Somalia: Strategic Failures And Operational Successes CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues ABSTRACT TITLE OF THESIS: Somalia: Strategic Failures and Operational Successes STUDENT: Major Alan G. Hendrickson CLASS: Marine Corps Command and Staff College DATE: April 1995 THESIS COMMITTEE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. C D. McKenna Problem. Moved by the searing images of starving Somalis United States went ashore in Mogadishu, Somalia on 9 December 1992 to begin Operation Restore Hope. What began as an operation to provide a secure environment for the distribution of relief supplies and evolved into an effort to bring the Somali people to a government ended with a whimper 27 months later. This anticlimactic ending to a once promising endeavor was the result of a classic mismatch of ends, ways, and means. Ultimately, the strategic goal of rebuilding Somalia was not worth the lives of 130 peacekeepers and the two million dollars a day that the United Nations was spending in Somalia. But the strategic failure cannot be allowed to cast its pallor over the numerous operational successes enjoyed by the military and political participants of the operation. Methodology. The paper examines the initial lessons learned from the United States experience in Somalia - the successes, the failures, and their implications on the future of US involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The brief history of Somalia was pieced together from books and articles by noted experts on Somalia. Lessons learned were compiled from interviews with Ambassador Robert Oakley and Admiral Jonathan Howe, articles written by senior military and State Department personnel involved with US Somalia operations, and the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS). Results: In spite of the numerous operational successes of UNITAF in Operation Restore Hope, UNOSOM II was unable to achieve the expanded goal of rebuilding Somalia in Operation Continue Hope. Instead, UNOSOM II became embroiled in the internal politics of Somalia, which it was not equipped or prepared to handle. The continuing loss of life and expenditure of resources forced the United States, then the United Nations to abandon their efforts in Somalia. Conclusion: The desired strategic "ends" of a rebuilt Somalia was beyond the ways and means of the United States and the United Nations. The Nation was unwilling to bear the costs in lives and resources, to include time, that would have been required to "fix" Somalia. Operationally, there were numerous success stories and the political/military effort proved its utility in achieving more limited objectives. The civil war was suspended and the starvation halted, giving the Somali people time to regroup and possibly rethink their own destiny. SOMALIA: STRATIGIC FAILURES AND OPERATIONAL SUCCESSES by Alan G. Hendrickson Major USMC Command and Staff AY 1994/95 Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requiements for the degree of Master of Military Science April 1995 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES iv Chapter Page 1. OUT OF AFRICA 1 2. HARSH LAND-LIMITED RESOURSES 3 3. HISTORY AND CULTURE 7 4. OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF 22 5. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (UNITAF) 24 6. UNOSOM II (OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE) 32 7. OPERATION UNITED SHIELD 39 8. LESSONS LEARNED 42 Ends, Ways, and Means, 42 Mohammed Farah Aideed, 48 Mission Creep, 51 ... From the Sea, 52 Clarity of Mission, 53 Command Structure, 54 Rules of Engagement, 57 Civil-Military Operations Center, 62 Coalition Forces, 63 Intelligence, 65 Logistics, 68 Training and Professionalism, 71 Military-Media Relations, 71 9. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 73 10. CONCLUSION 76 Appendixes A. Missions and Tasks of the UNITAF CMOC 80 Bibliography 90 LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. The Horn of Africa 4 2. Somali Ethnic Limits 8 3. Major Clan-Families and Clans 10 4. Humanitarian Relief Sectors 28 5. UNITAF Command Relationships 55 6. UNOSOM II Command Relationships 57 CHAPTER 1 OUT OF AFRICA Moved by the devastating images of starving Somalis the United States and the world mobilized for action in December 1992. Marines and sailors from the Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit (ATU) went ashore in Mogadishu, Somalia on 9 December 1992 to begin Operation Restore Hope. During the predawn darkness of 3 March 1995 the final wave of Marine amphibious assault vehicles - who had come ashore on 28 February to cover the withdrawal of the last United Nations peacekeeping forces- left the beaches of Mogadishu for their amphibious ships waiting four miles off the coast. The efforts of 26 months seem to have done nothing more than the former ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone suggested, To keep tens of thousands of Somali-kids from starving to death in 1993 who, in all probability, will starve to death in 1994 (unless we are prepared to remain through 1994).1 What began as an operation to provide a secure environment for the distribution of relief supplies and evolved into an effort to bring the Somali people to a government ended with a whimper. In the end, the ultimate fate of the Somali people lies, as it always has, with the Somali people. This anticlimactic ending to a once promising endeavor was the result of a classic mismatch of ends, ways, and means. Ultimately, the strategic goal of rebuilding Somalia was not worth the lives of 130 peacekeepers and the two million dollars a day that the United Nations was spending in Somalia. The strategic failure cannot be allowed to cast its pallor over the numerous operational successes enjoyed by the military and political participants of the operation. The correct combination of political and military tools applied to the more limited objectives of December 1992 was able to end the starvation and, for the time being, extinguish the civil war, buying breathing room for the Somalis to rethink their own destiny. As the curtain closes on this act of Somali history it is appropriate to examine the initial lessons learned from the United States experience there - the successes, the failures, and their implications on the future of United States involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. To understand the Somalia of 1995 one must first understand the geography and history that combined to create the Somalia of January 1991 when Siad Berre was overthrown. From there my focus will shift to Operation Provide Relief, UNITAF Somalia (Restore Hope), UNOSOM II (Continue Hope), and Combined Task Force United Shield (Operation United Shield) in order to glean strategic and operational lessons learned. I will conclude with a look at what the future may hold in regards to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. CHAPTER 2 HARSH LAND - LIMITED RESOURCES "The Somali is as tough as his country..."2 In order to understand the Somali people, it is necessary to understand the land in which they live. Tom Farer aptly describes this geography in his writings: Except in the narrow belt between the two southern rivers, the Jubba and Shebelle, and in the far northwest of the plateau overlapping the political frontier with Ethiopia, the land is an arid savanah, an endless vista of coarse grass punctuated by thorn trees, giant anthills, and thick trunked baobabs.3 Located on the African Horn, Somalia is continuously hot except at the higher elevations of the country. Two wet seasons, April to June and October through November, bring erratic rainfall, generally less than 500 millimeters (20 inches). Droughts are common and only one of the nation's two major rivers, the Jubba, flows permanently. Climate and topography notwithstanding Somalia's location is strategically important. The country's northern shore borders the Gulf of Aden, a potential choke point for the southern Red Sea and the vital sea lanes which converge there. The eastern shores provide access to the Indian Ocean and the equally vital sea lanes which converge upon the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. Click here to view image Crop and livestock production, forestry, and fisheries accounted for the bulk of the Somali gross domestic product (GDP) in 1991, the last year in which records were kept.4 The harsh environment will support little more than subsistence crop cultivation, but prior to 1990 there was enough of a surplus to support informal domestic markets and a barter economy. Before 1990 Somali livestock production even supported an export economy, primarily with Italy and nearby Arab states. Fisheries and forestry were small portions of the nation's GDP and have virtually disappeared since the civil war. Khat, a narcotic plant grown in Ethiopia, Kenya, and northern Somalia deserves special mention. The fresh green leaves are chewed for their stimulating effect, ranging from a pleasant mild insomnia to a mild intoxication. Its use is prohibited by some religious orders and permitted by others, but former Somali governments forbade its use.5 However, it was and still remains an important staple of Somali life and provides an enormously lucrative cash crop.6 Somalia possesses substantial mineral deposits which remain virtually unexploited. Domestic wood, charcoal, and wind are the nation's only proven natural energy sources Petroleum products must be imported, although a 1991 United Nations Development Program hydrocarbon study indicated a good potential for oil and gas deposits in northern Somalia.7 The land is harsh and unforgiving. Even in the best of times life survives on the margins. Disasters, both natural and man- made, strongly affect the balance of life in Somalia. Heavy spending on military hardware left little funding for the building or improvement of Somali infrastructure in the 1970s and 1980s. The limited network of paved roads, 2,600 kilometers, runs primarily between the coastal cities of Mogadishu, Merca, Kismayu, and Berbera. Since the civil war this network has fallen into disrepair. Most interior roads are unpaved and grading and other maintenance is haphazard. Many stretches are not passable in the rainy season. There are no major rail lines in the country. Somalia's eight paved airstrips are in various states of disrepair. Only the international airport at Mogadishu, the military airfield at Berbera, and the former air force base at Baledogle are suitable for large jet transport aircraft. Somalia possesses four major ports: deepwater facilities at Berbera, Mogadishu, and Kismayu; and a lighterage port at Merca. Civil unrest made repair and improvements at these facilities impossible during the early 1990s, and prior to U.N. intervention in 1992 none were able to function at near full capacity. The civil war also left Somalia without a functioning telephone system.8 CHAPTER 3 HISTORY AND CULTURE The people who live in present day Somalia are thought to have occupied the Horn of Africa by 100 A.D. or earlier. The proto-Sam, as they are called by anthropologists, migrated into northern Kenya and southern Somalia from the lake regions of the southern Ethiopian highlands. Primarily a pastoral people, the proto-Sam migrated north into the Ogaden of Ethiopia and northern Somalia in search of water and pasture lands. This expansion was marked by a largely "violent expulsion of predecessor peoples and the consequent establishment of a single cultural nation in continuous occupation of a vast though impoverished territory. ."9 The proto-Sam came to be known as the Samaal, or Samaale, a clear reference to the mythical father figure of the same name, from whom all Somalis clans originated.10 From Samaale came the term Somali. The geography of Somalia defined the evolution of the Samaale into two sub-cultures. The Samaale of the southern interriverine country adapted to their physical environment by becoming agrarians. They raised cattle and cultivated crops, enslaving the non-Somali cultivators who had lived there before. The Samaale who settled outside the interriverine areas remained pastorals, raising camels, sheep, and goats. They migrated as necessary to keep their herds near water and good pasture lands. In the eighth century Persian and Arab traders began to ply the coast of Somalia and Islam was introduced into the country. The large scale conversion of Somalia to Islam took place in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries. This conversion created a relatively uniform cultural and ethnic block of people who inhabited all of present day Somalia, the Ogaden region of modern Ethiopia, and portions of present day Kenya and Djibouti.11 (See Figure 2) Click here to view image Ethnic Somalis are united by language, culture, devotion to Islam, and a common ancestor, Samaale. Genealogy constitutes the heart of the Somali social system. It is the basis of the collective Somali inclination toward internal fission and internecine conflict, as well as of the Somalis' sense of being distinct - a consciousness of others which borders on xenophobia.12 From Samaale descended six major clan-families (See Figure 3). Four are overwhelmingly pastoral nomads who are collectively denoted by the name of Samaale (the Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and Hawiye), and two are agricultural and sometimes referred to as the Sab (the Digil and Rahanwayn). Somalis consider the name Sab to be derogatory in nature. The Samaale consider themselves superior to the Sab, who have lowered themselves by their reliance on agriculture and their readiness to assimilate foreigners - Persian and Arabian traders and some indigenous non-Somalis of the interriverine region - into their clans. Within the clan-family, lineage groups members into clans (see figure one) which are further divided into secondary and tertiary lineages that lack specific terms. While descent in the male line is the fundamental principle of Somali social organization, it does not act alone. Under the complex her system, the Somali may act in the capacity of a member of his clan-family, his clan, or as a member of one of the large number of lineages into which his clan is divided. The most binding and frequently mobilized of his diffuse attachments is his diya-paying group. This unit, with a fighting strength of several hundred to a few thousand, consists of close kinsmen united by a contractual alliance whose terms stipulate that they should collectively pay and receive blood-compensation. Throughout Somali history, the security of an individual and his property have depended on his membership in his diya- paying group. In general a Somalis' loyalty lies with his diya-paying group, then with his clan, and finally with the kindred clans of the clan-family.13 Click here to view image Noted anthropologist I.M. Lewis, an authority on the pastoral Somalis notes that the Somali are "...a warlike people, driven by poverty of their resources to intense competition for access to water and grazing."14 War, feud, and fighting are common among all Somalis though more prevalent among the nomads. Traditionally men fall into two categories: warenleh (warriors) or wadads (men of God).15 Islam is a strong unifying and defining force in Somali life, but considered secondary to the lineage and warrior tradition in importance. The American Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, cautioned Under Secretary of State Frank Wisner in a December 1992 cable about the violent nature of Somali culture, saying, "The Somali is a killer. The Somali is as tough as his country, and just as unforgiving."16 The centuries following Somalia's conversion to Islam were marked by the emergence of centralized state systems, noted for their prosperity and cosmopolitanism. From the 1400s on the Somalis became well known for their continuing religious conflicts with Ethiopian Christians. Mogadishu rose as Somalia's premier city and commercial trading center. At various times the Portuguese and the Omanis attempted to exert their authority over the area. The last remnants of the Portuguese were evicted from east Africa in 1728 and the Omanis were only able to exercise a shadowy authority over the Somalis, collecting a token annual tribute. Local clan- families retained the real power in Somalia, and it was not until the European "scramble" for African colonies in the 1880s that the Samaale faced real subjugation. