Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile Development

Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile Development - Employment

And The Cost Of Global Presence

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy

MILITARY ISSUES PAPER

CONVENTIONAL AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE

DEVELOPMENT - EMPLOYMENT

AND THE

COSTS OF GLOBAL PRESENCE

Major Stephen R. Hess

Marine Corps University

Command and Staff College, Conference Group 10

18 April 1995

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii

DEVELOPMENT 2

EMPLOYMENT 10

TRAINING 10

OPSEC 13

COSTS OF GLOBAL PRESENCE 16

CONCLUSION 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY 22

END NOTES 24

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile: Development -- Employment and the

Costs of Global Presence

Author: Major Stephen R. Hess, USAF

Thesis: The development of the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) in the late 1970's

initiated a technological revolution that changed the way America projects power. This

capability is continuing to mature as follow-on generations of conventional stand-off

precision munitions are being acquired and fielded by the U.S. military.

Background: The initial decision to acquire ALCM's came at the cost of canceling the

B-1A bomber in January 1977 by President Jimmy Carter. The reason was twofold: first,

cruise missiles deployed on existing platforms (the B-52s) came out as more cost effective;

and second, the estimates of the air defenses of the time allowed a large number of

ALCM's to strike their assigned targets--thus allowing follow-on generation cruise

missiles to be fielded in time to counter any advance in enemy air defense capabilities.

Interest for a conventional variant of the nuclear ALCM stemmed from the rash of

terrorist attacks aimed at American citizens in the late 1970's and 1980's. In May 1986,

USAF tasked Boeing Aircraft Company to determine the feasibility of converting the

nuclear-tipped ALCM with a conventional blast fragmentation warhead. Thus began a

"black" development, acquisition and testing process that eventually led to the fielding of

the Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) in time for use in Operation

DESERT STORM. Security constraints of the weapon mandated a very small cadre of

crewmembers and staff have access to the system. The tight security requirements and

limited man power strained training and Operational Security (OPSEC) procedures

considerably. Since the Gulf War, the roles and mission of the various U.S. military

branches have undergone close scrutiny--a peace dividend. As a result, the forward

presence of all branches of the military continues to be reduced as the force structure

draws down. The most economical means to fill this gap is through the "global presence"

offered by the CALCM and other stand-off weapons.

Recommendation: The traditional "man-in-the-loop" approach to target destruction has

a stand-off option that needs to be emphasized, funds allocated, additional weapons

procured, and training priority elevated.

CONVENTIONAL AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE

DEVELOPMENT - EMPLOYMENT

AND THE

COSTS OF GLOBAL PRESENCE

The air launched cruise missile (ALCM)... has a technology with

tremendous growth potential, and we see embarking on technology work

that is going to lead to a second, third and fourth generation air-launched

cruise missile which 20 years from now will have a tremendous impact on

how we maintain our national security.1

This quote from Thomas Reed, the Secretary of the Air Force in 1976, clearly

delineates the decisive role that cruise missiles were about to play in the balance of power

in the nuclear arena. Soon after Secretary Reed spoke these words, the increased reliance

on the developing cruise missile came into sharp focus. Shortly after Jimmy Carter

became President in 1977, he canceled the B-1A bomber program.2 The reason was

twofold: first, cruise missiles deployed on existing platforms (the B-52s) came out as more

cost effective; and second, the estimates of the air defenses of the time allowed a large

number of ALCM's to strike their assigned targets--thus allowing follow-on generation

cruise missiles to be fielded in time to counter any advance in enemy air defense

capabilities.3

The world has undergone dramatic changes from the height of the Cold War; the

monolithic Soviet threat has all but disappeared, the Warsaw Pact has been dismantled,

and numerous smaller regional contingencies now strain the limits of the U.S. military.

The basic premise of Thomas Reed's vision in 1976 is just now coming to fruition, only

not with the threat of mutual Armageddon looming, but with the advent of economical

employment of next generation conventional long range precision guided munitions

(PGM's).

The "next generation" cruise missile is primarily a modification of the nuclear armed

AGM-86B, a system that underwent considerable testing and flight verification before

becoming operational in 1982.4 Interest for a conventional variant of the nuclear system

stemmed from the rash of terrorist attacks aimed at American citizens in the late 1970's

and 1980's. This paper will discuss on the post-1986 development of the AGM-86C

(Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile/CALCM), operational considerations for the

employment of this weapon during DESERT SHIELD-DESERT STORM, and will

conclude with an economic analysis of the use of precision stand-off weapons as it applies

to the evolving military strategy of "GLOBAL PRESENCE."

