Somalia: Strategic Failures And Operational Successes
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
ABSTRACT
TITLE OF THESIS: Somalia: Strategic Failures and Operational
Successes
STUDENT: Major Alan G. Hendrickson
CLASS: Marine Corps Command and Staff College
DATE: April 1995
THESIS COMMITTEE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. C D. McKenna
Problem. Moved by the searing images of starving Somalis
United States went ashore in Mogadishu, Somalia on 9 December
1992 to begin Operation Restore Hope. What began as an
operation to provide a secure environment for the distribution
of relief supplies and evolved into an effort to bring the
Somali people to a government ended with a whimper 27 months
later. This anticlimactic ending to a once promising endeavor
was the result of a classic mismatch of ends, ways, and means.
Ultimately, the strategic goal of rebuilding Somalia was not
worth the lives of 130 peacekeepers and the two million
dollars a day that the United Nations was spending in Somalia.
But the strategic failure cannot be allowed to cast its pallor
over the numerous operational successes enjoyed by the
military and political participants of the operation.
Methodology. The paper examines the initial lessons learned
from the United States experience in Somalia - the successes,
the failures, and their implications on the future of US
involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
The brief history of Somalia was pieced together from books
and articles by noted experts on Somalia. Lessons learned
were compiled from interviews with Ambassador Robert Oakley
and Admiral Jonathan Howe, articles written by senior military
and State Department personnel involved with US Somalia
operations, and the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System
(MCLLS).
Results: In spite of the numerous operational successes of
UNITAF in Operation Restore Hope, UNOSOM II was unable to
achieve the expanded goal of rebuilding Somalia in Operation
Continue Hope. Instead, UNOSOM II became embroiled in the
internal politics of Somalia, which it was not equipped or
prepared to handle. The continuing loss of life and
expenditure of resources forced the United States, then the
United Nations to abandon their efforts in Somalia.
Conclusion: The desired strategic "ends" of a rebuilt Somalia
was beyond the ways and means of the United States and the
United Nations. The Nation was unwilling to bear the costs in
lives and resources, to include time, that would have been
required to "fix" Somalia. Operationally, there were numerous
success stories and the political/military effort proved its
utility in achieving more limited objectives. The civil war
was suspended and the starvation halted, giving the Somali
people time to regroup and possibly rethink their own destiny.
SOMALIA: STRATIGIC FAILURES
AND OPERATIONAL SUCCESSES
by
Alan G. Hendrickson
Major USMC
Command and Staff AY 1994/95
Thesis submitted to the Faculty
of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College
in partial fulfillment of the requiements for the degree of
Master of Military Science
April 1995
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and
do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government
CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES iv
Chapter Page
1. OUT OF AFRICA 1
2. HARSH LAND-LIMITED RESOURSES 3
3. HISTORY AND CULTURE 7
4. OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF 22
5. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (UNITAF) 24
6. UNOSOM II (OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE) 32
7. OPERATION UNITED SHIELD 39
8. LESSONS LEARNED 42
Ends, Ways, and Means, 42
Mohammed Farah Aideed, 48
Mission Creep, 51
... From the Sea, 52
Clarity of Mission, 53
Command Structure, 54
Rules of Engagement, 57
Civil-Military Operations Center, 62
Coalition Forces, 63
Intelligence, 65
Logistics, 68
Training and Professionalism, 71
Military-Media Relations, 71
9. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 73
10. CONCLUSION 76
Appendixes
A. Missions and Tasks of the UNITAF CMOC 80
Bibliography 90
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. The Horn of Africa 4
2. Somali Ethnic Limits 8
3. Major Clan-Families and Clans 10
4. Humanitarian Relief Sectors 28
5. UNITAF Command Relationships 55
6. UNOSOM II Command Relationships 57
CHAPTER 1
OUT OF AFRICA
Moved by the devastating images of starving Somalis the
United States and the world mobilized for action in December
1992. Marines and sailors from the Tripoli Amphibious Task
Unit (ATU) went ashore in Mogadishu, Somalia on 9 December
1992 to begin Operation Restore Hope. During the predawn
darkness of 3 March 1995 the final wave of Marine amphibious
assault vehicles - who had come ashore on 28 February to cover
the withdrawal of the last United Nations peacekeeping forces-
left the beaches of Mogadishu for their amphibious ships
waiting four miles off the coast. The efforts of 26 months
seem to have done nothing more than the former ambassador to
Kenya Smith Hempstone suggested,
To keep tens of thousands of Somali-kids from starving to death in
1993 who, in all probability, will starve to death in 1994 (unless
we are prepared to remain through 1994).1
What began as an operation to provide a secure environment for
the distribution of relief supplies and evolved into an effort
to bring the Somali people to a government ended with a
whimper. In the end, the ultimate fate of the Somali people
lies, as it always has, with the Somali people.
This anticlimactic ending to a once promising endeavor
was the result of a classic mismatch of ends, ways, and means.
Ultimately, the strategic goal of rebuilding Somalia was not
worth the lives of 130 peacekeepers and the two million
dollars a day that the United Nations was spending in Somalia.
The strategic failure cannot be allowed to cast its pallor
over the numerous operational successes enjoyed by the
military and political participants of the operation. The
correct combination of political and military tools applied to
the more limited objectives of December 1992 was able to end
the starvation and, for the time being, extinguish the civil
war, buying breathing room for the Somalis to rethink their
own destiny.
As the curtain closes on this act of Somali history it is
appropriate to examine the initial lessons learned from the
United States experience there - the successes, the failures,
and their implications on the future of United States
involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
To understand the Somalia of 1995 one must first understand
the geography and history that combined to create the Somalia
of January 1991 when Siad Berre was overthrown. From there my
focus will shift to Operation Provide Relief, UNITAF Somalia
(Restore Hope), UNOSOM II (Continue Hope), and Combined Task
Force United Shield (Operation United Shield) in order to
glean strategic and operational lessons learned. I will
conclude with a look at what the future may hold in regards to
peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
CHAPTER 2
HARSH LAND - LIMITED RESOURCES
"The Somali is as tough as his country..."2 In order to
understand the Somali people, it is necessary to understand
the land in which they live. Tom Farer aptly describes this
geography in his writings:
Except in the narrow belt between the two southern rivers, the
Jubba and Shebelle, and in the far northwest of the plateau
overlapping the political frontier with Ethiopia, the land is an
arid savanah, an endless vista of coarse grass punctuated by
thorn trees, giant anthills, and thick trunked baobabs.3
Located on the African Horn, Somalia is continuously hot
except at the higher elevations of the country. Two wet
seasons, April to June and October through November, bring
erratic rainfall, generally less than 500 millimeters (20
inches). Droughts are common and only one of the nation's two
major rivers, the Jubba, flows permanently. Climate and
topography notwithstanding Somalia's location is strategically
important. The country's northern shore borders the Gulf of
Aden, a potential choke point for the southern Red Sea and the
vital sea lanes which converge there. The eastern shores
provide access to the Indian Ocean and the equally vital sea
lanes which converge upon the Straits of Hormuz and the
Persian Gulf.
Click here to view image
Crop and livestock production, forestry, and fisheries
accounted for the bulk of the Somali gross domestic product
(GDP) in 1991, the last year in which records were kept.4 The
harsh environment will support little more than subsistence
crop cultivation, but prior to 1990 there was enough of a
surplus to support informal domestic markets and a barter
economy. Before 1990 Somali livestock production even
supported an export economy, primarily with Italy and nearby
Arab states. Fisheries and forestry were small portions of
the nation's GDP and have virtually disappeared since the
civil war. Khat, a narcotic plant grown in Ethiopia, Kenya,
and northern Somalia deserves special mention. The fresh
green leaves are chewed for their stimulating effect, ranging
from a pleasant mild insomnia to a mild intoxication. Its use
is prohibited by some religious orders and permitted by
others, but former Somali governments forbade its use.5
However, it was and still remains an important staple of
Somali life and provides an enormously lucrative cash crop.6
Somalia possesses substantial mineral deposits which
remain virtually unexploited. Domestic wood, charcoal, and
wind are the nation's only proven natural energy sources
Petroleum products must be imported, although a 1991 United
Nations Development Program hydrocarbon study indicated a good
potential for oil and gas deposits in northern Somalia.7 The
land is harsh and unforgiving. Even in the best of times life
survives on the margins. Disasters, both natural and man-
made, strongly affect the balance of life in Somalia.
Heavy spending on military hardware left little funding
for the building or improvement of Somali infrastructure in
the 1970s and 1980s. The limited network of paved roads,
2,600 kilometers, runs primarily between the coastal cities
of Mogadishu, Merca, Kismayu, and Berbera. Since the civil
war this network has fallen into disrepair. Most interior
roads are unpaved and grading and other maintenance is
haphazard. Many stretches are not passable in the rainy
season. There are no major rail lines in the country.
Somalia's eight paved airstrips are in various states of
disrepair. Only the international airport at Mogadishu, the
military airfield at Berbera, and the former air force base at
Baledogle are suitable for large jet transport aircraft.
Somalia possesses four major ports: deepwater facilities at
Berbera, Mogadishu, and Kismayu; and a lighterage port at
Merca. Civil unrest made repair and improvements at these
facilities impossible during the early 1990s, and prior to
U.N. intervention in 1992 none were able to function at near
full capacity. The civil war also left Somalia without a
functioning telephone system.8
CHAPTER 3
HISTORY AND CULTURE
The people who live in present day Somalia are thought to
have occupied the Horn of Africa by 100 A.D. or earlier. The
proto-Sam, as they are called by anthropologists, migrated
into northern Kenya and southern Somalia from the lake regions
of the southern Ethiopian highlands. Primarily a pastoral
people, the proto-Sam migrated north into the Ogaden of
Ethiopia and northern Somalia in search of water and pasture
lands. This expansion was marked by a largely "violent
expulsion of predecessor peoples and the consequent
establishment of a single cultural nation in continuous
occupation of a vast though impoverished territory. ."9 The
proto-Sam came to be known as the Samaal, or Samaale, a clear
reference to the mythical father figure of the same name, from
whom all Somalis clans originated.10 From Samaale came the
term Somali.
The geography of Somalia defined the evolution of the
Samaale into two sub-cultures. The Samaale of the southern
interriverine country adapted to their physical environment by
becoming agrarians. They raised cattle and cultivated crops,
enslaving the non-Somali cultivators who had lived there
before. The Samaale who settled outside the interriverine
areas remained pastorals, raising camels, sheep, and goats.
They migrated as necessary to keep their herds near water and
good pasture lands.
In the eighth century Persian and Arab traders began to
ply the coast of Somalia and Islam was introduced into the
country. The large scale conversion of Somalia to Islam took
place in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries.
This conversion created a relatively uniform cultural and
ethnic block of people who inhabited all of present day
Somalia, the Ogaden region of modern Ethiopia, and portions of
present day Kenya and Djibouti.11 (See Figure 2)
Click here to view image
Ethnic Somalis are united by language, culture, devotion
to Islam, and a common ancestor, Samaale.
Genealogy constitutes the heart of the Somali social system. It
is the basis of the collective Somali inclination toward internal
fission and internecine conflict, as well as of the Somalis' sense
of being distinct - a consciousness of others which borders on
xenophobia.12
From Samaale descended six major clan-families (See Figure 3).
Four are overwhelmingly pastoral nomads who are collectively
denoted by the name of Samaale (the Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and
Hawiye), and two are agricultural and sometimes referred to as
the Sab (the Digil and Rahanwayn). Somalis consider the name
Sab to be derogatory in nature. The Samaale consider
themselves superior to the Sab, who have lowered themselves by
their reliance on agriculture and their readiness to
assimilate foreigners - Persian and Arabian traders and some
indigenous non-Somalis of the interriverine region - into
their clans.
Within the clan-family, lineage groups members into clans
(see figure one) which are further divided into secondary and
tertiary lineages that lack specific terms. While descent in
the male line is the fundamental principle of Somali social
organization, it does not act alone. Under the complex her
system, the Somali may act in the capacity of a member of his
clan-family, his clan, or as a member of one of the large
number of lineages into which his clan is divided. The most
binding and frequently mobilized of his diffuse attachments is
his diya-paying group. This unit, with a fighting strength of
several hundred to a few thousand, consists of close kinsmen
united by a contractual alliance whose terms stipulate that
they should collectively pay and receive blood-compensation.
