Military

De-Fanging The Cobra: Staking The Future On Unproven Weapons

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues

 

 

 

                               EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

          Title: DE-FANGING THE COBRA: STAKING THE FUTURE ON UNPROVEN

                                    WEAPONS

 

 

Author: Major Scott P. Haney, United States Marine Corps

 

 

Problem Statement: The Army and the Marine Corps are "jumping the gun" by

canceling future buys of the Tube Launched Optically Tracked Wire Guided Missile

(TOW), without ensuring an adequate replacement missile exists.

 

 

Discussion: Allowances are not being made by the Army and the Marine Corps for the

possibility that the Joint Advanced Weapon System (JAWS), the missile planned to

replace TOW and possibly Hellfire, may not satisfy the requirements and needs for the

Marine Corps' attack helicopters. TOW has a shelf life of 10 years. Planned operational

fielding of the JAWS missile is 2005, but the last planned purchase of TOW missiles for

the Army and Marine Corps has already taken place.

   There is a trend in the military services due to diminished procurement fluids to have

each weapon system perform a myriad of tasks. By performing multiple missions, there

is a risk that the performance of the weapon system may be degraded. While TOW and

Hellfire are very good at destroying point target and armor targets, the JAWS missile's

capabilities may be lessened by tasking it to also perform as an air-to-air missile.

   Lastly, if the JAWS missile does not perform as planned in testing, it will be too late

to turn the TOW production line back on, as the vendors and expertise will have

disappeared.

 

 

Conclusion: The TOW missile should be retained and the production line kept open until

JAWS or another precision guided missile proves to be superior to TOW.

 

                                   CONTENTS

 

 

 

Chapter

 

 1.  INTRODUCTION                                              1

 

 

 2.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTACK HELICOPTER           7

     Vietnam, 12

     The Precision Guided Missile, 19

     Post Vietnam, 20

 

 3.  DOCTRINE/TASKING                                         24

 

     The Weapons, 26

     Tactics/Weapons Matching, 28

     Guidance Theory, 31

     MCLOS Guidance, 31

     SACLOS Guidance, 32

 

 4.  WEAPONS DESCRIPTION, ANALYSIS, AND TACTICS                38

 

     TOW Missile, 38

     Hellfire Missile, 43

     Weaknesses of Existing Precision Guided Missiles, 46

     Research and Development, 48

     Joint Advanced Weapon System (JAWS) Background, 49

     Mission and Threat Analysis, 52

 

 4.  CONCLUSION                                               56

 

Bibliography                                                  58

 

                               LIST OF FIGURES

 

 

 

Figure                                                        Page

 

1.   Wing Stores Stations                                      27

 

2.   TOW Missile                                               39

 

3.   Hellfire Missile                                          43

 

4.   JAWS Missile                                              50

 

                                   CHAPTER 1

 

 

 

     The use of precision guided munitions by the United States military is a practiced

 

and expected way of waging war, and of operations other than war (OOTW).

 

     Desert Storm is the first image that typically comes to mind when the subject of

 

precision guided munitions is discussed.  One imagines precision strikes by fixed wing

 

aircraft bombing Baghdad or Kuwait using laser guided bombs, or attack helicopters

 

carrying precision guided missiles to destroy Iraqi tanks with first round hits.

 

           Operations other than war (OOTW) such as Operation RESTORE HOPE in

 

Somalia will probably account for the majority of conflicts in the near future.   OOTW

 

operations require very close integration between the infantryman on the ground and the

 

aircraft supporting him. With television cameras glaring, the commander on the ground

 

can not afford the collateral damage that may occur with free fall iron bombs or aerial

 

unguided rockets.

 

     Indeed, precision guided munitions give the commander a capability that comes

 

close to guaranteeing a surgeon-like ability to cleanly and antiseptically destroy the

 

enemy's ability to fight without the collateral damage that a commander would accept as

 

a given in prosecuting past wars or conflicts.  The statistics for Desert Storm showed

 

precision guided missiles fired from attack helicopters approaching an accuracy rate for

 

hitting the correct target of 95%1.

 

     This capability that precision guided munitions have afforded the military

 

commander and planners is a double edged sword. This double edged sword consists of

 

a technological increase in capability and effectiveness on one side countered with an

 

increased (sometimes unrealistic) expectation of mission success regardless of the

 

situation on the other side.

 

       Desert Storm highlighted the successes of the military procurement/acquisition

 

system in preparing for war by fielding modern weapons.   However, there were

 

notable failures in the procurement system. The last of the Marine Corps' reconnaissance

 

squadrons, VMFP-3, retired just days before the Iraqi's invaded Kuwait, leaving the

 

Marine Corps practically blind.  VMFP-3 was an RF-4 Phantom squadron whose sole

 

purpose was to provide timely tactical reconnaissance. The squadron deactivated with

 

the promise that the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS) pod

 

would be fielded soon, providing a fixed-wing tactical reconnaissance (TAC-RECCE)

 

capability to the F/A-18 Hornet.  The Marine Corps and Navy are still waiting to field

 

the ATARS system, and still do not possess a tactical reconnaissance capability.

 

           The very things that make the attack helicopter attractive to the battlefield

 

commander are its ability to perform a varied number of tasks on the battlefield.  No

 

other aircraft can fly, land, shutdown, and brief face to face with the ground forces where

 

they live. No other aircraft can provide the Ground Combat Element with two hours of

 

on-station time, 8 precision guided anti-armor missiles, and its own suppressive fire.

 

Underneath the smoke clouds caused by the burning oil fields in Southwest Asia, it was

 

the Supercobra providing the Ground Combat Element with precision guided anti-armor

 

weapons.2

 

      To satisfy these requirements a number of different types of ordnance must be

 

available to the attack helicopter to ensure that it can adequately meet these different

 

tasks without compromising effectiveness due to a shortfall in weapons capability.

 

      This paper will argue that the Army and Marine Corps are "jumping the gun"

 

by canceling future buys of the Tube Launched Optically Tracked Wired guided missile

 

(TOW) without ensuring an adequate replacement exists.  The Marine Corps and Army

 

are not making allowances for the possibility that the Joint Advanced Weapon System

 

(JAWS) may not satisfy the requirements and needs for Marine Corps attack helicopters.

 

These requirements are being met by TOW and Hellfire, the presently fielded precision

 

guided missiles.

 

      The ability to use one round of ammunition that costs a few thousand dollars to

 

destroy a tank that costs a few million dollars, to hit and destroy a target with little or no

 

collateral damage, dramatically increases the military's effectiveness in some areas that

 

would have been unimaginable a few years ago.  This technological improvement in

 

accuracy and firepower occurs without a resulting spread in the collateral damage.

 

However, this improvement in capability has also has a down side.  The media and the

 

military may  second guess how a target should be destroyed and by what type of

 

weapon system.     Presumptions and expectations have increased as a result of the

 

successes that precision guided munitions afforded the military in the past two decades.

 

The media and the American people have come to regard precision guided munitions as

 

the panacea for all types of military targets, and that fratricide should be a thing of the

 

past.  Collateral damage to buildings, non-combatants, or civilians on the periphery of

 

an attack or conflict  is completely unacceptable. One can understand why a

 

commander, with  CNN filming the event, and presented the choice of his attack

 

helicopter firing a TOW or Hellfire missile at an enemy building or tank rather than

 

unguided rockets, chooses the Hellfire or TOW.

 

    This relationship between technology, the commander, and the media has resulted

 

in a new term, the Revolution in Military Affairs, or what a study by the Center for

 

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) termed the "Revolution in Warfare".

 

       In 1993 the CSIS devoted an entire report to the revolution,  "a fundamental

 

advance in technology, doctrine or organization that renders existing methods of

 

conducting warfare obsolete."3 Is the post-Gulf War US military being driven by the

 

belief in technology, this so-called Revolution in Military Affairs?

 

    The United States Army and Marine Corps have canceled future procurement of the

 

TOW missile for their attack helicopters.   TOW was one of the first success stories in

 

employing precision guided munitions.4  TOW, and possibly Hellfire (and probably

 

Stinger missile for the Army), are planned for replacement with the Joint Advanced

 

Weapons System that has yet to be tested or produced.  Planned operational fielding of

 

the JAWS missile is 2005.  TOW has a shelf life of 10 years, but the last planned

 

purchases of TOW for the Army and Marine Corps have already taken place.

 

    There is a trend in the military services, due to diminished procurement funds, to

 

have each weapon system perform a myriad of tasks.  The logic is that less money

 

requires a reduction in the number of weapon systems that can be procured.  This study

 

will examine if this reduction will result in a less capable, less versatile attack helicopter

 

for the Marine Corps.

 

                                     NOTES

 

 

 

1     LtCol. Barry M. Ford, USMC, "The Future is Attack Helicopters" Parameters,

No.9, (September 1994): 54.

 

2     Capt Mike Rocco, USMC, Supercobra, Superdeal, (Quantico, Va: Writing

requirement for the Writing Program at the Amphibious Warfare School),  Feb. 1993.

 

3     Dr. David Jablonsky, Colonel, USA  (Ret.), "US Military Doctrine and the

Revolution in Military Affairs" Parameters, No.3,  (Autumn 1994): 19.

 

4     Maj. J.C. Burns, USA, "XM-26 TOW: Birth of the Helicopter as a Tank

Buster" Master of Military Studies AY:1993-94 Command and Staff College Marine

Corps University.

 

                                   CHAPTER 2

 

 

 

   In tracing the development of the attack helicopter, one must look to the United

 

States Army as the real impetus for the development of this type of aerial gun platform.

 

During World War II, the United States Marine Corps, the other service besides the

 

Army with ground combat troops, enjoyed the luxury of possessing its own fixed wing

 

aircraft with the primary mission of close air support, or CAS.  Close air support is

 

defined by Joint Pub 1-02 as,   "Air action against hostile targets that are in close

 

proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with

 

the fire and movement of those forces."1  The Army was dependent on the Army Air

 

Corps for its close air support, a mission that Air Corps conventional wisdom and

 

leadership did not enthusiastically embrace.

 

   Dating back to Douhet and Mitchell, the Army Air Corps' mindset was that strategic

 

and interdiction bombing was a much more effective way to wage war than by using

 

these aircraft for close air support.  In 1937 the differing attitudes between the US Army

 

fliers on one hand and the US Navy and Marine Corps fliers on the other, were summed

 

up in this manner.