DEVELOPMENT

The arrival of the cruise missile emerged dramatically on

June 13, 1944, when the first of more than 10,000 German V-1's

were launched against England. The United States was quick to

emulate the Germans. Thus ensued a series of development programs to field a viable

long-rang cruise missile5--all of which lacked desired reliability and accuracy. The

CALCM program began in earnest after the United States raided Libyan terrorist facilities

and training camps in April 1986. Operation EL DORADO CANYON, though successful

in retaliating against terrorist attacks on Americans in Europe and effectively deterring

further terrorist activities6 for some time, proved to be an extremely expensive and

complicated mission. EL DORADO CANYON took considerable time to plan and

coordinate, required the movement of two aircraft carriers,7 involving dozens of fighters

and air refueling tankers, and complicated further by France and Spain's refusal of to

allow overflight of their countries. "When it was all over, an F-111 and its crew had been

lost, and some errant bombs had injured or killed civillians."8 In the wake of this mission,

the Air Force senior leadership reaffirmed the necessity of a long range, conventionally

armed weapon that was capable of surgical precision--a weapon that would not require the

"shooters" to overfly their targets.

In May 1986, USAF headquarters contracted Boeing Aircraft Company, the original

contractors for the ALCM, to determine the feasibility of converting the W-80 nuclear

tipped missile with a conventional blast fragmentation warhead. The specifications called

for a weapon with a large enough warhead to produce desired effects, while limiting

undesirable collateral damage. The end result gave the CALCM the blast "effect" of a

2000 pound bomb using less than 1000 pounds of explosive. The Air Force also

requested modifications to improve the accuracy of the missile. The replacement of the

digital terrain correlation and mapping functions of the original missiles inertial navigation

set with the emerging technology resident in the Global Positioning System (GPS)

accomplished this specification, thereby giving the weapon pinpoint accuracy.

A classified number of weapons (eventually given the designation of AGM-86C or

"CALCM") were modified at a cost of $380,000 (FY 90 dollars) each.9

The entire program was under the protection of a "black-world" cloak of secrecy, and

so closely guarded that "less than 20 people in the Pentagon and Capitol Hill knew of the

weapon until just prior to DESERT STORM."10 The Air Force wanted these weapons to

be a complete surprise for two reasons; first, externally they were nearly indistinguishable

from their nuclear tipped counterparts11 and might complicate pending arms control

negotiations with the former Soviet Union; and second, only a few GPS satellites were

operational in the late 80's; therefore, a potential adversary could easily know when these

navigation satellites were in optimum position to insure highest accuracy, making the time

of arrival of these weapons predictable.12

The "black-world" cloak of secrecy was also required to satisfy the operational need to

get a limited number of CALCM's ready within one year. This "black" status allowed

action officers to invoke senior authority to open doors and slip past routine bottlenecks.

Armed with the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF), the Chief of Staff

(CSAF) and the Commander of the Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), officers in

charge of the CALCM were able to move ahead with little, if any, delay from the

otherwise normal bureaucratic processes. The power that this "cloak" provided brought

with it the necessity for the handful of people associated with the program, both Air Force

and Boeing contractors, to work 16 to 18 hours a day to fulfill the CSAF's requirement to

have a limited capability by early June 1987.13

Considerable debate revolved around what base was going to get the mission of

employing the CALCM. From an operational prospective, basing the CALCM at a B-52H

wing would optimize the better fuel efficiency inherent in the turbofan engines of the H

model. However, these initial basing considerations were not supportable, for then, the

B-52G was evolving into a "conventional only" role, and the B-52H's were concentrating

on a larger role in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). The option to allow

potential CALCM missions to be executed by the more fuel efficient B-52H's were

recommended by then Eighth Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Peek--an option

that would resurface in August 1990. Hence, the decision to base the CALCM at the 2d

Bomb Wing, Barksdale AFB Louisiana, revolved around three main reasons, First, there

were two bomb squadrons assigned to the wing that would provide aircraft and trained

crews. Second, adequate room in the weapon storage facility existed for these sensitive

weapons. Third, this base was the home of the 49TES (Test and Evaluation Squadron),

which was responsible for initial testing and integration of the ALCM (and the CALCM)

into the Strategic Air Command, thereby provided an excellent cover story for testing.