Throughout Somali history, the security of an individual and
his property have depended on his membership in his diya-
paying group. In general a Somalis' loyalty lies with his
diya-paying group, then with his clan, and finally with the
kindred clans of the clan-family.13
Click here to view image
Noted anthropologist I.M. Lewis, an authority on the
pastoral Somalis notes that the Somali are "...a warlike
people, driven by poverty of their resources to intense
competition for access to water and grazing."14 War, feud,
and fighting are common among all Somalis though more
prevalent among the nomads. Traditionally men fall into two
categories: warenleh (warriors) or wadads (men of God).15
Islam is a strong unifying and defining force in Somali life,
but considered secondary to the lineage and warrior tradition
in importance. The American Ambassador to Kenya, Smith
Hempstone, cautioned Under Secretary of State Frank Wisner in
a December 1992 cable about the violent nature of Somali
culture, saying, "The Somali is a killer. The Somali is as
tough as his country, and just as unforgiving."16
The centuries following Somalia's conversion to Islam
were marked by the emergence of centralized state systems,
noted for their prosperity and cosmopolitanism. From the
1400s on the Somalis became well known for their continuing
religious conflicts with Ethiopian Christians. Mogadishu rose
as Somalia's premier city and commercial trading center. At
various times the Portuguese and the Omanis attempted to exert
their authority over the area. The last remnants of the
Portuguese were evicted from east Africa in 1728 and the
Omanis were only able to exercise a shadowy authority over the
Somalis, collecting a token annual tribute. Local clan-
families retained the real power in Somalia, and it was not
until the European "scramble" for African colonies in the
1880s that the Samaale faced real subjugation.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the
Somalis became the subjects of state systems under the flags
of Great Britain, France, Italy, Egypt, and Ethiopia. The
Anglo-French Agreement of 1888 formalized the claims and
boundaries of what became the Somaliland Protectorate
(British) and French Somaliland (present day Djibouti). The
British facilitated the Italian occupation of the Eritrean
coast and the Italian military pushed inland and eventually
occupied southern Somalia (Italian Somaliland). Italian
Somaliland was formalized in the 1891 Anglo-Italian Agreement.
Completing the colonial partition of the Somali people, the
Ethiopians were ceded the Ogaden territory in a 1897.
The French enjoyed success in securing the economic
future of Djibouti and the Italians slowly introduced the
infrastructure and bureaucracy required to support a growing
agribusiness in Italian Somaliland. The British found them
selves engaged in a twenty year struggle with Muhammad
'Abdille Hassan, "The Mad Mulla" and his followers, the
Dervishes for control of the Somali land Protectorate and the
hinterlands. The Dervish fight for independence occupied the
British at the expense of economic or social improvement.17
Italian Somalis received some education and training as Italy
established the colony, strengthening the concepts of commerce
and agriculture in the southern clans and further distancing
their culture from the pastoral culture of their northern
countrymen. The first stirrings of modern Somali nationalism
were born in these times.18 Though the Dervish movement was
unsuccessful in its aims of driving the infidels to the sea,
Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan was viewed as a national hero and
patriot.
Italian military action in World War II reunited the
Somali clans for the first time in 40 years. Italy
established a common currency, set prices, and collected taxes
throughout the entire area. The Somali economy moved to a
monetary system from a traditional barter economy during the
occupation. The British invaded northern Somalia in March
1941. They embarked upon a lightning campaign which retook
the whole region from Italy and restored Emperor Haile
Selassie to his throne in Ethiopia. The British then placed
the former Somaliland Colonies and the Ogaden under a military
administration that stood until 1948.
In 1948 Great Britain returned the Ogaden to Ethiopia
under pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union.
Despite a strong desire for independence voiced by southern
Somalia's major political parties, the United Nations General
Assembly voted in 1949 to make southern Somalia a trust
territory under Italian control for ten years. After ten
years it would become an independent nation. The General
Assembly stipulated that under no circumstances should Italian
rule be extended beyond 1960.
The return and re-empowerment of the Italian technocrats
helped to build the economy and improve the infrastructure,
though Italian Somaliland was never able to stand on its own
economic feet. British Somaliland, by contrast, would
continue to stagnate in spite of British development efforts.
By 1956, political protests forced Great Britain to introduce
representative government into the protectorate and eventually
acquiesce to the reunification of British and Italian
Somaliland. British Somaliland received its independence on
26 June 1960 and united with the trust territory of Italian
Somaliland on 1 July 1960 to form the Somali Republic. The
disparity between the two territories would cause serious
political and social difficulties when the two territories
united.19
Following Somali independence a parliamentary democracy
ruled the nation until 1969. The national ideal professed by
the government was one of political and legal equality not
limited to one profession, clan, or class. The ruling
political party, the Somali Youth League (SYL), originally had
formed to promote Somali independence and ban clanishness.20
However, a dissatisfaction with the distribution of power
among the clans, especially between those of the north and
south would continue to dog the government. More often than
not, the membership of a political party was aligned along
clan or clan-family lines. Accusations of nepotism and
favoritism abounded and were not entirely unfounded.
Integration of the north and south was complicated by the
differences in the legal, economic, and educational systems
left behind by the British and Italians.
The educated elites of the north and south had divergent
interests and beliefs and were reluctant to trust each other.
The thin unifying thread allying the government and the people
was the dream of Pan-Somalia, the unification of all Somali
speaking people. Over 200,000 Somali speaking people lived in
northern Kenya, some 120,000 in the "Afars and the Isaacs"
(The Republic of Djibouoti), and the Ogaden was heavily
populated by Somalis.21 The Pan-Somalia ideal proved to be as
destructive as it was unifying and would eventually bring
Somalia into armed conflicts with her neighbors, Kenya and
Ethiopia. These military actions kept defense spending a
disproportional high item of the small national budget.
By 1969 charges of corruption and nepotism had seriously
weakened the SYL government. Dissatisfaction with the
government grew and was especially high with intellectuals and
members of the armed forces and the police. The stage was set
for a coup d'etat but the catalyst was unplanned. On 15
October 1969 President Shermaarke was assassinated by a
bodyguard. (The bodyguard came from a lineage said to have
been badly treated by the president.22) The Prime Minister
arranged for the National Assembly to elect a president from
the same clan as Shermaarke. The military, convinced that
there was no hope for positive change, took to the streets of
Mogadishu on 21 October 1969 and overthrew the government.
Though not regarded as the architect of the coup, army
commander General Mahammad Siad Barre assumed leadership of
the new governing body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council
(SRC).
Siad Barre retroactively declared the army's action a
Marxist revolution, although there is no evidence that the
Soviet Union or its proxies were involved. The SRC
reorganized the country's legal and political institutions
through the application of "scientific socialism." Somalia
refused to relinquish claims to disputed territories with
Kenya and Ethiopia, but the SRC pledged to continue a policy
of regional detente with its neighbors, which angered some
clans. The Siad Barre government took a tough stance against
the solidarity of clan-families and clans, but was itself one
of the greatest practitioners of the system. By mid-1975, 50
per cent of the SRC were from Siad Barre's clan-family, the
Daarood. The government was commonly referred to by the code
name MOD which stood for Mareerteen (Siad Barre's clan),
Ogaden (Siad Barre's mother's clan), and Dulbahante (the clan
of Siad Barre's son-in-law who headed the National Security
Service). The southern interriverine clan families of the
Rahanwayn and Digil were not represented in the government
continuing the north-south clan-family fissures.
During the cold war Somalia and Ethiopia remained among
the world's poorest nations, but the Horn's geographical
relationship to sub-Saharan Africa and to the Middle East and
North Africa elevated it to a position of importance greater
than its intrinsic value.23 During the 1970s and 1980s the
United States and the Soviet Union poured more than 16 billion
dollars worth of arms into Ethiopia and Somalia.24 The
superpowers became involved in a complex diplomatic dance with
Somalia and Ethiopia in which the participants frequently
changed partners to gain advantage over one or more of the
others. The United States had been involved in the Horn since
May 1953 when Washington and the Ethiopian government in Addis
Ababa signed a mutual defense agreement package.25 The
Soviets first entered the Horn of Africa in 1963 when they
signed a limited arms deal with Mogadishu.26 In 1974
Mogadishu and Moscow signed a Mutual Friendship Treaty which
opened up air and naval bases to the Soviets in exchange for
large amounts of military hardware. Ethiopia's increased
demand for arms to end the Eritrean rebellion, and the ever
more repressive actions of the nations socialist government,
brought an end to the Washington-Addis Ababa arms connection
in June 1977. The Soviet Union stepped in to fill this arms
gap and found themselves supplying both Somalia and Ethiopia
with arms. But those who wish to meddle in the affairs of the
Horn must be prepared to choose sides.27
In July 1977, Somalia invaded the Ogaden in Ethiopia
fearing that the Soviet arms exports to Ethiopia would forever
change the balance of power in the latter's favor.28 Forced
to choose between which combatant to supply, Moscow chose
Ethiopia and Mogadishu renounced its Friendship Treaty with
Moscow later that year. In succeeding months the Somali
National Army gained control of nearly 60 per cent of the
Ogaden, but the loss of Soviet arms support eventually turned
the tide against Somalia. A February 1978 Ethiopian offensive
regained all of the major cities in the region. On 9 March
1978 Siad Barre recalled the army from Ethiopia. The SNA was
never able to recover from the losses of the Ogaden War.
The Ogaden War stood as the high water mark of popularity
for the Siad Barre government.29 Prior to the war, Siad
Barre's popularity waned as many Somalis criticized him for
not pursuing Pan-Somalia aggressively enough. The regime's
commitment of troops to the Ogaden and the expulsion of the
highly unpopular Soviet military advisors was greeted with
overwhelming support. However, Somalia's defeat refocused
criticism on Siad Barre. The Ogaden Clan broke from the
government over the handling of the war effort and the ruling
MOD alliance began to break-up. Siad Barre, surviving a April
1978 coup attempt and watching the erosion of his power base,
began to install members of his own clan in important
government positions. Growing discontent with the regime's
policies and personalities prompted the defection of many
government officials and the establishment of numerous
opposition groups and anti-government insurgent movements.
Most anti-government insurgent movements were poorly
organized along clan and clan-family lines and based outside
of Somalia proper. But their guerrilla activities forced Siad
Barre to deepen political repression and to continue with his
practice of placing members of his own clan into key
government positions. He tried to play off clan against clan
to keep the opposition in disarray. These policies, coupled
with his loss of prestige after the Ogaden War, continued to
isolate the regime. The Reagan Administration, concerned
about the threat imposed by a heavily armed, Soviet sponsored
Ethiopia, concluded a basing for arms agreement with
Mogadishu. Washington gained use of the port of Berbera and
its 15,000 foot airfield for 36 to 40 million dollars per
year. Despite the President's concerns, the congress turned
its attention to the state of human rights in Somalia. Siad
Barre was described as a notorious opportunist with no real
love for the west.30 He became a symbol of all that was wrong
with Somalia and his continuing repression plus the erosion of
congressional support prompted the United States to suspend
all military support to Somalia in 1987.
The Somali National Movement (SNM), a group of Isaaq
clan-family members living in London, became the strongest of
the opposition groups.31 SNM commandos, operating from
Ethiopia and Djibouti, raided armories, freed political
prisoners, and harassed the SNA in north Somalia. Their
operations in 1985/86 forced Siad Barre to institute harsh
security measures in the north to curtail SNM activities.
These unsuccessful measures further isolated his regime and
failed to halt the SNM, who moved out of their Ethiopian bases
and controlled most of northwest Somalia. To further weaken
Siad Barre, the SNM encouraged the formation of other clan
based insurgents, providing them with military and political
aid. The two most prominent were the United Somalia Congress
(USC), a Hawiye clan-family organization founded in 1989 which
operated in central Somalia; and the Somalia Patriotic
Movement (SPM), which operated in southern Somalia.32 North
and south Somalia briefly united to defeat a common enemy,
Siad Barre. By the fall of 1989 political authority had
broken down in Somalia and government forces were engaged in a
full fledged civil war.33
In November 1990, the SNM announced that it had concluded
an agreement with the USC and SPM to overthrow the Siad Barre
regime. All three rebel organizations had made significant
military progress by early 1991. The SNM was in control of
northern Somalia, the USC had stormed the presidential palace
in Mogadishu, and the SPM had overrun several major SNA
outposts in the south. On 6 January 1991 the 13th Marine
Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEU(SOC))
evacuated the United States Embassy in Mogadishu.34 A week
later the Italian Embassy, the last foreign embassy in
Mogadishu, was evacuated. Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in late
January 1991 and the USC formed an interim government.35
The interim government was short lived. The SNM failed
to recognize the interim government and the SNM-USC-SPM
unification of November 1990 disintegrated. Fighting broke
out between and within the USC and SPM and in May 1991 the SNM
declared northern Somalia to be a free and independent state,
the Republic of Somali land. The nation state completely
collapsed and the fighting intensified, now centered on clan
and guerrilla struggles for dominance and survival. Warlords,
a new phenomenon in Somali society, came to power controlling
cities, harbors, and airports. Warlords, bandits, and
guerrillas carved out their own sections of the nation and
completely gutted the infrastructure. Compounding the
problem, Somalia was in the midst of three years of drought
which had dried up wells and rivers. Local food stores
dwindled and the tons of international aid on the docks in
Mogadishu could not be distributed because of the activities
of the warlords and bandits. Between 300,000 and 500,000
Somalis starved to death.36 A tongue lashing by U.N.
