Can Too Much "Jointness" Disjoint The Marine Corps
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Can Too Much 'Jointness' Disjoint The Marine Corps?
Author: Major Randall A. Hodge, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The Marine Corps' current focus on 'MEF
Warfighting' and 'Service Componency' in joint operations
poses a threat to the continued survivability of the Corps
as an independent military service.
Background: U.S. Marines have one of the finest 'warrior'
reputations in the world, yet the Corps has struggled for
more than two centuries to maintain its relevance in the
U.S. national defense. History clearly attributes the
Marine Corps' survival to its naval and expeditionary
character, coupled with its unique application of combined-
arms tactics. Marines have enjoyed unparalleled battlefield
success during major U.S. wars at the tactical level under
the operational command of Navy and Army forces. Over
the past several years, the Marines have 'crept' into the
realm of operational level warfighting. Marine forces
are routinely participating in Joint Task Force (JTF)
operations around the globe and in many cases have assumed
JTF leadership. The excitement of playing in the 'Big
League' has thrust the Corps' warfighting philosophy beyond
its capability to function effectively and efficiently
as a tactical warfighting organization. As the Marine
Corps prepares itself for the 21st century, it is training
more like an Army Corps than an integral element of the
Navy-Marine team.
Recommendation: To survive as an institution, the Marine
Corps must remain faithful to its traditional roles in
the U.S. national defense. America still needs a force
in readiness that is naval in character and expeditionary
in nature.
CAN TOO MUCH 'JOINTNESS' DISJOINT THE MARINE CORPS?
For more than two centuries, U.S. Marines have eagerly
embraced those missions, functions and warfighting concepts
that offered the best prospect of an enduring role in the
national defense. "The Marine Corps has never surrendered
a major function or had one stripped from it."1 Innovation,
adaptation and reliable performance embellish the Corps'
history; however, it is chiefly our naval characteristic
and combined-arms prowess to which we owe our institutional
survival. In today's rapidly changing global environment,
all branches of the U.S. military are making necessary
adjustments to maintain their relevance. The Marines
however, are exhibiting an especial propensity for
overindulgence in the joint and combined warfare arena
that threatens the very existence of our Corps as a separate
service. This paper will briefly explore the Marines'
historic struggle for survival, followed by an analysis
of current trends and issues.
The Marines' Forte - Soldiers of the Sea
Marines were created to serve as soldiers of the sea
and throughout history have 'specialized' in the conduct
of military operations from the sea Although Marines
served gallantly on land and at sea in every action called
upon during the late 18th and 19th century,2 it wasn't
until the early 1900s that the Marine Corps finally latched
on to a function of enduring value. Following the
Spanish-American War, the Navy's war strategy underwent
significant evolution in order to protect America's overseas
empire, as well as the continental United States from
possible invasion. The Navy's solution to the preservation
of this maritime domain was the establishment of advanced
naval bases at strategic outposts, which necessitated the
creation of an advanced base force to defend those
installations. In a 1916 Marine Corps Gazette article,
Colonel John A. Lejeune described the impact of the Marines'
new enduring function:
If...the Marine Corps can be utilized as an Advance
Base organization, it would have the opportunity to
share with the Navy the glory always resting on those
who strike the first blows at the enemy, and it would
also have the satisfaction of feeling that it had
an important, semi-independent duty to perform and
that on the manner of its performance would largely
depend the success or failure of the fleet.3
Marines continued to serve in their primary capacity
as soldiers of the sea until the eve of U.S. involvement
in World War I. Since the war in Europe was not envisioned
as one of major naval confrontations, the Marines would
serve, in the words of Colonel Lejeune, "as the Advance
Guard of the Army." The Corps grew significantly during
World War I and for the first time it participated in
sustained land combat directly under a U.S. Army commander.4
Ironically, WW I experiences marked the beginning of Army-
Marine rivalry following the U.S. victory at Belleau Wood,
for which the Marines were publicly given all the credit.
The inter-war years between World War I and World War
II found the Marines again searching for an enduring
mission, one that would distinguish them from the U.S.
