

dovetailed into the first. Female officers did not deploy with their platoons due to a lack

 

of berthing space on amphibious shipping.3 The third stumbling block to success lay in

 

socialization. The female combat engineer officer entered the unit singularly, usually with

 

no other female officer or staff noncommissioned officer available for support.4

 

Fraternization and pregnancy became perception problems. Due to the low density of

 

females, a mistake by one reflected poorly on the group.5

 

       This paper will not address the issues for the unsuccessful gender integration listed

 

above. They are no longer relevant, as all of these issues are considered correctable

 

through planning and leadership. This paper aims at ensuring gender integration does not

 

result in the degradation of combat readiness of engineer units. By admitting only

 

mentally and physically qualified females and males into the combat engineer MOS,

 

engineer units should remain combat ready.

 

MALE/FEMALE DIFFFERENCES

 

       There is great debate about physical strength requirements in the military. Some

 

argue that today's military depends much less on brawn in favor of smart, educated,

 

technically trainable people.6 This is true in some branches of the military and even in

 

some MOS's in the Marine Corps. However, even on today's technological battlefields,

 

the requirements for strength and endurance in closing with and destroying the enemy by

 

close combat exist. It doesn't matter that the billets requiring extreme vigor and physical

 

exertion may have decreased (down from ninety-five percent in the Civil War to sixteen

 

percent today).7 What matters is that the requirement for brawn is vital in certain MOS's

 

to ensure victory on the battlefield.8 Combat engineering is one of the MOS's requiring

 

brawn.

 

       Some women can exceed the average man in physical strength and endurance.

 

Athletes such as Florence Griffith Joyner are proof that women can excel far beyond the

 

average male.9 However, comparing trained female athletes with the average male serves

 

no purpose. I will examine capacities of the average male and female who become

 

Marines.

 

       Cardiovascular strength and upper body strength are the standards for measuring

 

Marines strength. A number of studies as to the differences in strength between males and

 

females are consistent in denoting the female's lack of natural strength. "The mean

 

strength of the female is estimated to range somewhere between forty to seventy percent

 

of the male, taking into account her lower body weight, muscle mass, and level of muscle

 

training."10 The average male will be larger than the average female, so size and strength

 

differentials exist immediately. The average male has more endurance, greater muscle and

 

bone mass, so therefore can lift more, carry more, jump higher, and throw farther. What

 

happens with a balanced playing field? Start with two one hundred and forty pound

 

eighteen year olds, one male and one female. The male is stronger, faster and has more

 

physical stamina to start with, but put them both into intensive physical training and the

 

male will have increased his relative physical superiority over the female.11

 

MARINE CORPS PHYSICAL STANDARDS

 

       Physical Fitness Test

 

 

       The PFT is a baseline standard designed to measure the physical fitness level for all

 

Marines in three areas.12 Although not designed to evaluate an individual's ability to

 

endure the rigors of combat, the PFT does highlight the different physical characteristics

 

and limitations between males and females. Debate revolves around the disparities

 

between male and female PFT's, and arguments for continuing separate gender and age

 

requirements for the PFT can be persuasive.13 This allows the continued illusion of male

 

and female physical capabilities being the same. They are not.

 

       The Marine Corps conducted a study of active duty female Marines and their

 

performance on both the male and female PFT's. I emphasize that these were active duty

 

Marines, all passed the female PFT, and none assigned to weight control or appearance

 

programs. After undergoing an inventory male PFT test in which eighty-eight percent

 

failed, these Marines underwent a rigorous twelve weeks conditioning program designed

 

to increase their cardiovascular and upper body strength. Following this intensive

 

mandatory conditioning program, sixty-six percent still failed the male PFT, with

 

forty-four percent unable to do the three pull-up minimum and twenty-six percent unable

 

to complete the three mile run in the required time.14

 

       The "official" Marine Corps view is overemphasis on achieving exemplary scores

 

on the Physical Fitness Test which can be detrimental to the training required to develop

 

the "total Marine."15 Regardless of the official view, many Marines take great pride in

 

their personal fitness, even to the point of becoming zealots.16 Most Marines agree that

 

physical fitness and appearance are highly important parts of leadership and a

 

measurement is through the PFT.

 

       Battle Skills Standard

 

       A female Marine's failure to pass the male PFT is an initial indication that the

 

combat engineer MOS may be too physically demanding for her. The other universal

 

measurable physical standard for Marines is the battle skills standard of annually

 

completing a fifteen mile forced march in field gear carrying a forty pound pack and

 

weapon within a designated time limit.17 This task measures endurance and is an indicator

 

of both cardiovascular and upper body strength. Tracking of this task is non-existent since

 

no entry into the unit diary system takes place. Lack of measurable data prevents an

 

accurate analysis of this requirement. Personal experience in a mixed gender Fleet Marine

 

Force unit indicates that many female Marines experience great difficulty in completing

 

this requirement. The Commanding Officers of Marine Wing Support Squadron 371,

 

demanded battle skills testing of all hands. Of twenty-one male officers and three

 

hundred and eleven male Marines participating, all twenty-one male officers and three

 

hundred and two male Marines passed (all Marines who did not complete the march were

 

re-tested and given a second chance to meet the standard). However, both female officers

 

and eighteen of the twenty-seven female Marines failed to meet the prescribed standard.18

 

SISTER SERVICE/FOREIGN COUNTRY POLICIES

 

       The U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force instituted screening strength tests for

 

military occupational specialties in 1983, with varying degrees of success. Administered at

 

the Military Entrance Processing Station, the physical strength tests applied Department of

 

Labor Occupational Classification methodology to military occupations. The physical

 

strength tests for military applicants provided an initial MOS screening for candidates

 

before specialty training.19 Penalties for failing the screening test varied according to

 

service. The Army highly discouraged the applicant who failed the testing from pursuing

 

their chosen branch.20 The Air Force prevented failed applicants from entering their

 

specialty.21 The administration of tests before recruit training rely solely on strength and

 

conditioning achieved before recruit training. Administering the test before recruit

 

training placed women at a disadvantage. However, even with the upper body

 

conditioning received at recruit training the increase in female strength scores was

 

minimal.22 The Air Force has stayed with their Strength Aptitude Test, while the Army

 

abandoned their Military Enlisted Physical Strength Capacity Test in 1990.23 Interestingly

 

the Army has determined that the major physical limiting factor for completing tasks

 

within a MOS is upper body strength, not stamina.24 The U.S. Navy has not incorporated

 

strength screening in their entrance process, although their own studies agree with the

 

Army's conclusions regarding MOS task completion and upper body strength.25

 

       Currently there are three countries that allow women into ground combat and

 

combat engineer units. They are Denmark, the Netherlands, and Canada.