The first test, scheduled for April 1987, was postponed until May 1987 due to

technological growing pains associated transmitting mission data to the CALCM by the

bomber carrier aircraft. Once this was resolved, the first operational flight of the CALCM

produced outstanding results-locking onto four GPS satellites and landing within

tolerances to the target. The second test, later in May 1987, lasted less than two minutes,

when the missile failed to attain powered flight. Failure of the separation pin switch on

release caused the missile's engine not to start. A correction to the problem was

engineered and incorporated into the remainder of the weapons procured.14

The third test, at the start of July, showed much better results. The missile, containing

a conventional warhead, was fired from 30,000 feet. The missile flew the entire pre-

programmed navigation profile and detonated near the target. The target was "extensively

damaged." This test persuaded General Welch and the AFCS to extend the CALCM test

program that otherwise would have concluded in October 1987 with the fourth flight.

General Welch directed two more tests be performed to build a "higher level of

confidence." Though successful in its own right, this test pointed out the need for

additional flight testing to determine a consistent altitude computational error, and

demonstrate greater accuracy inherent with GPS guidance.15

The fourth test, set for mid-October 1987, was the first "operational end-to-end flight,"

and saw the CALCM display improved accuracy only to display some old and new

difficulties. Much of the test went as planned, with the missile demonstrating the ability to

navigate the entire pre-programmed flight profile. However, the altitude computation

error manifested itself in a new way--the warhead failed to detonate. Later analysis

indicated that an interface unit and warhead fuzing could be to blame. While no precise

cause was determined, this failure prompted General Welch to recommend further

"confidence tests" in the future.16

Two tests in December 1987 completed the initial round of test flights and confirmed

the operational viability of the CALCM. On 1 December, the testing arena was moved to

the Pacific Missile Test Center at Point Magu Naval Test Range, California, in order to

take advantage of greater operational realism offered by the location on the West Coast.

The first test was cut short when range safety officers aborted the test 30 seconds from the

target due to an erroneous display in the mission control center. The display indicated a

violation of the safety corridor. After correcting the display problem, the "ideal test"

followed on December 4. After flawlessly executing the navigation profile, the missile

destroyed the target with a terminal accuracy consistent with the GPS guidance system.17

CALCM gained initial operational capability status in January 1988, providing the

capability to employ conventional cruise missiles. Security considerations dictated that

only two flight crews, a handful of maintenance personnel, and a limited number of staff

planners were allowed access into the system. Twenty-one months from the initiation of

the CALCM program, trained crews and support staff awaited execution of another

Libyan type raid, or even larger operation, thus fulfilling the capability that General

Gabriel envisioned after Operation EL DORADO CANYON.18

The CALCM program experienced sudden failure in October 1989 when during a test

mission the missile crashed three minutes into flight over the Utah Test Range.

Investigation revealed that the weapon exploded shortly after reaching its first navigation

point, and was directly linked to premature fuze detonation. The investigation further

revealed that the power requirements of the missile were incompatible with the power

requirements of the fuze. The fix would require a phase in period of 90 days to fix the

power and fuze computability problems.19

The following test in May 1990 also ended in failure. Designed primarily to test the

viability of the fixes from the October test, specifically the fuzing and power stability, a

new missile receiver hardware/software combination was also included in this mission.

While this failure was frustrating, it was not a catastrophic setback. The probable cause

for this failure was an electrical short associated with the basic airframe--a problem

identified on a ALCM test in late December 1989. The correction was not incorporated

into the missile in time for this CALCM test.20

The real dilemma that faced the CALCM team was the perceived unreliability of the

system. This perception prevented SAC from offering up the CALCM as an option to be

used during DESERT SHIELD/STORM. As a result of this concern, the Acquisition

Division of the Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/AQ) created a "Tiger Team" to determine

what went wrong with the missile and how it could be repaired. SAF/AQ recommended

an unprecedented "double launch" on August 21, 1990, to verify the fuze fix and test

procedure, but more importantly to increase the commands' confidence in the weapon.21

The double launch was a test and evaluation first--never before had SAC launched

more than one cruise missile on any given test. These launches were "100 percent

successful" and achieved accuracy well within the parameters established for GPS. The

elation of the success did not last for long. Immediately after the launch, SAC test

officials were tasked to launch a CALCM from the B-52H's internal common strategic

rotary launcher (CSRL), a feat that had never been performed. The challenge was further

complicated by the mandate it be performed within three days!