Army and guarantee their future relevance. The Marines
found their niche in amphibious operations under the
leadership of their new Commandant, now General Lejeune.5
World War II history is largely written in terms of
amphibious landings. Allied decisive victories in North
Africa, Sicily, Europe, and throughout the Pacific were
all made possible by operations from the sea. Factually,
the U.S. Army conducted more amphibious landings than did
the Marine Corps during World War II; however, it is
important to note that those landings were based upon Fleet
Marine Force doctrine developed during the inter-war years.6
Also, many Marines served on the staffs of those Army units
participating in amphibious operations. The Marines had
once again embraced a function of lasting value to their
role in the national defense. Secretary of the Navy James
V. Forrestal, commenting upon the flag-raising on Mount
Suribachi, Iwo Jima, February 23, 1945, made clear his
opinion of the Corps' future relevance when he stated:
"This means there will be a Marine Corps for the next 500
years."7
Marine tactical innovation again flourished during
the Korean War. The combined-arms style of warfighting
employed by-the First Provisional Marine Brigade8 at the
Pusan Perimeter, validated the lethality of a new
organizational and force employment concept the Marines
would later refer to as the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTF). Furthermore, the successful operations conducted
by the 1st Marine Division at Inchon, as an element of
the U.S. Army's X Corps, lent further credibility to the
employment of amphibious forces at the operational level
of war to achieve decisive victory. General Douglas
MacArthur, Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea,
had this to say about the Marines shortly after the landings
at Inchon: "I have just returned from visiting the Marines
at the front, and there is not a finer fighting organization
in the world."9
The performance of Marine units during World War II
and the Korean War earned the Corps a seemingly permanent
role in the nation's defense, as the organization of the
Marine Corps became public law. The Corps' organization
as prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947, and
as amended in 1952 by Title 10, U.S. Code, states that
the Marine Corps shall be organized to include -
...not less than three combat divisions, three air
wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other
services as may be organic therein...and [to] provide
fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with
supporting air components, for service with the fleet
in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases
and for the conduct of such land operations as may
be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign
....[and to] Develop, in coordination with the Army,
Navy, and Air Force, the doctrines, tactics,
techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces
in amphibious operations....In addition, the Marine
Corps...shall perform such other duties as the
President may direct.10
The intent of the 82nd Congress in its passage of this
law is clear -- America needs a force in readiness that
is naval in character and expeditionary11 in nature. The
Marines' primary role as set forth above is to provide
forces of combined arms for service with the fleet. The
final caveat "...shall perform such other duties as the
President may direct" left open a wide range of
possibilities for employment of Marine forces in the future.
Drawn from historical precedence, Marines embraced secondary
roles to serve as the nation's military instrument for
international conflicts short of war, and to remain prepared
for involvement in land warfare during major wars.
The Vietnam war became the Marines' ultimate test for
survivability. The principal Marine air-ground team in
Vietnam, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), became
the largest U.S. Marine command ever employed by the Army
in combat up to that time. Similar to Marine exploits
of the Korean War, Marine successes during Vietnam were
directly linked to their amphibious and expeditionary
capabilities.
General William Westmoreland's12 decision to employ
Marine Forces at Da Nang in March 1965 was predicated by
the fact that Da Nang could only be safely supplied from
the sea. A Navy-Marine operation to secure Da Nang
airfield13 simplified command relationships and enabled
Marine aircraft to operate from both afloat and ashore
bases in support of the ground troops. Furthermore, the
designation of predominantly coastal provinces as Marine
zones of action facilitated the effective employment of
Marine Special Landing Forces (SLF). These SLFs,
task-organized around elements of the 7th Marine Regiment
embarked aboard 7th Fleet amphibious ships, conducted
numerous raids into the coastal regions of Vietnam.
Operations such as 'Starlite' and 'Piranha' exemplified
the potent combat power derived through the combined
application of vertical envelopments, naval gunfire, close
air support, and aggressive infantry tactics.
During their six year (1965 -1971) involvement in
Vietnam, the Marines were never defeated in battle.