 

        Low altitude dive bombing from scout and observation airplanes armed

     with light fragmentation bombs was practiced by the Marine Corps in some of

     their small wars operations as early as 1927. Naval aviation began experiments

     with dive-bombing fighters about the same time. The present development of

     high altitude, high speed dive bombing began, however, with the advent of the

     Curtiss Helldiver in 1930. This airplane was the forerunner of the present type

     heavy dive bomber, and was instrumental in the formulation of dive-bombing

     technique and tactics, as practiced by (American) naval aviation today.

 

       The (Army) Air Corps has conducted some dive bombing experiments with

    pursuit airplanes in recent years, but has never evolved any tactics for the

    employment of dive bombers as a class. At present there are no airplanes

    within the army air forces capable of being used as dive bombers. At the end

    of World War II, despite the 1945 publication of the US strategic bombing

    survey, which clearly illustrated the shortcomings of massive bombing raids on

    Axis nations, the Air Force clung to its belief in the effectiveness of strategic

    bombing.2

 

   Military historians remember the National Defense Act of 1947 as the Air Force's

 

emancipation document. However, the NDA of 1947 and the subsequent Key West

 

Agreement of 1948 set forth clear obligations for both the Army and the Air Force. The

 

Air Force tasks were to:

 

    furnish close combat and logistical air support to the Army, to include airlift,

    support, and resupply of Airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical

    reconnaissance, and interdiction of enemy land power and communications.3

 

   The realities of fighting a ground war in Korea forced the Air Force to shift its

 

priorities from the strategic targeting and bombing of North Korea (as there were few

 

strategic targets) to concentrating on interdiction and close air support.  Although this

 

was not the way the Air Force preferred to fight, Air Force close air support probably

 

prevented the Allied forces from being overwhelmed at the Pusan perimeter.

 

   During the Korean War the Army was not satisfied with the lack or perceived lack of

 

close air support that they received from the Air Force. The Air Force, on the other hand,

 

stated that in the first seventy five days of operations in Korea, close air support had

 

consumed two thirds of the total sortie capability of the Far East Air Forces. Some in the

 

Army also believed that jets were a less efficient platform to provide close air support

 

than had been the propeller driven aircraft.4

 

   The performance of the Marines in Korea with their own organic aviation support only

 

confirmed what many Army leaders already had come to realize as a result of their

 

experiences in World War II.  One of the believers in the importance of aviation to

 

ground forces was Major General Howze.  General  Howze had been with the 1st

 

Armored Division in World War II and had fought in North Africa.  One battle in

 

particular, Sidi-Bou-Zid, where the Germans had beaten the Americans, made a lasting

 

impression on General Howze.5 In this battle, air superiority played a significant role in

 

the Axis victory.

 

   The contrast between the methods of the Marine Corps fliers and those of the Army

was given voice by ground troops. Air Force Magazine quoted three anonymous press

reports:

 

      July 1950: "What was needed of course, was a couple of old fashioned Marine

   Divisions with their integrated Air Force."   19 August 1950: "We want no more

   of these jet jockeys. They don't have enough fuel to stay in our areas long enough to

   find out where we are having trouble. And they don't have enough fire power to do

   any real good. Give us those Marines."   26 November 1950:  "A lot of GIs in

   Korea are wishing for a big "umbrella" like the one "issued to the Marines when

   they go out in a storm."6

 

    The Marine Corps was fortunate enough to have kept its air arm after the National

 

Defense Act of 1947,  and this air arm was oriented to supporting ground warfare.

 

Marines who fought in Korea recall that the Army loved having their close air support

 

come from Marines flying Corsairs.  The Army understood that, unlike the Air Force,

 

CAS was Marine aviation's primary mission, not something Marines did when other

 

missions allowed.

 

    With the election of Eisenhower as President, and the end of the Korean War, the

 

U.S. entered an era of military fiscal restraint. Nuclear weapons delivered by the Air

 

Force and Strategic Air Command (SAC) anywhere in the world promised "more bang

 

for the buck"  for  the American taxpayer.  SAC believed these weapons of mass

 

destruction to be infinitely more cost effective than the old pre-nuclear weapons of

 

infantry, armor, and artillery.   Strategic air power continued to hold the dominant

 

position in the Air Force, with the Eisenhower Administration supporting the Air Force

 

and SAC.

 

        The Army perceived the Air Force as lacking interest in providing Close Air

 

Support to the Army.  The Air Force prevented the Army from flying any but the most

 

benign types of fixed wing.  For these reasons, the Army began to experiment with

 

helicopters in the armed role. In 1950 the Army and Bell Helicopter collaborated on

 

experimentally arming the OH-13 observation helicopter.  It was  the US Army in

 

Korea that first used the armed helicopter in combat. The French also tried a variety of

 

armament on helicopters in their futile attempt to hold onto Algeria.7

 

   In 1956, Brigadier General Carl Hutton, the first commandant of the Aviation School

 

at Camp Rucker, and a proponent of armed helicopters, was determined that the Army get

 

back into the air, supporting their own troops. General Hutton directed Colonel Jay D.

 

Vanderpool, the first director of combat developments for the Aviation School to form a

 

prototype unit of armed helicopters. Vanderpool's first efforts resulted in the successful

 

arming of helicopters with rockets and .50 caliber machine guns. The outcome of these

 

trials was very positive. Perfecting an anti-tank weapon for the helicopter interested

 

Vanderpool even more.8

 

   The Continental Army Command (CONARC), the new name of Army Ground Forces,

 

was also trying to find a weapons system that would allow helicopters to kill armor.

 

CONARC instructed Fort Rucker to obtain the French SS-10 antitank missile and test it

 

from a helicopter. Two OH-13 helicopters selected for the test were installed with SS-10

 

airborne launching and guidance instruments. Although the results indicated poor system

 

performance, Vanderpool recalls their being better than any other existing antitank

 

systems.9  The Army did not adopt the SS-10 system. This left the Army searching for

 

a future missile with which to arm their helicopters for an anti-armor role.

 

   While the anti-armor role for helicopters interested Vanderpool and CONARC,

 

Vanderpool also experimented with the airmobile and assault division concept Colonel

 

Vanderpool took his lead from General Hutton, who started out his concept of "Sky

 

Cavalry" by borrowing from the Duke of Wellington's ideas on cavalry, in which the

 

cavalrymen fought from mounts, the dragoons dismounted to fight as infantry, and all

 

were supported by horsemobile artillery.  Formed in March of 1957, this unit was the

 

forerunner of the airmobile divisions who fought in Vietnam. It received the designation

 

"Aerial Combat Reconnaissance platoon provisional (experimental)," or ACR.  The

 

forming of the first armed helicopter company took place in Okinawa on July 25, 1962.

 

  It deployed to Vietnam in October, and received its baptism of fire within a week.10

 

During this period the disagreements and debates between the Army and Air Force

 

continued to intensify.  The Air Force believed that the arming of the helicopter and its

 

possible use as a close air support weapon through the airmobile concept was in direct

 

conflict with the Air Forces' roles and missions.  The Air Force argued that they could

 

provide any air support that the Army needed. In the Air Force's opinion, the arming of

 

helicopters would not only degrade the ability of the US. Air Force to provide CAS, it

 

would also represent an unnecessary drain on limited budget resources. This debate led

 

Robert McNamara to direct the Secretary of the Army to examine the Army's

 

requirements for tactical mobility.  The result of this was the formation in 1962 of the

 

Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, or as it became known, the Howze Board, after

 

its chairman Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze, the commander of the Strategic Army

 

Command and the 18th Airborne Corps.

 

  The results of the Howze Board published on 30 August 1962 caused the Air Force to

 

reexamine its CAS and airlift aircraft obligations. To soothe Army complaints, the Air

 

Force prepared and forwarded to Congress requests for additional fighter-bomber wings.

 

The board's final recommendation endorsed an "air assault division" complete with

 

organic air support capabilities, to include organic armed helicopters and fixed-wing

 

assault transports. Though the board stressed the need for an advanced design of armed

 

helicopter to escort and provide covering fire for the troop carrying helicopters, Air Force

 

insistence that tactical air support was their exclusive domain restricted the flow of

 

development funds for dedicated gunships.11

 

  Another recommendation by the Howze Board was to use armed OV-1 Mohawk fixed

 

wing aircraft to escort troop carrying helicopters.   The Mohawk's speed and ability to

 

carry greater loads than armed helicopters gave it a big advantage over the overloaded

 

UH-1Bs. However, the Air Force flatly refused to allow the Army to arm their Mohawks,

 

and the Army was forced to go to the helicopter as a less acceptable alternative.12

 

                                   Vietnam

 

       The urgent requirement for an armed helicopter was initially filled with the

 

introduction of the UH-1B Iriquois, or Huey.  Both the UH-1B flown by the Army and

 

the UH-1E flown by the Marine Corps and Navy had a variety of weapons

 

configurations.  The early variants of Huey would strap on almost any weapon. The

 

most common arrangement was a combination of 2.75 inch rockets, 40 mm grenade

 

launchers and two or more 7.62 machine guns.   The UH-1's proved themselves in

 

numerous operations.  But in both actual combat operations in Vietnam and in air

 

assault tests, the weapons loaded Hueys strained to keep up with the troop carrying

 

Hueys.  Dashing ahead or catching up with the troop carriers was out of the question.

 

There was an urgent need in the Army and  the Marine Corps for a faster armed

 

helicopter.

 

   The Secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance, directed a giant leap into the future rather

 

than try to modify the existing airframe.13   Secretary Vance insisted that the new

 

advanced helicopter gunship must have a speed of at least two hundred knots. (A loaded

 

-down Huey gunship cruised between 95 and one hundred knots in comparison.)  This

 

decision drove the program to a new airframe and, subsequently, to long years of

 

development and testing.

 

   In June 1963 the Army announced its intent to build its advanced aerial fire support

 

system (AAFSS), later named Cheyenne. The Army awarded the contract to Lockheed

 

to build the helicopter in 1965. The Cheyenne rolled out in 1967, and exceeded the

 

Army's expectations  It possessed a unique flight system that combined a helicopter

 

main rotor, a pusher prop in the tail, small stubby wings along the narrow fuselage

 

similar to a conventional airplane to provide lift. A single engine developing 3,435

 

shaft horsepower powered the main rotor, the pusher propeller, and the anti-torque tail

 

rotor.  This unique combination of airplane and helicopter technology enabled the

 

Cheyenne to attain a speed of 256 miles per hour, twice that of the UH-1B.

 

   The design of the wapons and avionics gave the Cheyenne an all weather capability.