 

       Denmark

 

       Denmark is experiencing mixed success integrating women into combat and

 

combat support units. They have not achieved their goal of integrating five percent of

 

their females into the combat arms. Surprisingly there is no great concern for combat

 

readiness among the Danes, who believe they will have ample time to prepare for war.26

 

Women must meet male physical standards. However, the integration of women into

 

formerly male-only MOS's required lowering physical standards for men. The Danes take

 

a group approach to physical training that allows the strong to carry the weaker unit

 

member's load.

 

       The Netherlands

 

       The Dutch implemented their policy of women in the combat arms to be more in

 

line with their countries moral philosophy. Like the Danes they hoped to increase their

 

female military population, with a similar lack of success. Due to high physical standards

 

there is only one female serving in the infantry and none in the combat engineers. Because

 

women have been unable to meet male physical standards, the Dutch are exploring

 

relaxing these standards.27

 

       Canada

 

       Our neighbor to the North is the best example of how gender integration should

 

take place, at least initially. In 1989, through judicial decree, all ground combat positions

 

opened to women. This approach caused the realization that men and women are not

 

equal, at least not physically.28 Initially, twelve women attended OCS of which five

 

passed. These five continued on to infantry officer's school, but all withdrew unable to

 

meet the physical standards of the course. The enlisted women have fared no better.29

 

Initially ninety-two women entered mixed gender recruit training of which forty-seven

 

graduated. From that forty-seven only one completed the infantry training school, and she

 

asked for an assignment other than infantry.30 The field engineer field (combat engineer)

 

has not shown any greater success; a total of one female field engineer has successfully

 

completed training.31

 

       After one hundred and three attempts at integrating the combat arms without

 

success, the Canadian Forces lowered their physical standards.32 The current test now for

 

the combat arms requires a soldier to carry a soldier of similar weight and limits the field

 

pack weight to no more than fifty pounds. Even with lowered standards, women have not

 

expressed interest in the infantry and field engineering specialties.33

 

COMBAT ENGINEER REQUIREMENTS

 

       Mission/Tasks

 

       The physical strength requirement for combat engineers is no less today than on

 

the battlefield's of World War II, Korea or Vietnam.34 The two main reasons for this are

 

the missions of the combat engineer and the equipment available to complete this mission.

 

       Missions assigned to engineer units supporting the MAGTF split into

 

countermobility, mobility, and survivability areas. Elements of these missions include

 

engineer reconnaissance, obstacle breaching and emplacement, bridging, demolitions,

 

emplacing field fortifications, and fighting as infantry.

 

       The combat engineers complete their tasks as part of the accomplishment of the

 

unit's mission. The mission of obstacle breaching requires the performance of many

 

individual tasks. In Operation Desert Storm the combat engineer battalions attached

 

breaching teams to Task Forces to perform the mission of breaching obstacle belts erected

 

by the Iraqis. These teams integrated with tanks and assault amphibious vehicles to form

 

obstacle clearing detachment teams.35 To complete the mission, the combat engineers

 

tasks included exiting their vehicles and entering the mine field on foot. Further tasks

 

included priming the mine clearing line charges by hand, followed by a foot race back to

 

safety before the two thousand pounds of explosives detonated.36

 

       Equipment

 

       The tools of the trade of the Marine combat engineer have remained basically the

 

same for the last fifty years. Even with technological advances, the weight of equipment

 

carried and employed by combat engineers remains burdensome. Because of fiscal

 

restraints and low budget priorities, no new engineer sets, chests, or kits made the cut for

 

the fiscal year 1996 budget. Only a few obstacle breaching items are currently still alive,

 

with these items not scheduled for actual production and procurement before the turn of

 

the century.

 

       The equipment carried by division combat engineers, besides the prescribed

 

combat load, varies with their assigned mission. Normal additional equipment includes: an

 

individual demolition set (seven pounds, less explosives), mine detector (twenty-six

 

pounds), and crew served weapon. Also, depending on the mission and available

 

transportation, parts of the squad demolition kit (eighty pounds, less explosives), the

 

carpenters tool kit (one hundred and sixty-five pounds), pioneer tool kit (four hundred and

 

four pounds), or block and tackle kit (two hundred and five pounds) may be added to their

 

load.37 Demolitions required will be mission dependent. These tool kits and the mine

 

field marking sets (nine hundred pounds in three boxes) require loading and unloading by

 

hand, moving by vehicle as close to the mission site as possible. Lifting of these kits to

 

platforms as high as five feet is not uncommon, placing the emphasis on teamwork and

 

upper body strength.

 

       The FSSG combat engineers have the advantage of greater access to vehicle

 

transportation for their equipment (unless augmenting the division engineers). However,

 

their tool kits are larger (pioneer kit is one thousand pounds vice four hundred and four,

 

the carpenter kit is two hundred and twenty pounds vice one hundred and sixty-five) and

 

there are more of them per company than in the division. The lifting requirements for

 

these kits remain the same however, as does the need to rely on teamwork and upper body

 

strength.