Commenting on the Marine Corps' operations in Vietnam,
General Westmoreland, had this to say: "Its military feats
will go down in history." The Marines had once again earned
the Army's respect for their unique combined-arms style
of warfighting. The Corps' MAGTF doctrine had been refined
and serves as the foundation for the employment of Marine
forces up to the present day.
During the post-Vietnam era, America's Cold War strategy
shifted from 'global containment' to an orientation on
the defense of Europe against a possible Soviet invasion.
In the wake of intense congressional skepticism concerning
the relevance of amphibious assaults in a Western Europe
contingency, Marines continued to defend their amphibious
orientation. Marine strategists, struggling to promote
the Corps' relevance, successfully argued that American
interests abroad could not be adequately safeguarded through
a singular focus on Western Europe. "Amphibious ready
forces, backed by undeployed FMF units, gave the United
States a unique instrument unaffected by the complexities
of base rights, overflight rights, and inter-allied
diplomacy."14
Hindered by the declining availability of amphibious
ships, as the Navy prioritized funding to its 'blue water'
capabilities, the Marine Corps sought to develop an
alternate force deployment option which would diminish
its reliance on amphibious shipping. The Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF) concept, built around forward
deployed logistics and equipment-carrying ships and air-
transportable Marine units, fulfilled the force deployment
needs of the Corps while retaining the integrity of the
Navy-Marine team.15 Although the MPF concept was applied
in numerous operations other than war during the 1980s,
it wasn't until Operation 'Desert Shield', in 1990, that
the strategic value of MPF as a rapid force deployment
option was truly recognized. The MPF concept had enabled
the Navy-Marine team to provide an immediate and credible
response to a major regional crisis.
During Operation 'Desert Storm', the U.S. led coalition
offensive campaign of the Persian Gulf War, Marine forces
were employed both ashore and afloat. Afloat forces, under
the operational control of the Navy, never made an
amphibious assault; however, the mere threat that such
an operation could take place kept scores of Iraqi armored
formations tied up in defensive positions along the Kuwait
coast. Marine forces ashore, under the direct operational
control of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-
Chief, U.S. Central Command, executed a flawless supporting
attack into southeastern Kuwait.
Speaking to the group of Marine commanders assembled
during the 'Desert Storm' debrief, General Schwarzkopf
summarized his affections of Marine performance during
the war by saying: "You absolutely executed superbly...You
did everything I thought you were going to do, and more."16
Marines had once again proven their relevance as an
essential contributing force during our nation's major
wars.
Historical Conclusion
While many conclusions can be drawn from the Corps'
long and illustrious history, the recurring theme to which
we owe our survival as an institution is our continuous
and faithful service with the fleet. The Navy-Marine team
provides the United States with an amphibious force in
readiness that is expeditionary in nature and possesses
the unique capability to engage in the air, on land and
at sea
The Advent and Implications of 'Jointness'
As our history substantiates, Marines are no strangers
to joint warfare. In the strictest sense of the term17,
Marines have operated within a joint environment since
inception alongside Navy forces. In fact, joint operations
involving elements of all services have made significant
contributions to the conduct of every war fought during
the twentieth century. So what then is so novel about
joint warfighting?
Most military members attribute today's growing pains
regarding joint operations with the passage of the DoD
Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols), which came
about on the heels of joint service debacles such as
Operation Desert-One and Grenada. However, few would argue
that the basic philosophy of 'jointness' is unsound. When
properly applied, the implications of 'jointness' benefit
the nation as a whole, as well as each individual military
service. Joint requirements and doctrine developed through
inter-service collaboration uses defense resources wiser
and logically result in improved military operations.
Greater coordination and cooperation among the services
is unquestionably positive.
The recurring theme throughout the Goldwater-Nichols
Act is the attainment of service interoperability, not
service [element] interchangeability. "Jointness, properly
understood, is the art of taking highly trained functional
capabilities and combining them to provide the most
effective operational package. When the concept is
perverted for political purposes, functional capabilities
are combined inappropriately, to provide a role for
everybody."18 "The 'Era of Jointness' created by the
Goldwater-Nichols Act was not intended for every Service
to share everything jointly. The idea was for each Service
to contribute based on its unique capabilities as required
to accomplish the mission."19 'Jointness', the way we
have seen it repeatedly applied in recent years, violates
a fundamental principle of war - simplicity.