 

The weapons consisted of a nose turret that accepted either a 7.62 mm machine gun or a

 

40 mm grenade launcher. This gun was capable of swiveling or traversing 180 degrees

 

either side of the nose. Mounted under the co-pilot-gunner's station in a belly turret, was

 

a 30 mm cannon capable of 180 degrees of traverse either side of the aircraft's nose. The

 

pilots were able to control either turret independently of the other turret or pilot, simply

 

by aiming with the helmet sight, turning the head, and firing.  In addition, the

 

underside of each wing had three pylons, each of which could carry a thousand pound

 

load. The integrated helicopter avionics system (IHAS) controlled all of these weapons.

 

It was a system so advanced that it could engage two targets at once.  The avionics

 

consisted of a terrain-avoidance radar, a doppler inertial navigation system, and an

 

automatic flight control system that would allow for hands off flying in order to operate

 

the weapons systems.

 

   Due to the complexity and expense of the Cheyenne, and the difficulty of perfecting

 

some of these avionics systems, the Cheyenne program began to stall.  Part of this

 

problem in costs and complexity was the Army's fault. During the development of the

 

Cheyenne, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) became a multifaceted, multilaboratory

 

bureaucracy that sometimes was its own worst enemy.   AMC insisted that Lockheed

 

use AMC's internally developed XM53 30 mm cannon, which often did not work.

 

Defense of this decision was based on "sunk costs," meaning that since AMC had spent

 

so much developing this cannon, it had to be used.14  The requirement to fix such

 

problems ate away at time and increased expenses.  With the American involvement in

 

the Vietnam War continuing to expand and the urgent need for a dedicated gunship still

 

not satisfied, time was probably a bigger factor than was expense.

 

   Bell had submitted a gunship proposal (Model 262) during the advanced aerial fire

 

support system competition that lost to Lockheed's Cheyenne concept.  Bell helicopter

 

probably understood the requirements for a gunship in Vietnam better than the other

 

competing companies. Bell had a large number of technical representatives (tech reps) in

 

support of all the Hueys in Vietnam. What Bell Helicopter was hearing from these tech

 

reps in Vietnam was that a gunship needed building now, not in a few years.  The

 

tech-reps stressed that the Huey could not fill the interim requirement.

 

   Because of the urgent need for a gunship, Bell started working on a new gunship

 

without any encouragement, requirement, or funding from the government.

 

   In December 1964, Bell president E. J. Ducayet directed work for a new gunship, the

 

Model 209, based on the Huey parts system. Ducayet also directed that the work on the

 

gunship be finished in the unheard of time of six months. November 1965 was the target

 

date for demonstrating to the military the capabilities of this platform.15

 

     Almost simultaneous with Bell Helicopter funding their own attack helicopter, the

 

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were adjusting to airmobile tactics and the lack of a

 

speedy escort. General Westmoreland directed Brig. General John Norton (who had

 

served on the Howze Board), to conduct an in-country study of what was needed to make

 

up for the lack of helicopter escort capability.  Norton concluded that an interim

 

attack/escort helicopter must fill the void until the Cheyenne could be fielded.  This

 

helicopter would require a speed of at least 150 knots.

 

     The Model 209, or Huey Cobra, flew for the first time in early September 1965,

 

reaching a top speed of 174 knots, 24 knots faster than the Army's stated requirement

 

The Army selection Board announced that the three finalists--Sikorsky's Sea King,

 

Kaman's Seasprite, and Bell's Cobra would compete in a fly-off at Edwards Air Force

 

Base, California, during November 1965.

 

     On March 11, 1965, a month after testing ended, the Army announced its decision:

 

The Bell Model 209 had won. Bell signed a contract to deliver 110 aircraft, scheduled

 

for delivery directly to the field.16

 

   With the Cobra attack helicopter doing what the Army needed at that time, critics and

 

opponents of the Cheyenne were able to put an end to the development of the Cheyenne,

 

and final cancellation of the production contract took place on May 1969.

 

     As Vietnam was drawing to a close, the Army began to refocus on Europe and its

 

NATO commitment. Due to the high number of anti-air weapons systems that the Soviets

 

were placing in Eastern Europe, the Army began testing those prototype Cheyenne

 

helicopters built prior to the cancellation of the contract.   Through studies, the Army

 

concluded that using diving fire or strafing fire as was the plan with the Cheyenne

 

helicopter would not be survivable in this heavy integrated air defense system in Europe.

 

The only way to survive would be to adjust tactics to flying nap of the earth or NOE to

 

prevent these radar directed and heat seeking systems from acquiring the helicopter. The

 

Cheyenne's rigid rotor system performed poorly during slow speed, or during hovering

 

flight profiles. The aircraft design was for flight at speeds similar to a fixed wing aircraft.

 

In 1972 and 1973 tests found the Cheyenne lacking in "the ability to effectively perform

 

low speed low mission tasks below 120 knots..."17

 

    Trials held in Germany tested the survivability and effectiveness of the attack

 

helicopter in the European theater scenario. These trials concluded that helicopters armed

 

with missiles such as the BGM-71 TOW (Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire guided)

 

can perform effectively in the defensive anti-armor battlefield of Europe.  TOW had

 

proven its worth in Vietnam as an armor killer and would be fitted to AH-1 Cobras in the

 

Army and eventually in the Marine Corps.

 

       The AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter was the final result of a 1972 Army

 

requirement for an advanced attack helicopter. Continuing with the studies conducted in

 

Europe against a Soviet style threat, the Army set forth a requirement for an attack

 

helicopter that would be survivable on this modern battlefield. It would require good

 

slow speed and hovering characteristics, must be able to deliver its anti-armor missiles at

 

stand-off distances from Soviet anti-aircraft artillery, and also be able to fight at night and

 

in reduced visibility conditions.  With the introduction of the Apache on January 26,

 

1984 attack helicopters entered a new era.18

 

   While the Marine Corps had followed the Army lead on buying the AH-1G to fill its

 

need for an attack helicopter, the Marine Corps took a different track on future

 

procurement of attack helicopters.   While the Army believed in the Cobra's single

 

engine, the Marine Corps concluded that, to be able to work from ships at sea, the

 

follow-on attack helicopters should have two engines (in case of an engine failure at sea),

 

and be marinised.  A marinised attack helicopter would have the same requirements of

 

other Naval aircraft; the ability to function from ships while being subjected to the

 

hazards of the naval environment aboard ship.   Due to the demanding environment

 

aboard ship, the follow-on Cobra attack helicopters would require more robust wiring to

 

protect against the ship's heavy magnetic radio emissions, better corrosion protection, and

 

as earlier mentioned, two engines.  As the Army proceeded with procuring AH-1Q,

 

AH-1S, and AH-IF model Cobras, the Marine Corps split from the Army and bought the

 

AH-1J, the AH-1T and finally the AH-1W.  The AH-1W began arriving into the Marine

 

Corps inventory approximately two years after the first Apache AH-64 attack helicopters

 

began arriving in Army units.

 

     Many aviators in the Marine Corps believe that the Marine Corps would have been

 

wiser in selecting the Apache as its next attack helicopter rather thin the AH-1W

 

SuperCobra. There are a number of reasons why the Marine Corps chose the "Whiskey"

 

model as its attack helicopter rather than the Apache. While the Army initially wanted

 

the Apache to be a joint venture between the Marine Corps and the Army, the Marine

 

Corps had operational service specific and weapons specific requirements that the Army

 

did not share. To meet Marine and Navy standards, the wiring and the airframe would

 

need protection against salt water to allow operations aboard ship. The Apache did not

 

possess an acceptable blade fold for stowage aboard ships. The wheel brakes were

 

insufficient for a rolling deck in high seas. The rolling deck of a ship also presented

 

problems with the Apache due to its high center of gravity. Engineers believed the

 

Apache had more of a tendency to roll in heavy swells than did the lower center of

 

gravity Cobra. The Army did not have requirements for weapons such as the AIM-9

 

Sidewinder missile, or the AGM-122A Sidearm, an anti-radiation missile. Importantly,

 

the Apache would not possess the ability to fire TOW.  It was to be an AGM-114

 

Hellfire anti-armor missile carrier only.

 

       The Apache was more maintenance intensive than the Cobra.  This would not

 

work well for the Marine requirement to be able to function out of austere working

 

conditions.    Probably just as important was  the $200 million in research and

 

development costs required to make the Apache Marine compatible. (At this same time

 

the Marine Corps had spent hundreds of millions "going it alone" with the AV-8B

 

Harrier, and the Marine Corps could not afford another costly aircraft).  The Marine

 

Corps instead invested  $40 million in research and development costs to bring the

 

AH-1T up to AH-1W standard.19

 

 

 

                         The Precision Guided Missile

 

    In August 1958 tests began to find a way to employ helicopters as tank killers. The

 

Army adapted the French SS-10 antitank missile, a ground system, to OH-10 helicopters

 

for testing. While the results were not encouraging, the U.S. Army continued to search

 

for a weapon system that would fulfill its search for a helicopter tank killer. The Army

 

recognized that helicopters with the capability to kill  enemy armor would have a

 

valuable place on the battlefield.

 

     One of the most significant problems in utilizing a guided missile from a helicopter

 

was trying to stabilize the gunner's line of sight picture from the helicopter to a point

 

target such as a tank.   The Army chose two companies to work on a solution to the

 

missile line of sight stabilization problem. Both of these companies, the Aeronautic

 

Division of Philco Ford which designed the SHILLELAGH missile, and Hughes

 

Corporation which was the prime contractor for the Tube launched Optically tracked

 

Wire guided missile (TOW) system began work designing a solution to the problem.20

 

    The Hughes system was superior to the Aeronautic system and the Army Missile

 

Command (MICOM) awarded a contract to Hughes on October of 1965. This contract

 

was to cover research and development costs of the effort.

 

    During the period from 1965 to 1967 there were conflicting opinions as to whether or

 

not to cancel the XM-26 airborne subsystem which consisted of Hughes' sight, and the

 

TOW missile. The reasons were that the XM-26 subsystem was running into cost

 

overruns and may have led to an unwanted competition between the Huey with the TOW

 

system and the soon to be fielded Cheyenne helicopter. Nevertheless, testing continued

 

on the TOW system, and by October of 1968, testing had achieved a moving-hit average

 

of 85 percent, a very high score.21

 

 

                                                                        Post Vietnam

 

During May of 1972 the first combat firings of the TOW missile against enemy armor

 

took place by UH-1B's in Vietnam.  The missile reliability rate was 93 percent with 84

 

percent scoring direct hits on targets. The Army had found its tank killer.