The process of compressing four months of preparation into three days began. The 7th

Bomb Wing from Carswell AFB, Texas, deployed a crew and aircraft. A CSRL specific

mission tape was cut, and the test was flown on August 24, 1990. Again with a "100

percent successful" launch and an accuracy consistent with the test on August 21,22 and

just in time. For this test validated the ability of the CALCM to perform within an

acceptable reliability actor and justified SAC placing five B-52G's on alert at Barksdale

AFB, Louisiana, on August 18, 1990--targeted against critical elements in Iraq.

The development of the CALCM, the reason for the abbreviated acquisition time, and

the need for extreme security measures were all actors surrounding the intended

"surprise" use of this weapon. The technological advantage in accuracy inherent in GPS

guidance, the relatively small radar cross section (stealth characteristics), and the ability to

destroy an objective in "less than a day...on any spot on the globe"23 gives the CALCM

this high degree of surprise. The normal "long and leaky process of the weapon

acquisition"24 was bypassed during the development and testing of the CALCM through

the use of compartmentalized "black" access to the system. Clausewitz's statement that

"the two factors that produce the highest degree of surprise are speed and secrecy"25

embodies the rational for the level of security and secrecy surrounding the procurement of

the CALCM.

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EMPLOYMENT

The five months following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

allowed the Air Force to prepare for the eventual launch

of the CALCM strike from Barksdale AFB. During this

time two areas of the mission were identified as critical to

its success-training, and operations security (OPSEC)

requirements.

TRAINING

The training of the crews required a considerable undertaking. Due to the security and

staffing constraints, only one operational crew was briefed into the system at that time.

This crew performed the detailed mission development at SAC Headquarters. The onus

for training the 50+ crew members fell on the close cadre of officers in the 49TES and a

handful of senior instructors in the 2d Bomb Wing. The majority of the training required

access to actual assets loaded on the aircraft; specifically, B-52's loaded with CALCM's

and specialized radio equipment. First the weapons; actual CALCM's mated to the B-52

were required for all aspects of weapon training, for there were no simulators available the

CALCM. This access permitted training on how the missiles interfaced with the Offensive

Avionics System (OAS) in the bomber. To satisfy the near real time command and control

requirements, Secure Voice Satellite communication Kits (SVSK) were loaded into the

bombers This radio equipment also required additional familiarization training. On

August 18, 1990, the training program began when SAC ordered the loading of five

aircraft in an attempt to shorten the reaction time for the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) and

Central Command (CENTCOM) tasking. The process of granting access to over 70

people, nearly double the total number of people who even knew of the weapons

existence, was a security manager's nightmare.

Once the crews were initially trained and essential staff members briefed, the process of

establishing a clandestine daily training program began. This proved to be nearly

impossible to accomplish during the first six weeks of DESERT SHIELD due to the

constant alert status of the crews and staff. During these first weeks of DESERT

SHIELD, the JCS and CENTCOM had this mission on an alert status to satisfy the

"preponderance of air power in the region."27 The "short string" required the crews and

staff were to be on the job at 3:30 A.M. each day. This early morning wake-up was

mandated to optimize the number of GPS satellites that were available in theater. The

immediate benefit for this intense period of alert was the near vertical learning curve the

crews experienced with daily exposure to mission planning, weapon system familiarization,

and communication training.28

After the initial insertion of the 1st Fighter Wing, 82nd Airborne Division, 101st

Airborne Division, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and the presence of two carrier battle

groups into Southwest Asia, the "window of vulnerability"29 slowly began to close, and

the daily 0330 show requirement was lifted. The easing of the alert requirement allowed

the development of a ground and flight normalized training program--all still under the

"black cloak." Ground training consisted of weekly preflights scheduled on an equitable

rotational basis for the selected crews. The crews were required to bring the aircraft "on-

line" and test all systems. This included performing a complete CALCM power-up and

OAS check-out. While the navigators were accomplishing this task, other members of the

crew were training on the SVSK. The remainder of the ground training was accomplished

on the following day, when all available crew members were required to sortie study.

After the morning review period, a selected crew would perform a certification briefing to

either the 2d Bomb Wing Commander or the Commander of Eighth Air Force.