Marines Enter the Big League
Marines habitually insist upon having an equal voice
at the table. Perhaps this is due to a paranoia of being
misunderstood or improperly employed, or possibly just
a natural desire to feel equal in importance to our sister
services. Ever since the Marine Corps Commandant earned
his seat amidst the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Marines
have fully embraced the joint operations concept. The
Corps' record of participation in joint operations over
the past 15 or so years is unmatched by any other service.
According to a 1993 Center for Naval Analyses report,
Marines participated in 21 of the 32 Joint Task Force (JTF)
operations conducted during the preceding 15 year period;
and of those 21, Marines commanded in 6 operations.20
Nothwithstanding our 'jointness' record, during the
latter part of 1992 the Marine Corps deemed it necessary
to establish component commands which now serve directly
under the unified commanders-in-chief (CinCs). While this
action has been billed by the Corps as being in consonance
with the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act21, it may
well have been the final break in the long-standing close
association between Navy and Marine forces. As a direct
result of establishing component commands, Marine Forces
are currently finding themselves 'thinly stretched' between
service with the fleet and participation in joint operations
as a separate service component. Furthermore, no longer
is it assured that a CinC or Navy Fleet commander will
look only to the Marines for amphibious forces, as we have
recently seen with Army-Navy operations in Haiti.22
Perhaps the most drastic change Marines now experience,
as a result of having established component commands, is
the requirement to field yet another headquarters whenever
a Marine operating force participates in a joint operation.
While the Marine Corps is well aware of the vast
responsibilities associated with fulfilling the service
component role, it is hardly capable of meeting those
requirements without task-organizing ad hoc headquarters
elements at the expense of the operating forces.
The traditional organization of JTFs was relatively
simple -- functional component (air, ground, maritime)
commanders reporting to a common commander. Marine forces,
so long as the MAGTF remained intact, fit nicely into either
the maritime or ground component depending upon the mission
or phase of the operation. Marine liaison or augmentation
cells would be assigned to serve on the functional component
staff to ensure the proper employment of Marine Forces
and to work the Marine issues and requirements. Of course,
this model does not rule out the possibility of a Marine
commander and his staff forming the nucleus of a functional
component headquarters or that of the JTF.
The current trend seems to be following the service
component model of JTF organization, wherein each service
is represented under the Joint Force Commander (JFC).
Service componency is increasingly more common, especially
for operations of extended duration. As previously alluded
to, the service component model for JTF organization imposes
an unnecessary requirement for the Marines to layer in
another headquarters and normally does not eliminate the
need for liaison and augmentation cells. So where do we
come up with the necessary staffing and equipment to create
these component headquarters?
My recent tour of duty within III MEF (1991 - 1994)
revealed that Marine Forces Pacific (MarForPac) was seldom
available to fulfill the service component role. Component
headquarters were usually established by assembling staff
officers from each of the major subordinate commands of
the MEF -- the Marine Division, Marine Air Wing, and the
Force Service Support Group. This practice routinely
occurred for such major exercises as 'Cobra Gold' in
Thailand and 'Yama Sakura' in Japan. In a recent 'Yama
Sakura' exercise, conducted in early 1994, a subordinate
command staff (1st MEB) was assigned to fulfill the role
of the Marine Force Component to the JTF so that the MEF
staff could focus on fighting the MEF. When these type
of situations occur, we have done little more than create
a temporary organization which possesses no cohesive unit
experience in the execution of the service component role
within the JTF. Furthermore, we have degraded the
capability of those subordinate commands to function
efficiently in the execution of their daily operational
missions.