 

  To counter the Soviet and Warsaw threat the main focus for helicopter armament after

 

Vietnam became precision guided missiles such as the TOW, used on the UH-1 and later

 

on the Cobra, and the newer Hellfire missile system in the design phase for the Apache.

 

Both of these missiles had the ability to hit tank-sized targets at extended ranges. (3,750

 

meters for TOW and 8,000 meters for Hellfire) Both had relatively large shaped charge

 

warheads, but while TOW was a SACLOS system, (semi automatic command to line of

 

sight) the Hellfire was a laser guided missile.  This purpose of this chapter was to

 

highlight the process of arming helicopters, adapting weapons to helicopters, and finally,

 

building helicopters and weapons designed to function as integral pieces. There were

 

some definite winners in this process, the Cobra and Apache helicopters, and the TOW

 

and Hellfire missiles. There were also some losers, such as the Cheyenne, when the

 

procurement process was out of touch with the actual needed requirements of the Army

 

and Marine Corps as happened during Vietnam. The next chapter will examine some of

 

the existing and future requirements to examine whether cancelling TOW for the future

 

JAWS missile may also be out of touch with actual needs.

 

                                     NOTES

 

1     The Joint Chiefs of Staff; Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms, (Washington D.C.; 1 June 1987), 70.

 

2     Peter C. Smith; Close Air Support (New York: Orion Books, 1990), 27.

 

3     James W. Bradin; From Hot Air to Hellfire (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994), 74.

 

4     Smith, 139.

 

5     Eugene H. Grayson; Hamilton H. Howze Visionary Giant from the Past (U.S.

Army Aviation Digest, November/December, 1991), 4.

 

6     Anonymous; Out of Millions of Words..., Confusion, Doubt and Concern, (Air

Force Magazine, Washington D.C., March 1951 Volume 34, Number 3,) 18.

 

7     Bradin; 81.

 

8     Lou Drendel; Gunslingers in Action (Michigan, Squadron Signals Publication,

Inc., 1974), 5.

 

9     Bradin; 80.

 

10    Drendel; 5.

 

11    Drendel; 5.

 

12    Bradin; 115.

 

13    Bradin;  116.

 

14    Bradin;  117.

 

15    Bradin;  121.

 

16    Jerry Scutts; UH-1 Iriquois, AH-1. Hueycobra (London, Modern Combat

Aircraft Series; 1984), 88-89.

 

17    Bradin; 131.

 

18    Bradin; 125.

 

19    30 January 1995 interview with Colonel Larry Outlaw, who, during 1984,

conducted the study at Headquarters Marine Corps as to the feasibility of procuring the

Apache for the Marine Corps.

 

20     Major J.C. Burns, USA, XM-26 TOW: Birth of the Helicopter as a Tank Buster

(United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076

South Street, Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia

22134-5068, 1994) 90.

 

21    Major Burns; 90.

 

                                   CHAPTER 3

 

                                                                        DOCTRINE/TASKING

 

 

   To determine if the Joint Attack Weapons System missile will satisfy the

 

requirements of the TOW and Hellfire missile, it is important to review Marine Corps

 

doctrinal publications and Navy publications dealing specifically with the employment

 

of Marine attack helicopters. The US Marine Corps derives doctrine from two

 

documents, FMFM- 1 Warfighting, and from the Navy/Marine Corps publication

 

FORWARD...FROM THE SEA.

 

   FMFM 1-1's basic tenets are that the Marine Corps must practice maneuver warfare

 

vice attrition warfare. That is to say the Marine Corps will seek to shatter the enemy's

 

cohesion through a series of rapid unexpected actions with which the enemy can not

 

cope. Fundamental in this design is combined arms, aviation and ground forces fighting

 

integrally to find and exploit enemy weaknesses.

 

FORWARD...FROM THE SEA's philosophy implies a mindset, culture and

 

commitment to Naval expeditionary forces, forces tailored for national needs, forces

 

shaped for joint operations, and forces operating forward from the sea.1

 

   Ideally, one would derive from these doctrinal publications the actual mission tasking

 

for individual fighting units, Ground Combat Element, Aviation Combat Element, and

 

Combat Service Support Element.  Long delays in publishing service specific strategies,

 

and the need of the different combat elements to go on training and procuring equipment

 

for what they perceive as potential threats and needs, may result in missions and tasks

 

being written prior to the service strategies. The missions and tasks of attack helicopters

 

(AH-1 Cobras) in the Marine Corps are found in FMFM 5-3,Assault Supports and in

 

NWP 55-3 AH-1 Tactical Manual and are as follows:2

 

    1. Provide fire support and security for forward and rear area forces

 

    2. Conduct point target/antiarmor operations

 

    3. Conduct anti-helicopter operations

 

    4. Provide armed escort, control, and coordination for assault support operations

 

    5. Control, coordinate, and provide terminal guidance for supporting arms to

 

      include close air support, artillery, mortars, and naval gunfire

 

    6. Provide point and limited area air defense from threat fixed-wing aircraft

 

    7. Conduct armed and visual reconnaissance

 

    8. Augment local search and rescue assets

 

    9. Maintain the capability to operate from amphibious shipping, other floating

 

        bases, and austere shore bases as required

 

    10. Maintain the capability to operate at night, in adverse weather, and under

 

        instrument flight conditions at extended ranges

 

    11. Perform organizational maintenance on assigned aircraft in all environmental

 

         conditions.

 

   Due to the varied mission tasking of the AH-1, there is a need for diverse types of

 

ordnance. A balanced inventory of weapons to include precision and general purpose

 

ordnance is the best course to prepare for an unknown present and future target set. The

 

types of weapons that the AH-1W carries to meet this present or future target set is more

 

varied than any other attack helicopter in the world. A conscious effort has gone into

 

including weapons that may not seem at first glance to have applicability to an attack

 

helicopter such as the AIM-9 Sidewinder or AGM-122 A Sidearm missile. Because of

 

the unique expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps and the tasking of the attack

 

helicopters, the Marine Corps has endeavored to include weapons that to other services

 

may not seem normal fare for attack helicopters. The Marine Corps believes that it is

 

important to put the best weapon for a specific mission on the helicopter rather than

 

trying to jury-rig another weapon to perform a specific role.  An example of this latter

 

approach is the Army outfitting some of its platforms with the Stinger missile, a missile

 

that was designed as a surface to air weapon. Designed as a surface to air missile,

 

Stinger has degraded performance as an air to air missile. There are several reasons for

 

Stinger's degraded performance. One problem is the launch motor. The launch motor

 

propels the missile out of the tube prior to the ignition of the flight motor. This launch

 

motor that the missile ejects, protects the gunner by preventing injury by the blast and

 

fire of the flight motor. With an aircraft, this ejected launch motor that protected the

 

gunner now presents a hazard. It is an empty canister that may hit the moving aircraft.

 

The second reason is that the aircraft may need to be super-elevated, which consists of

 

raising the nose of the missile to allow the seeker to acquire the target prior to launch.

 

When this takes place on the ground, the gunner simply raises the missile to acquire the

 

target.  In the air this super-elevation causes the aircraft to climb, thereby losing

 

contact with the enemy aircraft. As demonstrated during the 1988 maritime effort

 

ERNEST WILL, Marine Corps will task AH-1Ws with the primary mission of point

 

defense against fixed-wing. ERNEST WILL was the re-flagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers

 

under US protection. The only air defense in the Gulf against Iraqi aggression was the

 

AIM-9 equipped AH-1W.3

 

                                                                        Weapons Description

 

    The weapons that the AH-1W carries include 2.75" and 5.0" rockets utilized during

 

anti-personnel/CAS and Forward Air Controller (FAC A) and illumination missions, and

 

20 millimeter cannon for CAS missions and anti-air. The AGM-122A Sidearm missile

 

(a modified AIM-9C missile) is used for anti-radiation missions (the missile seeks out

 

and destroys enemy radars).

 

Click here to view image

 

The AIM 9 Sidewinder missile is designed for anti air missions. The Cobra can also

 

carry the CBU-55 Fuel Air Explosive (FAE), used as an anti-personnel explosive, and

 

the SUU-44 and SUU-25 parachute illumination flares. Of the above listed tasks, the

 

precision guided missile has direct applicability in tasks 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 10. Tasks 3,

 

anti-helicopter operations, and 6, air defense against fixed-wing, also have applicability to

 

a TOW/Hellfire/JAWS missile system, although these weapons are not specifically

 

designed as an anti-air weapon system as is the AIM-9 missile, one of the premier anti-air

 

missiles in the world. While tasks 3 and 6 are air to air missions and a dedicated air to

 

air missile such as the AIM 9 Sidewinder would be the missile of choice, the mission

 

planners must decide how likely an air threat is compared to a ground threat.

 

   If the ground threat is more likely, then TOW and Hellfire would be more viable

 

weapons since they have a proven, albeit limited, viability against aircraft. AIM 9 has

 

almost no applicability against an armor or point surface target.  Due to only two smart

 

stations onboard the Cobra, taking along a dedicated single mission missile such as the

 

AIM-9 effectively cuts the ability to deliver precision guided missiles in the ground

 

attack mode by 50 percent.

 

                                                            TACTICS/WEAPONS MATCHING

 

                                                                                    Survival

 

 

 

    There is an old saying in the aviation community that, "Speed is life." This is true

 

not only in air to air engagements, (air combat maneuvering or ACM) but also true as to

 

the amount of time a pilot and his aircraft must spend over the objective area.

 

Obviously, the less time that one is shot at, the more likely the chances of survival. The

 

positive results are the continued use of that platform for later engagements or missions,

 

and the continued preservation of a warfighting asset.

 

    Unlike fixed-wing aircraft which due to their high speed, can quickly enter and leave

 

the target area, helicopters do not possess this capability of quick target ingress and

 

egress. The fastest airspeed with which a helicopter can enter an engagement area,

 

deliver fire and egress the target area is slower than World War II attack aircraft, less

 

than 200 miles per hour. Fixed wing attack aircraft routinely ingress and egress the

 

target area at 450 knots, more than twice as fast as a helicopter.