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who accused the U.N.
Security Council of caring only about a rich man's war in
white Bosnia while hundreds of thousands of black Somalis
starved to death, prompted the Council into action.37
CHAPTER 4
OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF (UNOS0M)
United Nations Resolution 751 was passed in April 1992,
and authorized United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM or
UNOSOM I). Food airlifts were begun and 50 UNOSOM observers
were sent to Somalia. The observers were ineffective in
ending the inter-clan hostilities or in securing relief
supplies. In July the U.N. asked for an increased supply
effort and President Bush responded by ordering U.S. forces to
support the airlift. Operation Provide Relief was to,
"Provide military assistance in support of emergency
humanitarian relief to Kenya and Somalia."38 A Humanitarian
Relief Survey Team was deployed to Somalia to assess the
requirements and to activate a Joint Task Force (JTF) which
would coordinate the airlift of emergency supplies to Somalia
and the refugee camps in northern Kenya. Beginning on 15
August 1992, the operation ran through early December and its
four C-141 and eight C-130 transport aircraft delivered more
than 28,000 metric tons of relief supplies.39 The aircraft
flew only daytime missions to locations which provided a safe
and permissive environment. In spite of the large amount of
relief supplies delivered to Somalia, local bandits and
warlords made distribution ineffective and much of the aid
never was delivered to those who required it. Former
Ambassador to Somalia, Robert Oakley, described Provide Hope
as, "Too little, too late.40
CHAPTER 5
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (UNITAF)
In August 1992 Boutrous-Ghali authorized sending an
additional 3,500 United Nations peacekeepers to Somalia to
augment a 500 man Pakistani Force already authorized. Due to
delays resulting from the opposition of local warlords, the
Pakistani troops did not enter Mogadishu until 10 November
1992. The security situation in Somalia grew progressively
worse. In November, a ship laden with relief supplies was
fired upon in the Mogadishu Harbor, forcing it to withdraw
before supplies could be unloaded. The United Nations Center
for Disease Control estimated that 40 per cent of the
population of the city of Baidoa starved to death in the
months between August and the end of November.41 The media
was filled with images of starving Somalis and armed
"technicals" (trucks and other wheeled vehicles with mounted
crew served weapons) patrolling the streets of Mogadishu.
On 21 November 1992, the National Security Council
recommended to President Bush that the United States intervene
in Somalia. The State Department proposed to incrementally
increase the U.S. political and military presence in Somalia
while General Collin Powell supported a decisive military-
political intervention.42 The President opted for the
stronger option. Twelve days later the United Nations passed
U.N. Resolution 794, which provided that the United States
lead and provide forces to a multinational coalition, known as
United Task Force (UNITAF), to restore order in Southern
Somalia so that relief supplies could be distributed.
Significant in the resolution was its reference to Chapter VII
enforcement provisions of the U.N. Charter and its language
concerning the use of force to establish a secure environment
for the distribution of relief supplies. President Bush
publicly announced the initiation of Operation Restore Hope
under the terms of U.N. Resolution 794 on 4 December.
Commander in Chief United States Central Command
(USCINCCENT), General Joseph P. Hoar USMC, whose Unified
Command area included Somalia, appointed Lieutenant General
Robert Johnston of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I
MEF) to command the Joint Task Force (JTF or JTF Somalia).
The Central Command's (CENTCOM) mission statement clearly
established the objectives and end state desired:
When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will conduct joint/combined
military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea
ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide
open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for
convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NG0's in
providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. Upon
establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief
operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations
to UN peacekeeping forces.43
The Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit (ATU) and its marines were
the force readily available and chosen to conduct the entry
operation. The ATU's three ships and marines were in the
Indian Ocean, en route to the Persian Gulf for previously
scheduled training operations. They were diverted to Somalia
on 26 November and arrived off the coast of Mogadishu in the
evening of 1 December, setting the stage for Operation Restore
Hope.
President Bush's Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador
Robert B. Oakley, met with the two most powerful clan leaders
in Mogadishu, Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohammed, on
7 and 8 December, to enlist their cooperation in assuring that
the arrival of United States forces went unopposed. He
impressed upon both leaders the massive fire power that the
United States had used so effectively in Operation Desert
Storm. Both leaders agreed to use Mogadishu's radio station
and their political-clan organizations to urge people to
remain clear of the port and airport. They also agreed to
attend a follow on meeting with Ambassador Oakley, Lieutenant
General Johnston, and the U.N. Ambassador Ismatt Kittan on 11
December.44 Marines and Navy Seals from the Tripoli ATU went
ashore at the Mogadishu International Airport and port
facility with little to no opposition the morning of 9
December. By days end the port, airport, and former American
Embassy compound were in American hands.
Special Envoy Oakley, Lieutenant General Johnston, and
U.N. Ambassador Kittan met with Aideed, Ali Mahdi, and their
delegations in the Conoco compound, Mogadishu, on 11 December.
After a two hour closed session Aideed and Ali Mahdi called
for the U.S. and U.N. representatives to witness the signing
of a cease-fire agreement.45 One of the most important tenets
of the agreement called for the movement of 60 technicals out
of Mogadishu into designated cantonments. The agreement
between Aideed and Ali Mahdi and the presence of the 15th
MEU(SOC) in Mogadishu stabilized the situation enough to
permit the continued airlift of JTF Somalia personnel into
Mogadishu International Airport and allowed the Marines to
focus on securing the countryside.
On 15 December Special Envoy Oakley met with community
leaders in Baidoa, the heart of the famine belt. His mission
was to defuse potential resistance to a Marine heliborne air
lift into the city, scheduled for 16 December, and to lay the
groundwork for the revival of local political institutions.
Assured that the Marines came in peace and as friends to help
the Somali people, the air lift went off with out resistance.
Within three weeks, Baidoa was no longer a city in danger.
Mass starvation, disease, and the heavy fighting were over.
Markets and streets that had been deserted for months were
once again active. The UNITAF actions in Baidoa became the
model for future operations in Somalia. Advance teams
consisting of a political officer and UNITAF military
representative would meet with a broad cross section of the
local population to explain the UNITAF objectives and
encourage local leaders to come forward.46 Ambassador Oakley
described the strategy, "...as far as possible , our purpose
would be achieved by dialogue and co-option, using implicit
threats of coercion to buttress requests for cooperation among
the factions and with UNITAF."47 Repeating this pattern,
UNITAF forces spread out through Somalia, establishing nine
separate Humanitarian Relief Sectors (see figure 4) to
coordinate the local military, political, and relief
activities. By March 1993, Somalia was no longer on the brink
of starvation and much of the intra-clan fighting had stopped.
Banditry, though reduced, still presented a problem for relief
organizations.
Click here to view image
While a relatively modest combined force kept the
hinterlands secure, UNITAF built up the JTF headquarters and
fleshed out the Joint Task Force. General Hoar described the
deployment as like going to the moon; everything they needed
had to be brought in or built on site.48 Compounding the
distances involved - 8,000 miles from continental United
States military bases - were problems like a shortage of ramp
space at the Mogadishu airport and the deterioration of the
runway at Baledogle. The port facility at Mogadishu was in a
sorry state as well. It had not been dredged in over two
years, it suffered from limited berthing space, and sunken
vessels in the port and near its entrance presented hazards to
navigation. The first Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)
ship to enter the port brushed the bottom as it entered the
channel. Three army prepositioning ships arrived off the
coast of Mogadishu but were unable to enter the port or
accomplish an "in-stream" offload because of rough seas. Two
of the ships never offloaded their cargo in Somalia.49
The JTF Somalia Headquarters was built around the I MEF
staff which added a Marine flavor to the operation but aided
in the cohesion of the operation. Ambassador Oakley and his
teams worked closely with the JTF staff and met several times
a week to synchronize the military and political campaign.50
To deal with the multitude of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) at work
in-country, the JTF established the Civil-Military Operations
Center (CMOC). So successful was the concept that a CMOC was
established in each of the nine Humanitarian Relief
Districts.51 Multinational contingents began to arrive in
Mogadishu in early December. Some contingents arrived
unexpectedly and others without any meaningful sustainment
capability. On 18 December, the JTF established the Coalition
Forces Support Team (CFST) to meet the large number of
Coalition units arriving in-country. The CFST was tasked with
settling the units and getting them into action with as little
difficulty and as quickly as possible.52
In early February the Tripoli ATU and the Marines of the
15th MEU were relieved of their UNITAF responsibilities. The
ships then left for the Persian Gulf to continue with their
planned deployment. During their two months in theater the
ATU and 15th MEU(SOC) accomplished the following: (1) they
gained entry into Somalia and secured the airport and port in
Mogadishu allowing the fly-in and build-up of the JTF; (2) the
USS Tripoli (LPH-10) served as the primary hospital facility
in Somali-treating U.S. forces, Somali nationals, and news
correspondents; (3) the 15th MEU Air Combat Element (ACE)
helicopters provided the primary assault support services for
all of UNITAF; and (4) the 15th MEU Ground Combat Element
(GCE), working in conjunction with Belgian, French, and
Italian forces, provided a secure environment throughout the
most of southern Somalia, giving the JTF time to build up its
forces and permitting the delivery of badly needed relief
supplies.
By March 1993, General Hoar felt that UNITAF forces had
succeeded in the assigned mission.53 Starvation was no longer
a major problem and security was sufficient to allow
transition of the operation to the United Nations. The U.N.
Secretary General did not agree and urged the U.S. to remain
in Somalia until the warlords, bandits, and rival clans that
continued to operate in Somalia could be effectively disarmed.
Disarmament had been excluded from the UNITAF mission
statement because it was thought to be neither realistically
achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of
providing a secure environment for relief operations.54 The
United Nations did not take over relief operations until 4 May
1993.
CHAPTER 6
UNOSOM II (OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE)
United Nations Operation Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was
officially established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 814
on 26 March 1993. The resolution was significant in three
ways: (1) it mandated the first ever United Nations directed
peacekeeping operation under the Chapter VII provisions of the
United Nations Charter, including the requirement to disarm
the Somali clans; (2) it endorsed the goal of rebuilding the
political institutions of Somalia; and (3) it called for the
creation of a stable environment throughout the entire
country, including the Republic of Somaliland (northern
Somalia) which had declared its independence in May 1992.55
These far-reaching objectives went far beyond the more limited
objectives of UNITAF or any other peacekeeping operation ever
attempted by the United Nations. UNOSOM II's mission:
When directed, UN0S0N II Force Command conducts military
operations to consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure
environment for the advancement of humanitarian aid, economic
assistance, and political reconciliation in Somalia.56
UNOSOM II was headed by retired U.S. Navy Admiral
Jonathan Howe, serving as Special Representative of the United
Nations Secretary General. Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik
Bir was appointed as force commander of the U.N. multinational
contingent and U.S. Army Major General Thomas Montgomery was
assigned as his deputy. Initially, the U.S. was to provide
3,000 personnel to fill primarily logistics billets. However,
the U.S. was also asked to provide an 800 member quick-
reaction force (QRF) that would operate under the tactical
control of the Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia. The QRF was
made up of a light infantry battalion, an attack helicopter
battalion, and an assault helicopter battalion from the 10th
Mountain Division.57
The United Nations contingent felt that the hand-off
between UNITAF and UNOSOM II could have been handled better.58
In ADM Howe's opinion, "The effort was not done in bad faith.
UNITAF viewed Somalia through their mission and was under
external pressure to get their people home."59 When ADM Howe
arrived in Mogadishu on 17 March 1993 he watched the Navy
Construction Battalion (CBs) in their final stages of packing
out to leave Mogadishu. He commented to his staff that these
were just the type of assets that UNOSOM II would need in
order to tackle their more extensive mandate, adding, "How
come we're losing them?"60 From the UNITAF side, Ambassador
Oakley felt that transition could have gone smoother as well.