 

       The MAW combat engineers have many of the same tools as their FSSG brethren,

 

to include the larger carpenter and pioneer tool kits. The lifting requirements for these

 

kits remains the same however, as does the need to rely on teamwork and upper body

 

strength.

 

       The sets, chests, and kits previously noted are in the current inventory with no

 

requirement for replacement or upgrade except for the demolitions kit. Even though

 

noted for improvements to safety, performance, and weight, the demolitions kit went

 

unfunded in the last budget cycle.

 

       The existence of heavy tool kits in itself does not require special strength

 

standards. The assigned missions requiring the use of this equipment does. Obstacle

 

breaching is one of the missions that standout as requiring higher than normal upper body

 

strength. According to Army studies, sixty percent of males and zero percent of females

 

can perform the required task of placing a breaching charge against a fortified position,

 

which requires a higher degree than normal of upper body strength and endurance.38

 

Conducting an assault breach with a bangalore torpedo is another test of strength and

 

stamina. This breaching device is man packed to the breach site under the observation and

 

fire of the enemy and requires the assembly of multiple one hundred and ninety-eight

 

pound kits. During assembly at the forward edge of the obstacle the breaching team

 

manually pushes the bangalore torpedo through the minefield. The standard threat

 

minefield requires linking three kits and pushing the assembled five hundred and ninety-six

 

pound tube through variable types of terrain. The employment of the bangalore torpedo is

 

extremely physically demanding, relying largely on upper body strength. The

 

Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching System (APOBS) will replace the bangalore torpedo.

 

Weighing one hundred and twenty-five pounds, the APOBS comes in two backpacks,

 

each weighing more than sixty pounds. The APOBS, carried up to two kilometers before

 

employed, may include running with the backpack to the forward edge of the obstacle.39

 

Although an improvement over the bangalore, it is still a strain on upper body strength and

 

endurance.

 

       The FSSG combat engineer requirements for upper body strength stand out during

 

the erection of Medium Girder Bridging (MGB). The erection of the MGB requires

 

dividing the company into teams, with each team member contributing equally. The MGB

 

components weigh up to four hundred and thirty-five pounds for a bottom panel, and are

 

designed for a four Marine lift to waist height. Requiring an overhead press of three

 

hundred and eighty-five pounds by four Marines, the top panel requires equal portions of

 

strength and teamwork. The six Marine lift of the post tensioning beam is six hundred and

 

fifty-seven pounds.40 All these lifts require moving the component from the aging area

 

to the erection site by hand (distance is terrain dependent) and lifting the component in

 

place (from waist to overhead height) until secured by a metal pin. All team lifts are at

 

least to waist height with chest high being the normal lift, depending on the terrain. The

 

average lift per individual would be under eighty pounds, with the three hundred and

 

eighty-five pound top panel lifted overhead twelve times per hundred feet of bridging

 

erected.41

 

       A common mission for the combat engineers in the MAW is laying AM-2 matting

 

for expeditionary airfields, known as "slamming mat." This AM-2 matting comes in 2'x6'

 

and 2'x12' sections that weigh seventy-two and one hundred forty-four pounds

 

respectively and are linked using a key system. Laid in ninety-six foot squares for landing

 

pads or three thousands feet or more for runways, AM-2 matting requires above average

 

physical strength and stamina to emplace. The mat requires two Marines carrying and

 

hand placing each section of mat on the airfield42.

 

       The above strength requirements are not worst case examples, but daily

 

requirements.  The Army's evaluation of physical strength requirements for MOS's

 

recommended both the combat engineer and the bridge crewman remain closed to females

 

due to strength requirements.43

 

COURSES OF ACTION

 

       I have identified three courses of action available to the Marine Corps. Criteria in

 

examining the courses of action: fairness, readiness, and costs in their requirements for

 

implementing physical standards based on MOS.

 

       Accept All MOS Applicants

 

       Accepting all applicants, male and female regardless of physical capabilities, is

 

fairness at its best. This approach means adopting the Danish model of gender integration

 

and relying on teamwork to accomplish heavy physical tasks. This method also keeps the

 

myth of "every Marine a rifleman"44 alive by keeping physical requirement testing to the

 

PFT and the battle skills march. The positive effects on fairness masks the negative effects

 

on readiness of this plan. Fiscal costs would be very high.

 

       As previously noted, the Marine Corps does not have initial strength testing to

 

qualify for a MOS. Nor does the Marine Corps have identifiable physical standards as

 

part of the training for MOS qualification.45 However, when a MOS standard calls for

 

assisting in erecting a fixed panel bridge it should be a given that there is an inherent

 

requirement for physical strength. This route, if adopted, places the adoption of physical

 

standards below the goal of fairness.

 

       In the past the Marine Corps has opted for fairness instead of readiness. In 1977

 

the Marine Corps integrated their training companies at Officer Candidate School (OCS)

 

and at the Basic School (TBS).46 Female lieutenants underwent the same physical training

 

as their male counterparts, with little success. The vast majority were not capable of

 

surviving in this physically demanding training environment. With women unable to pass

 

the male PFT and keep up on conditioning hikes, the Marine Corps reverted to dual

 

standards for males and females.47 This clearly shows some women could indeed handle

 

the physical requirements, although a distinct minority. If the male PFT is too strenuous,

 

bridge company is out for most females.

 

       Under this course of action tasks requiring above-average physical strength

 

become the domain of the Marines possessing the strength to accomplish them. Called

 

teamwork by those not having to do the physical labor, it breeds resentment. Teamwork

 

is everyone pulling their own share of the load, not a constant division of tasks by physical

 

capabilities.

 

       A possible solution to the strength requirements lies in reducing the weight of the

 

engineer's equipment. However, current budget constraints will not permit combat

 

engineers to procure lighter equipment to factor out Marines' lack of physical strength.