 

    While the relatively slow speed of the helicopter presents some real challenges in

 

survivability, this slow speed offers some benefits to the CAS engagement. One of the

 

complaints of fixed-wing aviators is the inability to acquire the target or target area at the

 

high speed that they are traveling.  Another problem for the fixed wing aviator is

 

altitude. Depending on the sophistication and type of surface to air threat the fixed wing

 

aircraft is flying against, the ingress altitude of the fixed wing aircraft may be as high as

 

10-15 thousand feet.  A high altitude ingress makes it extremely hard to see a small,

 

tank-sized target. This is not the case with helicopters. Due to their slow speed and the

 

ability to hover, attack helicopter pilots can acquire the enemy target and monitor it for a

 

much longer period of time. A target that may be nearly invisible to a fixed wing aircraft

 

due to speed and altitude may be readily identifiable to the attack helicopter. The

 

problem for the attack helicopter is that simultaneous to the attack helicopter acquiring

 

the target, the target is also acquiring the attack helicopter.  To increase the chances of

 

survivability for the attack helicopter, it must, if at all possible, avoid flying over the

 

target.  The attack helicopter is much too slow and is asking to be shot down if it

 

attempts to use these types of tactics, especially in areas that risk early acquisition such as

 

open terrain and desert environments. Weapons that are compatible for fixed wing

 

missions such as general purpose, free fall bombs or any other type of ordnance delivered

 

by overflying the target are not tactically viable for attack helicopters.  There are always

 

exceptions to every rule but generally these are tried and true precepts.

 

   What the attack helicopter depends on for survivability is stand off weapons systems.

 

These are systems and weapons that allow the attack helicopter to engage targets and kill

 

these targets outside the weapons envelope of the threat systems. For example, if an

 

attack helicopter was to engage a man with a rifle, the pilot would figure that the rifle

 

could reach out approximately 500 and 800 meters.  To kill the man with a rifle the

 

attack helicopter would engage primarily with 20 millimeter cannon with a maximum

 

effective range of 2000 meters or rockets with a maximum effectiveness of between

 

2000 and 4000 meters, depending on the airspeed and delivery of the rocket. With either

 

the 20 millimeter or the rockets the attack helicopter would be outside the threat envelope

 

(500-800 meters) while remaining well within the killing distance of its own weapons.

 

   There are classified tables (Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals or J-MEM's) with

 

computer generated data that give the attack helicopter pilot planning figures for the

 

number of rockets, rounds of 20 millimeter ammunition, numbers of TOW missiles,

 

etc., that will probably be expended to kill, disable, or immobilize a given target. From

 

the JMEM's data, the pilot can plan his ingress to the target, airspeed (or lack thereof),

 

distance from the target to fire the weapon, and the number of weapons and type of

 

weapons to employ to achieve the required damage to the target.

 

 

                                                                                    Guidance Theory

 

 

 

    There are four types of guidance systems associated with precision guided munitions

 

and missiles. These four types are: Manual Command to Line of Sight, or MCLOS;

 

Semi-Automatic Command to Line of Sight, or SACLOS: Laser Semi-Active Homing,

 

or LSAH: and lastly, Automatic Command to Line of Sight, or ACLOS 4.   The

 

differences among these different missile guidance systems is a function of technology,

 

pilot workload, and survivability.

 

   Ideally, every pilot would prefer a missile system that allowed him to "fire and

 

forget" the missile after launch.  This allows the pilot to fire the missile similar to

 

shooting a rocket or bullet and to egress from the objective area, rather than continuing

 

to track the missile all the way to target impact.  The time of missile tracking varies,

 

but depending on the speed of the missile and distance from the target, the time that the

 

aircraft is tracking the missile rather than protecting itself can be anywhere from 20 to 30

 

seconds.

 

                                MCLOS Guidance

 

   The first generation of missile guidance was MCLOS. The MCLOS or manual type

 

of anti-armor missile requires very high pilot workload. The pilot must fly the missile to

 

the target similar to flying a radio controlled airplane. Just as the operator of a radio

 

controlled airplane must keep the airplane and runway in sight simultaneously to effect a

 

landing, so must the missile operator track both the missile and the target. With high

 

speeds of the missile, the continuous movement of the target, and the missile operators'

 

helicopter also moving, one can understand how difficult a system like this would be to

 

use in a combat environment.  The United States operated two systems that used

 

MCLOS guidance prior to the TOW missile SACLOS technology. These two types of

 

MCLOS systems that the United States operated from the ground, and with minimal

 

success from helicopters were the French built SS-10 and SS-11 anti-armor missiles.5

 

   Following MCLOS, the next generation of missile guidance was SACLOS. SACLOS

 

continues to be the primary type of missile guidance in operation today.  SACLOS

 

guidance allows the missile operator to track the target only as opposed to tracking the

 

target and missile simultaneously as was required with MCLOS guidance.

 

                           SACLOS Guidance

 

    SACLOS guidance results in much less workload for the missile operator/pilot than

 

was required of MCLOS guidance. Typically with SACLOS guided missiles such as

 

TOW, the missile operator acquires the target through a telescopic sight unit which

 

magnifies the target. Inside the telescopic sight unit, or TSU, there is a crosshair

 

superimposed. The missile operator keeps this crosshair on the target by manually

 

slewing the crosshair with the aid of a sight hand control. This is similar to a "joystick"

 

one uses with arcade or computer games.  As long as the operator keeps the crosshairs

 

on the target, the missile will continue to track to the target. Information is fed back and

 

forth between the missile and the aircraft through a xenon beacon on the back of the

 

missile, or some other type of pyrotechnic device such as a flare. A goniometer in the

 

nose of the aircraft receives relative distance and motion as to the missile's position in

 

relation to the target through this beacon "talking " to the aircraft. The aircraft then

 

"talks" back to the missile and corrects its flight path through two wires that send

 

guidance information back to the missile. This connection between the aircraft and

 

TOW are wire commands, but some other types of foreign missiles that operate similarly

 

to TOW use radio frequency guidance rather than wire guidance. With TOW, the

 

magnification of the target is a 13x magnification. Foreign missile systems that are also

 

SACLOS systems typically are approximately the same degree of magnification. What

 

this degree of magnification allows is acquisition and recognition of tank-sized targets

 

out to an effective engagement distance of around 4000 meters. After acquiring the

 

target, the missile operator superimposes the crosshairs of the sighting unit onto the

 

target. The missile operator then launches the missile, and continues to track the target,

 

not the missile, all the way to target impact.

 

     An example of a Laser Semi-Active Homing, or LSAH missile is the Hellfire

 

missile. Rather than guiding on information supplied as does a TOW missile, which

 

requires constant updating of spatial position in relation to the missile, aircraft and target,

 

the Hellfire missile seeks reflected laser energy from the target that is "shot," or

 

designated onto the target.  More will be discussed later on the workings. Suffice it to

 

say that Hellfire must also be constantly guided to the target.

 

     The advantage of a missile that must be guided all the way to the target is that

 

usually there is less chance of fratricide than a missile that is launched and becomes

 

"active" or guides itself to the target.  If at any time in the missile's flight path the

 

operator decides that he does not want to engage the earlier chosen target, or that the

 

target chosen was friendly, he can, in the case of TOW, drive the missile into the ground,

 

allow the missile to go ballistic, or find a new target.

 

    The disadvantages of a SACLOS missile system are survivability of the aircraft,

 

and the pilot or missile operator. During the whole missile fly-out or time of flight, the

 

aircraft must have line of sight to the target. This means that the aircraft can not "hide"

 

or remain masked behind a piece of terrain such as a hill or ridge while the missile is

 

tracking to the target.  To see the target means that the target can also see the aircraft.

 

For a helicopter to expose itself to enemy air defenses for up to 30 seconds or more

 

markedly increases the risk of the helicopter or aircraft to being engaged by enemy

 

weapons systems and possibly shot down.

 

 

 

                           ACLOS Guidance

 

   Another name for Automatic Command to Line of Sight Guidance or ACLOS

 

guidance is "Fire and Forget."  Examples of "Fire and Forget" systems are the

 

AGM-122A Sidearm anti-radiation missile and the AIM-9 series of heat seeking anti-air

 

missiles. These missiles self-guide to the target once launched. The pilot or missile

 

operator no longer has to track the missile during its fly-out or missile time of flight to

 

the target The AIM-9 missile guides to the target using infrared guidance. The seeker in

 

the nose of the missile looks for the heat given off by the engine and moving components

 

of the aircraft or target. The AGM-122 A guides to the target in much the same way but

 

rather than seeking the heat of the target, the missile is  seeking the radar emission of

 

the target.

 

   The advantage of an ACLOS system is clearly in the self-protection it provides the

 

launching platform by allowing the pilot or missile operator to egress the target area or

 

engage another target without having to continue to track the prior missile launch. This

 

normally translates into a more survivable attack by the launching platform, pilot, or

 

missile operator, as less time is spent in the objective area, or on a vulnerable flight path.

 

    The disadvantage of ACLOS systems is that generally, once the missile is launched

 

the missile is out of control of the pilot or missile operator. If during the missile fly-out

 

the operator realizes that the target the missile was launched at was not an enemy target,

 

there is very little that the pilot or missile operator can do to redirect the missile either

 

away from the misidentified target or onto another target. Many times ACLOS missiles

 

may require launch prior to positive identification of the target as enemy.  An example

 

of an ACLOS system that may require launch prior to positive identification by the pilot

 

or missile operator is the infrared guided Maverick missile. During the recent war in

 

Southwest Asia, an aircraft launched a Maverick infrared guided missile outside of

 

positive visual parameters. The missile was seeking "hot metal", and locked onto a

 

friendly personnel carrier. The Maverick hit the personnel carrier, destroying the vehicle

 

and its occupants. After launch of the Maverick missile, even if the pilot recognized his

 

mistake, there was no way for him to redirect the missile.  In addition to the above

 

episode, if an ACLOS guided heat seeking, or radar guided missile, determines that a

 

friendly target is producing a heat signature or radar signature that meets its internally

 

programmed target criteria, or presents a stronger, more lucrative signature, the missile

 

may guide onto the friendly target.

 

   The purpose of this chapter was to familiarize the reader with the special demands

 

that attack helicopters require of the precision guided ordnance they employ and the

 

different types of guidance systems that are available for precision guided missiles. The

 

next chapter will analyze the currently fielded precision guided missiles and some of the

 

tactics that are employed to successfully fight and survive on the battlefield. The future

 

JAWS missile will also be analyzed to determine if this weapon is a viable alaternative

 

for TOW, and if the Marine Corps can affford to cancel TOW.

 

                                     NOTES

           

1            FORWARD...FROM THE SEA (Washington, DC. Department of the Navy, 1994)

 

 

2     US. Marine Corps, NWP 55-3 AH-1 Tactical Manual Vol. 1 Rev. E. (Washington

DC.: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1993)10-1.