Boutros-Ghahli had promised LtGen Johnston 30 to 40 Untied
Nations military planners since January 1993 to work the
details of the transition with the UNITAF staff. The planners
would never show.61
UNOSOM II took a series of decisive actions to
demonstrate that it had the situation in Somalia under control
during the first week of its mandate. These included show of
force operations in Mogadishu and the southern port city of
Kismayu as well as letters of warning to various troublesome
factional leaders.62 Tensions began to mount between the
faction leaders and the United Nations. However, the UNOSOM
II headquarters was neither organized or equipped to function
as a battle staff. Further complicating matters was the
unique command and control arrangement of the U.S. forces that
was designed to keep U.S. forces firmly under U.S. operational
control, to reduce the visibility of U.S. combat forces -at
the time the only credible combat power in Mogadishu, and to
eliminate any misrepresentation that those forces were under
the command of the United Nations.63 ADM Howe was concerned
by the various levels of training and willingness of the
various coalition contingents to participate in peace
enforcement.64 The coalition force assembled was mostly a
peacekeeping force send to do a peacemaking job.65 For
example, the departing Marines briefed the arriving UNOSOM II
Pakistani contingent that they would need to continue
patrolling the streets of Mogadishu at night, and to continue
to maintain contact with the Aideed's people. The Pakistanis
would do neither.66
UNOSOM II and Aideed immediately got off to a bad start
due to Aideed's distrust of the United Nations and UNOSOM II's
distrust of Aideed. The United Nation's attempt to
marginalize Aideed would ultimately threaten his Mogadishu
power base and lead to open conflict. In May 1993, Aideed
made an overture to UNOSOM II to hold a conference concerning
disarming the three factions vying for military control of
Galcayo.67 Galcayo was just north of the UNOSOM II area of
operation and represented the largest cache of arms outside of
Mogadishu. UNOSOM II and Aideed could not agree on rules for
the conference and in early June Aideed and some 200
representatives of rival clan factions met in Mogadishu
without UNOSOM II to sign a peace accord. The agreement
called for a commitment to peace but proclaimed the intent of
allied clan factions to work outside UNOSOM II channels. It
also called for an early departure of UNOSOM II. UNOSOM
called the conference unauthorized and questioned the
legitimacy of the peace agreement.68 On 5 June, the day after
the peace conference, Pakistani troops, searching for arms
caches, found the transmitter to Aideed's Mogadishu radio
station. Word incorrectly spread through Mogadishu that the
Pakistanis had captured the radio station. They were ambushed
as they attempted to return to base.69 In the day's fighting
24 Pakistani soldiers were killed. Aideed claimed that UNOSOM
was attempting to shut down the only alternative voice to the
United Nations in Somalia. The United Nations Security
Council passed Resolution 837 on 7 June which called for the
immediate apprehension of all those responsible for the
deaths. After a week of failed attempts at diplomacy with
Aideed, Admiral Howe ordered air strikes on Aideed
strongholds. U.N. forces launched into an unprecedented and
unsuccessful five month manhunt for the clan leader.
The U.S. QRF became the force of choice for the man-hunt.
Commander U.S. Forces Somalia, MGEN Montgomery, asked the
national command authority for armor to augment the
capabilities of the QRF. His request was denied. Within days
of Aideed attack ADM Howe requested special forces to aid in
the search for Aideed feeling that it was crucial to move
against Aideed quickly.70 Task Force Ranger was eventually
flown into Somalia in late August to assist the QRF in the
man-hunt. ADM Howe continued overtures to Aideed throughout
the summer to work out some sort of arrangement that would
meet the requirements of U.N. Resolution 637.71 Aideed
refused.
The U.S. quick-reaction forces and then Task Force Ranger
played a cat and mouse game with Aideed forces that lasted
throughout the summer. Violence between Somali factions and
UNOSOM II coalition escalated as well. Mortar attacks, sniper
attacks, and armed confrontations became weekly, then daily
occurrences. As the chances for armed clashes increased many
coalition members backed away from their assigned missions.
In the late summer Colonel Gary Anderson, serving as military
assistant to Ambassador Gasende, spoke with the commanding
officer of the Pakistani contingent concerning their refusal
to participate in a large scale military sweep of Mogadishu.
The general told Col Anderson, "I have come to the conclusion
that it is better to talk than to fight."72 Parallel lines of
authority developed around the already vague UNOSOM II chain
of command as national contingents sought guidance from their
respective capitals.73 The Italians were especially
troublesome to ADM Howe as they began working on their own
agenda without UNOSOM knowledge or permission.74 Tensions
continued to rise between factional leaders and the United
Nations. Aideed's Mogadishu based radio station stepped up
its anti-colonial rhetoric appealing to the xenophobic and
nationalist tenancies of the Somalis.
On 3 October 1993, during a daytime raid on a suspected
Aideed hideout in Mogadishu, two Task Force Ranger helicopters
were shot down. The lightly armed Rangers were unable to
fight their way out and members of the QRF were sent in to
extract them. In the ensuing battle 18 Army Rangers were
killed. The American public was outraged by the Task Force
Ranger incident. President Clinton faced strong public and
congressional opposition to continued U.S. support of UNOSOM
II. Several congressional leaders called for the immediate
withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Somalia and for the firing
of Defense Secretary Les Aspin. The President was able to
extend the presence of U.S. forces in Somalia until 31 March
1994, but Secretary Aspin was eventually forced to resign.
His handling of U.S. actions in Somalia was partly to blame
for his departure.
As part of the deal with Congress to keep American troops
in Somalia through March 1994 the administration was forced to
rethink its policies concerning the employment of U.S. troops
and dealing with Aideed. Aideed's stature increased as a
result of the UNOSOM II actions against him. Now considered a
populist hero in Baghdad, Tehran, and Khartom, the once
anonymous clan leader was internationally known.75
Ironically, an American military aircraft transported Aideed
to Ethiopia in December, 1993 to attend a U.N. sponsored peace
conference.76 Operation Quickdraw, in March 1994, was the
last stage of America's pull-out of Somalia and ended the
nation's direct support of UNOSOM II until Operation United
Shield in February and March, 1995. President Clinton,
welcoming returning troops of the 10th Mountain Division to
Fort Drum, New York, thanked the soldiers for their efforts
and told them, "We cannot rebuild other peoples' societies.
You have given them a chance to seize their own future."77
CHAPTER 7
OPERATION UNITED SHIELD
The events of October 1993 and the withdrawal of United
States combat forces from Somalia greatly weakened U.S. and
world support for UNOSOM II. While spending nearly two
million dollars a day United Nations peacekeeping efforts
languished and coalition forces retreated into increasingly
smaller areas of Mogadishu.78 Somali farmers enjoyed record
harvests, but in the streets of Mogadishu the peace was
withering away. Kidnappings, snipings, looting and theft were
commonplace. Somalis and peacekeepers exchanged gunfire
regularly. Having lost control of Mogadishu, the United
Nations decided to end UNOSOM II by 31 March 1995. In several
isolated incidents, Somalis formerly employed by the U.N. took
hostages to secure back wages. NGOs began to refuse to
deliver relief supplies and were eventually asked to leave
Somalia by UNOSOM II officials for their own safety in January
1995. Slowly, Somalia was returning to the chaos of 1992.
On 16 December 1994, Deputy Defense Secretary John Deutch
announced that President Clinton agreed to send the Essex
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 3,000 Marines from the 13th
MEU(SOC) to protect the last of the United Nations peace
keepers as they withdraw.79 In addition to providing cover
for the United Nations Troops, the Marines were tasked with
laying claim to the millions of dollars worth of United States
military hardware that remained in Somalia when the U.S.
military pulled out in March 1994. Included were two OH-58
scout helicopters, five AH-1 attack helicopters, 30 M-60
tanks, and 75 armored personnel carriers.80 ADM William
Owens, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that
he hoped that the U.S. force would be strong and visible
enough to discourage anyone from starting trouble. He further
added, "It would be unwise for anyone to interfere with this
operation, so our hope would be that the amount of resistance
would be very limited."81
In its final form, Operation United Shield evolved into a
multinational task force headed by Marine Lieutenant General
Anthony Zinny, Commander I MEF. The Essex ARG was augmented
by a Special Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTAF) aboard
the USS Belleau Wood, and ships and soldiers from seven
nations. Following the lead of operations in Restore Hope,
David Shinn of the State Department led a political/military
team to Mogadishu in late January to meet with Aideed and Ali
Mahdi to obtain assurances from the Mogadishu based leaders
that they would remain clear of United Shield forces.82 By 22
February 1995, Combined Task Force United Shield had massed 23
ships, 80 aircraft, and 14,000 troops off the coast of
Mogadishu and was prepared to conduct an operation of
"overwhelming force" should the Somalis choose to interfere
with the extraction. In addition to their traditional
military training, elements within the Special MAGTAF were
trained in the use of several "less than lethal" weapons to
defuse potential problems with minimal bloodshed. Included in
the Marine's less than lethal arsenal were rubber bullets, 12-
gauge wood plugs, bean bag ammunition, three types of pepper
spray, stinger and stun grenades, and a sticky foam gun
developed by Sandia National Laboratories.83 U.S. and Italian
Marines went ashore in force in Mogadishu at midnight 28
February with no resistance. Three days later the withdrawal
of the remaining 2400 Pakistani peacekeepers was complete and
the United Shield forces returned to their ships. Somalia was
returned to the Somalis to find their own destiny.
CHAPTER 8
LESSONS LEARNED
Ends, Ways, and Means
Perhaps it is still too early to fully judge whether or
not the efforts of 26 months will have any impact on ending
the anarchy in Somalia. But consider that Somalia still has
no popularly backed central government. The clan leaders,
warlords, and bandits continue in place and are no closer to
agreement on power sharing than they were in 1991. Large
quantities of arms remain in Somalia and are still disbursed
throughout the populace. The situation which pushed Somalia
into anarchy in 1990/91 has changed little.
The ultimate failure to rebuild Somalia from the ground
up resulted from a mismatch of ends, ways, and means. The
ways - the armed forces, diplomatic efforts, and NGOs/PVOs-
were the policy tools. The means or resources to achieve the
"ends," were the willingness of the nation or collection of
nations such as the United Nations community, to bear the
financial cost, the human costs, and/or the cost in time to
achieve the ends. The ultimate "ends" of the entire UNITAF
and UNOSOM II effort was the U.N.'s widest reaching operation
ever. UNITAF was tasked to provide a secure environment for
the distribution of relief supplies. UNOSOM II was mandated
to remedy the causes of the Somali conflict, to rebuild the
nation in the eyes of the United Nations. The objectives were
vaguely defined, the reach very ambitious, and its results
difficult to measure. Though many of UNOSOM II's headaches
were solvable operational problems, there existed a more
serious weakness. Former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, T. Frank
Crigler referred to this weakness,
... perhaps fatal flaw lies in the very concept of peace
enforcement, the notion that peace can be imposed on a reluctant
and notoriously proud people at gunpoint and that the social
fabric of their nation can be rewoven at the direction of
outsiders.84
The ways to achieve an end must be balanced to suite the
situation. Reduced to its most simple form, the commanders of
Restore Hope and Continue Hope had the armed forces, the
political apparatus, and the NGOs and PVOs at there disposal
to achieve their prescribed end states. There is probably no
one "correct" balance that would have been successful for both
operations, nor one balance that, unchanged, would have worked
throughout either operation.
LtGen Johnston's and Ambassador Oakley's blending of the
military and political tools was key to the successful entry
of the Marines into Somalia and the quick expansion into
southern Somalia by the coalition forces. They were extremely
successful in sending the message that UNITAF was in Somalia
to help, but would, given the provocation, use what ever force
was required to ensure their safety. Ambassador Oakley
ensured that UNITAF did not enter into, or was not manipulated
into entering inter and intra clan disputes.85 UNITAF
sponsored, but did not referee conferences, meetings, and
other dealings between the Somalis. Their reading of the
Somali psyche and culture was right on target. Having
established themselves as a credible force, UNITAF was then
able to begin the distribution of relief supplies with
military assets. With the establishment of a secure
environment" UNITAF was able to turn more and more
distribution over to the NGOs, who were escorted by military
assets.
Working in UNITAF's favor were several factors: 1) the
preponderance of the armed forces were well trained and well
equipped combat troops; 2) a fairly unified military command
structure; 3) a clearly stated and achievable set of goals;
and 4) time. The first three will be addressed in detail
latter in this chapter. Time, however, deserves attention at
this juncture. UNITAF opened Operation Restore Hope and
continued in place for five months. During that time great
strides were made to relieve the suffering of the Somali
people. The results were visible to the Somalis as well as to
the people and governments of the participating nations.
Progress, especially quick, measurable progress, is an easy
sell. Considering their accomplishments and their relatively
short time in Somalia, familiarity did not have a chance to
settle into contempt.