 

The current budget only includes those engineer items that will make a notable difference

 

on the battlefield. I will address efforts of lightening sets, chests, and kits. Items such as

 

bridging sets are constantly being refined by manufacturers to carry the heaviest possible

 

vehicle with the lowest amount of bridge weight. Unfortunately, even if a lightweight

 

bridge became available the MGB's service life doesn't expire until 2002. Also, bridging

 

replacement may take up to twenty years beyond service life.48

 

       Further restricting the purchase of low weight engineer sets, chests, and kits are

 

design and logistics costs. With few exceptions, off-the-shelf commercial sources furnish

 

the components making up combat engineer kits. Commercial hand tools are heavy and

 

until there is a considerable demand for extremely lightweight tools combat engineers will

 

continue to ply their trade with heavy steel. Even the APOBS, quite an improvement in

 

both capability and weight over the bangalore torpedo, is still a very heavy piece of gear.

 

Designing out too much weight may affect the capability of the equipment or the

 

equipment will normally become cost prohibitive. If modernization does take place and

 

nail gun sets become readily available to replace harmers, the logistics tail tied to the nail

 

gun set (generator requiring fuel) is burdensome and unwieldy.49

 

       Besides purchasing new tools requiring new designs, another possible solution to

 

the strength problem is to repackage the engineer sets, chests, and kits into lighter

 

sub-kits. For instance, make the carpenters tool kit (one hundred sixty-five pounds) into

 

two boxes instead of one, or turn the three box pioneer tool kit (four hundred and four

 

pounds) into six boxes, effectively cutting the physical lift requirement in half per box.

 

This solution does not take into account the additional space "footprint" and impact on

 

readiness.50 The addition of numerous boxes of tools adds unnecessary space

 

requirements to amphibious shipping, already scarce. In addition, it impacts on covered

 

storage space at permanent facilities and could affect the number of vehicles required to

 

move the unit. Finally, in these austere times it would be prohibitively expensive for the

 

Marine Corps to repackage its tools.

 

       This course of action adversely affects unit readiness in two ways. First, lowered

 

morale prevails in units where all members do not share the same hardships. The

 

teamwork emphasis for physical tasks vice each team member carrying their own load will

 

quickly erode unit cohesion. Second, the increase in time to complete missions due to unit

 

members being unable to complete assigned tasks would significantly degrade readiness.

 

       Implement Physical Standards Based on Gender Average

 

       Implementing physical standards based on gender averaging in place of the current

 

PFT and battle skills march is a middle-of-the-road course of action. This plan requires

 

the Marine to pass the PFT followed by specific physical tests before MOS assignment is

 

complete. These tests would be gender specific and conducted at recruit training.

 

Derived from the statistical "average" Marine, the physical standards would require a

 

recruit to show they are in the top fifty percent for their gender in upper body and

 

cardiovascular strength. This approach still means adopting the Danish model of relying

 

on teamwork to accomplish heavy physical tasks. This plan emphasizes fairness over unit

 

readiness. Costs involved are for studies to develop the statistical average and

 

implementation of testing at recruit training.

 

       In converting strength requirement standards from civilian to military tasks the

 

Army discovered that all MOS's open to women in the utilities and general engineering

 

fields required physical strength above the baseline for females.51 The strength standards

 

may seem unreasonable because women are already serving in these MOS's. However, a

 

majority of the females in these MOS's are unable to perform some of their assigned tasks

 

because they do not possess the upper body strength to do the task at hand.52

 

       This course of action requires teamwork, but not to the point of becoming like the

 

Danes. One of the ways suggested to deal with a Marine who cannot physically handle

 

assigned tasks is to team them with another Marine to assist with the task. This approach

 

can foster camaraderie or cause a great deal of resentment by the Marines who have to

 

shoulder two loads.

 

       Physical standards for a unit drop if women and men have different standards for

 

the same tasks in the name of fairness. Since the arrival of women in 1976, the United

 

States Military Academy (USMA) incorporated the following changes to ensure fairness:

 

              -the Physical Aptitude Exam has been made gender specific.

              -cadets no longer run with rifles or do rifle exercises.

              -ability running groups were adopted because women could not keep up

               on unit runs.

              -cadets no longer run in combat boots.

              -the elimination of RECONDO training.

              -the Indoor Obstacle Course, designed to test endurance and the ability

               to overcome physical obstacles directly related to the tasks of a combat

               soldier, was made easier so women would not be physiologically

               discouraged.

              -women take self-defense instead of wrestling or boxing.53

 

       The success of Operation Desert Storm included more than adequate performances

 

by an entire generation of Army officers brought up on these "lowered" physical

 

standards. PFT scores have fallen with the lowering of standards at the USMA.

 

However, the standards at the active duty infantry, ranger, and engineer schools remained

 

high, negating the gender standard adjustments at the USMA.

 

       The implementation of standards is a good start in ensuring unit readiness. The

 

insertion of gender specific standards ensure that some of the unit's member will lower the

 

overall readiness of the unit. Again, the increase in time to complete missions due to unit

 

members being unable to complete assigned tasks would significantly degrade readiness.

 

       Set Physical Standards Matching the Physical Requirements

 

       Setting physical standards based on the individual tasks a combat engineer

 

performs forms the basis for the final proposed course of action. This plan also requires

 

the Marine to pass their gender's PFT and a set of physical tests at recruit training before

 

MOS assignment is complete. These tests would be not be gender specific. Derived from

 

the tasks required of a combat engineer, the physical standards would require testing of

 

capacity for overhead press, dead lift, and marching with a heavily weighted pack among

 

others. These requirements mirror tasks such as bridging and obstacle breaching. The

 

physical standards would require a recruit to meet minimum levels in upper body and

 

cardiovascular strength. This approach means adopting the original Canadian path of

 

placing the emphasis on mission accomplishment, not fairness. This plan emphasizes unit

 

readiness as the driving factor. Developing statistical data and converting it to strength

 

measurement and implementation of testing at recruit training account for costs.