 

3     Colonel D.D. Fulton, USMC Military Fellow, Center for Strategic and

International Studies, interview by author, February 15, 1995.

 

 

4     NWP 55-3 AH-I Tactical Manual Vol. I Rev. E. 4-2.

 

 

5     Major J.C. Burns, USA XM-26 TOW: Birth of the Helicopter as a Tank Buster.

Master of Military Studies  AY: 1993-1994 (US Marine Corps Command and Staff

College Marine Corps University MCCDC Quantico Va., 1994.) 3.

 

                                   CHAPTER 4

 

                   WEAPONS DESCRIPTION, ANALYSIS, AND TACTICS

 

 

                                  TOW Missile

 

            The purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with the capabilities and

 

shortcomings of the existing precision guided weapons and compare their capability to

 

the planned capabilities of the JAWS missile. As we've seen, some of the unique

 

capabilities of TOW, such as the ability to work in low cloud ceilings is not planned for

 

JAWS. The TOW missile is the most widely used Western anti-armor missile in history.

 

More than 550,000 units have been produced, and more than 600,000 can be expected to

 

be completed by the end of the century.  The TOW missile, and specifically the newer

 

TOW 2 AIR missile which at the present time Marines could expect to employ in

 

combat, is a tube-launched, optically tracked, wire command linked weapon, with a solid

 

propellant flight and launch motor. The TOW 2 AIR missile was developed because of

 

the TOW's inability to defeat tanks with reactive armor. Additionally, TOW 2 AIR is

 

specifically designed for use on aircraft and is shipboard compatible. Reactive armor is

 

made up of a thin layer of explosive placed between small metal plates and attached to

 

armor vehicles. When hit by anti-armor weapon such as TOW, the explosive detonates,

 

throwing the metal plates into the missile warhead's explosively formed jet which impairs

 

its ability to penetrate the tank's main armor.

 

Click here to view image

 

    The TOW 2 AIR features an improved direct attack warhead which has a secondary

 

charge in its nose probe.  This prematurely detonates the explosive in the reactive

 

armor, clearing the disruptive plates, before the main charge attacks the main armor of

 

the tank.  The US Army approved the TOW2 AIR as an interim measure to defeat

 

Soviet reactive armor in November 1983.1 Production of the missile began in FY 1987,

 

and this is the latest model to be procured for the AH-1W. The Marine Corps purchased

 

the latest model, TOW2 AIR in FY 94 to fill the Marine Corps inventory.

 

       SACLOS guidance steers the missile to the target. This method requires the

 

aircraft to be within appropriate launch constraints (aircraft pitch, roll, and yaw) prior to

 

launching the missile, visually acquiring the target, firing the missile, and keeping the

 

target sight cross hairs on the target until weapon impact.  The TOW is propelled from

 

its sealed launch tube, which also serves as its transport container. After missile launch,

 

the missile's wings and tail control surface unfold to control the missile's flight to the

 

target.  Weapon guidance depends upon uninterrupted visual contact between the

 

missile and the aircraft guidance sensors and the unbroken wire command link to the

 

missile.   The time required to track the TOW missile to the maximum range (3,750

 

meters) is 21.5 seconds. Combining the missile tracking time, detection time,

 

acquisition time, and time to identify the target, often results in an exposure time that is

 

significantly longer than the actual required tracking time.

 

    SACLOS guidance systems such as the TOW, French HOT missile and

 

Russian AT-2 and AT-3, may be vulnerable to certain enemy countermeasures.  An

 

armored vehicle may use decoy flares to seduce the missile tracking detector

 

(goniometer) or an IR searchlight or an imitative IR jammer that may cause erroneous

 

missile tracking signals to be generated by the onboard missile control computers. In

 

addition, any countermeasure such as smoke, or other obscurants that establish an

 

intermediate barrier between the missile and the aircraft, may also adversely affect the

 

guidance of the missile. The modification of the TOW2 AIR guidance system permits

 

guidance through heavy battlefield obscurants, and includes hardening against

 

electro-optical countermeasures. To aid in flight guidance, the xenon beacon in the aft of

 

the missile was replaced with a thermal beacon to provide an infrared tracker. To ensure

 

proper launch and tracking, the TOW2 AIR required new computer "card" installation

 

in the AH-IW. However, the night time and obscurant capability of the TOW2 AIR

 

won't be applicable to the AH-1W until the new Night Targeting System (NTS) enters

 

the fleet, which is taking place today.    The maximum number of TOW missiles that

 

can be carried on a single sortie is 8 (4 missiles each on stations 1 and 4).  The AH-1W

 

is limited to carrying precision stores only on the outboard stations.2   The cost of a

 

TOW2 AIR missile is approximately $22,000 per round. The cost of a full load of

 

TOW2 AIR missiles (8) is $176,000.3

 

                      Strengths of the TOW Missile System

 

    There are some advantages to the TOW missile that are unique. Since the TOW

 

is completely passive (does not radiate any emissions), radar warning receivers and laser

 

warning receivers which are standard fare on many combat systems today will not detect

 

the launch of the TOW.  The TOW also flies a very low trajectory to the target. If the

 

aircraft fires the missile from a hover of 50 feet, the missile's highest flyout trajectory

 

will only be slightly higher than the aircraft. This allows the missile to be fired from

 

attack helicopters in cloud decks as low as 100 feet above ground level.  The system

 

also has a high probability of killing most known armor on the battlefield today.  All

 

known enemy armor and tanks were vulnerable to the Improved-TOW missile in

 

Southwest Asia.

 

                     Weaknesses of the TOW Missile System

 

    TOW has some disadvantages that must be planned for when employing the weapon.

 

Since it is a wire command linked missile, water can affect the signals being sent

 

through the wire if the wire is immersed in water.  This presents planning challenges if

 

the missile is to be fired at sea, or over open water.  There is a similar problem if the

 

missile wire drapes over power lines. Power lines can cause the wire to become burned

 

and to quit transmitting the required signals to the missile. (This presents no hazard to the

 

crew)  Line of sight must be maintained with the target at all times, and the aircraft

 

must continue to be exposed to enemy weapons during the missile fly-out. This is

 

particularly important with the TOW missile as it is a relatively slow missile. There are

 

currently no interchangeable warheads, nor a requirement for interchangeable warheads

 

for the TOW missile. This is a major disadvantage to engaging any type of structure

 

other than armor.  The TOW warhead with its shaped charge has very little blast effect

 

and may be close to useless against structures that are made of wood or concrete.

 

 

                           TOW Missile Tactics

 

    When employing the TOW missile in a tactical scenario from the AH-1W, the

 

aircrews plan their mission utilizing what is known as "TOW team tactics". The

 

smallest element that would normally go out on a mission, a section, (two aircraft)

 

delineates prior to engaging targets which aircraft in that section the primary TOW

 

shooter is and which the primary covering aircraft is.  With multiple targets, this

 

assigning and changing of responsibilities between being the TOW shooter and the

 

covering aircraft may continue to shift back and forth during the attack.  The reason for

 

a covering aircraft rather than both aircraft shooting simultaneously is to try and limit the

 

vulnerability of the aircraft shooting the TOW missile. While the TOW shooter can

 

suppress targets using the pilot's helmet sights during missile flight, it is very close to

 

workload saturation.  In practice it is much more efficient to use another Cobra to

 

suppress any enemy fire directed at the TOW shooting aircraft.

 

                             Hellfire Missile

 

   The Hellfire missile is a semi-active, laser guided precision weapon. The missile was

 

designed to provide increased survivability and lethality against armor. The Hellfire is

 

capable of defeating any current armor in production.4

 

Click here to view image

 

    Semi-active laser guidance requires that the intended target be illuminated for the

 

terminal guidance phase of the missile flight This method of guidance requires an

 

airborne or ground designator to operate within the launch and guidance parameters of

 

the missile. The Hellfire missile system has a variety of missile trajectory profiles and

 

methods of engaging targets using different delivery and designator combinations.  For

 

example, the lock on after launch (LOAL) mode allows a launch aircraft to be

 

completely terrain masked and outside of the range of threat weapon systems.  Once the

 

aircraft is maneuvered within the proper launch envelope, and communication has been

 

established between the laser designation crew and attack helicopter crew, a missile

 

launch can be initiated.  The solid propellant launch motor propels the missile along a

 

pre-programmed climb, acquisition, and guidance trajectory.  When the missile is

 

established in the acquisition phase the laser seeker head scans the target area for the

 

properly coded reflected laser energy.  Once the reflected energy, or laser spot, is

 

detected by the laser seeker, the missile guidance section will compute steering

 

commands into mechanical fin movements. The missile will guide to the laser spot until

 

target impact. A large, shaped charge warhead takes advantage of the missile flight

 

profile and the warhead penetrates the top of the armor from an optimized angle of

 

impact. The stand-off range and lethality of the Hellfire system make the weapon one

 

of the most effective anti-armor weapons of any type.

 

    The sophistication and advanced capabilities of the Hellfire missile make it more

 

expensive than the TOW missile. The unit fly away cost of the AGM-114K Hellfire is

 

$ 47,600.5

 

 

 

                            Strengths of the Hellfire Missile

 

     The Hellfire gives a much greater stand-off range from the target than the TOW

 

missile. The maximum range of the Hellfire is 8000 meters compared to the TOW at

 

3,750 meters. The Hellfire has a much bigger warhead than the TOW missile, and can

 

produce more of a blast explosion than can the TOW missile. In comparison the Hellfire

 

penetrates 40 inches of cold rolled homogeneous steel while the TOW 2A missile

 

penetrates 30 inches of cold rolled homogeneous steel.6 The Hellfire may be more

 

survivable than the TOW since the Hellfire missile can be launched without the pilot or

 

aircraft ever having seen the target.  To accomplish this, another aircraft must designate

 

the target with a laser, or a ground laser system must designate the target.

 

                      Weaknesses of the Hellfire Missile

 

     Whatever laser system designates the target, all laser guided weapons in

 

production today have the same requirement. That is, the target must be tracked in one

 

form or another through at least the last portion of the flight. Therefore, whether it is

 

the aircraft firing the missile that is designating the target for launch, another aircraft

 

designating the target for launch, or a person on the ground using a modular portable

 

designator, someone must guide the missile during its final flight path to the target. This

 

means that someone is still vulnerable to attack by enemy systems since they can not

 

leave the engagement or target area as they could if any of these systems were truly fire

 

and forget systems.