UNOSOM II began its operation with the same types of
tools as UNITAF: the armed forces, the political apparatus,
and the NGOs and PVOs. However, UNOSOM II's much broader
mandate was resourced by a smaller coalition force that was
not as well trained or equipped as its predecessor. For the
most part it was a Chapter VI peacekeeping force. The
coalition suffered from a confusing and often times parallel
chain of command. ADM Howe commented that the United Nations
was not prepared for the task of rebuilding Somalia, "The U.N.
bureaucracy was slow and depended heavily on the
idiosyncrasies of countries with their own agendas."86
Because it lacked the robust force of its predecessor, UNOSOM
II was unable to keep the same tight reigns on the clan
leaders of Mogadishu. Social rebuilding programs suffered
from a lack of qualified personnel to make run them. For
example, the effort to rebuild Somalia's police and judicial
system was staffed by only two people and would not receive
extensive funding until August 1993.87 By then it was too
late for a rebuilt Somali police force to make a real
difference. ADM Howe's requests for specific military assets
were generally denied or delayed.88 Not properly resourced,
the probability for the success of UNOSOM II's mission was
greatly reduced.
Time also played a crucial role in the United Nations'
operation. At the time UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF,
foreign forces had been on Somali soil for five months.
Starvation and disease had been abated and there was a record
harvest on the way. The question of personal survival no
longer an issue, the Somalis, especially those in Mogadishu,
looked upon what Somalia extremist rhetoric called an
occupation or colonial force and began to ask, "What can you
do for us now?" The much more difficult tasks of rebuilding a
nation could not be completed at the rapid pace that UNITAF
had maintained in achieving its more limited objectives.
Progress, in the eyes of the Somalis, had stagnated. And with
time, and help from Aideed and UNOSOM II's ill suited
political policies, the Somalis began to distrust and dislike
the United Nations.
The means to achieve the ends were matched in Operation
Restore Hope but fell woefully short of what was required to
achieve the expanded goals of UNOSOM II in Operation Continue
Hope. Moved to action by the searing media images of the
human suffering in Somalia, the world mobilized behind the
United States and entered Somalia to bring an end the human
catastrophe. Restore Hope's clearly defined and limited
objectives, were quickly achieved by a well organized and
generally well trained coalition military force. By January
1993 there was a dramatic decrease in the number of Somalis
dying from starvation and disease. By March 1993, LtGen
Johnston felt they had accomplished the major task assigned to
the JTF, the establishment of a secure environment for
uninterrupted relief operations. JTF casualties were light
and the supporting nations and their forces could easily
measure the gains from their efforts, time, and money. The
clans, warlords, and bandits had not been disarmed, but that
was never UNITAF's intent. UNITAF, through Ambassador Oakley,
had also aided in Sponsoring peace talks in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, but the implementation of the accords was left to
UNOSOM II.
UNOSOM II's much broader nation building agenda was a
more severe test of the means available. Not only were the
goals of Continue Hope intrinsically more difficult than those
of Restore Hope, but there were few tangible interim measures
by which to gauge the progress of the operation. Whether
mulled into a false sense of security by the ease with which
UNITAF had completed its mission, or by just plain arrogance
the United Nations and the United States assumed that they
would quickly solve the riddle of nation building in Somalia.
As the summer progressed, the United Nations spent nearly two
million dollars a day in Somalia, while clan leaders,
warlords, and bandits became increasingly bold in countering
coalition forces. Coalition and Somali casualties became
increasingly high but little progress in nation building was
realized. In a classic example of Clauswitz's "paradoxical
trinity," the 3 October 1993 Task Force Ranger incident, was
the straw that broke the back of American public support. The
American people seeing no return on the lives and money
already lost in Somalia, and facing the prospect of a very
long term commitment there, forced the American government to
end support of Continue Hope. The member nations of the U.N.,
for the same reasons, eventually followed suite and forced the
United Nations to end its efforts in Somalia.
Mohammed Farah Aideed
No one person more exemplifies the difficulty in
understanding and dealing with the Somali culture than
Mohammed Farah Aideed. UNITAF strove to avoid becoming
involved in the inter and intra clan politics of Somalia.
With the lessons from the United States involvement in the
Lebanese civil war in the forefront of their thinking, the
UNITAF staff felt that backing or creating the perception of
siding with any clan or clan family would be counter
productive if not dangerous to the mission.89 UNOSOM II took
a different bent. They viewed Aideed as the most dangerous of
the many bad actors and attempted to marginalize him.
Describing Aideed, Somali intellectual Anmad Hussein Fidow
said, "The U.N. seems to have forgotten that Aideed isn't just
a person. He represents a clan. When you push down his clan,
other clans come up."90 During a March 1993 interview with
Mark Fineman of The Los Angeles Times, a personal aid to
Aideed related the following in a prophetic interview:
But the moment Aideed senses the U.S. and the U.N. are one, the
moment he believes they are favoring other clans over his, it will
be a very dangerous game to be playing, because its difficult to
be evenhanded in Somalia. If Aideed senses he is being pushed out.
I guarantee you the results will be horrifying.91
Ambassador Oakley considered Aideed to be a powerful man with
higher ambitions of kingmaker or king.92 Aideed described
himself to Ambassador Oakley by saying that he was like Dwight
D. Eisenhower, a great general in wartime and a great
statesman in peacetime.93 In the same March 1993 interview
with Mark Fineman, Aideed made it clear that he had his own
vision for the post-Restore Hope Somalia. His vision did not
include U.S. or U.N. efforts to restructure district or local
governments which he felt would create jealousy among the
groups. He added, "This is our job. They should leave it to
us."94
Aideed's personal desires to govern Somalia and his
distrust for the United Nations were important factors in his
relations with UNOSOM II. Aideed's distrust of the United
Nations began years prior. Both Aideed and rival Ali Mahdi
played key roles in bringing down the Siad Barre regime.
Boutros-Ghali, who was then serving as Egypt's foreign
minister, supported Barre until his fall, and then agreed to
recognize the interim Ali Mahdi government. This sowed the
seeds of Aideed's distrust for Boutros-Ghali and ultimately
the United Nations.
During Restore Hope, UNITAF devoted considerable time to
balancing the power base of the Mogadishu clans. Due to
manpower shortages and the unwillingness of coalition
partners, UNOSOM II did not maintain the same tight control
over Mogadishu.95 But it was UNOSOM II's political actions
against Aideed that started them down a road from which there
was no return.
Once Aideed's forces struck the U.N. ADM Howe and UNOSOM
II found themselves on the horns of a serious dilemma. United
Nations Resolution 637 called for the arrest of those
responsible for the attacks. ADM Howe was concerned about the
message that simply ignoring the attacks would send to the
Somalis, or the impact such a decision would have on future
peacemaking operations.96 He added, "When you are attacked,
viability depends on standing up and being counted."97 The
operation to capture Aideed was a gamble and had to be kept
narrow in order to reconcile others.98 ADM Howe felt that
time was key and that capturing or isolating Aideed in June
was UNOSOM II's best chance. His request for specialist
support to capture Aideed was not answered until late August
with the arrival of Task Force Ranger.
The United Nations manhunt for Aideed which followed
ultimately backfired, permanently tarnishing the efforts of
UNOSOM II. In attacking Aideed's arsenals and capturing his
key aides, the United Nations strengthened the position of
Aideed's key rival, Ali Mahdi.99 The United Nations actions
left Aideed fighting a desperate battle to restore his
personal and his clan's organizational, political, and
economic power. The "victim" of a foreigners unjust manhunt,
Aideed was able to play upon the strong nationalistic and
xenophobic tendencies of the Somali people and become an
underdog hero to the common man. The U.N. effort
unintentionally gave Aideed the "moral high ground." Now
struggling for the life of his clan, Aideed could cast doubt
into the minds of Somali's as to the legitimacy of UNOSOM II-
even in the minds of those who did not support Aideed.
Understanding the nuances of a culture is as important to
the success of a peacemaking operation as it is difficult.
The differences between American and Somali culture were vast.
Ambassador Oakley and the Restore Hope team, working with a
strong military force for relatively limited objectives were
able control the clan military activity maintain the delicate
balance of power between the clans. ADM Howe and UNOSOM II,
working with a less robust military organization for a much
broader set of objectives had less room for error in their
political calculations. Aideed's personal aid said that it is
hard to be evenhanded in Somalia. In such a political climate
a small misstep or loss of control can lead to disaster.
Mission Creep
The United Nations has received much criticism on the
issue of "mission creep," or the desire to have the
participants involved in the operation expand their activities
to include tasks that were neither specified or implied in the
original mission statement. The U.N. pressed UNITAF to
conduct several missions that UNITAF commanders did not
consider to be part of the original scope of their operation.
Missions such as reestablishing a national Somali police force
and expanding operation into the northern part of the country
were generally resisted.100
The criticism leveled at UNOSOM II for allowing or
promoting mission creep is unjustified. UNOSOM II, under U.N.
Resolution 814, was a broad Chapter VII operation. Although
its objectives can be considered vague and wide ranging,
operations under the auspices of Chapter VII are by nature,
peace enforcement. Peace enforcement implies that the forces
may not be in country at the request of local authorities. It
also authorizes the use of force to achieve the desired
objectives which can mean the causing and taking of
casualties. "...forces sent to intervene under U.N. direction
and control in a Chapter VII operation should be
warfighters.."101 The hidden issue is whether or not the
UNOSOM II coalition members had shifted their thought
processes from a Chapter VI mentality to a Chapter VII
mentality. Their reactions to the increasing hostilities in
Mogadishu indicates that they did not. The debate may
continue on the UNOSOM II method of handling Aideed, but the
operation was correctly advertised as a Chapter VII effort.
As ADM Howe suggests, "Nations participating in Chapter VII
operations have to be willing to be shot at and to react."102
... From the Sea
The unqualified success of the TRIPOLI ATU/15th MEU(SOC)
in entering Somalia and securing the Mogadishu airport and
port facility and the support provided by subsequent ARGs and
carrier battle groups, validated the Navy/Marine Corps ... From
the Sea concept. Within days of President Bush's decision to
send U.S. forces into Somalia the ATU was in position,
awaiting only the order to execute the mission. The 15th MEU
(SOC) provided the secure environment required to fly-in the
JTF and begin relief operations. Two carrier battle groups
provided support for UNITAF. In addition to aerial
reconnaissance operations, the carrier air wings provided E-2C
support for helicopters flying inland out of radio range with
amphibious shipping, and the never used, but implied threat of
close air support aircraft. UNOSOM II was aided by the
several ARGs which assisted in various efforts including night
air operations over Mogadishu. The Essex ARG and SPMAGTAF
aboard the Belleau Wood safely extracted the final remnants of
UNOSOM II. Making use of heavily defended interior Lines of
Communication (LOCs) to amphibious shipping waiting just four
miles off the shore, the force provided the flexibility and
strength to extract the United Nations contingent. No other
force would have conducted such a clean and rapid withdrawal
from a potentially dangerous situation.
Clarity of Mission
The key to the success of any operation is "...the
formulation of a clear and precise mission statement which
defines measurable and attainable objectives..."1O3 General
Hoar's mission statement focused UNITAF on a set of clearly
defined goals and provided JTF Somalia with a well defined and
obtainable end state. The UNOSOM II mission statement was not
as clear. Broader in scope than UNITAF's mission, the UNOSOM
mission offered fewer quantifiable measures of success and was
more open to interpretation. An inadequate appreciation by
planners for their potential advisory, coupled with the ever
increasing scope of nation building, lead to the deepening
involvement of U.S. forces in combat operations."104 Without
a clear set of quantifiable goals the American people began to
perceive the operation as a futile waste of money. A
misunderstanding of the potentials of Chapter VII operations
lead to charges of mission creep and further lack of
confidence in the operation which ultimately led to the
withdrawal of American forces from Somalia.
Command Structure
UNITAF was a distinctly American operation. The staff
was built around a well-formed central nucleus which lent a
continuity of relationships and procedures that was critical
to such a large operation. Considering the multi-national
make up of the force a remarkable degree of unity of command
was achieved. Much of that owes to the fact that the
commanders of most of the major contingents met with CENTCOM
personnel and agreed to the command and control structure and
rules of engagement prior to becoming attached to the JTF.
Additionally, CENTCOM headquarters retained approval authority
and screened each offer of assistance to ensure that
contributors were willing to adhere to American operational
control (OPCON) and rules of engagement (ROE).105 UNITAF also
strove to create a reasonable span of control in the command
structure. Preferring brigade sized units that could be given
mission-type orders, smaller contingents were combined or
folded into larger units. Figure 5 is a graphic depiction of
the UNITAF command and control structure in the that
operations final stages.
Parallel lines of command and control were typically
avoided because the contingents had signed up to the American
operation before arriving in-country, and the distinct lack of
Somali resistance to UNITAF.106 Parallel lines of control
Click here to view image
Source: Kenneth Allard, Colonel US Army, Somalia Operations:
Lessons Learned, Fort McNair, Washington DC: National
Defense University Press, January 1995.
refers to the existence of the established command
relationship between a contingent and UNITAF and the
unofficial command relationship between a contingent and its
home government. This second relationship reflects more the
desires of the home state and can be counter productive to the
overall effort of the JTF.