 

       This course of action levels all playing fields and concentrates on mission

 

accomplishment. No Marines are exempt from testing. Marines shoulder no more than

 

their share of the load. Unit morale remains constant along with enhanced readiness.

 

Measuring fairness by unit success gives those who succeed a sense of real

 

accomplishment.

 

       In the 1990's the Marine Corps again integrated OCS and TBS, this time with

 

much better results. Two of the main differences contributing to success are not requiring

 

females to run the male PFT, and allowing women to have compensators on the obstacle

 

course. Overall the women had higher physical fitness scores when integrated than in

 

previous segregated companies.54  Women will improve their performance when they train

 

with men, but their performances will not become equal.55 Marines who quality will train

 

together and rely on one another, regardless of gender.

 

CONCLUSION

 

       The combat engineer requires physical abilities to complete assigned missions or

 

to lead Marines. There is no room for "feather merchants" of either sex. Standards

 

incorrectly set, whether too high or low, need adjusting. That adjustment requires a

 

review of the standard and what results from the accomplishment of the standard.

 

Lowering standards to ensure fairness is wrong. There is no fair in combat and lowered

 

standards equate to lowered readiness. The only thing worse than lowered standards are

 

no standards, which is where we are now.

 

       The following factors influenced evaluating the courses of action against readiness:

 

             --current lack of specific MOS physical standards

 

             --the secondary mission to fight as infantry

 

             --the MOS task requiring closing with the enemy to breach obstacles

 

             --the lowering of established standards by other western countries

 

       Although the Marine Corps does not want to recognize physical differences in

 

MOS's, the fact remains that certain specialties require actual physical standards apart

 

from the PFT. The combat engineer MOS is one of these. With the physical requirements

 

already noted, standards delineating specific strength requirements need to be

 

incorporated immediately. These standards need to relate to the tasks required of all

 

combat engineers making the last course of action the only logical choice.

 

                                 BIBLIOGRAPHY

10 U.S.C. Section 6015.

 

Binkin, Martin and Irene Kyriakopoulos, "Youth or Experience? Manning the Modern

       Military", The Brookings Bulletin, XVI (Summer 1979).

 

Blankemeyer, Francis J., Major USMC, telephone interview of author, 10 February

       1995.

 

Butler, J. M., Col., USMC (Ret.), telephone interview by author, 13 February 1995.

 

Carney, Thomas P., Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, United States Army, memorandum

       for Commander. Subject: "Training Doctrine Command." 11 February 1994.

 

Combat Engineer Battalion, Table of Organization (T/O) 1378C Mission Statement dated

       7 December 1993.

 

Cureton, Charles H., Lieutenant Colonel USMCR, US. Marines in the Persian Gulf,

       1990-1991 With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

       Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 1993.

 

Davis, William J., Lieutenant Commander USN, Leadership Challenge: Successfully

       Integrating Women into Carrier Aviation Squadrons. MMS Thesis. Quantico,

       VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, May 1994.

 

Deegan, Gene A., Major General USMC, "Women in Combat: A View from the Top",

       Marine Corps Gazette, September 1992, 42-44.

 

Dusky, Lorraine, "Combat Ban Stops Women's Progress, Not Bullets." Ed. David L.

       Bender, 64-66. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 1991.

 

Engineer Support Battalion, Table of Organization (T/O) 3914N Mission Statement dated

       7 December 1993.

 

Field Manual (FM) 90-13-1. Combined Arms Breaching Operations. Washington, DC:

       Department of the Army. February 1990.

 

Fischl, M. A., Dr., Chairman Gender Neutral Strength Standards Committee, telephone

       interview by author, 25 January 1995.

 

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 13. MAGTF Engineer Operations. Washington,

       DC: United States Marine Corps. February 1992.

 

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 13-8. MAGTF Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

       Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps. December 1993.

 

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 0-1B. Marine Physical Readiness

       Training for Combat. Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps. January

       1988.

 

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-51. Engineer Operations.

       Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps. September 1991.

 

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-52. Engineer! Comments on the

       Evolution of the Marine Engineer. Washington, DC: United States Marine

       Corps. August 1989.

 

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-97. Engineer Support of Combat

       in Deserts (A Russian View). Washington, DC: United States Marine

       Corps. October 1990.

 

Frank, Benis M., Oral History of General R. M Davis, USMC. Washington, DC: United

       States Marine Corps, 1978.

 

Glenn, Russell W., Lieutenant Colonel USA, "Together into the Breach", Armor,

       Jan/Feb 1994, 40-43.

 

Glumm, M. M. The Female in Military Equipment Design. Aberdeen Proving Ground,

       Human Engineering Lab. 1976.

 

Goldman, Nancy L. ed., Female Soldiers-Combatants or Noncombatants? Westport, CT:

       Greenwood Press, 1982.

 

Harper, J. E. Commander Canadian Forces, Integration of Women in FMC (Memo),

       Canadian Defence Liaison, Washington, DC, May 13, 1991.

 

Hawkins, Glen R., Major USA, Report on Training Changes at West Point Since the

       Admission of Women, Washington, DC: Presidential Commission on the

       Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, September 22, 1992.

 

Hope, P.D Lieutenant Colonel Canadian Forces, telephone interview of author, 10

       February 1995.

 

Holm, Jeanne, Major General USAF (Ret.), Women in the Military: An Unfinished

       Revolution. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982.

 

Holm, Jeanne, Major General USAF (Ret.), "Women in Combat: The New Reality." In

       Women in the Military. Ed. David L. Bender, 67-72. San Diego, CA:

       Greenhaven Press, 1991.

 

Jennings, James Mark Lieutenant Colonel USMC, interview by author, 7 January 1995.

 

Knight, D.E., Major USMC, personal notes from Marine Wing Support Squadron 371,

       Yuma, AZ, 1989.