On occasions when a MEF commander is designated as
the JFC, and his staff forms the nucleus of the JTF staff,
the componency issue is further complicated by the
additional requirement to redesignate a MAGTF commander
and staff. For many years we have preached to our sister
services that Marines are always employed as MAGTFs;
however, in a pinch we are willing to 'dual-hat' one of
the MEF's major subordinate commanders and his staff to
fulfill the MEF role. The organization of the Marine forces
initially deployed for Operation 'Restore Hope' (Somolia,
1993) exemplified this practice, wherein the 1st Marine
Division commander and his staff were assigned additional
duties as I MEF commander and staff, while the standing
I MEF commander and staff assumed Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF) responsibilities. This practice violated Marine
Corps force employment doctrine, reduced the efficiency
and effectiveness of the MAGTF, and undermined the Corps'
emerging 'Primacy of the MEF' warfighting philosophy.
An alternative to the preceding scenario is to have
the JFC and his staff continue acting in their capacity
as the MEF, in addition to fulfilling their CJTF
responsibilities. This practice has been applied in past
years during the annual 'ULCHI FOCUS LENS' exercises in
Korea, wherein a MEF commander exercises command of an
Army Corps-sized CJTF, formerly known as the Combined Marine
Expeditionary Corps (CMEC), while retaining his warfighting
command over the subordinate MEF. Are Marines prepared
to accept another service commander, acting in the capacity
of Commander, CMEC, to 'dual-hat' himself and his staff
as the MAGTF command element by exercising operational
control directly over the Marine division, wing and FSSG?
I think not! Our saving grace to this 'hallow argument'
will always rest upon the fact that Marines are employed
as MAGTFs and the integrity of that MAGTF is maintained
by the MEF Command Element.
The current Korea contingency plan provides the best
example of Marine componency gone astray. As reported
in a recent issue of "Marines" magazine, there now exists
a new combined (ROK-US) service component headquarters
-- Combined Marine Forces Command (CMFC). CMFC, commanded
by the CG, Marine Forces Pacific, is charged with the same
responsibilities as the Ground Component Command (GCC),
Air Component Command (ACC), and Naval Component Command
(NCC); however, it maintains operational control during
employment phases over a very insignificant number of
forces. The preponderance of Marine forces, during
employment, remain under the operational control of either
the GCC or NCC because that is where they are best
integrated into the CinC's overall plan.
In addition to CMFC, there are headquarters/command
element requirements for a U.S. Marine Forces Korea
component, a landing force command element, and a Combined
Marine Expeditionary Force (CMEF).23 CMEF is best described
as a CJTF because it has multiple nation and service forces
within its organization. Here again, the CMEF Commander
must decide whether to fight the MEF himself (in addition
to the other forces within CMEF); delegate MEF warfighting
to one of his subordinate Marine commanders (e.g. Division
or Wing); or create yet another Marine headquarters by
establishing a MEF CE to fight the MAGTF within CMEF.
'MEF Warfighting' versus '...From the Sea'
The future of the Marine Corps is currently traveling
along two very divergent paths which are linked to the
concepts known as 'MEF Warfighting' and '...From the Sea'.
MEF Warfighting has its roots in the draft Fleet Marine
Force Manual (FMFM) 2-1, entitled "Fighting the MEF", which
was initially released for comment in October 1992. Just
one month earlier (September 1992), the Navy-Marine Corps
team published "...From the Sea" which outlined a
fundamental shift in the operational focus and priorities
of the Naval Service into the 21st century. More recently,
"Forward...From the Sea" was published to update and expand
upon the concept articulated in the September 1992 document.
These two concepts are currently in fierce competition
with one another in Marine circles with respect to their
emphasis during formal education, unit training exercises,
and real-world military operations.
As a logical reaction to the difficulties experienced
by Marine Forces during Operations 'Desert Shield' and
'Desert Storm', FMFM 2-1 (Draft) is a noteworthy effort
aimed at focusing the Corps' leadership attention on our
deficiencies in the conduct of warfighting at the MEF
level.24 However, I would argue that the greatest
impediment to the effectiveness of the I MEF Command
Element, during the initial stages of the Gulf War, was
that Lieutenant General Boomer served as both the Commander,
U.S. Marine Forces Central Command (MarCent) and Commanding
General, I MEF. While FMFM 2-1 (Draft) addresses both
issues (warfighting and componency), it fails to adequately
address the interrelationship between the warfighter and
the component commander. Furthermore, this document
completely ignores the inherent limitations of the MEF
in fulfilling either function.25 My criticism here is
not centered on the structure or content of the document,
but rather upon the notion that the Marine Corps must
drastically change its warfighting philosophy and
organizational structure to maintain its relevance into
the 21st century. The obvious omission from FMFM 2-1
(Draft) is the traditional recognition that the Marine
Corps is a partner in the Navy-Marine team -- the global
force in readiness that doesn't depend exclusively on fixed
land bases and strategic airlift to accomplish a wide range
of military missions.