UNOSOM II did not share UNITAF's well-formed nucleus.
The staff was brought together incrementally from the
voluntary contributions of the multi-national contingents as
they arrived. Parallel lines of command and control were
built into the structure from the outset. MG Montgomery,
Deputy UNOSOM II, was also dual-hatted as Commander United
States Forces Somalia (USFORSOM). As USFORSOM, MG Montgomery
was a Combatant Command (COCOM) of CENTCOM and OPCON to UNOSOM
II. When the increasing involvement in the manhunt for Aideed
necessitated the deployment of Task Force Ranger to Somalia
the command and control situation became more complex. Task
Force Ranger, a strategic asset, operated under its own chain
of command that was headed in-country by a U.S. Army major
general and extended directly to CENTCOM, bypassing both
USFORSOM and UNOSOM II. The escalation of violence in the
spring and early summer of 1993 increased the potential for
combat. National contingents that had contributed forces for
a peacekeeping mission became concerned and frequently sought
guidance from their respective capitals before executing even
the most routine tactical orders, opening up the parallel
lines of command and control. In the most striking example of
parallel command and control the Commander of the Italian
contingent opened up separate negotiations with fugitive
leader Aideed with the full approval of the Italian
government. The size of the UNOSOM II staff itself was
inadequate to perform the new, expanded mission of the U.N.
mandate.107 Hampered by this size plus the confusing web of
parallel lines of command and control, the UNOSOM II
headquarters was not organized or equipped to function as a
battle staff.108 Figure 6 is a graphic presentation of the
UNSOM II command and control organization.
Click here to view image
Rules of Engagement (ROE)
ROE are crucial to any employment of force but are more
crucial to peacekeeping operations. In the CNN world, where
every move is broadcast live, an individual solider can be
confronted with a situation which might affect the whole
operation. His decision to shoot, challenge, or simply ignore
the event may have far greater implications.
The UNITAF ROE were sufficient to the task. Though
classified, UNITAF personnel carried an unclassified card
version of the ROE with them at all times.109 UNITAF forces
were given the authority to bring "all necessary force" to
bear when required. Advance State Department teams preceded
UNITAF forces, clearly explained the humanitarian goals of the
operation to the local leaders, and solicited the cooperation
of the local establishment. However, the teams made the
consequences of non-cooperation perfectly clear. The use of
all necessary force by no means meant shoot on sight. LtGen
Johnston directed commanders to challenge and approach
technicals before firing even though the ROE listed technicals
as a threat regardless of their posture.110 Backed by the
demonstration of overwhelming force, challenges were very
successful in UNITAF confiscation efforts and resulted in
minimal casualties to all concerned. Just as important as the
ability to use all required force was the Somali belief that
UNITAF forces would do precisely that when required. The
French Foreign Legion actions at a Mogadishu check point on
the night of 10 December 1992 and the Marine actions against
two technicals and a arms cache on 12 December 1992 left no
doubts as to the UNITAF resolve to use deadly force when
required.
During Restore Hope there were relatively few armed
clashes and the biggest concerns for UNITAF forces were the
possibility of riots and the frequent instances of looting and
petty thievery. The unclassified ROE card's direction read,
"When U.S. forces are attacked by unarmed hostile elements,
mobs and/or rioter, U.S. forces should use the minimum force
necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the
threat."111
After December it became clear to some Somali elements
that the discipline and self-restraint shown by the American
forces could be used to their advantage. Improvised
roadblocks would slow food convoys and children and youths
would rush the convoys stealing food and personal items-
sunglasses being the most popular-from convoy escorts. Two
incidents illustrate the seriousness of the problem. In
January a U.S. Marine shot and killed a Somali youth who had
just stolen his sun glasses. In a similar incident a U.S.
solider shot and killed a Somali youth caring a small box who
rushed a convoy. In the first incident the solder was courts
marshaled and in the second case the charge was dismissed,
based upon legitimate self defense.112 To dissuade this type
of activity among Somali youth the UNITAF forces began to
place barbed wire around convoy vehicles and equip assistant
drivers and passengers with sticks. Riot control agents such
as mace and cayenne pepper spray were eventually approved for
use and proved to be very effective.
Detaining civilians presented a unique challenge to
UNITAF for it had neither the capacity nor the responsibility
to care for large numbers of civilians. The UNITAF force was
not an army of occupation and could not be held accountable
for the health, welfare and safety of the Somali people. The
unclassified ROE card addressed detention as follows,
"Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or
in self-defense."113 In late December a more complete
detainment standard was published as Commander's Policy
Guidance Number 1. It stipulated that detention would only be
authorized for civilians:
1. Suspected of crimes of such a serious nature (such as willful
killing, torture, inhumane treatment, rape willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body and health) that the
failure to detain would be an embarrassment to the United States.
2. Whose release immediately following a hostile encounter would
likely endanger UNITAF forces or persons under the protection of
UNITAF forces.
3. Suspected of a violent crime against UNITAF forces.114
This policy was in keeping with UNITAF's charter under UN
Resolution 794 but petty thieves and trespassers were
routinely removed from the scene of the crime and released.
Even nationals apprehended committing more substantial crimes
slipped through the "system." For example, two Somali's who
were apprehended for committing a rape were detained by a unit
for 24 hours while the unit tried to resolve what was to be
done with the prisoners. In the end both were released.115 To
provide a more effective means of dealing with Somalia's petty
criminals, UNITAF found some former Mogadishu police who were
willing to begin patrolling the streets once more in December.
In January, the United Nations began a program to reconstruct
the Mogadishu police force. Finally, in March, UNITAF
military lawyers made an attempt to revive the local judicial
system. At the time of the hand-off to UNOSOM II in May
little progress had been made in reviving the court system
because of security and facility problems. Concerning legal
authority, the JTF Staff Judge Advocate concluded it was,
"...probably the most difficult political issue we had to deal
with. A satisfactory solution was never reached - each case
was determined in coordination with higher headquarters."116
The UNITAF ROE were left unchanged as UNOSOM II assumed
the peacekeeping responsibilities. The change of mission and
increasing levels of violence resulted in Lieutenant General
Bir amending the ROE with Fragmentary (Frag.) Order 39.
Organized and armed militias, technicals, and other crew
served weapons were threats to UNOSOM II Forces and could be
engaged without provocation.117 The interpretation of Frag.
Order 39 differed between the national contingents. The U.S.
forces stressed an aggressive enforcement while others
preferred a more graduated response before using deadly force.
This provided potential adversaries with a confusing picture
depending on which national contingent they faced. The
inconsistencies could be used to the advantage of a savvy
adversary.
ROE should be kept simple and consistent. Consistency of
enforcement must run across the whole multinational force.
Without a effective local judicial system UNOSOM II was
plagued by petty criminals who were either released
immediately after apprehension or put back on the streets
after a quick trip through the "revolving door" of the Somali
justice system. As clan leaders, warlords, and bandits re-
asserted their power, the Somali police became less and less
effective.
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)
One of the most important and successful innovations of
the UNITAF operation was the CMOC. When UNITAF forces first
arrived in Somalia there were at least 49 different
international agencies at work. These included U.N. agencies,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and humanitarian relief
organizations (HROs). To deal with the plethora of
organizations UNITAF established the CMOC in the JTF
Headquarters. Liaison officers from the American and
multinational forces met, sometimes daily, with the members of
the various organizations to coordinate relief support, convoy
escorts, and the assignment of pier space and port access to
the Port of Mogadishu. As UNITAF forces moved out through
southern Somalia, Ambassador Oakley's teams would set up local
CMOCs in each of the Humanitarian Relief Districts. The JTF
CMOC worked closely with the United Nations Humanitarian
Operations Center allowing for a single focal point for all
relief agencies. CMOC staffs were deliberately kept small to
keep the centers efficient and focused on their mission. The
CMOC would eventually control and issue ID cards for relief
workers, and maintain a data matrix to track the status of
relief supplies.118 Appendix A provides a detailed list of
missions and tasks performed by the CMOC.
Coalition Forces
The UNITAF and UNOSOM II coalitions serve as examples of
the successes and pitfalls of coalition peacekeeping and peace
enforcement operations. In both operations the commanders had
to deal with the integration of multi-national contingents
into a single force. Successful integration requires insight
into the providing nation's political orientation and
cultural, as well as dealing with the challenge of assessing
limitations and capabilities, and integrating often times
incompatible equipment. The preponderance of the UNITAF
coalition was made up of American combat troops. The other
members agreed to United States leadership and ROE prior to
arriving in Mogadishu. The UNOSOM II coalition was more
diverse in makeup, less combat capable, and suffered parallel
lines of authority between contingents and their capitals.
Within days after the JTF Somalia Headquarters
established itself in Mogadishu, multi-national contingents
began to arrive in-country. Some were expected, and others
arrived with little or no notice. Each contingent brought its
own unique strengths and weaknesses, but all had to be melded
into the Task Force. Some arrived with little or no support
or sustainment capability. Others were limited in the
training they had received and the types of missions that they
could perform. Equipment considered basic to most western
militaries simply was not in the inventories of many of the
poorer coalition partners. Still others were limited to
specific missions by their governments.
To promote an organized transition into the UNITAF and
Somalia, the JTF created the Coalition Forces Support Team
(CFST). The CFST was chartered to welcome and orient the
arriving forces and insure they received briefings on ROE,
command and control relationships within and external to
UNITAF, and a description of their duties. Multi-national
contingents were assigned a liaison officer(s) to facilitate
communications between UNITAF and the newly arrived forces.
During their initial indoctrination and settlement the JTF
would evaluate the contingents to assess their potential for
prospective missions. It was up to commanders to play to the
strengths of the various contingents' training and abilities,
while fully understanding any political limitations placed
upon each contingent by its government. The bottom line was
to never put a contingent commander into a position where he
or she would have to say no or worse, to fail at a mission
that was beyond their capability.119
The UNOSOM II coalition was less robust than its
predecessor. The forces were more akin to those typically
provided for peacekeeping operations. As the probability for
armed conflict with the Somalis increased many coalition
contingents backed away from their assigned missions. Relying
increasing on parallel lines of command to their capitals
coalitions would conferee with their governments before taking
on UNOSOM II assigned missions. The Italian government
disagreed with UNOSOM II's handling of Aideed and directed its
contingent to open negotiations with him without notifying
UNOSOM II. The political divisions within the coalition and
unwillingness or inability to participate in combat operations
crippled the UNOSOM II forces ability to conduct Chapter VII
operations.
Intelligence
Prior to November 1992, Somalia had been a low
intelligence priority. With the collapse of the USSR and
cessation of the Cold War, American interest in the Horn of
Africa had waned. Though the nation kept track of Somalia's
slide into anarchy, it was preoccupied with the situation in
the Persian Gulf. The decision to enter Somalia in November
1992 required a rapid shift in resources to create a new data
base and build a new architecture.120 After the evacuation of
the U.S. Embassy in January 1991, little was done to update
the intelligence data base concerning the state of the
Mogadishu port facility and airport, and the former military
airfield at Baledogle. It remained for the U.S. forces to
determine the status of these facilities upon their
occupation.
Initially, American forces relied on technology based
systems as there was little human intelligence (HUMINT)
available. Navy F-14s from the Ranger Carrier Battle Group
(CBG) equipped with the tactical airborne reconnaissance pod
system (TARPS) provided timely, high quality imagery to U.S.
forces prior to and immediately after D-day.121 TARPS was
especially effective because it provided good, timely
information on the small units involved in the low intensity
conflict (LIC) encountered in Somalia. National imagery could
not provide American forces with the quality or timeliness of
information that they required. Additionally, UNITAF
intelligence personnel were given the original negative rolls
from TARPS flights, allowing them to accurately exploit the
imagery and produce high resolution select prints.122
HUMINT later proved to be the most valuable intelligence
resource in Somalia.123 Initially, many units felt that they
were hampered in their operations by a lack of "cultural
understanding."124 Personnel would have felt more comfortable
and been more effective if they had received a comprehensive
briefing on Somali history and culture. Counter intelligence
(CI) and interrogator translator team (ITT) personnel were
combined into HUMINT collection teams (HCT) and HUMINT
exploitation teams (HET) who focused on gathering intelligence
against gangs and their leaders; headquarters and hangouts;
weapons cashes and arms markets; and factional/clan leaders
and their territorial boundaries. As the effort matured, the
HUMINT collection teams shifted their focus of effort to key
elders and leaders of the community, police forces, leaders
and headquarters; and to civic systems such as courts,
schools, and public utilities.125
Linguists and interpreters proved invaluable to the
HUMINT teams, especially as teams left the Mogadishu area and
encountered fewer Somalis who spoke English. There was not a
large reservoir of Somali speaking military linguists to
choose from so the JTF developed procedures for hiring locals
to act as interpreters.126 Interpreters served in a variety of
intelligence and non-intelligence roles. Teams found it
advantageous to have Somalis from different clans available
for use. Interpreters not associated with the particular
target clan were less likely to be tainted by the clan "party
line" and more likely to provide the HUMINT teams with
accurate information. Lack of interpreters was frequently
identified as a problem with all units operating in Somalia.127
There was also a misunderstanding about the difference between
general interpreters and those screened and provided by higher
headquarters for intelligence collection. This often resulted
in HUMINT teams being assigned to general interpreter duties
vice intelligence collection.128
The dissemination of intelligence presented several
problems in Somalia. Somalia's communications infrastructure
had been completely destroyed by the years of civil war and
UNITAF had to re-build the architecture from the ground up.