After the easing of the JCS "short string," normal flight training began to fix the

currency problems caused by the initial alert requirements of this mission. Heavyweight

air refueling became a concern of the wing leadership because no-one had carried an

external load of CALCM's and refueled to the maximum gross weight of the

B-52 (488,000 pounds), a feat that would occur no less than four times during the actual

mission. In an attempt to "get a handle" on this dilemma, a training scenario was designed

in the Gulf of Mexico to emulate the actual mission. The "dry-run" consisted of five

separate training missions composed of four bombers on each flight. These missions

allowed the crews to: (1), follow the exact missile launch track, allowing verification of

critical timing actors in the launch box; (2), practice heavyweight refueling; and (3),

familiarization with the SVSK, with emphasis on communication tactics training.30

OPSEC

OPSEC contributes directly towards achieving the superiority US

forces need to prevail against hostile capabilities. OPSEC contributes to

denying an adversary the critical information necessary to design systems,

devise tactics and techniques, prepare and sustain forces, conduct

preemptive strikes, or conduct other activities to counter US capabilities.

Equally important, OPSEC provides a base of secrecy that permits

achievement of technical, tactical, and strategic surprise and allows for

opportunities to conduct deceptions that can further reduce an opponent's

effectiveness.31

This mission embodied, probably more so than any other strike mission flown by SAC,

a complete OPSEC plan--a plan that required active participation from all involved with

the mission. The "black" mystique of the weapon placed additional challenges on the

cover and concealment of the individuals, hardware, and intent of the National Command

Authorities--due primarily to the limited number of people that were briefed-in.

Bomber operations on the ramp were of great concern from not only an internal

security prospective, but also from possible international ramifications. On August 18,

1990, the five CALCM loaded bombers assumed alert in parking spots normally reserved

for bombers going on nuclear alert--an area where a bomber would normally spend less

than a day in when it is mated with weapons. The cover story of a SAC sponsored

loading exercise tried to defuse a tense situation, for the USSR Reid had just fired the first

warning shots on the Iraqi tanker Khanaqin for failure to alter course or allow boarding.32

As the weeks progressed, the political implication of the appearance of "additional ALCM

loaded bombers" might cause the Soviets' intelligence analysts to question the apparent

build-up. The solution was to move the CALCM loaded aircraft into the "Christmas

tree"33 with the other SIOP bombers--providing a "safety in numbers" approach to internal

security. Ultimately, the matter passed because either the Russians did not notice or did

not grasp the significance of the additional assets on the alert ramp.34

During the course of DESERT SHIELD, the CALCM mission remained out of local

and national press, a credit to all the people at Barksdale AFB. As the January 15, 1991,

United Nations' deadline drew closer the remaining aircraft were generated and assumed

alert on January 14, 1991. Later that afternoon, the selected crews were sequestered into

the alert facility in preparation for the launch--an alert facility already occupied with SIOP

alert crews. The task of assigning which crews would fly the CALCM mission and who

would remain on SIOP alert was decided the day prior with final modifications made on

January 15. The atmosphere in the alert facility was professional and an air of "business as

usual" prevailed. The shroud of secrecy remained in-force for those two days the crews

were sequestered. Orders from wing leadership mandated that "good-bye" or "watch

CNN tomorrow" phone calls were not allowed.

The primary cover story, the one that we told our friends and families, was the same

one we used during the previous five months--no explanations, just mission training. This

cover failed 12 hours prior to the start of DESERT STORM. For within three hours of

the launch of the CALCM mission, the squadron was flooded with calls (from family

members mostly) demanding information on where the CALCM loaded aircraft went.35 In

the attempt to keep the mission and CALCM in the "black", we neglected to inform our

immediate family members that there was a possibility that we could be called to enforce

the United Nations' sanctions against Iraq.

In the time since DESERT STORM, and the emergence of the CALCM program from

the "black" on 17 January 1992, the 2d Bomb Wing has maintained a small cadre of

qualified crews Mission essential tasks were incorporated into formal flying requirements

within one year of the disclosure with the intent of keeping these crews in a high state of

readiness. The crew tasks are being complied with, but mating the crews with the weapon

system itself has not.36 With the demise of the Soviet Union, bombers no longer on SIOP

alert and the retirement of SAC, the CALCM has become "just another weapon system."

As a result of this reduced level of priority, if this weapon is exercised or actually used, the

interest level of the base and local media could easily equal that experienced in August

1990.