 

Koper, Paul, Lieutenant Colonel USMC, personal interview by author, 6 February 1995.

 

Lamerson, Cheryl Major Canadian Forces, Integration of Women in the Canadian

       Forces, Canadian Defence Force, October 1990.

 

Ledoux, John Lance, Major USMC, interview by author, 22 December 1994.

 

Marine Corps Order 1200.7N, Military Occupational Specialties Manual (Short Title:

       MOS Manual), United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 23 March 1994.

 

Marine Corps Order 6100.3J, Physical Fitness, United States Marine Corps, Washington,

       DC, 29 February 1988.

 

Marine Wing Support Squadron, Table of Organization (T/O) 8703N Mission Statement

       dated 24 October 1995.

 

McDaniels, George, Chief Warrant Officer 4 USMC, telephone interview by author, 6

       February 1995.

 

Melson, Charles D., Major USMC (Ret.), Evelyn A. Englander, and David A. Dawson,

       Captain USMC, US. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: Anthology and

       Annotated Bibliography. Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 1992

 

Memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations, Plan for Assigning Women Marines

       to Routine Seagoing Deployments and Seagoing Training Deployments,

 

Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC dated 6 May 1994.

       Memorandum from the Department Head, Installation and Logistics Department,

       Transition of Women Marines Who Possess MOS 1361. Engineer Assistant.

       Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC, dated 18 November

       1992.

 

Memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, United States Army, to the

       Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces,

       Army Physical Testingat Recruitment, dated May 1, 1992.

 

Memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff for PPO of the Marine Corps, to the

       Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces,

       Marine Corps Physical Fitness Testing dated May 1, 1992.

 

Memorandum from the Director, Manpower Plans and Policy Division, Change in

       Assignment of Women Policy Headquarters, United States Marine Corps,

       Washington, DC, dated 13 January 1994.

 

Memorandum from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Personnel, Women

       in the Army Policy Review, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1982.

 

Memorandum from the Secretary of the Army, Recommendations for Opening

       Additional Positions for Women Under the DOD Assignment Policy--DECISION

       MEMORANDUM. Department of the Army, Washington, DC, dated 1 June

       1994.

 

Miller, Randy, Major USMC, personal interview by author, 8 February 1995.

 

Mitchell, Brian, Weak Link. The Feminization of the American Military. Washington,

       DC: Regnery Gateway, 1989.

 

Mitchell, Brian, "Should Women Serve in Combat?" In Women in the Military. Ed.

       David L. Bender, 80-81. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 1991.

 

Moskos, Charles, "Army Women." In Women in the Military. Ed. David L. Bender,

       107-114. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 1991.

 

Mroczkowski, Dennis P., Lieutenant Colonel USMCR, US Marines in the Persian Gulf,

       1990-1991 With the 2nd Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

       Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 1993.

 

Operational Requirements Document (ORD). Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching System

       (APOBS) LOG 213.3.9. Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps.

       April 1, 1994.

 

Ottowa Citizen, "First Women Recruits Fail Infantry Training."  11 November 1988.

 

Pfluke, L.A. Maj. USA, "Measuring Up", Proceedings, August 1994.

 

Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, Report to

       the President, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 November

       1992.

 

Quilter,Charles J. II, Colonel USMCR,  U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991

       With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

       Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 1993.

 

Riggs, R.K., Brigadier General, USMC, memorandum of July l, 1994.

 

Schroeder, Patricia, "Be All We Can Be." In Women in the Military. Ed. David L.

       Bender, 73-74. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 1991.

 

Secretary of Defense Memo dated February 2, 1988.

 

Secretary of Defense Memo dated April 28, 1993.

 

Secretary of Defense Memo dated January 13, 1994.

 

Shearman, D.M., Williams Fairey Engineering Limited, Derby, England. Letter to

       Captain T. Seamon. Subject: "Lift requirements for the Medium Girder Bridge."

       14 February 1994.

 

Smith, Richard J., Lieutenant Colonel USMC, personal interview by author, 20 January

       1995.

 

Snyder, Kathy L., "An Equal Right to Fight: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of

       Laws and Policies that Exclude Women from Combat in the United States

       Military." Ed. David L. Bender, 75-78. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press,

       1991.

 

Soldier Training Publication 5-21II-MQS Engineer (21) Company Grade Officer's

       Manual, Washington, DC: Department of the Army. 22 March 1991.

 

Soldier Training Publication 5-12B24-SM-TG Combat Engineer (12B) Company Grade

       Soldier's Manual, Washington, DC: Department of the Army. Washington, DC.

 

Southam News. "$500,000 Ad Campaign Set to Sell Women on Combat", 27 October

       1988.

 

Stremlow, M. V., Colonel USMCR., History of the Women Marines 1946-1977.

       Washington, DC: History and Museums Division Headquarters Marine Corps,

       1986.

 

Technical Manual (TM) 11275-15/3c. Principal Technical Characteristics of U.S.

       Marine Corps Engineer Equipment, Washington, DC: United States Marine

       Corps, September 1991.

 

United States Congress. House. Military Personnel Subcommittee on Armed Services,

       Women in the Military, 96th Congress, 1981.

 

United States Congress. House. Military Personnel Subcommittee on Armed Services,

       Women in the Military, 103rd Congress, 1993.

 

United States Department of Labor. Work, Jobs and Occupations: A Critical Review of

       the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Washington, DC: Committee on

       Occupational Classification and Analysis, Assembly of Behavioral and Social

       Sciences, National Research Council, 1980.

 

United States Marine Corps. "Campaign Plan for Implementation of Revised Women

       Assignment Policies (Draft)"  Washington, DC: staffed December 1994.

 

United States Marine Corps. "Combat Engineer Battalion Study." Headquarters, United

       States Marine Corps, February 1988.

 

United States Marine Corps. "Female Physical Fitness Test (PFT) Study." Unpublished

       research paper. Training and Education Division, June 1994.