CENTCOM would eventually establish a Intelligence Support
Element (ISE) staffed solely by American personnel to provide
a dissemination focal point.129 The exclusively American staff
was necessary because U.S. law requires that intelligence be
disseminated only through channels which are under exclusive
American control. Because both UNITAF and UNOSOM II were
multi-national operations, guidelines were established to
protect U.S. sources and methods. The guidelines generally
permitted the timely flow of information but always presented
a potential gauntlet. Dissemination was also hampered simply
by the lack of copying machines and the machines poor
performance in the harsh Somali environment.130 UNOSOM II's
assumption of duties further complicated the information
dissemination problem because much of the command element
staff - including the commanding general - and most of the
forces were now foreign nationals. General Montgomery and the
ISE were kept busy guarding sensitive collection methods and
sources while trying to keep General Bir fully appraised of
the intelligence picture.
Logistics
Overall Restore Hope and succeeding operations can be
judged as a logistics success. During Restore Hope, 986
airlift missions moved over 33,000 passengers and more than
32,000 short tons of cargo into Somalia. Eleven ships,
including five fast sealift vessels, moved 365,000 measurement
tons of cargo into theater as well as 1,192 containers of
relief supplies. Over 14 million gallons of fuel were
delivered from Ready Reserve Force tankers to the forces
ashore.131 Even with these great successes, Restore Hope was
not without its logistics problems. In contingencies there is
a tendency for everyone to consider themselves of such
importance that they need to be in-country first. In the
corollary, higher rank translates into higher precedence for
arriving in-country. Somalia was like any other contingency
in this matter but the austere conditions exacerbated the
problem. The National Defense University recommended that the
JTF be organized into headquarters modules, each with its
associated logistics and communications, so they could be
deployed in-country in successive stages.132 In the haste to
establish the JTF headquarters in Mogadishu the deployment of
logistics personnel "transportation through-putters," was
delayed. These specialist would have quickened the whole
deployment effort had they been sent into Somalia sooner.
Maritime Propositioning Force (MPF) shipping and Fast
Sealift ships quickly arrived off the cost of Mogadishu to
find the that the port could initially accommodate only one
MPF ship and was too small for Fast Sealift shipping. The
surface conditions prohibited an in-stream off-load in
Mogadishu. The southern Somali port of Kismayu offered the
little more to the Fast Sealift ships who would eventually
off-load in Mombassa, Kenya. The use of Mogadishu port
resulted in the possibility of MPF ships being placed directly
into the line of enemy fire. The JTF Chief of Staff said the
port was secure but not benign and MPF shipping was allowed
pierside.133 This appeared to violate the requirement for a
benign MPF facility but facilitated the rapid off-loading of
MPF assets where and when they were needed. Three of the MPF
ships that off-loaded in Mogadishu had not been through the
MPF maintenance cycle since their employment in Southwest
Asia.134 Because of this there were some shortfalls in various
classes of supply and ammunition. Assault amphibious vehicles
(AAVs) were without radios or feed trays for weapons. The MPF
ships were a valuable asset but not the "shining jewel" they
could have been. One last major concern about MPF assets was
their final destination. The JTF arrived by air lift and
required substantial supply from MPF assets.135 Not considered
in the original planning, this posed an immediate supply
allocation problem.
Data differences caused problems with Time-Phased Force
Deployment Data (TPFDD) during Restore Hope and UNOSOM II.
TPFDD is built around Unit Line Numbers but the Army organize
much of their accounting data around Unit Identity Codes and
Unit Type Codes. Because the codes do not match there was
difficulty in manipulating data and ensuring that units were
provided with the proper amount of space aboard airlift.136
ARCENT forces allowed subordinate units to make changes to the
TPFDD, the rationale being that the units would be able to
fine tune the data base for efficiency. Instead the
subordinate commands made wholesale changes to the data base
causing substantial confusion. The TPFDD still continues to
baffle many of the users.
Coalition members arrived at Restore Hope and UNOSOM II
requiring various degrees of logistics support. However,
legal restrictions prohibit the military from giving away DoD
supplies and services, even to coalition members. To meet
this need a system was pieced together that relied on a
variety of techniques, including foreign military sales cases,
cross-serving agreements, and special agreements under the
Foreign Assistance Act.137 Defense attaches and coalition
liaison officers were invaluable aids to this patch-work
system. The system ultimately worked though it could be slow
and cumbersome. CENTCOM has since sent in draft legislation,
supported by the DoD, which would greatly enhance coalition
logistics operations in the future.
Training and Professionalism
Peace operations in Somalia show how the training and
professionalism of the soldier, airman, sailor, and marine is
basic to everything a military force does.138 Supplemental
training is a great idea but most forces sent to Somalia
received little supplemental training. It was their basic
qualifications as war fighters that enabled the peacekeepers to
successfully complete the often complex and occasionally
dangerous tasks that they were assigned. Lacking a keen
cultural insight, peacekeepers relied on common sense and
discipline to avoid embarrassing and potentially harmful
situations. Overall, American service personnel shone in
Somalia, demonstrating the discipline, knowledge, flexibility,
and resolve to accomplish most any task assigned.
Military-Media Relations
Other than the DoD sponsored media circus surrounding the
Marines and Navy SEALS coming ashore in Mogadishu on 9
December 1992, the military and the media seemed to have
buried their hatchet.139 Opening up all aspects of the
operation to the media, the press generally responded with
fair and accurate reporting. The operation's public affairs
officer, Colonel Fred Peck, U.S. Marine Corps was in theater
before the operation began. He escorted members of the press
aboard the USS Tripoli on 8 December for what was to become
the norm for Operation Restore Hope, a complete briefing on
the next morning's assault by the 15th MEU(SOC) Commander and
Commander, Amphibious Squadron 3. After the briefing they
were flown to the various ships of the ATU where they would
join up with units going ashore the next morning. The media
were asked only that they delay the release of their stories
until the landing was in progress.140 The media received
unprecedented logistical support throughout Restore Hope.
Support included transportation, operational briefings,
assistance in filing stories, and the occasional meal or
aspirin. Troops and journalists alike quickly learned who had
a reputation for professionalism and fairness.
CHAPTER 9
FUTURE OPERATIONS
For the immediate future, the nation seems less likely to
become involved in large scale peacekeeping operations which
are not seen as being in the national interests. When ethnic
violence boiled over in Rwanda, resulting in hundreds of
thousands of deaths and millions of refugees, the U.S. sent in
relief supplies with Air Force transport aircraft and a small
contingent of Marines from the Tripoli ARG to cover the exodus
of American Embassy personnel. The nation would not, however,
commit troops to security or peacekeeping operations. It was
up to the French and neighboring African nations to provide
those forces. The U.S. is currently involved in a large scale
nation building exercise in Haiti which the Clinton
administration deemed to be in our national interests.
The Republican congressional majority, elected in
November 1994, is pushing a platform of reforms in its
Contract with America which includes mandates that U.S. forces
not be allowed to serve under a United Nations commander and
that the United States reduce its share of the U.N.
peacekeeping budget. In December 1994, national security
advisor Anthony Lake toured Africa spreading the word that
U.S. aid money will be in tighter supply in the future.141 On
5 January 1995, Boutros-Ghali called for governments to set up
a rapid-action force under U.N. command to respond to
peacekeeping emergencies and U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Madeleine K. Albright rebuffed the idea saying, "If
there were such a force, it would never be tailored quite
right."142 The eternal optimist, Secretary General Boutros-
Ghali, addressing a world conference on peacekeeping in March
1995 stated, "..that unless there is the political will among
the protagonist of a dispute to solve it by themselves, the
U.N. cannot impose a solution."143
Considering that since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
United States Armed Forces have been involved in one major
conflict, but five major peace keeping and relief operations:
Bangladesh, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Hertsagovinia, and
Rwanda; the conditions that brought the United States into
Somalia in 1992 are not unique. Perhaps Somalia represents a
cultural and geographic extreme, but it is certainly not an
aberration. In December 1994, the Washington Post published
excerpts from the final draft of a classified U.S. national
intelligence estimate which stated that 40 million people are
estimated to be at risk of malnutrition and death in potential
crises in 1995; 30 million alone in Africa.144 The report
forecast that
In the next 12 to 18 months, ethnic conflict, civil war, and
natural disasters will place a greater demand on humanitarian
support in Africa than at any time since the 1960s."145
In Africa, five nations - Zaire, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
and Somalia are in danger of complete collapse. Five more are
listed as trouble spots where tension could erupt into
violence and interrupt tenuous lines of international relief.
In Burundi, for example, ethnic tensions are close to those
that precipitated the crisis in Rwanda, where a genocidal
massacre killed hundreds of thousands in 1994.146 Many
potential Somalias lie on the horizon.
For the time being, the Somali experience has soured the
American public and congressional leadership on peace
operations and as Ms. Albright's comments indicate, the
Clinton administration also prefers to distance itself from
the more aggressive peacekeeping agenda of Boutros-Ghali.
However, in March 1995, the Department of Defense released the
current edition of the National Military Strategy which
outlines a more active strategy of flexible and selective
engagement increasing the involvement of U.S. troops in
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.147 Americans are
not noted for long term political memories. The nation is
currently involved in a protracted nation building exercise in
Haiti. The successes and failures of that venture and the
American reaction to the images of human suffering in the
nightly news may very well move the nation to action once
more.
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
Framing the results of American involvement in the goals
of the UNOSOM II mission, the intervention in Somalia was a
strategic failure. There is still no popularly backed central
government and the clans, warlords, bandits, and arms remain.
If the large scale fighting were to again break out, Somalia
could quickly find itself as it was in November 1992.
However, the strategic failure must be couched in terms of
some remarkable successes: there are hundreds of thousands of
Somalis alive today that would have died if it were not for
Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope; the nation has
produced two back-to-back bumper crops and is currently an
exporter of bananas;148 Somali refugees, for the most part,
have returned home; and the civil war is extinguished, even if
the struggle for power remains. At the operational level
there were many successes, both military and political. Some
of these operational lessens were incorporated into U.S.
operations in Haiti. All remain valuable to a military and
political apparatus which faces a host of potential Somalias.
Nation building, if it is possible at all, is a
monumental task, taking a huge toll in manpower, money, and
time. Standing on the Flag Bridge of the USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)
during the opening days of Restore Hope, Captain John
Peterson, then serving as the Commander of Amphibious Squadron
Three, was asked by NBC news anchor Tom Browcaw just how long
he thought it would take to rebuild Somalia. Captain Peterson
replied, "At least 10 years."149 Historically, peace
processes have been long and difficult requiring decades to
run their course. The Israeli-Jordan peace accord signed in
1994 came after decades of negotiations and fighting. Lebanon
has been in civil war or near civil war conditions for over 15
years. The antagonists in Northern Ireland are just now
sitting down to negotiations after 40 plus years of blood-
shed. An externally sponsored overnight solution to the
problems in Somalia should not have been expected.
UNITAF, with its much more limited goals, was remarkably
successful and demonstrates what can be done in peacekeeping
if the right tools are applied correctly. If the United
States is unwilling or unable to pay the costs of nation
building, let this success be a model for what can be done in
the arena of peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
There is a lack of understanding about the full
ramifications of a U.N. Chapter VII operation in the United
States and abroad. Chapter VII operations don't guarantee,
but certainly imply the use of military force to achieve a
desired end state. Military operations may mean casualties,
heavier casualties than a government might be willing to
tolerate. Chapter VII operations cannot be viewed with a
Chapter VI mind set. The Government must recognize the
potentials of Chapter VII operations prior to committing
itself and decide upon the level of support to provide at that
time, rather than bailing out of an operation in midstream and
leaving the blame for failure with the United Nations.