On two separate occasions, FMFM 2-1 (Draft) addresses
the Marine Corps' position on the componency issue -- that
the JTF commander's interests are best served when the
JTF is organized along service lines. On the first
occasion, service componency is said to maximize doctrinal
and unit training similarities; while later it is necessary
due to logistical, manning and throughput considerations. 26
This document further expounds upon the various command
relationship scenarios in which a MEF may function during
a joint force operation. The first three scenarios portray
the MEF as a robust organization analogous to an Army Corps,
a numbered Fleet, or numbered Air Force. These three
scenarios are accompanied by wire diagrams of 'notional'
command relationships to include: The MEF as a warfighter
for the CinC, the MEF as a warfighter and force headquarters
in a JTF, and the MEF as a CJTF and warfighter for the
CinC. The last two scenarios portray the role of the MEF
in a JTF organized by functional components and the
detachment of MEF elements for other operations. These
last two scenarios, albeit the most suitable for the MEF
in my opinion, are down-played as possible but not probable
situations within which a MEF commander may find himself.
There are no wire diagrams to support these last two
scenarios, presumably because they are the least desirable
from a Marine Corps viewpoint. What we seem to have
forgotten is that the auspiciousness of Marine Corps
operating forces has historically been most prevalent while
serving under the cognizance of another service, without
the added bureaucracy or burden of fielding a Marine Service
Component.
"...From the Sea", in stark contrast to FMFM 2-1
(Draft), is premised upon the role and capabilities of
U.S. naval forces (Navy and Marine Corps). This document
accurately captures the primary purpose of U.S. naval forces
as: "...to project the power and influence of the nation
across the seas to foreign waters and shores in both peace
and war." The Navy is shifting its operational focus for
the future in response to the changing strategic landscape
around the globe; not solely based upon deficiencies
uncovered during the last war. As has always been the
case, the Navy depends upon the Corps to provide the combat
forces necessary to influence events ashore. The MEF is
an integral component of the evolving naval expeditionary
force concept envisioned by "...From the Sea". On the
issue of joint and combined operations, "... From the Sea"
recognizes the interoperability gains and the enhanced
combat power produced through 'jointness', but stops short
of taking a position on the service versus functional
componency aspect of the issue.
Conclusions - Enduring or Dying Corps
As we enter into the 21st century, we must shed
ourselves of the notion that the survival of the Corps
is somehow linked to our competitiveness in the 'big league'
of service componency. Historically, the survival of the
U.S. Marine Corps as an institution is attributable to
our faithful association with the U.S. Navy and our unique
combined-arms style of warfighting at the tactical level
of war. If we continue to lobby for service component
equality around the joint forces table, we are certain
to lose that peculiar identity which has for many years
distinguished us from the U.S. Army. When called upon
to participate in our nation's wars, the Marines can best
serve a CinC by providing a complementary capability to
the sea, air, and land 'functional' components.
"In deciding the future role for the Marine
Expeditionary Force, the Marine Corps should stick to what
it does best -- amphibious and expeditionary warfare in
the world's littoral regions."27 To this end, our training,
education, and procurement focus must remain on amphibious
and expeditionary warfare. If we continue to emphasize
sustained land combat training (MEF warfighting) ahead
of amphibious and expeditionary warfare (...From the Sea),
the Marine Corps will find itself headed down a path of
self destruction. America desperately needs a force capable
of "Warfighting...From the Sea", but it does not need and
will not pay for a second land army.
Endnotes
1. Allan Millett, Semper Fidelis - The History of the
United States Marine Corps (New York: Macmillan Publishing,
1980), p. xv.