 

     The Hellfire missile is not a passive system. While the Hellfire has been updated

 

and "hardened" against electro-optic countermeasures (this is a product improvement

 

named Hellfire Optimized Missile System, or HOMS), it is still possible through laser

 

warning receivers, for the enemy target to pick up indications that they are being lased.

 

Through these indications that the enemy is being targeted by the laser pulse on their

 

weapons platform, the enemy can take appropriate disruptive countermeasures against

 

the Hellfire attack.  The use of active repeating jammers that interpret, imitate and

 

disrupt the missile steering command signals may induce a sufficient tracking error to

 

cause the missile to miss the intended target.  Artificial smoke and obscurants may also

 

block the target from the designator's view or cause the laser "spot" to be reflected off the

 

obscurants instead of the target.  Another major problem is that, due to the higher

 

flight path that the Hellfire missile flies (between 400 and 2600 feet above ground level

 

depending on distance and type of launch), the missile may fly into the clouds and lose

 

the target designation. Another limiting factor with the utilization of the Hellfire is that

 

no US systems have a high explosive warhead that can be used rather than the shaped

 

charge warhead.  While the government of Sweden has purchased a high explosive

 

warhead for their Hellfire, designated the RBS-17, no high explosive warhead is

 

available in the United States.

 

           Weaknesses of Existing Precision Guided/Anti-Armor Missiles

 

     The largest problem area in all existing precision guided missiles of today such as

 

TOW and Hellfire is that survivability of the launcher or designator platform is

 

diminished to varying degrees since these missile systems require continuous

 

information to be fed to them during the terminal phase of their flight to the target.

 

Neither of these missiles is a true "fire and forget" missile.

 

     The susceptibility of these missiles to jamming by enemy or threat countermeasure

 

systems is also a weakness of the existing operational precision guided missiles TOW

 

and Hellfire.

 

     There is another major problem area that is more of a concern to the Army than to

 

the Marine Corps, but has far reaching implications for the Marine Corps. Neither

 

Hellfire nor TOW works well as anti-helicopter or anti-fixed wing weapons.  While

 

the Marine Corps is satisfied with the performance of the AIM-9 series of air to air

 

missiles for the AH-1W, as was discussed earlier, the aircraft gives up a large

 

percentage of its anti-armor /CAS ability since it only has two "smart", or precision

 

guided stations on the aircraft.  If the AIM-9 is carried, then instead of having the

 

capability to carry 8 TOW or Hellfire missiles, the maximum number drops to 4 of

 

either type.  In addition, the joint issue of procuring future weapons can not be ignored.

 

In other words, if the Army considers it important that the missile have a true air to air

 

capability, the Marine Corps must also consider it important if the Marine Corps hopes

 

to procure any future advanced armor killing missile.

 

     Both TOW and Hellfire were originally US. Army projects that the Marine Corps

 

adapted to its attack helicopters. Other systems such as the Sidearm anti-radiation

 

missile were Marine Corps specific projects. To develop a sense of how a weapon

 

system comes into being, an examination of the development process of the Joint

 

Advanced Weapon System (JAWS) missile, through examining the research and

 

development process, and the Mission Need Statement, should help provide insight.

 

                           Research and Development

 

    In 1992 the Marine Corps Aviation Weapons and Requirements Branch,

 

Headquarters Marine Corps, drafted a Mission Need Statement for JAWS. The purpose

 

of the Mission Need Statement (MNS), was to jointly provide the Army and the

 

Navy/Marine Corps team with a highly versatile weapon that would permit simultaneous

 

engagement of multiple targets. Its goal was to enable force commanders to focus lethal

 

combat power, enhance survivability, and achieve freedom of action on a modern,

 

dynamic battlefield.

 

    The Army also concurred with the MNS of the Marine Corps, and was particularly

 

interested in the applicability of JAWS to satisfy the deficiencies in the air to air

 

capability of its attack and scout aircraft.

 

    The description of the JAWS program as envisioned by the Army, and specifically

 

MICOM, was to provide a follow on anti-armor replacement for the Hellfire 2 (HOMS)

 

and the TOW2 AIR missile, overcoming the current operational limitations inherent in

 

laser and/or wire guided SACLOS weapons.

 

    The objectives of the program were,  1. To "neckdown", that is, to produce one

 

missile where today there are two, TOW and Hellfire.   2. To augment the AIM-9

 

missile for an anti-helo capability (a capability that the Army was more concerned with

 

than the Marine Corps).   3. To fire and forget the missile.  4.  To possess a very

 

high speed and long range.  5. To be IOC (have an initial operating capability) by

 

2003.  6. To be fully operational in 2005.

 

                            MISSION NEED STATEMENT

 

     To start a program in the Defense Department that requires funding for a piece

 

of equipment requires a Mission Need Statement.  The Mission Need Statement

 

describes an area that is lacking in the proper type of weapon, airframe or piece of

 

equipment to ensure that the military services are able to accomplish their assigned

 

missions against any threat into the foreseeable future.  There is a format that a Mission

 

Need Statement (MNS) must follow. The format for MNS's discusses the Mission

 

and Threat Analysis of the weapon or weapon system, what the Threat this weapon is

 

likely to face in the present and future, and the Deficiencies of the current weapon or

 

weapon system. The next area of discussion in the MNS is the Non-Material

 

Alternatives.   This shows, or attempts to show, that there are no existing systems that

 

will satisfy the requirements for this new proposed system.

 

 

                Joint Advanced Weapon System (JAWS) Background

 

     Paralleling the Marine Corps' quest for a follow on missile to TOW and Hellfire

 

was an Army project that also considered a follow on missile to replace TOW and

 

Hellfire. The Army's requirement for a new missile originally were developed from a

 

concept for a new heavy anti-tank missile called the Advanced Missile System-Heavy

 

(AMS-H).  In 1988, the Army funded Texas Instruments and Hughes to develop a focal

 

plane IIR seeker for the AMS-H requirement. In FY 91 as no firm requirement for a

 

TOW replacement existed, the Army canceled the program and shelved the project.

 

   Since the cancellation of the AMS-H, the Army's Missile Command (MICOM) has

 

been working on new missile technology called The Army Counter Air Weapon System

 

(TACAWS).

 

Click here to view image

 

This is the leading research and development for the JAWS program, and the Army plans

 

to use the missile against both air and ground targets. The missile can be fired from

 

either the ground or from helicopters in the anti-armor role, and anti-air role.

 

  The TACAWS project will demonstrate advanced tactical missile technology

 

including seekers, propulsion airframes, warheads, and guidance and control. The

 

project is planned to demonstrate lightweight multi-role missile technology in support of

 

air-to-air, ground-to-air, and ground to ground missions. Particular attention will be

 

given to the development of IR seeker technology capable of defeating helos buried in

 

cluttered backgrounds, the innovative use of optical data links for identification of friend

 

or foe (to attempt to limit fratricide), and the ability to attack targets masked from the

 

launch platform. MICOM plans for JAWS missile performance to exceed current

 

baseline parameters for the Stinger missile, the Hellfire missile, and the TOW missile.

 

 

 

         Joint Advanced Weapon System (JAWS) Mission Need Statement

 

   Due to the current system deficiencies of both Hellfire and TOW, the Marine Corps

 

drafted a Mission Need Statement to address these deficiencies. The areas of

 

shortcoming regarding the TOW missile as set out by the Mission Need Statement

 

include the short range of the missile, the slow time of flight, the vulnerability of the

 

pilot and aircraft during the launch and attack phase of the missile operation, the

 

restrictive delivery constraints, the electro-optical countermeasure problems, the missile

 

not being ship board qualified, (does not meet all the Navy requirements for safety on

 

board a ship) the missile is SACLOS, the relatively short shelf life of the missile

 

(approximately 8-10 years) and the limitation that the TOW launcher can only be used to

 

fire TOW.

 

    The deficiencies for the Hellfire missile include the inability to lase a target

 

through smoke, fog, or other obscurants, the inability to operate in low cloud conditions,

 

susceptibility to electro-optical countermeasures that can be employed to defeat the

 

missile, and the fact that the Hellfire launcher can only be used to fire Hellfire missiles.

 

The last deficiency of each missile is that neither missile is optimized for air to air

 

applications.

 

 

                          Mission and Threat Analysis

 

JAWS requirements in the MNS are that the future missile be multi-service, affordable,

 

and possess the capability for employment against armor, surface targets, and aircraft.

 

While these are the requirements as set out in the mission and threat analysis, it is

 

important to keep in mind that anti-armor missiles require different things from their

 

warhead than do anti-air missiles. Since tanks and armor are traditionally reinforced

 

with some type of protection such as rolled homogeneous steel, chobam armor, or in

 

some cases depleted uranium, anti-armor missiles require a large, heavy warhead. This

 

results in a missile that may be fast but is not agile or able to make quick turns. Anti-air

 

missiles traditionally have much lighter warheads since they are employed against very

 

thin-skinned aircraft. While they are agile and able to turn quickly, they would not be

 

able to defeat armor due to their light warhead composition. To ask a missile to contain

 

a warhead that is heavy enough to destroy all existing armor and all future armor for the

 

foreseeable future and also be quick and agile enough to turn with helicopters and

 

fixed-wing aircraft may present problems in design, if not an outright compromise in

 

missile performance.7

 

    JAWS is supposed to possess a true "fire and forget" capability. This is to be

 

accomplished through an infrared imaging system that will allow the missile to seek

 

targets on the battlefield for which it has been programmed. For instance, if the missile

 

is "looking" for an enemy T-72 tank but instead "sees" a friendly M1-A1 tank, the

 

missile will not home in on the friendly tank. The approximate location of the enemy

 

position or exact location can also be fed into the missile so that the missile "knows"

 

where in space to fly to after launch. Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) information

 

feeds into the missile from the aircraft so the missile orients to its present location on the

 

battlefield prior to launch. In case both sides are using the same type of weapons, to

 

prevent fratricide, JAWS will have the capability for control throughout the whole time

 

of flight to the target, similar to TOW by selecting a program that allows the pilot to

 

control the launch and flight of the missile.

 

    Since JAWS uses a seeker head that relies on infrared homing rather than laser

 

reflected energy like Hellfire, the missile should have better poor weather capability.

 

However, thick clouds will also present a problem for JAWS as there is a limit to the

 

density of cloud that the infrared seeker can penetrate. Presently, during testing, the

 

missile climbs to a height of 260 meters, or approximately 800 feet above ground level.