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Somalis became the subjects of state systems under the flags of Great Britain, France, Italy, Egypt, and Ethiopia. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1888 formalized the claims and boundaries of what became the Somaliland Protectorate (British) and French Somaliland (present day Djibouti). The British facilitated the Italian occupation of the Eritrean coast and the Italian military pushed inland and eventually occupied southern Somalia (Italian Somaliland). Italian Somaliland was formalized in the 1891 Anglo-Italian Agreement. Completing the colonial partition of the Somali people, the Ethiopians were ceded the Ogaden territory in a 1897. The French enjoyed success in securing the economic future of Djibouti and the Italians slowly introduced the infrastructure and bureaucracy required to support a growing agribusiness in Italian Somaliland. The British found them selves engaged in a twenty year struggle with Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan, "The Mad Mulla" and his followers, the Dervishes for control of the Somali land Protectorate and the hinterlands. The Dervish fight for independence occupied the British at the expense of economic or social improvement.17 Italian Somalis received some education and training as Italy established the colony, strengthening the concepts of commerce and agriculture in the southern clans and further distancing their culture from the pastoral culture of their northern countrymen. The first stirrings of modern Somali nationalism were born in these times.18 Though the Dervish movement was unsuccessful in its aims of driving the infidels to the sea, Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan was viewed as a national hero and patriot. Italian military action in World War II reunited the Somali clans for the first time in 40 years. Italy established a common currency, set prices, and collected taxes throughout the entire area. The Somali economy moved to a monetary system from a traditional barter economy during the occupation. The British invaded northern Somalia in March 1941. They embarked upon a lightning campaign which retook the whole region from Italy and restored Emperor Haile Selassie to his throne in Ethiopia. The British then placed the former Somaliland Colonies and the Ogaden under a military administration that stood until 1948. In 1948 Great Britain returned the Ogaden to Ethiopia under pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite a strong desire for independence voiced by southern Somalia's major political parties, the United Nations General Assembly voted in 1949 to make southern Somalia a trust territory under Italian control for ten years. After ten years it would become an independent nation. The General Assembly stipulated that under no circumstances should Italian rule be extended beyond 1960. The return and re-empowerment of the Italian technocrats helped to build the economy and improve the infrastructure, though Italian Somaliland was never able to stand on its own economic feet. British Somaliland, by contrast, would continue to stagnate in spite of British development efforts. By 1956, political protests forced Great Britain to introduce representative government into the protectorate and eventually acquiesce to the reunification of British and Italian Somaliland. British Somaliland received its independence on 26 June 1960 and united with the trust territory of Italian Somaliland on 1 July 1960 to form the Somali Republic. The disparity between the two territories would cause serious political and social difficulties when the two territories united.19 Following Somali independence a parliamentary democracy ruled the nation until 1969. The national ideal professed by the government was one of political and legal equality not limited to one profession, clan, or class. The ruling political party, the Somali Youth League (SYL), originally had formed to promote Somali independence and ban clanishness.20 However, a dissatisfaction with the distribution of power among the clans, especially between those of the north and south would continue to dog the government. More often than not, the membership of a political party was aligned along clan or clan-family lines. Accusations of nepotism and favoritism abounded and were not entirely unfounded. Integration of the north and south was complicated by the differences in the legal, economic, and educational systems left behind by the British and Italians. The educated elites of the north and south had divergent interests and beliefs and were reluctant to trust each other. The thin unifying thread allying the government and the people was the dream of Pan-Somalia, the unification of all Somali speaking people. Over 200,000 Somali speaking people lived in northern Kenya, some 120,000 in the "Afars and the Isaacs" (The Republic of Djibouoti), and the Ogaden was heavily populated by Somalis.21 The Pan-Somalia ideal proved to be as destructive as it was unifying and would eventually bring Somalia into armed conflicts with her neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia. These military actions kept defense spending a disproportional high item of the small national budget. By 1969 charges of corruption and nepotism had seriously weakened the SYL government. Dissatisfaction with the government grew and was especially high with intellectuals and members of the armed forces and the police. The stage was set for a coup d'etat but the catalyst was unplanned. On 15 October 1969 President Shermaarke was assassinated by a bodyguard. (The bodyguard came from a lineage said to have been badly treated by the president.22) The Prime Minister arranged for the National Assembly to elect a president from the same clan as Shermaarke. The military, convinced that there was no hope for positive change, took to the streets of Mogadishu on 21 October 1969 and overthrew the government. Though not regarded as the architect of the coup, army commander General Mahammad Siad Barre assumed leadership of the new governing body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). Siad Barre retroactively declared the army's action a Marxist revolution, although there is no evidence that the Soviet Union or its proxies were involved. The SRC reorganized the country's legal and political institutions through the application of "scientific socialism." Somalia refused to relinquish claims to disputed territories with Kenya and Ethiopia, but the SRC pledged to continue a policy of regional detente with its neighbors, which angered some clans. The Siad Barre government took a tough stance against the solidarity of clan-families and clans, but was itself one of the greatest practitioners of the system. By mid-1975, 50 per cent of the SRC were from Siad Barre's clan-family, the Daarood. The government was commonly referred to by the code name MOD which stood for Mareerteen (Siad Barre's clan), Ogaden (Siad Barre's mother's clan), and Dulbahante (the clan of Siad Barre's son-in-law who headed the National Security Service). The southern interriverine clan families of the Rahanwayn and Digil were not represented in the government continuing the north-south clan-family fissures. During the cold war Somalia and Ethiopia remained among the world's poorest nations, but the Horn's geographical relationship to sub-Saharan Africa and to the Middle East and North Africa elevated it to a position of importance greater than its intrinsic value.23 During the 1970s and 1980s the United States and the Soviet Union poured more than 16 billion dollars worth of arms into Ethiopia and Somalia.24 The superpowers became involved in a complex diplomatic dance with Somalia and Ethiopia in which the participants frequently changed partners to gain advantage over one or more of the others. The United States had been involved in the Horn since May 1953 when Washington and the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa signed a mutual defense agreement package.25 The Soviets first entered the Horn of Africa in 1963 when they signed a limited arms deal with Mogadishu.26 In 1974 Mogadishu and Moscow signed a Mutual Friendship Treaty which opened up air and naval bases to the Soviets in exchange for large amounts of military hardware. Ethiopia's increased demand for arms to end the Eritrean rebellion, and the ever more repressive actions of the nations socialist government, brought an end to the Washington-Addis Ababa arms connection in June 1977. The Soviet Union stepped in to fill this arms gap and found themselves supplying both Somalia and Ethiopia with arms. But those who wish to meddle in the affairs of the Horn must be prepared to choose sides.27 In July 1977, Somalia invaded the Ogaden in Ethiopia fearing that the Soviet arms exports to Ethiopia would forever change the balance of power in the latter's favor.28 Forced to choose between which combatant to supply, Moscow chose Ethiopia and Mogadishu renounced its Friendship Treaty with Moscow later that year. In succeeding months the Somali National Army gained control of nearly 60 per cent of the Ogaden, but the loss of Soviet arms support eventually turned the tide against Somalia. A February 1978 Ethiopian offensive regained all of the major cities in the region. On 9 March 1978 Siad Barre recalled the army from Ethiopia. The SNA was never able to recover from the losses of the Ogaden War. The Ogaden War stood as the high water mark of popularity for the Siad Barre government.29 Prior to the war, Siad Barre's popularity waned as many Somalis criticized him for not pursuing Pan-Somalia aggressively enough. The regime's commitment of troops to the Ogaden and the expulsion of the highly unpopular Soviet military advisors was greeted with overwhelming support. However, Somalia's defeat refocused criticism on Siad Barre. The Ogaden Clan broke from the government over the handling of the war effort and the ruling MOD alliance began to break-up. Siad Barre, surviving a April 1978 coup attempt and watching the erosion of his power base, began to install members of his own clan in important government positions. Growing discontent with the regime's policies and personalities prompted the defection of many government officials and the establishment of numerous opposition groups and anti-government insurgent movements. Most anti-government insurgent movements were poorly organized along clan and clan-family lines and based outside of Somalia proper. But their guerrilla activities forced Siad Barre to deepen political repression and to continue with his practice of placing members of his own clan into key government positions. He tried to play off clan against clan to keep the opposition in disarray. These policies, coupled with his loss of prestige after the Ogaden War, continued to isolate the regime. The Reagan Administration, concerned about the threat imposed by a heavily armed, Soviet sponsored Ethiopia, concluded a basing for arms agreement with Mogadishu. Washington gained use of the port of Berbera and its 15,000 foot airfield for 36 to 40 million dollars per year. Despite the President's concerns, the congress turned its attention to the state of human rights in Somalia. Siad Barre was described as a notorious opportunist with no real love for the west.30 He became a symbol of all that was wrong with Somalia and his continuing repression plus the erosion of congressional support prompted the United States to suspend all military support to Somalia in 1987. The Somali National Movement (SNM), a group of Isaaq clan-family members living in London, became the strongest of the opposition groups.31 SNM commandos, operating from Ethiopia and Djibouti, raided armories, freed political prisoners, and harassed the SNA in north Somalia. Their operations in 1985/86 forced Siad Barre to institute harsh security measures in the north to curtail SNM activities. These unsuccessful measures further isolated his regime and failed to halt the SNM, who moved out of their Ethiopian bases and controlled most of northwest Somalia. To further weaken Siad Barre, the SNM encouraged the formation of other clan based insurgents, providing them with military and political aid. The two most prominent were the United Somalia Congress (USC), a Hawiye clan-family organization founded in 1989 which operated in central Somalia; and the Somalia Patriotic Movement (SPM), which operated in southern Somalia.32 North and south Somalia briefly united to defeat a common enemy, Siad Barre. By the fall of 1989 political authority had broken down in Somalia and government forces were engaged in a full fledged civil war.33 In November 1990, the SNM announced that it had concluded an agreement with the USC and SPM to overthrow the Siad Barre regime. All three rebel organizations had made significant military progress by early 1991. The SNM was in control of northern Somalia, the USC had stormed the presidential palace in Mogadishu, and the SPM had overrun several major SNA outposts in the south. On 6 January 1991 the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEU(SOC)) evacuated the United States Embassy in Mogadishu.34 A week later the Italian Embassy, the last foreign embassy in Mogadishu, was evacuated. Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in late January 1991 and the USC formed an interim government.35 The interim government was short lived. The SNM failed to recognize the interim government and the SNM-USC-SPM unification of November 1990 disintegrated. Fighting broke out between and within the USC and SPM and in May 1991 the SNM declared northern Somalia to be a free and independent state, the Republic of Somali land. The nation state completely collapsed and the fighting intensified, now centered on clan and guerrilla struggles for dominance and survival. Warlords, a new phenomenon in Somali society, came to power controlling cities, harbors, and airports. Warlords, bandits, and guerrillas carved out their own sections of the nation and completely gutted the infrastructure. Compounding the problem, Somalia was in the midst of three years of drought which had dried up wells and rivers. Local food stores dwindled and the tons of international aid on the docks in Mogadishu could not be distributed because of the activities of the warlords and bandits. Between 300,000 and 500,000 Somalis starved to death.36 A tongue lashing by U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who accused the U.N. Security Council of caring only about a rich man's war in white Bosnia while hundreds of thousands of black Somalis starved to death, prompted the Council into action.37 CHAPTER 4 OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF (UNOS0M) United Nations Resolution 751 was passed in April 1992, and authorized United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM or UNOSOM I). Food airlifts were begun and 50 UNOSOM observers were sent to Somalia. The observers were ineffective in ending the inter-clan hostilities or in securing relief supplies. In July the U.N. asked for an increased supply effort and President Bush responded by ordering U.S. forces to support the airlift. Operation Provide Relief was to, "Provide military assistance in support of emergency humanitarian relief to Kenya and Somalia."38 A Humanitarian Relief Survey Team was deployed to Somalia to assess the requirements and to activate a Joint Task Force (JTF) which would coordinate the airlift of emergency supplies to Somalia and the refugee camps in northern Kenya. Beginning on 15 August 1992, the operation ran through early December and its four C-141 and eight C-130 transport aircraft delivered more than 28,000 metric tons of relief supplies.39 The aircraft flew only daytime missions to locations which provided a safe and permissive environment. In spite of the large amount of relief supplies delivered to Somalia, local bandits and warlords made distribution ineffective and much of the aid never was delivered to those who required it. Former Ambassador to Somalia, Robert Oakley, described Provide Hope as, "Too little, too late.40 CHAPTER 5 OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (UNITAF) In August 1992 Boutrous-Ghali authorized sending an additional 3,500 United Nations peacekeepers to Somalia to augment a 500 man Pakistani Force already authorized. Due to delays resulting from the opposition of local warlords, the Pakistani troops did not enter Mogadishu until 10 November 1992. The security situation in Somalia grew progressively worse. In November, a ship laden with relief supplies was fired upon in the Mogadishu Harbor, forcing it to withdraw before supplies could be unloaded. The United Nations Center for Disease Control estimated that 40 per cent of the population of the city of Baidoa starved to death in the months between August and the end of November.41 The media was filled with images of starving Somalis and armed "technicals" (trucks and other wheeled vehicles with mounted crew served weapons) patrolling the streets of Mogadishu. On 21 November 1992, the National Security Council recommended to President Bush that the United States intervene in Somalia. The State Department proposed to incrementally increase the U.S. political and military presence in Somalia while General Collin Powell supported a decisive military- political intervention.42 The President opted for the stronger option. Twelve days later the United Nations passed U.N. Resolution 794, which provided that the United States lead and provide forces to a multinational coalition, known as United Task Force (UNITAF), to restore order in Southern Somalia so that relief supplies could be distributed. Significant in the resolution was its reference to Chapter VII enforcement provisions of the U.N. Charter and its language concerning the use of force to establish a secure environment for the distribution of relief supplies. President Bush publicly announced the initiation of Operation Restore Hope under the terms of U.N. Resolution 794 on 4 December. Commander in Chief United States Central Command (USCINCCENT), General Joseph P. Hoar USMC, whose Unified Command area included Somalia, appointed Lieutenant General Robert Johnston of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to command the Joint Task Force (JTF or JTF Somalia). The Central Command's (CENTCOM) mission statement clearly established the objectives and end state desired: When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NG0's in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to UN peacekeeping forces.43 The Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit (ATU) and its marines were the force readily available and chosen to conduct the entry operation. The ATU's three ships and marines were in the Indian Ocean, en route to the Persian Gulf for previously scheduled training operations. They were diverted to Somalia on 26 November and arrived off the coast of Mogadishu in the evening of 1 December, setting the stage for Operation Restore Hope. President Bush's Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, met with the two most powerful clan leaders in Mogadishu, Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohammed, on 7 and 8 December, to enlist their cooperation in assuring that the arrival of United States forces went unopposed. He impressed upon both leaders the massive fire power that the United States had used so effectively in Operation Desert Storm. Both leaders agreed to use Mogadishu's radio station and their political-clan organizations to urge people to remain clear of the port and airport. They also agreed to attend a follow on meeting with Ambassador Oakley, Lieutenant General Johnston, and the U.N. Ambassador Ismatt Kittan on 11 December.44 Marines and Navy Seals from the Tripoli ATU went ashore at the Mogadishu International Airport and port facility with little to no opposition the morning of 9 December. By days end the port, airport, and former American Embassy compound were in American hands. Special Envoy Oakley, Lieutenant General Johnston, and U.N. Ambassador Kittan met with Aideed, Ali Mahdi, and their delegations in the Conoco compound, Mogadishu, on 11 December. After a two hour closed session Aideed and Ali Mahdi called for the U.S. and U.N. representatives to witness the signing of a cease-fire agreement.45 One of the most important tenets of the agreement called for the movement of 60 technicals out of Mogadishu into designated cantonments. The agreement between Aideed and Ali Mahdi and the presence of the 15th MEU(SOC) in Mogadishu stabilized the situation enough to permit the continued airlift of JTF Somalia personnel into Mogadishu International Airport and allowed the Marines to focus on securing the countryside. On 15 December Special Envoy Oakley met with community leaders in Baidoa, the heart of the famine belt. His mission was to defuse potential resistance to a Marine heliborne air lift into the city, scheduled for 16 December, and to lay the groundwork for the revival of local political institutions. Assured that the Marines came in peace and as friends to help the Somali people, the air lift went off with out resistance. Within three weeks, Baidoa was no longer a city in danger. Mass starvation, disease, and the heavy fighting were over. Markets and streets that had been deserted for months were once again active. The UNITAF actions in Baidoa became the model for future operations in Somalia. Advance teams consisting of a political officer and UNITAF military representative would meet with a broad cross section of the local population to explain the UNITAF objectives and encourage local leaders to come forward.46 Ambassador Oakley described the strategy, "...as far as possible , our purpose would be achieved by dialogue and co-option, using implicit threats of coercion to buttress requests for cooperation among the factions and with UNITAF."47 Repeating this pattern, UNITAF forces spread out through Somalia, establishing nine separate Humanitarian Relief Sectors (see figure 4) to coordinate the local military, political, and relief activities. By March 1993, Somalia was no longer on the brink of starvation and much of the intra-clan fighting had stopped. Banditry, though reduced, still presented a problem for relief organizations. Click here to view image While a relatively modest combined force kept the hinterlands secure, UNITAF built up the JTF headquarters and fleshed out the Joint Task Force. General Hoar described the deployment as like going to the moon; everything they needed had to be brought in or built on site.48 Compounding the distances involved - 8,000 miles from continental United States military bases - were problems like a shortage of ramp space at the Mogadishu airport and the deterioration of the runway at Baledogle. The port facility at Mogadishu was in a sorry state as well. It had not been dredged in over two years, it suffered from limited berthing space, and sunken vessels in the port and near its entrance presented hazards to navigation. The first Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ship to enter the port brushed the bottom as it entered the channel. Three army prepositioning ships arrived off the coast of Mogadishu but were unable to enter the port or accomplish an "in-stream" offload because of rough seas. Two of the ships never offloaded their cargo in Somalia.49 The JTF Somalia Headquarters was built around the I MEF staff which added a Marine flavor to the operation but aided in the cohesion of the operation. Ambassador Oakley and his teams worked closely with the JTF staff and met several times a week to synchronize the military and political campaign.50 To deal with the multitude of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) at work in-country, the JTF established the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). So successful was the concept that a CMOC was established in each of the nine Humanitarian Relief Districts.51 Multinational contingents began to arrive in Mogadishu in early December. Some contingents arrived unexpectedly and others without any meaningful sustainment capability. On 18 December, the JTF established the Coalition Forces Support Team (CFST) to meet the large number of Coalition units arriving in-country. The CFST was tasked with settling the units and getting them into action with as little difficulty and as quickly as possible.52 In early February the Tripoli ATU and the Marines of the 15th MEU were relieved of their UNITAF responsibilities. The ships then left for the Persian Gulf to continue with their planned deployment. During their two months in theater the ATU and 15th MEU(SOC) accomplished the following: (1) they gained entry into Somalia and secured the airport and port in Mogadishu allowing the fly-in and build-up of the JTF; (2) the USS Tripoli (LPH-10) served as the primary hospital facility in Somali-treating U.S. forces, Somali nationals, and news correspondents; (3) the 15th MEU Air Combat Element (ACE) helicopters provided the primary assault support services for all of UNITAF; and (4) the 15th MEU Ground Combat Element (GCE), working in conjunction with Belgian, French, and Italian forces, provided a secure environment throughout the most of southern Somalia, giving the JTF time to build up its forces and permitting the delivery of badly needed relief supplies. By March 1993, General Hoar felt that UNITAF forces had succeeded in the assigned mission.53 Starvation was no longer a major problem and security was sufficient to allow transition of the operation to the United Nations. The U.N. Secretary General did not agree and urged the U.S. to remain in Somalia until the warlords, bandits, and rival clans that continued to operate in Somalia could be effectively disarmed. Disarmament had been excluded from the UNITAF mission statement because it was thought to be neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a secure environment for relief operations.54 The United Nations did not take over relief operations until 4 May 1993. CHAPTER 6 UNOSOM II (OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE) United Nations Operation Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was officially established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 814 on 26 March 1993. The resolution was significant in three ways: (1) it mandated the first ever United Nations directed peacekeeping operation under the Chapter VII provisions of the United Nations Charter, including the requirement to disarm the Somali clans; (2) it endorsed the goal of rebuilding the political institutions of Somalia; and (3) it called for the creation of a stable environment throughout the entire country, including the Republic of Somaliland (northern Somalia) which had declared its independence in May 1992.55 These far-reaching objectives went far beyond the more limited objectives of UNITAF or any other peacekeeping operation ever attempted by the United Nations. UNOSOM II's mission: When directed, UN0S0N II Force Command conducts military operations to consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure environment for the advancement of humanitarian aid, economic assistance, and political reconciliation in Somalia.56 UNOSOM II was headed by retired U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe, serving as Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General. Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir was appointed as force commander of the U.N. multinational contingent and U.S. Army Major General Thomas Montgomery was assigned as his deputy. Initially, the U.S. was to provide 3,000 personnel to fill primarily logistics billets. However, the U.S. was also asked to provide an 800 member quick- reaction force (QRF) that would operate under the tactical control of the Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia. The QRF was made up of a light infantry battalion, an attack helicopter battalion, and an assault helicopter battalion from the 10th Mountain Division.57 The United Nations contingent felt that the hand-off between UNITAF and UNOSOM II could have been handled better.58 In ADM Howe's opinion, "The effort was not done in bad faith. UNITAF viewed Somalia through their mission and was under external pressure to get their people home."59 When ADM Howe arrived in Mogadishu on 17 March 1993 he watched the Navy Construction Battalion (CBs) in their final stages of packing out to leave Mogadishu. He commented to his staff that these were just the type of assets that UNOSOM II would need in order to tackle their more extensive mandate, adding, "How come we're losing them?"60 From the UNITAF side, Ambassador Oakley felt that transition could have gone smoother as well. Boutros-Ghahli had promised LtGen Johnston 30 to 40 Untied Nations military planners since January 1993 to work the details of the transition with the UNITAF staff. The planners would never show.61 UNOSOM II took a series of decisive actions to demonstrate that it had the situation in Somalia under control during the first week of its mandate. These included show of force operations in Mogadishu and the southern port city of Kismayu as well as letters of warning to various troublesome factional leaders.62 Tensions began to mount between the faction leaders and the United Nations. However, the UNOSOM II headquarters was neither organized or equipped to function as a battle staff. Further complicating matters was the unique command and control arrangement of the U.S. forces that was designed to keep U.S. forces firmly under U.S. operational control, to reduce the visibility of U.S. combat forces -at the time the only credible combat power in Mogadishu, and to eliminate any misrepresentation that those forces were under the command of the United Nations.63 ADM Howe was concerned by the various levels of training and willingness of the various coalition contingents to participate in peace enforcement.64 The coalition force assembled was mostly a peacekeeping force send to do a peacemaking job.65 For example, the departing Marines briefed the arriving UNOSOM II Pakistani contingent that they would need to continue patrolling the streets of Mogadishu at night, and to continue to maintain contact with the Aideed's people. The Pakistanis would do neither.66 UNOSOM II and Aideed immediately got off to a bad start due to Aideed's distrust of the United Nations and UNOSOM II's distrust of Aideed. The United Nation's attempt to marginalize Aideed would ultimately threaten his Mogadishu power base and lead to open conflict. In May 1993, Aideed made an overture to UNOSOM II to hold a conference concerning disarming the three factions vying for military control of Galcayo.67 Galcayo was just north of the UNOSOM II area of operation and represented the largest cache of arms outside of Mogadishu. UNOSOM II and Aideed could not agree on rules for the conference and in early June Aideed and some 200 representatives of rival clan factions met in Mogadishu without UNOSOM II to sign a peace accord. The agreement called for a commitment to peace but proclaimed the intent of allied clan factions to work outside UNOSOM II channels. It also called for an early departure of UNOSOM II. UNOSOM called the conference unauthorized and questioned the legitimacy of the peace agreement.68 On 5 June, the day after the peace conference, Pakistani troops, searching for arms caches, found the transmitter to Aideed's Mogadishu radio station. Word incorrectly spread through Mogadishu that the Pakistanis had captured the radio station. They were ambushed as they attempted to return to base.69 In the day's fighting 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed. Aideed claimed that UNOSOM was attempting to shut down the only alternative voice to the United Nations in Somalia. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 837 on 7 June which called for the immediate apprehension of all those responsible for the deaths. After a week of failed attempts at diplomacy with Aideed, Admiral Howe ordered air strikes on Aideed strongholds. U.N. forces launched into an unprecedented and unsuccessful five month manhunt for the clan leader. The U.S. QRF became the force of choice for the man-hunt. Commander U.S. Forces Somalia, MGEN Montgomery, asked the national command authority for armor to augment the capabilities of the QRF. His request was denied. Within days of Aideed attack ADM Howe requested special forces to aid in the search for Aideed feeling that it was crucial to move against Aideed quickly.70 Task Force Ranger was eventually flown into Somalia in late August to assist the QRF in the man-hunt. ADM Howe continued overtures to Aideed throughout the summer to work out some sort of arrangement that would meet the requirements of U.N. Resolution 637.71 Aideed refused. The U.S. quick-reaction forces and then Task Force Ranger played a cat and mouse game with Aideed forces that lasted throughout the summer. Violence between Somali factions and UNOSOM II coalition escalated as well. Mortar attacks, sniper attacks, and armed confrontations became weekly, then daily occurrences. As the chances for armed clashes increased many coalition members backed away from their assigned missions. In the late summer Colonel Gary Anderson, serving as military assistant to Ambassador Gasende, spoke with the commanding officer of the Pakistani contingent concerning their refusal to participate in a large scale military sweep of Mogadishu. The general told Col Anderson, "I have come to the conclusion that it is better to talk than to fight."72 Parallel lines of authority developed around the already vague UNOSOM II chain of command as national contingents sought guidance from their respective capitals.73 The Italians were especially troublesome to ADM Howe as they began working on their own agenda without UNOSOM knowledge or permission.74 Tensions continued to rise between factional leaders and the United Nations. Aideed's Mogadishu based radio station stepped up its anti-colonial rhetoric appealing to the xenophobic and nationalist tenancies of the Somalis. On 3 October 1993, during a daytime raid on a suspected Aideed hideout in Mogadishu, two Task Force Ranger helicopters were shot down. The lightly armed Rangers were unable to fight their way out and members of the QRF were sent in to extract them. In the ensuing battle 18 Army Rangers were killed. The American public was outraged by the Task Force Ranger incident. President Clinton faced strong public and congressional opposition to continued U.S. support of UNOSOM II. Several congressional leaders called for the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Somalia and for the firing of Defense Secretary Les Aspin. The President was able to extend the presence of U.S. forces in Somalia until 31 March 1994, but Secretary Aspin was eventually forced to resign. His handling of U.S. actions in Somalia was partly to blame for his departure. As part of the deal with Congress to keep American troops in Somalia through March 1994 the administration was forced to rethink its policies concerning the employment of U.S. troops and dealing with Aideed. Aideed's stature increased as a result of the UNOSOM II actions against him. Now considered a populist hero in Baghdad, Tehran, and Khartom, the once anonymous clan leader was internationally known.75 Ironically, an American military aircraft transported Aideed to Ethiopia in December, 1993 to attend a U.N. sponsored peace conference.76 Operation Quickdraw, in March 1994, was the last stage of America's pull-out of Somalia and ended the nation's direct support of UNOSOM II until Operation United Shield in February and March, 1995. President Clinton, welcoming returning troops of the 10th Mountain Division to Fort Drum, New York, thanked the soldiers for their efforts and told them, "We cannot rebuild other peoples' societies. You have given them a chance to seize their own future."77 CHAPTER 7 OPERATION UNITED SHIELD The events of October 1993 and the withdrawal of United States combat forces from Somalia greatly weakened U.S. and world support for UNOSOM II. While spending nearly two million dollars a day United Nations peacekeeping efforts languished and coalition forces retreated into increasingly smaller areas of Mogadishu.78 Somali farmers enjoyed record harvests, but in the streets of Mogadishu the peace was withering away. Kidnappings, snipings, looting and theft were commonplace. Somalis and peacekeepers exchanged gunfire regularly. Having lost control of Mogadishu, the United Nations decided to end UNOSOM II by 31 March 1995. In several isolated incidents, Somalis formerly employed by the U.N. took hostages to secure back wages. NGOs began to refuse to deliver relief supplies and were eventually asked to leave Somalia by UNOSOM II officials for their own safety in January 1995. Slowly, Somalia was returning to the chaos of 1992. On 16 December 1994, Deputy Defense Secretary John Deutch announced that President Clinton agreed to send the Essex Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 3,000 Marines from the 13th MEU(SOC) to protect the last of the United Nations peace keepers as they withdraw.79 In addition to providing cover for the United Nations Troops, the Marines were tasked with laying claim to the millions of dollars worth of United States military hardware that remained in Somalia when the U.S. military pulled out in March 1994. Included were two OH-58 scout helicopters, five AH-1 attack helicopters, 30 M-60 tanks, and 75 armored personnel carriers.80 ADM William Owens, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that he hoped that the U.S. force would be strong and visible enough to discourage anyone from starting trouble. He further added, "It would be unwise for anyone to interfere with this operation, so our hope would be that the amount of resistance would be very limited."81 In its final form, Operation United Shield evolved into a multinational task force headed by Marine Lieutenant General Anthony Zinny, Commander I MEF. The Essex ARG was augmented by a Special Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTAF) aboard the USS Belleau Wood, and ships and soldiers from seven nations. Following the lead of operations in Restore Hope, David Shinn of the State Department led a political/military team to Mogadishu in late January to meet with Aideed and Ali Mahdi to obtain assurances from the Mogadishu based leaders that they would remain clear of United Shield forces.82 By 22 February 1995, Combined Task Force United Shield had massed 23 ships, 80 aircraft, and 14,000 troops off the coast of Mogadishu and was prepared to conduct an operation of "overwhelming force" should the Somalis choose to interfere with the extraction. In addition to their traditional military training, elements within the Special MAGTAF were trained in the use of several "less than lethal" weapons to defuse potential problems with minimal bloodshed. Included in the Marine's less than lethal arsenal were rubber bullets, 12- gauge wood plugs, bean bag ammunition, three types of pepper spray, stinger and stun grenades, and a sticky foam gun developed by Sandia National Laboratories.83 U.S. and Italian Marines went ashore in force in Mogadishu at midnight 28 February with no resistance. Three days later the withdrawal of the remaining 2400 Pakistani peacekeepers was complete and the United Shield forces returned to their ships. Somalia was returned to the Somalis to find their own destiny. CHAPTER 8 LESSONS LEARNED Ends, Ways, and Means Perhaps it is still too early to fully judge whether or not the efforts of 26 months will have any impact on ending the anarchy in Somalia. But consider that Somalia still has no popularly backed central government. The clan leaders, warlords, and bandits continue in place and are no closer to agreement on power sharing than they were in 1991. Large quantities of arms remain in Somalia and are still disbursed throughout the populace. The situation which pushed Somalia into anarchy in 1990/91 has changed little. The ultimate failure to rebuild Somalia from the ground up resulted from a mismatch of ends, ways, and means. The ways - the armed forces, diplomatic efforts, and NGOs/PVOs- were the policy tools. The means or resources to achieve the "ends," were the willingness of the nation or collection of nations such as the United Nations community, to bear the financial cost, the human costs, and/or the cost in time to achieve the ends. The ultimate "ends" of the entire UNITAF and UNOSOM II effort was the U.N.'s widest reaching operation ever. UNITAF was tasked to provide a secure environment for the distribution of relief supplies. UNOSOM II was mandated to remedy the causes of the Somali conflict, to rebuild the nation in the eyes of the United Nations. The objectives were vaguely defined, the reach very ambitious, and its results difficult to measure. Though many of UNOSOM II's headaches were solvable operational problems, there existed a more serious weakness. Former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, T. Frank Crigler referred to this weakness, ... perhaps fatal flaw lies in the very concept of peace enforcement, the notion that peace can be imposed on a reluctant and notoriously proud people at gunpoint and that the social fabric of their nation can be rewoven at the direction of outsiders.84 The ways to achieve an end must be balanced to suite the situation. Reduced to its most simple form, the commanders of Restore Hope and Continue Hope had the armed forces, the political apparatus, and the NGOs and PVOs at there disposal to achieve their prescribed end states. There is probably no one "correct" balance that would have been successful for both operations, nor one balance that, unchanged, would have worked throughout either operation. LtGen Johnston's and Ambassador Oakley's blending of the military and political tools was key to the successful entry of the Marines into Somalia and the quick expansion into southern Somalia by the coalition forces. They were extremely successful in sending the message that UNITAF was in Somalia to help, but would, given the provocation, use what ever force was required to ensure their safety. Ambassador Oakley ensured that UNITAF did not enter into, or was not manipulated into entering inter and intra clan disputes.85 UNITAF sponsored, but did not referee conferences, meetings, and other dealings between the Somalis. Their reading of the Somali psyche and culture was right on target. Having established themselves as a credible force, UNITAF was then able to begin the distribution of relief supplies with military assets. With the establishment of a secure environment" UNITAF was able to turn more and more distribution over to the NGOs, who were escorted by military assets. Working in UNITAF's favor were several factors: 1) the preponderance of the armed forces were well trained and well equipped combat troops; 2) a fairly unified military command structure; 3) a clearly stated and achievable set of goals; and 4) time. The first three will be addressed in detail latter in this chapter. Time, however, deserves attention at this juncture. UNITAF opened Operation Restore Hope and continued in place for five months. During that time great strides were made to relieve the suffering of the Somali people. The results were visible to the Somalis as well as to the people and governments of the participating nations. Progress, especially quick, measurable progress, is an easy sell. Considering their accomplishments and their relatively short time in Somalia, familiarity did not have a chance to settle into contempt. UNOSOM II began its operation with the same types of tools as UNITAF: the armed forces, the political apparatus, and the NGOs and PVOs. However, UNOSOM II's much broader mandate was resourced by a smaller coalition force that was not as well trained or equipped as its predecessor. For the most part it was a Chapter VI peacekeeping force. The coalition suffered from a confusing and often times parallel chain of command. ADM Howe commented that the United Nations was not prepared for the task of rebuilding Somalia, "The U.N. bureaucracy was slow and depended heavily on the idiosyncrasies of countries with their own agendas."86 Because it lacked the robust force of