2. U.S. Marines fought in the following conflicts during
the 18th and 19th centuries: Revolutionary War (1775-1783),
Quasi-War with France (1797-1800), Barbary Expeditions
(1805-1801), War of 1812, Creek-Seminole Wars (1836-1841),
Mexican War (18461848), American Civil War, Spanish-American
War (1898), Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902).
3. Millett, p. 265.
4. Thomas Siefring, History of the United States Marine
Corps (London: Bison Books, 1979), p. 50. During WW I,
the Marine Corps grew from 13,000 to nearly 17,000 men.
Marine forces participated in combat operations as part
of General John Pershing's American Expeditionary Force.
5. General John Lejeune served as the Marine Corps
Commandant from 1920 - 1929. Lejeune was highly regarded
as a leader who fought for the welfare of his men, but
perhaps his most notable achievement was the firm foundation
he established for future amphibious operations. The
visionary efforts of Lejeune were largely responsible for
the preservation of the Marine Corps through those trying
years after World War I.
6. Four U.S. Army divisions were specially trained by
Marines in amphibious operations: 1st, 3rd, 7th and 9th
Infantry Divisions. These divisions were major participants
in operations at Oran, Sicily, Casablanca, Anzio, Attu,
Kiska, Kwajalein, Leyte, Okinawa, Port Lyautey, and
Normandy.
7. Millett, p. 265.
8. At the request of General Douglas MacArthur, the First
Provisional Marine Brigade landed at Pusan, Korea on 2
August 1950. The principal units comprising the brigade
were the 5th Marines and Marine Air Group-33. The 1st
Brigade was a major factor in stopping the North Korean
invasion and securing the Pusan Perimeter. On 13 September,
the Brigade was deactivated and absorbed into the 1st Marine
Division for action at Inchon.
9. Siefring, p. 164.
10. Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 2-12,
Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1991),
p. 11.
11. The term 'expeditionary' refers to the capability of
operating on foreign soil, without U.S. bases or facilities,
for a limited period of time.
12. General Westmoreland served as the Commander, U.S.
Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) and was the
principal advisor to the U.S. President on military strategy
during the war.
13. Da Nang Airfield was a key base for the U.S. Air Force
during its prosecution of Operation 'Rolling Thunder',
an extensive air campaign conducted against North Vietnam.
14. Millett, p. 609.
15. For a comprehensive explanation of the MPF concept,
refer to Chapter 1, FMFM 7-6, MPF Operations.
16. Colonel Charles Quilter II, U.S. Marines in the Persian
Gulf, 1990 - 1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force
in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: History
and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
1993), p. 111.
17. Joint warfare, joint operations, joint environment,
joint arena, and 'jointness' are frequently used terms,
often interchangeably, to denote military operations
conducted by elements of more than one branch of the
services, acting in harmony, under a common commander.
18. Colonel John Greenwood, "The Jointness Challenge."
Marine Corps Gazette (October 1994), p. 2.
19. LtCol Kent Leonhardt, "Focus on Capability." Marine
Corps Gazette (October 1994), p. 22.
20. Major John Ballard, "Marines Can Be Joint to the Core."
Proceedings (November 1994), p. 31.
21. "Corps Establishes Component Commands." Marine Corps
Gazette (March 1993), p. 7.
22. As a test case for an emerging joint task force concept
known as 'Adaptive Force Packaging', U.S. Army helicopter
units deployed to Haiti in September 1994 aboard the USS
Eisenhower (CVN-69).
23. CMEF, formerly known as CMEC, was presumably renamed
at the insistence of senior Marine officers to connotate
its Marine leadership.
24. See Quilter, "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990
- 1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert
Shield and Desert Storm," for a complete accounting of
Marine Corps experiences in the Persian Gulf War.
25. A convincing argument which highlights many of the
deficiencies in the current MEF to fulfill the 'Warfighter'
role is made by Major Robert Brennan, "The MEF as a
Warfighter?" Proceedings (November 1994), pp. 36-38.
26. Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-1 (Draft), Fighting
the MEF (Quantico, Va.: Doctrine Branch, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, 1992), pp. 2-2 and 4-11.
27. Brennan, p. 36.
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