 

This could present some very serious degradation of capabilities on a cloudy or rainy

 

day. Again, the lower flight profile TOW affords, and is not possible with Hellfire, will

 

also be a problem with JAWS.8

 

The required capabilities of JAWS include the following:

 

1. Autonomous launch and leave. (This is synonymous with "fire and forget".)

 

2. Light weight (60-80 pounds, approximately between the weight of TOW and

 

Hellfire).

 

3. Maximum range of between 8,000 and 10,000 meters.

 

4.  Off boresight capability. (This means that the missile has the capability for track

 

and     shoot targets that are not off the nose of the aircraft; they may be as much as 90

 

        degrees out to either side).

 

5. High speed (F-Pole parity). If a friendly JAWS carrying aircraft launches a missile at

 

     the same time as an enemy aircraft launches a missile at the friendly, the enemy

 

      aircraft's missile will not beat the JAWS missile.

 

6. The JAWS missile must be shipboard qualified.

 

7. The JAWS missile must have the capability to fire from either a TOW launcher or a

 

     Hellfire launcher.9

 

    This chapter presented the strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities of attack

 

helicopter precision guided weapons. This was done to present the reader with a proper

 

framework from which to compare TOW and Hellfire in relation to JAWS. The next

 

chapter will draw conclusions and make recommendations about the decision to cancel

 

the TOW missile prior to the delivery of a tested acceptable alternative.

 

                                     NOTES

 

1     TEAL GROUP TOW

 

2     Major Mark H. Bamberger, USMC, Are Non Precision Munitions a Viable

Weapon for Attack Helicopters? Master of Military Studies AY: 1992 (US Army

command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Ks, 1992)121.

 

 

3     Major Bamberger, 121.

 

 

4     TEAL GROUP HELLFIRE

 

 

5     TACAWS Program Research, Development & Engineering Center guidance &

Control Directorate Technology Homing Branch. This was a talking paper presented to

TACAWS Executive Steering Committee, 4 Nov. 1993.

 

 

6     NWP 55-3 AH-1 Tactical Manual Vol.1 Rev. E. (U) (Washington D.C.) Dec.

1993 17-6.

 

7     TEAL GROUP HELLFIRE

 

 

8     Interview with Dr. James C. Bradas, TACAWS program manger, Research,

Development, and Engineering Center Guidance and Control Directorate

Technology/Terminal Homing Branch, US Army MICOM, Redstone Arsenal, A1. Nov.

1994.

 

 

9    Marine Corps Mission Need Statement Briefing paper for JAWS, 1992.

 

                                   CHAPTER 5

 

 

                   SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 

                                                                                    Summary

 

  This paper investigated whether the Marine Corps and the Army are canceling a

 

proven precision guided missile for attack helicopters before a proven adequate

 

replacement exists.  The method of determining the answer to the question was to

 

establish a baseline knowledge for the reader through a historical perspective, existing

 

weapons capabilities, and the relationship between the weapons platform and mission

 

requirements.

 

                                                                                    Conclusions

 

     The Marine Corps and Army are committing a mistake in canceling future buys of

 

TOW prior to the arrival of a proven, tested weapon that can perform as well or better

 

than TOW, without any degradation in mission accomplishment. The Marine AH-1W is

 

unique as an attack helicopter because it carries the most diverse weapons suite of any

 

attack helicopter in the world. Utilization of the best possible weapon to accomplish the

 

mission was the rule. A symbiotic relationship existed between a mix of precision and

 

non-precision weapons that gave a greater capability than one or the other. TOW and

 

Hellfire also serve each other in a symbiotic relationship. The weaknesses of TOW, its

 

short range and slow speed, were offset by the long range and high speed of Hellfire. The

 

weakness of Hellfire, its inability to operate in low cloud conditions and its need for a

 

laser designation, were offset by TOW's low ceiling capability and passive launch. It is

 

not viable to cancel a proven weapon in the hope that a future weapon will accomplish

 

the mission of the old system. If the JAWS missile is unable to meet the requirements set

 

out for it or fails during test trials, the Marine Corps and Army will not have a TOW

 

production line to fall back on. Vendors and parts suppliers move on, corporate

 

knowledge is lost and a proven capability could end up being impossible to recapture.

 

 

 

                                                                        Recommendations

 

   The TOW missile should be retained and the production line kept open until JAWS

 

or another precision guided missile passes testing and proves to be a superior missile to

 

TOW. Product improvements should continue with TOW. A blast fragment warhead

 

would increase the capability of TOW in expeditionary environments where a precision

 

blast weapon is preferable to a shaped charge. The Russians did it, why can't we? (The

 

AT-2 wire guided Russian missile has both a blast frag and a shaped charge warhead that

 

are interchangeable.)

 

     Both TOW and Hellfire would benefit from screw on warheads and seekers. A

 

great enhancement in mission performance is possible by tailoring the warheads and

 

seekers for a given mission. Rather than being revolutionary, an evolutionary

 

development and improvement in both TOW and Hellfire should be looked at and may be

 

possible by using active seekers strapped on to the existing TOW and Hellfire missiles.

 

            The Marine Corps and Army should maintain the procurement line for TOW until

 

more than just an idea can be fired from the aircraft.

 

                                 BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

                                  Books

 

 

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Braybrook, Roy.  Attack Aircraft. Newbury Park, CA : Haynes, 1990.

 

Drendel, Lou. Gunslingers in Action.  Warren, Michigan: Signal Publications, 1974.

 

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Richardson, Doug. AH-1. New York, N.Y. : Prentice Hall, 1987.

 

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                                                                        Government Publications

 

 

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Weapons in the Strike/ASUW Master Plan (U). 9 Feb. 1990.

 

Weinert, Richard P. TRADOC Historical Monograph Series A History of Army

Aviation-1950-1962.  Office of the Command Historian United States Army Training and

Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe VA, 1991.

 

                                                                        Journals

 

 

LtCol. Barry, Richard M. USMC "In Praise of Close Air Support". Marine Corps Gazette Vol.

76, Number 5 (May 1992): 56.

 

LtCol. Ford, Barry M. USMC "The Future is Attack Helicopters". Proceedings Vol.120,

Number 9 (September 1994) 54.

 

Col. Ewers, Norman G. USMC (Ret) " Aviation - A Conversation with LtGen Royal N.

Moore, Jr.". Marine Corps Gazette Vol. 75, Number 10 (October 1991): 44.

 

MGN Gavin, James M. "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses.". United States Army Combat

Forces Journal  (June 1954) : 21

 

Maj. Gibson, Mark J. USMC "The All-1W SuperCobra: Semper Volens, Semper Potens"..

Marine Corps Gazette Vol. 76, Number 12 (December 1992) : 70.

 

LTC Grayson, Eugene H. Army (Ret) "Hamilton H. Howze, Visionary Giant from the Past"..

 US Army Aviation Digest  (Nov/Dec 1991) : 2.

 

Jablonsky, David. "US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs.". Parameters

Vol.24, Number3 (Autumn 1994) :18.

 

LtGen Smith, Keith A. USMC (Ret) "A Different Kind of Artillery--The AH-1W.".

Marine Corps Gazette Vol. 77, Number 5 (May 1993): 38.

 

Stech, Frank J. "Winning CNN Wars.". Parameters Vol. 24, Number 3 (Autumn 1994):

37.

 

Steinweg Kenneth K.  "Dealing Realistically with Fratricide.". Parameters Vol. 25, Number

1 (Spring 1995): 4.

 

LtCol. Sullivan, John J. USMC (Ret) "You're Killing Friendlies!".  Marine Corps Gazette

Vol. 71, Number 7 (July 1987): 28.

 

LTC Welch, William G. "Is Fixed-Wing CAS Worth It?". Proceedings Vol. 120 Number 9

(September 1994) : 51.

 

 

                             After Action Reports

 

 

Horner, Charles, A. The Air Campaign Desert Shield/Desert Storm Command and Staff

College, Quantico, VA November 1994,  Notes taken during question and answer period.

 

United States Marine Corps, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One. "Desert

    Shiel/Desert Storm After Action Report". MAWTS-1, Yuma, AZ. 1991, After action

    report from Capt. P. J. Gough to Commanding Officer, MAWTS-1 concerning Marine

    helicopter operations during Desert Shield/Desert Shield.

 

 

United States Marine Corps, Marine Liaison, CENTAF "Desert Shield/Desert Storm After

    Action Report". After action report from Marine Liaison At CENTAF to Commanding

     General I Marine Expeditionary Force. 18 March 1991.

 

 

                                                                        Unpublished Manuscripts

 

Bamberger, Maj. Mark, H. USMC. Are Non-Precision Munitions a Viable Weapon for the

Attack Helicopter? MSSI Thesis. Fort Leavenworth KS.: US. Army Command and General

Staff College, 1992.

 

 

Bums, Maj. J.C., USA. XM-26 TOW: Birth of the Helicopter as a Tank Buster. MSSI

Thesis. Quantico, VA.: USMC. Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 2

May, 1994.

 

 

Goforth, Maj. Charles, T. Do We Need a New Aircraft for Close Air Support. A thesis

submitted to the Air Command and Staff College of the Air University in partial requirement for

the Requirements for Graduation.: Air University Maxwell Air Force Base Al., June 1967.

 

 

Redden, LtCol. Joseph, J. USAF.  AIRLAND Battle--The Global Doctrine? Military Studies

Program Individual Study Project US. Army War College Carlisle Barrack, Penn. 18 May 1983.

 

 

Rocco, Capt Mike, A. Supercobra, Superdeal. Writing requirement for Amphibious

Warfare. Quantico, VA.: U.S.M.C Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps University, 18

Feb. 1993..

 

 

Smith, Maj. Ross, L.  Close Air Supprt-Can it Survive the 80s?. MSSI Thesis. Fort

Leavenworth, KS. : US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1979.

 

                                                                         Memorandums/Briefings

 

Head, Amphibious Section, Air Warfare. Letter to Head, Aviation Weapons Systems

   Requirements Branch, Headquarters, US. Marine Corps, DoDInst 5000.2M, Subject:

   "Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile

 

 

Department of the Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Memorandum for Comptroller

   of the Navy. Subject "Request for release of FY 93 Air Systems Advanced Technology

    development Funding (PE 060321 7N)".

 

 

TACAWS Program Manager Research, Development, & Engineering Center Guidance &

Control  Directorate Technology Terminal Homing Branch. Review presented to TACAWS

         Executive Steering Committee. 4 Nov. 1993.

 

Col. Edwards, US Army, TRADOC JAWS Overview presented to TACAWS Executive

    Steering Committee. Slide presentation format undated.