 

United States Marine Corps. Manning and Equipping Combat Engineer and Engineer

       Support Battalions. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development

       Command, 1994.

 

United States Marine Corps. Mines, Minelaying and Countermine Requirements for the

       Mid-Term (1990-2000) Period. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat

       Development Command, 1992.

 

United States Marine Corps. Women Marines in the 1980's. Washington, DC: Division

       of Public Affairs, 1986.

 

Van Camp, Janice, Lieutenant Colonel USMC, telephonic interview by author, 7

       February 1995.

 

West, Toga D. Jr., Secretary of the Army. Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense.

       June 1, 1994.

 

Wheeler, George Major USMC, telephone interview by author, 8 January 1995.

 

1      Memo from DC/S Plans, Policies, and Operations, United States Marine Corps, 12

January 1995.

 

2      Stremlow, M. V., Colonel USMCR., History of the Women Marines 1946-1977,

History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC 1986. 97.

The "official" history of women in the Marine Corps.

 

3      Van Camp, Janice, Lieutenant Colonel USMC, telephone interview 7 February

1995. LtCol Van Camp was originally a combat engineer officer before moving to the

logistics field. She provided great insight into what went wrong on the first attempt at

integration.

 

4      Butler, J. M., Colonel USMC Ret., personal interview on 13 February 1995.

Colonel Butler was the Commanding Officer 8th EngrSptBn during the first integration of

women into utilites and engineers. He later served as the CO, MCES.

 

5     Jennings, James M., Lieutenant Colonel USMC, personal interview on 7 January

1995. LtCol Jennings was a platoon commander during the integration period and

recalled the physical problems of female lieutenants at the time.

 

6      Holm, Jeanne, Major General USAF (Ret.), "Women in Combat: The New

Reality." In Women in the Military. Ed. David L. Bender. San Diego, CA:

Greenhaven Press, 1991. 72.

 

7       Binkin, Martin and Kyriakopoulos, Irene. "Youth or Experience? Manning the

Modern Military", The Brookings Bulletin, XVI (Summer 1979). 10.

 

8      FMFRP 0-lB, Marine Physical Readiness Training for Combat, Marine Corps

Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, 1988. 1-5.

 

9      Schroeder, Patricia, "Be All We Can Be." In Women in the Military. Ed. David L.

Bender. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 1991. 73.

 

10     Glumm, M. M. "The Female in Military Equipment Design". Aberdeen Proving

Ground, Human Engineering Lab. 1976.

 

11    Goldman, Nancy L. ed., Female Soldiers-Combatants or Noncombatants?

Greenwood Press, Westport, CT 1982. 247-8.

 

12     MCO 6100.3J, Physical Fitness, Headquarters United States Marine Corps,

Washington, DC, 29 February 1988. 1. The MCO on PT encompasses everything from

PFT standards to what order to run the PFT events in.

       Memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff for PPQ of the Marine Corps, to the

Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, Marine

Corps Physical Fitness Testing dated May 1, 1992.

 

13     Pfluke, L. A., Major USA, "Measuring Up". Proceedings, United States Naval

Institute, Annapolis, MD, August 1994. 60. Good article concerning the PFT vice MOS

physical standards. Unfortunately, it doesn't apply if there are no MOS physical standards.

 

14     USMC, "Female Physical Fitness Test (PFT) Study", 4 June 1994. These Marines

made a concerted effort to pass the male PFT. They were trained by the British Colour

Sergeant who assists in ensuring OCS is physically demanding.

 

15     MCO6100.3J. 1.

 

16     Deegan, Gene A., Major General USMC, "Women in Combat: A View from the

Top", Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, VA, September 1992. 42. General Deegan

argues that women should not be placed in front line positions.

 

17     Memo from DC/S PPO USMC.

 

18     Knight, D.E., Major USMC, personal experience from Marine Wing Support

Squadron 371, Yuma, Az, 1989.

 

19     Committee on Occupational Classification and Analysis, Assembly of Behavioral

and Social Sciences, National Research Council, Washington, DC, Work, Jobs and

Occupations: A Critical Review of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, United States

Department of Labor, Washington, DC, 1980.

 

20     Memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, United States Army, to

the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, Army

Physical Testing at Recruitment, dated May 1, 1992.

 

21     Fischl, M. A., Dr., Chairman Gender Neutral Strength Standards Committee,

telephone interview on January 25, 1995. Dr. Fischl is in charge of reevaluating strength

requirements for the Army.

 

22     Fischl, interview.

 

23     Fischl, interview.

       Memo from DC/S Army.

       Mitchell, Brian, Weak Link: The Feminization of the American Military, Regnery

Gateway, Washington, DC, 1989. 121-125. This is the most quoted anti-women in

combat (actually the military) book.

 

24     Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Personnel, Women in the Army

Policy Review Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1982. 2-4.

 

25     Ibid.2-4.

 

26     Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces,

Report to the President, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1992. C-22.

The Danish military is obviously not a force in readiness.

 

27     Women in the Military Hearings, 1992. C-24.

 

28     "$500,000 Ad Campaign Set to Sell Women on Combat", Southam News,

October 27, 1988. This article explains that internal Canadian military surveys say women

aren't interested in combat arms specialties.

 

29     "First Women Recruits Fail Infantry Training", Ottawa Citizen, November 11,

1988.  Female recruits lack of endurance and strength are explored in this article.

 

30     Lamerson, Cheryl Major Canadian Forces, Integration of Women in the Canadian

Forces, Canadian Defence Force, October 1990. 3. This paper discusses the efforts of the

Canadian Forces in integrating women in all specialties.

 

31     Harper, J. E. Commander Canadian Forces, Integration of Women in FMC

(Memo), Canadian Defence Liaison, Washington, DC, May 13, 1991. 1. This memo

updates the success of women in the combat arms in Canada.