its predecessor, UNOSOM II was unable to keep the same tight reigns on the clan leaders of Mogadishu. Social rebuilding programs suffered from a lack of qualified personnel to make run them. For example, the effort to rebuild Somalia's police and judicial system was staffed by only two people and would not receive extensive funding until August 1993.87 By then it was too late for a rebuilt Somali police force to make a real difference. ADM Howe's requests for specific military assets were generally denied or delayed.88 Not properly resourced, the probability for the success of UNOSOM II's mission was greatly reduced. Time also played a crucial role in the United Nations' operation. At the time UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF, foreign forces had been on Somali soil for five months. Starvation and disease had been abated and there was a record harvest on the way. The question of personal survival no longer an issue, the Somalis, especially those in Mogadishu, looked upon what Somalia extremist rhetoric called an occupation or colonial force and began to ask, "What can you do for us now?" The much more difficult tasks of rebuilding a nation could not be completed at the rapid pace that UNITAF had maintained in achieving its more limited objectives. Progress, in the eyes of the Somalis, had stagnated. And with time, and help from Aideed and UNOSOM II's ill suited political policies, the Somalis began to distrust and dislike the United Nations. The means to achieve the ends were matched in Operation Restore Hope but fell woefully short of what was required to achieve the expanded goals of UNOSOM II in Operation Continue Hope. Moved to action by the searing media images of the human suffering in Somalia, the world mobilized behind the United States and entered Somalia to bring an end the human catastrophe. Restore Hope's clearly defined and limited objectives, were quickly achieved by a well organized and generally well trained coalition military force. By January 1993 there was a dramatic decrease in the number of Somalis dying from starvation and disease. By March 1993, LtGen Johnston felt they had accomplished the major task assigned to the JTF, the establishment of a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations. JTF casualties were light and the supporting nations and their forces could easily measure the gains from their efforts, time, and money. The clans, warlords, and bandits had not been disarmed, but that was never UNITAF's intent. UNITAF, through Ambassador Oakley, had also aided in Sponsoring peace talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, but the implementation of the accords was left to UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II's much broader nation building agenda was a more severe test of the means available. Not only were the goals of Continue Hope intrinsically more difficult than those of Restore Hope, but there were few tangible interim measures by which to gauge the progress of the operation. Whether mulled into a false sense of security by the ease with which UNITAF had completed its mission, or by just plain arrogance the United Nations and the United States assumed that they would quickly solve the riddle of nation building in Somalia. As the summer progressed, the United Nations spent nearly two million dollars a day in Somalia, while clan leaders, warlords, and bandits became increasingly bold in countering coalition forces. Coalition and Somali casualties became increasingly high but little progress in nation building was realized. In a classic example of Clauswitz's "paradoxical trinity," the 3 October 1993 Task Force Ranger incident, was the straw that broke the back of American public support. The American people seeing no return on the lives and money already lost in Somalia, and facing the prospect of a very long term commitment there, forced the American government to end support of Continue Hope. The member nations of the U.N., for the same reasons, eventually followed suite and forced the United Nations to end its efforts in Somalia. Mohammed Farah Aideed No one person more exemplifies the difficulty in understanding and dealing with the Somali culture than Mohammed Farah Aideed. UNITAF strove to avoid becoming involved in the inter and intra clan politics of Somalia. With the lessons from the United States involvement in the Lebanese civil war in the forefront of their thinking, the UNITAF staff felt that backing or creating the perception of siding with any clan or clan family would be counter productive if not dangerous to the mission.89 UNOSOM II took a different bent. They viewed Aideed as the most dangerous of the many bad actors and attempted to marginalize him. Describing Aideed, Somali intellectual Anmad Hussein Fidow said, "The U.N. seems to have forgotten that Aideed isn't just a person. He represents a clan. When you push down his clan, other clans come up."90 During a March 1993 interview with Mark Fineman of The Los Angeles Times, a personal aid to Aideed related the following in a prophetic interview: But the moment Aideed senses the U.S. and the U.N. are one, the moment he believes they are favoring other clans over his, it will be a very dangerous game to be playing, because its difficult to be evenhanded in Somalia. If Aideed senses he is being pushed out. I guarantee you the results will be horrifying.91 Ambassador Oakley considered Aideed to be a powerful man with higher ambitions of kingmaker or king.92 Aideed described himself to Ambassador Oakley by saying that he was like Dwight D. Eisenhower, a great general in wartime and a great statesman in peacetime.93 In the same March 1993 interview with Mark Fineman, Aideed made it clear that he had his own vision for the post-Restore Hope Somalia. His vision did not include U.S. or U.N. efforts to restructure district or local governments which he felt would create jealousy among the groups. He added, "This is our job. They should leave it to us."94 Aideed's personal desires to govern Somalia and his distrust for the United Nations were important factors in his relations with UNOSOM II. Aideed's distrust of the United Nations began years prior. Both Aideed and rival Ali Mahdi played key roles in bringing down the Siad Barre regime. Boutros-Ghali, who was then serving as Egypt's foreign minister, supported Barre until his fall, and then agreed to recognize the interim Ali Mahdi government. This sowed the seeds of Aideed's distrust for Boutros-Ghali and ultimately the United Nations. During Restore Hope, UNITAF devoted considerable time to balancing the power base of the Mogadishu clans. Due to manpower shortages and the unwillingness of coalition partners, UNOSOM II did not maintain the same tight control over Mogadishu.95 But it was UNOSOM II's political actions against Aideed that started them down a road from which there was no return. Once Aideed's forces struck the U.N. ADM Howe and UNOSOM II found themselves on the horns of a serious dilemma. United Nations Resolution 637 called for the arrest of those responsible for the attacks. ADM Howe was concerned about the message that simply ignoring the attacks would send to the Somalis, or the impact such a decision would have on future peacemaking operations.96 He added, "When you are attacked, viability depends on standing up and being counted."97 The operation to capture Aideed was a gamble and had to be kept narrow in order to reconcile others.98 ADM Howe felt that time was key and that capturing or isolating Aideed in June was UNOSOM II's best chance. His request for specialist support to capture Aideed was not answered until late August with the arrival of Task Force Ranger. The United Nations manhunt for Aideed which followed ultimately backfired, permanently tarnishing the efforts of UNOSOM II. In attacking Aideed's arsenals and capturing his key aides, the United Nations strengthened the position of Aideed's key rival, Ali Mahdi.99 The United Nations actions left Aideed fighting a desperate battle to restore his personal and his clan's organizational, political, and economic power. The "victim" of a foreigners unjust manhunt, Aideed was able to play upon the strong nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies of the Somali people and become an underdog hero to the common man. The U.N. effort unintentionally gave Aideed the "moral high ground." Now struggling for the life of his clan, Aideed could cast doubt into the minds of Somali's as to the legitimacy of UNOSOM II- even in the minds of those who did not support Aideed. Understanding the nuances of a culture is as important to the success of a peacemaking operation as it is difficult. The differences between American and Somali culture were vast. Ambassador Oakley and the Restore Hope team, working with a strong military force for relatively limited objectives were able control the clan military activity maintain the delicate balance of power between the clans. ADM Howe and UNOSOM II, working with a less robust military organization for a much broader set of objectives had less room for error in their political calculations. Aideed's personal aid said that it is hard to be evenhanded in Somalia. In such a political climate a small misstep or loss of control can lead to disaster. Mission Creep The United Nations has received much criticism on the issue of "mission creep," or the desire to have the participants involved in the operation expand their activities to include tasks that were neither specified or implied in the original mission statement. The U.N. pressed UNITAF to conduct several missions that UNITAF commanders did not consider to be part of the original scope of their operation. Missions such as reestablishing a national Somali police force and expanding operation into the northern part of the country were generally resisted.100 The criticism leveled at UNOSOM II for allowing or promoting mission creep is unjustified. UNOSOM II, under U.N. Resolution 814, was a broad Chapter VII operation. Although its objectives can be considered vague and wide ranging, operations under the auspices of Chapter VII are by nature, peace enforcement. Peace enforcement implies that the forces may not be in country at the request of local authorities. It also authorizes the use of force to achieve the desired objectives which can mean the causing and taking of casualties. "...forces sent to intervene under U.N. direction and control in a Chapter VII operation should be warfighters.."101 The hidden issue is whether or not the UNOSOM II coalition members had shifted their thought processes from a Chapter VI mentality to a Chapter VII mentality. Their reactions to the increasing hostilities in Mogadishu indicates that they did not. The debate may continue on the UNOSOM II method of handling Aideed, but the operation was correctly advertised as a Chapter VII effort. As ADM Howe suggests, "Nations participating in Chapter VII operations have to be willing to be shot at and to react."102 ... From the Sea The unqualified success of the TRIPOLI ATU/15th MEU(SOC) in entering Somalia and securing the Mogadishu airport and port facility and the support provided by subsequent ARGs and carrier battle groups, validated the Navy/Marine Corps ... From the Sea concept. Within days of President Bush's decision to send U.S. forces into Somalia the ATU was in position, awaiting only the order to execute the mission. The 15th MEU (SOC) provided the secure environment required to fly-in the JTF and begin relief operations. Two carrier battle groups provided support for UNITAF. In addition to aerial reconnaissance operations, the carrier air wings provided E-2C support for helicopters flying inland out of radio range with amphibious shipping, and the never used, but implied threat of close air support aircraft. UNOSOM II was aided by the several ARGs which assisted in various efforts including night air operations over Mogadishu. The Essex ARG and SPMAGTAF aboard the Belleau Wood safely extracted the final remnants of UNOSOM II. Making use of heavily defended interior Lines of Communication (LOCs) to amphibious shipping waiting just four miles off the shore, the force provided the flexibility and strength to extract the United Nations contingent. No other force would have conducted such a clean and rapid withdrawal from a potentially dangerous situation. Clarity of Mission The key to the success of any operation is "...the formulation of a clear and precise mission statement which defines measurable and attainable objectives..."1O3 General Hoar's mission statement focused UNITAF on a set of clearly defined goals and provided JTF Somalia with a well defined and obtainable end state. The UNOSOM II mission statement was not as clear. Broader in scope than UNITAF's mission, the UNOSOM mission offered fewer quantifiable measures of success and was more open to interpretation. An inadequate appreciation by planners for their potential advisory, coupled with the ever increasing scope of nation building, lead to the deepening involvement of U.S. forces in combat operations."104 Without a clear set of quantifiable goals the American people began to perceive the operation as a futile waste of money. A misunderstanding of the potentials of Chapter VII operations lead to charges of mission creep and further lack of confidence in the operation which ultimately led to the withdrawal of American forces from Somalia. Command Structure UNITAF was a distinctly American operation. The staff was built around a well-formed central nucleus which lent a continuity of relationships and procedures that was critical to such a large operation. Considering the multi-national make up of the force a remarkable degree of unity of command was achieved. Much of that owes to the fact that the commanders of most of the major contingents met with CENTCOM personnel and agreed to the command and control structure and rules of engagement prior to becoming attached to the JTF. Additionally, CENTCOM headquarters retained approval authority and screened each offer of assistance to ensure that contributors were willing to adhere to American operational control (OPCON) and rules of engagement (ROE).105 UNITAF also strove to create a reasonable span of control in the command structure. Preferring brigade sized units that could be given mission-type orders, smaller contingents were combined or folded into larger units. Figure 5 is a graphic depiction of the UNITAF command and control structure in the that operations final stages. Parallel lines of command and control were typically avoided because the contingents had signed up to the American operation before arriving in-country, and the distinct lack of Somali resistance to UNITAF.106 Parallel lines of control Click here to view image Source: Kenneth Allard, Colonel US Army, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, Fort McNair, Washington DC: National Defense University Press, January 1995. refers to the existence of the established command relationship between a contingent and UNITAF and the unofficial command relationship between a contingent and its home government. This second relationship reflects more the desires of the home state and can