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COSTS OF GLOBAL PRESENCE

Current force reduction and the resulting scrutiny of the roles

and mission of the armed forces focus, in part, on the ability to

project power forward. These power projection capabilities are vital to all services, with

the Air Force emphasizing the use of CONUS based aircraft during the "initial stages of a

18conflict with the capability to carry significant payloads over great distances."37

Conventional long range PGM's have proved to be the right weapon for most high priority

targets, and reduces both U.S. aircrew risk and monetary expenditure.

The most inexpensive method to employ stand-off precision weapons during the initial

phases of a conflict is through the use CONUS based bombers. Table 1 data shows

current hourly operations and maintenance (O&M) costs for some Air Force assets that

could have a power projection mission. A typical CONUS-to-CONUS B-52 mission of

30 hour's duration would cost approximately $12.86 million per aircraft. This figure

includes four air refueling by KC-135R aircraft and launching eight CALCM's.38

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The Navy is also capable of projecting

"global presence" by the use of carrier based

aircraft and the Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM). Power projection and

the "employment of naval forces from the sea to influence events in the littoral regions of

the world"41 are the mainstay of the Navy's mission. This mission has become more

important due to recent force structure reductions that necessitated the closing of

numerous overseas U.S. bases. Under the current National Security Strategy of

maintaining a "military capability appropriately sized and postured to ... win two nearly

simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC),"42 a potential carrier coverage gap of four

months could occur if a full time carrier presence is required in a third (lesser contingency)

region of the world.43 The reduced capability of preventing conflicts and controlling crises

due to the lack of these overseas locations and the "quick reaction" capability the Navy

offers will get worse as the carrier force shrinks to 11. This potential gap in coverage

would be covered by CONUS based Air Force assets.

The employment of TLAM and CALCM are complementary weapon systems, sharing

much of the same engine and avionics technology. With recent Block III improvements to

the TLAM, GPS capability is now incorporated into the navigation accuracy of the

missile. These modifications that will allow the TLAM to fly ingress routes away from

known landmarks that were once required for update purposes.44 Where the TLAM has

the capability to strike targets with slightly greater accuracy than the CALCM due to its

terminal sensor, the CALCM is capable of quick mission planning, employment, and

inflight retargeting capability.45

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The cost of naval power projection is high, and

rightly so, given the diversity of their mission. Since

the fall of the Soviet Union, the focus of maritime

forces has shifted from a global to regional threats.

Current missions now include: Deterrence, Forward Presence, Littoral Operations, Strike

Warfare, Sea Control Operations, Maritime Support of Landing Forces, Surveillance, and

Space and Electronic Warfare/Intelligence.46 Table 3 breaks don the $555.3 million

annual operating cost of a notional carrier battle group. For cost comparison purposes,

Air Force operational funding data is provided in Table 2.

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CONCLUSION

The venerable B-52H will continue to provide an economical means to

conduct standoff precision attacks or direct attacks. Acting in concert, the

bomber force will provide critical leverage in an MRC and a responsive

swing capability to deter or respond to a second conflict.49

The development of CALCM, shrouded in secrecy from its inception, proved itself a

vital contributor to victory during the Gulf War. The CALCM mission, launched 12 hours

before hostilities began, consisted of seven B-52G bombers. At 6:36 A.M. on January 16,

1991, under the cover of darkness, the first of three cells of bomber's took-off from

Barksdale AFB, Louisiana on, to ultimately launch 35 CALCM's on eight high value Iraq

targets--a mission that has been likened as similar to the Doolittle Raid 18 April 1942.50

Developed and executed under the protection of a compartmentalized "black" program,

the mission was finally disclosed one year after its completion. This mission proved that

the Air Force could "...reach out and touch our enemies with devastating accuracy from

the United States."51 This capability exists today and continues to provide realistic

options to the National Command Authorities and the regional CINC's.

Due to the rapid reduction of U.S. overseas bases, the Rand Corporation has indicated

that the next major confrontation may be initially fought from the CONUS using long

range bombers. However, the sight and sound of bombers taking off in the United States

will not restrain our next adversaries. A credible naval "forward presence" combined with

an assertive and well documented "global power" capability will be needed to accomplish

the deterrence mission. This mission will require a significant number of PGMs, well

above our current stock. The advancement of this revelation in warfare is rooted in the

Bomber Roadmap of 1992--calling for the procurement of additional stand-off weapons

(CALCM specifically) to meet the emerging threat of the new world order. The

Department of Defense is moving in the direction of procuring these new weapons,

attempting to design inter-service commonality into the next generation PGMs.