 

32     Women in the Military Hearings, 1992. C-67. The Canadians only admit to

modifying their standards to better reflect actual requirements.

 

33     Hope, P.D Lieutenant Colonel Canadian Forces, telephone interview on February

10, 1995. LtCol Hope is on the task force for women in the Canadian forces combat

arms. She noted that Canada is at year 5 of a judicially mandated 10 year program, and

success has been very limited.

 

34     FMFRP 12-52, Engineer! Comments on the Evolution of the Marine Engineer,

Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1989. 7.

 

35     Cureton, Charles H. Lieutenant Colonel USMCR, U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf

, 1990-1991 With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm History and

Museums Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington DC, 1993.

14-15. This document gives a good overview of the conduct of the obstacle breach by the

1st Division Task Forces.

 

36     Ibid. 74-75.

       Wheeler, George, Major USMC, telephone interview of 18 January 1995. Major

Wheeler was the Operations Officer for 2d Combat Engineer Battalion during the Gulf

War and a task force breach team leader.

       FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations. Department of the Army,

1990. This is the handbook for breaching operations. The Marine Corps is in the process

of adopting this publication.

       Mroczkowski, Dennis P., Lieutenant Colonel USMCR, U.S. Marines in the

Persian Gulf. 1990-1991 With the 2nd Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert

Storm, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps,

Washington DC, 1993. 44-46. This document gives a good overview of the conduct of the

obstacle breach by the 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion. As in the history of the 1st

Division, it does not take much effort on the readers part to see that the combat engineers

in the division easily fit the combat exclusion rule as outlined in the SecDef Memo of 13

Jan 94.

 

37     TM 11275-15/3c Principal Technical Characteristics of U.S. Marine Corps

Engineer Equipment, United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC, Sept. 1991. This is

the engineer equipment bible for capabilities, embarkation, etc. It is used by

MARCORSYSCOM to track engineer equipment from "cradle to grave".

 

38     Women in the Army Policy Review. A-1-5-27.

 

39     Operational Requirements Document for the Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching

System (APOBS) LOG 213.3.9, United States Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, April 1,

1994. This item of equipment was widely praised for its effectiveness during testing, the

only drawback noted was its weight. It was decided that it was a man packable item and

is now in the final testing phase.

 

40     Blankemeyer, Francis J., Major USMC, telephone interview on 10 February 1995.

Major Blankemeyer is the project officer for the MGB.

 

41     Shearman, D.M., "Letter detailing lift requirements for the Medium Girder

Bridge", Williams Fairey Engineering Limited, Derby, England, dated 14 February 1994.

Fairey Engineering designed and sells the MGB. This letter details lifting requirements for

the bridge components.

 

42     McDaniels, George, Chief Warrant Officer 4 USMC, telephone interview on 6

February 1995. CWO McDaniels holds the senior Expeditionary Airfield Officer billet in

the Marine Corps, and was the EAF officer for I MEF during Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm.

 

43     Women in the Army Policy Review. A-1-5-27 through A-1-5-28. The charts on

these pages show that females are given a "no go" due to physical capabilities/limitations.

 

44     Deegan, Gene A., 42. General Deegan dismisses every Marine as a rifleman,

arguing that male Marines will still be the riflemen of the Marine Corps. If an admin clerk

is going to be used as a rifleman, it should be a male admin clerk.Lowering standards to

ensure fairness is wrong. There is no fair in combat, and lowered standards equate to

lowered readiness.

       Ledoux interview. The reluctance to set physical standards for MOS's stems from

the institutional view that every Marine is a rifleman, regardless of primary MOS.

 

45     Marine Corps Order 1200.7N, Military Occupational Specialties Manual (Short

Title: MOS Manual), Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 23

March 1994. 3-59.

 

46     Women Marines in the 1980's, Division of Public Affairs, Headquarters United

States Marine Corps, 1986. 3. This update begins where Women in the Marine Corps

left off. One of the keys to this document is the pilot program for integrating OCS and

TBS.

 

47     Women in the Military, Hearings, House of Representatives Military Personnel

Subcommittee on Armed Services, Ninety-sixth Congress, U.S. Government Printing

Office, Washington, DC, !981. 45 and 152. While at TBS, 86.4% of the females failed

the male PFT while the males failure rate was 4.8%.

 

48     Blankemeyer, interview. Major Blankemeyer assured me that the no replacement

of the MGB would be considered before 2002, with a probable upgrade to the current

bridge rather than a new bridge being procured.

 

49     Miller, Randy, Major USMC, personal interview on February 8, 1995. Major

Miller has worked in procurement for the Marine Corps Systems Command for 4 years on

engineer projects such as the advanced demolitions kit and APOBS.

 

50     Koper, Paul, Lieutenant Colonel USMC, personal interview on February 6, 1995.

LtCol Koper has served two tours in acquisitions including over one year as the Deputy

Program Manager for Engineer Systems in the Marine Corps.

 

51     Women in the Army Policy Review. A-1-1-1.

 

52     Knight, D. E. Author's personal experiences at various commands.

 

53     Hawkins, Glen R, Major USA, Report on Training Changes at West Point Since

the Admission of Women, for the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women

in the Armed Forces, dated September 22, 1992. 1-2. This report was done for the 1992

congressional hearings. It is an eye opener on the lowering of standards at West Point.

 

54     Women in the Military Hearings, House of Representatives Military Personnel

Subcommittee on Armed Services, One hundred and third Congress, U.S. Government

Printing Office, Washington, DC, !993. 34. The hearings concerning air and naval

combat roles for women.

 

55     "Army Testing Women on Ability to Bulk Up: A Muscle is a Muscle",

Fredericksburg Free Lance Star, 13 February 1994. A-1. Despite numerous studies

showing that women will not be as strong as men, the Army pays $140,000 to prove these

studies wrong. To accomplish this they will use civilian women.