be counter productive to the overall effort of the JTF. UNOSOM II did not share UNITAF's well-formed nucleus. The staff was brought together incrementally from the voluntary contributions of the multi-national contingents as they arrived. Parallel lines of command and control were built into the structure from the outset. MG Montgomery, Deputy UNOSOM II, was also dual-hatted as Commander United States Forces Somalia (USFORSOM). As USFORSOM, MG Montgomery was a Combatant Command (COCOM) of CENTCOM and OPCON to UNOSOM II. When the increasing involvement in the manhunt for Aideed necessitated the deployment of Task Force Ranger to Somalia the command and control situation became more complex. Task Force Ranger, a strategic asset, operated under its own chain of command that was headed in-country by a U.S. Army major general and extended directly to CENTCOM, bypassing both USFORSOM and UNOSOM II. The escalation of violence in the spring and early summer of 1993 increased the potential for combat. National contingents that had contributed forces for a peacekeeping mission became concerned and frequently sought guidance from their respective capitals before executing even the most routine tactical orders, opening up the parallel lines of command and control. In the most striking example of parallel command and control the Commander of the Italian contingent opened up separate negotiations with fugitive leader Aideed with the full approval of the Italian government. The size of the UNOSOM II staff itself was inadequate to perform the new, expanded mission of the U.N. mandate.107 Hampered by this size plus the confusing web of parallel lines of command and control, the UNOSOM II headquarters was not organized or equipped to function as a battle staff.108 Figure 6 is a graphic presentation of the UNSOM II command and control organization. Click here to view image Rules of Engagement (ROE) ROE are crucial to any employment of force but are more crucial to peacekeeping operations. In the CNN world, where every move is broadcast live, an individual solider can be confronted with a situation which might affect the whole operation. His decision to shoot, challenge, or simply ignore the event may have far greater implications. The UNITAF ROE were sufficient to the task. Though classified, UNITAF personnel carried an unclassified card version of the ROE with them at all times.109 UNITAF forces were given the authority to bring "all necessary force" to bear when required. Advance State Department teams preceded UNITAF forces, clearly explained the humanitarian goals of the operation to the local leaders, and solicited the cooperation of the local establishment. However, the teams made the consequences of non-cooperation perfectly clear. The use of all necessary force by no means meant shoot on sight. LtGen Johnston directed commanders to challenge and approach technicals before firing even though the ROE listed technicals as a threat regardless of their posture.110 Backed by the demonstration of overwhelming force, challenges were very successful in UNITAF confiscation efforts and resulted in minimal casualties to all concerned. Just as important as the ability to use all required force was the Somali belief that UNITAF forces would do precisely that when required. The French Foreign Legion actions at a Mogadishu check point on the night of 10 December 1992 and the Marine actions against two technicals and a arms cache on 12 December 1992 left no doubts as to the UNITAF resolve to use deadly force when required. During Restore Hope there were relatively few armed clashes and the biggest concerns for UNITAF forces were the possibility of riots and the frequent instances of looting and petty thievery. The unclassified ROE card's direction read, "When U.S. forces are attacked by unarmed hostile elements, mobs and/or rioter, U.S. forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat."111 After December it became clear to some Somali elements that the discipline and self-restraint shown by the American forces could be used to their advantage. Improvised roadblocks would slow food convoys and children and youths would rush the convoys stealing food and personal items- sunglasses being the most popular-from convoy escorts. Two incidents illustrate the seriousness of the problem. In January a U.S. Marine shot and killed a Somali youth who had just stolen his sun glasses. In a similar incident a U.S. solider shot and killed a Somali youth caring a small box who rushed a convoy. In the first incident the solder was courts marshaled and in the second case the charge was dismissed, based upon legitimate self defense.112 To dissuade this type of activity among Somali youth the UNITAF forces began to place barbed wire around convoy vehicles and equip assistant drivers and passengers with sticks. Riot control agents such as mace and cayenne pepper spray were eventually approved for use and proved to be very effective. Detaining civilians presented a unique challenge to UNITAF for it had neither the capacity nor the responsibility to care for large numbers of civilians. The UNITAF force was not an army of occupation and could not be held accountable for the health, welfare and safety of the Somali people. The unclassified ROE card addressed detention as follows, "Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense."113 In late December a more complete detainment standard was published as Commander's Policy Guidance Number 1. It stipulated that detention would only be authorized for civilians: 1. Suspected of crimes of such a serious nature (such as willful killing, torture, inhumane treatment, rape willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body and health) that the failure to detain would be an embarrassment to the United States. 2. Whose release immediately following a hostile encounter would likely endanger UNITAF forces or persons under the protection of UNITAF forces. 3. Suspected of a violent crime against UNITAF forces.114 This policy was in keeping with UNITAF's charter under UN Resolution 794 but petty thieves and trespassers were routinely removed from the scene of the crime and released. Even nationals apprehended committing more substantial crimes slipped through the "system." For example, two Somali's who were apprehended for committing a rape were detained by a unit for 24 hours while the unit tried to resolve what was to be done with the prisoners. In the end both were released.115 To provide a more effective means of dealing with Somalia's petty criminals, UNITAF found some former Mogadishu police who were willing to begin patrolling the streets once more in December. In January, the United Nations began a program to reconstruct the Mogadishu police force. Finally, in March, UNITAF military lawyers made an attempt to revive the local judicial system. At the time of the hand-off to UNOSOM II in May little progress had been made in reviving the court system because of security and facility problems. Concerning legal authority, the JTF Staff Judge Advocate concluded it was, "...probably the most difficult political issue we had to deal with. A satisfactory solution was never reached - each case was determined in coordination with higher headquarters."116 The UNITAF ROE were left unchanged as UNOSOM II assumed the peacekeeping responsibilities. The change of mission and increasing levels of violence resulted in Lieutenant General Bir amending the ROE with Fragmentary (Frag.) Order 39. Organized and armed militias, technicals, and other crew served weapons were threats to UNOSOM II Forces and could be engaged without provocation.117 The interpretation of Frag. Order 39 differed between the national contingents. The U.S. forces stressed an aggressive enforcement while others preferred a more graduated response before using deadly force. This provided potential adversaries with a confusing picture depending on which national contingent they faced. The inconsistencies could be used to the advantage of a savvy adversary. ROE should be kept simple and consistent. Consistency of enforcement must run across the whole multinational force. Without a effective local judicial system UNOSOM II was plagued by petty criminals who were either released immediately after apprehension or put back on the streets after a quick trip through the "revolving door" of the Somali justice system. As clan leaders, warlords, and bandits re- asserted their power, the Somali police became less and less effective. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) One of the most important and successful innovations of the UNITAF operation was the CMOC. When UNITAF forces first arrived in Somalia there were at least 49 different international agencies at work. These included U.N. agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and humanitarian relief organizations (HROs). To deal with the plethora of organizations UNITAF established the CMOC in the JTF Headquarters. Liaison officers from the American and multinational forces met, sometimes daily, with the members of the various organizations to coordinate relief support, convoy escorts, and the assignment of pier space and port access to the Port of Mogadishu. As UNITAF forces moved out through southern Somalia, Ambassador Oakley's teams would set up local CMOCs in each of the Humanitarian Relief Districts. The JTF CMOC worked closely with the United Nations Humanitarian Operations Center allowing for a single focal point for all relief agencies. CMOC staffs were deliberately kept small to keep the centers efficient and focused on their mission. The CMOC would eventually control and issue ID cards for relief workers, and maintain a data matrix to track the status of relief supplies.118 Appendix A provides a detailed list of missions and tasks performed by the CMOC. Coalition Forces The UNITAF and UNOSOM II coalitions serve as examples of the successes and pitfalls of coalition peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. In both operations the commanders had to deal with the integration of multi-national contingents into a single force. Successful integration requires insight into the providing nation's political orientation and cultural, as well as dealing with the challenge of assessing limitations and capabilities, and integrating often times incompatible equipment. The preponderance of the UNITAF coalition was made up of American combat troops. The other members agreed to United States leadership and ROE prior to arriving in Mogadishu. The UNOSOM II coalition was more diverse in makeup, less combat capable, and suffered parallel lines of authority between contingents and their capitals. Within days after the JTF Somalia Headquarters established itself in Mogadishu, multi-national contingents began to arrive in-country. Some were expected, and others arrived with little or no notice. Each contingent brought its own unique strengths and weaknesses, but all had to be melded into the Task Force. Some arrived with little or no support or sustainment capability. Others were limited in the training they had received and the types of missions that they could perform. Equipment considered basic to most western militaries simply was not in the inventories of many of the poorer coalition partners. Still others were limited to specific missions by their governments. To promote an organized transition into the UNITAF and Somalia, the JTF created the Coalition Forces Support Team (CFST). The CFST was chartered to welcome and orient the arriving forces and insure they received briefings on ROE, command and control relationships within and external to UNITAF, and a description of their duties. Multi-national contingents were assigned a liaison officer(s) to facilitate communications between UNITAF and the newly arrived forces. During their initial indoctrination and settlement the JTF would evaluate the contingents to assess their potential for prospective missions. It was up to commanders to play to the strengths of the various contingents' training and abilities, while fully understanding any political limitations placed upon each contingent by its government. The bottom line was to never put a contingent commander into a position where he or she would have to say no or worse, to fail at a mission that was beyond their capability.119 The UNOSOM II coalition was less robust than its predecessor. The forces were more akin to those typically provided for peacekeeping operations. As the probability for armed conflict with the Somalis increased many coalition contingents backed away from their assigned missions. Relying increasing on parallel lines of command to their capitals coalitions would conferee with their governments before taking on UNOSOM II assigned missions. The Italian government disagreed with UNOSOM II's handling of Aideed and directed its contingent to open negotiations with him without notifying UNOSOM II. The political divisions within the coalition and unwillingness or inability to participate in combat operations crippled the UNOSOM II forces ability to conduct Chapter VII operations. Intelligence Prior to November 1992, Somalia had been a low intelligence priority. With the collapse of the USSR and cessation of the Cold War, American interest in the Horn of Africa had waned. Though the nation kept track of Somalia's slide into anarchy, it was preoccupied with the situation in the Persian Gulf. The decision to enter Somalia in November 1992 required a rapid shift in resources to create a new data base and build a new architecture.120 After the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in January 1991, little was done to update the intelligence data base concerning the state of the Mogadishu port facility and airport, and the former military airfield at Baledogle. It remained for the U.S. forces to determine the status of these facilities upon their occupation. Initially, American forces relied on technology based systems as there was little human intelligence (HUMINT) available. Navy F-14s from the Ranger Carrier Battle Group (CBG) equipped with the tactical airborne reconnaissance pod system (TARPS) provided timely, high quality imagery to U.S. forces prior to and immediately after D-day.121 TARPS was especially effective because it provided good, timely information on the small units involved in the low intensity conflict (LIC) encountered in Somalia. National imagery could not provide American forces with the quality or timeliness of information that they required. Additionally, UNITAF intelligence personnel were given the original negative rolls from TARPS flights, allowing them to accurately exploit the imagery and produce high resolution select prints.122 HUMINT later proved to be the most valuable intelligence resource in Somalia.123 Initially, many units felt that they were hampered in their operations by a lack of "cultural understanding."124 Personnel would have felt more comfortable and been more effective if they had received a comprehensive briefing on Somali history and culture. Counter intelligence (CI) and interrogator translator team (ITT) personnel were combined into HUMINT collection teams (HCT) and HUMINT exploitation teams (HET) who