The CALCM mission became the longest strike sorties in aviation history, the

significance of which may not be fully appreciated until historians have a chance to reflect

on the implications and possibilities this class of weapon offers. For if these weapons are

developed and employed to their fullest potential, will change how the United States

project's presence, power, and political resolve in the future. Furthermore, the traditional

Air Force "man-in -the-loop" approach to target destruction has a stand-off option that

needs to be emphasized, funds allocated, additional weapons procured, and training

priority elevated. This is not to advocate a lesser importance of tactical aircraft, "PGMs

will act as force multipliers for manned aircraft--freeing up these more useful resources for

other tasks,"52 and allow time for tactical forces to employ into the theaters of the future.

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Joint Publication 3-54. Joint Doctrine for Operations Security. Washington D.C.: Joint

Chief of Staff, 1991.

Kam, Ephraim. Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective. Harvard: Harvard University

Press, 1988.

Keaney, Thomas A. and Eliot A. Cohen. Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report.

Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

Perry, William J. Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to the President and Congress.

Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995.

Tirpack, John. The Secret Squirrels. Air Force Magazine, April 1994.

The White House. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.

Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994.

United States General Accounting Office. Navy Carrier Battle Groups: The Structure

and Affordability of the Future Force (GAO/NSIAD-93-74). Washington D.C.:

United States General Accounting Office, 1993.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for

Fiscal Year 1995 and the Future Years Defense Program. 103rd Congress, second

session, April 12, 19, 26 and May 3, 1994. S. Hrg. 103-765 Pt. 2.

Werrell, Kenneth P. The Evolution of the Cruise Missile. Maxwell Air Force Base,

Alabama: Air University Press, 1985.

Widnall, Sheila E. Secretary of the Air Force. Annual Report to the President and

Congress. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995.

INTERVIEWS

Dillon, Jerry, Maj., USAF, CALCM program director, Det 1, 608 AOG. Interviewed by

author, 10 February 1995.

Maxwell, Jerry, Lt. Col., USAF, Operations Officer for the 596th Bomb Squadron at the

time of the CALCM mission. Interviewed by author, 30 March 1995.

END NOTES

1Thomas Reed, Secretary of the Air Force, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement,

hearings, Senate Armed Service Committee, Part 2, February 1976, pp. 968-69. Extracted from Ronald

Huisken, The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1981), p 77.

2Richard K. Betts, Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics (The Brookings Institution,

Washington D.C., 1981),p. 95.

3Op. cit.,Huisken,p 81.

4Kenneth P, Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile, (Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force

Base, Alabama, 1985), p. 271. Information derived from chronological flight test history contained in

Appendix I.

5Op. cit, Huisken, p. 15.

6John Tirpack, The Secret Squirrels. Air Force Magazine, April 94, p 56.

7Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1995 and the Future Years

Defense Program, hearings, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, second

session, April 12, 19,26 and May 3, 1994, p.133. This quote is derived from the prepared statement by

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Director, Defense Budget Project, as heard by the Subcommittee on Regional

Defense and Contingency Forces, on May 3, 1994.

8Op. cit, Tirpack, p. 56.

9Ibid.

10Mission acceptance briefings by Lt Col. Chuck Costa at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana on 8 August 90.

11Excerpts from classified "Warrior Briefings" given to CSAF, SECAF, CJCS, and SECDEF at the

Pentagon in September and October 91.

12The GPS constellation is comprised of 24 satellites in a semi-geosynchronous orbit. This system is

commercially available to all users, only the highest accuracy signals are provided to the military. At the

time of the CALCM's conception in the mid 80's there were less than 10 functional GPS satellites in

orbit. The "window" that these satellites would be in optimum position were available to all users.

13(S) Kent M. Beck, Edward W. Gale, and Robert de V. Brunkow, Special Study--"Black" Weapon,

Covert Mission: The Conventional ALCM. DESERT SHIELD, and DESERT STORM, 1986-1991.

(Strategic Air Command Historian, May,1992), p. 3.

14Ibid.,p. 7.

15Ibid.,p. 8.

16Ibid.,p. 8.

17Ibid.,p. 9.

18Ibid.,p. 11.

19Ibid.,p. 12.

20Ibid.,p. 13.

21Ibid.,p. 14.

22Ibid.,p. 15.

23Remarks from Gen. McPeak speaking at a Florida Air Force Association symposium in early 1994.

24Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack - The Victim's Perspective, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,

Massachusetts, 1985), p.19.

25Carl von Clausewitz, eds./trans. Michael Howard and Peter Peret, On War (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1976), Book three, Chapter nine, p. 198.

26Ibid.

27Warrior Briefing to CSAF, SECAF, SECDEF, and CJCS in September and October 1991.

28Ibid.

29Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, (U.S. Government Printing

Office, Washington D.C., 1992), p. 37.

30Op cit, Beck, p. 30.

31Joint Pub 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August

1991), p. I-4, para 3.

32Op cit, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 54.

33The "Christmas tree" is the alert aircraft parking location at the end of the active runway. This ramp

area allows for fast taxi and launch of aircraft in case of a national emergency or war.

34Op. cit., Beck, p. 23.

35Lt Col. Jerry Maxwell, Operations Officer for the 596th Bomb Squadron at the time of the CALCM

mission, interviewed by author, 30 March 1995.

36Maj Jerry Dillon, CALCM program director, Det 1, 608 AOG, interviewed by author, 10 February

1995.

37AirForce Manual 1-1, Volume II, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, (U.S.

Government Printing Office, March 1992), p. 252.

38Data obtained from HQ ACC, Flying Hours Management Branch, January 26, 1995. Data does not

include acquisition amortization, contractor supplied logistic support, or personnel costs.

39Forward deployed tankers are usually available to most parts of the world on a daily basis. Average

tanker sortie for past bomber CONUS to CONUS flights are about four hours in duration. Calculations as

follows: 30 B-52 hours X $6,000/hr = $180,000

16 KC-135R hours X $2,749/hr = $44,000

8 CALCM X ($1.2 initial costs +$380,000 modification costs) = $12.64 million

TOTAL=$12.86 million

This generic strike mission will not require fighter escort or other airborne assets to protect the bombers

due to the bombers remaining well inside international airspace, and will not require overflight clearance

from and country.

40Data obtained from HQ ACC, Financial Management Branch, February 10, 1995. Data does not

include acquisition amortization or personnel costs.

41Department of the Navy, Forward ...from the Sea, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. i.

42The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (U.S. Government

Printing Office, July 1994), p.5.

43Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, (U.S. Government Printing Office,

October 1993), p. 50.

44DESERT STORM employment of TLAM resulted in some missiles being shot down by Iraqi gunners.

45CALCM software modifications have returned the ability to "flex-target" the missile and will be flight

tested during the next scheduled Follow On Test and Evaluation (FOTE) mission. The software change

will allow the aircrew to change the pre-programmed target to one directed by competent authority.

46William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report of the President and Congress (U.S. Government

Printing Office, Washington, DC, February 1995), p. 181.

47United States General Accounting Office Report to Congress, Navy Carrier Battle Groups - The

Structure and Affordability of the Future Force, (U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993), p.

118. Accounting methodology varies greatly between GAO and DOD. In an attempt to "level the playing

field" between the Navy and the Air Force, I did not included acquisition costs into the equations. DOD

agrees with this rational in saying that these costs are "sunk costs" once the ship/aircraft is procured. I

have also included the amortized costs of the carrier nuclear refueling into the O&M budget for this ship.

48Data obtained form CINCLANTFLT Financial Program Comptrollers Office, February 17,1995.

NOTES:

- Data provided by CINCLANTFLT on CVN's did not include the $2.3 billion (153 million/yr) required

for refueling operations that are required every 15 years.

- Data does not include the refueling costs for nuclear submarines and surface combatants.

- Data does not include acquisition amortization or personnel costs.

- Data also assumes that TLAM capable surface vessels are usually deployed as part of a CVBG, and not

as a stand-alone weapons platform within easy striking distance of land based aircraft.

- Data does not include the costs of TLAM's used in striking a target, estimated at $1.2 million each.

49Sheila E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, Annual Report to the President and Congress (U.S.

Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, February 1995), p. 300.

50Remarks from Lt Gen. Shuler during pre-takeoff briefing at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, 0430L,16 Jan

1991.

51Remarks from Lt. Gen. Ryan, 8 AF commander, during the award/recognition ceremony at Barksdale

AFB, Louisiana, on 17 Jan 92.

52Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq - Air Power and the Gulf War, (Smithsonian Institution Press,

Washington DC, 1992), p.250.

53Op.cit, Huisken, p 128.

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