The United Nations fell short in its first efforts at
peacemaking under Chapter VII of the charter. Burdened with a
slow and wasteful United Nations bureaucracy UNOSOM II was not
sourced, staffed, or prepared to take on the mission.
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali spoke of the "quantitative
changes" that differentiate a 1995 conflict from the 1950s
type conflict that Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter was
designed to deal with - wars in the new world order are fought
within states rather than between states, placing higher
demands on the United Nations.150 That being the case the
United Nations should either: limit their reach to a more
reasonable goal; evolve into an organization that can
prosecute Chapter VII operations; or consider handing peace
enforcement operations to a less multilateral effort such as
UNITAF - an effort that has the unity of command and purpose
to be successful.
Perhaps our intervention in Somalia has done nothing more
than Ambassador Hemstone suggested, to postpone the inevitable
deaths of several hundred thousand Somalis. Ambassador Oakley
offered a more positive spin. He likened Somali to a
perennial which didn't need to be uprooted and replanted. "We
just needed to dust off the snow and ash and let it grow on
its own."151 This is perhaps the most important lesson for the
United States. Its right there on page 26 of the President's
National Security Strategy, "In Somalia and elsewhere, the
responsibility for the fate of a nation rests finally with its
own people."152
APPENDIX A: Missions and Tasks of the UNITAF
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)
Mission
The CMOC was the key coordinating point for Humanitarian
Relief Organizations in their dealings with UNITAF.
Functions
1. Validation of requests for military support. This
included requests within the Mogadishu area, long haul convoy,
security escorts to the interior, and requests for support at
specific sites within the UNITAF area of operations. Military
support to HROs within a Humanitarian Relief Sector was
usually the responsibility of the local military commander.
2. Coordination of request for military support within the
various military components of UNITAF.
3. Convening and hosting ad hoc mission planning groups as an
arm of the UNITAF J-3, for requests involving complicated
military support and/or numerous military units and HROs.
4. Promulgating and explaining UNITAF policies to the
humanitarian community.
5. Providing information on UNITAF operations and the general
security situation via daily security briefings.
6. Administering and issuing HRO identification cards.
7. Validating HRO personnel request for space available seats
on UNITAF aircraft.
8. Acting as an interface, facilitator, and coordinating
agency between UNITAF elements, HROs, and UNOSOM headquarters
staff.
9. Chairing Mogadishu Port Shipping Committee which delt with
port space, port access, and related issues important to HROs.
10. Acting as the agency that retrieved and returned weapons
confiscated from HROs.
11. Responding to emergency requests for assistance from HROs
in the Mogadishu area either by responding directly with CMOC
assets or by requesting assistance via the UNITAF Joint
Operations Center.
12. Maintaining and operating a 24-hour watch in the CMOC.
13. Maintaining contact with regional CMOCs.
14. Supporting, as required, a six-person Civil Affairs Team.
15. Facilitating the creation of a Food Logistics System for
Somalia which factored in food stocks, delivery dates,
warehousing capabilities, transport availability, and road
repair efforts to create a basic matrix for food relief
efforts within the UNITAF area of operations.
Source: Kenneth Allard, Colonel US Army, Somalia Operations:
Lessons Learned, Fort McNair, Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, January 1995.
NOTES
1 Smith Hempstone, "Think Three Times Before You Embrace the
Somali Tarbaby," U.S. News and World Report, 14 December 1992,
30.
2 Hempstone, 30.
3 Tom J. Farer, War Clouds On the Horn of Africa: The
Widening Storm (New York: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1979) 69.
4 Somalia: A Country Study, 4th ed., by Helen Chapin Metz
and others, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, DA
Pam. No. 550-86 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), xv.
5 Margaret Castagno, Historical Dictionary of Somalia,
(Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 1975), 92.
6 Mark Fineman, "Next Step in the Mind of Aidid," Los
Angeles Times, 12 October 1993, Sec Al.
7 Somalia: A Country Study, 138.
8 Information concerning Somalia's Infrastructure was
obtained from Somaolia: A Country Study, xvi-xvii; Institute
for National Strategic Studies, Lessons Learned Somalia: A
First Look, Study (Final Draft), November 1994, 6,7.
9 Farer, 71.
10 Somalia: A Country Study, 5.
11 See I. M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1965), 206.
12 Somalia: A Country Study, 71.
13 For more on her, diya-paying groups, and Somali social
customs see Lewis, 7-12.
14 Lewis, 11.
15 Lewis, 15.
16 Hempstone, .30.
17 I. M. Lewis, 113.
18 Lewis, 113.
19 Somalia: A Country Study, 20.
20 Somalia: A Country Study, 18.
21 Farer, 93 - 101.
22 Somalia: A Country Study, 36.
23 Center for Naval Analyses, The Soviet Involvement in the
Ogaden War (Alexandria, VA: Defensw Technical Information
Center, Professional Paper 269, February 1980),
AD A082219, 1.
24 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security
Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-1991, (Pittsburg:
University of Pittsburg Press, 1991), 282.
25 Lefebrve, 55.
26 Lefebrve, 16.
27 Lefebrve, 19.
28 Center for Naval Analyses, 6.
29 Somalia: A Country Study, 189.
30 Lefebrve, 235.
31 Somalia: A Country Study, 191.
32 Somalia: A Country Study, 195.
33 Lefebrve, 257.
34 Lefebrve, 256.
35 Mohammed Siad Barre fled Mogadishu for southern Somalia.
After a short stay there, he left for Nairobi, Kenya where he
stayed for two weeks. Siad Barre finally settled in Lagos,
Nigeria. He had diabetes and was suffering from the
complications brought on by a heart attack when he died 2
January 1995.
36 Carla Anne Robbins, "Waiting for America," U.S. News and
World Report, 7 December 1992, 26; Kenneth Allard, Colonel US
Army, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Fort McNair,
Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, January
1995), 13.
37 Robbins, 26.
38 Allard, 14.
39 Allard, 14-15.
40 Robert Oakley, Ambassador (Retired), interviewed by
author, 14 March 1995.
41 Somalia: A Country Study, xxxii.
42 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995.
43 Allard, 16.
44 See Robert B. Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," Joint
Force Quarterly, no. 2, (Autumn 1993): 46-47.
45 Oakley, 47.
46 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995.
47 See Oakley, 47-50 and Joseph P. Hoar, General, USMC, "A
CINC's Perspective," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 2 (Autumn
1993): 59.
48 Hoar, 60.
49 Allard, 50.
50 Oakley, 48.
51 Allard, 70.
52 Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-00485 (01220),
"Employment of Coalition Forces Support Team During Operation
Restore Hope."
53 Hoar, 62.
54 Joseph P. Hoar, 58.
55 Allard, 18.
56 Allard, 19.
57 Charles P. Ferry, CPT USA, "Mogadishu, October 1993: A
Company XO's Notes and Lessons Learned," Infantry, Vol. 84
No. 6 (November-December 1994): 32.
58 ADM Johnathan Howe, Special Representative to the
Secratary General, telephone interview by the author, 3 March
1995.
59 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995.
60 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995.
61 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995.
62 Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in
Somalia," Parameters, No. X, (Winter 1993-1994): 51.
63 Allard, 57.
64 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995.
65 Gary W. Anderson, Colonel USMC, interview by the author,
15 March 1995.
66 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995.
67 Clarke, 52.
68 See T. Frank Grigler, "The Peace-Enforcement Dilemma,"
Joint Force Quarterly, no. 2, (Autumn 1993): 68.
69 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995.
70 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995.
71 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995.
72 Anderson interview, 15 March 1995.
73 Allard, 56.
74 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995.
75 Fineman, Sec. Al.
76 Ed Timms, "U.S. Assesses Lessons Amid Somalia Pullout:
Mission Posed Conflict Between Altruism and Politics," Dallas
Morning News, 22 March 1994, Sec. A 1.
77 Timms, Sec Al.
78 Julia Preston, "Waste in Somalia Typifies Failings of U.N.
Management," The Washington Post, 5 January 1995, A23.
79 John M. Harris and Bradley Graham, "Marines Will Assist
U.N. Exit From Somalia," Washington Post, 17 December 1994,
Sec. A 24.
80 "U.S. Sends Force to Protect U.N. Somalia Evacuation," The
Washington Post, 11 January 1995, A13.
81 Harris and Graham, Sec. A24.
82 "Somalis Assure U.S. on U.N. Pullout," The Washington
Post, 27 January 1995, A19.
83 Rick Atkinson, "Lean Not-So-Mean Marines Set fro Somalia,"
The Washington Post, 25 February 1995, A22.
84 Crigler, 67.
85 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995.
86 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995.
87 Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995 and Oakley
interview, 14 March 1995.
88 Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995.
89 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995.
90 Fineman, Al.
91 Fineman, Sec. Al.
92 Oakley, 53.
93 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995.
94 Fineman, Al.
95 Oakley, 53.
96 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995.
97 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995.
98 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995.
99 Fineman, Al.
100 Waldo D. Freeman, Major General US Army, "Operation
Restore Hope-A US CENTCOM Perspective," Military Review, no.
X, September 1993, 66.
101 Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in
Somalia," Parameters, no. X, Winter 1993-1994, 44.
102 ADM Howe, telephone interview, 3 March 1995.
103 Hoar, 63.
104 Allard, 31.
105 Hoar, 61.
106 See Allard, 22-26.
107 Oakley, 53.
108 See Allard, 22-26, and 55-56.
109 F. M. Lorenz, Colonel, USMC, "Confronting Thievery in
Somalia," Military Review, no. 8 (August 1994): 48.
110 Allard, 36-37.
111 Lorenz, 48.
112 Lorenz, 49.
113 Lorenz, 51.
114 Lorenz, 52.
115 "Problems of Legal Authority During Operation Restore
Hope," Marine Corps Lesson Learned Number 50753-12069 (01233).
116 "Problems of Legal Authority During Operation Restore
Hope," Marine Corps Lesson Learned Number 50753-12069 (01233).
117 Allard, 37.
118 See Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-00485
(01220), Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-01441
(00050), and Allard, 68.
119 See Hoar, 61; and Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number
50753-00485 (01220)
120 Hoar, 59.
121 "SPMAGTF CENT (SOC) S-2's Perspective on Imagery During
Restore Hope, Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-05599
(01228).
122 "SPMAGTF CENT (SOC) S-2's Perspective on Imagery During
Restore Hope, Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-05599
(01228).
123 See "Counterintelligence Operations in Operation Restore
Hope," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-09471
(00058); and Allard, 74.
124 "Lack of Cultural Understanding," Marine Corps Lessons
Learned Number 72356-73693 (01155).
125 "Counterintelligence Operations in Operation Restore
Hope," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-09471
(00058)
126 "Continuing Need for Linguist During Operation Restore
Hope." Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-09224
(00057)
127 "Continuing Need for Translators During Operation Restore
Hope," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-13667
(00066)
128 "Continuing Need for Linguist During Operation Restore
Hope." Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-09224
(00057)
129 Allard, 75.
130 "MARFOR Perspective on JTF Intelligence Dissemination
During Restore Hope," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number
50573-08812 (01231)
131 Allard, 45.
132 Allard, 42.
133 "The 'Benign' Port and Airfield Requirement for MPF in
Somalia," Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-23203
(01254).
134 "Maritime Prepositioning Force Liabilities," Marine Corps
Lessons Learned Number 21256-60264 (01180).
135 "JTF use of MPF Equipment During Opeartion Restore Hope,"
Marine Corps Lessons Learned Number 50753-24268 (00082).
136 Allard, 47.
137 Hoar, 61.
138 Allard, 95.
139 Keith Oliver, Major USMC, "Burying the Military-Media
Hatchet," Proceedings (February 1993): 13.
140 Information concerning events aboard the USS Tripoli based
on the author's recollections while serving as Air Operations
Officer of the Tripoli during Operation Restore Hope.
141 John F. Harris, "Lake's Trip to Africa to Focus on Famine,
Debt Relief Programs, "The Washington Post, 14 December 1994,
Sec. A32.
142 Preston, Sec. A23.
143 Edward Mortimer, "The U.N.-Sadder if not Wiser," London
Financial Times, 8 March 1995, 14.
144 R. Jeffery Smith, "Demand for Humanitarian Aid May
Skyrocket," Washington Post, 17 December 1994, Sec A22.
145 Smith, Sec A22.
146 Smith, Sec A22.
147 Bradely Graham, "Responsibilities of U.S. Military
Expanded," The Washington Post, 9 March 1995, A36.
148 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995.
149 John Peterson, Captain USN, Commander Amphibious Squadron
Three, interview by the author, 3 March 1995.
150 Mortimer, 14.
151 Oakley interview, 14 March 1995.
152 The White House, "A National Security Strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement," July 1994.
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