focused on gathering intelligence against gangs and their leaders; headquarters and hangouts; weapons cashes and arms markets; and factional/clan leaders and their territorial boundaries. As the effort matured, the HUMINT collection teams shifted their focus of effort to key elders and leaders of the community, police forces, leaders and headquarters; and to civic systems such as courts, schools, and public utilities.125 Linguists and interpreters proved invaluable to the HUMINT teams, especially as teams left the Mogadishu area and encountered fewer Somalis who spoke English. There was not a large reservoir of Somali speaking military linguists to choose from so the JTF developed procedures for hiring locals to act as interpreters.126 Interpreters served in a variety of intelligence and non-intelligence roles. Teams found it advantageous to have Somalis from different clans available for use. Interpreters not associated with the particular target clan were less likely to be tainted by the clan "party line" and more likely to provide the HUMINT teams with accurate information. Lack of interpreters was frequently identified as a problem with all units operating in Somalia.127 There was also a misunderstanding about the difference between general interpreters and those screened and provided by higher headquarters for intelligence collection. This often resulted in HUMINT teams being assigned to general interpreter duties vice intelligence collection.128 The dissemination of intelligence presented several problems in Somalia. Somalia's communications infrastructure had been completely destroyed by the years of civil war and UNITAF had to re-build the architecture from the ground up. CENTCOM would eventually establish a Intelligence Support Element (ISE) staffed solely by American personnel to provide a dissemination focal point.129 The exclusively American staff was necessary because U.S. law requires that intelligence be disseminated only through channels which are under exclusive American control. Because both UNITAF and UNOSOM II were multi-national operations, guidelines were established to protect U.S. sources and methods. The guidelines generally permitted the timely flow of information but always presented a potential gauntlet. Dissemination was also hampered simply by the lack of copying machines and the machines poor performance in the harsh Somali environment.130 UNOSOM II's assumption of duties further complicated the information dissemination problem because much of the command element staff - including the commanding general - and most of the forces were now foreign nationals. General Montgomery and the ISE were kept busy guarding sensitive collection methods and sources while trying to keep General Bir fully appraised of the intelligence picture. Logistics Overall Restore Hope and succeeding operations can be judged as a logistics success. During Restore Hope, 986 airlift missions moved over 33,000 passengers and more than 32,000 short tons of cargo into Somalia. Eleven ships, including five fast sealift vessels, moved 365,000 measurement tons of cargo into theater as well as 1,192 containers of relief supplies. Over 14 million gallons of fuel were delivered from Ready Reserve Force tankers to the forces ashore.131 Even with these great successes, Restore Hope was not without its logistics problems. In contingencies there is a tendency for everyone to consider themselves of such importance that they need to be in-country first. In the corollary, higher rank translates into higher precedence for arriving in-country. Somalia was like any other contingency in this matter but the austere conditions exacerbated the problem. The National Defense University recommended that the JTF be organized into headquarters modules, each with its associated logistics and communications, so they could be deployed in-country in successive stages.132 In the haste to establish the JTF headquarters in Mogadishu the deployment of logistics personnel "transportation through-putters," was delayed. These specialist would have quickened the whole deployment effort had they been sent into Somalia sooner. Maritime Propositioning Force (MPF) shipping and Fast Sealift ships quickly arrived off the cost of Mogadishu to find the that the port could initially accommodate only one MPF ship and was too small for Fast Sealift shipping. The surface conditions prohibited an in-stream off-load in Mogadishu. The southern Somali port of Kismayu offered the little more to the Fast Sealift ships who would eventually off-load in Mombassa, Kenya. The use of Mogadishu port resulted in the possibility of MPF ships being placed directly into the line of enemy fire. The JTF Chief of Staff said the port was secure but not benign and MPF shipping was allowed pierside.133 This appeared to violate the requirement for a benign MPF facility but facilitated the rapid off-loading of MPF assets where and when they were needed. Three of the MPF ships that off-loaded in Mogadishu had not been through the MPF maintenance cycle since their employment in Southwest Asia.134 Because of this there were some shortfalls in various classes of supply and ammunition. Assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) were without radios or feed trays for weapons. The MPF ships were a valuable asset but not the "shining jewel" they could have been. One last major concern about MPF assets was their final destination. The JTF arrived by air lift and required substantial supply from MPF assets.135 Not considered in the original planning, this posed an immediate supply allocation problem. Data differences caused problems with Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) during Restore Hope and UNOSOM II. TPFDD is built around Unit Line Numbers but the Army organize much of their accounting data around Unit Identity Codes and Unit Type Codes. Because the codes do not match there was difficulty in manipulating data and ensuring that units were provided with the proper amount of space aboard airlift.136 ARCENT forces allowed subordinate units to make changes to the TPFDD, the rationale being that the units would be able to fine tune the data base for efficiency. Instead the subordinate commands made wholesale changes to the data base causing substantial confusion. The TPFDD still continues to baffle many of the users. Coalition members arrived at Restore Hope and UNOSOM II requiring various degrees of logistics support. However, legal restrictions prohibit the military from giving away DoD supplies and services, even to coalition members. To meet this need a system was pieced together that relied on a variety of techniques, including foreign military sales cases, cross-serving agreements, and special agreements under the Foreign Assistance Act.137 Defense attaches and coalition liaison officers were invaluable aids to this patch-work system. The system ultimately worked though it could be slow and cumbersome. CENTCOM has since sent in draft legislation, supported by the DoD, which would greatly enhance coalition logistics operations in the future. Training and Professionalism Peace operations in Somalia show how the training and professionalism of the soldier, airman, sailor, and marine is basic to everything a military force does.138 Supplemental training is a great idea but most forces sent to Somalia received little supplemental training. It was their basic qualifications as war fighters that enabled the peacekeepers to successfully complete the often complex and occasionally dangerous tasks that they were assigned. Lacking a keen cultural insight, peacekeepers relied on common sense and discipline to avoid embarrassing and potentially harmful situations. Overall, American service personnel shone in Somalia, demonstrating the discipline, knowledge, flexibility, and resolve to accomplish most any task assigned. Military-Media Relations Other than the DoD sponsored media circus surrounding the Marines and Navy SEALS coming ashore in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992, the military and the media seemed to have buried their hatchet.139 Opening up all aspects of the operation to the media, the press generally responded with fair and accurate reporting. The operation's public affairs officer, Colonel Fred Peck, U.S. Marine Corps was in theater before the operation began. He escorted members of the press aboard the USS Tripoli on 8 December for what was to become the norm for Operation Restore Hope, a complete briefing on the next morning's assault by the 15th MEU(SOC) Commander and Commander, Amphibious Squadron 3. After the briefing they were flown to the various ships of the ATU where they would join up with units going ashore the next morning. The media were asked only that they delay the release of their stories until the landing was in progress.140 The media received unprecedented logistical support throughout Restore Hope. Support included transportation, operational briefings, assistance in filing stories, and the occasional meal or aspirin. Troops and journalists alike quickly learned who had a reputation for professionalism and fairness. CHAPTER 9 FUTURE OPERATIONS For the immediate future, the nation seems less likely to become involved in large scale peacekeeping operations which are not seen as being in the national interests. When ethnic violence boiled over in Rwanda, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of refugees, the U.S. sent in relief supplies with Air Force transport aircraft and a small contingent of Marines from the Tripoli ARG to cover the exodus of American Embassy personnel. The nation would not, however, commit troops to security or peacekeeping operations. It was up to the French and neighboring African nations to provide those forces. The U.S. is currently involved in a large scale nation building exercise in Haiti which the Clinton administration deemed to be in our national interests. The Republican congressional majority, elected in November 1994, is pushing a platform of reforms in its Contract with America which includes mandates that U.S. forces not be allowed to serve under a United Nations commander and that the United States reduce its share of the U.N. peacekeeping budget. In December 1994, national security advisor Anthony Lake toured Africa spreading the word that U.S. aid money will be in tighter supply in the future.141 On 5 January 1995, Boutros-Ghali called for governments to set up a rapid-action force under U.N. command to respond to peacekeeping emergencies and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine K. Albright rebuffed the idea saying, "If there were such a force, it would never be tailored quite right."142 The eternal optimist, Secretary General Boutros- Ghali, addressing a world conference on peacekeeping in March 1995 stated, "..that unless there is the political will among the protagonist of a dispute to solve it by themselves, the U.N. cannot impose a solution."143 Considering that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, United States Armed Forces have been involved in one major conflict, but five major peace keeping and relief operations: Bangladesh, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Hertsagovinia, and Rwanda; the conditions that brought the United States into Somalia in 1992 are not unique. Perhaps Somalia represents a cultural and geographic extreme, but it is certainly not an aberration. In December 1994, the Washington Post published excerpts from the final draft of a classified U.S. national intelligence estimate which stated that 40 million people are estimated to be at risk of malnutrition and death in potential crises in 1995; 30 million alone in Africa.144 The report forecast that In the next 12 to 18 months, ethnic conflict, civil war, and natural disasters will place a greater demand on humanitarian support in Africa than at any time since the 1960s."145 In Africa, five nations - Zaire, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia are in danger of complete collapse. Five more are listed as trouble spots where tension could erupt into violence and interrupt tenuous lines of international relief. In Burundi, for example, ethnic tensions are close to those that precipitated the crisis in Rwanda, where a genocidal massacre killed hundreds of thousands in 1994.146 Many potential Somalias lie on the horizon. For the time being, the Somali experience has soured the American public and congressional leadership on peace operations and as Ms. Albright's comments indicate, the Clinton administration also prefers to distance itself from the more aggressive peacekeeping agenda of Boutros-Ghali. However, in March 1995, the Department of Defense released the current edition of the National Military Strategy which outlines a more active strategy of flexible and selective engagement increasing the involvement of U.S. troops in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.147 Americans are not noted for long term political memories. The nation is currently involved in a protracted nation building exercise in Haiti. The successes and failures of that venture and the American reaction to the images of human suffering in the nightly news may very well move the nation to action once more. CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION Framing the results of American involvement in the goals of the UNOSOM II mission, the intervention in Somalia was a strategic failure. There is still no popularly backed central government and the clans, warlords, bandits, and arms remain. If the large scale fighting were to again break out, Somalia could quickly find itself as it was in November 1992. However, the strategic failure must be couched in terms of some remarkable successes: there are hundreds of thousands of Somalis alive today that would have died if it were not for Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope; the nation has produced two back-to-back bumper crops and is currently an exporter of bananas;148 Somali refugees, for the most part, have returned home; and the civil war is extinguished, even if the struggle for power remains. At the operational level there were many successes, both military and political. Some of these operational lessens were incorporated into U.S. operations in Haiti. All remain valuable to a military and political apparatus which faces a host of potential Somalias. Nation building, if it is possible at all, is a monumental task, taking a huge toll in manpower, money, and time. Standing on the Flag Bridge of the USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) during the opening days of Restore Hope, Captain John Peterson, then serving as the Commander of Amphibious Squadron Three, was asked by NBC news anchor Tom Browcaw just how long he thought it would take to rebuild Somalia. Captain Peterson replied, "At least 10 years."149 Historically, peace processes have been long and difficult requiring decades to run their course. The Israeli-Jordan peace accord signed in 1994 came after decades of negotiations and fighting. Lebanon has been in civil war or near civil war conditions for over 15 years. The antagonists in Northern Ireland are just now sitting down to negotiations after 40 plus years of blood- shed. An externally sponsored overnight solution to the problems in Somalia should not have been expected. UNITAF, with its much more limited goals, was remarkably successful and demonstrates what can be done in peacekeeping if the right tools are applied correctly. If the United States is unwilling or unable to pay the costs of nation building, let this success be a model for what can be done in the arena of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. There is a lack of understanding about the full ramifications of a U.N. Chapter VII operation in the United States and abroad. Chapter VII operations don't guarantee, but certainly imply the use of military force to achieve a desired end state. Military operations may mean casualties, heavier casualties than a government might be willing to tolerate. Chapter VII operations cannot be viewed with a Chapter VI mind set. The Government must recognize the potentials of Chapter VII operations prior to committing itself and decide upon the level of support to provide at that time, rather than bailing out of an operation in midstream and leaving the blame for failure with the United Nations. The United Nations fell short in its first efforts at peacemaking under Chapter VII of the charter. Burdened with a slow and wasteful United Nations bureaucracy UNOSOM II was not sourced, staffed, or prepared to take on the mission. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali spoke of the "quantitative changes" that differentiate a 1995 conflict from the 1950s type conflict that Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter was designed to deal with - wars in the new world order are fought within states rather than between states, placing higher demands on the United Nations.150 That being the case the United Nations should either: limit their reach to a more reasonable goal; evolve into an organization that can prosecute Chapter VII operations; or consider handing peace enforcement operations to a less multilateral effort such as UNITAF - an effort that has the unity of command and purpose to be successful. Perhaps our intervention in Somalia has done nothing more than Ambassador Hemstone suggested, to postpone the inevitable deaths of several hundred thousand Somalis. Ambassador Oakley offered a more positive spin. He likened Somali to a perennial which didn't need to be uprooted and replanted. "We just needed to dust off the snow and ash and let it grow on its own."151 This is perhaps the most important lesson for the United States. Its right there on page 26 of the President's National Security Strategy, "In Somalia and elsewhere, the responsibility for the fate of a nation rests finally with its own people."152 APPENDIX A: Missions and Tasks of the UNITAF Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) Mission The CMOC was the key coordinating point for Humanitarian Relief Organizations in their dealings with UNITAF. Functions 1. Validation of requests for military support. This included requests within the Mogadishu area, long haul convoy, security escorts to the interior, and requests for support at specific sites within the UNITAF area of operations. Military support to HROs within a Humanitarian Relief Sector was usually the responsibility of the local military commander. 2. Coordination of request for military support within the various military components of UNITAF. 3. Convening and hosting ad hoc mission planning groups as an arm of the UNITAF J-3, for requests involving complicated military support and/or numerous military units and HROs. 4. Promulgating and explaining UNITAF policies to the humanitarian community. 5. Providing information on UNITAF operations and the general security situation via daily security briefings. 6. Administering and issuing HRO identification cards. 7. Validating HRO personnel request for space available seats on UNITAF aircraft. 8. Acting as an interface, facilitator, and coordinating agency between UNITAF elements, HROs, and UNOSOM headquarters staff. 9. Chairing Mogadishu Port Shipping Committee which delt with port space, port access, and related issues important to HROs. 10. Acting as the agency that retrieved and returned weapons confiscated from HROs. 11. Responding to emergency requests for assistance from HROs in the Mogadishu area either by responding directly with CMOC assets or by requesting assistance via the UNITAF Joint Operations Center. 12. Maintaining and operating a 24-hour watch in the CMOC. 13. Maintaining contact with regional CMOCs. 14. Supporting, as required, a six-person Civil Affairs Team. 15. Facilitating the creation of a Food Logistics System for Somalia which factored in food stocks, delivery dates, warehousing capabilities, transport availability, and road repair efforts to create a basic matrix for food relief efforts within the UNITAF area of operations. Source: Kenneth Allard, Colonel US Army, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, Fort McNair, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, January 1995. NOTES 1 Smith Hempstone, "Think Three Times Before You Embrace the Somali Tarbaby," U.S. News and World Report, 14 December 1992, 30. 2 Hempstone, 30. 3 Tom J. Farer, War Clouds On the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979) 69. 4 Somalia: A Country Study, 4th ed., by Helen Chapin Metz and others, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, DA Pam. No. 550-86 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), xv. 5 Margaret Castagno, Historical Dictionary of Somalia, (Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 1975), 92. 6 Mark Fineman, "Next Step in the Mind of Aidid," Los Angeles Times, 12 October 1993, Sec Al. 7 Somalia: A Country Study, 138. 8 Information concerning Somalia's Infrastructure was obtained from Somaolia: A Country Study, xvi-xvii; Institute for National Strategic Studies, Lessons Learned Somalia: A First Look, Study (Final Draft), November 1994, 6,7. 9 Farer, 71. 10 Somalia: A Country Study, 5. 11 See I. M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1965), 206. 12 Somalia: A Country Study, 71. 13 For more on her, diya-paying groups, and Somali social customs see Lewis, 7-12. 14 Lewis, 11. 15 Lewis, 15. 16 Hempstone, .30. 17 I. M. Lewis, 113. 18 Lewis, 113. 19 Somalia: A Country Study, 20. 20 Somalia: A Country Study, 18. 21 Farer, 93 - 101. 22 Somalia: A Country Study, 36. 23 Center for Naval Analyses, The Soviet Involvement in the Ogaden War (Alexandria, VA: Defensw Technical Information Center, Professional Paper 269, February 1980), AD A082219, 1. 24 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-1991, (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1991), 282. 25 Lefebrve, 55. 26 Lefebrve, 16. 27 Lefebrve, 19. 28 Center for Naval Analyses, 6. 29 Somalia: A Country Study, 189. 30 Lefebrve, 235. 31 Somalia: A Country Study, 191. 32 Somalia: A Country Study, 195. 33 Lefebrve, 257. 34 Lefebrve, 256. 35 Mohammed Siad Barre fled Mogadishu for southern Somalia. After a short stay there, he left for Nairobi, Kenya where he stayed for two weeks. Siad Barre finally settled in Lagos, Nigeria. He had diabetes and was suffering from the complications brought on by a heart attack when he died 2 January 1995. 36 Carla Anne Robbins, "Waiting for America," U.S. News and World Report, 7 December 1992, 26; Kenneth Allard, Colonel US Army, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Fort McNair, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, January 1995), 13. 37 Robbins, 26. 38 Allard, 14. 39 Allard, 14-15. 40 Robert Oakley, Ambassador (Retired), interviewed by author, 14 March 1995. 41 Somalia: A Country Study, xxxii. 42 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995. 43 Allard, 16. 44 See Robert B. Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 2, (Autumn 1993): 46-47. 45 Oakley, 47. 46 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995. 47 See Oakley, 47-50 and Joseph P. Hoar, General, USMC, "A CINC's Perspective," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 2 (Autumn 1993): 59. 48 Hoar, 60. 49 Allard, 50. 50 Oakley, 48. 51 Allard, 70. 52 Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-00485 (01220), "Employment of Coalition Forces Support Team During Operation Restore Hope." 53 Hoar, 62. 54 Joseph P. Hoar, 58. 55 Allard, 18. 56 Allard, 19. 57 Charles P. Ferry, CPT USA, "Mogadishu, October 1993: A Company XO's Notes and Lessons Learned," Infantry, Vol. 84 No. 6 (November-December 1994): 32. 58 ADM Johnathan Howe, Special Representative to the Secratary General, telephone interview by the author, 3 March 1995. 59 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995. 60 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995. 61 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995. 62 Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," Parameters, No. X, (Winter 1993-1994): 51. 63 Allard, 57. 64 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995. 65 Gary W. Anderson, Colonel USMC, interview by the author, 15 March 1995. 66 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995. 67 Clarke, 52. 68 See T. Frank Grigler, "The Peace-Enforcement Dilemma," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 2, (Autumn 1993): 68. 69 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995. 70 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995. 71 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995. 72 Anderson interview, 15 March 1995. 73 Allard, 56. 74 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995. 75 Fineman, Sec. Al. 76 Ed Timms, "U.S. Assesses Lessons Amid Somalia Pullout: Mission Posed Conflict Between Altruism and Politics," Dallas Morning News, 22 March 1994, Sec. A 1. 77 Timms, Sec Al. 78 Julia Preston, "Waste in Somalia Typifies Failings of U.N. Management," The Washington Post, 5 January 1995, A23. 79 John M. Harris and Bradley Graham, "Marines Will Assist U.N. Exit From Somalia," Washington Post, 17 December 1994, Sec. A 24. 80 "U.S. Sends Force to Protect U.N. Somalia Evacuation," The Washington Post, 11 January 1995, A13. 81 Harris and Graham, Sec. A24. 82 "Somalis Assure U.S. on U.N. Pullout," The Washington Post, 27 January 1995, A19. 83 Rick Atkinson, "Lean Not-So-Mean Marines Set fro Somalia," The Washington Post, 25 February 1995, A22. 84 Crigler, 67. 85 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995. 86 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995. 87 Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995 and Oakley interview, 14 March 1995. 88 Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995. 89 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995. 90 Fineman, Al. 91 Fineman, Sec. Al. 92 Oakley, 53. 93 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995. 94 Fineman, Al. 95 Oakley, 53. 96 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995. 97 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995. 98 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995. 99 Fineman, Al. 100 Waldo D. Freeman, Major General US Army, "Operation Restore Hope-A US CENTCOM Perspective," Military Review, no. X, September 1993, 66. 101 Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," Parameters, no. X, Winter 1993-1994, 44. 102 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995. 103 Hoar, 63. 104 Allard, 31. 105 Hoar, 61. 106 See Allard, 22-26. 107 Oakley, 53. 108 See Allard, 22-26, and 55-56. 109 F. M. Lorenz, Colonel, USMC, "Confronting Thievery in Somalia," Military Review, no. 8 (August 1994): 48. 110 Allard, 36-37. 111 Lorenz, 48. 112 Lorenz, 49. 113 Lorenz, 51. 114 Lorenz, 52. 115 "Problems of Legal Authority During Operation Restore Hope," Marine Corps Lesson Learned Number 50753-12069 (01233). 116 "Problems of Legal Authority During Operation Restore Hope," Marine Corps Lesson Learned Number 50753-12069 (01233). 117 Allard, 37. 118 See Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-00485 (01220), Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-01441 (00050), and Allard, 68. 119 See Hoar, 61; and Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-00485 (01220) 120 Hoar, 59. 121 "SPMAGTF CENT (SOC) S-2's Perspective on Imagery During Restore Hope, Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-05599 (01228). 122 "SPMAGTF CENT (SOC) S-2's Perspective on Imagery During Restore Hope, Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-05599 (01228). 123 See "Counterintelligence Operations in Operation Restore Hope," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-09471 (00058); and Allard, 74. 124 "Lack of Cultural Understanding," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 72356-73693 (01155). 125 "Counterintelligence Operations in Operation Restore Hope," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-09471 (00058) 126 "Continuing Need for Linguist During Operation Restore Hope." Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-09224 (00057) 127 "Continuing Need for Translators During Operation Restore Hope," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-13667 (00066) 128 "Continuing Need for Linguist During Operation Restore Hope." Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-09224 (00057) 129 Allard, 75. 130 "MARFOR Perspective on JTF Intelligence Dissemination During Restore Hope," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50573-08812 (01231) 131 Allard, 45. 132 Allard, 42. 133 "The 'Benign' Port and Airfield Requirement for MPF in Somalia," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-23203 (01254). 134 "Maritime Prepositioning Force Liabilities," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 21256-60264 (01180). 135 "JTF use of MPF Equipment During Opeartion Restore Hope," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-24268 (00082). 136 Allard, 47. 137 Hoar, 61. 138 Allard, 95. 139 Keith Oliver, Major USMC, "Burying the Military-Media Hatchet," Proceedings (February 1993): 13. 140 Information concerning events aboard the USS Tripoli based on the author's recollections while serving as Air Operations Officer of the Tripoli during Operation Restore Hope. 141 John F. Harris, "Lake's Trip to Africa to Focus on Famine, Debt Relief Programs, "The Washington Post, 14 December 1994, Sec. A32. 142 Preston, Sec. A23. 143 Edward Mortimer, "The U.N.-Sadder if not Wiser," London Financial Times, 8 March 1995, 14. 144 R. Jeffery Smith, "Demand for Humanitarian Aid May Skyrocket," Washington Post, 17 December 1994, Sec A22. 145 Smith, Sec A22. 146 Smith, Sec A22. 147 Bradely Graham, "Responsibilities of U.S. Military Expanded," The Washington Post, 9 March 1995, A36. 148 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995. 149 John Peterson, Captain USN, Commander Amphibious Squadron Three, interview by the author, 3 March 1995. 150 Mortimer, 14. 151 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995. 152 The White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," July 1994. BIBLIOGRAPHY "Aid Groups Strike Over Kidnapping." The Washington Post, 13 January 1995, A26. Allard, Kenneth, Colonel United States Army. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. 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